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ιδ′ περὶ τῶν δέκα τρόπων.

[36] Παραδίδονται τοίνυν συνήθως παρὰ τοῖς ἀρχαιοτέροις σκεπτικοῖς τρόποι, δι’ ὧν ἡ ἐποχὴ συνάγεσθαι δοκεῖ, ¹ 10 δέκα τὸν ἀριθμόν, καὶ λόγους καὶ τύπους συνωνύμως καλοῦσιν. εἰσὶ δὲ οὗτοι, πρῶτος ὁ παρὰ τὴν τῶν ζῴων ἀξαλλαγήν,
δεύτερος ὁ παρὰ τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων διαφοράν, τρίτος ὁ παρὰ τἀς διαφόρους τῶν αἰσθητηρίων κατασκευάς, τέταρτος ὁ παρὰ τἀς περιστάσεις, πέμπτος ὁ παρὰ τἀς θέσεις καὶ τὰ διαστήματα καὶ τούς τόπους, ἕκτος ὁ παρὰ τἀς ἐπιμιξίας,

[37] ἕβδομος ὁ παρὰ τὰς ποσότητας καὶ σκευασίας
τῶν ὑποκειμένων, ὄγδοος ὁ ἀπὸ τοῦ πρός τι, ἔννατος ὁ παρὰ τὰς συνεχεῖς ἢ σπανίους ἐγκυρήσεις, δέκατος ὁ παρὰ τἀς ἀγωγὰς καὶ τὰ ἔθη καὶ τοὺς νόμους καὶ τἀς μυθικὰς
πίστεις καὶ τἀς δογματικὰς ὑπολήψεις.

[38] χρώμεθα δὲ τῇ τάξει ταύτῃ θετικῶς. τούτων δὲ ἐπαναβεβηκότες εἰσὶ τρόποι τρεῖς, ὁ ἀπὸ τοῦ κρίνοντος, ὁ ἀπὸ τοῦ κρινομένου, ὁ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν· τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἀπὸ τοῦ κρίνοντος ὑποτάσσονται
οἱ πρῶτοι τέσσαρες τὸ γὰρ κρῖνον ἢ ζῷόν ἐστιν ἢ ἄνθρωπος ἢ αἴσθησις ἢ ἔν τινι περιστάσει), εἰς δὲ τὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ κρινομένου <ἀνάγονται> ὁ ἕβδομος καὶ ὁ δέκατος, εἰς δὲ τὸν ἐξ ἀμφοῖν σύνθετον ὁ πέμπτος καὶ ὁ ἕκτος καὶ ὁ ὄγδοος καἰ ὁ ἔννατος.

[39] πάλιν δὲ οἱ τρεῖς οὗτοι ἀνάγονται εἰς τὸν πρός τι,
ὡς εἶναι γενικώτατον μὲν τὸν πρός τι, εἰδικοὺς δὲ τούς τρεῖς, ὑποβεβηκότας δὲ τούς δέκα. ταῦτα μὲν περὶ τῆς ποσότητος αὐτῶν κατὰ τὸ πιθανὸν λέγομεν· περὶ δὲ τῆς δυνάμεως τάδε.

[40] Πρῶτον ἐλέγομεν εἶναι λόγον καθ’ ὃν <παρὰ> τὴν δια- ²³⁴ 11 φορὰν τῶν ζῴων οὐχ αἱ αὐταὶ ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν ὑποπίπτουσι
φαντασίαι. τοῦτο δὲ ἐπιλογιζόμεθα ἔκ τε τῆς περὶ τὰς γενέσεις αὐτῶν διαφορᾶς καὶ ἐκ τῆς περὶ τὰς συστάσεις τῶν σωμάτων παραλλαγῆς.

[41] περὶ μὲν οὖν τὰς γενέσεις, ὅτι τῶν ζῴων τὰ μὲν χωρὶς μίξεως γίνεται τὰ δ’ ἐκ συμπλοκῆς. καὶ τῶν μὲν χωρὶς μίξεως γινομένων τὰ μὲν ἐκ πυρὸς
γίνεται ὡς τὰ ἐν ταῖς καμίνοις φαινόμενα χωΰωια, τὰ δ’ ἐξ ὕδατος φθειρομένου ὡς κώνωπες , τὰ δ’ ἐξ οἴνου τρεπομένου ὡς σκνῖπες, τὰ δ’ ἐκ γῆς <ὡς . . . . >,τὰ δ’ ἐξ ἰλύος ὡς βάτραχοι, τὰ δ’ ἐκ βορβόρου ὡς σκώληκες, τὰ δ’ ἐξ ὄνων ὡς κάνθαροι τὰ δ’ ἐκ λαχάνων ὡς κάμπαι, τὰ δ’ ἐκ καρπῶν
ὡς οἱ ἐκ τῶν ἐρινεῶν ψῆνες, τὰ δ’ ἐκ ζῴων νῶν ὡς μέλισσαι ταύρων καὶ σφῆκες ἱππὼν·

[42] τῶν δ’ ἐκ συμπλοκῆς τὰ μὲν ἐξ ὁμοιογενῶν ὡς τὰ πλεῖστα, τὰ δ’ ἐξ ἀνομοιογενῶν ὡς ἡμίονοι. πάλιν κοινῇ τῶν ζῴων τὰ μὲν χωοτοκεὶται ὡς ἄνθρωποι, τὰ δ’ ᾠοτοκεῖται ὡς ὄρνιθες, τὰ
δὲ σαρκοτοκεῖται ὡς ἄρκτοι.

[43] εἰκὸς οὖν τὰς περὶ τὰς γενέσεις ἀνομοιότητας ἀνομοιότητας καὶ διαφορὰς μεγάλας ποιεῖν ἀντιπαθείας, τὸ ἀσύγκρατον καὶ ἀσυνάρμοστον καὶ μαχόμενον
ἐκεῖθεν φερομένας.

[44] ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡ διαφορὰ τῶν κυριωτάτων μερῶν τοῦ σώματος, καὶ μάλιστα τῶν πρὸς τὸ ἐπικρίνειν καὶ πρὸς τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι πεφυκότων , μεγίστην δύναται ποιεῖν μάχην τῶν φαντασιῶν παρὰ τὴν τῶν ζῴων παραλλαγήν].
οἱ γοῦν ἰκτεριῶντες ὠχρά φασιν εἶναι τὰ ἡμῖν φαινόμενα λευκὰ, καὶ οἱ ὑπόσφαγμα ἔχοντες αἱμωπά. ἐπεὶ οὖν καὶ τῶν ζῴων τὰ μὲν ὠχρούς ἔχει τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς τὰ δ’ ὑφαίμους τὰ δὲ λευκανθίζοντας τὰ δ’ ἄλλην χροιὰν ἔχοντας, εἰκός, οἶμαι, διάφορον αὐτοῖς τὴν τῶν χρωμάτων
ἀντίληψιν γίγνεσθαι.

[45] ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐνατενίσαντες ἐπὶ πολύν χρόνον τῷ ἡλίῳ , εἶτα ἐγκύψαντες βιβλίῳ τὰ γράμματα χρυσοειδῆ δοκοῦμεν εἶναι καὶ περιφερόμενα. ἐπεὶ οὖν καὶ τῶν ζῴων τινὰ φύσει λαμπηδόνα ἐν τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς ἔχει ⁵ 12
καὶ φῶς λεπτομερές τε καὶ εὐκίνητον ἀπ’ αὐτῶν ἀποστέλλει, ὡς καὶ νυκτὸς ὁρᾶν, δεόντως ἂν νομίζοιμεν ὅτι μὴ ὅμοια ἡμῖν τε κἀκείνοις τὰ ἐκτὸς ὑποπίπτει.

[46] καί γε οἱ γόητες χρίοντες τὰς θρυαλλίδας ἰῷ χαλκοῦ καὶ θολῷ σηπίας ποιοῦσιν ὁτὲ μὲν χαλκοῦς ὁτὲ δὲ μέλανας φαίνεσθαι
τοὺς παρόντας διὰ τὴν βραχεῖαν τοῦ μιχθέντος παρασποπάν. πολὺ δήπου εὐλογώτερόν ἐστι, χυμῶν διαφόρων ἀνακεκραμένων τῇ ὁράσει τῶν <καὶ;>

[47] φαντασίας αὐτοῖς γίνεσθαι. ὅταν τε παραθλίψωμεν τὸν ὀφθαλμόν, ἐπιμήκη καὶ στενὰ φαίνεται τὰ εἴδη καὶ
τὰ σχήματα καὶ τὰ μεγέθη τῶν ὁρατῶν. εἰκὸς οὖν ὅτι ὅσα τῶν ζῴων λοξὴν ἔχει τὴν κόρην καὶ προμήκη, καθάπερ αἶγες αἴλουροι καὶ τὰ ἐοικότα, διάφορα φαντάζεται τὰ ὑποκείμενα εἶναι, καὶ οὐχ οἵα τὰ περιφερῆ τὴν κόρην ἔχοντα ζῷα εἶναι αὐτὰ ὑπολαμβάνει.

[48] τά τε κάτοπτρα παρὰ
τὴν διάφορον κατασκευὴν ὁτὲ μὲν μικρότατα δείκνυσι τὰ ἐκτὸς ὑποκείμενα ὧς τὰ κοῖλα, ὁτὲ δ’ ἐπιμήκη καὶ στενά ὡς τὰ κυρτά· τινὰ δὲ τὴν μὲν κεφαλὴν κάτω δείκνυσι τοῦ κατοπτριζομένου , τοὺς δὲ πόδας ἄνω.

[49] ἐπεὶ οὖν καὶ τῶν
περὶ τὴν ὄψιν ἀγγείων τὰ μὲν ἐξόφθαλμα κομιδῇ προπέπτωκεν ὑπὸ κυρτότητος, τὰ δὲ κοιλότερά ἐστι, τὰ δ’ ἐν ὑπτίῳ πλάτει βέβηκεν, εἰκὸς καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀλλοιοῦσθαι τὰς φαντασίας, τασίας, καὶ μήτε ἴσα τοῖς μεγέθεσι μήτε ὅμοια ταῖς μορφαῖς
ὁρᾶν τὰ αὐτὰ κύνας ἰχθύας λέοντας ἀνθρώπους ἀλλ’ οἵαν ἑκάστου ποιεῖ τύπωσιν ἡ δεχομένη τὸ φαινόμενον ὄψις.

[50] ὁ δὲ αὐτὸς καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθή- σέων λόγος· πῶς γὰρ ἂν λεχθείη ὁμοίως κινεῖσθαι κατὰ τὴν ἁφὴν τά τε ὀστρακόδερμα καὶ τὰ σαρκοφανῆ καὶ τὰ
ἠκανθωμένα καὶ τὰ ἐπτερωμένα ἢ λελεπιδωμένα; πῶς δὲ ὁμοίως ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι κατὰ τὴν ἀκοὴν τά τε στενώτατον ἔχοντα τὸν πόρον τὸν ἀκουστικὸν καὶ τὰ εὐρυτάτῳ τούτῳ κεχρημένα, ἢ τὰ τετριχωμένα τὰ ὦτα καὶ ⁶ τὰ ψιλὰ ταῦτα ἔχοντα; ὅπου γε καὶ ἡμεῖς ἄλλως μὲν κινούμεθα κατὰ τὴν ἀκοὴν παραβύσαντες τὰ ὧτα, ἄλλως
δὲ ἢν ἀπλῶς αὐτοῖς χρώμεθα.

[51] καὶ ἡ ὄσφρησις δὲ διαφέροι ἂν παρὰ τὴν τῶν ζῴων ἐξαλλαγήν· εἰ γὰρ καὶ ἡμεῖς ἄλλως μὲν κινούμεθα ἐμψυγέντες καὶ τοῦ φλέγματος πλεονάσαντος ἐν ἡμῖν, ἄλλως δὲ ἢν τὰ περὶ τὴν κεφαλὴν ἡμῶν μέρη πλεονασμὸν αἵματος ὑποδέξηται, ἀποστρεφόμενοι τὰ εὐώδη
τοῖς ἄλλοις δοκοῦντα εἶναι καὶ ὥσπερ πλήττεσθαι ὑπ’ αὐτῶν νομίζοντες, ἐπεὶ καὶ τῶν ζῴων τὰ μὲν πλαδαρά τέ ἐστι φύσει καὶ φλεγματώδη, τὰ δὲ πολύαιμα σφόδρα, τὰ δ’ ἐπικρατοῦσαν καὶ πλεονάζουσαν ἔχοντα τὴν ξανθὴν χολὴν ἢ τὴν μέλαιναν, εὔλογον καὶ διὰ τοῦτο διάφορα ἑκάστοις
αὐτῶν φαίνεσθαι τὰ ὀσφρητά.

[52] καὶ τὰ γευστὰ ὁμοίως τῶν μὲν τραχεῖαν καὶ ἄνικμον ἐχόντων τὴν γλῶσσαν τῶν δὲ ἔνυγρον σφόδρα, εἴγε καὶ ἡμεῖς ξηροτέραν ἐν πυρετοῖς τὴν γλῶτταν σχόντες γεώδη καὶ κακόχυμα ἢ πικρὰ τὰ προσφερόμενα εἶναι νομίζομεν, τοῦτο δὲ πάσχομεν καὶ παρὰ
τὴν διάφορον ἐπικράτειαν τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν χυμῶν εἶναι λεγομέων· μένων· ἐπεὶ οὖν καὶ τὰ ζῷα διάφορον τὸ γευστικὸν αἰσθητήριον ἔχει καὶ διαφόροις χυμοῖς πλεονάζον, διαφόρους ἂν
καὶ κατὰ τὴν γεῦσιν φαντασίας τῶν ὑποκειμένων λαμβάνοι.

[53] ὥσπερ γὰρ ἡ αὐτὴ τροφὴ ἀναδιδομένη ὅπου μὲν γίνεται φλὲψ ὅπου δὲ ἀρτηρία ὅπου δὲ ὀστέον ὅπου δὲ νεῦρον καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον, παρὰ τὴν διαφορὰν τῶν ὑποδεχομένων
αὐτὴν μερῶν διάφορον ἐπιδεικνυμένη δύναμιν, καὶ ὥσπερ τὸ ὕδωρ ‘ὲν καὶ μονοειδὲς ἀναδιδόμενον εἰς τὰ δένδρα ὅπου μὲν γίνεται φλοιὸς ὅπου δὲ κλάδος ὅπου δὲ καρπὸς καὶ ἤδη σῦκον καὶ ῥοιὰ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον,

[54] καὶ καθάπερ τὸ τοῦ μουσουργοῦ πνεῦμα ‘ὲν καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἐμπνεόμενον τῷ
αὐλῷ ὅπου μὲν γίνεται ὀξὺ ὅπου δὲ βαρύ, καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ ἐπέρεισις τῆς χειρὸς ἐπὶ τῆς λύρας ὅπου μὲν βαρὺν φθόγγον ποιεῖ ὅπουδὲὀξύν,οὕτωςεἰκὸςκαὶ τὰ ἐκτὸς ὑποκείμενα ⁷ 14 φόρα θεωρεῖσθαι παρὰ τὴν διάφορον κατασκευὴν τῶν
τὰς φαντασίας ὑπομενόντων ζῴων.

[55] ἐναργέστερον δὲ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἔστι μαθεῖν ἀπὸ τῶν αἱρετῶν τε καὶ φευκτῶν τοῖς ζῴοις. μύρον γοῦν ἀνθρώποις μὲν ἥδιστον φαίνεται, κανθάροις δὲ καὶ μελίσσαις δυσανάσχετον· καὶ τὸ ἔλαιον τοὺς μὲν ἀνθρώπους ὠφελεῖ, σφῆκας δὲ καὶ μελίσσας ἀναιρεῖ
καταρραινόμενον· καὶ τὸ θαλάττιον ὕδωρ ἀνθρώποις μὲν ἀηδές ἐστι πινόμενον καὶ φαρμακῶδες, ἰχθύσι δὲ ἥδιστον καὶ πότιμον.

[56] σύες τε ἥδιον βορβόρῳ λούονται δυσωδεστάτῳ ἢ ὕδατι διειδεῖ καὶ καθαρῷ. τῶν τε ζέων τὰ μέν ἐστι ποηφάγα τὰ δὲ θαμνοφάγα τὰ δὲ ὑληνόμα τὰ δὲ
σπερμοφάγα τὰ δὲ σαρκοφάγα τὰ γαλακτοφάγα, καὶ τὰ μὲν σεσηπυίᾳ χαίρει τροφῇ τὰ δὲ νεαρᾷ, καὶ τὰ μὲν ὠμῇ τὰ δὲ μαγειρικῶς ἐσκευασμένῃ. καὶ κοινῶς τὰ ἄλλοις ἡδέα ἄλλοις ἐστὶν ἀηδῆ καὶ φευκτά καὶ θανάσιμα.

[57] τὸ γοῦν κώνειον νεῖον πιαίνει τοὺς ὄρτυγας καὶ ὁ ὑοσκύαμος τὰς ὗς, αἵ
δὴ χαίρουσι καὶ σαλαμάνδρας ἐσθίουσαι, ὡσπεροῦν ἔλαφοι τὰ ἰοβόλα ζῷα καὶ αἱ χελιδόνες κανθαρίδας. οἴ τε μύρμηκες καὶ οἱ σκνῖπες ἀνθρώποις μὲν ἀηδίας καὶ στρόφους ἐμποιοῦσι καταπινόμενοι· ἡ δὲ ἄρκτος ἢν ἀρρωστίᾳ τινὶ περιπέσῃ, τούτους καταλιχμωμένη ῥώννυται.

[58] ἔχιδνα δὲ
θιγόντος αὐτῆς μόνον φηγοῦ κλάδου καροῦται, καὶ νυκτερὶς πλατάνου φύλλου. φεύγει δὲ κριὸν μὲν ἐλέφας, λέων δὲ ἀλεκτρυόνα, καὶ θραγμὸν κυάμων ἐρεικομένων τὰ θαλάττια κήτη, καὶ τίγρις ψόφον τυμπάνου. καὶ ἄλλα δὲ
πλείω τούτων ἔνεστι λέγειν· ἀλλ’ ἴνα μὴ μᾶλλον τοῦ δέοντος ἐνδιατρίβειν δοκῶμεν, εἰ τὰ αὐτὰ τοῖς μέν ἐστιν ἀηδῆ τοῖς δὲ ἡδέα, τὸ δὲ ἡδὺ καὶ ἀηδὲς ἐν φαντασίᾳ κεῖται, διάφοροι γίνονται τοῖς ζῴοις ἀπὸ τῶν ὑποκειμένων φαντασίαι.

[59] εἰ δὲ τὰ αὐτὰ πράγματα ἀνόμοια φαίνεται παρὰ
τὴν τῶν ζῴων ἐξαλλαγήν, ὁποῖον μὲν ἡμῖν θεωρεῖται τὸ ὑποκείμενον ἕξομεν λέγειν, ὁποῖον δὲ ἔστι πρὸς τὴν ⁸ σιν ἐφέξομεν. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐπικρίνειν αὐτοὶ δυνησόμεθα τὰς φαντασίας τάς τε ἡμετέρας καὶ τἀς τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων, μέρος ρος καὶ αὐτοὶ τῆς διαφωνίας ὄντες καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τοῦ ἐπικρινοῦντος κρινοῦντος δεησόμενοι μᾶλλον ἢ αὐτοὶ κρίνειν δυνάμενοι.

[60] καὶ ἄλλως οὔτε ἀναποδείκτως δυνάμεθα προκρίνειν τὰς ἡμετέρας φαντασίας τῶν παρὰ τοῖς ἀλόγοις ζῴοις γινομένων οὔτε μετ’ ἀποδείξεως. πρὸς γὰρ τῷ μὴ εἷναι ἀπόδειξιν ἴσως, ὡς ὑπομνήσομεν, αὐτὴ ἡ λεγομένη ἀπόδειξις ἤτοι φαινομένη ἡμῖν ἔσται ἢ οὐ φαινομένη. καὶ εἰ μὲν μὴ
φαινομένη, οὐδὲ μετὰ πεποιθήσεως αὐτὴν προοισόμεθα· εἰ δὲ φαινομένη ἡμῖν, ἐπειδὴ περὶ τῶν φαινομένων τοῖς ζώοις ζητεῖται καὶ ἡ ἀπόδειξις ἡμῖν φαίνεται ζῴοις οὖσι, καὶ αὐτὴ ζητηθήσεται εἰ ἔστιν ἀληθὴς καθό ἐστι φαινομένη.

[61] ἄτοπον δὲ τὸ ζητούμενον διὰ τοῦ ζητουμένου κατασκευάζειν
ἐπιχειρεῖν, ἐπεὶ ἔσται τὸ αὐτὸ πιστὸν καὶ ἄπιστον, ὅπερ ἀμήχανον, πιστὸν μὲν ἡ βούλεται ἀποδεικνύειν, ἄπιστον δὲ ᾗ ἀποδείκνυται. οὐχ ἕξομεν ἄρα ἀπόδειξιν δι’ ἧς προκρινοῦμεν τὰς ἑαυτῶν φαντασίας τῶν παρὰ τοῖς ἀλόγοις καλουμένοις ζῴοις γινομένων. εἰ οὖν διάφοροι γίνονται αἱ
φαντασίαι παρὰ τὴν τῶν ζῴων ἐξαλλαγήν, ἃς ἐπικρῖναι ἀμήχανόν ἐστιν, ἐπέχειν ἀνάγκη περὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς ὑποκειμένων.

