Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, Theodor Braun (Translator), 3.82

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Zu solch wilder Wut artete der Parteikamps aus, und das
machte damals um so tieferen Eindruck, weil es hier eigentlich
zum erstenmal vorkam. Später ging es dann freilich in ganz
Griechenland sozusagen drunter und drüber, da es überall
Parteikämpfe gab, in denen die Führer der Volkspartei die
Athener, die Oligarchen aber die Lakedämonier zu Hilfe riefen.
Im Frieden hätte man dazu wahrscheinlich weder Veranlassung
noch Neigung gehabt, jetzt aber, wo sie miteinander im Kriege
lagen, bot sich in solchen Kämpfen beiden Parteien die beste
Gelegenheit, sich auf diese Weise zur Unterdrückung der Gegen
partei und zur Befestigung der eigenen Macht fremde Hilfe
zu verschaffen. Es waren schwere Leiden, welche damit über
die Städte hereinbrachen, Leiden, wie sie freilich in solchen
Parteikämpfen je nach Umständen mehr oder weniger zu allen
Zeiten vorgekommen sind und vorkommen werden, solange die
menschliche Natur dieselbe bleibt. In Frieden und guten Tagen,
wo die bittere Not noch nicht an sie herantritt, sind die
Staaten wie die Menschen so böse nicht; wenn aber der Krieg
sie in die harte Schule nimmt und ihnen ungewohnte Ent
behrungen auferlegt, entfesselt er damit auch die Leidenschaften
der Menge. Dieser beständige Parteikampf in den Städten,
und was man von den Dingen hörte, die dabei früher schon
vorgekommen, trug nicht wenig dazu bei, die Sinnesart der
Menschen völlig umzuwandeln und dem Gegner gegenüber jede
Art von Hinterlist und maßloser Rache für erlaubt zu halten.
Selbst die gewöhnliche Bedeutung der Wörter änderte man
nach Belieben. Unverschämtheit hieß Freiheit und Brüderlich
keit, vernünftige Überlegung bloße Feigheit, der besonnene
Mann war ein Hasensuß, der Bedächtige eine Schlafmütze,
tolles Zufahren männlich, ruhiges Nachdenken nur ein Vor-
wand, sich zu drücken. Wer auf alles schimpfte, war gesinnungs
tüchtig, und wer ihm widersprach, verdächtig. Wem ein hinter
listiger Streich gegen einen anderen geglückt war, galt für
klug, für noch klüger aber der andere, der sich nicht hatte
hinters Licht führen lassen, und wer sich auf dergleichen über
haupt nicht einließ, war ein Duckmäuser und eine Bange
büchse. Wer einem ihm zugedachten Streich zuvorkam oder
jemand dazu anstiftete, einem anderen einen solchen Streich zu
spielen, der wurde gerühmt. Die Partei war ein festeres
Band als selbst die Verwandtschaft, weil bei ihr auf unbedingte
Bereitwilligkeit zu jedem Wagnis zu zählen war. Solchen
Verbindungen war es nicht um Förderung erlaubter Zwecke,
sondern um gesetzwidrige Erweiterung ihrer Macht und ihres
Einflusses zu tun; man verband sich nicht, um die göttlichen
Gesetze zu halten, sondern um sie zu brechen. Versöhnliche
Anerbietungen der Gegner nahm man an, wenn sie die Ober
hand hatten, aber nicht auf Treu und Glauben, sondern nur
gegen handfeste Sicherheit. Sich zu rächen, galt für ehren-
voller, als sich nichts gefallen zu lassen. Eide, die man einander
bei einer Aussöhnung etwa geleistet hatte, betrachtete man nur
als einstweiligen Notbehelf und hielt sich dadurch nicht länger
für gebunden, bis man anderweit wieder zu Kräften gekommen
war. Wer sich dann zufällig zuerst wieder MannS genug
fühlte, rächte sich an dem Gegner weit lieber in einem un
bewachten Augenblick, wo er sich sicher fühlte, als in offenem
Kampfe; denn dabei konnte er nicht nur gewisser auf Erfolg
rechnen, sondern auch auf den Ruhm, den Gegner durch
Schlauheit überlistet zu haben. Die meisten Menschen wollen
aber lieber, daß man sie für gescheite Bösewichter als für
ehrliche Dummköpfe hält; denn hierüber schämen sie sich, darauf
aber tun sie sich was zugute. Schuld an alledem war das
Umsichgreifen der Mächtigen und die Leidenschaft, womit sie
den Kampf um die Herrschaft führten. Denn während die
Häupter beider Parteien in den Städten die schönen Namen
Gleichberechtigung aller oder gemäßigte Aristokratie im Munde
führten und für das Wohl der Stadt zu kämpfen behaupteten,
stritten sie in der Tat nur miteinander um die Herrschaft,
schreckten dabei vor keinem Mittel zurück und übten ohne Rück
sicht auf Recht und Gemeinwohl in fanatischer Parteiwut
maßlose Rache an den Gegnern, die sie unbedenklich durch un
gerechte Abstimmung verurteilen ließen oder mit Gewalt zu
Boden schlugen. Gottesfurcht war ein leerer Wahn und jede
unter hochtönenden Phrasen verübte Untat ein neuer Ruhmes
titel. Diejenigen Bürger aber, die es mit keiner Partei
hielten, wurden von beiden mißhandelt, teils weil sie nicht
mitmachten, teils weil man ihnen nicht gönnte, daß sie un
geschoren blieben.

History of the Peloponnesian War. Thucydides. Theodor Braun (Translator). Leipzig. 1917.

Current edition First1KGreek

Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs (German) (Thucydides. Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs. Braun, Theodor, translator. Leipzig: Insel-Verlag, 1917.)

Editions (1)

Ἱστορίαι Perseus (Thucydides. Historiae, Vol 1-2. Jones, Henry Stuart, editor. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1910. (1942 printing).) — 3.82.1 focus

[1] οὕτως ὠμὴ 〈ἡ〉 στάσις προυχώρησε, καὶ ἔδοξε μᾶλλον, διότι ἐν τοῖς πρώτη ἐγένετο, ἐπεὶ ὕστερόν γε καὶ πᾶν ὡς εἰπεῖν τὸ Ἑλληνικὸν ἐκινήθη, διαφορῶν οὐσῶν ἑκασταχοῦ τοῖς τε τῶν δήμων προστάταις τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἐπάγεσθαι καὶ τοῖς ὀλίγοις τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους. καὶ ἐν μὲν εἰρήνῃ οὐκ ἂν ἐχόντων πρόφασιν οὐδ’ ἑτοίμων παρακαλεῖν αὐτούς, πολεμουμένων δὲ καὶ ξυμμαχίας ἅμα ἑκατέροις τῇ τῶν ἐναντίων κακώσει καὶ σφίσιν αὐτοῖς ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ προσποιήσει ῥᾳδίως αἱ ἐπαγωγαὶ τοῖς νεωτερίζειν τι βουλομένοις ἐπορίζοντο.

