ιγ′ περὶ τῶν ὁλοσχερῶν τρόπων τῆς ἐποχῆς.

[31] Επεὶ δὲ τὴν ἀταραξίαν ἀκολουθεῖν ἐφάσκομεν τῇ περὶ πάντων ἐποχῇ, ἀκόλουθον ἂν εἴη λέγειν ὅπως ἡμῖν ἡ ἐποχὴ ¹ περιγίνεται. γίνεται τοίνυν αὕτη, ὧς ἂν ὁλοσχερέστερον
εἴποι τις, διὰ τῆς ἀντιθέσεως τῶν πραγμάτων. ἀντιτίθεμεν δὲ ἢ φαινόμενα φαινομένοις ἢ νοούμενα νοουμένοις ἢ ἐναλλάξ, οἷον φαινόμενα μὲν φαινομένοις,

[32] ὅταν λέγωμεν ‘ὁ αὐτὸς πύργος πόρρωθεν μὲν φαίνεται στρογγύλος, ἐγγύθεν δὲ τειράγωνος’, νοούμενα δὲ νοουμένοις, ὅταν
πρὸς τὸν κατασκευάζοντα ὅτι ἔστι πρόνοια ἐκ τῆς τάξεως τῶν οὐρανίων, ἀντιτιθῶμεν τὸ τοὺς μὲν ἀγαθοὺς δυσ- πραγεῖν πολλάκις τοὺς δὲ κακοὺς εὐπραγεῖν, καὶ διὰ
τούτου συνάγωμεν τὸ μὴ εἶναι πρόνοιαν·

[33] νοούμενα δὲ φαινομένοις, ὡς ὁ Ἀναξαγόρας (A 97 Diels) τῷ <κατασκευάζοντι> λευκὴν εἶναι τὴν χιόνα ὅτι ἡ χιὼν ὕδωρ ἐστὶ πεπηγός, τὸ δὲ ὕδωρ
ἐστὶ μέλαν, καὶ ἡ χιὼν ἄρα μέλαινά ἐστιν. καθ’ ² ἑτέραν δὲ ἐπίνοιαν ἀντιτίθεμεν ὁτὲ μὲν παρόντα παροῦσιν, ὧς τὰ προειρημένα· ὁτὲ δὲ παρόντα παρεληλυθόσιν ἢ μέλλουσιν, οἷον ὅταν τις ἡμᾶς ἐρωτήσῃ λόγον ὃν λῦσαι οὐ δυνάμεθα, φαμὲν πρὸς αὐτὸν ὅτι,

[34] ὥσπερ πρὸ τοῦ γεμέσιαο τὸν εἰσηγησάμενον τὴν αἳρεσιν ἣν μετέρχῃ, οὐδέπω ὁ
κατ’ αὐτὴν λόγος ὑγιὴς ὢν ἐφαίνετο, ὑπέκειτο μέντοι ὧς πρὸς τὴν φύσιν, οὕτως ἐνδέχεται καὶ τὸν ἀντικείμενον τῷ ὑπὸ σοῦ ἐρωτηθέντι νῦν λόγῳ ὑποκεῖσθαι μὲν ὧς πρὸς τὴν φύσιν, μηδέπω δ’ ἡμῖν φαίνεσθαι, ὥστε οὐδέπω χρὴ συγκατατίθεσθαι ἡμᾶς τῷ δοκοῦντι νῦν ἰσχυρῷ εἶναι λόγῳ.

[35] ὑπὲρ
δὲ τοῦ τὰς ἀντιθέσεις ταύτας ἀκριβέστερον ἡμῖν ὑποπεσεῖν, καὶ τοὺς τρόπους ὑποθήσομαι δι’ ὧν ἡ ἐποχὴ συνάγεται, οὔτε περὶ τοῦ πλήθους οὔτε περὶ τῆς δυνάμεως αὐτῶν διαβεβαιούμενος· ἐνδέχεται γὰρ αὐτοὺς καὶ σαθροὺς εἶναι καὶ πλείους τῶν λεχθησομένων.

Chapter XIII.—Of The General Modes Leading to Suspension of Judgement

[31] Now that we have been saying that tranquillity follows on suspension of judgement, it will be our next task to explain how we arrive at this suspension. Speaking generally, one may say that it is the result of setting things in opposition. We oppose either appearances to appearances or objects of thought to objects of thought or alternando.

[32] For instance, we oppose appearances to appearances when we say ‟The same tower¹ appears round from a distance, but square from close at hand;” and thoughts to thoughts, when in answer to him who argues the existence of Providence from the order of the heavenly bodies we oppose the fact that often the good fare ill and the bad fare well, and draw from this the inference that Providence does not exist.

[33] And thoughts we oppose to appearances, as when Anaxagoras² countered the notion that snow is white with the argument, ‟Snow is frozen water, and water is black; therefore snow also is black.” With a different idea we oppose things present sometimes to things present, as in the foregoing examples, and sometimes to things past or future, as, for instance, when someone propounds to us a theory which we are unable to refute, we say to him in reply,

[34] ‟Just as, before the birth of the founder of the School to which you belong, the theory it holds was not as yet apparent as a sound theory, although it was really in existence, so likewise it is possible that the opposite theory to that which you now propound is already really existent, though not yet apparent to us, so that we ought not as yet to yield assent to this theory which at the moment seems to be valid.”

[35] But in order that we may have a more exact understanding of these antitheses I will describe the Modes by which suspension of judgement is brought about, but without making any positive assertion regarding either their number or their validity; for it is possible that they may be unsound or there may be more of them than I shall enumerate.

Sextus Empiricus Pyrrhoniae Hypotyposes 1.13

ed. Hermann Mutschmann

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ιγ′ περὶ τῶν ὁλοσχερῶν τρόπων τῆς ἐποχῆς.

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Chapter XIII.—Of The General Modes Leading to Suspension of Judgement

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