[62] ’Εκ περιουσίας δὲ καὶ συγκρίνομεν τὰ ἄλογα καλούμενα
ζῷα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις κατὰ φαντασίαν· καὶ γὰρ καταπαίζειν τῶν δογματικῶν τετυφωμένων καὶ περιαυτολογούντων οὐκ ἀποδοκιμάζομεν μετὰ τοὺς πρακτικοὺς τῶν λόγων. οἱ μὲν οὖν ἡμέτεροι τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ἀλόγων ζῴων ἀπλῶς εἰώθασι
συγκρίνειν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ·

[63] ἐπεὶ δὲ εὑρεριλογοῦντες οἱ δογματικοὶ ἄνισον εἶναί φασι τὴν σύγκρισιν, ἡμεῖς ἐκ πολλοῦ τοῦ περιόντος ἐπὶ πλέον παίζοντες ἐπὶ ἑνὸς ζῴου στήσομεν τὸν λόγον, οἶον ἐπὶ κυνός, εἰ δοκεῖ, τοῦ εὐτελεστάτου δοκοῦντος εἶναι. εὑρήσομεν γὰρ καὶ οὕτω μὴ λειπόμενα ἡμῶν τὰ ζῷα, περὶ ὧν ὁ λόγος, ὡς πρὸς τὴν πίστιν τῶν φαινομένων.

[64] ὅτι τοίνυν αἰσθήσει διαφέρει τοῦτο τὸ ζῷον ⁹ 16 ἡμῶν, οἱ δογματικοὶ συνομολογοῦσιν· καὶ γὰρ τῇ ὀσφρήσει μᾶλλον ἡμῶν ἀντιλαμβάνεται, τὰ μὴ ὁρώμενα αὐτῷ
θηρία διὰ ταύτης ἀνιχνεύων καὶ τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς θᾶττον ἡμῶν ταῦτα ὁρῶν καὶ τῇ ἀκοῇ αἰσθανόμενος ὀξέως.

[65] οὐκοῦν ἐπὶ τὸν λόγον ἔλθωμεν. τούτου δὲ ὁ μέν ἐστιν ἐνδιάθετος ὁ δὲ προφορικός. ἴδωμεν οὗν πρότερον περὶ τοῦ ἐνδιαθέτου. οὗτος τοίνυν κατὰ τοὺς μάλιστα ἡμῖν ἀντιδοξοῦντας
νῦν δογματικούς, τοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς, ἐν ¹⁰ τούτοις ἔοικε σαλεύειν, τῇ αἱρέσει τῶν οἰκείων καὶ φυγῇ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων, τῇ γνώσει τῶν εἰς τοῦτο συντεινουσῶν τεχνῶν, τῇ ἀντιλήψει τῶν κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν φύσιν ἀρετῶν <καὶ> τῶν περὶ τὰ πάθη.

[66] ὁ τοίνυν κύων, ἐφ’ οὗ τὸν λόγον ἔδοξε στῆσαι παραδείγματος
ἕ αἴρεσιν ποιεῖται ποιεῖται τῶν οἰκείων καὶ φυγὴν τῶν βλαβερῶν, τὰ μὲν τρόφιμα διώκων, μάστιγος δὲ ἀναταθείσης ὑποχωρῶν. ἀλλὰ καὶ τέχνην ἔχει ποριστικὴν τῶν οἰκείων, τὴν θηρευτικήν.

[67] ἔστι δὲ οὐδ’ ἀρετῆς ἐκτός· τῆς γέ τοι δικαιοσύνης οὔσης τοῦ κατ’ ἀξίαν ἀποδοτικῆς ἑκάστῳ, ὁ κύων τοὺς
μὲν οἰκείους γε καὶ εὖ ποιοῦντας σαίνων καὶ φρουρῶν τούς δὲ ἀνοικείους καὶ ἀδικοῦντας ἀμυνόμενος οὐκ ἔξω ἂν εἴη τῆς δικαιοσύνης.

[68] εἰ δὲ ταύτην ἔχει, τῶν ἀρετῶν ἀντακολουθουσῶν καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετὰς ἔχει, ἃς οὔ φασιν ἔχειν
τοὺς πολλούς ἀνθρώπους οἱ σοφοί. καὶ ἄλειμον δὲ ὄντα ὁρῶμεν ἐν ταῖς ἀμύναις καὶ συνετόν, ὧς λαὶ Ὅμηρος ἐμαρτύρησεν, ποιήσας τὸν Ὀδυσσέα πᾶσι μὲν τοῖς οἰκείοις
ἀνθρώποις ἀγνῶτα ὄντα ὑπὸ μόνου δὲ τοῦ Ἀργοῦ σθέντα, μήτε ὑπὸ τῆς ἀλλοιώσεως τῆς κατὰ τὸ σῶμα τἀνδρὸς ἀπατηθέντος τοῦ κυνός, μήτε ἐκστάντος τῆς καταληπτικῆς φαντασίας, ἣν μᾶλλον τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἔχων ἐφάνη.

[69] κατὰ δὲ τὸν Χρύσιππον τὸν μάλιστα συμπολεμοῦντα τοῖς ἀλόγοις ζῴοις καὶ τῆς ἀοιδίμου διαλεκτικῆς μετέχει. ¹¹¹² 17 φησὶ γοῦν αὐτὸν ὁ προειρημένος ἀνὴρ ἐπιβάλλειν τῷ
πέμπτῳ διὰ πλειόνων ἀναποδείκτῳ, ὅταν ἐπὶ τρίοδον ἐλθὼν καὶ τἀς δύο ὁδούς ἰχνεύσας δι’ ὧν οὐ διῆλθε τὸ θηρίον, τὴν τρίτην μηδ’ ἰχνεύσας εὐθέως ὁρμήσῃ δι’ αὐτῆς. δυνάμει γὰρ τοῦτο αὐτὸν λογίζεσθαί φησιν ὁ ἀρχαῖος ‘τῇδε ἢ τῇδε ἢ τῇδε διῆλθε
τὸ θηρίον· οὔτε δὲ τῇδε οὔτε τῇδε·

[70] τῇδε ἄρα.’ ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἑαυτοῦ παθῶν ἀντιληπτικός τέ ἐστι καὶ παραμυθητικός· σκόλοπος γὰρ αὐτῷ καταπαγέντος ἐπὶ τὴν ἄρσιν τούτου ὁρμᾷ τῇ τοῦ ποδὸς πρὸς τὴν γῆν παρατρίψει καὶ διὰ τῶν ὀδόντων. ἕλκος τε εἰ¹³ ἔχει που, ἐπεὶ τὰ μὲν ῥυπαρὰ ἕλκη δυσαλθῆ ἐστιν,
τὰ δὲ καθαρὰ ῥᾳδίως θεραπεύεται, πρᾴως ἀποψᾷ τὸν γινόμενον ἰχῶρα.

[71] ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ‘Ιπποκράτειον φυλάσσει μάλα καλῶς· ἐπεὶ γὰρ ποδὸς ἄκος ἀκινησία, εἴ ποτε τραῦμα ἐν ποδὶ σχοίη, μετεωρίζει τοῦτον καὶ ὧς οἶόν τε ἄσκυλτον τηρεῖ. ὀχλούμενός τε ¹⁴ ὑπὸ χυμῶν ἀνοικείων πόαν ἐσθίει, μεθ’ ἧς ἀποβλύζων
βλύζων τὸ ἀνοίκειον ὑγιάζεται.

[72] εἰ τοίνυν ἐφάνη τὸ ζῷον, ἐφ’ οὗ τὸν λόγον ἐστήσαμεν παραδείγματος ἕνεκα, καὶ αἱρούμενον τὰ οἰκεῖα καὶ τὰ ὀχληρὰ φεῦγον, τέχνην τε ἔχον ποριστικὴν τῶν οἰκείων, καὶ τῶν ἑαυτοῦ παθῶν ἀντιληπτικὸν καὶ παραμυθητικόν, καὶ οὐκ ἔξω ἀρετῆς, ἐν οἷς κεῖται ἡ
τελειότης τοῦ ἐνδιαθέτου λόγου, τέλειος ἂν εἴη κατὰ τοῦτο ὁ κύων· ὅθεν μοι δοκοῦσί τινες τῶν κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν ἑαυτοὺς σεμνῦναι τῇ τοῦ ζῴου τούτου προσηγορίᾳ.

[73] περὶ δὲ τοῦ προφορικοῦ λόγου τέως μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν ἀναγκαῖον ζητεῖν·
τοῦτον γὰρ καὶ τῶν δογματικῶν ἔνιοι παρῃτήσαντο ὧς ἀντιπράττοντα τῇ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἀναλήψει, διὸ καὶ παρὰ τὸν τῆς μαθήσεως χρόνον ἤσκησαν σιωπήν· καὶ ἄλλως, εἰ καθ’ ὑπόθεσιν εἴη ἄνθρωπος ἐνεός, οὐδεὶς φήσει αὐτὸν εἶναι ἄλο-
γον. ἵνα δὲ καὶ ταῦτα παραλίπωμεν, μάλιστα μὲν ὁρῶμεν ¹⁵ 18 τὰ ζῷα, περὶ ὧν ὁ λόγος, καὶ ἀνθρωπίνας προφερόμενα φωνάς, ὧς κίττας καὶ ἄλλα τινά.

[74] ἴνα δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ἐάσωμεν, εἰ καὶ μὴ συνίεμεν τὰς φωνὰς τῶν ἀλόγων καλουμένων
ζῴων, ὅλως οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπεικὸς διαλέγεσθαι μὲν ταῦτα, ἡμᾶς δὲ μὴ συνιέναι· καὶ γὰρ τῆς τῶν βαρβάρων φωνῆς ἀκούοντες οὐ συνίεμεν ἀλλὰ μονοειδῆ ταύτην εἶναι δοκοῦμεν.

[75] καὶ ἀκούομεν δὲ τῶν κυνῶν ἄλλην μὲν φωνὴν προϊεμένων ὅταν ἀμύνωνταί τινας, ἄλλην δὲ ὅταν
ὠρύωνται, καὶ ἄλλην ὅταν τύπτωνται, καὶ διάφορον ἐπὰν σαίνωσιν. καὶ ὅλως εἰ τις εἰς τοῦτο ἀτενίσειεν, εὖροι ἂν πολλὴν παραλλαγὴν τῆς φωνῆς παρὰ τούτῳ τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις ἐν ταῖς διαφόροις περιστάσεσιν, ὥστε διὰ
ταῦτα εἰκότως λέγοιτ’ ἂν καὶ τοῦ προφορικοῦ μετέχειν γου τὰ καλούμενα ἄλογα ζῷα.

[76] εἰ δὲ μήτε ἀκριβείᾳ τῶν αἰσθήσεων λείπεται τῶν ἀνθρώπων ταῦτα μήτε τῷ ἐνδιαθέτῳ λόγῳ, ἐκ περιουσίας δὲ εἰπεῖν μηδὲ τῷ προφορικῷ, οὐκ ἂν ἀπιστότερα ἡμῶν εἴη κατὰ τὰς φαντασίας.

[77] καὶ ἐφ’ ἑκάστου δὲ τῶν ἀλόγων ζῴων ἴσως ἱστάντας τὸν
λόγον ταῦτα ἀποδεικνύειν δυνατόν ἐστιν. οἶον γοῦν τίς οὐκ ἂν εἴποι τοὺς ὄρνιθας ἀγχινοίᾳ τε διαφέρειν καὶ τῷ προφορικῷ κεχρῆσθαι λόγῳ; οἴ γε οὐ μόνον τὰ παρόντα ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ ἐσόμενα ἐπίστανται καὶ ταῦτα τοῖς συνιέναι δυναμένοις προδηλοῦσιν, ἄλλως τε σημαίνοντες καὶ τῇ
φωνῇ προαγορεύοντες.

[78] Τὴν δὲ σύγκρισιν ἐποιησάμην, ὡς καὶ ἔμπροσθεν ἐπεσημηνάμην, ἐκ περιόντος, ἱκανῶς, ὧς οἶμαι, δείξας ἔμπροσθεν] ὅτι μὴ δυνάμεθα προκρίνειν τὰς ἡμετέρας φαντασίας
τῶν παρὰ τοῖς ἀλόγοις ζῴοις γινομένων. ἀλλ’ εἰ μή ἐστιν ἀπιστότερα τά ἄλογα ζῷα ἡμῶν πρὸς τὴν κρίσιν τῶν φαντασιῶν, καὶ διάφοροι γίνονται φαντασίαι παρὰ τὴν τῶν ζῴων παραλλαγήν, ὁποῖον μὲν ἕκαστον τῶν
ὑποκειμένων ἐμοὶ φαίνεται δυνήσομαι λέγειν, ὁποῖον δὲ ἔστι τῇ φύσει διὰ τὰ προειρημένα ἐπέχειν ἀναγκασθήσομαι.

¹⁶ 19

[79] Καὶ ὁ μὲν πρῶτος τῆς ἐποχῆς τρόπος τοιοῦτός ἐστι, δεύτερον δὲ ἐλέγομεν εἶναι τὸν ἀπὸ τῆς διαφορᾶς τῶν ἀνθρώπων· ἴνα γὰρ καθ’ ὑπόθεσιν καὶ συγχωρήσῃ τις πιστοτέρους εἶναι τῶν ἀλόγων ζῴων τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, εὑρήσομεν καὶ ὅσον ἐπὶ τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ διαφορᾷ τὴν ἐποχὴν εἰσαγομένην. δύο τοίνυν εἶναι λεγομένων ἐξ ὧν σύγκειται ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος, κατ’ ἄμφω ταῦτα διαφέρομεν ἀλλήλων, οἷον κατὰ σῶμα ταῖς τε μορφαῖς καὶ ταῖς ἰδιοσυγκρισίαις.

[80] διαφέρει μὲν γὰρ κατὰ μορφὴν σῶμα
Σκύθου Ἰνδοῦ σώματος, τὴν δὲ παραλλαγὴν ποιεῖ, καθάπερ φασίν, ἡ διάφορος τῶν χυμῶν ἐπικράτεια. παρὰ δὲ τὴν διάφορον τῶν χυμῶν ἐπικράτειαν διάφοροι γίνονται καὶ αἱ φαντασίαι, καθάπερ καὶ ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ λόγῳ (ξ 52) παρεστήσαμεν. ταῦτά τοι καὶ ἐν τῇ αἱρέσει καὶ φυγῇ τῶν ἐκτὸς διαφορὰ πολλὴ κατ’ αὐτούς ἐστιν· ἄλλοις γὰρ χαίρουσιν Ἰνδοὶ καὶ ἄλλοις οἱ καθ’ ἡμᾶς, τὸ δὲ διαφόροις χαίρειν τοῦ παρηλλαγμένας ἀπὸ τῶν ὑποκειμένων φαντασίας, λαμβάνειν ἐστὶ μηνυτικόν.

[81] κατὰ δὲ ἰδιοσυγκρισίας διαφέρομεν ὡς ἐνίους κρέα βόεια πετραίων ἰχθυδίων ῥᾷον πέττειν καὶ
ὑπὸ Λεσβίου οἰναρίου εἰς χολέραν περιτρέπεσθαι. ἦν δέ, φασίν, γραῦς Ἀττικὴ τριάκοντα ὁλκὰς κωνείου ἀκινδύνως προσφερομένη, Λῦσις δὲ καὶ μηκωνείου τέσσαρας ὁλκὰς ἀλύπως ἐλάμβανεν.

[82] καὶ Δημοφῶν μὲν ὁ Ἀλεξάνδρου τραπεζοποιὸς ἐν ἡλίῳ γινόμενος ἢ ἐν βαλανείῳ ἐρρίγου, ἐν
σκιᾷ δὲ ἐθάλπετο, Ἀθηναγόρας δὲ ὁ Ἀργεῖος ὑπό σκορπίων καὶ φαλαγγίων ἀλύπως ἐπλήσσετο, οἱ δὲ καλούμενοι Ψθλλαεῖς οὐδ’ ὑπὸ ὄφεων ἤ ἀσπίδων δακνόμενοι βλάπτονται,

[83] οἱ δὲ Τεντυρῖται τῶν Αἰγυπτίων οὐ βλάπτονται πρὸς
¹⁷¹⁸ 20 ἄνω κάτω] τῶν κροκοδείλων. ἀλλά καὶ Αἰθιόπων οἱ ἀντι- πέραν τῆς Μερόης παρὰ τὸν ’Αστάπουν ποταμὸν οἰκοῦντες σκορπίους καὶ ὄφεις καὶ τὰ παραπλήσια ἀκινδύνως ἐσθίουσιν.
καὶ Ῥουφῖνος δὲ ὁ ἐν Χαλκίδι πίνων ἑλλέβορον οὔτε ἤμει οὔτε ὅλως ἐκαθαίρετο, ἀλλ’ ὥς τι τῶν συνήθων προσεφέρετο καὶ ἔπεσσεν.

[84] Χρύσερμος δὲ ὁ Ἡροφίλειος εἴ ποτε πέπερι προσηνέγκατο, καρδιακῶς ἐκινδύνευεν. καὶ Σωτήριχος δὲ ὁ χειρουργὸς εἴ ποτε σιλούρων ᾔσθετο κνίσσης, χολέρᾳ ἡλίσκετο.
Ἄνδρων δὲ ὁ Ἀργεῖος οὕτως ἄδιψος ἦν ὡς καὶ διὰ τῆς ἀνύδρου Λιβύης ὁδεύειν αὐτὸν μὴ ἐπιζητοῦντα ποτόν. Τιβέριος δὲ ὁ Καῖσαρ ἐν σκότῳ ἑώρα. Ἀριστοτέλης δὲ ἱστορεῖ (Meteor. p.373b4) Θάσιόν τινα ᾧ ἐδόκει ἀνθρώπου εἴδωλον προηγεῖσθαι αὐτοῦ διὰ παντός.

[85] τοσαύτης οὖν par-
ἀλλαγῆς οὔσης ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις κατὰ τὰ σώματα, ἵνα ὀλίγα ἀπὸ πολλῶν τῶν παρὰ τοῖς δογματικοῖς κειμένων ἀρκεσθῶμεν εἰπόντες, εἰκός ἐστι καὶ κατ’ αὐτὴν τὴν ψυχὴν διαφέρειν ἀλλήλων τοὺς ἀνθρώπους· τύπος γάρ τίς ἐστι τὸ σῶμα τῆς ψυχῆς, ὧς καὶ ἡ φυσιογνωμονικὴ σοφία δείκνυσιν. τὸ
δὲ μέγιστον δεῖγμα τῆς κατὰ τὴν διάνοιαν τῶν ἀνθρώπων πολλῆς καὶ ἀπείρου διαφορᾶς ἡ διαφωνία τῶν παρὰ τοῖς δογματικοῖς λεγομένων περί τε τῶν ἄλλων καὶ περὶ τοῦ τίνα μὲν αἱρεῖσθαι προσήκει τίνα δὲ ἐκκλίνειν.

[86] δεόντως οὖν καὶ οἱ ποιηταὶ περὶ τούτων ἀπεφήναντο· ὁ μὲν γὰρ
Πίνδαρός φησιν (fr. 242 Boeckh, 221 Schroed.)

ἀελλοπόδων μέν τιν’ εὐφραίνουσιν ἱππὼν

τιμαί <τε> καὶ στέφανοι,

τοὺς δ’ ἐν πολυχρύσοις θαλάμοις βιοτά·

τέρπεται δὲ καί τις ἐπ’ οἶδμ’ ἅλιον

¹⁹

ναὶ· θοᾷ διαμείβων.

²⁰ 20 ὁ δὲ ποιητὴς λέγει (ξ 228) ²¹

ἄλλος γάρ τ’ ἄλλοισιν ἀνὴρ ἐπιτέρπεται ἔργοις.

ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡ τραγῳδία μεστὴ τῶν τοιούτων ἐστί· λέγει γοῦν (Eurip. Phoen. 499)

εἰ πᾶσι ταὐτὸν καλὸν ἔφυ σοφόν θ’ ἅμα,

οὐκ ἦν ἂν ἀμφίλεκτος ἀνθρώποις ἔρις,

καὶ πάλιν (Fragm. Trag. adesp. 462 Nauck)

δεινόν γε ταὐτὸν τοῖς μὲν ἁνδάνειν βροτῶν

τοῖς δ’ ἔχθος εἶναι.