[2] καὶ ἐπέπεσε πολλὰ καὶ χαλεπὰ κατὰ στάσιν ταῖς πόλεσι, γιγνόμενα μὲν καὶ αἰεὶ ἐσόμενα, ἕως ἂν ἡ αὐτὴ φύσις ἀνθρώπων ᾖ, μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ ἡσυχαίτερα καὶ τοῖς εἴδεσι διηλλαγμένα, ὡς ἂν ἕκασται αἱ μεταβολαὶ τῶν ξυντυχιῶν ἐφιστῶνται. ἐν μὲν γὰρ εἰρήνῃ καὶ ἀγαθοῖς πράγμασιν αἵ τε πόλεις καὶ οἱ ἰδιῶται ἀμείνους τὰς γνώμας ἔχουσι διὰ τὸ μὴ ἐς ἀκουσίους ἀνάγκας πίπτειν· ὁ δὲ πόλεμος ὑφελὼν τὴν εὐπορίαν τοῦ καθ’ ἡμέραν βίαιος διδάσκαλος καὶ πρὸς τὰ παρόντα τὰς ὀργὰς τῶν πολλῶν ὁμοιοῖ.

[3] ἐστασίαζέ τε οὖν τὰ τῶν πόλεων, καὶ τὰ ἐφυστερίζοντά που πύστει τῶν προγενομένων πολὺ ἐπέφερε τὴν ὑπερβολὴν τοῦ καινοῦσθαι τὰς διανοίας τῶν τ’ ἐπιχειρήσεων περιτεχνήσει καὶ τῶν τιμωριῶν ἀτοπίᾳ.

[4] καὶ τὴν εἰωθυῖαν ἀξίωσιν τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐς τὰ ἔργα ἀντήλλαξαν τῇ δικαιώσει. τόλμα μὲν γὰρ ἀλόγιστος ἀνδρεία φιλέταιρος ἐνομίσθη, μέλλησις δὲ προμηθὴς δειλία εὐπρεπής, τὸ δὲ σῶφρον τοῦ ἀνάνδρου πρόσχημα, καὶ τὸ πρὸς ἅπαν ξυνετὸν ἐπὶ πᾶν ἀργόν· τὸ δ’ ἐμπλήκτως ὀξὺ ἀνδρὸς μοίρᾳ προσετέθη, ἀσφαλείᾳ δὲ τὸ ἐπιβουλεύσασθαι ἀποτροπῆς πρόφασις εὔλογος.

[5] καὶ ὁ μὲν χαλεπαίνων πιστὸς αἰεί, ὁ δ’ ἀντιλέγων αὐτῷ ὕποπτος. ἐπιβουλεύσας δέ τις τυχὼν ξυνετὸς καὶ ὑπονοήσας ἔτι δεινότερος· προβουλεύσας δὲ ὅπως μηδὲν αὐτῶν δεήσει, τῆς τε ἑταιρίας διαλυτὴς καὶ τοὺς ἐναντίους ἐκπεπληγμένος. ἁπλῶς δὲ ὁ φθάσας τὸν μέλλοντα κακόν τι δρᾶν ἐπῃνεῖτο, καὶ ὁ ἐπικελεύσας τὸν μὴ διανοούμενον.

[6] καὶ μὴν καὶ τὸ ξυγγενὲς τοῦ ἑταιρικοῦ ἀλλοτριώτερον ἐγένετο διὰ τὸ ἑτοιμότερον εἶναι ἀπροφασίστως τολμᾶν· οὐ γὰρ μετὰ τῶν κειμένων νόμων ὠφελίας αἱ τοιαῦται ξύνοδοι, ἀλλὰ παρὰ τοὺς καθεστῶτας πλεονεξίᾳ. καὶ τὰς ἐς σφᾶς αὐτοὺς πίστεις οὐ τῷ θείῳ νόμῳ μᾶλλον ἐκρατύνοντο ἢ τῷ κοινῇ τι παρανομῆσαι.

[7] τά τε ἀπὸ τῶν ἐναντίων καλῶς λεγόμενα ἐνεδέχοντο ἔργων φυλακῇ, εἰ προύχοιεν, καὶ οὐ γενναιότητι. ἀντιτιμωρήσασθαί τέ τινα περὶ πλείονος ἦν ἢ αὐτὸν μὴ προπαθεῖν. καὶ ὅρκοι εἴ που ἄρα γένοιντο ξυναλλαγῆς, ἐν τῷ αὐτίκα πρὸς τὸ ἄπορον ἑκατέρῳ διδόμενοι ἴσχυον οὐκ ἐχόντων ἄλλοθεν δύναμιν· ἐν δὲ τῷ παρατυχόντι ὁ φθάσας θαρσῆσαι, εἰ ἴδοι ἄφαρκτον, ἥδιον διὰ τὴν πίστιν ἐτιμωρεῖτο ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ προφανοῦς, καὶ τό τε ἀσφαλὲς ἐλογίζετο καὶ ὅτι ἀπάτῃ περιγενόμενος ξυνέσεως ἀγώνισμα προσελάμβανεν. ῥᾷον δ’ οἱ πολλοὶ κακοῦργοι ὄντες δεξιοὶ κέκληνται ἢ ἀμαθεῖς ἀγαθοί, καὶ τῷ μὲν αἰσχύνονται, ἐπὶ δὲ τῷ ἀγάλλονται.

[8] πάντων δ’ αὐτῶν αἴτιον ἀρχὴ ἡ διὰ πλεονεξίαν καὶ φιλοτιμίαν· ἐκ δ’ αὐτῶν καὶ ἐς τὸ φιλονικεῖν καθισταμένων τὸ πρόθυμον. οἱ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι προστάντες μετὰ ὀνόματος ἑκάτεροι εὐπρεποῦς, πλήθους τε ἰσονομίας πολιτικῆς καὶ ἀριστοκρατίας σώφρονος προτιμήσει, τὰ μὲν κοινὰ λόγῳ θεραπεύοντες ἆθλα ἐποιοῦντο, παντὶ δὲ τρόπῳ ἀγωνιζόμενοι ἀλλήλων περιγίγνεσθαι ἐτόλμησάν τε τὰ δεινότατα ἐπεξῇσάν τε τὰς τιμωρίας ἔτι μείζους, οὐ μέχρι τοῦ δικαίου καὶ τῇ πόλει ξυμφόρου προτιθέντες, ἐς δὲ τὸ ἑκατέροις που αἰεὶ ἡδονὴν ἔχον ὁρίζοντες, καὶ ἢ μετὰ ψήφου ἀδίκου καταγνώσεως ἢ χειρὶ κτώμενοι τὸ κρατεῖν ἑτοῖμοι ἦσαν τὴν αὐτίκα φιλονικίαν ἐκπιμπλάναι. ὥστε εὐσεβείᾳ μὲν οὐδέτεροι ἐνόμιζον, εὐπρεπείᾳ δὲ λόγου οἷς ξυμβαίη ἐπιφθόνως τι διαπράξασθαι, ἄμεινον ἤκουον. τὰ δὲ μέσα τῶν πολιτῶν ὑπ’ ἀμφοτέρων ἢ ὅτι οὐ ξυνηγωνίζοντο ἢ φθόνῳ τοῦ περιεῖναι διεφθείροντο.

Translations (10)

The History of the Grecian War Perseus (Thucydides. The English works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury. Hobbes, Thomas. translator. London: John Bohn, 1843.) — 3.82.1 focus

[1] For afterwards all Greece, as a man may say, was in commotion; and quarrels arose everywhere between the patrons of the commons, that sought to bring in the Athenians, and the few, that desired to bring in the Lacedaemonians. Now in time of peace they could have had no pretence nor would have been so forward to call them in; but being war and confederates to be had for either party, both to hurt their enemies and strengthen themselves, such as desired alteration easily got them to come in.

