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With respect to DICTION, one part of its theory is that, which treats of the figures of speech¹; such as, commanding, entreating, relating, menacing, interrogating, answering, and the like. But this belongs, properly, to the art of acting, and to the professed masters of that kind.

[23]

Poetics. Aristotle. Thomas Twining (Translator). London, UK. 1789.

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Current edition Experimental

Poetics (Thomas Twining, 1789) (OCR draft) (English) (Thomas Twining's English translation of Aristotle's Poetics, published in 1789 and aligned to the Kassel reference passage sequence.)

Provisional text from uncorrected OCR; expect errors.

Editions (4)

Περὶ ποιητικῆς (OCR draft) (Aristotle, Poetics. Immanuel Bekker, editor, Aristotelis Opera, volume 2. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1837.) — 19 focus

Περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἄλλων ἤδη εἴρηται, λοιπὸν δὲ περὶ λέξεως ἢ διανοίας εἰπεῖν.

Τὰ μὲν οὖν περὶ τὴν διάνοιαν ἐν τοῖς περὶ ῥητορικῆς κείσθω· τοῦτο γὰρ ἴδιον μᾶλλον ἐκείνης τῆς μεθόδου.

Ἔστι δὲ κατὰ τὴν διάνοιαν ταῦτα, ὅσα ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου δεῖ παρασκευασθῆναι.

Μέρη δὲ τούτων τό τε ἀποδεικνύναι καὶ τὸ λύειν καὶ τὸ πάθη παρασκευάζειν, οἷον ἔλεον ἢ φόβον ἢ ὀργὴν καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα, καὶ ἔτι μέγεθος καὶ μικρότητα.

Δῆλον δὲ ὅτι καὶ ἐν τοῖς πράγμασιν ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν ἰδεῶν δεῖ χρῆσθαι, ὅταν ἢ ἐλεεινὰ ἢ δεινὰ ἢ μέγαλα ἢ εἰκότα δέῃ παρασκευάζειν.

Πλὴν τοσοῦτον διαφέρει, ὅτι τὰ μὲν δεῖ φαίνεσθαι ἄνευ διδασκαλίας, τὰ δὲ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ ὑπὸ τοῦ λέγοντος παρασκευάζεσθαι καὶ παρὰ τὸν λόγον γίγνεσθαι. Τί γὰρ ἂν εἴη τοῦ λέγοντος ἔργον, εἰ φανοῖτο ἡδέα καὶ μὴ διὰ τὸν λόγον;

Τῶν δὲ περὶ τὴν λέξιν ἓν μέν ἐστιν εἶδος θεωρίας τὰ σχήματα τῆς λέξεως, ἅ ἐστιν εἰδέναι τῆς ὑποκριτικῆς καὶ τοῦ τὴν τοιαύτην ἔχοντος ἀρχιτεκτονικήν, οἷον τί ἐντολὴ καὶ τί εὐχὴ καὶ διήγησις καὶ ἀπειλὴ καὶ ἐρώτησις καὶ ἀπόκρισις, καὶ εἴ τι ἄλλο τοιοῦτον.

Παρὰ γὰρ τὴν τούτων γνῶσιν ἢ ἄγνοιαν οὐδὲν εἰς τὴν ποιητικὴν ἐπιτίμημα φέρεται, ὅ τι καὶ ἄξιον σπουδῆς. Τί γὰρ ἄν τις ὑπολάβοι ἡμαρτῆσθαι ἃ Πρωταγόρας ἐπιτιμᾷ, Ὅτι εὔχεσθαι οἰόμενος ἐπιτάττει εἰπὼν

Μῆνιν ἄειδε θεά;

Τὸ γὰρ κελεῦσαι, φησί, ποιεῖν τι ἢ μὴ ἐπίταξίς ἐστιν.

Διὸ παρείσθω ὡς ἄλλης καὶ οὐ τῆς ποιητικῆς ὂν θεώρημα.

Περὶ ποιητικῆς (OCR draft) Perseus (Aristotle, De arte poetica liber. Rudolf Kassel, editor. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965. Reference edition for passage alignment.) — 19 focus

περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἄλλων εἰδῶν εἴρηται, λοιπὸν δὲ περὶ λέξεως καὶ διανοίας εἰπεῖν.

τὰ μὲν οὖν περὶ τὴν διάνοιαν ἐν 35 τοῖς περὶ ῥητορικῆς κείσθω· τοῦτο γὰρ ἴδιον μᾶλλον ἐκείνης τῆς μεθόδου.

ἔστι δὲ κατὰ τὴν διάνοιαν ταῦτα, ὅσα ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου δεῖ παρασκευασθῆναι.

μέρη δὲ τούτων τό τε ἀποδεικνύναι καὶ τὸ λύειν καὶ τὸ πάθη παρασκευάζειν (οἷον 1456b 1 ἔλεον ἢ φόβον ἢ ὀργὴν καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα) καὶ ἔτι μέγεθος καὶ μικρότητας.

δῆλον δὲ ὅτι καὶ ἐν τοῖς πράγμασιν ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν ἰδεῶν δεῖ χρῆσθαι ὅταν ἢ ἐλεεινὰ ἢ δεινὰ ἢ μεγάλα ἢ εἰκότα δέῃ παρασκευάζειν·

πλὴν τοσοῦτον 5 διαφέρει, ὅτι τὰ μὲν δεῖ φαίνεσθαι ἄνευ διδασκαλίας, τὰ δὲ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ ὑπὸ τοῦ λέγοντος παρασκευάζεσθαι καὶ παρὰ τὸν λόγον γίγνεσθαι. τί γὰρ ἂν εἴη τοῦ λέγοντος ἔργον, εἰ φαίνοιτο ᾗ δέοι καὶ μὴ διὰ τὸν λόγον;

τῶν δὲ περὶ τὴν λέξιν ἓν μέν ἐστιν εἶδος θεωρίας τὰ σχήματα τῆς λέξεως, 10 ἅ ἐστιν εἰδέναι τῆς ὑποκριτικῆς καὶ τοῦ τὴν τοιαύτην ἔχοντος ἀρχιτεκτονικήν, οἷον τί ἐντολὴ καὶ τί εὐχὴ καὶ διήγησις καὶ ἀπειλὴ καὶ ἐρώτησις καὶ ἀπόκρισις καὶ εἴ τι ἄλλο τοιοῦτον.

παρὰ γὰρ τὴν τούτων γνῶσιν ἢ ἄγνοιαν οὐδὲν εἰς τὴν ποιητικὴν ἐπιτίμημα φέρεται ὅ τι καὶ ἄξιον 15 σπουδῆς. τί γὰρ ἄν τις ὑπολάβοι ἡμαρτῆσθαι ἃ Πρωταγόρας ἐπιτιμᾷ, ὅτι εὔχεσθαι οἰόμενος ἐπιτάττει εἰπὼν

μῆνιν ἄειδε θεά;

τὸ γὰρ κελεῦσαι, φησίν, ποιεῖν τι ἢ μὴ ἐπίταξίς ἐστιν.

διὸ παρείσθω ὡς ἄλλης καὶ οὐ τῆς ποιητικῆς ὂν θεώρημα.

Poetics, Greek text (Ingram Bywater, 1909) (OCR draft) Experimental (Ingram Bywater's Greek text of Aristotle's Poetics, published in 1909.) — 19 focus

Περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἄλλων ἤδη εἴρηται, λοιπὸν δὲ περὶ
λέξεως καὶ διανοίας εἰπεῖν.

τὰ μὲν οὖν περὶ τὴν διάνοιαν ἐν
τοῖς περὶ ῥητορικῆς κείσθω· τοῦτο γὰρ ἴδιον μᾶλλον ἐκείνης
τῆς μεθόδου.

ἔστι δὲ κατὰ τὴν διάνοιαν ταῦτα, ὅσα ὑπὸ
τοῦ λόγου δεῖ παρασκευασθῆναι.

μέρη δὲ τούτων τό τε ἀποδεικνύναι
καὶ τὸ λύειν καὶ τὸ πάθη παρασκευάζειν (οἷον
ἔλεον ἢ φόβον ἢ ὀργὴν καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα) καὶ ἔτι μέγεθος
καὶ μικρότητα.

δῆλον δὲ ὅτι καὶ ἐν τοῖς πράγμασιν ἀπὸ
τῶν αὐτῶν ἰδεῶν δεῖ χρῆσθαι ὅταν ἢ ἐλεεινὰ ἢ δεινὰ ἢ
μεγάλα ἢ εἰκότα δέῃ παρασκευάζειν·

πλὴν τοσοῦτον διαφέρει,
ὅτι τὰ μὲν δεῖ φαίνεσθαι ἄνευ διδασκαλίας, τὰ δὲ
ἐν τῷ λόγῳ ὑπὸ τοῦ λέγοντος παρασκευάζεσθαι καὶ παρὰ
τὸν λόγον γίγνεσθαι. τί γὰρ ἂν εἴη τοῦ λέγοντος ἔργον, εἰ
φαίνοιτο ᾗ δέοι καὶ μὴ διὰ τὸν λόγον;

τῶν δὲ περὶ τὴν λέξιν
ἓν μέν ἐστιν εἶδος θεωρίας τὰ σχήματα τῆς λέξεως,
ἅ ἐστιν εἰδέναι τῆς ὑποκριτικῆς καὶ τοῦ τὴν τοιαύτην ἔχοντος
ἀρχιτεκτονικήν, οἷον τί ἐντολὴ καὶ τί εὐχὴ καὶ διήγησις
καὶ ἀπειλὴ καὶ ἐρώτησις καὶ ἀπόκρισις καὶ εἴ τι
ἄλλο τοιοῦτον.

παρὰ γὰρ τὴν τούτων γνῶσιν ἢ ἄγνοιαν οὐδὲν
εἰς τὴν ποιητικὴν ἐπιτίμημα φέρεται ὅ τι καὶ ἄξιον σπουδῆς.
τί γὰρ ἂν τις ὑπολάβοι ἡμαρτῆσθαι ἃ Πρωταγόρας
ἐπιτιμᾷ, ὅτι εὔχεσθαι οἰόμενος ἐπιτάττει εἰπὼν “μῆνιν ἄειδε
θεά”; τὸ γὰρ κελεῦσαι, φησίν, ποιεῖν τι ἢ μὴ ἐπίταξίς
ἐστιν.

διὸ παρείσθω ὡς ἄλλης καὶ οὐ τῆς ποιητικῆς ὂν
θεώρημα.

Poetics, Greek text (Franz Ritter, 1839) (OCR draft) Experimental (Franz Ritter's 1839 Greek edition, corrected against OCR of the represented copy and aligned to the conventional Perseus chapter-and-subchapter sequence.) — 19 focus

Περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἄλλων ἤδη εἴρηται, λοιπὸν δὲ περὶ λέξεως ἢ διανοίας εἰπεῖν.