ἐπεὶ οὖν ἡ αἵρεσις καὶ ἡ φυγὴ ἐν ἡδονῇ

[87] καὶ ἀηδισμῷ ἐστιν, ἡ δὲ ἡδονὴ καὶ ὁ ἀηδισμὸς ἐν αἰσθήσει κεῖται καὶ φαντασίᾳ, ὅταν τὰ αὐτὰ οἱ μὲν αἱρῶνται οἱ δὲ φεύγωσιν, ἀκόλουθον ἡμᾶς ἐπιλογίζεσθαι ὅτι οὐδὲ ὁμοίως ὑπὸ τῶν αὐλουθον κινοῦνται, ἐπεὶ ὁμοίως ἂν τὰ αὐτὰ ᾑροῦντο ἢ ἐξέκλινον.
εἰ δὲ τὰ <αὐτὰ> διαφόρως κινεῖ παρὰ τὴν διαφορὰν τῶν ἀνθρώπων, θρώπων, εἰσάγοιτ’ ἂν εἰκότως καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο ἡ ἐποχή, ὅ τι μὲν ἕκαστον φαίνεται τῶν ὑποκειμένων ὧς πρὸς ἑκάστην διαφορὰν ’ίσως λέγειν ἡμῶν δυναμένων, τί δὲ ἔστι κατὰ δύναμιν] ὡς πρὸς τὴν φύσιν οὐχ οἰῶν τε ὄντων ἀπο-
φήνασθαι.

[88] ἤτοι γὰρ πᾶσι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις πιστεύσομεν ἢ τισίν. ἀλλ’ εἰ μὲν πᾶσιν, καὶ ἀδυνάτοις ἐπιχειρήσομεν καὶ τὰ ἀντικείμενα παραδεξόμεθα· εἰ δὲ τισίν, εἰπάτωσαν ἡμῖν τίσι χρὴ συγκατατίθεσθαι· ὁ μὲν γὰρ Πλατωνικὸς λέξει ὅτι Πλάτωνι, ὁ Ἐπικούρειος δὲ Ἐπικούρῳ, καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι
ἀναλόγως, καὶ οὕτως ἀνεπικρίτως στασιάζοντες αὖθις ἡμᾶς εἰς τὴν ἐποχὴν περιστήσουσιν.

[89] ὁ δὲ λέγων ὅτι τοῖς πλείστοις δεῖ συγκατατίθεσθαι παιδαριῶδές τι προοίσεται, οὐδενὸς δυναμένου πάντας τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἐπελθεῖν καὶ διαλογίσασθαι τί τοῖς πλείστοις ἀρέσκει, ἐνδεχομένου τοῦ ἔν τισιν
ἔθνεσιν, ἃ ἡμεῖς οὐκ ἴσμεν, τὰ μὲν παρ’ ἡμῖν σπάνια ²² 21 τοῖς πλείοσι προσεῖναι τὰ δὲ ἡμῶν τοῖς πολλοῖς συμβαί- νοντα σπάνια ὑπάρχειν, ὧς τοὺς πολλούς μὲν ὑπὸ φαλαγ- γίων δακνομένους μὴ ἀλγεῖν, τινὰς δὲ σπανίως ἀλγεῖν, καὶ
ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ἔμπροσθεν (ξ 81 sqq.) εἰρημένων ἰδιοσυγκρισιῶν τὸ ἀνάλογον. ἀναγκαῖον οὖν καὶ διὰ τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων διαφορὰν εἰσάγεσθαι τὴν ἐποχήν.

[90] Ἐπεὶ δὲ φίλαυτοί τινες ὄντες οἱ δογματικοί φασι δεῖν τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων ἑαυτούς προκρίνειν ἐν τῇ κρίσει τῶν πραγμάτων, ἐπιστάμεθα μὲν ὅτι ἄτοπός ἐστιν ἡ ἀξίωσις αὐτῶν μέρος γάρ εἰσι καὶ αὐτοὶ τῆς διαφωνίας· καὶ ἐὰν
αὐτοὺς προκρίνοντες οὕτω κρίνωσι τὰ φαινόμενα, πρὶν ἄρξασθαι τῆς κρίσεως τὸ ζητούμενον συναρπάζουσιν, ἑαυτοῖς τὴν κρίσιν ἐπιτρέποντες),

[91] ὁμῶ ’ς δ’ οὖν ἔνα καὶ ἐπὶ ἑνὸς ἀνθρώπου τὸν λόγον ἱστάντες, οἷον τοῦ παρ’ αὐτοῖς ὀνειροπολουμένου σοφοῦ, ἐπὶ τὴν ἐποχὴν καταντῶμεν, τὸν
τρίτον τῇ τάξει τρόπον προχειριζόμεθα. τοῦτονδ᾿ ἐλέγομεν τὸν ἀπὸ τῆς διαφορᾶς τῶν αἰσθήσεων. ὅτι δὲ διαφέρονται αἱ αἰσθήσεις πρὸς ἀλλήλας, πρόδηλον.

[92] αἱ γοῦν γραφαὶ τῇ μὲν ὄψει δοκοῦσιν εἰσοχὰς καὶ ἐξοχὰς ἔχειν, οὐ μὴν καὶ τῇ ἁφῇ. καὶ τὸ μέλι τῇ μὲν γλώττῃ ἡδύ φαίνεται ἐπί
τινων, τοῖς δ’ ὀφθαλμοῖς ἀηδές· ἀδύνατον οὖν ἐστιν εἰπεῖν πότερον ἡδύ ἐστιν εἰλικρινῶς ἢ ἀηδές. καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ μύρου ὁμοίως· τὴν μὲν γὰρ ὄσφρησιν εὐφραίνει, τὴν δὲ γεῦσιν ἀηδίζει.

[93] τό τε εὐφόρβιον ἐπεὶ τοῖς μὲν ὀφθαλμοῖς λυπη- ρόν ἐστι τῷ δὲ ἄλλῳ σώματι παντὶ ἄλυπον, οὐχ ἕξομεν
εἰπεῖν, πότερον ἄλυπόν ἐστιν εἰλικρινῶς τοῖς σώμασιν ὅσον ἐπὶ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ φύσει ἢ λυπηρόν. τό τε ὄμβριον ὕδωρ ὀφθαλμοῖς μέν ἐστιν ὠφέλιμον, ἀρτηρίαν δὲ καὶ πνεύμονα τραχύνει, καθάπερ καὶ τὸ ἔλαιον, καίτοι τὴν ἐπιφάνειαν παρηγοροῦν. καὶ ἡ θαλαττία νάρκη τοῖς μὲν ἄκροις
τεθεῖσα ναρκᾶν ποιεῖ, τῷ δ’ ἄλλῳ σώματι ἀλύπως παραξξ ²³²⁴ 22 τίθεται. διόπερ ὁποῖον μὲν ἔστι πρὸς τὴν φύσιν ἕκαστον τούτων οὐχ ἕξομεν λέγειν, ὁποῖον δὲ φαίνεται ἑκάστοτε δυνατὸν εἰπεῖν.

[94] καὶ ἄλλα δὲ πλείω τούτων ἔνεστι λέγειν· ἀλλ’ ἴνα μὴ διατρίβωμεν, διὰ τὴν πρόθεσιν τοῦ τρόπου] τῆς συγγραφῆς ἐκεῖνο λεκτέον. ἕκαστον τῶν φαινομένων
ἡμῖν αἰσθητῶν ποικίλον ὑποπίπτειν δοκεῖ, οἷον τὸ μῆλον λεῖον εὐῶδες γλυκὺ ξανθόν. ἄδηλον οὖν πότερόν ποτε ταύτας μόνας ὄντως ἔχει τἀς ποιότητας, ἢ μονόποιον μέν ἐστιν, παρὰ δὲ τὴν διάφορον κατασκευὴν τῶν αἰσθητηρίων
διάφορον φαίνεται, ἢ καὶ πλείονας μὲν τῶν φαινομένων ἔχει ποιότητας, ἡμῖν δ’ οὐχ ὑποπίπτουσί τινες αὐτῶν.

[95] μονόποιον μὲν γὰρ εἷναι τοῦτο ἐνδέχεται λογίζεσθαι ἐκ τῶν ἔμπροσθεν ἡμῖν εἰρημένων (j53) τῆς εἰς τὰ σώ-
μάτα ἀναδιδομένης τροφῆς καὶ τοῦ ὕδατος τοῦ εἰς τὰ δένδρα ἀναδιδομένου καὶ τοῦ πνεύματος τοῦ ἐν] αὐλοῖς καὶ σύριγξι καὶ τοῖς παραπλησίοις ὀργάνοις <ἐμπνεομένον>· δύναται γὰρ καὶ τὸ μῆλον μονοειδὲς μὲν εἶναι, διάφορον δὲ θεωρεῖσθαι παρὰ τὴν διαφορὰν τῶν αἰσθητηρίων περὶ ἃ γίνεται
αὐτοῦ ἡ ἀντίληψις.

[96] πλείονας δὲ τῶν φαινομένων ἡμῖν ποιοτήτων ἔχειν τὸ μῆλον ποιότητας δύνασθαι οὕτως ἐπιλογιζόμεθα. ἐννοήσωμέν τινα ἐκ γενετῆς ἁφὴν μὲν ἔχοντα καὶ ὄσφρησιν καὶ γεῦσιν, μήτε δὲ ἀκούοντα μήτε ὁρῶντα. οὗτος τοίνυν ὑπολήψεται μήτε ὁρατόν τι εἶναι τὴν ἀρχὴν
μήτε ἀκουστόν, ἀλλὰ μόνα ἐκείνα τὰ τρία γένη τῶν ποιοτήτων ὑπάρχειν ὧν ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι δύναται.

[97] καὶ ἡμᾶς οὖν ἐνδέχεται τἀς πέντε μόνας αἰσθήσεις ἔχοντας μόνον ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι, ἐκ τῶν περὶ τὸ μῆλον ποιοτήτων, ὧν ἐσμεν ἀντιληπτικοί· ὑποκεῖσθαι δὲ ἄλλας οἶόν τέ ἐστι ποιότητας,
ὑποπιπτούσας ἑτέροις αἰσθητηρίοις, ὧν ἡμεῖς οὐ μετεσχήκαμεν, διὸ οὐδὲ ἀντιλαμβανόμεθα τῶν κατ’ αὐτὰς αἰσθητῶν.

[98] ἀλλ’ ἡ φύσις συνεμετρήσατο, φήσει τις, τἀς αἰσθήσεις πρὸς τὰ αἰσθητὰ. ποία φύσις, διαφωνίας τοσαύτης
²⁵ 23
επικρίτου παρὰ τοῖς δογματικοῖς οὔσης περὶ τῆς ὑπάρξεως τῆς κατ’ αὐτήν; ὁ γὰρ ἐπικρίνων αὐτὸ τοῦτο εἰ ἔστι φύσις, εἰ μὲν ἰδιώτης εἴη, ἄπιστος ἔσται κατ’ αὐτούς, φιλόσοφος δὲ ὢν μέρος ἔσται τῆς διαφωνίας καὶ κρινόμενος αὐτὸς ἀλλ’ οὐ κριτής.

[99] πλὴν ἀλλ’ <εἰ> ἐνεχώρει καὶ ταύτας
μόνας ὑποκεῖσθαι παρὰ τῷ μήλῳ τὰς ποιότητας ὣν ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι δοκοῦμεν, καὶ πλείους τούτων, ἢ πάλιν μηδὲ τἀς ἡμῖν ὑποπιπτούσας, ἄδηλον ἡμῖν ἔσται ὁποῖόν ἐστι τὸ μῆλον. ὁ δὲ αὐτὸς καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθητῶν
λόγος. τῶν τῶν αἰσθήσεων μέντοι μὴ καταλαμβανουσῶν τὰ ἐκτός, οὐδὲ ἡ διάνοια ταῦτα δύναται κατ’ καταλαμβάνειν, <σφαλλουσῶν αὐτὴν τῶν ὁδηγῶν> ὥστε καὶ διὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ἡ περὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς ὑποκειμένων ἐποχὴ συνάγεσθαι δόξει.

[100] Ἵνα δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ μιᾶς ἑκάστης αἰσθήσεως ἱστάντες τὸν λόγον, ἢ καὶ ἀφιστάμενοι τῶν αἰσθήσεων, ἔχωμεν καταλήγειν εἰς τὴν ἐποχήν, παραλαμβάνομεν καὶ τὸν τέταρτον τρόπον αὐτῆς. ἔστι δ’ οὗτος ὁ παρὰ τὰς περιστάσεις καλούμενος, λούμενος, περιστάσεις λεγόντων ἡμῶν τὰς διαθέσεις.
θεωρεῖσθαι δ’ αὐτόν φαμεν ἐν τῷ κατὰ φύσιν ἢ παρὰ φύσιν <ἔχειν> ἐν τῷ ἐγρηγορέναι ἢ καθεύδειν, παρὰ τὰς ἡλικίας, παρὰ τὸ κινεῖσθαι ἢ ἠρεμεῖν, παρὰ τὸ μισεῖν ἤ φιλεῖν, παρὰ τὸ ἐνδεεῖς εἶναι ἢ κεκορεσμένους, παρὰ τὸ μεθύειν ἢ νήφειν, παρὰ τἀς προδιαθέσεις, παρὰ τὸ θαρρεῖν ἢ δεδιέναι, ἢ]
παρὰ τὸ λυπεῖσθαι ἢ χαίρειν.

[101] οἶον παρὰ μὲν τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ἢ παρά φύσιν ἔχειν ἀνόμοια ὑποπίπτει τὰ πράγματα, ἐπεὶ οἱ μὲν φρενιτίζοντες καὶ οἱ θεοφορούμενοι δαιμόνων ἀκούειν δοκοῦσιν, ἡμεῖς δὲ οὔ. ὁμοίως δὲ ἀποφορᾶς στύ- ρακος ἢ λιβανωτοῦ ἤ τινος τοιούτου καὶ ἄλλων πλειόνων ²⁶²⁷ 24 ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι πολλάκις λέγουσιν, ἡμῶν μὴ αἰσθανομένων.
καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ὕδωρ φλεγμαίνουσι μὲν τόποις ἐπιχυθὲν ζεστὸν εἶναι δοκεῖ, ἡμῖν δὲ χλιαρόν. καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἱμάτιον τοῖς μὲν ὑπόσφαγμα ἔχουσι φαίνεται κιρρόν, ἐμοὶ δὲ οὔ. καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ μέλι ἐμοὶ μὲν φαίνεται γλυκύ, τοῖς δὲ ἰκτερικοῖς πικρόν.

[102] εἰ δέ τις λέγει ὅτι χυμῶν τινων παραπλοκὴ
ἀνοικείους φαντασίας ἐκ τῶν ὑποκειμένων ποιεῖ τοῖς παρὰ φύσιν ἔχουσιν, λεκτέον ὅτι ἐπεὶ καὶ οἱ ὑγιαίνοντες χυμοὺς ἔχουσιν ἀνακεκραμένους, δύνανται οὗτοι τὰ ἐκτὸς ὑποκείμενα, τοιαῦτα ὄντα τῇ φύσει ὁποῖα φαίνεται τοῖς παρὰ φύσιν ἔχειν λεγομένοις, ἑτεροῖα φαίνεσθαι ποιεῖν τοῖς
ὑγιαίνουσιν.

[103] τὸ γὰρ ἐκείνοις μὲν τοῖς χυμοῖς μεταβλητικὴν τῶν ὑποκειμένων διδόναι δύναμιν, τούτοις δὲ μή, πλασματικόν ἐστιν, ἐπεὶ καὶ ὥσπερ οἱ ὑγιαίνοντες κατὰ
φύσιν μὲν τὴν τῶν ὑγιαινόντων ἔχουσι, παρὰ φύσιν δὲ τὴν τῶν νοσούντων, οὕτω καὶ οἱ νοσοῦντες παρὰ φύσιν μὲν ἔχουσι τὴν τῶν ὑγιαινόντων, κατὰ φύσιν δὲ τὴν τῶν νοσούντων, ὥστε κἀκείνοις πρός τι κατὰ φύσιν ἔχουσι πιστευτέον.

[104] παρὰ δὲ τὸ ὑπνοῦν ἢ ἐγρηγορέναι διάφοροι γί- νονται φαντασίαι, ἐπεὶ ὧς καθ’ ὕπνους φανταζόμεθα, οὐ φανταζόμεθα ἐγρηγορότες, οὐδὲ ὡς φανταζόμεθα ἐγρηγορότες, καὶ κατὰ τοὺς ὕπνους φανταζόμεθα, ὥστε εἶναι αὐταῖς ἢ μὴ εἶναι γίνεται οὐχ ἁπλῶς ἀλλὰ πρός τι·
πρὸς γὰρ τὸ καθ’ ὕπνους ἢ πρὸς ἐγρήγορσιν. εἰκότως οὖν καθ’ ὕπνους ὁρῶμεν ταῦτα ἅ ἐστιν ἀνύπαρκτα ἐν τῷ ἐγρη- γορέναι, οὐ[κ ἐν τῷ] καθάπαξ ἀνύπαρκτα ὄντα· ἔστι γὰρ καθ’ ὕπνους, ὥσπερ τὰ ὕπαρ ἔστιν κἂν μὴ ᾖ καθ’ ὕπνους.

[105] παρὰ δὲ τὰς ἡλικίας, ὅτι ὁ αὐτὸς ἀὴρ τοῖς μὲν
γέρουσι ψυχρὸς εἶναι δοκεῖ τοῖς δὲ ἀκμάζουσιν εὔκρατος, ²⁸ καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ χρῶμα τοῖς μὲν πρεσβυτέροις ἀμαυρὸν φαί- νεται τοῖς δὲ ἀκμάζουσι κατακορές, καὶ φωνὴ ὁμοίως ἡ αὐτὴ τοῖς μὲν ἀμαυρὰ δοκεῖ τυγχάνειν τοῖς δ’ ἐξάκουστος.

[106]
καὶ παρὰ τἀς αἱρέσεις δὲ καὶ φυγὰς ἀνομοίως κινοῦνται οἱ ταῖς ἡλικίαις διαφέροντες· παισὶ μὲν γάρ, εἰ τύχοι, σφαῖραι καὶ τροχοὶ διὰ σπουδῆς εἰσιν, οἱ ἀκμάζοντες δὲ ἄλλα αἱροῦνται, καὶ ἄλλα οἱ γέροντες. ἐξ ὧν συνάγεται ὅτι διάφοροι γίνονται φαντασίαι ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν ὑποκειμένων
καὶ παρὰ τὰς διαφόρους ἡλικίας.

[107] παρὰ δὲ τὸ κινεῖσθαι ἢ ἠρεμεῖν ἀνόμοια φαίνεται τὰ πράγματα, ἐπεὶ ἅπερ ἑστῶτες ὁρῶμεν ἀτρεμοῦντα, ταῦτα παραπλέοντες κινεῖσθαι δοκοῦμεν.

[108] παρὰ δὲ τὸ φιλεῖν ἤ μισεῖν, ὅτι κρέα ὕεια τινὲς μὲν ἀποστρέφονται καθ’ ὑπερβολήν, τινὲς δὲ
ἥδιστα προσφέρονται. ὅθεν καὶ ὁ Μένανδρος (fr. 518 Kock cf. Nauck Mel. gr. VI 120 Cobet N. L. p. 85.) ἔφη

οἶος δὲ καὶ τὴν ὄψιν εἶναι φαίνεται;

ἀφ’ οὗ τοιοῦτος γέγονεν; οἶον θηρίον.

τὸ μηδὲν ἀδικεῖν καὶ καλοὺς ἡμᾶς ποιεῖ.

πολλοὶ <δὲ> καὶ ἐρωμένας αἰσχρὰς ἔχοντες ὡραιοτάτας αὐτὰς εἷναι δοκοῦσιν.

[109] παρὰ δὲ τὸ πεινῆν ἢ κεκορέσθαι, ὅτι τὸ αὐτὸ ἔδεσμα τοῖς μὲν πεινῶσιν ἥδιστον εἶναι δοκεῖ, τοῖς δὲ κεκορεσμένοις ἀηδές. παρὰ δὲ τὸ μεθύειν ἢ νήφειν,
ὅτι ἅπερ νήφοντες αἰσχρὰ εἶναι δοκοῦμεν, ταῦτα ἡμῖν μεθύουσιν οὐκ αἰσχρὰ φαίνεται.

[110] παρὰ δὲ τὰς προδιαθέσεις, ὅτι ὁ αὐτὸς οἶνος τοῖς μὲν φοίνικας ἢ ἰσχάδας προφαγοῦσιν ὀξώδης φαίνεται, τοῖς δὲ κάρυα ἢ ἐρεβίνθους προσενεγκαμένοις ἡδὺς εἶναι δοκεῖ, καὶ ἡ τοῦ βαλανείου
παραστὰς τοὺς μὲν ἔξωθεν εἰσιόντας θερμαίνει, ψύχει δὲ τοὺς ἐξιόντας, εἰ ἐν αὐτῇ διατρίβοιεν.