[2] And many and heinous things happened in the cities through this sedition, which though they have been before and shall be ever as long as human nature is the same, yet they are more calm and of different kinds according to the several conjunctures. For in peace and prosperity as well cities as private men are better minded because they be not plunged into necessity of doing anything against their will. But war, taking away the affluence of daily necessaries, is a most violent master and conformeth most men's passions to the present occasion. The cities therefore being now in sedition and those that fell into it later having heard what had been done in the former, they far exceeded the same in newness of conceit, both for the art of assailing and for the strangeness of their revenges.

[3] The received value of names imposed for signification of things was changed into arbitrary. For inconsiderate boldness was counted true-hearted manliness; provident deliberation, a handsome fear; modesty, the cloak of cowardice; to be wise in everything, to be lazy in everything.

[4] A furious suddenness was reputed a point of valour. To re-advise for the better security was held for a fair pretext of tergiversation. He that was fierce was always trusty, and he that contraried such a one was suspected. He that did insidiate, if it took, was a wise man; but he that could smell out a trap laid, a more dangerous man than he.

[5] But he that had been so provident as not to need to do the one or the other was said to be a dissolver of society and one that stood in fear of his adversary. In brief, he that could outstrip another in the doing of an evil act or that could persuade another thereto that never meant it was commended. To be kin to another was not to be so near as to be of his society because these were ready to undertake anything and not to dispute it.

[6] For these societies were not made upon prescribed laws of profit but for rapine, contrary to the laws established. And as for mutual trust amongst them, it was confirmed not so much by divine law as by the communication of guilt. And what was well advised of their adversaries, they received with an eye to their actions to see whether they were too strong for them or not, and not ingenuously.

[7] To be revenged was in more request than never to have received injury. And for oaths (when any were) of reconcilement, being administered in the present for necessity, were of force to such as had otherwise no power; but upon opportunity, he that first durst thought his revenge sweeter by the trust than if he had taken the open way. For they did not only put to account the safeness of that course but, having circumvented their adversary by fraud, assumed to themselves withal a mastery in point of wit. And dishonest men for the most part are sooner called able than simple men honest, and men are ashamed of this title but take a pride in the other. The cause of all this is desire of rule out of avarice and ambition, and the zeal of contention from those two proceeding.

[8] For such as were of authority in the cities, both of the one and the other faction, preferring under decent titles, one, the polit- ical equality of the multitude, the other, the moderate aristoc- racy, though in words they seemed to be servants of the public, they made it in effect but the prize of their contention; and striving by whatsoever means to overcome both ventured on most horrible outrages and prosecuted their revenges still fartheir without any regard of justice or the public good, but limiting them, each faction, by their own appetite, and stood ready, whether by unjust sentence or with their own hands, when they should get power, to satisfy their present spite. So that neither side made account to have anything the sooner done for religion [of an oath], but he was most commended that could pass a business against the hair with a fair oration. The neutrals of the city were destroyed by both factions, partly because they would not side with them and partly for envy that they should so escape.

History of the Peloponnesian War Perseus (Thucydides. History of the Peloponnesian War. Crawley, Richard, translator. London and Toronto: J. M. Dent and Sons Ltd.; New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., 1914.) — 3.82.1 focus

[1] So bloody was the march of the revolution, and the impression which it made was the greater as it was one of the first to occur. Later on, one may say, the whole Hellenic world was convulsed; struggles being everywhere made by the popular chiefs to bring in the Athenians, and by the oligarchs to introduce the Lacedaemonians. In peace there would have been neither the pretext nor the wish to make such an invitation; but in war, with an alliance always at the command of either faction for the hurt of their adversaries and their own corresponding advantage, opportunities for bringing in the foreigner were never wanting to the revolutionary parties.

[2] The sufferings which revolution entailed upon the cities were many and terrible, such as have occurred and always will occur, as long as the nature of mankind remains the same; though in a severer or milder form, and varying in their symptoms, according to the variety of the particular cases. In peace and prosperity states and individuals have better sentiments, because they do not find themselves suddenly confronted with imperious necessities; but war takes away the easy supply of daily wants, and so proves a rough master, that brings most men's characters to a level with their fortunes.

[3] Revolution thus ran its course from city to city, and the places which it arrived at last, from having heard what had been done before carried to a still greater excess the refinement of their inventions, as manifested in the cunning of their enterprises and the atrocity of their reprisals.

[4] Words had to change their ordinary meaning and to take that which was now given them. Reckless audacity came to be considered the courage of a loyal ally; prudent hesitation, specious cowardice; moderation was held to be a cloak for unmanliness; ability to see all sides of a question inaptness to act on any. Frantic violence, became the attribute of manliness; cautious plotting, a justifiable means of self-defence.

[5] The advocate of extreme measures was always trustworthy; his opponent a man to be suspected. To succeed in a plot was to have a shrewd head, to divine a plot a still shrewder; but to try to provide against having to do either was to break up your party and to be afraid of your adversaries. In fine, to forestall an intending criminal, or to suggest the idea of a crime where it was wanting, was equally commended,

[6] until even blood became a weaker tie than party, from the superior readiness of those united by the latter to dare everything without reserve; for such associations had not in view the blessings derivable from established institutions but were formed by ambition for their overthrow; and the confidence of their members in each other rested less on any religious sanction than upon complicity in crime.

[7] The fair proposals of an adversary were met with jealous precautions by the stronger of the two, and not with a generous confidence. Revenge also was held of more account than self-preservation. Oaths of reconciliation, being only proffered on either side to meet an immediate difficulty, only held good so long as no other weapon was at hand; but when opportunity offered, he who first ventured to seize it and to take his enemy off his guard, thought this perfidious vengeance sweeter than an open one, since, considerations of safety apart, success by treachery won him the palm of superior intelligence. Indeed it is generally the case that men are readier to call rogues clever than simpletons honest, and are as ashamed of being the second as they are proud of being the first.

[8] The cause of all these evils was the lust for power arising from greed and ambition; and from these passions proceeded the violence of parties once engaged in contention. The leaders in the cities, each provided with the fairest professions, on the one side with the cry of political equality of the people, on the other of a moderate aristocracy, sought prizes for themselves in those public interests which they pretended to cherish, and, recoiling from no means in their struggles for ascendancy, engaged in the direct excesses; in their acts of vengeance they went to even greater lengths, not stopping at what justice or the good of the state demanded, but making the party caprice of the moment their only standard, and invoking with equal readiness the condemnation of an unjust verdict or the authority of the strong arm to glut the animosities of the hour. Thus religion was in honor with neither party; but the use of fair phrases to arrive at guilty ends was in high reputation. Meanwhile the moderate part of the citizens perished between the two, either for not joining in the quarrel, or because envy would not suffer them to escape.

Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs First1KGreek (Thucydides. Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs. Wahrmund, Adolf, translator. Stuttgart: Krais and Hoffmann, 1864.) — 3.82 focus

Denn später wurde, so zu sagen, das ganze Hellenenthum ¹
in Ausregung versetzt, da überall Zerwürfniß herrschte und die
Häupter der Volkspartei die Athener herbeizuführen strebten, die
Vornehmen aber die Lakedämonier. Und wenn sie bei Fortdauer des
-Friedens auch weder Veranlassung noch Neigung gehabt haben würden,
jene herbeizurufen, so doch jetzt, wo beide in Krieg verwickelt waren.
Und weil jede der kriegführenden Parteien, wie zur Schwächung des
Gegners so zur eigenen Verstärkung Bundesgenossen wünschte, so war
es denen, welche in den Städten Neuerungen wünschten, leicht, die
Zusendung von Hülfstruppen zu erwirken. Und in diesem Ansruhr
trafen die einzelnen Städte viele schwere Ereignisse, wie sie noch
vorkommen und immer vorkommen werden, so lange die menschliche
Natur dieselbe ist, bald härter, bald gelinder, und verschieden an Art, je
nachdem die äußeren Zufälle wechseln. Denn im Frieden und unter
bequemen Verhältnissen pflegen die Staaten sowohl wie die Bürger
vernünftigere Gesinnung zu hegen, weil die gebieterische
Nothwendigkeit sie noch nicht angefallen hat; der Krieg aber, der die gewohnte
alltägliche Gemächlichkeit entzieht, ist ein gewaltsamer Lehrmeister und
stimmt die Leidenschaften der Menge nach der jeweiligen
Beschaffenbeit der Laae.

So herrschte also Zerwürfniß in den Städten, und wo solches
erst später eintrat, da brachte die Kunde von dem, was anderwärts
bereits früher geschehen war, ein höheres Maß der Verderbtheit der
Gesinnung zu Wege, wie sie sich in der Verschmitztheit persönlicher
Angriffe und in unerhörter Art der Rache zeigte. Ja sogar die
gewohnte Bedeutung der Worte, wie sie zur Würdigung der Thaten
dienen, änderte man nach Belieben. Tobsüchtige Verwegenheit galt
als treufreundliche Tapferkeit; in wohlüberlegter Bedächtigkeit sah
man Beschönigung der Feigheit, und besonnenes Maßhalten erschien
als Vorwand der Unmännlichkeit, und wer überall vernünftig handeln
wollte, galt überall als schlafsüchtig; für ein Stück Männlichkeit aber
hielt man es, wenn Einer aufbrauste wie ein Wahnsinniger. Wer
vorsichtig mit sich zu Rathe gehen wollte, schien nur einen anständigen
Vorwand zu suchen, sich ganz aus der Sache zu ziehen. Wer recht
schimpfen konnte, der galt überall als ein zuverlässiger Mann, wer
ihm aber widersprach, der wurde verdächtig. Hatte Einer den Andern
listig zu Fall gebracht, so galt er für klug, für noch tüchtiger aber -
der, reicher rechtzeitig Lunte gerochen hatte. Wer aber von vorn ²
herein seine Sache so gestellt Halle, deß er nichts dergleichen bedürfte, i
von dem hieß es, er störe die Freundschaft -und fürchte die Gegner.
Ueberhauvt wurde den: Beifall geschenkt, der den: Andern zuror^m,
wenn dieser ihn: einen Sn^eich svielen sollte, und der Andere eben
dazu aufstachelte, die keine seine Rase hauen. P^arteigenoisenschasi
nxir ein engeres Band, als Verrvandtshc^st, n?ei! jene bereite: war,
rücksichtslos mitzurvagen- denn nicht zum Schirm der Gesetze wurden
dergleichen Verbindungen eingegangen, sondern zum eigenen Vortheil
aus Kosten der bestehenden Einrichtungen, und an die Eide, die sie
unter einander geleistet, banden sie sich nich: sowohl an- Scheu ro:
den: göttlichen Gesetz, als vielmehr im Beivußtsein gemeinsamer
Verbrechen.

Von feindlicher Seite nahn: man versöhnliche Antrage an, n?enn
jene etnxi in: Vortheil waren und man thaisächlich gegen sie gedeckt
wurde, aber nicht ans Vertrauen und Großmuth. Hinterher Rache
zu nehmen galt mehr als sich vorher vor Leid geschützt zu haben.
Versöhnungseide , wenn sie et^ann vorkamen, galten nur für den
Augenblick, als von beiden Seiten nur im Zwange der Umstände gegeben,
und nur so lange, als kein Zuivach- an Mach: andersn-oher kommen
r?oll:e. Wem aber die Gunst des Augenblicks zuerst mieder größeres
Vertrauen auf seine Kraft gab, der nahm, wenn er den Gegner
ungedeckt sand, gerade seines Vertrauens wegen. mit viel größerer Lust an
ihm Rache, als im offenen Kampfe, und er bedcch:e dabei nicht minder
die größere Sicherheit des Gelingens, als das Lob der Klugheit, das
ihm als Sieger durch List zu Theil würde. Lassen sich doch die
meisten Menschen viel liebe? gewiegte Schelme nennen, als gutmüthig und
einfältig, denn dieses Lobes schämen sie sich, mit jenem aber thun
sie groß.

Von Allem dem aber lag die Schuld in dem habsüchtigen und
ehrgeizigen Regiment und in Folge deisen in dem leidenschaftlichen
Eifer der Männer, die sich in die Kämpfe der Ehrsucht eingelassen
hatten. Denn die Regierungshäupler in den einzelnen Städten, und
zwar von beiden Parteien, indem sie der Sache einen schönen Hainen
gaben, jenachdem sie und der bürgerlichen Gleichheit des ganzen
Volkes, oder einer maßvollen Staatslenkung der Vornehmen den Vorzug ³
schenkten, schienen nur die Hebung des Gemeinwohls zum Preise ihres
Wettkampfs zu machen, in der That aber rangen sie nur auf jede Weise
Einer des Andern Meister zu werden, indem sie dabei die äußersten
Mittel wagten nnd sich einander mit immer empfindlicheren Strafen
belegten, die sie nicht nach der Gerechtigkeit und dem Staatsvortheil
abmaßen, sondern nach dem schadenfrohen Belieben der Parteien
bestimmten, und so waren sie immer fertig, entweder durch ungerechte
Verurtheilung mittels Abstimmung, oder durch das Uebergewicht der
Fäuste sich den Sieg zu verschaffen und so für den Augenblick ihr
Müthchen zu kühlen. Auf Furcht der Götter sah Niemand mehr,
sondern wem es gelingen mochte, durch schönllingende Worte etwas
Unerhörtes durchzusetzen, der wuchs dadurch nur an gutem Rufe. Wer
aber von den Bürgern es mit keinem Theil hielt, der wurde von
beiden tödtlich verfolgt, entweder weil sie im Kampfe nicht zu ihnen
standen, oder aus Neid, daß sie allein glücklich davon kommen sollten.

Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponèse First1KGreek (Thucydides. Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponnése, Vol. 1-2. Zévort, Marie Charles, translator. Paris: Charpentier, 1852.) — 3.82 focus

LXXXII. En effet, la Grèce tout entière, pour ainsi dire, fut, dans la suite, ébranlée par les séditions : la division était partout ; les chefs du parti populaire appelaient les Athéniens, et la faction oligarchique les Lacédémoniens¹. En temps de paix on n’aurait eu aucun prétexte pour réclamer leur secours, et on n’était pas en mesure de le faire ; mais une fois en guerre, lorsque chacun des deux partis cherchait des alliances, en vue de nuire au parti contraire et d’augmenter en même temps sa propre puissance, ces appels devenaient faciles à ceux qui méditaient quelque révolution. De nombreuses calamités fondirent sur les villes en proie aux séditions. Au reste, ces mêmes calamités se renouvelleront toujours, tant que la nature humaine sera la même, mais plus ou moins terribles, et diffé- rentes par leurs caractères suivant la diversité des circonstances au milieu desquelles elles se produiront. En temps de paix et au sein de la prospérité, les États et les particuliers ont un meilleur esprit, parce qu’ils ne sont point jetés, contre leur gré, dans de dures nécessités ; mais la guerre, en supprimant les facilités journalières de la vie, enseigne la violence et assimile les passions de la multitude à l’âpreté des temps.