τὰ μὲν οὖν περὶ τὴν διάνοιαν ἐν τοῖς περὶ ῥητορικῆς κείσθω· τοῦτο γὰρ ἴδιον μᾶλλον ἐκείνης τῆς μεθόδου.

ἔστι δὲ κατὰ τὴν διάνοιαν ταῦτα, ὅσα ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου δεῖ παρασκευασθῆναι.

μέρη δὲ τούτων τό τε ἀποδεικνύναι καὶ τὸ λύειν καὶ τὸ πάθη παρασκευάζειν, οἷον ἔλεον ἢ φόβον ἢ ὀργὴν καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα, καὶ ἔτι μέγεθος καὶ μικρότητα.

δῆλον δὲ ὅτι καὶ ἐν τοῖς πράγμασιν ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν ἰδεῶν δεῖ χρῆσθαι, ὅταν ἢ ἐλεεινὰ ἢ δεινὰ ἢ μεγάλα ἢ εἰκότα ιοδέῃ παρασκευάζειν.

πλὴν τοσοῦτον διαφέρει, ὅτι τὰ μὲν δεῖ φαίνεσθαι ἄνευ διδασκαλίας, τὰ δὲ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ ὑπὸ τοῦ λέγοντος παρασκευάζεσθαι καὶ παρὰ τὸν λόγον γίγνεσθαι. τί γὰρ ἂν εἴη τοῦ λέγοντος ἔργον, εἰ φανοῖτο ἡδέα καὶ μὴ διὰ τὸν λόγον;

τῶν δὲ περὶ τὴν λέξιν ἓν μέν ἐστιν εἶδος θεωρίας τὰ σχήματα τῆς λέξεως, ἃ ἐστιν εἰδέναι τῆς ὑποκριτικῆς καὶ¹ τοῦ τὴν τοιαύτην ἔχοντος ἀρχιτεκτονικήν, οἷον τί ἐντολὴ καὶ τί εὐχὴ καὶ διήγησις καὶ ἀπειλὴ καὶ ἐρώτησις καὶ ἀπόκρισις, καὶ εἴ τι ἄλλο τοιοῦτον.

παρὰ γὰρ τὴν τούτων γνῶσιν ἢ ἄγνοιαν οὐδὲν εἰς τὴν ποιητικὴν ἐπιτίμημα φέρεται, ὅ τι καὶ ἄξιον σπουδῆς. τί γὰρ ἄν τις ὑπολάβοι ἡμαρτῆσθαι ἃ Πρωταγόρας ἐπιτιμᾷ, ὅτι εὔχεσθαι οἰόμενος ἐπιτάττει εἰπὼν “μῆνιν ἄειδε θεά;” τὸ γὰρ κελεῦσαι, φησί, ποιεῖν τι ἢ μὴ ἐπίταξίς ἐστιν.

διὸ παρείσθω ὡς ἄλλης καὶ οὐ τῆς ποιητικῆς ὂν θεώρημα.

Translations (13)

Poetics (W. H. Fyfe) (OCR draft) Perseus (William Hamilton Fyfe's English translation of Aristotle's Poetics, Loeb Classical Library, 1939 printing.) — 19 focus

The other factors have been already discussed. It remains to speak of Diction and Thought.

All that concerns Thought may be left to the treatise on Rhetoric, for the subject is more proper to that inquiry.¹

Under the head of Thought come all the effects to be produced by the language.

Some of these are proof and refutation, 1456b 1 the arousing of feelings like pity, fear, anger, and so on, and then again exaggeration and depreciation.²

It is clear that in the case of the incidents, too, one should work on the same principles, when effects of pity or terror or exaggeration or probability have to be produced.

There is just this difference, that some effects must be clear without explanation,³ whereas others are produced in the speeches by the speaker and are due to the speeches. For what would be the use of a speaker, if the required effect were likely to be felt without the aid of the speeches?

Under the head of Diction one subject of inquiry is the various modes of speech, the knowledge of which is proper to elocution or to the man who knows the master art⁴—I mean for instance, what is a command, a prayer, a statement, a threat, question, answer, and so on.

The knowledge or ignorance of such matters brings upon the poet no censure worth serious consideration. For who could suppose that there is any fault in the passage which Protagoras censures, because Homer, intending to utter a prayer, gives a command when he says, Sing, goddess, the wrath? To order something to be done or not is, he points out, a command.

So we may leave this topic as one that belongs not to poetry but to another art.

Arabic Poetics (Badawī edition, 1953) (OCR draft) (The ancient Arabic translation of Aristotle's Poetics in ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Badawī's 1953 edition.) — 19 focus

〈الفكرة والمقولة〉

أما فى الأنواع الأخر فقد قلنا. فينبغى الآن أن نتكلم فى المقولة وفى الضمير والذهن.

وقد وضعت الأشياء التى هى نحو الذهن والضمير فى كتاب «البلاغة» وذلك أن هذا هو من شأن تلك الصناعة ومما يخصها. والأشياء التى فى الذهن قد يجب أن ترتب وتعد تحت القول. وأجزاء هذه هى أن يبين، 〈وأن يفند〉 وأن يستثير الألم بمنزلة الحزن أو الخوف أوالحرد أو أشباه هذه، وأيضاً الكبر والصغر.

وظاهر أن فى الأمور أيضاً من هذه الصور والخلق ينبغى أن يستعمل متى كان إما الأمران وإما الصفات وإما العظائم، ويستعد التى هى حقائق. غير أن مقدار الفرق فى هذا هو أن منها 〈ما〉 يرى دائماً بلا تعظيم ومنها ما يعدها الذى يتكلم والقائل، وهى خارج عن القول. وإلا فما فعل ذلك الذى إما أن يقول، وإما أن يبين فيه اللذات؟

وليس سبب القول ونوع النظر للى هى نحو المقولة هو نوعاً واحداً، مثلا أشكال المقولة، وهذه ترى الأخذ بالوجوه والذى له مثل أعنى النبأ وصناعة القيام عليه، بمنزلة ما الأمر وما الصلاة أو حديث أو جزم أو سؤال أو جواب، وإن كان شىء آخر مما هو نظير لهذه. وذلك أنه لا شىء آخر خارج عن علم هذه، ولا علم مما هو تهجين يؤتى به فى صناعة الشعر يستحق الحرص والعناية. وإلا فماذا للإنسان أن يتوهم أنه وقع فى الزلل فى التى كان فروطاغورس يهجن بها من أنه كان يأمر [يظن] غير ما كان يظن أن يصلى ويقول: «خبرى أيتها الإلهة على السخطة والحرد...»؛ وذلك أنه زعم أن معنى أنه أمر بأن يفعل شىء أو لا يفعل هو: أمر، ولذلك يتخلى ذلك لصناعة 〈أخرى〉 لا على أنه من شأن صناعة الشعراء، ويترك.

Poetics (S. H. Butcher, 1911) (OCR draft) Experimental (S. H. Butcher's English translation from Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Art, fourth edition, 1911.) — 19 focus

It remains to speak of Diction and Thought, the
other parts of Tragedy having been already discussed.

Concerning Thought, we may assume what is said in
the Rhetoric, to which inquiry the subject more strictly
belongs.

Under Thought is included every effect which
has to be produced by speech,

the subdivisions being,—
proof and refutation;
the excitation of the feelings, such as pity, fear, anger, and the like;
the suggestion of importance or its opposite.

Now, it is evident that
the dramatic incidents must be treated from the same
points of view as the dramatic speeches, when the object
is to evoke the sense of pity, fear, importance, or probability.

The only difference is, that the incidents
should speak for themselves without verbal exposition;
while the effects aimed at in speech should be produced by the speaker, and as a result of the speech.
For what were the business of a speaker, if the Thought were revealed quite apart from what he says?

Next, as regards Diction. One branch of the inquiry
treats of the Modes of Utterance.
But this province of knowledge belongs to the art of Delivery and to
the masters of that science.
It includes, for instance, —what is a command, a prayer, a statement,
a threat, a question, an answer, and so forth.

To know or not to know these things involves no serious
censure upon the poet's art.
For who can admit the fault imputed
to Homer by Protagoras,—that in the words, 'Sing,
goddess, of the wrath,' he gives a command under the
idea that he utters a prayer? For to tell some one to do a thing or not to do it is, he says, a command.

We may, therefore, pass this over as an inquiry that belongs
to another art, not to poetry.

Aristotle on the Art of Poetry (Ingram Bywater, 1909) (OCR draft) Experimental (Ingram Bywater's English translation of Aristotle's Poetics, published in 1909.) — 19 focus

The Plot and Characters having been discussed, it remains
to consider the Diction and Thought.

As for the Thought,
we may assume what is said of it in our Art of Rhetoric,
as it belongs more properly to that department of inquiry.

The Thought of the personages is shown in everything to
be effected by their language-

in every effort to prove or
disprove, to arouse emotion (pity, fear, anger, and the like),
or to maximize or minimize things.

It is clear, also, that
their mental procedure must be on the same lines in their
actions likewise, whenever they wish them to arouse pity
or horror, or have a look of importance or probability.

The
only difference is that with the act the impression has to
be made without explanation; whereas with the spoken word
it has to be produced by the speaker, and result from his
language. What, indeed would be the good of the speaker,
if things appeared in the required light even apart from
anything he says?

As regards the Diction, one subject for inquiry under
this head is the turns given to the language when spoken;
e. g. the difference between command and prayer, simple
statement and threat, question and answer, and so forth.

The theory of such matters, however, belongs to Elocution
and the professors of that art. Whether the poet knows
these things or not, his art as a poet is never seriously criti-
cized on that account. What fault can one see in Homer's
'Sing of the wrath, Goddess'?-which Protagoras has criti-
cized as being a command where a prayer was meant, since
to bid one do or not do, he tells us, is a command.

Let us
pass over this, then, as appertaining to another art, and
not to that of poetry.

The Poetic of Aristotle (Henry James Pye, revised 1792) (OCR draft) Experimental (Henry James Pye's revised 1792 English translation, corrected against the 1788 first edition, aligned to the Kassel reference edition, and supplied with a selective apparatus of substantive 1788 readings.) — 19.7 focus

There is one part of the theory of elocution relating to the mode of expression, which principally belongs to the player and the professed¹²³

teachers of that art. Such as to distinguish between supplication, command, narration, question, answer and any other circumstances of the same kind.