[111] παρὰ δὲ τὸ φοβεῖσθαι ἢ θαρρεῖν, ὅτι τὸ αὐτὸ πρᾶγμα τῷ μὲν δειλῷ φοβερὸν καὶ δεινὸν εἶναι δοκεῖ, τῷ θαρραλεωτέρῳ δὲ οὐσαμῶς. παρὰ δὲ τὸ λυπεῖσθαι ἢ χαίρειν, ὅτι τὰ αὐτὰ ²⁹ 26 πράγματα τοῖς μὲν λυπουμένοις ἐστὶν ἐπαχθῆ τοῖς δὲ xaqiroysin
ἡδέα.

[112] Τοσαύτης οὖν οὔσης ἀνωμαλίας καὶ παρὰ ³⁰ τὰς διαθέσεις, καὶ ἄλλοτε ἄλλως ἐν ταῖς διαθέσεσι τῶν ἀνθρώπων γινομένων, ὁποῖον μὲν ἕκαστον τῶν ὑποκειμένων ἑκάστῳ φαίνεται ῥᾴδιον ἴσως εἰπεῖν, ὁποῖον
δὲ ἔστιν οὐκέτι, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἀνεπίκριτός ἐστιν ἡ ἄνωμαλία. ὁ γὰρ ἐπικρίνων ταύτην ἤτοι ἔν τισι τῶν προειρημένων διαθέσεων ἐστιν ἢ ἐν οὐδεμιᾷ τὸ παράπαν ἐστὶ διαθέσει. τὸ μὲν οὖν λέγειν ὅτι ἐν οὐδεμιᾷ διαθέσει τὸ σύνολόν ἐστιν, οἷον οὔτε ὑγιαίνει οὔτε νοσεῖ, οὔτε κινεῖται οὔτε
ἠρεμεῖ, οὔτε ἔν τινι ἡλικίᾳ ἐστίν, ἀπήλλακται δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων διαθέσεων, τελέως ἀπεμφαίνει. εἰ δὲ ἔν τινι διαθέσει ὢν κρινεῖ τὰς φαντασίας, μέρος ἔσται τῆς διαφωνίας,

[113] καὶ ἄλλως οὐκ εἰλικρινὴς τῶν ἐκτὸς ὑποκειμένων ἔσται κριτὴς διὰ τὸ τεθολῶσθαι ταῖς διαθέσεσιν ἐν αἷς ἔστιν· οὔτε οὖν ὁ
ἐγρηγορὼς δύναται συγκρίνειν τἀς τῶν καθευδόντων φαντασιάς ταῖς τῶν ἐγρηγορότων, οὔτε ὁ ὑγιαίνων τὰς τῶν ωοσούντων ταῖς τῶν ὑγιαινόντων· τοῖς γὰρ παροῦσι καὶ κινοῦσιν ἡμᾶς κατὰ τὸ παρὸν συγκατατιθέμεθα μᾶλλον ἢ τοῖς μὴ
παροῦσιν.

[114] καὶ ἄλλως δὲ ἀνεπίκριτός ἐστιν ἡ τῶν τοιούτων φαντασιῶν ἀνωμαλία. ὁ γὰρ προκρίνων φαντασίαν φαντασίας καὶ περίστασιν περιστάσεως ἤτοι ἀκρίτως καὶ ἄνευ ἀποδείξεως τοῦτο ποιεῖ ἢ κρίνων καὶ ἀποδεικνύς. ἀλλ’ οὔτε
ἄνευ τούτων (ἄπιστος γὰρ ἔσται), οὔτε σύν τούτοις. εἰ γὰρ κρινεῖ τὰς φαντασίας, πάντως κριτηρίῳ κρινεῖ.

[115] τοῦτο οὖν τὸ κριτήριον ἤτοι ἀληθὲς εἶναι λέξει ἢ ψευδές. ἀλλ’ εἰ μὲν ψευδές, ἄπιστος ἔσται. εἰ δὲ ἀληθὲς εἶναι τοῦτο φήσει, ἤτοι ἄνευ ἀποδείξεως λέξει ὅτι ἀληθές ἐστι τὸ κριτήριον,
ἢ μετὰ ἀποδείξεως. καὶ εἰ μὲν ἄνευ ἀποδείξεως, ἄπιστος ἔσται· εἰ δὲ μετὰ ἀποδείξεως, πάντως δεήσει καὶ τὴν ἀπόδειξιν ἀληθῆ εἶναι, ἐπεὶ ἄπιστος ἔσται. ἀληθῆ ³¹ 27 οὖν λέξει τὴν ἀπόδειξιν τὴν εἰς πίστωσιν τοῦ κριτηρίου
λαμβανομένην πότερον κεκρικὼς αὐτὴν ἢ μὴ κεκρικώς;

[116] κώς; εἰ μὲν γὰρ μὴ κρίνας, ἄπιστος ἔσται, εἰ δὲ κρίνας, δῆλον ὅτι κριτηρίῳ φήσει κεκρικέναι, οὗ κριτηρίου ζητήσομεν ἀπόδειξιν, κἀκείνης κριτήριον. χρῄζει γὰρ ἀεὶ καὶ ἡ ἀπόδειξις κριτηρίου, ἴνα βεβαιωθῇ, καὶ τὸ κριτήριον ἀποδείξεως,
ἵν́α ἀληθὲς εἶναι δειχθῇ· καὶ οὔτε ἀπόδειξις ὑγιὴς εἶναι δύναται μὴ προϋπάρχοντος κριτηρίου ἀληθοῦς, οὔτε κριτήριον ἀληθὲς μὴ προπεπιστωμένης τῆς ἀποδείξεως.

[117] καὶ οὕτως ἐμπίπτουσιν εἰς τὸν διάλληλον τρόπον τό τε κριτήριον καὶ ἡ ἀπόδειξις, ἐν ᾧ ἀμφότερα εὑρίσκεται ἄπιστα·
ἑκάτερον γὰρ τὴν θατέρου πίστιν περιμένον ὁμοίως τῷ λοιπῷ ἐστιν ἄπιστον. εἰ οὖν μήτε ἄνευ ἀποδείξεως <καὶ< κριτηρίου μήτε σὺν τούτοις δύναταί τις προκρῖναι φαντασίαν φαντασίας, ἀνεπίκριτοι ἔσονται αἱ παρὰ τὰς διαφόρους διαθέσεις διάφοροι γινόμεναι φαντασίαι, ὥστε εἰσάγεται
ἡ περὶ τῆς φύσεως τῶν ἐκτὸς ὑποκειμένων ἐποχὴ καὶ ὅσον ἐπὶ τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ.

[118]
Πέμπτος ἐστὶ λόγος ὁ παρά τὰς θέσεις καὶ τὰ διαστήματα καὶ τούς τόπους· καὶ γὰρ παρὰ τούτων ἕκαστον τὰ αὐτὰ πράγματα διάφορα φαίνεται, οἷον ἡ αὐτὴ στοὰ ἀπὸ μὲν τῆς ἑτέρας ἀρχῆς ὁρωμένη μείουρος φαίνεται, ἀπὸ δὲ
τοῦ μέσου σύμμετρος πάντοθεν, καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ πλοῖον πόρρωθεν μὲν μικρὸν φαίνεται καὶ ἑστὼς, ἐγγύθεν δὲ μέγα καὶ κινούμενον, καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς πόργος πόρρωθεν μὲν φαίνεται στρογγύλος ἐγγύθεν δὲ τετράγωνος.

[119] ταῦτα μὲν παρὰ τὰ διαστήματα, παρὰ δὲ τούς τόπους ὅτι τὸ λυχνιαῖον φῶς ἐν
ἡλίῳ μὲν ἀμαυρὸν φαίνεται ἐν σκότῳ δὲ λαμπρόν, καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ κώπη ἔναλος μὲν κεκλασμένη ἔξαλος δὲ εὐθεῖα, καὶ τὸ ᾠὸν ἐν μὲν τῇ ὄρνιθι ἁπαλὸν ἐν ἀέρι δὲ σκληρόν, καὶ τὸ λυγγούριον ἐν μὲν λυγγὶ ὑγρὸν ἐν ἀέρι δὲ σκληρόν, καὶ ³²³³ 28 τὸ κοράλον ἐν θαλάττῃ μὲν ἁπαλὸν ἐν ἀέρι δὲ σκληρόν, καὶ φωνὴ ἀλλοία μὲν φαίνεται ἐν σύριγγι γινομένη, ἀλλοία
δὲ ἐν αὐλῷ, ἀλλοία δὲ ἐν ἀέρι ἁπλῶς.

[120] παρὰ δὲ τὰς θέσεις ὅτι ἡ αὐτὴ εἰκὼν ἐξυπτιαζομένη μὲν λεία φαίνεται, ποσῶς δὲ ἐπινευομένη εἰσοχὰς καὶ ἐξοχὰς ἔχειν δοκεῖ. καὶ οἱ τράχηλοι δὲ τῶν περιστερῶν παρὰ τὰς διαφόρους ἐπικλίσεις διάφοροι φαίνονται κατὰ χρῶμα.

[121] ἐπεὶ οὖν πάντα τὰ φαινόμενα
ἔν τινι θεωρεῖται καὶ ἀπό τινος διαστήματος καὶ κατά τινα θέσιν, ὧν ἕκαστον πολλὴν ποιεῖ παραλλαγὴν περὶ τἀς φαντασίας, σίας, ὧς ὑπεμνήσαμεν (ξ 118spp.), ἀναγκασθησόμεθα καὶ διὰ τούτου τοῦ τρόπου καταντᾶν εἰς ἐποχήν. καὶ γὰρ ὁ βουλόμενος τούτων τῶν φαντασιῶν προκρίνειν τινὰς ἀδυνάτοις
ἐπιχειρήσει.

[122] εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἀπλῶς καὶ ἄνευ ἀποδείξεως ποιήσεται τὴν ἀπόφασιν, ἄπιστος ἔσται· εἰ δὲ ἀποδείξει βουλήσεται χρήσασθαι, εἰ μὲν ψευδῆ λέξει τὴν ἀπόδειξιν εἷναι, ἑαυτὸν περιτρέψει, ἀληθῆ δὲ λέγων εἶναι τὴν ἀπόδεξιν αἰτηθήσεται ἀπόδειξιν τοῦ ἀληθῆ αὐτὴν εἶναι, κἀκείνης
ἄλλην, ἐπεὶ καὶ αὐτὴν ἀληθῆ εἶναι δεῖ, καὶ μέχρις ἀπείρου. ἀδύνατον δέ ἐστιν ἀπείρους ἀποδείξεις παραστῆσαι·

[123] οὐκοῦν οὐδὲ μετὰ ἀποδείξεως δυνήσεται προκρίνειν φαντασίαν φαντασίας. εἰ δὲ μήτε ἄνευ ἀποδείξεως μήτε μετὰ ἀποδείξεως δυνατὸς ἔσται τις ἐπικρίνειν τἀς προειρημένας φαντασίας, συνάγεται ἡ ἐποχή, ὁποῖον μὲν
φαίνεται ἕκαστον κατὰ τήνδε τὴν θέσιν ἢ κατὰ τόδε τὸ διάστημα ἤ ἐν τῷδε εἰπεῖν ἴσως δυναμένων ἡμῶν, ὁποῖον δέ ἐστιν ὡς πρὸς τὴν φύσιν ἀδυνατούντων ἀποφαίνεσθαι διὰ τὰ προειρημένα.

[124] Ἕκτος ἐστὶ τρόπος ὁ παρὰ τὰς ἐπιμιγάς, καθ’ ὃν
συνάγομεν ὅτι, ἐπεὶ μηδὲν τῶν ὑποκειμένων καθ’ ἑαυτὸ ³⁴³⁵ 29 ἡμῖν ὑποπίπτει ἀλλὰ σύν τινι, ὁποῖον μέν ἐστι τὸ μῖγμα ἔκ τε τοῦ ἐκτὸς καὶ τοῦ ᾧ συνθεωρεῖται τάχα δυνατὸν εἰπεῖν, ὁποῖον δέ ἐστι τὸ ἐκτὸς ὑποκείμενον εἰλικρινῶς
οὐκ ἂν ἔχοιμεν λέγειν. ὅτι δὲ οὐδὲν τῶν ἐκτὸς καθ’ αὑτὸ ὑποπίπτει ἀλλὰ πάντως σύν τινι, καὶ ὅτι παρὰ τοῦτο ἀλλοῖον θεωρεῖται, πρόδηλον, οἶμαι.

[125] τὸ γοῦν ἡμέτερον χρῶμα ἀλλοῖον μὲν ὁρᾶται ἐν ἀλεεινῷ ἀέρι, ἀλλοῖον δὲ ἐν τῷ] ψυχρῷ, καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἔχοιμεν εἰπεῖν ὁποιον
ἔστι τῇ φύσει τὸ χρῶμα ἡμῶν, ἀλλ’ ὁποῖον σὺν ἑκάστῳ τούτων θεωρεῖται. καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ φωνὴ ἀλλοία μὲν φαίνεται σὺν λεπτῷ ἀέρι, ἀλλοία δὲ σὺν παχυμερεῖ, καὶ τὰ ἀρώματα ἐν βαλανείῳ καὶ ἡλίῳ πληκτικώτερα μᾶλλόν ἐστιν ἢ ἐν ἀέρι καταψύχρῳ, καὶ τὸ σῶμα ὑπὸ ὕδατος μὲν περιεχόμενον
κοῦφόν ἐστιν, ὑπὸ δὲ ἀέρος βαρύ.

[126] ἔνα δὲ καὶ τῆς ἔξωθεν ἐπιμιξίας ἀποστῶμεν, οἱ ὀφθαλμοὶ ἡμῶν ἔχουσιν ἐν ἑαυτοῖς καὶ χιτῶνας καὶ ὑγρά. τὰ οὖν ὁρατὰ ἐπεὶ μὴ ἄνευ τούτων θεωρεῖται, οὐ καταληφθήσεται πρὸς ἀκρίβειαν· τοῦ γὰρ μίγματος ἀντιλαμβανόμεθα, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οἱ μὲν
ἰκτερικοὶ πάντα ὠχρὰ ὁρῶσιν, οἱ δ’ ὑπόσφαγμα ἔχοντες ὕφαιμα. καὶ ἐπεὶ ἡ φωνὴ ἡ αὐτὴ ἀλλοία μὲν φαίνεται ἐν ἀναπεπταμένοις τόποις, ἀλλοία δὲ ἐν στενοῖς καὶ ἑλικοειδέσι,
καὶ ἀλλοία μὲν ἐν καθαρῷ ἀέρι, ἀλλοία δὲ ἐν τεθολωμένῳ, εἰκός ἐστι μὴ ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι ἡμᾶς εἰλικρινῶς τῆς φωνῆς· τὰ γὰρ ὦτα σκολιόπορά ἐστι καὶ στενόπορα καὶ ἀτμώδεσιν ἀποφορήσεσιν, αἳ δὴ ἀπὸ τῶν περὶ τὴν κεφαλὴν φέρεσεαι
λέγονται τόπων, τεθολωμένα.

[127] ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τοῖς μυξωτῆρσι καὶ ἐν τοῖς τῆς γεύσεως τόποις ὑλῶν ὑποκειμένων, μετ’ ἐκείνων ἀντιλαμβανόμεθα τῶν γευστῶν καὶ τῶν ὀσφρητῶν, ἀλλ’ οὐκ εἰλικρινῶς. ὥστε διὰ τὰς ἐπιμιξίας αἱ αἰσθήσεις οὐκ ἀντιλαμβάνονται ὁποῖα πρὸς ἀκρίβειαν τὰ
ἐκτὸς ὑποκείμενά ἐστιν.

[128] ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ ἡ διάνοια, μάλιστα μὲν ἐπεὶ αἱ ὁδηγοὶ αὐτῆς αἰσθήσεις σφάλλονται· ἴσως δὲ καὶ αὕτη ἐπιμιξίαν τινὰ ἰδίαν ποιεῖται πρὸς τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν ἀισθήαὐτὸ ³⁶ σέων ἀναγγελλόμενα· περὶ γὰρ ἕκαστον τῶν τόπων ἐν οἷς τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν εἷναι δοκοῦσιν οἱ δογματικοί, χυμούς τινας ὑποκειμένους θεωροῦμεν, εἴτε περὶ ἐγκέφαλον εἴτε περὶ
καρδίαν εἴτε περὶ ὁτιδήποτε οὖν μέρος τοῦ ζῴου τοῦτο τίθεσθαι βούλοιτό τις. καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον οὖν τὸν τρόπον ὁρῶμεν, ὅτι περὶ τῆς φύσεως τῶν ἐκτὸς ὑποκειμένων οὐδὲν εἰπεῖν ἔχοντες ἐπέχειν ἀναγκαζόμεθα.

[129] Ἕβδομον τρόπον ἐλέγομεν εἶναι τὸν παρὰ τὰς ποσότητας
καὶ σκευασίας τῶν ὑποκειμένων, σκευασίας λέγοντες κοινῶς τἀς συνθέσεις. ὅτι δὲ καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ἐπέχειν ἀναγκαζόμεθα περὶ τῆς φύσεως τῶν πραγμάτῶν, δῆλον. οἷον γοῦν τὰ ξέσματα τοῦ κέρατος τῆς αἰγὸς φαίνεται μὲν λευκὰ ἁπλῶς καὶ ἄνευ συνθέσεως θεωρούμενα,
συντιθέμενα δὲ ἐν τῇ τοῦ κέρατος ὑπάρξει μέλανα θεωρεῖται. καὶ τοῦ ἀργύρου τὰ μέρη] τὰ ῥινήματα κατ’ ἰδίαν μὲν ὄντα μέλανα φαίνεται, σύν δὲ τῷ ὅλῳ ὡς λευκὰ ὑποπίπτει.

[130] καὶ τῆς Ταιναρείας λίθου τὰ μὲν μέρη λευκὰ ὁρᾶται ὅταν λεανθῇ, σὺν δὲ τῇ ὁλοσχερεῖ ξανθὰ φαίνεται.
καὶ αἱ ἀπ’ ἀλλήλων ἐσκεδασμέναι ψάμμοι τραχεῖαι φαίνονται, ὧς σωρὸς δὲ συντεθεῖσαι ἁπαλῶς κινοῦσι τὴν αἴσθη- σιν. καὶ ὁ ἐλλέβορος λεπτὸς μὲν καὶ χνοώδης προδφερόμενος πνιγμὸν ἐπιφέρει, κριμνώδης δὲ ὢν οὐκέτι.

[131] καὶ ὁ
οἶνος σύμμετρος μὲν πινόμενος ῥώννυσιν ἡμᾶς, πλείων δὲ λαμβανόμενος παραλύει τὸ σῶμα. καὶ ἡ τροφὴ παραπλη- σίως παρὰ τὴν ποσότητα διάφορον ἐπιδείκνυται δύναμιν· πολλάκις γοῦν διὰ τὸ πολλὴ προσενεχθῆναι καθαίρει τὸ
σῶμα διά τε ἀπεψιῶν καὶ χολερικῶν παθῶν.

[132] ἕξομεν οὖν κἀνταῦθα λέγειν ὁποῖόν ἐστι τοῦ κέρατος τὸ λεπτὸν καὶ ³⁷³⁸ 31 ὁποῖον τὸ ἐκ πολλῶν λεπτομερῶν συγκείμενον, καὶ ὁποῖος μέν ἐστιν ὁ μικρομερὴς ἄργυρος ὁποῖος δὲ ὁ ἐκ πολλῶν
συγκείμενος, καὶ ὁποία μὲν ἡ ἀκαριαία Ταιμεκρομερῶν ναρεία λίθος ὁποία δὲ ἡ ἐκ πολλῶν μικρῶν συγκειμένη, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ψάμμων καὶ τοῦ ἐλλεβόρου καὶ τοῦ οἴνου καὶ τῆς τροφῆς τὸ πρός τι, τὴν μέντοι φύσιν τῶν πραγμάτων καθ’ ἑαυτὴν οὐκέτι διὰ τὴν παρὰ τὰς συνθέσεις τῶν φαντασιῶν
ἀνωμαλίαν.

[133] καθόλου γὰρ δοκεῖ καὶ τὰ ὠφέλιμα λυπηρὰ γίνεσθαι παρὰ τὴν κατὰ ποσότητα ἄμετρον αὐτῶν χρῆσιν, καὶ τὰ βλαβερὰ εἶναι δοκοῦντα ἐν τῷ καθ’ ὑπερωβολὴν παραλαμβάνεσθαι ἀκαριαῖα μὴ λυπεῖν. μαρτυρεῖ δὲ τῷ λόγῳ μάλιστα τὸ κατὰ τὰς ἰατρικὰς δυνάμεις θεωρούμενον,
ἐν αἷς ἡ μὲν πρὸς ἀκρίβειαν μῖξις τῶν ἁπλῶν φαρμάκων ὠφέλιμον ποιεῖ τὸ συντεθέν, ῥοπῆς δὲ βραχυ- τάτης ἐνίοτε παροραθείσης οὐ μόνον οὐκ ὠφέλιμον ἀλλὰ καὶ βλαβερώτατον καὶ δηλητήριον πολλάκις.