Les villes étaient donc en proie aux séditions : si quelqu’une était restée en arrière, lorsqu’on y apprenait ce qui s’était passé ailleurs, on s’ingéniait à dépasser de bien loin les excès des autres et à signaler son esprit d’invention par la perfide habileté des attaques et l’atrocité de supplices inouïs. On en vint à changer arbitrairement l’acception ordinaire des mots qui caractérisent les actions : l’audace insensée fut érigée en noble dévouement au parti ; la lenteur prévoyante passa pour lâcheté déguisée, la prudence pour un masque de la pusillanimité, la rectitude des vues en toutes choses pour incapacité absolue ; l’emportement aveugle devint l’apanage de l’homme de coeur ; réfléchir pour ne rien compromettre, c’était chercher un prétexte spécieux pour s’esquiver ; l’homme violent était toujours un homme sûr, son contradicteur un suspect ; savoir préparer une intrigue et la mener à bonne fin était capacité, l’éventer était plus habile encore ; prendre ses mesures pour n’avoir pas besoin de cette double habileté, c’était travailler à la dissolution de son parti et avoir peur de ses adversaires ; en un mot, devancer un autre dans l’accomplissement d’une mauvaise action, l’y pousser s’il n’y songeait pas, était chose digne d’éloges. La parenté était un lien moins intime que les relations de parti², parce que là on trouvait plus d’empressement à tout oser sans objection ; car on formait ces liaisons, non en vue d’un intérêt avoué par les lois établies, mais pour satisfaire sa cupidité en violation des lois. La confiance qu’on s’accordait mutuellement reposait bien moins sur le respect de la loi divine que sur une commune révolte contre la loi. Si on accueillait ce que disait de bon un adversaire, c’était pour se précautionner contre ses actes quand il avait le dessus, et non par générosité. On aimait mieux avoir à se venger que n’avoir pas été offensé le premier. Les serments de réconciliation, s’il s’en faisait parfois, prêtés de part et d’autre dans un instant critique, étaient respectés pour le moment, parce qu’on n’avait pas d’ailleurs les moyens de s’en affran- chir ; mais, à l’occasion, celui qui osait le premier, quand il voyait son adversaire sans défense, trouvait bien plus de plaisir à se venger par trahison qu’à force ouverte ; car il calculait qu’outre l’avantage de ne courir aucun risque, il s’assurait, en triomphant par la ruse, la palme de l’habileté, et en effet, il est plus facile, en général, de passer pour habile homme quand on est malhonnête, que pour honnête homme quand on est malhabile ; et tandis qu’on rougit de l’un, on se fait gloire de l’autre.

La cause de tous ces maux était la fureur de dominer, inspirée par l’ambition et la cupidité³. De là nais- sait, une fois les rivalités soulevées, l’esprit de trouble et d’audace. Les chefs de parti, dans les villes, mettaient en avant, de part et d’autre, des mots spécieux ; par exemple leurs préférences soit pour l’égalité politique du peuple, soit pour une aristocratie modérée ; ils n’avaient qu’un but, disaient-ils : servir l’intérêt public ; mais, en réalité, ils mettaient tout en oeuvre pour se supplanter mutuellement : ils se portaient aux derniers excès et se vengeaient avec usure, sans calculer, dans l’application des peines, ni la justice, ni l’intérêt de l’État, sans autre règle que le désir de complaire à leur parti. Lorsqu’ils s’étaient emparés du pouvoir, soit au moyen de condamnations injustes, soit à main armée, ils n’hésitaient jamais à assouvir leurs haines ; aussi n’y avait-il plus aucun respect des lois les plus sacrées, et on estimait surtout ceux qui savaient satisfaire leurs passions haineuses sous le voile de belles paroles. Quant aux citoyens modérés, ils étaient victimes des deux factions, soit parce qu’ils ne combattaient pas avec elles, soit parce qu’on enviait leur sécurité.

Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponnése First1KGreek (Thucydides. Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponnése. Bétant, Élie-Ami, translator. Paris: Librairie de L. Hachette, 1863.) — 3.82 focus

Plus tard la Grèce en totalité fut ébranlée. La division régnant partout, les chefs du parti populaire appelaient les Athéniens, l’aristocratie les Lacédémoniens. En temps de paix, on n’aurait eu ni le prétexte ni l’idée d’attirer ces auxiliaires ; mais, une fois la guerre allumée et les deux partis acharnés à s’entre-détruire, le recours à l’intervention étrangère devint plus facile aux agitateurs. Ces déchirements occasionnèrent aux Ëtats des calamités sans nombre, calamités qui sont et seront toujours le partage de la nature humaine, quoique, selon les conjonctures, elles puissent varier de violence ou de caractère. Durant la paix et la prospérité, les États et les individus ont un meilleur esprit, parce qu’ils ne sont pas sous le joug d’une nécessité impérieuse; mais la guerre, détruisant le bien-être journalier, est un maître brutal, qui règle les passions de la multitude sur les circonstances du moment.

Les villes étaient en proie aux dissensions. Si Tune d’elles était restée en arrière des autres, elle aspirait à renchérir sur leur exemple, à imaginer de nouveaux excès, à raffiner sur l’atrocité des vengeances. On en vint à changer arbitrairement l’acception des mots. L’audace irréfléchie passa pour un courage à toute épreuve ; la lenteur prudente pour une lâcheté déguisée ; la modération pour un prétexte de la timidité; une grande intelligence pour une grande inertie. L’emportement aveugle devint le trait distinct de l’homme de cœur ; la circonspection, un spécieux subterfuge. L’homme le plus irascible fut regardé comme le plus sûr; celui qui osait lui tenir tête fut déclaré suspect. C’était faire preuve de finesse que d’attirer ses ennemis dans le piège et surtout de l’éluder. Prenait-on ses mesures pour se passer de ces artifices, on était taxé de trahison ou de pusillanimité. Rien ne valait plus d’éloges que de prévenir une perfidie ou d’y exciter celui qui n’y songeait pas. Les liens dn sang étaient moins forts que l’esprit de parti, parce que celui-ci inspirait plus de dévouements à toute épreuve; en effet, de telles associations n’étaient pas formées sous l’égide des lois, mais plutôt contre elles et dans un but coupable; elles ne reposaient pas sur la crainte des dieux, mais sur la complicité du crime. Accueillait-on les ouvertures d’un adversaire, c’était par mesure de prudence et non par générosité. On attachait bien plus de prix à se venger d’une offense qu’à ne l’avoir pas reçue. Les serments de réconciliation qu’on prêtait quelquefois n’avaient qu’une force passagère, arrachés qu’ils étaient à l’embarras des partis; mais que l’occasion fût donnée, et le premier qui reprenait courage en voyant son rival sans défense l’attaquait plus volontiers en trahison qu’à visage découvert. Il y trouvait deux avantages : l’un de frapper à coup sûr, l’autre de se faire une réputation d’habileté en ne devant son triomphe qu’à l’astuce. Aux yeux du vulgaire, il est plus aisé aux fripons de passer pour adroits qu’aux simples pour honnêtes. On rougit de la maladresse ; on tire vanité de la méchanceté.