The Poetic of Aristotle (Theodore Alois Buckley) (OCR draft) Experimental (Theodore Alois Buckley's English translation, first published in 1850 and represented from the Henry G. Bohn 1857 printing; corrected against a second OCR and aligned to the Kassel reference passage sequence.) — 19.7 focus

and whatever else there may be of this kind. ¹ For from the knowledge or ignorance of these, the poetic art incurs no blame of any moment. For who would think that Homer errs in what he is reproved for by Protagoras? viz. that while he fancies he prays, he commands,

Poetica Latine conversa (Franciscus Ritter, 1839) (OCR draft) Experimental (Franz Ritter's Latin translation, corrected against OCR of the represented copy and aligned to the conventional Perseus chapter-and-subchapter sequence.) — 19 focus

De ceteris iam expositum est, restat autem ut de dictione vel sententia dicamus.

sed quae ad sententiam pertinent in libris de arte dicendi exprompta sunto: hoc enim proprium est magis illius disputationis.

pertinent autem ad sententiam haec, quaecumque oratione parari debent.

partes eorum sunt demonstrare et solvere et perturbationes facere, veluti miserationem vel timorem vel iram et quae sunt ciusdem generis, ac praeterea exaggerationem et extenuationem.

patet vero etiam in factis hauriendum esse ex isdem locis, cum sive miseranda sive timenda sive exaggerata sive verisimilia afferenda sunt.

nisi quod hoc intercedit discrimen, quod alia prodire debent sine expositione, alia per orationem a dicente parari et secundum orationem fieri. nam quid dicente opus esset, si iucunda comparerent etiam sine oratione?

ex iis autem quae ad dictionem pertinent unum est genus contemplationis quod figuras dictionis complectitur, quas cognitas habere est artis histrionalis et eius qui talem architecturam profitetur, veluti quid sit mandatum et quid precatio et enarratio et comminatio et interrogatio et responsio, et si quid aliud eiusdem generis.

nam ex horum intellectu aut ignoratione nulla in poeticam vituperatio manat, quae quidem operae pretium sit. quid enim est quod quis existimet peccatum esse in iis quae reprehendit Protagoras, quod precari se opinatus imperet dicens "iram cane dea?” iubere enim, inquit, facere aliquid aut non praeceptio est.

quare mittatur haec ratio, ut quae ad aliam artem et non ad poeticam pertineat.

La poëtique d'Aristote (André Dacier, 1692) (OCR draft) Experimental (André Dacier's French translation of Aristotle's Poetics, published in 1692.) — 19.7 focus

Pour ce qui eſt de la diction, il y en a une partie qui eſt pour le Spectacle & pour le Theatre, c'eſt la prononciation & le geſte; mais cela regarde proprement l'art des Comediens, ou de ceux qui font une ſemblable profeſſion. Car c'eſt à eux d'enſeigner ce que c'eſt qu'un commandement, une priere, une ſimple narration, une menace, une interrogation, une réponſe, & autres choſes ſemblables.

5.

Poetica d'Aristotile (Bernardo Segni, 1549) (OCR draft) Experimental (Bernardo Segni's 1549 Florentine Italian translation, aligned to the Kassel reference passage sequence.) — 19 focus

Tquanto alle coſe, che fon'nel Diſcorſo, nella Rettotica ſen'è parlato.¹

Che inuero tal ragionamento è più propio di quella inſtitutione. Nel Difcorſo fi dicono eſſere tutte quelle coſe, che col parlare ſi debbono andare preparando;

delle quali parte ne conſiſte in dimostrare, & in foluere, & in eccitare gli affetti;

come è la Mifericordia, ò il Timore, ò l'Ira, ò altre fimili perturbationi:& parte d'eſſe ne conſiſte circa alla Amplificatione, & alla Diminutione.

Et è manifeſto, che nelle ſopradette parti e' biſogni vſare; l'Ampli fication' dico, & la Diminutione dalle medeſime fpetre cioè quando e' s'habbia à preparar coſe compaſsio neuoli,ò terribili, ò grandi,ò verifimili.

Doue nondimanco è da vſare queſta diſtintione, che certe coſe è di neceſsità, che appariſchino ſenza aiuto alcuno di dottrina; & certe altre le debbe, chi dice, preparare co parlare:anzi debbe fare, che elle interuenghino per for za d'effo.

Imperoche qual farebbe l'uffitio di chi dice, ſe le coſe appariſsino piaceuoli; ma non per via del parlare? Vanto alla Locutione, vna parte di lei ſta in cofiderare le figure d'effa, lequali s'appartengono à ſapere all'arte Iſtriouica; ò à chi ſia prepo fto à tale arte:che cofa, dico, fia il Commandamento, che il Prego, che la Narratione, che il Minacciò, che l'Interrogatione, che la Riſpoſta, ò qualunche altra cofa, che à queſte ſia ſimigliante.

Concioſia che' per ſapere,ò non ſaper queſte coſe, la Poetica non ne ſia incari cata per tal cagione di carico, che meriti il pregio. Imperoche chi farebbe mai, che ſtimaſſe eſſere errore in quelle coſe, che Protagora mette per errore?cioè quan do vno penſando di pregare inquel cambio comandi in queſto modo. L'ira contami, o Dea. Perchè il dire, che vn faccia, ò non faccia-vna coſa, dice egli, e' vn comandamento.²

Laſsiſi pertanto queſta confideratione, come ſe ella fuſſe d'altra faculta, & non propia diqueſta.

De poetica (Antonio Riccobono, 1587) (OCR draft) Experimental (Antonio Riccobono's Latin translation, first published in 1587; text represented from Immanuel Bekker's 1831 edition.) — 19 focus

Ac de aliis quidem iam dictum est.

reliquum vero est de elocutione vel sententia dicere. ac quae pertinent quidem ad sententiam, in libris de rhetorica posita sunt: hoc enim methodi illius magis est proprium. sunt autem secundum sententiam ea quaecunque ab oratione paranda sunt.

et eorum partes sunt tum demon¿ strare et solvere,

tum perturbationes parare, ut misericordiam vel metum vel iram et quaecunque talia, tum praeterea amplificare et diminuere.

manifestum autem est et in actionibus utendum esse iisdem formis, cum miserabilia aut terribilia aut magna aut verisimilia parare oportuerit;

nisi quod ea sola differentia est, quod haec quidem apparere sine doctrina oportet, quae vero in oratione posita sunt, a dicente parari et per orationem fieri.

quod enim esset dicentis munus, si apparerent iucunda et non per orationem? eorum vero quae pertinent ad elocutionem una species est contemplationis, quae considerat figuras elocutionis, quas scire est histrionicae, et eius qui talem habeat architectonicam, ut quid sit mandatum et quid precatio et narratio et mina et interrogatio et responsio, et si quid aliud huiusmodi.

ab horum enim cognitione vel ignorantia nulla reprehensio in poeticam affertur, quae curanda sit. qui enim fieri potest ut aliquis existimet errorem commissum esse in iis quae Protagoras reprehendit, quod putans precari praecipit, dicens 'iram diya cane?" nam iubere, inquit, ut aliquid faciat aut non faciat praeceptio est.

quamobrem omittatur, ut quae alterius et non poeticae sit contemplatio.

De arte poetica liber (William of Moerbeke, ca. 1277) (OCR draft) Experimental (William of Moerbeke's medieval Latin translation, represented by the 1953 Aristoteles Latinus edition.) — 19 focus

De aliis quidem igitur iam dictum est. Reliquum autem de locutione aut ratiocinatione dicere.

Que quidem igitur circa dianoiam (idest ratiocinationem) in hiis que de rethorica supponantur; hoc enim proprium magis illius methodi.

Sunt autem secundum dianoiam hec, quecumque a ratione oportet preparari

Partes autem horum demonstrareque et solvere et passiones preparare, puta miserationem aut terrorem aut iram et quecumque talia, et adhuc magnitudinem et parvitatem.

Palam autem quod et in rebus ab eisdem speciebus oportet uti, quando aut miserabilia aut dira aut magna aut verisimilia oportet exhibere;

preter quam tantum differt, quod hec quidem oportet apparere sine doctrina, hec autem in sermone a dicente preparari et preter rationem fieri. Quid enim utique sit dicentis opus, apparebit idea et non propter sermonem. —

Eorum autem que circa locutionem una quidem est species theorie scemata locutionis, que scire est ypocritice et habentis talem architectonicam, puta quid mandatum et quid oratio et narratio et comminatio et interrogatio et responsio et si quid aliud tale.

Preter enim horum cognitionem aut ignorantiam nulla in poeticam increpatio fertur, que sit digna studio. Quid enim utique quis existimet peccasse que Protagoras increpat, quod orare putans precipit dicens «insaniam vide dea» ? Nam iubere, inquit, facere aliquid aut non preceptio est.

Propter quod pretermittatur tamquam alterius et non poetice ens theorema. —

Arabic Poetics (Abū Bishr Mattā; Tkatsch edition) (OCR draft) Experimental (The Arabic translation attributed to Abū Bishr Mattā, edited by Jaroslaus Tkatsch in 1928 and aligned to the Kassel reference passage sequence.) — 19 focus

‏اما فى الانواع الاخر فقد قلنا فينبغى الان ان نتكلم فى المقولة وفى الضمير والذهن

‏وقد وصعت الاشيا التى هى نحو الذهن والضمير فى كتاب البلاغة وذلك ان هذا هو من شان تلك الصناعة ومما يخصها

‏والاشيا التى فى الذهن قد يجب ان ترتب وتعد تحت القول

‏واجزا هذه هى ان يبين وان يستقر للالم بمنزلة الحزن او الخوف او الحرد او اشباه هذه وايضا الكبر والصغر

‏وظاهر ان فى الامور ايضا من هذه الصور والخلق ينبغى ان يستعمل متى كان اما الاحزان واما الصفات واما العظايم ويستعد التى هى حقايق

‏غير [ال] ان مقدار الفرق فى هذا هو ان منها يرى دايما بلا تعطيم ومنها ما يعدها الذى يتكلم والقايل وهى خارج عن القول والا فما فعل ذلك الذى اما ان يقول واما ان يبين فيه اللذات وليس سٮٮ القول

‏ونوع النظر للتى هى نحو المقولة هو نوعا واحدا مٮلا اشكال المقولة وهذه ترى للاخر بالوجوه والذى له مثل اعنى البنا وصناعة القيام عليه بمنزلة ما الامر وما الصلاة او حديث او حرض او سوال او جواب وان كان شى اخر مما هو نظير لهذه

‏وذلك انه لا شى اخر خارج عن علم هذه ولا علم من ما هو تهجين يوتا به فى صناعة الشعر يستحق الحرص والعناية والا فماذا للانسان ان يتوهم انه وقع الزلل فى التى كان فروطاغورس يهجن بها من انه كان يامر [ٮطں] عـٮر ما كاں يطں ان يصلى ويقول خبرى انه الاله على السخطة والحرد وذلك انه زعم ان معنى انه امر بان يفعل شى او لا يفعل هو امر

‏ولذلك لٮحلا ذلك الصناعة لا على انه من شان صناعة الشعرا

Arabic Poetics (Abū Bishr Mattā; Tkatsch edition, unaligned) (OCR draft) Experimental (Tkatsch's edition of the medieval Arabic translation in its original, unaligned segmentation.) — 19 focus

‏اما فى الانواع الاخر فقد قلنا فينبغى الان ان نتكلم فى المقولة وفى الضمير والذهن

‏وقد وصعت الاشيا التى هى نحو الذهن والضمير فى كتاب البلاغة وذلك ان هذا هو من شان تلك الصناعة ومما يخصها

‏والاشيا التى فى الذهن قد يجب ان ترتب وتعد تحت القول

‏واجزا هذه هى ان يبين وان يستقر للالم بمنزلة الحزن او الخوف او الحرد او اشباه هذه وايضا الكبر والصغر

‏غير [ال] ان مقدار الفرق فى هذا هو ان منها يرى دايما بلا تعطيم ومنها ما يعدها الذى يتكلم والقايل وهى خارج عن القول

‏والا فما فعل ذلك الذى اما ان يقول واما ان يبين فيه اللذات وليس سٮٮ القول

‏وذلك انه لا شى اخر خارج عن علم هذه ولا علم من ما هو تهجين يوتا به فى صناعة الشعر يستحق الحرص والعناية

‏والا فماذا للانسان ان يتوهم انه وقع الزلل فى التى كان فروطاغورس يهجن بها من انه كان يامر [ٮطں] عـٮر ما كاں يطں ان يصلى ويقول خبرى انه الاله على السخطة والحرد

‏وذلك انه زعم ان معنى انه امر بان يفعل شى او لا يفعل هو امر

‏ولذلك لٮحلا ذلك الصناعة لا على انه من شان صناعة الشعرا

Notes on the current edition

Poetics

1. Figures of speech-not in the usual sense of that expression; as appears, indeed, from his instances. See the NOTE; and Hermes, I. 8. about the modes: particularly, NOTE (C.) .