[134] οὕτως ὁ κατὰ τὰς ποσότητας καὶ σκευασίας λόγος συγχεῖ τὴν τῶν ἐκτὸς
ὑποκειμένων ὕπαρξιν. διόπερ εἰκότως ἂν καὶ οὗτος ὁ τρό- πος εἰς ἐποχὴν ἡμᾶς περιάγοι μὴ δυναμένους εἰλικρινῶς ἀποφήνασθαι περὶ τῆς φύσεως τῶν ἐκτὸς ὑποκειμένων.

[135] ὄγδοος ἐστι τρόπος ὁ ἀπὸ τοῦ πρός τι, καθ’ ὃν ὅν δθνάγομεν ὅτι, ἐπεὶ πάντα ἐστὶ πρός τι, περὶ τοῦ τίνα ἐστὶν
ἀπολύτως καὶ ὧς πρὸς τὴν φύσιν ἐφέξομεν. ἐκεῖνο δὲ χρὴ γινώσκειν ὅτι ἐνταῦθα, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις, τῷ ‘ἔστι’ καταχρώμεθα
χρώμεθα ἀντὶ τοῦ ‘φαίνεται’, δυνάμει τοῦτο λέγοντες ‘πρός τι πάντα φαίνεται.’ τοῦτο δὲ διχῶς λέγεται, ἅπαξ μὲν ὡς πρὸς τὸ κρῖνον τὸ γὰρ ἐκτὸς ὑποκείμενον καὶ κρινόμενον πρὸς τὸ κρῖνον φαίνεται), καθ’ ἕτερον δὲ τρόπον πρὸς τὰ
συνθεωρούμενα, ὧς τὸ δεξιὸν πρὸς τὸ ἀριστερόν.

[136] ὅτι δὲ ³⁹⁴⁰ 32 πάντα ἐστὶ πρός τι, ἐπελογισάμεθα μὲν καὶ ἔμπροσθεν, οἷον κατὰ τὸ κρῖνον, ὅτι πρὸς τόδε τὸ ζῷον καὶ τόνδε τὸν ἄνθρωπον καὶ τήνδε τὴν αἴσθησιν ἕκαστον φαίνεται καὶ πρὸς τοιάνδε περίστασιν, κατὰ δὲ τὰ συνθεωρούμενα, ὅτι πρὸς τήνδε τὴν ἐπιμιξίαν καὶ τόνδε τὸν τρόπον καὶ τὴν
σύνθεσιν τήνδε καὶ τὴν ποσότητα καὶ τὴν θέσιν ἕκαστον φαίνεται.

[137] καὶ ἰδίᾳ δὲ ἐνδέχεται συνάγειν ὅτι πάντα ἐστὶ πρός τι, τόνδε τὸν τρόπον· πότερον διαφέρει τῶν πρός τι τὰ κατὰ διαφορὰν ἢ οὔ; εἰ μὲν οὐ διαφέρει, καὶ αὐτὰ πρός τι ἐστίν· εἰ δὲ διαφέρει, ἐπεὶ πᾶν τὸ διαφέρον πρός
τι ἐστίν λέγεται γὰρ πρὸς ἐκεῖνο οὗ διαφέρει), πρός τι ἐστὶ τὰ κατὰ διαφοράν.

[138] τῶν τε ὄντων τὰ μέν ἐστιν ἀνω- τάτω γένη κατὰ τοὺς δογματικούς, τὰ δ’ ἔσχατα εἴδη, τὰ δὲ γένη καὶ εἴδη· πάντα δὲ ταῦτά ἐστι πρός τι· πάντα ἄρα ἐστὶ πρός τι. ἔτι τῶν ὄντων τὰ μέν ἐστι πρόδηλα, τὰ δὲ
ἄδηλα, ὧς αὐτοί φασιν, καὶ σημαίνοντα μὲν τὰ φαινόμενα, σημαινόμενα δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν φαινομένων τὰ ἄδηλα· ὄψις γὰρ κατ᾿ αὐτοὺς (Anaxag. B21 (??) Diels) τῶν ἀδήλων τὰ φαινόμενα. τὸ δὲ σημαῖνον καὶ τὸ σημαινόμενόν ἐστι πρός τι· πρός τι ἄρα ἐστὶ πάντα.

[139] πρὸς τούτοις τῶν ὄντων τὰ μέν ἐστιν ὅμοια
τὰ δὲ ἀνόμοια καὶ τὰ μὲν ἴσα τὰ δὲ ἄνισα· ταῦτα δέ ἐστι πρός τι· πάντα ἄρα ἐστὶ πρός τι. καὶ ὁ λέγων δὲ μὴ πάντα εἶναι πρός τι βεβαιοῖ τὸ πάντα εἶναι πρός τι· καὶ αὐτὸ γὰρ τὸ πάντα εἶναι πρός τι πρὸς ἡμᾶς εἶναι δείκνυσι, καὶ οὐ καθόλου, δι’ ὧν ἡμῖν ἐναντιοῦται.

[140] πλὴν ἀλλ’ οὕτω
παριστάντων ἡμῶν ὅτι πάντα ἐστὶ πρός τι, δῆλόν ἐστι λοίπόν, ὅτι ὁποῖον ἔστιν ἕκαστον τῶν ὑποκειμένων κατὰ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ φύσιν καὶ εἰλικρινῶς λέγειν οὐ δυνησόμεθα, ἀλλ’
ὁποῖον φαίνεται ἐν τῷ πρός τι. <ᾡ> ἀκολουθεῖ τὸ περὶ τῆς φύσεως τῶν πραγμάτων δεῖν ἡμᾶς ἐπέχειν.

⁴¹ 33

[141] Περὶ δὲ τοῦ κατὰ τὰς συνεχεῖς ἢ σπανίους συγκυρήσεις
τρόπου, ὃν ἔννατον ἐλέγομεν εἶναι τῇ τάξει, τοιαῦτά τινα διέξιμεν. ὁ ἥλιος πολλῷ δήπου ἐκπληκτικώτερός ἐστιν ἀστέρος κομήτου· ἀλλ’ ἐπεὶ τὸν μὲν ἥλιον συνεχῶς ὁρῶμεν, τὸν δὲ κομήτην ἀστέρα σπανίως, ἐπὶ μὲν τῷ ἀστέρι ἐκπλησσόμεθα ὥστε καὶ διοσημείαν αὐτὸν εἶναι δοκεῖν,
ἐπὶ δὲ τῷ ἡλίῳ οὐδαμῶς. ἐὰν μέντοι γε ἐννοήσωμεν τὸν ἥλιον σπανίως μὲν φαινόμενον, σπανίως δὲ δυόμενον, καὶ πάντα μὲν ἀθρόως φωτίζοντα, πάντα δὲ ἐξαίφνης ἐπισκιά- ζεσθαι ποιοῦντα, πολλὴν ἔκπληξιν ἐν τῷ πράγματι θεωρήσομεν.

[142] καὶ ὁ σεισμὸς δὲ οὐχ ὁμοίως θορυβεῖ τούς τε
πρῶτον αὐτοῦ πειρωμένους καὶ τοὺς ἐν ἔθει τούτου γεγενημένους. πόσην δὲ ἔκπληξιν ἀνθρώπῳ φέρει θάλασσα πρῶτον ὀφθεῖσα. ἀλλὰ καὶ κάλλος σώματος ἀνθρωπίνου πρῶτον καὶ ἐξαίφνης θεωρούμενον συγκινεῖ μᾶλλον ἡμᾶς ἢ εἰ ἐν ἔθει τοῦ ὁρᾶσθαι γένοιτο. καὶ τὰ μὲν σπάνια
τίμια εἶναι δοκεῖ, τὰ δὲ σύντροφα ἡμῖν καὶ εὔπορα οὐσαμῶς.

[143] ἐὰν γοῦν ἐννοήσωμεν τὸ ὕδωρ σπανίζον, πόσῳ ἂν τῶν τιμίων εἶναι δοκούντων ἁπάντων τιμιώτερον ἡμῖν φανείη. ἢ ἐὰν ἐνθυμηθῶμεν τὸν χρυσὸν ἁπλῶς ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς ἐρριμμένον πολὺν παραπλησίως τοῖς λίθοις, τίνι δόξομεν
ἔσεσθαι τοῦτον τίμιον ἢ κατάκλειστον οὕτως;

[144] ἐπεὶ οὖν τὰ αὐτὰ πράγματα παρὰ τὰς συνεχεῖς ἢ σπανίους περιπτώσεις ὁτὲ μὲν ἐκπληκτικὰ ἢ τίμια, ὁτὲ δὲ οὐ τοιαῦτα εἶναι δοκεῖ, ἐπιλογιζόμεθα ὅτι ὁποῖον μὲν φαίνεται τούτων ἕκαστον μετὰ συνεχοῦς περιπτώσεως ἢ σπανίας ἴσως δυνησόμεθα
λέγειν, ψιλῶς δὲ ὁποῖον ἔστιν ἕκαστον τῶν ἐκτὸς ὑποκειμένων οὐκ ἐσμὲν δυνατοὶ φάσκειν. καὶ διὰ τοῦτον οὖν τὸν τρόπον περὶ αὐτῶν ἐπέχομεν.

[145] Δέκατός ἐστι τρόπος, ὃς καὶ μάλιστα συνέχει πρὸς. τὰ ⁴²⁴³⁴⁴ 34 ἠθικά, ὁ παρὰ τἀς ἀγωγὰς καὶ τὰ ἔθη καὶ τοὺς νόμους καὶ τἀς μυθικὰς πίστεις καὶ τὰς δογματικὰς ὑπολήψεις. ἀγωγὴ μὲν οὖν ἐστιν αἵρεσις βίου ἤ τινος πράγματος περὶ ἴνα ἢ πολλοὺς γινομένη, οἷον περὶ Διογένην ἢ τοὺς
Λάκωνας·

[146] νόμος δέ ἐστιν ἔγγραφος συνθήκη παρὰ τοῖς πολιτευομένοις, ἣν ὁ παραβαίνων κολάζεται, ἔθος δὲ ἢ συνήθεια οὐ διαφέρει γάρ) πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων κοινὴ πράγματός τινος παραδοχή, ἣν ὁ παραβὰς οὐ πάντως κολάζεται, οἷον νόμος ἐστὶ τὸ μὴ
μοιχεύειν, ἔθος δὲ ἡμῖν τὸ μὴ δημοσίᾳ γυναικὶ μίγνυσθαι.

[147] μυθικὴ δὲ πίστις ἐστὶ πραγμάτων ἀγενήτων τε καὶ πεπλασμένων μένων παραδοχή, οἷά ἐστιν ἄλλα τε καὶ τὰ περὶ τοῦ Κρόνου μυθευόμενα· ταῦτα γὰρ πολλοὺς εἰς πίστιν ἄγει. δογματικὴ δέ ἐστιν ὑπόληψις παραδοχὴ πράγματος
δι’ ἀναλογισμοῦ ἤ τινος ἀποδείξεως κρατύνεσθαι δοκοῦσα, οἷον ὅτι ἄτομα ἔστι τῶν ὄντων στοιχεῖα ἢ ὁμοιομερῆ <ἢ> ἐλάχιστα ἤ τινα ἄλλα.

[148] ἀντιτίθεμεν δὲ τούτων ἕκαστον ὁτὲ μὲν ἑαυτῷ, ὁτὲ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων ἑκάστῳ. οἷον ἔθος μὲν ἔθει οὕτως· τινὲς τῶν Αἰθιόπων στίζουσι τὰ
βρέφη, ἡμεῖς δ’ οὔ· καὶ Πέρσαι μὲν ἀνθοβαφεῖ ἐσθῆτι καὶ ποδήρει χρῆσθαι νομίζουσιν εὐπρεπὲς εἶναι, ἡμεῖς δὲ ἀπρεπές· καὶ οἱ μὲν Ἰνδοὶ ταῖς γυναιξὶ δημοσίᾳ μίγνυνται, οἱ δὲ πλεῖστοι τῶν ἄλλων αἰσχρὸν τοῦτο εἶναι ἡγοῦνται.

[149] νόμον δὲ νόμῳ οὕτως ἀντιτίθεμεν· παρὰ μὲν τοῖς Ῥωμαίος ὁ τῆς
πατρῴας ἀποστὰς οὐσίας οὐκ ἀποδίδωσι τὰ τοῦ πατρὸς χρέα, παρὰ δὲ τοῖς Ῥοδίος πάντως ἀποδίδωσιν· καὶ ἐν μὲν Ταύροις τῆς Σκυθίας νόμος ἦν τοὺς ξένους τῇ Ἀρμὲμιδι καλλιερεῖσθαι, παρὰ δὲ ἡμῖν ἄνθρωπον ἀπείρηται πρὸς ἱερῷ φονεύεσθαι.

[150] ἀγωγὴν δὲ ἀγωγῇ, ὅταν τὴν Διογενοῦς
ἀγωγὴν ἀντιτιθῶμεν τῇ τοῦ Ἀριστίππου ἢ τὴν τῶν Λακώνων τῇ τῶν Ἰταλῶν. μυθικὴν δὲ πίστιν πίστει μυθικῇ, ὅταν ὅπου μὲν <λέγωμεν> τὸν Δία μυθεύεσθαι πατέρα ἀνδρῶν ⁴⁵
τε θεῶν τε, ὅπου δὲ τὸν Ὠκεανόν, λέγοντες (Ξ 201)

Ὠκεανόν τε θεῶν γένεσιν καὶ μητέρα Τηθύν.

δογματικὰς δὲ ὑπολήψεις ἀλλήλαις ἀντιτίθεμεν,

[151] ὅταν λέγωμεν τοὺς μὲν ‘ὲν εἷναι στοιχεῖον ἀποφαίνεσθαι, τοὺς δὲ
ἄπειρα, καὶ τοὺς μὲν θνητὴν τὴν ψυχὴν, τοὺς δὲ ἀθάνατον, καὶ τοὺς μὲν προνοίᾳ θεῶν διοικεῖσθαι τὰ καθ’ ἡμᾶς, τοὺς δὲ ἀπρονοήτως.

[152] τὸ ἔθος δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀντιτίθεμεν, οἷον νόμῳ μέν, ὅταν λέγωμεν παρὰ μὲν Πέρσαις ἔθος εἷναι ἀρρενομιξίαις χρῆσθαι, παρὰ δὲ Ῥωμαίοις ἀπαγορεύεσθαι
νόμῳ τοῦτο πράττειν, καὶ παρ’ ἡμῖν μὲν τὸ μοιχεύειν ἀπειρῆσθαι, παρὰ δὲ Μασσαγέταις <ἐν> ἀδιαφορίας ἔθει παραδεδόσθαι, ὡς Εὔδοξος ὁ Κνίδιος ἱστορεῖ ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τῆς περιόδου (fr. 15 Brandes), καὶ παρ’ ἡμῖν μὲν ἀπηγορεῦσθαι μητράσι μίγνυσθαι, παρὰ δὲ τοῖς Πέρσαις ἔθος
εἶναι μάλιστα οὕτω γαμεῖν. καὶ παρ’ Αἰγυπτίοις δὲ τὰς ἀδελφὰς γαμοῦσιν, ὃ παρ’ ἡμῖν ἀπείρηται νόμῳ.

[153] ἀγωγῇ δὲ ἔθος ἀντιτίθεται, ὅταν οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ ἄνθρωποι ἀναχωροῦντες μιγνύωνται ταῖς ἑαυτῶν γυναιξίν, ὁ δὲ Κράτης τῇ Ἱπ- παρχίᾳ δημοσίᾳ· καὶ ὁ μὲν Διογενὴς ἀπὸ ἐξωμίδος περιῄει,
ἡμεῖς δὲ ὡς εἰώθαμεν.

[154] μυθικῇ δὲ πίστει, [ὡς] ὅταν λέγωσιν οἱ μῦθοι ὅτι ὁ Κρόνος κατήσθιεν αὑτοῦ τὰ τέκνα, ἔθους ὄντος ἡμῖν προνοεῖσθαι παίδων· καὶ παρ’ ἡμῖν μὲν συνήθεια ὧς ἀγαθοὺς καὶ ἀπαθεῖς κακῶν σέβειν τοὺς θεούς, τιτρωσκόμενοι δὲ καὶ φθονοῦντες ἀλλήλοις ὑπὸ
τῶν ποιητῶν εἰσάγονται.

[155] δογματικῇ δὲ ὑπολήψει, ὅταν ἡμῖν μὲν ἔθος ᾖ παρὰ θεῶν αἰτεῖν τὰ ἀγαθά, ὁ δὲ Ἐπίκουρος λέγῃ μὴ ἐπιστρέφεσθαι ἡμῶν τὸ θεῖον, καὶ ὅταν ὁ μὲν Ἀρ ίστ ιππο ς ἀδ ιάφ ορον ἡγῆται τὸ γυναικείαν ἀμφιέννυσθαι σ τ ολήν, ἡμεῖς
δὲ αἰσχρὸν τοῦτο ἡγώμεθα εἶναι.

[156] ἀγωγὴν δὲ ἀντιδὲ ⁴⁶ 35 τίθεμεν νόμῳ μέν, ὅταν νόμου ὄντος μὴ ἐξεῖναι τύπτειν ἄνδρα ἐλεύθερον καὶ εὐγενῆ οἱ παγκρατιασταὶ τύπτωσιν ἀλλήλους διὰ τὴν ἀγωγὴν τοῦ κατ’ αὐτοὺς βίου, καὶ ὅταν ἀπειρημένου τοῦ ἀνδροφονεῖν οἱ μονομάχαι
ἀναιρῶσιν ἀλλήλους διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν αἰτίαν.

[157] μυθικὴν δὲ πίστιν ἀγωγῇ ἀντιτίθεμεν, ἐπειδὰν λέγωμεν ὅτι οἱ μὲν μῦθοι παρὰ τῇ Ὀμφάλῃ τὸν Ἡρακλέα λέγουσιν (ξ 423)

εἴριά τε ξαίνειν καὶ δουλοσύνης ἀνέχεσθαι

καὶ ταῦτα ποιῆσαι ἅπερ οὐδ’ ἂν μετρίως προῃρημένος ἐποίησεν ἄν τις, ἡ δὲ ἀγωγὴ τοῦ βίου τοῦ Ἡρακλέους ἦν γενναία.

[158] δογματικῇ δὲ ὑπολήψει, ὅταν οἱ μὲν ἀθληταὶ ὧς ἀγαθοῦ <τινος> τῆς δόξης ἀντιποιούμενοι ἐπίπονον ἀγωγὴν βίου δι’ αὐτὴν ἐπαναιρῶνται, πολλοὶ δὲ τῶν φιλοσόφων θαῦλον
λον εἶναι τὴν δόξαν δογματίζωσιν.

[159] τὸν δὲ νόμον ἀντιτίθεμεν μυθικῇ μὲν πίστει, ὅταν οἱ μὲν ποιηταὶ εἰσάγωσι τοὺς θεοὺς καὶ μοιχεύοντας καὶ ἀρρενομιξίαις χρωμένους, νόμος δὲ παρ’ ἡμῖν κωλύῃ ταῦτα πράττειν, δογματικῇ

[160] δὲ ὑπολήψει, ὅταν οἱ μὲν περὶ Χρύσιππον (III 745 Arn.) ἀδιάφορον
εἶναι λέγωσι τὸ μητράσιν ἢ ἀδελφαῖς μίγνυσθαι, ὁ δὲ νόμος ταῦτα κωλύῃ.

[161] μυθικὴν δὲ πίστιν δογματικῇ ὑπολήψει ἀντιτίθεμεν, ὅταν οἱ μὲν ποιηταὶ λέγωσι τὸν Δία κατελθόντα θνηταῖς γυναιξὶ μίγνυσθαι, παρὰ δὲ τοῖς δογματικοῖς ἀδύνατον τοῦτο εἶναι νομίζηται, καὶ ὁ μὲν ποιητὴς λέγῃ,

[162]
ὅτι Ζεὺς διὰ τὸ πένθος τὸ ἐπὶ Σαρπηδόνι αἱματοέσσας ωεκάδας κατέχευεν ἔραζε (Π 459), δόγμα μέντοι φιλοσόφων <ᾖ> ἀπαθὲς εἶναι τὸ θεῖον, καὶ ὅταν <. . . . . > τὸν τῶν ἱπποκενταύρων μῦθον ἀναιρῶσιν, ἀνυπαρξίας παράδειγμα τὸν ἱπποκένταυρον ἡμῖν φέροντες.

[163] πολλὰ μὲν οὖν καὶ ἄλλα ἐνῆν καθ’
ἑκάστην τῶν προειρημένων ἀντιθέσεων λαμβάνειν παρα<εἶναι> ⁴⁷ δείγματα· ὡς ἐν συντόμῳ δὲ λόγῳ ταῦτα ἀρκέσει. πλὴν τοσαύτης ἀνωμαλίας πραγμάτων καὶ διὰ τούτου τοῦ τρόπου δεικνυμένης, ὁποῖον μὲν ἔστι τὸ ὑποκείμενον κατὰ
τὴν φύσιν οὐκ ἕξομεν λέγειν, ὁποῖον δὲ φαίνεται πρὸς τήνδε τὴν ἀγωγὴν ἢ πρὸς τόνδε τὸν νόμον ἢ πρὸς τόδε
τὸ ἔθος καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον. καὶ διὰ τοῦτον οὖν περὶ τῆς φύσεως τῶν ἐκτὸς ὑποκειμένων πραγμάτων ἐπέχειν ἡμᾶς ἀνάγκη. οὕτω μὲν οὖν διὰ τῶν δέκα τρόπων κατ’ παταλήγομεν εἰς τὴν ἐποχήν.