Tous ces maux eurent leur source dans la fureur de dominer, inspirée par la cupidité et par l’ambition ; puis, les rivalités éveillées, la passion s’en mêla. Les chefs du parti prenaient pour mot d’ordre, ceux-ci l’égalité des droits, ceux-là une aristocratie tempérée ; et, sous le masque du bien public, ils ne travaillaient qu’à se supplanter mutuellement. Ils donnaient un libre cours à leur audace et à leurs vengeances, sans nul souci de la justice ou de l’intérêt commun, sans autre règle que leur caprice. Une fois au pouvoir, ils s’empressaient, à l’aide de sentences iniques ou à force ouverte, de satisfaire leurs inimités actuelles. Ni les uns ni les autres ne respectaient la bonne foi ; mais ceux qui, au mépris des lois divines, réussissaient à commettre quelque noirceur, palliée d’un nom honnête , étaient les plus estimés. Les citoyens qui se tenaient à l’écart tombaient sous les coups des deux partis, soit parce qu’ils refusaient de prendre part à la lutte, soit parce qu’on était jaloux de leur tranquillité.

History of the Peloponnesian War First1KGreek (Thucydides, Vol. 1-4. Smith, Charles Foster, translator. London and Cambridge, MA: Heinemann and Harvard University Press, 1919-1923.) — 3.82.1 focus

[1] To such excesses of savagery did the revolution go; and it seemed the more savage, because it was among the first that occurred; for afterwards practically the whole Hellenic world was convulsed, since in each state the leaders of the democratic factions were at variance with the oligarchs, the former seeking to bring in the Athenians, the latter the Lacedaemonians. And while in time of peace they would have had no pretext for asking their intervention, nor any inclination to do so, yet now that these two states were at war, either faction in the various cities, if it desired a revolution, found it easy to bring in allies also, for the discomfiture at one stroke of its opponents and the strengthening of its own cause.

[2] And so there fell upon the cities on account of revolutions many grievous calamities, such as happen and always will happen while human nature is the same, but which are severer or milder, and different in their manifestations, according as the variations in circumstances present themselves in each case. For in peace and prosperity both states and individuals have gentler feelings, because men are not then forced to face conditions of dire necessity; but war, which robs men of the easy supply of their daily wants, is a rough schoolmaster and creates in most people a temper that matches their condition.
And so the cities began to be disturbed by revolutions, and those that fell into this state later, on hearing of what had been done before, carried to still more extravagant lengths the invention of new devices, both by the extreme ingenuity of their attacks and the monstrousness of their revenges.

[3] The ordinary acceptation of words in their relation to things was changed as men thought fit.

[4] Reckless audacity came to be regarded as courageous loyalty to party, prudent hesitation as specious cowardice, moderation as a cloak for unmanly weakness, and to be clever in everything was to do naught in anything. Frantic impulsiveness was accounted a true man's part, but caution in deliberation a specious pretext for shirking. The hot-headed man was always trusted, his opponent suspected. He who succeeded in a plot was clever, and he who had detected one was still shrewder;

[5] on the other hand, he who made it his aim to have no need of such things¹ was a disrupter of party and scared of his opponents. In a word, both he that got ahead of another who intended to do something evil and he that prompted to evil one who had never thought of of it were alike commended. Furthermore, the tie of blood was weaker than the tie of party, because the partisan was more ready to dare without demur;

[6] for such associations are not entered into for the public good in conformity with the prescribed laws, but for selfish aggrandisement contrary to the established laws. Their pledges to one another were confirmed not so much by divine law as by common transgression of the law. Fair words proffered by opponents, if these had the upper hand, were received with caution as to their actions and not in a generous spirit.² To get revenge on some one was more valued than never to have suffered injury oneself.

[7] And if in any case oaths of reconcilement were exchanged, for the moment only were they binding, since each side had given them merely to meet the emergency, having at the time no other resource; but he who, when the opportunity offered and he saw his enemy off his guard, was the first to pluck up courage, found his revenge sweeter because of the violated pledge than if he had openly attacked, and took into account not only the greater safety of such a course, but also that, by winning through deceit, he was gaining besides the prize of astuteness. And in general it is easier for rogues to get themselves called clever than for the stupid to be reputed good,³ and they are ashamed of the one but glory in the other.
The cause of all these evils was the desire to rule which greed and ambition inspire, and also, springing from them, that ardour⁴ which belongs to men who once have become engaged in factious rivalry.

[8] For those who emerged as party leaders in the several cities, by assuming on either side a fair-sounding name, the one using as its catch-word “political equality for the masses under the law,” the other “temperate aristocracy,”⁵ while they pretended to be devoted to the common weal, in reality made it their prize; striving in every way to get the better of each other they dared the most awful deeds, and sought revenges still more awful, not pursuing these within the bounds of justice and the public weal, but limiting them, both parties alike, only by the moment's caprice; and they were ready, either by passing an unjust sentence of condemnation or by winning the upper hand through acts of violence, to glut the animosity of the moment. The result was that though neither had any regard for true piety, yet those who could carry through an odious deed under the cloak of a specious phrase received the higher praise. And citizens who belonged to neither party were continually destroyed by both, either because they would not make common cause with them, or through mere jealousy that they should survive.

History of the Peloponnesian War First1KGreek (Thucydides. The history of the Peloponnesian War, Volume 1-2. Dale, Henry, translator. London: Heinemann and Henry G. Bohn, 1851-1852.) — 3.82.1 focus

[1] For afterwards, even the whole of Greece, so to say, was convulsed; struggles being every where made by the popular leaders to call in the Athenians, by the oligarchical party, the Lacedaemonians. ¹ Now they would have had no pretext for calling them in, nor have been prepared to do so, in time of peace. But when pressed by war, and when an alliance also was maintained by both parties for the injury of their opponents and for their own gain therefrom, occasions of inviting them were easily supplied to such as wished to effect any revolution.

[2] And many dreadful things befell the cities through this sedition, which occur, and will always do so, as long as human nature is the same, but ² in a more violent or milder form, and varying in their phenomena, as the several variations of circumstances may in each case present themselves. For in peace and prosperity both communities and individuals have better feelings, through not falling into ³ urgent needs; whereas war, by taking away the free supply of daily wants is a violent master, and assimilates most men's tempers to their present condition, The states ten were thus torn by sedition, and the later instances of it in any part, from having heard what had been done before, exhibited largely an excessive refinement of ideas, both in the eminent cunning of their plans, and the monstrous cruelty of their vengeance.

[3] The ordinary meaning of words was chanced by them as they thought proper. For reckless daring was regarded as courage tat was true to its friends; prudent delay, as specious cowardice; moderation, as a cloak for unmanliness; being intelligent in every thing, as being useful for nothing.

[4] Frantic violence was assigned to the manly character; cautious plotting was considered a specious excuse for declining the contest. The advocate for cruel measures was always trusted; while his opponent was suspected. He that plotted against another, if successful, was reckoned clever; he that suspected a plot, still cleverer; but he that forecasted for escaping the necessity of all such things, was regarded as one who broke up his party, and was afraid of his adversaries.

