Thucydides History of the Peloponnesian War 3.83

[1] Thus was wickedness on foot in every kind throughout all Greece by the occasion of their sedition. Sincerity (whereof there is much in a generous nature) was laughed down; and it was far the best course to stand diffidently against each other with their thoughts in battle array, which no speech was so powerful nor oath terrible enough to disband.

[2] And being all of them the more they considered the more desperate of assurance, they rather contrived how to avoid a mischief than were able to rely on any man's faith.

[3] And for the most part, such as had the least wit had the best success; for both their own defect and the subtlety of their adversaries putting them into a great fear to be overcome in words, or at least in preinsidiation, by their enemies' great craft, they therefore went roundly to work with them with deeds.

[4] Whereas the other, not caring though they were perceived and thinking they needed not to take by force what they might do by plot, were thereby unprovided and so the more easily slain.

[1] Thus every form of iniquity took root in the Hellenic countries by reason of the troubles. The ancient simplicity into which honor so largely entered was laughed down and disappeared; and society became divided into camps in which no man trusted his fellow.

[2] To put an end to this, there was neither promise to be depended upon, nor oath that could command respect; but all parties dwelling rather in their calculation upon the hopelessness of a permanent state of things, were more intent upon self-defence than capable of confidence.

[3] In this contest the blunter wits were most successful. Apprehensive of their own deficiencies and of the cleverness of their antagonists, they feared to be worsted in debate and to be surprised by the combinations of their more versatile opponents, and so at once boldly had recourse to action:

[4] while their adversaries, arrogantly thinking that they should know in time, and that it was unnecessary to secure by action what policy afforded, often fell victims to their want of precaution.

So riß jede Art der Lasterhaftigkeit in Folge der
Parteikämpfe unter den Hellenen ein, und die Sitteneinfalt, welche am Adel
der Gesinnung so großen Theil hat, wurde verlacht und verschwand.
Mißtrauischen Sinns feindlich einander entgegenzustehen wurde
vorherrschend. Versöhnliche Gesinnung zu wirken, war weder ein Wort
zuverlässig, noch ein Eid furchtbar genug. Ueber dergleichen waren
Alle in ihrer Denkweise hinaus, so daß sie überhaupt an Treue und
' an Zuverlässigkeit nicht mehr zu glauben wagten, und Alle dachten
eher daran, sich selbst vor Schaden zu hüten, als daß sie Einem hätten
vertrauen können. Männern geringerer Einsicht blieb gewöhnlich der
Sieg. Denn weil sie wegen ihrer eigenen Unzulänglichkeit und der
überlegenen Einsicht der Gegner zu fürchten hatten, daß sie selbst,
wenn es zum Reden käme, unterliegen würden, und jene bei ihrer
Geistesgewandtheit ihnen mit irgend einer List zuvorkommen könnten,
so gingen sie rasch entschlossen zu Thätlichkeiten. Jene aber, die in
ihrem Hochmuth glaubten, sie würden schon Alles vorhermerken und es
bedürfe für sie der Gewaltthat nicht, wo List auch zum Zweck führe,
fanden, da sie sich nicht schützten, um so leichter den Untergang ^). ¹

LXXXIII. C’est ainsi que, grâce aux séditions, la Grèce vit se produire tous les genres d’iniquités : la simplicité confiante, partage ordinaire des âmes élevées, devint un objet de risée, et disparut. Partout prévalurent les dissensions mutuelles et les habitudes de suspicion. Il n’y avait pour faire cesser ces défiances ni parole assez sûre, ni serments assez redoutables : chacun, dominé par la pensée qu’on ne pouvait compter sur rien de stable, ne songeait qu’à se garantir contre la violence, sans pouvoir se fier à personne. L’avantage était ordinairement aux intelligences les plus vulgaires ; car le sentiment de leur propre insuffisance et de l’habileté de leurs adversaires leur faisant craindre de n’avoir pas l’avantage de la parole, et d’être devancés par les intrigues de rivaux plus adroits et plus féconds en ressources, ils allaient audacieusement au fait. Les autres, au contraire, dédaignaient des adversaires dont ils se croyaient toujours assurés de pressentir les desseins, et ne croyaient pas nécessaire de recourir aux actes pour atteindre un résultat qu’ils pouvaient obtenir par la supériorité de l’intelligence ; ils ne pre- naient dès lors aucune précaution ; aussi succombaientils le plus souvent.

C’est ainsi que les dissensions remplirent la Grèce de toute sorte de crimes. La candeur, compagne de la droiture de caractère, devint un objet de risée et disparut ; on éleva bien plus haut la duplicité cauteleuse. Ni langage ne fut assez fort ni serment assez terrible pour cimenter une réconciliation. Ne pouvant compter sur personne, on cherchait à se mettre à couvert plutôt qu’à faire preuve d’une confiante loyauté. Ceux qui avaient le plus d’avantages étaient les hommes d’une intelligence bornée. La conscience de leur inhabileté et du talent de leurs adversaires leur faisant eraindre d’être dupes des beaux discours de leurs ennemis ou de leur souplesse d’esprit, ils allaient droit au but ; tandis que les autres, dédaignant même de prévoir les desseins de leur§ adversaires et croyant l’action superflue là où l’adresse -semblait suffire, se trouvaient désarmés et succombaient.

[1] So it was that every form of depravity showed itself in Hellas in consequence of its revolutions, and that simplicity, which is the chief element of a noble nature, was laughed to scorn and disappeared, while mutual antagonism of feeling, combined with mistrust, prevailed far and wide.

[2] For there was no assurance binding enough, no oath terrible enough, to reconcile men; but always, if they were stronger, ¹ since they accounted all security hopeless, they were rather disposed to take precautions against being wronged than able to trust others.