Commentary

Commentary on the Poetics (Ingram Bywater, 1909) (OCR draft) (Ingram Bywater's English commentary on Aristotle's Poetics.) focus

1. mvp-aristotle-comment-686

1. mvp-aristotle-comment-687

1456a34 λέξεως καὶ διανοίας. This is the usual order of the two terms in the Poetics (v. 6, 1450 a9, 14, 29 and 24, 1459 b16 ). The only instance of the reverse order, which is that of their logical importance ( 6, 1450 b12 ; comp. Rhet. 2. 26, 1403 b36 ), is in 24, 1459 b12

ἔτι τὰς διανοίας καὶ τὴν λεξιν ἔχειν καλῶς.

For the meaning of διάνοια see on 6, 1450 a6 .

κατὰ τὴv διάνοιαν; comp. Phys. 4. 14, 222 b31

τὸ θᾶττον καὶ βραδύτερον κατὰ πᾶσάν ἐστι μεταβολήν.

In Bon. Ind. 369 b8

κατὰ τὴν διάνοιαν

is explained as equivalent to διανοητικά.

3. mvp-aristotle-comment-688

ὅσα ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου κτέ. In the Rhetoric three kinds of speech are recognized, according as the aim of the speaker is (1) to gain the confidence of his audience by creating in their minds a favourable idea of himself and his general credibility; or (2) to work on their feelings; or (3) to convince their reason: Rhet. 1. 2, 1356 a1

τῶν δὲ διὰ τοῦ λόγου ποριζομένων πίστεων τρία εἴδη ἐστίν αἱ μὲν γάρ εἰσιν ἐν τῷ ἤθει τοῦ λέγοντος, αἱ δὲ ἐν τῷ τὸν ἀκροατὴν διαθεῖναί πως, αἱ δὲ ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ λόγῳ διὰ τοῦ δεικνύναι ἢ φαίνεσθαι δεικνύναι κτέ.

The present summary notes the second and third of these three εἴδη, but ignores the first, though there is certainly nothing to exclude that sort of speech from the rhetoric of Tragedy.

4. mvp-aristotle-comment-689

πάθη. The instances οἷον ἔλεον ἢ φόβον κτέ. are added, because up to this point πάθος has usually meant

‘suffering’

‘calamity’

( 11, 1452 b11 ).

4. mvp-aristotle-comment-690

ἔλεον ἢ φόβον ἢ ὀργὴν καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα. According to Tumlirz ( Die tragischen Affecte Mitleid und Furcht nach Aristoteles p. 28) this shows that Aristotle supposes Tragedy to arouse anger and other emotions as well as pity and fear in the mind of the spectators. There is no such reference here to the spectators; the effect meant is that on the hearer on the stage. One might just as well say that the arguments put into the mouth of a personage ( τό τε ἀποδεικνύναι κτέ.) are addressed to the spectators, and not to some other personage in the play. The rhetoric of the speaker in a tragedy is dramatically directed to the hearer on the stage, i. e. to another of the dramatis personae. When Plato says of Euripides

ἐπίσταται . . ῥήσεις ποιεῖν . . οἰκτρὰς καὶ τοὐναντίον αὖ φοβερὰς καὶ ἀπειλητικάς

( Phaedr. 268 c ), he does not suppose him to threaten the hearers of his pieces.

4. mvp-aristotle-comment-691

μέγεθος καὶ μικρότητα, scil. παρασκευάζειν. The clause is an afterthought, as its logical place would be after τό τε ἀποδεικνύναι καὶ τὸ λύειν. The corresponding formula in Isocrates 42 c is

τά τε μεγάλα ταπεινὰ ποιῆσαι καὶ τοῖς μικροῖς μέγεθος περιθεῖναι;

and in the Rhetoric αὔξειν καὶ μειοῦν : Rhet. 2. 26, 1403 a 20

τὸ δ᾽ αὔξειν καὶ μειοῦν ἐστιν ἐνθυμήματα πρὸς τὸ δεῖξαι ὅτι μέγα ἢ μικρόν, ὥσπερ καὶ ὅτι ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακὸν ἢ δίκαιον ἢ ἄδικον.

The reading μικρότητας is retained by Vahlen, who defends the change of number by quoting (among other instances) De part. an. 4. 5, 679 b 37

διαφέρει τῇ θέσει καὶ τοῖς μεγέθεσιν.

— 680 a 29

ἐν τῷ ψύχει καὶ ταῖς ἀλέαις.

— Plato Laws 734 Α

μεγέθει καὶ πλήθει καὶ πυκνότησιν.

—

779 Β ὁμαλότητί τε καὶ ὁμοιότησιν.

— 860 Β

πλήθει καὶ μεγέθεσιν.

1456b1

1456b μέγεθος καὶ μικρότης continued It is difficult, however, to explain the change of number with two words so closely related as μέγεθος and μικρότης, and in a formula so technical as the present. The sense also of the plural μικρότητας is obscure, as it does not seem to fall under any of the heads recognized by Bernhardy, Synt. p. 62 or Kühner, Gr. Gr. 2. 1 p. 17.

5. mvp-aristotle-comment-692

καὶ ἐν τοῖς πράγμασιν: comp. 15, 1454 a 18

ὁ λόγος ἢ ἡ πρᾶξις.

Aristotle is quite aware that there is a rhetoric of action as well as a rhetoric of words. The διάνοια of the dramatis personae may be shown in their acts; they may do things, just as they say things, with a view to exciting pity, fear, etc., or with a view to creating an idea that something is or is not true, etc.; and whichever mode of expression be used, they have to follow, according to Aristotle, the same method and principles.

5. mvp-aristotle-comment-693

ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν ἰδεῶν δεῖ χρῆσθαι, scil. τῇ διανοίᾳ, or τοῖς τῆς διανοίας μέρεσιν. For the meaning of see on 7, 1450b 34.

ἀπό

denotes here the logical starting-point.

5. mvp-aristotle-comment-694

μεγάλα ἢ εἰκότα. Aristotle might have expressed himself more fully by saying μεγάλα ἢ μικρά ἢ εἰκότα ἢ ἀπίθανα (comp. on 18, 1456 a 9 ).

6. mvp-aristotle-comment-695

ἄνευ διδασκαλίας = ἄνευ λόγου,.

‘sine docentis opera’

Tyrwhitt) it is explained by what follows,

τί γὰρ ἂν εἴη τοῦ λέγοντος ἔργον ;

The party instructed or informed here is one of the dramatis personae, who learns the mind of another either through some act of his, or through some statement by him in words.

6. mvp-aristotle-comment-696

τὰ δὲ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ, scil. ἐλεεινά, δεινά, μεγάλα κτέ.

6. mvp-aristotle-comment-697

παρὰ τὸν λόγον. For the preposition comp. b13 and 15, 1454 b 15 .

6. mvp-aristotle-comment-698

εἰ φαίνοιτο ᾗ δέοι. The traditional εἰ φανοῖτο (which would have to be taken as equivalent to εἰ μέλλοι φαίνεσθαι) is against the rule laid down by Mvig, Gr. Synt. p. 119 Eng. tr. There is not much to choose between Vahlen's ἢ δέοι and Castelvetro's ἤδη. ἢ δέοι, however, is somewhat nearer the manuscript reading ἡδέα, and much more probable than either Tyrwhitt's δεῖ or Spengel's διάνοια. It means

‘in the required light’

, i.e. as ἐλεεινά, or δεινά, etc. If things appear of themselves in this light, without the aid of the rhetorical art of the speaker, the speaker is not wanted. The present remark may be compared with that in 6, 1450 b8

ἐν οἷς οὐκ ἔστι δῆλον κτέ.

7. mvp-aristotle-comment-699

τῶν δὲ περὶ τὴν λέξιν. Having briefly considered the διάνοια, the intellectual or rhetorical power revealed in the speeches of the dramatic personages, Aristotle passes on to their λέξις, the diction or language in which they are made to express themselves. This point he investigates under three heads:—(1) the parts or constituents of the diction as a whole; (2) the various kinds of names in it; and (3) the limits within which unusual names or forms of names are admissible in poetry. Before entering on this line of discussion, however, he sets aside a matter which might perhaps seem germane to his subject, the elocutionary element in the spoken language. The word βαδίζει, for instance, according to one's tone in uttering it, may mean

‘he walks’

, or

‘does he walk?’

; and ἄειδε may be uttered as a command (

‘sing!’

) or as a prayer. These and similar distinctions, in Aristotle's view, belong to the language as spoken rather than to the language as written, and thus come within the province of elocution ( ὑποκριτική) rather than that of poetry or literature proper.

7. mvp-aristotle-comment-700

τὰ σχήματα τῆς λέξεως means literally the different

‘attitudes’

or turns of meaning given to the language when it comes to be actually spoken. The same idea underlies the expression σχήματα λέξεως of the grammarians, as one may see from Cicero Orator 83

Verborum collocationem illuminat iis luminibus quae Graeci quasi aliquos gestus orationis σχήματα appellant.

Quintilian 9. 1. 13

Si habitus quidam et quasi gestus sic [scil. σχήματα] appellandi sunt.