[5] In a word, the man was commended who anticipated one going to do an evil deed, or who persuaded to it one who had no thought of it. Moreover, kindred became a tie less close than party, because the latter was more ready for unscrupulous audacity. For such associations have nothing to do with any benefit from established laws, but are formed in opposition to those institutions by a spirit of rapacity.

[6] Again, their mutual grounds of confidence they confirmed not so much by any reference to the divine law as by fellowship in some act of lawlessness. The fair professions of their adversaries they received with a cautious eye to their actions, if they were stronger than themselves, and not with a spirit of generosity. To be avenged on another was deemed of greater consequence than to escape being first injured oneself.

[7] As for oaths, if in any case exchanged with a view to a reconciliation, being taken by either party with regard to their immediate necessity, they only held good so long as they had no resources from any other quarter; but he that first, when occasion offered, took courage [to break them], if he saw his enemy off his guard, wreaked his vengeance on him with greater pleasure for his confidence, than he would have done in an open manner; taking into account both the safety of the plan, and the fact that by taking a treacherous advantage of him he also won a prize for cleverness. And the majority of men, when dishonest, more easily get the name of talented an, when simple, that of good, and of the one hear ashamed, while of the her hey are proud. Now the cause of all these things was now proper pursued for the gratification of covetousness and ambition and the consequent violence parties when once engaged in contentio.

[8] For the leaders in the cities, having a specious profession on each side, putting forward, respectively, the political equality of the people, or a moderate aristocracy, while in word they served the common interests, in truth they made them their prizes. And while struggling by every means to obtain an advantage over each other, they dared and carried out the most dreadful deeds; heaping on still greater vengeance, not only so far s was just and expedient for he state, but it the measure of what pleasing to either party in each successive case: an whether by an unjust sentence of condemnation, or on ⁴ gaining the ascendency by the strong hand, they were ready to glut the animosity they felt at the moment. Thus piety was in fashion with neither party; but those who had the luck to effect some odious purpose under fair pretences were the more highly spoken of. The neutrals amongst the citizens were destroyed by both parties : either because they did not join them in their quarrel, or for envy that they should so escape.

Historia Belli Peloponnesiaci First1KGreek (Historia Belli Peloponnesiaci. Haase, Friedrich, translator. Paris: Firmin Didot, 1869.) — 3.82.1 focus

[1] nam postea quidem propemodum vel universa, paene dicam, Graecia commota est, quum ubique discordiae essent inter plebis patronos, qui Athenienses, et optimates, qui Lacedaemonios accersere volebant, et in pace quidem nullam speciosam causam haberent, nec ad ipsos accersen-dos adeo prompti essent; bello vero coorto utrisque, qui rerum novarum erant cupidi, facile dabatur facultas accer-sendi socios auxiliares, ut simul et adversam factionem opprimerent , et exinde potentiam sibimet compararent.

[2] Atque multae et graves calamitates inter seditionem civitatibus acciderunt, quae quidem accidere solent, et semper accident, quoad eadem hominum natura erit, sed tamen potius et sedatiores et genere diversae, pront singul* rerum fortuiucque mutationes incedant. Nam in pace quidem et rerum secundarum affluentia quum ipsae civi lates, tum etiam homines privati mentes habent meliores, quod non in necessitates animo suo adversas incidunt; bellum vero, subducens paulatim rerum copiam, quae ad quotidianum vita: usum sunt necessariae, violentus est magister, et ad pr®-sentium rerum similitudinem affectus plurimorum eflingit.

[3] Civitates igitur seditionibus agitabantur, et ubi id forte serius fiebat, ea quae alibi jam accidisse fama acceperant, longe superabant immoderato studio nova consilia reppe-riendi eximia inimicorum circumveniendorum solertia et inaudito suppliciorum genere.

[4] Atque usitatam vocabulorum significationem pro ipsis rebus arbitratu suo immutavere. Nam audacia quidem inconsiderata fortitudo amicorum studiosa existimata est, considerata vero cunctatio honesta timiditas, et continentia ignavia speciosa, et omnem rem moderans prudentia ad omnem rem inertia. At vesanus animi impetus viri virtuti tribuebatur; cautio vero in iteranda deliberatione vendibilis negotii detrectaudi praetextus.

[5] Et qui iracundus erat, is fide dignus semper habebatur, at qui verbis ei resistebat, hujus fides erat suspecta. Qui vero insidias aliis paraverat, si res successisset, prudens, et si insidias providisset, callidior etiam; qui vero prospexisset, ne ullis hujusmodi rebus opus esset, is amicitiae sodalium dissolutor, et adversariorum timens vocabatur. In summa, is laudabatur, qui alterum in injuria facienda praevertisset, et qui alium nihil tale cogitantem ad hoc ipsum ultro impulisset.

[6] Quinetiam sodales cognatis anteponebantur, quod ad audendum sine ulla tergiversatione promptiores erant; nam hujusmodi sodaliciorum coetus non utilitatis causa, ex legum latarum praescripto, sed avaritia: gratia, contra praesentes leges fiebant. Et fidem inter se non tam divina lege confirmabant, quam eo, quod communiter leges violassent.

[7] Et quae ab adversariis probe dicebantur, ea admittebant, ut actiones eorum caverent, si superiores essent, non autem ex generositate. Et unusquisque hoc pluris faciebat, si alium pro injuria illata ulcisci posset, quam si ipse nulla injuria ab alio lacesseretur. Et si forte reconciliand* grati* causa jusjurandum aliquando interponebatur, id in praesentia propter rerum difficultatem datum valebat, dum vires aliunde non habebant; sed ad quamlibet rei peragend* occasionem oblatam, qui prior fiduciam recepisset, is si minus munitum alterum animadvertisset, lubentius propter fidem ulciscebatur, quam aperte; nam et tutum hoc esse reputabat, et, quod fraude superasset, prudenti* praemium praeterea consequebatur. Facilius autem plurimi, quum sint malefici, sollertes appellati sunt, quam tardi boni, atque hoc quidem erubescunt, illo vero gloriantur.

[8] Horum autem omnium causa fuit principatus propter avaritiam et ambitionem quaesitus; et, id quod ex his causis, quum etiam in aemulationem adducuntur, nascitur, alacre animorum studium. Nam singularum civitatum principes, honesto et specioso utrique nomine, civilem populi mquabilitatera vel moderatam optimatum dominationem anteponentes, rempublicam quum verbo quidem curarent, tanquam suorum certaminum praemium sibi proponebant, omni autem modo contendentes, ut alii superarent alios, atrocissima quaeque facinora sunt ausi, et pcenas etiam majores exigebant, non eas in tantum sibi proponentes, quantum *quitas et utilitas publica postulabat, sed usque eo, dum in quaque re alterutris volupe esset, terminum proferentes, et vel iniquis suffragiis damnando , vel manu potentiam sibi parantes, ad praesentis contentionis libidinem explendam erant parati. Itaque neutri religionis observantia utebantur; sed si quibus accidisset, i ut sibi aliquo facinore invidiam contraherent, ob speciosam orationem melius audiebant. Cives vero, quotquot inter utrosque erant medii, vel quod illos non adjuvarent, vel propter invidiam, quod sic superessent, ab utraque factione perdebantur.