[3] And it was generally those of meaner intellect who won the day; for being afraid of their own defects and of their opponents' sagacity, in order that they might not be worsted in words, and, by reason of their opponents' intellectual versatility find themselves unawares victims of their plots, they boldly resorted to deeds.

[4] Their opponents, on the other hand, contemptuously assuming that they would be aware in time and that there was no need to secure by deeds what they might have by wit, were taken off their guard and perished in greater numbers.

[1] Thus every kind of villany arose in Greece from these seditions. Simplicity which is a very large ingredient in a noble nature, was laughed down and disappeared; and mutual opposition of feeling, with a want of confidence, prevailed to a great extent.

[2] For there was neither promise that could be depended on, nor oath that struck them with fear, t put an end to their strife; but all being in their calculations more strongly inclined to despair of any thing proving trustworthy, they looked forward to their own escape from suffering more easily than they could place confidence [in arrangements with others].

[3] And the men of more homely wit, generally speaking, had the advantage; for through fearing their own deficiency and the cleverness of their opponents, lest thy might be worsted in words, and be first plotted against by means of the versatility of their enemy's genius, they proceeded boldly to deeds.

[4] Whereas their opponents, arrogantly thinking that they should be aware beforehand, and that there was no need for their securing by action what they could by stratagem, were unguarded and more often ruined.

[1] Adeo omne malarum artium genus in Graecia passim propter seditiones exstitit, et simplicitas, cujus ipsa generositas est maxime particeps, per irrisionem funditus est deleta; perfide autem se ponere mentis cogitatione inter se adversarios, multum prae valuit;

[2] neque enim ut inter se conciliarentur, aut oratio ulla satis firma aut jusjurandum formidabile erat, sed quum (adversus has res) omnes invicti essent, ratiocinatione sua pro eo, quod certi nihil sperari posset , illud potius prospiciebant, quomodo malum impendens vitarent, quam, ut cuiquam fiderent, adduci poterant.

[3] Et qui prudentia minus valebant, plerumque superiores erant; quod enim et propter suam consilii inopiam et adversariorum prudentiam metuerent, ne vel illorum eloquentia superarentur, vel propter illorum ingenii versutiam praverte* rentur insidiis prjores appetiti, audacter ad quaelibet facinora suscipienda ferebantur.

[4] Qui vero eos contemnentes putabant et insidias se praesensuros, nec sibi factis ullis opus esse ad occupauda ea, quae consilio occupare licet, non muniti facilius opprimebantur.

[1] Akanthier! Die Absicht Spartas bei Aussendung meines Heeres ist keine andere, als den Zweck unseres Krieges mit Athen, als welchen wir in der Kriegserklärung die Befreiung Griechenlands angekündigt, zur Wirklichkeit zu machen. An unserm späten Erscheinen aber ist die durch die bisherigen Feldzüge getäuschte Hoffnung schuld, euch den Kampf zu ersparen und in kurzer Zeit allein mit Athen fertig zu werden; und es kann uns dasselbe um so weniger zum Vorwurf gemacht werden, da wir jetzt die erste Gelegenheit ergreifen, hieher zu kommen und auch euch zur Theilnahme an dem Vernichtungskampfe einzuladen. Um so mehr befremdet es mich, aus dem Sperren der Thore auf eine unfreundliche Stimmung bei euch schliessen zu müssen. In dem guten Glauben, in euch längst, vor unserer Ankunft schon, entschiedene Bundesgenossen zu finden, denen wir nur willkommen sein würden, haben wir Lacedämonier die Gefahr nicht angesehen, die mit einem so weiten Marsch durch fremdes Gebiet verbunden war, und jedes mögliche Opfer gebracht, — und wie, ihr solltet ganz andere Gesinnungen hegen, solltet eurer eigenen und aller Griechen Befreiung euch widersetzen wollen? Denn nicht allein, dass ihr zu dem Feinde stehet, es müsste auch alle folgenden Städte zurückhaltend und besorgt machen, wenn gleich anfangs eine so ansehnliche und einflussreiche Stadt wie die eurige mich abwiese. Der Glaube an meine Sendung wäre dahin ¹ , man argwohnte nur Böses in der Freiheit, die ich bringe ² , oder sähe in meinem Heere einen zu schwachen und nichtssagenden Schutz gegen Athens drohende Rache. Zwar es war dasselbe Heer, mit dem ich vor Nisäa zog, wo die Athener trotz ihrer Uebermacht keinen Angriff wagten, und ein so zahlreiches Heer wie das nisäische würden sie ohnehin in keinem Fall gegen euch über's Meer schicken. ³

Cosi a cagione delle sedizioni prese piede iit Grecia ogni maniera dì scelleratezza. La ingenuità ( dote principale di un animo nobile) derisa spari ; all’opposto il ridurre la mente in reciproca gara di diffidenza di gran lunga prevalse : non più sicuranza di parole , non più timore di giuramento a terminar queste rùggini : cosicché trovando universalmente più forti ragioni a disperare di ritrovar fiducia , premeditavano piuttosto il modo di non essere offesi, di quello che potessero indursi a fidarsi di chicchessia. I più imbecilli d! ingegno d’ordinario scampavano; stante che temendo della propria insufficienza e dello scaltnmento dei nemici, per non esser sopraffatti dalla loro facondia, e per non essere i primi condotti nella rete dagli agguindoli del loro ingegno, mettevansi ad operare alla sventata. Gli altri poi che reputavano viltà anche il solo farsi a subodorare le trame altrui, e credevano non esser bisogno di afferrar con mano ciò che potevano raggiunger °on P accortezza, privi di difesa più di leggeri venivano oppressi.