σχῆμα

‘gestus’

occurs in 17, 1455 29 and 26, 1462 3 (comp. 1, 1447 a27 ). Aristotle's σχήματα τῆς λέξεως, however, must not be identified with the σχήματα λέξεως or

‘figures of speech’

, as we call them, of later writers. A

‘figure of speech’

is a literary artifice, a deviation from the simple and usual mode of expression for purposes of literary effect; Quintilian defines it as a

conformatio quaedam orationis remota a communi et primum se offerente ratione

( 9. 1. 4 ), or as an

oratio a simplici rectoque loquendi genere deflexa

( 9.3.3 ; comp. Ernesti, Lex. techn. gr. p. 338 ). In a

‘figure of speech’

, as compared with the simple form of expression (e.g.

‘Macedonia's madman’

and

‘Alexander’

), we have a difference of words without any difference of sense; whereas in the Aristotelian σχήματα τῆς λέξεως we have the same words and a different sense—the difference of sense resulting from a difference of some kind in the mode of enunciation.

7. mvp-aristotle-comment-701

ὑποκριτικῆς. υπόκρισις, the Latin pronunciatio, means

‘delivery’

‘elocution’

. In the Rhetoric two styles of oratory are distinguished, the

‘graphic’

style in which the sense is fully expressed by the actual language, and the

‘hypocritic’

style, which requires certain artifices of elocution to bring out the meaning: Rhet. 3. 12, 1413 b 17

τὰ ὑποκριτικὰ ἀφῃρημένης τῆς ὑποκρίσεως οὐ ποιοῦντα τὸ αὑτῶν ἔργον φαίνεται εὐήθη, οἷον τά τε ἀσύνδετα καὶ τὸ πολλάκις τὸ αὐτὸ εἰπεῖν ἐν τῇ γραφικῇ ὀρθῶς ἀποδοκιμάζεται, ἐν δὲ (τῇ) ἀγωνιστικῇ καὶ οἱ ῥήτορες χρῶνται· ἔστι γὰρ ὑποκριτικά

(comp. 3. 12, 1414 b 5 ).

7. mvp-aristotle-comment-702

ἀρχιτεκτονικήν. The ἀρχιτέκτων is properly the master-builder, who knows the scheme of the whole work and directs the artisans and others under him: Plato Polit. 259 E

ἀρχιτέκτων γε πᾶς οὐκ αὐτὸς ἐργατικὸς ἀλλ᾽ ἐργατῶν ἄρχων ... παρεχόμενός γέ που γνῶσιν ἀλλ᾽ οὐ χειρουργίαν.

Aristotle recognizes a similar distinction in other arts, even in medicine: Pol. 3. 11, 1282 b 3

ἰατρὸς ὁ τε δημιουργὸς καὶ ὁ ἀρχιτεκτονικός.

The

‘architectonic’

form of ὑποκριτική involves a knowledge of its rationale and general principles, as distinct from the empiric knowledge possessed by rhapsodists, actors, orators, and other practicians.

7. mvp-aristotle-comment-703

οἷον τί ἐντολὴ κτέ. refers back to τὰ σχήματα τῆς λέξεως in 9 (comp. on 7, 1451 a 2 ). The classification in the text originated with Protagoras, who is said to have distinguished four (or perhaps seven) fundamental differences in our mode of speech: Diog. Laert. 9. 53

διεῖλέ τε τὸν λόγον πρῶτος εἰς τέτταρα, εὐχωλὴν ἐρώτησιν ἀπόκρισιν ἐντολήν —οἱ δὲ¹ εἰς ἑπτά, διήγησιν ἐρώτησιν ἀπόκρισιν ἐντολὴν ἀπαγγελίαν εὐχωλὴν κλῆσιν —, οὓς καὶ πυθμένας εἶπε λόγων,

— Quintilian 3. 4. 10

Protagoram transeo, qui interrogandi respondendi mandandi precandi, quod εὐχωλὴν dixit, partes solas putat.

It will be seen that Aristotle has arranged the σχήματα in pairs; one kind of speech may be made by a difference of intonation to mean either a command or a prayer, another either a simple statement or a threat, another either a question or an answer, and so forth with the rest. Aristotle's instances may be compared with those in Dion. Hal. 5. 46 R.

τὰ μὲν ὡς ἀποφαινόμενοι λέγομεν, τὰ δ᾽ ὡς πυνθανόμενοι, τὰ δ᾽ ὡς εὐχόμενοι, τὰ δ᾽ ὡς ἐπιτάττοντες, τὰ δ᾽ ὡς διαποροῦντες, τὰ δ᾽ ὡς ὑποτιθέμενοι, τὰ δ᾽ ἄλλως πως σχηματίζοντες.

8. mvp-aristotle-comment-704

παρὰ γὰρ τὴν τούτων γνῶσιν κτέ. The argument here comes practically to this: That these σχήματα τῆς λέξεως are something outside the art of Poetry itself is shown by the fact that ignorance of them is not one of the usual charges brought by hostile critics against a poet; Protagoras' criticism on the first line of the Iliad may be dismissed as too trivial to deserve attention.

8. mvp-aristotle-comment-705

ἐπιτίμημα: see on 25, 1460 b 6 .

8. mvp-aristotle-comment-706

καὶ ἄξιον: Pol. 2. 11, 1272 632

τι καὶ ἄξιον εἰπεῖν

(comp. Riddell, Digest of Idioms' § 132).

8. mvp-aristotle-comment-707

ἄειδε. The imperative as such merely expresses a bidding ( κελεύειν), but a tone of authority may turn it into a command ( ἐπιτάττειν ; comp. Schmidt, Handbuch der lat. u. gr. Synonymik p. 51). Protagoras professed to understand Homer's ἄειδε in this dictatorial sense of the imperative, on the assumption that it was to be read as 'ἄειδε!' Aristotle's answer is that if ἄειδε gets this sense, it is through the fault not of the poet but of the reciter. An echo of the criticism ascribed to Protagoras survives in Schol. Ven. A on Il. 1. 1, where ἄειδε is said to be an instance of the poetic use of the imperative for the optative:

ὅτι κατὰ τὴν ποιητικὴν ἤτοι ἄδειαν ἢ συνήθειαν λαμβάνει [ . e. Homer] τὰ προστακτικὰ ἀντὶ εὐκτικῶν.

Remarques sur la poëtique d'Aristote (André Dacier, 1692) (OCR draft) (André Dacier's French commentary on Aristotle's Poetics.) focus

1. mvp-aristotle-comment-457

19.1 1. Pour ce qui est des sentimens, on peut voir ce qui en a été dit dans nos Livres de la Rhetorique ; car ils font proprement du reſſort de ſon art.]¹

2. mvp-aristotle-comment-458

19.5 2. Il eſt donc évident que dans les ſujets du Poëme drama-tique, les Poëtes doivent ſe ſervir des mèmes lieux que les Orateurs.]²

3. mvp-aristotle-comment-459

19.6 3. Il y a pourtant cette difference entre les choses dont ils traitent , que les unes ſans le ſecours de l'art font naturellement telles qu'on veut les faire paroître, & que les autres font rendues telles par l'adreſſe de celuy qui parle.]³

4. mvp-aristotle-comment-460

19.6 4. Car que reſteroit-il à faire pour luy, fi toutes les chofes étoient touchantes par elles-mêmes ſans l'aide de ſes discours.]⁴

5. mvp-aristotle-comment-461

19.7 5. Pour ce qui est de la diction, il y en a une partie qui eft pour le Spectacle & pour le Theatre; c'est la prononciation & le geſte; mais cela regarde proprement l'art des Comediens, ou de ceux qui font une ſemblable profeſſion.]⁵

6. mvp-aristotle-comment-462

19.7 6. Mais cela regarde proprement l'art des Comediens, ou de ceux qui font une semblable profeſion.]⁶

7. mvp-aristotle-comment-463

19.7 7. Car c'est à eux d'enſeigner ce que c'est qu'un commandement, une priere, une ſimple narration, une menace.]⁷

8. mvp-aristotle-comment-464

19.8 8. En effet, qu'on obſerve, ou qu'on viole ces regles, cela ne fait rien pour la Poësie, qui de ce côté–là n'a à craindre aucun reproche digne de confideration.]⁸

9. mvp-aristotle-comment-465

19.8 9. Par exemple, qui eſt-ce qui s'aviſera jamais de recevoir la Critique de Protagoras, qui accuſe Homere d'avoir fait aux Muſes un commandement, au lieu d'une priere, ſous pretexte qu'il a dit par l'imperatif: Muſe chante-moy la colére.]⁹

Commentary on the Poetics (Thomas Twining, 1789) (OCR draft) (Thomas Twining's notes on Aristotle's Poetics, aligned to the Kassel reference edition.) focus

159. mvp-aristotle-comment-159

NOTE 159. P. 103.

19.5 BUT IT IS EVIDENT, THAT, WITH RESPECT TO THE THINGS THEMSELVES ALSO, &C.

Και ἐν τοις πραγμασιν

. The alteration of Heinsius ,

δραμασιν

, appears to me, not only to be unnecessary, but to pervert Aristotle's meaning.

Τα πραγματα

, here, are, I think, the things themselves—the circumstances and incidents of the action or fable, as opposed to

Διανοια

, the sentiments, or thoughts, and to

ὅσα ὑπο τε ΛΟΓΟΥ

κ. τ. αλ

. He had referred to the rhetorical treatises for what concerns the

διανοια

; he goes on, (after a short explanation of

διανοια

and its various branches,)—"But it is plain, that, not only for the

διανοἰα

, or sentiments, but also for the things themselves, (

ΚΑΙ ἐν τοις πραγμασιν

,) how they are to be made terrible, piteous, &c. the Poet should draw from the same sources, and may be referred to the same treatises."—Thus, for example, in the second book of Aristotle's Rhetoric , he may learn what sort of things, persons, and events, are proper to raise terror, or pity, the peculiar objects of Tragic imitation. ¹ After which observation, he goes on, very naturally and properly, to remark, as Dacier has well observed,

"la difference entre les choses que traitent les Orateurs, et celles que traitent les Poetes."

For the rest, my idea of this passage accords with that of Dacier, (note 3) ; but he does not appear to have seen the force of the expression,

ΚΑΙ ἐν τοις πραγ

. Indeed, he entirely drops the conjunction, which is here of great importance; for it seems to fix the sense of

πραγμασιν

, and to point its opposition to

διανοια

:—

Τα μεν ἐν περι την ΔΙΑΝΟΙΑΝ ἐν τοις ῥητ. κεισθω δηλον δε, ότι ΚΑΙ ἐν τοις ΠΡΑΓΜΑΣΙΝ ἀπο των αυτων ειδων δει χρησθαι

In Goulston’s version, which follows Castelvetro , this opposition is rightly expressed; but in what follows, Aristotle's meaning is, I think, mistaken: for the difference he is shewing, (

πλην τοσέτον διαφερει

, &c.) is not, I apprehend, the difference between the things and the sentiments, in Tragedy, but, between the things themselves only, considered in different views, as the subject of the Orator, or of the Poet. These commentators understand the expressions,

ἐν τῷ λόγῳ

, and,

τα λεγοντα

, of the dramatic speech, and speaker.