Pyrrhoniae Hypotyposes. Sextus Empiricus. ed. Hermann Mutschmann. Germany. 2014.

Current edition First1KGreek

Pyrrhoniae Hypotyposes (Greek) (Sextus Empiricus. Sexti Empiricii Opera, Volume 1. Mutschmann, Hermann, editor. Leipzig: Teubner, 1912.)

Translations (1)

Outlines of Pyrrhonism First1KGreek (Sextus Empiricus, Vol. 1. Bury, Robert Gregg, translator. London: William Heinemann Ltd.; New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1933.) — 1.14 focus

Chapter XIV.—Concerning The Ten Modes

[36] The usual tradition amongst the older Sceptics is that the ‟modes” by which ‟suspension” is supposed to be brought about are ten in number; and they also give them the synonymous names of ‟arguments” and ‟positions.” They are these: the first, based on the variety in animals; the second, on the differences in human beings; the third, on the different structures of the organs of sense; the fourth, on the circumstantial conditions; the fifth, on positions and intervals and locations; the sixth, on intermixtures;

[37] the seventh, on the quantities and formations of the underlying objects; the eighth, on the fact of relativity; the ninth, on the frequency or rarity of occurrence; the tenth, on the disciplines and customs and laws, the legendary beliefs and the dogmatic convictions.

[38] This order, however, we adopt without prejudice.

As superordinate to these there stand three Modes —that based on the subject who judges, that on the object judged, and that based on both. The first four of the ten Modes are subordinate to the Mode based on the subject (for the subject which judges is either an animal or a man or a sense, and existent in some condition): the seventh and tenth Modes are referred to that based on the object judged: the fifth, sixth, eighth and ninth are referred to the Mode based on both subject and object.

[39] Furthermore, these three Modes are also referred to that of relation, so that the Mode of relation stands as the highest genus, and the three as species, and the ten as subordinate sub-species. We give this as the probable account of their numbers; and as to their argumentative force what we say is this:

[40] The First argument (or Trope), as we said, is that which shows that the same impressions are not produced by the same objects owing to the differences in animals. This we infer both from the differences in their origins and from the variety of their bodily structures.

[41] Thus, as to origin, some animals are produced without sexual union, others by coition. And of those produced without coition, some come from fire, like the animalcules which appear in furnaces, others from putrid water, like gnats; others from wine when it turns sour, like ants; others from earth, like grasshoppers; others from marsh, like frogs; others from mud, like worms; others from asses, like beetles; others from greens, like caterpillars; others from fruits, like the gall-insects in wild figs; others from rotting animals, as bees from bulls and wasps from horses.

[42] Of the animals generated by coition, some—in fact the majority—come from homogeneous parents, others from heterogeneous parents, as do mules. Again, of animals in general, some are born alive, like men ; others are born as eggs, like birds; and yet others as lumps of flesh, like bears.

[43] It is natural, then, that these dissimilar and variant modes of birth should produce much contrariety of sense-affection, and that this is a source of its divergent, discordant and conflicting character.

[44] Moreover, the differences found in the most important parts of the body, and especially in those of which the natural function is judging and perceiving, are capable of producing a vast deal of divergence in the sense-impressions owing to the variety in the animals. Thus, sufferers from jaundice declare that objects which seem to us white are yellow, while those whose eyes are bloodshot call them blood-red. Since, then, some animals also have eyes which are yellow, others bloodshot, others albino, others of other colours, they probably, I suppose, have different perceptions of colour.

[45] Moreover, if we bend down over a book after having gazed long and fixedly at the sun, the letters seem to us to be golden in colour and circling round. Since, then, some animals possess also a natural brilliance in their eyes, and emit from them a fine and mobile stream of light, so that they can even see by night,¹ we seem bound to suppose that they are differently affected from us by external objects.

[46] Jugglers, too, by means of smearing lamp-wicks with the rust of copper or with the juice of the cuttle-fish make the bystanders appear now copper- coloured and now black—and that by just a small sprinkling of extra matter. Surely, then, we have much more reason to suppose that when different juices are intermingled in the vision of animals their impressions of the objects will become different.

[47] Again, when we press the eyeball at one side the forms, figures and sizes of the objects appear oblong and narrow. So it is probable that all animals which have the pupil of the eye slanting and elongated— such as goats, cats, and similar animals—have impressions of the objects which are different and unlike the notions formed of them by the animals which have round pupils.

[48] Mirrors, too, owing to differences in their construction, represent the external objects² at one time as very small—as when the mirror is concave, —at another time as elongated and narrow—as when the mirror is convex. Some mirrors, too, show the head of the figure reflected at the bottom and the feet at the top.

[49] Since, then, some organs of sight actually protrude beyond the face owing to their convexity, while others are quite concave, and others again lie in a level plane, on this account also it is probable that their impressions differ, and that the same objects, as seen by dogs, fishes, lions, men and locusts, are neither equal in size nor similar in shape, but vary according to the image of each object created by the particular sight that receives the impression.

[50] Of the other sense-organs also the same account holds good. Thus, in respect of touch, how could one maintain that creatures covered with shells, with flesh, with prickles, with feathers, with scales, are all similarly affected? And as for the sense of hearing, how could we say that its perceptions are alike in animals with a very narrow auditory passage and those with a very wide one, or in animals with hairy ears and those with smooth ears? For, as regards this sense, even we ourselves find our hearing affected in one way when we have our ears plugged and in another way when we use them just as they are.

[51] Smell also will differ because of the variety in animals. For if we ourselves are affected in one way when we have a cold and our internal phlegm is excessive, and in another way when the parts about our head are filled with an excess of blood, feeling an aversion to smells which seem sweet to everyone else and regarding them as noxious, it is reasonable to suppose that animals too—since some are flaccid by nature and rich in phlegm, others rich in blood, others marked by a predominant excess of yellow or of black gall— are in each case impressed in different ways by the objects of smell.

[52] So too with the objects of taste; for some animals have rough and dry tongues, others extremely moist tongues. We ourselves, too, when our tongues are very dry, in cases of fever, think the food proffered us to be earthy and ill-flavoured or bitter—an affection due to the variation in the predominating juices which we are said to contain. Since, then, animals also have organs of taste which differ and which have different juices in excess, in respect of taste also they will receive different impressions of the real objects.

[53] For just as the same food when digested becomes in one place a vein, in another an artery, in another a bone, in another a sinew, or some other piece of the body, displaying a different potency according to the difference in the parts which receive it;—and just as the same unblended water, when it is absorbed by trees, becomes in one place bark, in another branch, in another blossom, and so finally fig and quince and each of the other fruits;

[54] —and just as the single identical breath of a musician breathed into a flute becomes here a shrill note and there a deep note, and the same pressure of his hand on the lyre produces here a deep note and there a shrill note;—so likewise it is probable that the external objects appear different owing to differences in the structure of the animals which experience the sense-impressions.

[55] But one may learn this more clearly from the preferences and aversions of animals. Thus, sweet oil seems very agreeable to men, but intolerable to beetles and bees; and olive oil is beneficial to men, but when poured on wasps and bees it destroys them; and sea-water is a disagreeable and poisonous potion for men, but fish drink and enjoy it.

[56] Pigs, too, enjoy wallowing in the most stinking mire rather than in clear and clean water. And whereas some animals eat grass, others eat shrubs, others feed in woods, others live on seeds or flesh or milk; some of them, too, prefer their food high, others like it fresh, and while some prefer it raw, others like it cooked. And so generally, the things which are agreeable to some are to others disagreeable, distasteful and deadly.

[57] Thus, quails are fattened by hemlock, and pigs by henbane; and pigs also enjoy eating salamanders, just as deer enjoy poisonous creatures, and swallows gnats. So ants and wood-lice, when swallowed by men, cause distress and gripings, whereas the bear, whenever she falls sick, cures herself by licking them up.

[58] The mere touch of an oak-twig paralyses the viper, and that of a plane-leaf the bat. The elephant flees from the ram, the lion from the cock, sea- monsters from the crackle of bursting beans, and the tiger from the sound of a drum. One might, indeed, cite many more examples, but—not to seem unduly prolix—if the same things are displeasing to some but pleasing to others, and pleasure and displeasure depend upon sense-impression, then animals receive different impressions from the underlying objects.

[59] But if the same things appear different owing to the variety in animals, we shall, indeed, be able to state our own impressions of the real object, but as to its essential nature we shall suspend judgement. For we cannot ourselves judge between our own impressions and those of the other animals, since we ourselves are involved in the dispute and are, therefore, rather in need of a judge than competent to pass judgement ourselves.

[60] Besides, we are unable, either with or without proof, to prefer our own impressions to those of the irrational animals. For in addition to the probability that proof is, as we shall show,³ a non-entity, the so-called proof itself will be either apparent to us or non-apparent. If, then, it is non-apparent, we shall not accept it with confidence; while if it is apparent to us, inasmuch as what is apparent to animals is the point in question and the proof is apparent to us who are animals, it follows that we shall have to question the proof itself as to whether it is as true as it is apparent.

[61] It is, indeed, absurd to attempt to establish the matter in question by means of the matter in question,⁴ since in that case the same thing will be at once believed and disbelieved,—believed in so far as it purports to prove, but disbelieved in so far as it requires proof,—which is impossible. Consequently we shall not possess a proof which enables us to give our own sense-impressions the preference over those of the so-called irrational animals. If, then, owing to the variety in animals their sense-impressions differ, and it is impossible to judge between them, we must necessarily suspend judgement regarding the external underlying objects.

[62] By way of super-addition,⁵ too, we draw comparisons between mankind and the so-called irrational animals in respect of their sense-impressions. For, after our solid arguments, we deem it quite proper to poke fun at those conceited braggarts, the Dogmatists.⁶ As a rule, our School compare the irrational animals in the mass with mankind;

[63] but since the Dogmatists captiously assert that the comparison is unequal, we—super-adding yet more—will carry our ridicule further and base our argument on one animal only, the dog for instance if you like, which is held to be the most worthless of animals. For even in this case we shall find that the animals we are discussing are no wise inferior to ourselves in respect of the credibility of their impressions.

[64] Now it is allowed by the Dogmatists that this animal, the dog, excels us in point of sensation: as to smell it is more sensitive than we are, since by this sense it tracks beasts that it cannot see; and with its eyes it sees them more quickly than we do; and with its ears it is keen of perception.

[65] Next let us proceed to the reasoning faculty. Of reason one kind is internal, implanted in the soul, the other externally expressed.⁷ Let us consider first the internal reason. Now according to those Dogmatists who are, at present, our chief opponents—I mean the Stoics—internal reason is supposed to be occupied with the following matters: the choice of things congenial and the avoidance of things alien; the knowledge of the arts contributing thereto; the apprehension of the virtues pertaining to one’s proper nature and of those relating to the passions.

[66] Now the dog—the animal upon which, by way of example, we have decided to base our argument—exercises choice of the congenial and avoidance of the harmful, in that it hunts after food and slinks away from a raised whip. Moreover, it possesses an art which supplies what is congenial, namely hunting.

[67] Nor is it devoid even of virtue; for certainly if justice consists in rendering to each his due,⁸ the dog, that welcomes and guards its friends and benefactors but drives off strangers and evil-doers, cannot be lacking injustice.

[68] But if he possesses this virtue, then, since the virtues are interdependent, he possesses also all the other virtues; and these, say the philosophers,⁹ the majority of men do not possess. That the dog is also valiant we see by the way he repels attacks, and intelligent as well, as Homer too testified¹⁰ when he sang how Odysseus went unrecognized by all the people of his own household and was recognized only by the dog Argus, who neither was deceived by the bodily alterations of the hero nor had lost his original apprehensive impression, which indeed he evidently retained better than the men.

[69] And according to Chrysippus, who shows special interest in irrational animals, the dog even shares in the far-famed ‟Dialectic.”¹¹ This person, at any rate, declares that the dog makes use of the fifth complex indemonstrable syllogism¹² when, on arriving at a spot where three ways meet, after smelling at the two roads by which the quarry did not pass, he rushes off at once by the third without stopping to smell. For, says the old writer, the dog implicitly reasons thus: ‟The creature went either by this road, or by that, or by the other: but it did not go by this road or by that: therefore it went by the other.”

[70] Moreover, the dog is capable of comprehending and assuaging his own sufferings; for when a thorn has got stuck in his foot he hastens to remove it by rubbing his foot on the ground and by using his teeth. And if he has a wound anywhere, because dirty wounds are hard to cure whereas clean ones heal easily, the dog gently licks off the pus that has gathered.

[71] Nay more, the dog admirably observes the prescription of Hippocrates:¹³ rest being what cures the foot, whenever he gets his foot hurt he lifts it up and keeps it as far as possible free from pressure. And when distressed by unwholesome humours he eats grass, by the help of which he vomits what is unwholesome and gets well again.

[72] If, then, it has been shown that the animal upon which, as an example, we have based our argument not only chooses the wholesome and avoids the noxious, but also possesses an art capable of supplying what is wholesome, and is capable of comprehending and assuaging its own sufferings, and is not devoid of virtue, then—these being the things in which the perfection of internal reason consists—the dog will be thus far perfect. And that, I suppose, is why certain of the professors of philosophy have adorned themselves with the title of this animal.¹⁴

[73] Concerning external reason, or speech, it is unnecessary for the present to inquire; for it has been rejected even by some of the Dogmatists as being a hindrance to the acquisition of virtue, for which reason they used to practise silence¹⁵ during the period of instruction; and besides, supposing that a man is dumb, no one will therefore call him irrational. But to pass over these cases, we certainly see animals— the subject of our argument—uttering quite human cries,—jays, for instance, and others.

[74] And, leaving this point also aside, even if we do not understand the utterances of the so-called irrational animals, still it is not improbable that they converse although we fail to understand them; for in fact when we listen to the talk of barbarians we do not understand it, and it seems to us a kind of uniform chatter.

[75] Moreover, we hear dogs uttering one sound when they are driving people off, another when they are howling, and one sound when beaten, and a quite different sound when fawning. And so in general, in the case of all other animals as well as the dog, whoever examines the matter carefully will find a great variety of utterance according to the different circumstances, so that, in consequence, the so-called irrational animals may justly be said to participate in external reason.

[76] But if they neither fall short of mankind in the accuracy of their perceptions, nor in internal reason, nor yet (to go still further) in external reason, or speech, then they will deserve no less credence than ourselves in respect of their sense-impressions.

[77] Probably, too, we may reach this conclusion by basing our argument on each single class of irrational animals. Thus, for example, who would deny that birds excel in quickness of wit or that they employ external reason? For they understand not only present events but future events as well, and these they foreshow to such as are able to comprehend them by means of prophetic cries as well as by other signs.

[78] I have drawn this comparison (as I previously indicated) by way of super-addition, having already sufficiently proved, as I think, that we cannot prefer our own sense-impressions to those of the irrational animals. If, however, the irrational animals are not less worthy of credence than we in regard to the value of sense-impressions, and their impressions vary according to the variety of animal,—then, although I shall be able to say what the nature of each of the underlying objects appears to me to be, I shall be compelled, for the reasons stated above, to suspend judgement as to its real nature.

[79] Such, then, is the First of the Modes which induce suspense. The Second Mode is, as we said, that based on the differences in men; for even if we grant for the sake of argument that men are more worthy of credence than irrational animals, we shall find that even our own differences of themselves lead to suspense. For man, you know, is said to be compounded of two things, soul and body, and in both these we differ one from another.

Thus, as regards the body, we differ in our figures and ‟idiosyncrasies,” or constitutional peculiarities.¹⁶

[80] The body of an Indian differs in shape from that of a Scythian; and it is said that what causes the variation is a difference in the predominant humours, Owing to this difference in the predominant humours the sense-impressions also come to differ, as we indicated in our First Argument.¹⁷ So too in respect of choice and avoidance of external objects men exhibit great differences: thus Indians enjoy some things, our people other things, and the enjoyment of different things is an indication that we receive varying impressions from the underlying objects.

[81] In respect of our ‟idiosyncrasies,” our differences are such that some of us digest the flesh of oxen more easily than rock-fish, or get diarrhoea from the weak wine of Lesbos. An old wife of Attica, they say, swallowed with impunity thirty drams of hemlock, and Lysis took four drams of poppy-juice without hurt.

[82] Demophon, Alexander’s butler, used to shiver when he was in the sun or in a hot bath, but felt warm in the shade: Athenagoras the Argive took no hurt from the stings of scorpions and poisonous spiders; and the Psyllaeans,¹⁸ as they are called, are not harmed by bites from snakes and asps,

[83] nor are the Tentyritae¹⁹ of Egypt harmed by the crocodile. Further, those Ethiopians who live beyond Lake Meroë²⁰ on the banks of the river Astapous eat with impunity scorpions, snakes, and the like. Rufinus of Chalcis when he drank hellebore neither vomited nor suffered at all from purging, but swallowed and digested it just like any ordinary drink.

[84] Chrysermus the Herophilean doctor was liable to get a heart attack if ever he took pepper; and Soterichus the surgeon was seized with diarrhoea whenever he smelled fried sprats. Andron the Argive was so immune from thirst that he actually traversed the waterless country of Libya without needing a drink. Tiberius Caesar could see in the dark; and Aristotle²¹ tells of a Thasian who fancied that the image of a man was continually going in front of him.

[85] Seeing, then, that men vary so much in body—to content ourselves with but a few instances of the many collected by the Dogmatists,—men probably also differ from one another in respect of the soul itself; for the body is a kind of expression of the soul, as in fact is proved by the science of Physiognomy. But the greatest proof of the vast and endless differences in men’s intelligence is the discrepancy in the statements of the Dogmatists concerning the right objects of choice and avoidance, as well as other things.

[86] Regarding this the poets, too, have expressed themselves fittingly. Thus Pindar says:²²

The crowns and trophies of his storm-foot steeds

Give joy to one ; yet others find it joy

To dwell in gorgeous chambers gold-bedeckt;

Some even take delight in voyaging

O’er ocean’s billows in a speeding barque.

And the poet²³ says: ‟One thing is pleasing to one man, another thing to another.” Tragedy, too, is full of such sayings; for example:

Were fair and wise the same thing unto all,

There had been no contentious quarrelling.²⁴

And again:

'Tis strange that the same thing abhorr’d by some

Should give delight to others.²⁵

[87] Seeing, then, that choice and avoidance depend on pleasure and displeasure, while pleasure and displeasure depend on sensation and sense-impression, whenever some men choose the very things which are avoided by others, it is logical for us to conclude that they are also differently affected by the same things, since otherwise they would all alike have chosen or avoided the same things. But if the same objects affect men differently owing to the differences in the men, then, on this ground also, we shall reasonably be led to suspension of judgement. For while we are, no doubt, able to state what each of the underlying objects appears to be, relatively to each difference, we are incapable of explaining what it is in reality.

[88] For we shall have to believe either all men or some. But if we believe all, we shall be attempting the impossible and accepting contradictories; and if some, let us be told whose opinions we are to endorse. For the Platonist will say ‟Plato’s;” the Epicurean, ‟Epicurus’s;” and so on with the rest; and thus by their unsettled disputations they will bring us round again to a state of suspense.

[89] Moreover, he who maintains that we ought to assent to the majority is making a childish proposal, since no one is able to visit the whole of mankind and determine what pleases the majority of them; for there may possibly be races of whom we know nothing amongst whom conditions rare with us are common, and conditions common with us rare,—possibly, for instance, most of them feel no pain from the bites of spiders, though a few on rare occasions feel such pain; and so likewise with the rest of the ‟idiosyncrasies” mentioned above. Necessarily, therefore, the differences in men afford a further reason for bringing in suspension of judgement.

[90] When the Dogmatists—a self-loving class of men— assert that in judging things they ought to prefer themselves to other people, we know that their claim is absurd; for they themselves are a party to the controversy; and if, when judging appearances, they have already given the preference to themselves, then, by thus entrusting themselves with the judgement, they are begging the question before the judgement is begun.

[91] Nevertheless, in order that we may arrive at suspension of judgement by basing our argument on one person—such as, for example, their visionary ‟Sage”²⁶—we adopt the Mode which comes Third in order.

This Third Mode is, we say, based on differences in the senses. That the senses differ from one another is obvious.

[92] Thus, to the eye paintings seem to have recesses and projections, but not so to the touch. Honey, too, seems to some²⁷ pleasant to the tongue but unpleasant to the eyes; so that it is impossible to say whether it is absolutely pleasant or unpleasant. The same is true of sweet oil, for it pleases the sense of smell but displeases the taste.