Vier Staatsreden aus Thucydides First1KGreek (Thucydides. Vier Staatsreden aus Thucydides. Gürsching, Heinrich, translator. Augsburg: Wirth, 1856.) — 4.85.1 focus

[1] Akanthier! Die Absicht Spartas bei Aussendung meines Heeres ist keine andere, als den Zweck unseres Krieges mit Athen, als welchen wir in der Kriegserklärung die Befreiung Griechenlands angekündigt, zur Wirklichkeit zu machen. An unserm späten Erscheinen aber ist die durch die bisherigen Feldzüge getäuschte Hoffnung schuld, euch den Kampf zu ersparen und in kurzer Zeit allein mit Athen fertig zu werden; und es kann uns dasselbe um so weniger zum Vorwurf gemacht werden, da wir jetzt die erste Gelegenheit ergreifen, hieher zu kommen und auch euch zur Theilnahme an dem Vernichtungskampfe einzuladen. Um so mehr befremdet es mich, aus dem Sperren der Thore auf eine unfreundliche Stimmung bei euch schliessen zu müssen. In dem guten Glauben, in euch längst, vor unserer Ankunft schon, entschiedene Bundesgenossen zu finden, denen wir nur willkommen sein würden, haben wir Lacedämonier die Gefahr nicht angesehen, die mit einem so weiten Marsch durch fremdes Gebiet verbunden war, und jedes mögliche Opfer gebracht, — und wie, ihr solltet ganz andere Gesinnungen hegen, solltet eurer eigenen und aller Griechen Befreiung euch widersetzen wollen? Denn nicht allein, dass ihr zu dem Feinde stehet, es müsste auch alle folgenden Städte zurückhaltend und besorgt machen, wenn gleich anfangs eine so ansehnliche und einflussreiche Stadt wie die eurige mich abwiese. Der Glaube an meine Sendung wäre dahin¹ , man argwohnte nur Böses in der Freiheit, die ich bringe² , oder sähe in meinem Heere einen zu schwachen und nichtssagenden Schutz gegen Athens drohende Rache. Zwar es war dasselbe Heer, mit dem ich vor Nisäa zog, wo die Athener trotz ihrer Uebermacht keinen Angriff wagten, und ein so zahlreiches Heer wie das nisäische würden sie ohnehin in keinem Fall gegen euch über's Meer schicken.³

La storia di Tucidide First1KGreek (Thucydides. Della storia di Tucidide volgarizzata libri otto. Anonymous translator. Florence: Tipografia Galileiana, 1835.) — 3.82 focus

Conciossiachè nel tempo appresso Grecia tutta fu, a così dire, in sollevazione, regnando dovunque le sette fra i caporani del popolo ed i fautori dell'oligarchia, stante che quelli gli Ateniesi , questi i Lacedemoni volevano chiamare. E perocché in tempo di pace non aviebbono avuta onesta cagione nè bramosia di invitarli a sè, cosi, rotta ornai la guerra, ben di leggeri in ambe le parti occorrevano alla mente dei novatori adescamenti valevoli a procacciarsi alleanza per nuocere alla fazione avversa, e con ciò stesso avanzare ad un’ora il proprio potere. Duranti le sedizioni piombarono su le città molte e gravi calamita, che di continuo accadono e sempre accaderanno sino a che sia la medesima la natura degli nomini ; tuttoché più violente o più miti e diverse ilella spezie, secondochè caderanno le particolari mutazioni dei fortuiti evènti. Imperocché quando è pace e gli affari prosperano, le repubbliche ed i privati hanno più sano giudizio, perchè non s’imbattono in imperiose necessità : ma la guerra diminuendo a poco a poco l’affluenza di ciò che giornalmente bisogna alla vita, è un maestro violento, e conforma l’indole della moltitudine secondo il presente stato delle cose. Ardeva adunque la sedizione nelle città ; e quelle che più tardi tumultuavano, appunto per l’udita delle cose già avvenute, studiavansi di sorpassare le prime coll’immaginar nuovi pensieri, o ritrovare artificiosi modi del l’assai tare gli altri, ed inusitati supplizi. il consueto significato dei vocaboli a dinotare le cose lo càmbiavano giusta il loro arbitrare : sendochè l’inconsiderata audacia, amichevole coraggio; il cauto indugio, travisata timidità ; la moderazione , immascherata viltà ; la prudenza in checchefosse, assoluta ignavia nominaronsi. All’incontro poi la forsennata precipitauza si annestava all’ essere di valoroso ; la circospezione nel deliberare, bel pretesto a trarsi d’impaccio reputavasi. Ciascun malcontento sempre creduto; chilo contraddicesse, sospetto ; accorto, chi riuscisse nelle sue trame ; più astuto, chi sottomano una ne ordisse per accalappiare il primo ; chi provvedesse in modo da non fargli bisogno di ricorrere

«i tali cose, era detto un distruttore d’ogni società, uu trasecolato dai nemici. E brevemente, qualunque prevenisse chi mulinava alcun dannp q sobillasse chi ne anche vi pensava, erane commendato. I parenti inoltre erano reputati più stranieri che i compagni, stante che questi erano più prontamente audaci, messo a parte ogni pretesto. Infatti le combriccole di costoro non erano per giovarsi delle vegliauti leggi, ma per sopraffare altri, mandando in un fascio quelle che vigevano. La fiducia da aversi scambievolmente non veniva confermata pel rito religioso, ma per la complicità dei misfatti: le oneste profferte della fazione contraria non per generosità approvavano, ma quando scorgessero che coll5addarvisi resterebbero superiori: il ricambiar di vendetta era avuto in maggior pregio che il non esser di prima offeso. I giuramenti di riconciliazione, se alcuni ve ne furono, valevano per il momento, per l’impossibilità di quei che li facevano, i quali d'altronde noo avevano forze : ma alToccasiope, chi primo fosse ad usare ardire, qualor vedesse il nemico inerme più volentieri a’ vendicava durante la fiducia di lui, che alla scoperta j sì perchè calcolava così la propria sicurezza, sì perchè, sgaratolo artatamente, riportava il vanto di accortezza. Conciossiachè si chiamano più facilmente scaltri molli scellerati insieme, che semplici i buoni ; anzi di questo nome gli uomini si vergognano, di quello si gloriano. Di tutte queste sregolatezze era cagione la sete del comando che da ambizione e da orgoglio procede ; dalle quali due pesti trae origine l ’ ardimento di quelli che nelle sette à mettono in contrasto. Essendoché nelle città i capi delle fazioni, gli uni collo specioso pretesto di preferire la politica uguaglianza popolare, gli altri un discreto reggimento di pochi, aiutavano in nome la cosa pubblica, ma in fatto facevano mercato di essa. U perchè contrastando al postutto di sgarare l' uno l' altro , osavano e

Compivano le più orribili cose, aggravando le pene noil secondo la regola della giustizia o il vantaggio della Repubblica , ma secondo che le determinava il capriccio che entrambi ne avevano. Non esitavano di empier le loro presenti cupidità, sia col condannare altrui con ingiusto suffragio, sia col procacciarsi, armata mano, superiorità; di sorte che ambe le fazioni nissun riguardo avevano alla religione ; ma quelli cui accadesse coti ispcziosità di parole di fare un bel colpo erano i più reputati ; dove i cittadini che tenevano la via mezzana tra ambe le parti venivano nondimeno trucidati , o per non aver dato mano ad una, o per invidia di vederli fuori del tafferuglio.

Thucydides History of the Peloponnesian War 3.82

Theodor Braun (Translator)

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