160. mvp-aristotle-comment-160

NOTE 160. P. 103.

19.5 MUST DRAW FROM THE SAME SOURCES.

Απο των αυτων ειδων δει χρησθαι

.—The expression,

χρησθαι ΑΠΟ

, is, I believe, uncommon. It seems rightly explained by Victorius —"to borrow from:"

"quasi utendum illinc sumere atque mutuari."

161. mvp-aristotle-comment-161

NOTE 161. P. 103.

19.6 WITHOUT BEING SHEWN TO BE SUCH.—

Ανευ διδασκαλίας

"Senza che si dica e che s'insegni che fian tali."

— Piccolomini :—I believe, very exactly. The reader may compare Rhet. I. 2. p. 514, B. —and III. 1. p. 584, B. and, (

διδασκαλικη

,) I. 2. p. 515, A.

The truth of what the philosopher here observes, may appear from this single consideration. Suppose two Tragedies written by two Poets on the same subject, and of which the plot and princi- pal incidents are the same: and suppose two pleadings of the same cause, by two speakers. It seems very plain, that the difference of the effect upon an audience in the former case, would bear much less proportion to the difference between the Poets, than it would, in the other case, to the difference between the Speakers. ²

162. mvp-aristotle-comment-162

NOTE 162. P. 104.

19.6 IF THEY ALREADY APPEAR SO IN THEMSELVES.

Ει φαινοιτο ήδεα

.—That

ήδεα

is wrong, I have no doubt. For if we admit it, we must take it, as Victorius does, for a single instance; as if Aristotle had said,

"aut jucundæ, aut tristes, aut atroces, &c,---: quamvis enim nunc unum horum ponat, i. e. jucunda, reliqua tamen audienda sunt."

—But how improbable it is, that he should not chuse his single instance, if he meant to give one, out of those which had just been mentioned? that he should not rather have said,

ἐι φαινοιτο ἐλεεινα, δεινα

, than

ήδεα

jucunda

; which, besides, is evidently not at all to his purpose.

I cannot, therefore, help thinking it something more than probable, that Aristotle wrote this,

φαινοιτο ΗΔΗ

τοιαυτα

—that is,

ἐλεεινα, δεινα

, &c.) "If they appear already so;—in themselves." The elliptic brevity of the expression will hardly be objected to, in a writer who abounds with instances much more harsh and obscure than this. In the same manner,

τοιαυτα

is understood with

φαινεσθαι

just before:—

τα μεν δει φαινεσθαι

(

τοιαυτα

)

άνευ διδασκαλίας

The same conjecture had, I find, occurred, long ago, to Castelvetro , but, which I think somewhat singular, has not been taken notice of by any of the commentators I have seen. He says—

φαινοιτο ήδεα

"coloro, li quali non riconoscono che qui sia errore, assegnino à queste parole, se possono, senso degno e conveniente ad Aristotele. Adunque io crederei che non fosse male à leggere

ήδη

, in luogo d'

ήδεα

, e'l senso sarebbe convenevole."

[p. 406.] The reader may see a very different explanation of this whole passage in the Abbé Batteux’s notes; but an explanation which cannot, in my opinion, be reconciled to the text. His censure of Dacier and others, that they have rendered this chapter

"à contresens,"

seems to me to recoil upon himself.

163. mvp-aristotle-comment-163

NOTE 163. P. 104.

19.7 FIGURES OF SPEECH

Τα σχηματα της λεξεως

—. Dacier , Batteux , and indeed almost all the commentators, seem to take

σχηματα

, here, for the gestures, modifications of countenance, and tones of voice, that accompany speech.

But, first, I much doubt whether the Greek will fairly admit of such a sense. Aristotle says,

σχηματα ΛΕΞΕΩΣ

, figures, or forms, of the speech itself, not of the speaker. The same expression occurs several times in the Rhetoric, and always means the form of the diction itself; ³ never the gesture with which it is delivered.—2. Aristotle explains himself by—

διον, ΤΙ εντολη και ΤΙ ευχη

, &c. i. e. what they are, not, what action or tone of voice they require;

"avec quel ton et quel geste on ordonne,"

as M. Batteux ⁴ unwarrantably translates it. ⁵ —3. Aristotle says, that no blame, or none worth regarding, (

άξιον σπεδης

,) can fall upon the Poetry, (

εις την ποιητικην

,) in consequence of the Poet's ignorance of these matters, or of his not knowing them technically. A remark, surely, very unnecessary, if mere action and pronunciation were intended by

σχηματα

.—But, 4. The thing seems evident from the instance given of a criticism of this kind. Protagoras plainly charged Homer with ignorance, or inaccuracy, with respect to these

σχηματα λεξεως

, whatever they were. Now, according to the common explanation, the criticism could fall only on Homer's pronunciation or action: but, of this, Protagoras knew nothing; all he appears to have meant, is, that Homer had made an improper use of the imperative mood; that is, had used one

σχημα λεξεως

, where he should have used another.

But what, then, are we to understand by these

σχηματα λεξεως

?—The learned reader will immediately see, that, as Victorius has observed, they are not to be confounded with those

σχηματα λεξεως

, of which we hear so much from Cicero , Quintilian , Dion. Hal. &c. those

"figuræ verborum,"

which are opposed to the

σχηματα διανοἰας

, the

figuræ mentis, sententiarum

, &c. Indeed, no such division of

σχηματα

is, I believe, to be found in Aristotle. It seems to have been the invention of the later Rhetoricians; and how little they were agreed, as to the number and the species of these

σχηματα

, the propriety of the division itself, and even the precise sense of the word

σχημα

, may be seen in Quintilian IX. 1. —The

σχηματα λεξεως

of Aristotle, in this place, are plainly such, as would have been denominated by later writers,

σχηματα διανοἰας

—figures of the thought or sense. Indeed we find them actually enumerated among the figures of that class. See Dionys. Halicarn. de Struct. &c. Sect. 8. —So Quintilian :

"Figuras quoque mentis, quæ

σχηματα διανοιας

dicuntur, res eadem recipit omnes, in quas nonnulli diviserunt species dictorum, (i. e. of jokes, bons mots.) Nam et interrogamus, et dubitamus, et affirmamus, et minamur, et optamus."

⁶

I see, therefore, not the least reason, why the expression

σχημα λέξεως

should not be rendered here, exactly as in the other passages above referred to,

"figura orationis"

—form, or configuration, of speech. For

λέξις

, it must be observed, is here used, not in the particular sense of diction, or style and manner of expression, (as it is used Rhet. III. 8. ) but in the general sense of

λογ

, speech, as we find it used in the beginning of the next chapter.

But though I cannot admit, that

σχηματα

means

"configurationes oris,"

&c. or, should be so rendered, yet I certainly admit, that Aristotle appears plainly to consider these different forms of speech, or sentences, with a view to action, or delivery; and, possibly, the observation of Victorius may be well founded, that—

"vocatæ hæ figuræ ita videntur, quia aliter atque aliter vultus, totumque corpus, cum variantur illa, conformantur; ut meritò hâc de causâ,

σχηματα

, figuræ, ipsæ appellatæ sint."

—I find the same thing in the following passage of Aristides Quintilianus , which seems evidently to allude to this very part of Aristotle's treatise, and may be thought to afford some illustration.—

Περι δε της των ΣΧΗΜΑΤΩΝ φυσεως, δις προσαγειν χρη τα νοηματα, πολλα λέγειν δειν ήγομαι. ΙΚΑΝΗ ΓΑΡ Ἡ ὙΠΟΚΡΙΣΙΣ ΤΑΥΤΑ ΔΗΛΩΣΑΙ. Και γαρ τατων ἐκασον [i. e. each of these

σχηματα διανοἰας

, or

νοηματων

,] συςέλλει πως, ὡς αι παραιτησεις, ἀνιησιν, ὡς ἁι συγχωρησεις, την διανοιαν και ήτοι μικροπρεπεις, ὡς ἀι διορθωσεις, μεγαλειες, ὡς αι γνωμολογίαι και ἀφηγησεις, ἀπεργαζονται. ὧν ἐκασε την ἐνεργειαν ΕΚ ΤΩΝ ΤΥΠΩΝ ΑΡΙΣΤ᾿ ΑΝ ΔΙΑΓΝΟΙΗΜΕΝ, ΩΝ [leg. forte ΟΥΣ] ΕΚΑΣΤΟΝ, ΚΑΤΑ ΤΟΝ ΤΗΣ ΥΠΟΚΡΙΣΕΩΣ ΚΑΙΡΟΝ, ΤΟΙΣ ΣΩΜΑΣΙΝ ΕΝΤΙΘΗΣΙ· ΠΑΡ Ὁ ΚΑΙ ΣΧΗΜΑΣΙΝ ΑΥΤΟΙΣ ΣΥΝΕΒΗ ΚΛΗΘΗΝΑΙ

. I rather suspect, we should read

ΠΡΟΑΓΕΙΝ

, in the beginning of this passage; in the sense of

ἐκφερειν, προφερειν

, &c. Meibomius ⁷ renders

σχηματων

"gestuum,"

which cannot be the meaning; for by the

τετων ἐκασον

, and the exemplification which follows, (

παραιτησεις, συγχωρησεις

, &c.), and, indeed, by all the rest of the passage, it is clear, that he speaks of the configurations of the speech or sentence, of which he goes on to describe the different effects, first on the mind, and, ultimately, on the action, of the speaker. The version should, therefore, have been thus:—

"De figurarum natura quibus animi notiones proferenda,"

&c. Or, if

προσαγαν

be right, the meaning, I think, must be—"to which those

νοηματα

are to be referred under which they are to be classed." See the passage above, from Quintilian , and that of Dion. Hal. Sect. 8. which is much to the purpose.

Why Aristotle should dismiss this subject, as of much more concern, to the Actor, than to the Poet, requires no explanation. There could scarce, indeed, be any other occasion for the study of these

σχηματα

, but in order to learn, or to teach, in what manner, with what variations of tone, countenance, and gesture, propriety required them to be pronounced. At the same time, it will not appear strange that he should mention them, if we recollect, that the Poets themselves were, at first, actors also, in their own pieces, and, afterwards, no doubt, instructed their actors; and hence perhaps, after all—not, as is commonly understood, from the moral teaching of the drama itself—the well known phrases,

διδασκειν τραγῳδιαν

docere fabulam

, &c. ⁸ may, most naturally, be accounted for.

Nor was this practice peculiar to antient times. We know with what eagerness and animation Voltaire taught his Tragedies, almost to his latest hour. During his last visit to Paris, where he died,

"Il n'y vit rien, ne songea à y rien voir; il n'y vécut que pour des Comediens, qu'il fatiguoit, en voulant leur donner des leçons de declamation"

. ⁹

164. mvp-aristotle-comment-164

NOTE 164. P. 104.