[93] So too with spurge:²⁸ since it pains the eyes but causes no pain to any other part of the body, we cannot say whether, in its real nature, it is absolutely painful or painless to bodies. Rain-water, too, is beneficial to the eyes but roughens the wind-pipe and the lungs; as also does olive-oil, though it mollifies the epidermis. The cramp-fish, also, when applied to the extremities produces cramp, but it can be applied to the rest of the body without hurt. Consequently we are unable to say what is the real nature of each of these things, although it is possible to say what each thing at the moment appears to be.

[94] A longer list of examples might be given, but to avoid prolixity, in view of the plan of our treatise, we will say just this. Each of the phenomena perceived by the senses seems to be a complex: the apple, for example, seems smooth, odorous, sweet and yellow. But it is non-evident whether it really possesses these qualities only; or whether it has but one quality but appears varied owing to the varying structure of the sense-organs; or whether, again, it has more qualities than are apparent, some of which elude our perception.

[95] That the apple has but one quality might be argued from what we said above²⁹ regarding the food absorbed by bodies, and the water sucked up by trees, and the breath in flutes and pipes and similar instruments; for the apple likewise may be all of one sort but appear different owing to differences in the sense-organs in which perception takes place.

[96] And that the apple may possibly possess more qualities than those apparent to us we argue in this way. Let us imagine a man who possesses from birth the senses of touch, taste and smell, but can neither hear nor see. This man, then, will assume that nothing visible or audible has any existence, but only those three kinds of qualities which he is able to apprehend.

[97] Possibly, then, we also, having only our five senses, perceive only such of the apple's qualities as we are capable of apprehending; and possibly it may possess other underlying qualities which affect other sense-organs, though we, not being endowed with those organs, fail to apprehend the sense-objects which come through them.

[98] ‟But,” it may be objected, ‟Nature made the senses commensurate with the objects of sense.” What kind of ‟Nature?” we ask, seeing that there exists so much unresolved controversy amongst the Dogmatists concerning the reality which belongs to Nature. For he who decides the question as to the existence of Nature will be discredited by them if he is an ordinary person, while if he is a philosopher he will be a party to the controversy and therefore himself subject to judgement and not a judge.

[99] If, however, it is possible that only those qualities which we seem to perceive subsist in the apple, or that a greater number subsist, or, again, that not even the qualities which affect us subsist, then it will be non- evident to us what the nature of the apple really is. And the same argument applies to all the other objects of sense. But if the senses do not apprehend external objects, neither can the mind apprehend them; hence, because of this argument also, we shall be driven, it seems, to suspend judgement regarding the external underlying objects.

[100] In order that we may finally reach suspension by our argument on each sense singly, or even by disregarding the senses, we further adopt the Fourth Mode of suspension. This is the Mode based, as we say, on the ‟circumstances,” meaning by ‟circumstances” conditions or dispositions.³⁰ And this Mode, we say, deals with states that are natural or unnatural, with waking or sleeping, with conditions due to age, motion or rest, hatred or love, emptiness or fulness, drunkenness or soberness, predispositions, confidence or fear, grief or joy.

[101] Thus, according as the mental state is natural or unnatural, objects produce dissimilar impressions, as when men in a frenzy or in a state of ecstasy believe they hear daemons’ voices, while we do not. Similarly they often say that they perceive an odour of storax or frankincense, or some such scent, and many other things, though we fail to perceive them. Also, the same water which feels very hot when poured on inflamed spots seems lukewarm to us.And the same coat which seems of a bright yellow colour to men with blood-shot eyes does not appear so to me. And the same honey seems to me sweet, but bitter to men with jaundice.

[102] Now should anyone say that it is an intermixture of certain humours which produces in those who are in an unnatural state improper impressions from the under- lying objects, we have to reply that, since healthy persons also have mixed humours, these humours too are capable of causing the external objects—which really are such as they appear to those who are said to be in an unnatural state—to appear other than they are to healthy persons.

[103] For to ascribe the power of altering the underlying objects to those humours, and not to these, is purely fanciful; since just as healthy men are in a state that is natural for the healthy but unnatural for the sick, so also sick men are in a state that is unnatural for the healthy but natural for the sick, so that to these last also we must give credence as being, relatively speaking, in a natural state.³¹

[104] Sleeping and waking, too, give rise to different impressions, since we do not imagine when awake what we imagine in sleep, nor when asleep what we imagine when awake; so that the existence or non- existence of our impressions is not absolute but relative, being in relation to our sleeping or waking condition. Probably, then, in dreams we see things which to our waking state are unreal,³² although not wholly unreal; for they exist in our dreams, just as waking realities exist although non-existent in dreams.

[105] Age is another cause of difference.³³ For the same air seems chilly to the old but mild to those in their prime; and the same colour appears faint to older men but vivid to those in their prime; and similarly the same sound seems to the former faint, but to the latter clearly audible.

[106] Moreover, those who differ in age are differently moved in respect of choice and avoidance. For whereas children—to take a case—are all eagerness for balls and hoops, men in their prime choose other things, and old men yet others. And from this we conclude that differences in age also cause different impressions to be produced by the same underlying objects.

[107] Another cause why the real objects appear different lies in motion and rest. For those objects which, when we are standing still, we see to be motionless, we imagine to be in motion when we are sailing past them.³⁴

[108] Love and hatred are a cause, as when some have an extreme aversion to pork while others greatly enjoy eating it. Hence, too, Menander said:³⁵

Mark now his visage, what a change is there

Since he has come to this! How bestial!

'Tis actions fair that make the fairest face.

Many lovers, too, who have ugly mistresses think them most beautiful.³⁶

[109] Hunger and satiety are a cause; for the same food seems agreeable to the hungry but disagreeable to the sated.

Drunkenness and soberness are a cause; since actions which we think shameful when sober do not seem shameful to us when drunk.

[110] Predispositions are a cause; for the same wine which seems sour to those who have previously eaten dates or figs, seems sweet to those who have just consumed nuts or chick-peas; and the vestibule³⁷ of the bath-house, which warms those entering from outside, chills those coming out of the bath-room if they stop long in it.

[111] Fear and boldness are a cause; as what seems to the coward fearful and formidable does not seem so in the least to the bold man.

Grief and joy are a cause; since the same affairs are burdensome to those in grief but delightful to those who rejoice.

[112] Seeing then that the dispositions also are the cause of so much disagreement, and that men are differently disposed at different times, although, no doubt, it is easy to say what nature each of the underlying objects appears to each man to possess, we cannot go on to say what its real nature is, since the disagreement admits in itself of no settlement. For the person who tries to settle it is either in one of the afore-mentioned dispositions or in no disposition whatsoever. But to declare that he is in no disposition at all—as, for instance, neither in health nor sickness, neither in motion nor at rest, of no definite age, and devoid of all the other dispositions as well—is the height of absurdity. And if he is to judge the sense-impressions while he is in some one disposition, he will be a party to the disagreement,³⁸

[113] and, moreover, he will not be an impartial judge of the external underlying objects owing to his being confused by the dispositions in which he is placed. The waking person, for instance, cannot compare the impressions of sleepers with those of men awake, nor the sound person those of the sick with those of the sound; for we assent more readily to things present, which affect us in the present, than to things not present.

[114] In another way, too, the disagreement of such impressions is incapable of settlement. For he who prefers one impression to another, or one ‟circumstance” to another, does so either uncritically and without proof or critically and with proof; but he can do this neither without these means (for then he would be discredited) nor with them. For if he is to pass judgement on the impressions he must certainly judge them by a criterion;

[115] this criterion, then, he will declare to be true, or else false. But if false, he will be discredited; whereas, if he shall declare it to be true, he will be stating that the criterion is true either without proof or with proof. But if without proof, he will be discredited; and if with proof, it will certainly be necessary for the proof also to be true, to avoid being discredited. Shall he, then, affirm the truth of the proof adopted to establish the criterion after having judged it or without judging it?

[116] If without judging, he will be discredited; but if after Judging, plainly he will say that he has judged it by a criterion; and of that criterion we shall ask for a proof, and of that proof again a criterion. For the proof always requires a criterion to confirm it, and the criterion also a proof to demonstrate its truth; and neither can a proof be sound without the previous existence of a true criterion nor can the criterion be true without the previous confirmation of the proof.

[117] So in this way both the criterion and the proof are involved in the circular process of reasoning,³⁹ and thereby both are found to be untrustworthy; for since each of them is dependent on the credibility of the other, the one is lacking in credibility just as much as the other. Consequently, if a man can prefer one impression to another neither without a proof and a criterion nor with them, then the different impressions due to the differing conditions will admit of no settlement; so that as a result of this Mode also we are brought to suspend judgement regarding the nature of external realities.

[118] The Fifth Argument (or Trope) is that based on positions, distances, and locations; for owing to each of these the same objects appear different; for example, the same porch⁴⁰ when viewed from one of its corners appears curtailed, but viewed from the middle symmetrical on all sides; and the same ship seems at a distance to be small and stationary, but from close at hand large and in motion; and the same tower from a distance appears round but from a near point quadrangular.

[119] These effects are due to distances; among effects due to locations are the following: the light of a lamp appears dim in the sun but bright in the dark; and the same oar bent when in the water but straight when out of the water; and the egg soft when inside the fowl but hard when in the air; and the jacinth⁴¹ fluid when in the lynx but hard when in the air; and the coral soft when in the sea but hard when in the air’; and sound seems to differ in quality according as it is produced in a pipe, or in a flute, or simply in the air.

[120] Effects due to positions are such as these: the same painting when laid flat appears smooth, but when inclined forward at a certain angle it seems to have recesses and prominences. The necks of doves, also, appear different in hue according to the differences in the angle of inclination.

[121] Since, then, all apparent objects are viewed in a certain place, and from a certain distance, or in a certain position, and each of these conditions produces a great divergency in the sense-impressions, as we mentioned above, we shall be compelled by this Mode also to end up in suspension of judgement. For in fact anyone who purposes to give the preference to any of these impressions will be attempting the impossible.

[122] For if he shall deliver his judgement simply and without proof, he will be discredited; and should he, on the other hand, desire to adduce proof, he will confute himself if he says that the proof is false, while if he asserts that the proof is true he will be asked for a proof of its truth, and again for a proof of this latter proof, since it also must be true, and so on ad infinitum.⁴² But to produce proofs to infinity is impossible;

[123] so that neither by the use of proofs will he be able to prefer one sense-impression to another. If, then, one cannot hope to pass judgement on the afore-mentioned impressions either with or without proof, the conclusion we are driven to is suspension; for while we can, no doubt, state the nature which each object appears to possess as viewed in a certain position or at a certain distance or in a certain place, what its real nature is we are, for the foregoing reasons, unable to declare.

[124] The Sixth Mode is that based on admixtures, by which we conclude that, because none of the real objects affects our senses by itself but always in conjunction with something else, though we may possibly be able to state the nature of the resultant mixture⁴³ formed by the external object and that along with which it is perceived, we shall not be able to say what is the exact nature of the external reality in itself. That none of the external objects affects our senses by itself but always in conjunction with something else, and that, in consequence, it assumes a different appearance, is, I imagine, quite obvious.

[125] Thus, our own complexion is of one hue in warm air, of another in cold, and we should not be able to say what our complexion really is, but only what it looks like in conjunction with each of these conditions. And the same sound appears of one sort in conjunction with rare air and of another sort with dense air; and odours are more pungent in a hot bath-room or in the sun than in chilly air; and a body is light when immersed in water but heavy when surrounded by air.

[126] But to pass on from the subject of external admixture,—our eyes contain within themselves both membranes and liquids. Since, then, the objects of vision are not perceived apart from these, they will not be apprehended with exactness; for what we perceive is the resultant mixture, and because of this the sufferers from jaundice see everything yellow, and those with blood-shot eyes reddish like blood.⁴⁴ And since the same sound seems of one quality in open places, of another in narrow and winding places, and different in clear air and in murky air, it is probable that we do not apprehend the sound in its real purity; for the ears have crooked and narrow passages, which are also befogged by vaporous effluvia which are said to be emitted by the regions of the head.

[127] Moreover, since there reside substances in the nostrils and in the organs of taste, we apprehend the objects of taste and of smell in conjunction with these and not in their real purity. So that, because of these admixtures, the senses do not apprehend the exact quality of the external real objects.

[128] Nor yet does the mind apprehend it, since, in the first place, its guides, which are the senses, go wrong; and probably, too, the mind itself adds a certain admixture of its own to the messages conveyed by the senses; for we observe that there are certain humours present in each of the regions which the Dogmatists regard as the seat of the ‟Ruling Principle”⁴⁵— whether it be the brain or the heart, or in whatever part of the creature one chooses to locate it. Thus, according to this Mode also we see that, owing to our inability to make any statement about the real nature of external objects, we are compelled to suspend judgement.

[129] The Seventh Mode is that based, as we said, on the quantity and constitution of the underlying objects, meaning generally by ‟constitution” the manner of composition. And it is evident that by this Mode also we are compelled to suspend judgement concerning the real nature of the objects. Thus, for example, the filings of a goat’s horn appear white when viewed simply by themselves and without combination, but when combined in the substance of the horn they look black. And silver filings appear black when they are by themselves, but when united to the whole mass they are sensed as white.

[130] And chips of the marble of Taenarum⁴⁶ seem white when planed, but in combination with the whole block they appear yellow. And pebbles when scattered apart appear rough, but when combined in a heap they produce the sensation of softness. And hellebore if applied in a fine and powdery state produces suffocation, but not so when it is coarse.

[131] And wine strengthens us when drunk in moderate quantity, but when too much is taken it paralyses the body. So likewise food exhibits different effects according to the quantity consumed; for instance, it frequently upsets the body with indigestion and attacks of purging because of the large quantity taken.

[132] Therefore in these cases, too, we shall be able to describe the quality of the shaving of the horn and of the compound made up of many shavings, and that of the particle of silver and of the compound of many particles, and that of the sliver of Taenarean marble and of the compound of many such small pieces, and the relative qualities of the pebbles, the hellebore, the wine and the food,—but when it comes to the independent and real nature of the objects, this we shall be unable to describe because of the divergency in the sense-impressions which is due to the combinations.

[133] As a general rule, it seems that wholesome things become harmful when used in immoderate quantities, and things that seem hurtful when taken to excess cause no harm when in minute quantities. What we observe in regard to the effects of medicines is the best evidence in support of our statement; for there the exact blending of the simple drugs makes the compound wholesome, but when the slightest oversight is made in the measuring, as sometimes happens, the compound is not only unwholesome but frequently even most harmful and deleterious.

[134] Thus the argument from quantities and compositions causes confusion as to the real nature of the external substances. Probably, therefore, this Mode also will bring us round to suspension of judgement, as we are unable to make any absolute statement concerning the real nature of external objects.

[135] The Eighth Mode is that based on relativity; and by it we conclude that, since all things are relative, we shall suspend judgement as to what things are absolutely and really existent. But this point we must notice—that here as elsewhere we use the term ‟are” for the term ‟appear,” and what we virtually mean is ‟all things appear relative.”⁴⁷ And this statement is twofold, implying, firstly, relation to the thing which judges (for the external object which is judged appears in relation to that thing), and, in a second sense, relation to the accompanying percepts, for instance the right side in relation to the left.

[136] Indeed, we have already argued⁴⁸ that all things are relative—for example, with respect to the thing which judges, it is in relation to some one particular animal or man or sense that each object appears, and in relation to such and such a circumstance; and with respect to the concomitant percepts, each object appears in relation to some one particular admixture or mode or combination or quantity or position.

[137] There are also special arguments to prove the relativity of all things, in this way: Do things which exist ‟differentially”⁴⁹ differ from relative things or not? If they do not differ, then they too are relative; but if they differ, then, since everything which differs is relative to something (for it has its name from its relation to that from which it differs), things which exist differentially are relative.

[138] Again,—of existing things some, according to the Dogmatists,⁵⁰ are summa genera, others infimae species, others both genera and species; and all these are relative; therefore all things are relative. Further, some existing things are ‟pre-evident,”⁵¹ as they say, others non-evident; and the apparent things are significant, but the non-evident signified by the apparent; for according to them ‟the things apparent are the vision of the non-evident.” But the significant and the signified are relative; therefore all things are relative.

[139] Moreover, some existent things are similar, others dissimilar, and some equal, others unequal; and these are relative; therefore all things are relative. And even he who asserts that not all things are relative confirms the relativity of all things, since by his arguments against us he shows that the very statement ‟not all things are relative” is relative to ourselves, and not universal.

[140] When, however, we have thus established that all things are relative, we are plainly left with the conclusion that we shall not be able to state what is the nature of each of the objects in its own real purity, but only what nature it appears to possess in its relative character. Hence it follows that we must suspend judgement concerning the real nature of the objects.

[141] The Mode which, as we said, comes Ninth in order is based on constancy or rarity of occurrence, and we shall explain it as follows. The sun is, of course, much more amazing than a comet; yet because we see the sun constantly but the comet rarely we are so amazed by the comet that we even regard it as a divine portent, while the sun causes no amazement at all. If, however, we were to conceive of the sun as appearing but rarely and setting rarely, and illuminating everything all at once and throwing everything into shadow suddenly, then we should experience much amazement at the sight.

[142] An earthquake also does not cause the same alarm in those who experience it for the first time and those who have grown accustomed to such things. How much amazement, also, does the sea excite in the man who sees it for the first time! And indeed the beauty of a human body thrills us more at the first sudden view than when it becomes a customary spectacle. Rare things too we count as precious, but not what is familiar to us and easily got.

[143] Thus,if we should suppose water to be rare, how much more precious it would appear to us than all the things which are accounted precious!⁵² Or if we should imagine gold to be simply scattered in quantities over the earth like stones, to whom do we suppose it would then be precious and worth hoarding?

[144] Since then, owing to the frequency or rarity of their occurrence, the same things seem at one time to be amazing or precious and at another time nothing of the sort, we infer that though we shall be able perhaps to say what nature appears to belong to each of these things in virtue of its frequent or rare occurrence, we are not able to state what nature absolutely belongs to each of the external objects. So because of this Mode also we suspend judgement regarding them.

[145] There is a Tenth Mode, which is mainly concerned with Ethics, being based on rules of conduct, habits, laws, legendary beliefs, and dogmatic conceptions. A rule of conduct is a choice of a way of life, or of a particular action, adopted by one person or many—by Diogenes,⁵³ for instance, or the Laconians.

[146] A law is a written contract amongst the members of a State, the transgressor of which is punished. A habit or custom (the terms are equivalent) is the joint adoption of a certain kind of action by a number of men, the transgressor of which is not actually punished; for example, the law proscribes adultery, and custom with us forbids intercourse with a woman in public.

[147] Legendary belief is the acceptance of unhistorical and fictitious events, such as, amongst others, the legends about Cronos; for these stories win credence with many. Dogmatic conception is the acceptance of a fact which seems to be established by analogy or some form of demonstration, as, for example, that atoms are the elements of existing things, or homoeomeries, or minima,⁵⁴ or something else.

[148] And each of these we oppose now to itself, and now to each of the others. For example, we oppose habit to habit in this way: some of the Ethiopians tattoo their children, but we do not; and while the Persians think it seemly to wear a brightly dyed dress reaching to the feet, we think it unseemly; and whereas the Indians have intercourse with their women in public, most other races regard this as shameful.

[149] And law we oppose to law in this way: among the Romans the man who renounces his father’s property does not pay his father’s debts, but among the Rhodians he always pays them; and among the Scythian Tauri⁵⁵ it was a law that strangers should be sacrificed to Artemis, but with us it is forbidden to slay a human being at the altar.

[150] And we oppose rule of conduct to rule of conduct, as when we oppose the rule of Diogenes to that of Aristippus or that of the Laconians to that of the Italians. And we oppose legendary belief to legendary belief when we say that whereas in one story the father of men and gods is alleged to be Zeus, in another he is Oceanos— ‟Ocean sire of the gods, and Tethys the mother that bare them.”⁵⁶

[151] And we oppose dogmatic conceptions to one another when we say that some declare that there is one element only, others an infinite number; some that the soul is mortal, others that it is immortal; and some that human affairs are controlled by divine Providence, others without Providence.

[152] And we oppose habit to the other things, as for instance to law when we say that amongst the Persians it is the habit to indulge in intercourse with males, but amongst the Romans it is forbidden by law to do so; and that, whereas with us adultery is forbidden, amongst the Massagetae it is traditionally regarded as an indifferent custom, as Eudoxus of Cnidos⁵⁷ relates in the first book of his Travels; and that, whereas intercourse with a mother is forbidden in our country, in Persia it is the general custom to form such marriages; and also among the Egyptians men marry their sisters, a thing forbidden by law amongst us.

[153] And habit is opposed to rule of conduct when, whereas most men have intercourse with their own wives in retirement, Crates⁵⁸ did it in public with Hipparchia; and Diogenes went about with one shoulder bare, whereas we dress in the customary manner.

[154] It is opposed also to legendary belief, as when the legends say that Cronos devoured his own children, though it is our habit to protect our children; and whereas it is customary with us to revere the gods as being good and immune from evil, they are presented by the poets as suffering wounds and envying one another.

[155] And habit is opposed to dogmatic conception when, whereas it is our habit to pray to the gods for good things, Epicurus⁵⁹ declares that the Divinity pays no heed to us; and when Aristippus⁶⁰ considers the wearing of feminine attire a matter of indifference, though we consider it a disgraceful thing.