19.7 THE PROFESSED MASTERS OF THAT KIND—

Τε την τοιαυτην ἐχοντα ᾿ΑΡΧΙΤΕΚΤΟΝΙΚΗΝ

.—For this word, see Eth. Nicom. I. 1, 2. Thus, here, it seems to mean that master art, which teaches the principles of elocution, the art of public speaking, in general.

165. mvp-aristotle-comment-165

NOTE 165. P. 104.

19.8 THE CAVIL OF PROTAGORAS.See Hermes, I. 8, p. 144. This, it seems, was his usual style of criticism; for,

διανοιαν άφεις, προς τ'ενομα διελέχθη

, as Diog. Laertius says of him. He seems, indeed, to have been the inventor of these

σχηματα λεξεως

. At least the same writer says,

διειλε τον λόγον ΠΡΩΤΟΣ ἐις τεσσαρα ΕΥΧΩΛΗΝ, ΕΡΩΤΗΣΙΝ, ΑΠΟΚΡΙΣΙΝ, ΕΝΤΟΛΗΝ· (δι δε, εις ἑπτα κ. τ. αλ.) ὡς και πυθμένας είπε λογων

:—"the foundations of speech". ¹⁰ There is something amusing in the history of this man. He was originally a porter; and might have continued so, if his extraordinary genius for tying up wood had not attracted the notice of Democritus , by whose instructions and encouragement, from an eminent porter, he became as eminent a sophist. ¹¹ The reader may see the story in Aulus Gellius, V. 3. —The public was, certainly, not much obliged to Democritus. Protagoras was of more use to mankind when he invented porter's knots, ¹² than when he invented the

σχηματα λεξεως

, and undertook to teach, at the price of a hundred minæ, the art of Belial—"to make the worse appear the better reason:"—

τον ήττον λογον κρειττον ποιειν

. ¹³

"If a cobler,"

says Socrates in the Meno of Plato ,

"or a taylor, should return the shoes, or the clothes, he undertook to mend, in a worse condition than that, in which he received them, he would soon lose his business, and be starved for want of work. But it is not so with the sophists. PROTAGORAS was able to carry on, for forty years together, without detection, and with great credit, the trade of spoiling all those who became his disciples, and sending them back much worse than he found them."

Commentary on the Poetics (Henry James Pye, 1792) (OCR draft) (Henry James Pye's 1792 English commentary, aligned to the Kassel reference edition.) focus

19.1. mvp-aristotle-comment-77 19.1

THE LANGUAGE AND THE SENTIMENTS.

By the first of these Aristotle means the fimple and grammatical construction of speech, as is manifeft from the succeeding chapter, and by the second the sense and intention that is declared by it. For in the fixth chapter he declares the sentiments, (διάνοια,) to be ‘' the means by • which the intention or opinion of those who speak is discovered.' • In • short (to use the words of Mr. Harris) sentiment in this sense means • little less than the universal subjects of our difcourse.' The modern drama confiders sentiments in a more confined sense; and, as now used, it is properly enough defined by Lord Kaims, 'the expref- • sion of a thought prompted by passion.' Sentiments of this fort well applied so as to flatter the taste, the feelings, or the prejudices of the audience, are the surest traps for applause. In one of the critical papers either in the Tatler, Guardian, or Spectator, the virtue of a Roman theatre is exalted above our own, for the applaufe given to a virtuous sentiment, in one of [A] Terence's comedies. Since [A] Homo fum, nihil humani a me alienum puto.' • I am a man myself, and can think nothing indifferent to me that concerns human kind.' 3 D I have

I have known the theatre, I can answer for a British audience being to the full as virtuous as the citizens of Rome in this respect. This is fo well known, both by poets and players, that our comedies abounded. with these moral fentences to an excess, which became perfectly ridiculous: a very little exaggeration of which, by the masterly pen of Mr. Sheridan, has now in a great measure delivered the stage from their redundancy at leaft.

19.2. mvp-aristotle-comment-78 19.2

WHAT RELATES TO THE SENTIMENTS INDEED MAY RATHER BE REFERRED TO THE PRINCIPLES OF RHETORIC.

M. BATTEUX has given a sense to the whole passage, of which the above quotation is a part, directly oppofite to that of the other interpreters, all of whom he accuses of having applied to oratory what related to tragedy, and vice versa. I must confess I fee no shadow of fuch a fuppofition; and think the general meaning of the whole conveyed very clearly in the exact words of Ariftotle, as given in most of the printed editions; and which seems perfectly conformable with what is really the distinction between oratory and dramatic poetry. The critic first says, that sentiments belong most peculiarly to rhetoric; he then defines the nature and use of them, in raising and directing the feelings. Now he allows that the poet to work the fame effect must employ the fame means, such as amplification, extenuation, &c. but with this difference, that he must effect that by the incidents of the fable which the orator performs by the use of that application of speech which he terms sentiment; therefore sentiment belongs more effentially to rhetoric. NOTE

19.3. mvp-aristotle-comment-79 19.5

FOR WHAT WOULD BE THE MERIT OF THE ORATOR IF THEY WERE TO APPEAR AFFECTING WITHOUT THE ASSISTANCE OF HIS ELOQUENCE?

THE word which I have translated affecting, (ἡδέα, SWEET, literally,) has difpleased most of the commentators, and certainly not without reafon, if it can have no other meaning given it than pleafant or agreeable, expreffive of sensations which it is far from the particular business of oratory, and still farther from that of tragedy to excite. But Horace, in a passage of his Epistle to the Pifos, which is plainly taken from this, and where he is speaking of the language of tragedy uses the very word of Ariftotle, to signify that which (B) influences the paffions strongly, a sense which the context has obliged the commentators to be unanimous in giving to dulcia. • Non fatis eft pulchra esse poemata, dulcia funto, ، Et quocunque volunt animum auditoris agunto.' Which I will venture thus to paraphrafe, Tis not enough that each faftidious eye The drama's faultless structure can defy; The moving tale must charm the raptured foul, And as it lift the yielding sense controul. [Β] Ψυχαγογει. See Poetic, Chap. vI. The only commentator who has given this sense to ἡδέα, is Segni. He translates it indeed PIACEVOLI; but he explains it in a note by 'elle * poffino muovere gli affetti.' See also Dacier's note on the lines of Horace that are quoted. 3 D 2 Shakespear

Shakespear apparently annexes some such idea to sweet, when he makes Jeffica say, I am never merry when I hear sweet music.'

19.4. mvp-aristotle-comment-80 19.6

THERE IS ONE PART OF THE THEORY OF ELOCUTION RELAT- ING TO THE MODE OF EXPRESSION, WHICH PRINCIPALLY BE- LONGS TO THE PLAYER AND THE PROFESSED TEACHERS OF THAT ART; SUCH AS TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN SUPPLICA- TION, COMMAND, NARRATION, QUESTION, ANSWER, AND ANY OTHER CIRCUMSTANCE OF THE SAME KIND.

i Li BOTH this precept, and the example by which it is illustrated, appear to me fufficiently clear. That there is no grammatical diftinction between command and fupplication, and that the distinction depends entirely on the speaker the most sacred part of our liturgy sufficiently evinces. A mark of interrogation added or omitted, will often entirely change the sense of a fentence, for an instance of which the reader is referred to the first chapter of this work [c]. As for the author's instructing the performers how to recite their works, it could only happen in the cafe of new pieces. The player of the tragedies of the three great tragic poets of Greece were as much obliged to tradition or their own ingenuity for giving the proper utterance to their fentiments, at the time Aristotle wrote, as the performers of the [C] See Note [D]. Chap. I. on the tranflation.. plays

POETIC OF ARISTOTLE. plays of Shakespear are at the present hour. I question much even if the modern players would be quite so civil to a living poet in this respect as they are to Bayes in the rehearsal, or as the French players were to Voltaire [D]. I was present at the rehearsal of the Jealous Wife, and every circumstance relating to the elocution and the action of every character was directed by Mr. Garrick without one remonftrance from Mr. Colman who was present; though Mrs. Pritchard made several, but which were all over-ruled by the manager. I do not think Mr. Twining has treated this part of the subject with his usual clearness. That by σχήμαζα λέξεως Ariftotle must mean figures or forms of speech, I most perfectly agree with him. But when he says this belongs to the art of the player, and that no blame worthy of notice can be imputed to the poet on this account; it is clearly implied, that it is not only the duty of the player to understand how the poet uses these figures of speech, but to give them their due effect in the performance, by employing the proper gestures and tones of voice. Yet though Aristotle says the blame incurred by the poet on this occafion is not of a serious essential kind, that very expression implies that some blame is incurred. And this is perfectly just. For certainly the poet ought to take care that these forms should be so marked by the sense as to leave no doubt in the mind of the actor or reader. Of this fault Shakespear has been sometimes guilty. For instance, in the celebrated line of Othello, the proper delivery of which has been fo much controverted.. [D] See Mr. Twining's Note 163. Put

Put out the light and then put out the light.' Which I believe has been finally fettled by Garrick to be thus pronounced, 'Put out the light and then.-Put out the light? • If I quench thee,' &c. There is no doubt of this being the best mode, but much I think of its being the mode intended by Shakespear [E]. The fubject of this note is well illustrated by Leffing. ' It is often,' he says, very necessary in order to comprehend the nice touches of • Terence to have the power of figuring to ourselves the action of the ، ، players, for the ancients never wrote [F] stage directions. Recitation had its peculiar artists; and as to the rest, the poets could depend on the skill and judgement of the actors who studied their employment with the most serious attention. The poets themselves were often among their number; [G] they gave directions how they would have [E] Another passage of Shakespear has been thus spoken, This my hand will rather • The multitudinous sea incarnadine, • Making the green,-ONE red.' I am surprised to see the compliment paid by Mr. Stevens to such a substitution of bombafst, for the fimple diction of Shakespear. The late Mr. Sheridan has pointed out many glaring though almost general errors in the reading of the Liturgy. For more observations on this subject, the reader is referred to Note v. Chap. xxv. [F] See Note II. Chap. XII. [G] That is, they explained their own meaning; depending on the art of the player to express that meaning to the spectators. the

POETIC OF ARISTOTLE. ' the incidents performed; and as their works were not published previoufly to the representation, before the people had an opportunity [H] • both of feeing and hearing them, they had less occafion to interrupt ⚫ the written dialogue by directions in parenthesis, through which the • author in a manner makes himself one of the perfons of the drama. But • if we imagine that the ancient poets to avoid these parentheses marked ' in the dialogue itself, every movement, every gesture, every look, every • modulation of voice that the actor should use, we are mistaken. In Terence alone there are many places in which nothing of all this ' is marked, and where, nevertheless, the true sense can only be dif- • covered by guessing at the proper action which should accompany ⚫ them. In many, even the words may appear to convey a meaning directly contrary to what the actor ought to express by his gestures.' DRAMATURGIE, Part II. page 97. [H] The same is the case now as to the priority of representation; but the printed copies are read by thousands who could not see the drama performed. CHAP.

THOUGH I cannot fee with what propriety Ariftotle begins a direction for the choice of the language of tragedy, by sending us to the spelling-book: yet as I deemed it incumbent on me as a tranflator not to omit any thing that the critic says, I shall avail myself of the opportunity he has given me to introduce some general remarks on grammar, and some that relate more peculiarly to the grammar of our own language.

Commentarius in Aristotelis Poeticam (Franciscus Ritter, 1839) (OCR draft) (Ritter's Latin commentary, extracted from the 1839 volume, divided by Ritter's chapters and sections, and linked to the corresponding Perseus reference subsections.) focus

1. mvp-aristotle-comment-130

Ritter, cap. 19 § 1

Διάνοια aptius in arte rhetorica quam in poetica pertractatur; neque de λέξει quae exponi possunt, ad poeticam pertinent omnia. Explicata argumenti conformatione a poeta tragico instituenda (c. 7-11 et c. 13-14) et descripto morum habitu ab eodem in tragoediis observando (c. 15) et utraque disputatione praeceptis quibusdam tragoediarum scriptori destinatis conclusa (c. 17 et c. 18, 4-7), iam ad animi sensa ( διά- votar quam una voce sententiam appellare licet) a personis in scenam productis expromenda pervenit. quae cum dictione ( λέξει) proferantur, hanc tractandam sibi sumpsit, illa Rhetoricis reservanda putavit. περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἄλλων ἤδη εἴρηται: cetera quae dicit, sunt fabula, mores, spectaculum, melopoeia. de fabula quae disputata sunt sufficere videantur, de moribus quae docuit in epitomam contracta esse intelleximus: spectaculum vero et melopoeia nonnisi brevissime commemoravit c. 6, 4 et c. 18, 71). at vero spectaculum et melopoeiam accuratius ab Aristotele explicata non esse et nullis praeceptis a tragoediarum scriptore servandis instructa, vix est cur existimemus: immo c. 18, 7. cum chori tragici rite conformandi praeceptum paucis verbis proponit, ita disputat ut antegressa ampliore expositione niti videatur. quae igitur de ὄψει et μελοποιίą uberius explanata ab Aristotele erant, omisit, opinor, ille qui ex integra Aristotelis Poetica plura et egregia conservavit. nimirum inutilia illa videbantur poetis Alexandrinis (Alexandrinos dico omnes qui post Alexandri Magni aevum sive Alexandriae sive in aliis Grae- 1) Falsus Aristoteles etiam c. 6, 19. ad ὄψιν et μελοποιίαν revolvitur, sed nihil affert quae alicuius momenti videantur esse.cis urbibus artem tragicam factitabant), qui lectoribus magis quam spectatoribus scribebant, quique tragoedias edebant aut nullis aut paucis chori carminibus distinctas. - λοιπὸν δὲ περὶ λέξεως ἢ διανοίας εἰπεῖν: postquam de quattuor illis partibus dictum est, iam restat de διανοίᾳ vel λέξει disputare, ut de omnibus sex partibus ante constitutis (c. 6, 4-7) explicatio absolvatur. vide mihi Aristotelem ipsum pronuntiare se ex illis sex tragoediae partibus adhuc quattuor disputatione amplexum esse, duabus etiamnum relicuis de quibus dicatur. inde iam novo documento apparet, et illa quae de alteris κατὰ τὸ ποσὸν tragoediae partibus c. 12. posita sunt, et quae de quattuor formis tragoediarum c. 18, 2-3., quaeque de tragoediae δέσει et λύσει c. 18, 1. narrantur, quae omnia suis locis gravibus de causis pro suppositiciis declaravi, haec inquam ab Aristotele non scripta esse. – περὶ λέξεως ἢ διανοίας scribit, cum absolutis quattuor partibus iam ex duabus relicuis alterutram explicandam eligere possit. statim monet quae de διανοία dicenda sint, ea in Rhetoricis aptius explicari posse. ἐν τοῖς περὶ ῥητορικῆς: quamquam quae de animi sensis dicenda sunt in Rhetoricorum tribus libris comprehensorum primo et secundo libro legimus, inde tamen non consequitur Poeticam post artem illam rhetoricam a philosopho emissam esse: immo in Rhetoricis quater provocat ad Poeticam iam editam. lege III, 1 et 2. ars dicendi cum pluribus ac diversis libris ab Aristotele tractata et tradita sit, hoc loco lectores non ad tres illos Rhetoricorum libros sed ad alios prius evulgatos ablegantur. de operibus Aristotelis rhetoricis disputavit Titze de Aristotelis operum serie et distinctione p. 34 sqq. ἔστι δὲ κατὰ τὴν διάνοιαν ταῦτα, ὅσα ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου δεῖ παρασκευασθῆ - ναι: pertinent ad sententiam haec, quaecumque oratione parari debent, h. e. quae personae in scenam productae sentiunt verbisque pronuntiant. quod statim sequitur τὸ λύειν, est obstantia sive ab adversariis dicta dissolvere.

2. mvp-aristotle-comment-131

Ritter, cap. 19 § 2

καὶ ἔτι μέγεθος καὶ μικρότητα: nove acbreviter significavit rem exaggerare ( αὔξειν) et extenuare ( μειοῦν). conf. Rhetor. II, 26. p. 1403 a 20, τὸ δ' αὔξειν καὶ μειοῦν ἐστὶν ἐνθυμήματα πρὸς τὸ δεῖξαι ὅτι μέγα ἢ μικρόν, ὥσπερ καὶ ὅτι ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακὸν ἢ δίκαιον ἢ ἄδικον καὶ τῶν • ἄλλων ὁτιοῦν. pro nominibus μέγεθος et μικρότητα exspectaverimus saltem αὔξησιν et μείωσιν. itaque haec insolentia, cuius alia quoque vestigia hoc capite comparent, epitomatori tribuenda videatur.

3. mvp-aristotle-comment-132

Ritter, cap. 19 § 3

δῆλον δὲ ὅτι καὶ ἐν τοῖς πράγμασιν - δεῖ χρῆσθαι: etiam hoc rara brevitate positum est, ἐν τοῖς πράγμασιν pro ἐν τῇ συστάσει πραγμάτων τραγῳδίας sive ἐν τῷ μύθῳ τραγῳδίας. in rebus argumento tragico conserendis haurire debet poeta ex isdem eloquendi formis sive locis communibus ( ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν ἰδεῶν δεῖ χρῆσθαι) quos orator in elocutione oratoria adhibet. πλὴν τοσοῦτον διαφέρει – παρὰ τὸν λόγον γίγνεσθαι: haec est artis tragicae ab oratoria, quod ad sententiarum elocutionem attinet, differentia, quod in ipsa alia sine expositione (h. e. sine significatione verbis expressa, ἄνευ διδασκαλίας), alia per orationem a dicente proferri debent et secundum orationem fieri. in tragoedia igitur alia, sive metuenda sive miseranda, ita fiunt ut nulla oratione promantur sed ex rebus quae aguntur sponte consequantur, alia rursus oratione provocantur et secundum orationem accidunt. διδασκαλία h. 1. non est rerum in scenam introductio, nam si esset, ponendum erat διδασκαλίᾳ vel διὰ διδασκαλίας, non ἄνευ διδασκαλίας: immo est expositio verbis enuntiata, ut sibi opponantur ea quae oratione non significantur et quae significantur. παρὰ τὸν λόγον γίγνεσθαι: hoc fit, si res ita peraguntur ut in oratione personarum scenicarum significatum vel iussum vel suasum est. παρὰ τὸν λόγον, iuxta orationem, est igitur sic ut dicentis oratio sive poposcit sive persuasit sive iussit. τί γὰρ ἂν εἴη τοῦ λέγοντος ἔργον - διὰ τὸν λόγον: haec adiiciuntur ad illa παρὰ τὸν λόγον γίγνεσθαι adprobanda. dicentis nullus in tragoediis usus esset, si eaquae dicit nihil valerent ad rerum consecutionem et eventum varie afficiendum. quae tragicam voluptatem afferunt ( τὰ ἡδέα), si ea etiam sine dictione apparerent, dicente non opus esset.

4. mvp-aristotle-comment-133

Ritter, cap. 19 § 4

τὰ σχήματα τῆς λέξεως: potuit etiam scribere τὰ πάθη τῆς λέξεως. σχήματα non tam dictionis sunt quam dicentis vel oris eius qui dicit; sed ab ore transferuntur ad vocem et dictionem.

5. mvp-aristotle-comment-134

Ritter, cap. 19 § 5

ὅτιεὔχεσθαι οἰόμενος ἐπιτάττει : etiam in his agnoscas epitomatorem Homeri nomen reticentem: Iliadis enim initium omnibus aeque ac sibi notum esse credidit, non serio sed ingenii ostentandi causa hunc imperativum a Protagora reprehensum esse (in eo libro cui nomen Ὀρθοέ πεια) putaverim: aliter visum est Fr. A. Wolfio in Prolegomenis p. CLXVII. Homerum mire defendit scholiasta ad Il. pag. 1 b 20 ed. Bekker. conf. Eustath. p. 10. de illo Protagorae opere vid. Quintilian. III, 4, 10. Protagoram transeo, qui interrogandi respondendi mandandi precandi (quod εὐχωλὴν dixit) solas partes putat. Diogenes IX, 84. διεῖλέ τε τὸν λόγον πρῶτος εἰς τέτταρα, εὐχωλὴν ἐρώτησιν ἀπόκρισιν ἐντολήν. istam Protagorae reprehensionem recoxit Zoilus. conf. Suid. s. v. Ζώϊλος.

Aristotle Poetics 19.7

Thomas Twining (Translator)

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NOTE 159. P. 103.

NOTE 160. P. 103.

NOTE 161. P. 103.

NOTE 162. P. 104.

NOTE 163. P. 104.

NOTE 164. P. 104.

NOTE 165. P. 104.

THE LANGUAGE AND THE SENTIMENTS.

WHAT RELATES TO THE SENTIMENTS INDEED MAY RATHER BE REFERRED TO THE PRINCIPLES OF RHETORIC.

FOR WHAT WOULD BE THE MERIT OF THE ORATOR IF THEY WERE TO APPEAR AFFECTING WITHOUT THE ASSISTANCE OF HIS ELOQUENCE?

THERE IS ONE PART OF THE THEORY OF ELOCUTION RELAT- ING TO THE MODE OF EXPRESSION, WHICH PRINCIPALLY BE- LONGS TO THE PLAYER AND THE PROFESSED TEACHERS OF THAT ART; SUCH AS TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN SUPPLICA- TION, COMMAND, NARRATION, QUESTION, ANSWER, AND ANY OTHER CIRCUMSTANCE OF THE SAME KIND.

Ritter, cap. 19 § 1

Ritter, cap. 19 § 2

Ritter, cap. 19 § 3

Ritter, cap. 19 § 4

Ritter, cap. 19 § 5

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