[156] And we oppose rule of conduct to law when, though there is a law which forbids the striking of a free or well-born man, the pancratiasts strike one another because of the rule of life they follow; and when, though homicide is forbidden, gladiators destroy one another for the same reason.

[157] And we oppose legendary belief to rule of conduct when we say that the legends relate that Heracles in the house of Omphale ‟toiled at the spinning of wool, enduring slavery's burden,”⁶¹ and did things which no one would have chosen to do even in a moderate degree, whereas the rule of life of Heracles was a noble one.

[158] And we oppose rule of conduct to dogmatic conception when, whereas athletes covet glory as something good and for its sake undertake a toilsome rule of life, many of the philosophers dogmatically assert that glory is a worthless thing.

[159] And we oppose law to legendary belief when the poets represent the gods as commiting adultery and practising intercourse with males, whereas the law with us forbids such actions;

[160] and we oppose it to dogmatic conception when Chrysippus⁶² says that intercourse with mothers or sisters is a thing indifferent, whereas the law forbids such things.

[161] And we oppose legendary belief to dogmatic conception when the poets say that Zeus came down and had intercourse with mortal women, but amongst the Dogmatists it is held that such a thing is impossible;

[162] and again, when the poet relates⁶³ that because of his grief for Sarpedon Zeus ‟let fall upon the earth great gouts of blood,” whereas it is a dogma of the philosophers that the Deity is impassive; and when these same philosophers demolish the legend of the hippocentaurs, and offer us the hippocentaur as a type of unreality.⁶⁴

[163] We might indeed have taken many other examples in connexion with each of the antitheses above mentioned; but in a concise account like ours, these will be sufficient. Only, since by means of this Mode also so much divergency is shown to exist in objects, we shall not be able to state what character belongs to the object in respect of its real essence, but only what belongs to it in respect of this particular rule of conduct, or law, or habit, and so on with each of the rest. So because of this Mode also we are compelled to suspend judgement regarding the real nature of external objects. And thus by means of all the Ten Modes we are finally led to suspension of judgement.

Notes on the current edition

Pyrrhoniae hypotyposes

1. 27 post φαινόμενα add. ἢ EAB, post νοούμενα add. ἢ AB 4 suppl. e T (construenti) coll. p. 9, 31 8 ἐρωτήσει L Gen. 10 ἡγησάμενον EAB 13 ὑποκείσθω EAB 15 δοκοῦν EAB

2. §§ 36—163 : cf. Diog. Laert. IX ξ 79—88. Philo de 171 sqq. (cf. v. Arnim Quellenstudien zu Philo p. 59 sqq.) Aristocles apud Euseb. Praep. Ev. XIY 18, 11 sqq.

3. §§ 40—78: cf. Diog. Laert. IX ξ —80 Philo de ebr. 171.

4. 23 τύπους GT (figuras): τόπους edd. : τρόπους Kayser || συνωνύμως Μ: συνωνύμους LEAB 27 θέσεις ML: διαθέσεις EAB 31 fort. συγκυρήσεις sicut p. 33, 4. 2 θετικῶς om. T 5 κρίνειν · 6 ἢ ἐν scripsi: καὶ ἐν GT 7 add. Pappenh. 8 ὁ ἕβδομος post ὁ ἕκτος iterum EAB 10 ὧς—τι om. EABT 11 ἐννέα Kayser 14 εἶναι ἐλέγομεν EAB || παρὰ add. Gen.

5. 15 ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν om.T 18 ὀνομάτων EAB 19 et 20 μίξεων M 21 ζωΰφια Bekker: animaliaparvulaT: ζωόφθτα G 23 lac. stat. Fabr. addens ὡς μῦς 26 οἱ om. Μ 28 μὲν <ὡς> EAB 5/6 seclusi ut glossema ad p. 11, 14 7 καὶ ὑπόφασμα EAB 14 λάμπ’. ἐν τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῦ ἔχει LE (sic): ἐν τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς λ. ἔχει AB: λ. ἔχει ἐν τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς M

6. 15 ἀπ’ αὐτῶν om. T 21 ἀλογώτερον Gen. 22 add. e Τ (et differentes) 28 οἴα Μ : οἶς LEAB 29 αὐτὰ EAB : αὐτὴν M : αὐτ’ ἃς L 1 ἀγγείων G : ὀργάνων iam a Bekkero coni. T (instrumentorum) atcf. Philoleg. alleg. Π37 (Ι 97, 28Cohn) 1/2 προπέπτωνκεν ΕΑΒ et Μ (ommisso τ) T (procidunt) : πέπτωκεν L edd. 4 ὅμοια LE AB : ὁρᾶν M 5 ὁρᾶν om. M 13 τὰ ante ὧτα om. EAB || καὶ G : ἢ T (vel)

7. 15 παραβύσαντες MEAB: παραβήσαντες L 21 εἶναι et EAB (comp. script.): ταῦτα L 25 εὔλογον Salmasius: εὔλογα G: rationabile est Τ 26 αὐτῶν om. T 28 εἴγε καὶ ἡμεῖς MEABT (si quidem et nos): καὶ ἡ. εἴγε L 29 fort. coll. p. 13, 12. 14. 24. 27. || καὶ: ἢ Pasquali 30 παρὰ ΜΤ (secundum): περὶ LEAB 2 λαμβάνοι L: λαμβάνει MEABT (assumit) 6 αὐτὴν MEAB : αὐτῶν L 10 post αὐτὸ add. πνεῦμα MEAB

8. 20 ἀνθρώποις om. EAB 22 τε GT: δὲ edd. 28 <ἢ> καὶ θάν’. (aut et) Τ 29 αἳ L : ἃ MEAB 31 δὲ (vero) T 34 ἀναρρώνυται Pasquali coll. Aelian. h. a. II 9 1 μόνον Bekk. : μόνου G II φυγοῦ LEAB 4 δὲ om. Τ 7 εὐηδὲς L 10 ζώων ML: νόμων EAB

9. 12 οὐ (non) Τ 18 τῷ Μ: τὸ LEAB 21 προοισόμεθα G: producemus T: προσησόμεθα a Gen. coniectum recepit Bekk. 30 οὖν ML : γοῦν EAB || αἱ om. EAB 1 τὰ ἅλ’. ζῷα οὕτω EAB 6 εὑρεσιλογοῦντες Gen.: εὑρεσιολογοῦντες G 8 παίζειν ἔχοντες Kayser 11 ὧς om. Τ

10. 20a

11. ξ 65 cf. Porphyr. de abstin. III 2

12. 23 <καὶ> add. e T (et in eo quod est circa coll. p. 17, 17. 28 τοι L: τι MEAB 30 γε LM: om. T: τε E AB 1 δὲ G : μὲν (quidem) T 4 ὄντα G: εἶναι T (esse)
συμπολεμοῦντα scripsi: πολεμοῦντα GT (qui maxime repugnat): προσέχοντα Diels

13. 19a

14. 24a

15. 11 ἀναποδείκτῳ Apelt coll. Plut. de soll. anim. p. 969 B (vide p. 93,11): ἀναποδείκτων G: per plura inmittere quinto indemonstrativo T 12 ἐλθὼν MT (ueniens): ἐλθεῖν LEAB 14 ὁρμήσῆ Bekk. : ὁρμήσει G 16 οὔτε τῇδε Τ (neque hac) : ἢ τῇδε G 20 δυσαληθῆ L 22 τῶν γινομένων h 24(??) ἄσκυλον EAB 31 εἴη τοῦτο κατὰ τούτου EB : εἴη τοῦτο κατὰ τοῦτο A 3 τῇ om. L II παρὰ M: περὶ LEAB

16. 17 παρὰ τούτῳ Gen.: περὶ τούτω MEAB: περὶ τούτου L || τε MT (m eo quoque et): om. LEAB 24 ἀλόγων om. T 25 ἀποδεικνύειν Gen.: ὑποδεικνύειν G || δυνατὸν om. EAB 32/3 ἔμπροσθεν secl., fort. ἐν τούτοις 2 ἀλλ’ om. M

17. §§ 79—89 cf.Diog. Laert ξ 80—81. Philo de ebr. 175 sqq.

18. 9 συγχωρήσῃ EAB: συγχωρήσει MLT (concedet) 11 τὴν om. L 15 μὲν om. Τ 17 παρὰ δὲ MT (cecundum autem): παρὰ LEAB 17 ἐπικράτεια — 18 χυμῶν om. L 20 ταῦτάτοι G: quapropter T 21 κατὰ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους Kayser 28 καὶ om. Τ 31 ἐνεθάλπετο EAB 33 Ψυλλαεῖς G: Ψύλλοι iam desid. a Salmasio praeb. T (psilli) || post ὄφεων M add. ἢ σκορπίων 1 Τεντυρῖται Fabr.: Τιντυρῖται GT (fintarite) || προσνηχόμενοι ἄνω κάτω Diels

19. 29 a

20. 2 ἄνω κάτω ab Apeltio olim deletum omisit T (non leduntur a crocodilUs) 3 Ἀστάπουν olim ab Herchero inventum praeb. T (astapum): ὑδάσπην G edd. 7 χύσερμος EAB: chrisormus Τ 8 καὶ om. T 11 ποταμόν M 13 ᾧ T (cui videbatur) cf. Aristot. l..: ὧς Paris. suppl. 133: ὃς G
τῶν om. M 27 τε add. Schroeder 28 βιοτά L: βιωτά M: βιωταῖς EAB 29 οἶδμα G 29 (??) θοὰ LMT (naui ueloci): θοσῶν EAB: θοᾷ σῶν Gen. : θοᾷ σῶς Fabr. || διαμείβων Maas: διαστείβων G: pergens T

21. 29b

22. 4 γε LM: τε EABT (quoque) 11 αὐτὰ add. Bekk. 12 εἰσάγετ᾿ EAB 15 κατὰ δύναμιν delevi 16 τοῖς om. M 20 Ἐπικούρειος a Stephano restitutum praeb. Τ (Epicurius) et Paris. suppl. 133: Ἐπίκουρος G 23 προοίσεται M: προοίεται LEAB: infert Τ: προσίεται edd. || οὐδενὸς τῶν ἀνθρώ- πων M

23. §§ 90—99: cf. Diog. Laert. IX 81.

24. 29 τινὰς — ἀλγεῖν om. Τ 31 ἀναγκαίων L || διὰ MEAB : ἐπὶ L 6 τὸ ζητούμενον Τ (quod queritur subripiunt) : τὰ φαινόμενα G edd. 7 ἵνα om. M 10 πρόχειρ’. ML (cf. p. 115, 1 e. a.): ἐγχ. EAB edd.: proponimus T ΙΙ δ’ ἐλέγομεν Diels: δὲ λέγομεν GT (autem dicimus) cf. p. 33, 5

25. 27 ὁποῖον — 28 λέγ’ εἰν om. M 29 τ. τρ. delevi 32 ποτε om. Τ 33 μόνας ὄντως ἔχει L: μόνας ἔχει ὄντως Μ: μόνας ἔχειν EAB : solas vere ipsum habere Τ 4 μὲν om. EAB 7 ἐν delevi 8 ἐμπν. rest. e Τ (aspiratione) coll. p. 14, 10. 10 τἀς διαφορὰς EAB 12 τὸ μῆλον om. EAB

26. §§ 100—117 Diog. Laert. IX 82. Philo de ebr. 178 sqq.

27. 29 εἰ Gen. T (verum etiamsi): om. G cf. p. 6,4. 30 μόνας Bekk.: πλείονας GT (plures): πάσας Stephanus (omnes) 31 ἢ καὶ πλείους Kayser 32 τὰς ἡμῖν om. Μ || ἐστι om. EAB 33/1 ante λόγος inser. ἡμῖν M, ὁ L 1 suppL e T (ductoribus eum fallentibus) cf. p. 30, 11 5 στάντες Gen. Fabr. 6/7 Καταλλαγὴν L 11 ἔχειν addidi coU. p. 24, 16. 14 ἢ a Bekkero deL om. T 17 θεοφρουρούμενοι L 18 ἀπὸ φορᾶς EAB Gen. Fabr.: odorem Τ

28. 23 κιρρόν Fabr.: κορρόν G 25 λέγοι T (dicat) || τινων om. L 29 τῇ φύσει G cf. p. 39, 10: φύσει edd. 31 μεταβάλλει post χυμοῖς add. M 5 ἔχοντες EAB 9 <τὸ> εἷναι ci.: quare esse et nonesse fii eis T 10 αὐταῖς Apelt: αὐτοῖς G 11 ἐγρήγορσιν <γίνεται> Pappenheim 12 ἀνύπαρκτα ἐν τῷ ἐγρ. MLT (que sunt non existentiam in devigilando) sic: ἐν τῷ om: EAB: ἐν τῷ εγρ. ἀν’. edd. 13 ἐν τῷ delevi: οὐ καὶ τὸ καθ’. Diels colL p. 565,16 15 ὅτι Τ (quia) edd.: ἔτι G

29. 17 χρῶμα Bekk. : βρῶμα GT (cibus) 24 ἀπὸ Pappenh. coll. p. 58, 28. 27 πλέοντες Τ (navigantes) v. 34 om. Τ sed addit etc. (cf p. XI) 1 δὲ quod iam Bekk. ci. addit Τ (etiam et) ΙΙ ἔχοντες om. T 4 περὶ EAB 8 γίνεται M 9 εἶναι δοκεῖ om. T 14 περὶ δὲ τοῦ EAB

30. 16/7

31. 16/17 περὶ EABT (circa) 18 καὶ ἄλλοτε — 19 μὲν om. EAB 8 ἄλλως MLT (aliter) cf. Philo de ebr. 176: ἄλλων EAB 21 ἔστιν om. T 24 τὸ — 25 κινεῖται om. EAB 29 ἔσται T (erit): ἐστὶ G 33 ταῖς Τ (hiis que sanorum sunt): καὶ τἀς G 7 πάντως om. Μ ΙΙ κρινεῖ κριτηρίῳ EAB 9 ἄπιστος Bekk. : ἄπιστον GT (incredibile) 10 λέξει — 11 μετὰ ἀποδείξεως om. EAB 11 εἰ LMT (si): ὁ EAB

32. §§ 118—123 : cf. Diog. Laert. IX 85—86. Philo de ebr. 181 sqq.

33. 14 εἰς <τὴν> L edd. 20 καὶ ἵνα EAB 26 καὶ add. Stephanus 30 περὶ EABT (de): παρὰ LM || καὶ om. Τ || ὅσον MT (quantum): ὃς LEAB: ὡς Gen., del. Kayser 4 μείουρος A: μύουρος LMEB 10 ἀμαυρῶ L 13 λυνγούριον et λυνγί LM

34. §§ 124–128 cf. Diog. Laert. IX — 85. Philo de ebr. 189 sqq.

35. 15 γίνεται M (sicut p. 26, 8) 21 τόπῳ post τινι dubitanter Bekk., at cf. p. 29, 7 || καὶ alt. GT: ἢ edd. 22 περὶ EABT (circa) : παρὰ ML 24 τούτου τοῦ τρόπου Bekk. : τούτους τοὺς τρόπους GT (hos modos) 28 βουληθήσεται A 30 αὐτὸν L 31 δεῖ MLT (oportet)" δοκεὶ EAB 1 ἐστιν Τ (est): ἔσται G || περιστῆσαι EAB 7 τῷδε <τῷ τόπῳx003E; dub. Bekk. at cf. p. 28, 21. 11 καθ’ ἑαυτὸ ἡμῖν MEBAT (secundum se ipsum): αὐτὸ ἡμῖν L

36. 12 post ἡμῖν edd. 18 et 19 σὺν T (cum) 19 ἐν om.EAB II rcSdelevi: ἐν καταψύχρῳ Bekk. dub. 4 διαφορήσεσιν Μ : productionibus T 4 αἵ — 5 τόπων glossema? 6 χυμῶν Kayser (cf. V. 14) 11 sensus ductores eius fallunt T (vide p. 24,2)

37. §§ 129–134 cf. Diog. Laert. IX 86 (hic octavus modus). Philo de ebr. 189 sqq.

38. 13 post ἕκαστον inser. ποιεῖται EAB 14 εἶναι δοκοῦσιν MLT (putant esse): ἔχει. καὶ ὁποῖον εἷναι δοκ. EAB 27 τὰ μέρη GT (partes scilicet lineatura): seclusi 28 ὡς om. Μ 29 ταιναρείας Gen. : ταιναρέας L: ταιναρίας EAB: τεναραιεας Μ: tenarii lapidis Τ 1 κριμνώδης Fabr. : κριμώδης G 3 παραπλ. om. Τ 5 καθαίρει GT (purgat): καθαιρεῖ Fabr.

39. §§ 135–140: cf. Diog. Laert. IX 87–88 (hic decimus modus). Philo de ebr. 186 sqq.

40. 8 λεπτῶν μερῶν Stephamis: suhtilibus partibus T 10 μικρῶν μερῶν Stephanus: parvis partihus Τ 13 τρυφῆς L 19 <καὶ> μάλιστα T (et maxime) 21 ῥοπῆς LM: τροφῆς EAB 24 συνέχει T (continet) 30 ἀπολύτως GT (ansolute): ἁπλῶς Gen. Fabr. 4 κρίνειν EAB 5 πρὸς LM: παρὰ EAB

41. 10 καὶ τόνδε τὸν τρόπον del. Kayser: τόπον pro τρόπον Pappenheim ΙΙ τήνδε τὴν σύνθ. M 15 διάφορον EAB 17 τε Bekk.: δὲ GT (autem) 29 πάντα εἶναι LMT (omnia esse): εἶναι πάντα EAB II <μὴ> εἶναι πάντα Pappenheim || εἶναι δείκνυσι MLT (esse ostendit): ἀποδείκνυσι EAB 30 <εἰ> οὕτω coni. Kayser 2 9 add. e Τ (quod sequitur) || ἀκολουθεῖ LT: ἀκολουθεῖν MEAB 3 δι’ ἡμας EAB

42. §§ 141—144 cf. Diog. Laert. IX 87, deest apud Philonem.

43. §§ 145–163 cf. Diog. Laert. IX 83–84 (hic quintus modus) Philo de ebr. 193 sqq. (cf. v. Arnim, Quellenstudien zu Philo V. Al. p. 66).

44. 5 ἐλέγομεν εἶναι Τ (dicebanus esse): εἶναι λέγομεν G 9 καὶ om, T 18 καὶ GT: μὲν Gen. Fabr. 19 εἰ om. L 27 δὲ om. EAB 1 πρὸς del. Kayser: pertinet ad T

45. 7 a concivibus Τ (σθμπολ.?) 8 ἢ T (vel): ἡ G 9 ὁ — 11 δὲ bis EAB 18 ἢ add, Τ (aut) at cf. Doxogr. gr. p. 312, 4 Diels 24 ἄλλων G: Ἑλλήνων Τ (grecorum) || τοῦτο εἶναι L: εἶναι τοῦτο M: εἶναι EAB 30 τὴν <τοῦ> EAB 31 τοῦ om. M 33 λέγωμεν add. Τ (dicimus) cf. p. 35, 3. 8.

46. 3 δὲ om. L 11 μασαγέταις LM || ἐν addidi colL p. 33, 19 13 μὲν om. EAB 16 γαμεῖν Τ (in uxores ducere) 18 ἱππαρχίᾳ G: Praxarchidi Τ 19 ἀπὸ ἐξωμίδος GT (ob exomide) inusitatum, atforsitan rectum: ἄπο <δύσ τῆς> ἐξωμίδος conieci colL Aristoph. Thesmoph. 656: ἀπεξωμίδιος vel ἁπλῆ ἐξωμίδι Pasquali 20 ὡς om. Τ (quando) 23 consuetudo est Τ || ἀπειθεῖς EAB 27 λέγῃ Bekk.: λέγει GT (dicit) 28 ἡγῆται L: ἡγεῖται MEABT (putat) 30 ἡγώμεθα ME AB : ἡγούμεθσι LT (arbitramur)

47. 31 <εἶναι> νόμῳ EAB ΙΙ ὅταν Bekk.: οὕτως GT (sic) ΙΙ νόμου <μὲν> ὄντος Τ (lege quidem existente) 38 τύπτωσιν Bekk.: τύπτουσιν G 2 ἑαυτῶν EAB ζῆν post μέτρ’. add. dubit. Bekk. || προῃρημένος L: προειρημένος Μ: προειρημένως EAB: moderate discretus T 9 τινος add. T (tamquam honum aliquid)
φαύλην Μ: pravam rem Τ 14 et 17 κωλύῃ Bekk.: κωλύει GT (prohibet) 17 μυθικὴν δογματικὴ δὲ πίστιν ὑπολήψει EAB 21 λέγῃ Bekk.: λέγει GT (dicit) 22 ᾖ add. T (est) 23 lacunam post ὅταν statui ΙΙ τὸν EAB: τὸ Μ: om. L

Sextus Empiricus Pyrrhoniae Hypotyposes 1.14

ed. Hermann Mutschmann

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Chapter XIV.—Concerning The Ten Modes

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