The other factors have been already discussed. It remains to speak of Diction and Thought.

All that concerns Thought may be left to the treatise on Rhetoric, for the subject is more proper to that inquiry. ¹

Under the head of Thought come all the effects to be produced by the language.

Some of these are proof and refutation, 1456b 1 the arousing of feelings like pity, fear, anger, and so on, and then again exaggeration and depreciation. ²

It is clear that in the case of the incidents, too, one should work on the same principles, when effects of pity or terror or exaggeration or probability have to be produced.

There is just this difference, that some effects must be clear without explanation, ³ whereas others are produced in the speeches by the speaker and are due to the speeches. For what would be the use of a speaker, if the required effect were likely to be felt without the aid of the speeches?

Under the head of Diction one subject of inquiry is the various modes of speech, the knowledge of which is proper to elocution or to the man who knows the master art ⁴ —I mean for instance, what is a command, a prayer, a statement, a threat, question, answer, and so on.

The knowledge or ignorance of such matters brings upon the poet no censure worth serious consideration. For who could suppose that there is any fault in the passage which Protagoras censures, because Homer, intending to utter a prayer, gives a command when he says, Sing, goddess, the wrath? To order something to be done or not is, he points out, a command.

So we may leave this topic as one that belongs not to poetry but to another art.

The Plot and Characters having been discussed, it remains
to consider the Diction and Thought.

As for the Thought,
we may assume what is said of it in our Art of Rhetoric,
as it belongs more properly to that department of inquiry.

The Thought of the personages is shown in everything to
be effected by their language-

in every effort to prove or
disprove, to arouse emotion (pity, fear, anger, and the like),
or to maximize or minimize things.

It is clear, also, that
their mental procedure must be on the same lines in their
actions likewise, whenever they wish them to arouse pity
or horror, or have a look of importance or probability.

The
only difference is that with the act the impression has to
be made without explanation; whereas with the spoken word
it has to be produced by the speaker, and result from his
language. What, indeed would be the good of the speaker,
if things appeared in the required light even apart from
anything he says?

As regards the Diction, one subject for inquiry under
this head is the turns given to the language when spoken;
e. g. the difference between command and prayer, simple
statement and threat, question and answer, and so forth.

The theory of such matters, however, belongs to Elocution
and the professors of that art. Whether the poet knows
these things or not, his art as a poet is never seriously criti-
cized on that account. What fault can one see in Homer's
'Sing of the wrath, Goddess'?-which Protagoras has criti-
cized as being a command where a prayer was meant, since
to bid one do or not do, he tells us, is a command.

Let us
pass over this, then, as appertaining to another art, and
not to that of poetry.

[1] ¹ 19.1 OF the other parts of tragedy enough has now been said. But it remains that we should speak concerning the diction and the sentiments. The particulars, therefore, respecting the sentiments, are unfolded in the treatise on Rhetoric, to which it more properly belongs. 19.2 But those things pertain to the sentiments, which it is requisite to procure by a reasoning process. ² And the parts of these are, to demonstrate, to refute, and to excite the passions; such as pity, or fear, or anger, and such like; and besides these, to amplify and extenuate. ³ It is evident, however, that in things, also, it is requisite to derive what is useful from the same forms, 19.3 when it is necessary to procure objects of pity, or things that are dreadful, or great, or probable. Except that there is this difference, that things in tragedy ought to be rendered apparent without teaching, 19.4 but in an oration they are to be shown by the speaker, and in consequence of the speech. 19.5 For what employment would there be for the orator, if the things should appear [of themselves] pleasing, 19.6 and not through the speech ? ⁴ But of things pertaining to diction, there is one species of theory respecting the forms of speech 1, which it is the pro- ⁵ vince of the actor to know, and of him who is a master artist in this profession. Thus, or instance, [it is requisite he should know,] what a mandate is, what a prayer, narration, threats, interrogation and answer are, 19.7 and whatever else there may be of this kind. ⁶ For from the knowledge or ignorance of these, the poetic art incurs no blame of any moment. For who would think that Homer errs in what he is reproved for by Protagoras? viz. that while he fancies he prays, he commands, 19.8 when he says, " The wrath, O goddess, sing." For, says he, to order a thing to be done, or not to be done, is a mandate. 19.9 Hence, this must be omitted as a theorem pertaining to another art, and not to poetry.

De ceteris iam expositum est, restat autem ut de dictione vel sententia dicamus.

sed quae ad sententiam pertinent in libris de arte dicendi exprompta sunto: hoc enim proprium est magis illius disputationis.

pertinent autem ad sententiam haec, quaecumque oratione parari debent.

partes eorum sunt demonstrare et solvere et perturbationes facere, veluti miserationem vel timorem vel iram et quae sunt ciusdem generis, ac praeterea exaggerationem et extenuationem.

patet vero etiam in factis hauriendum esse ex isdem locis, cum sive miseranda sive timenda sive exaggerata sive verisimilia afferenda sunt.

nisi quod hoc intercedit discrimen, quod alia prodire debent sine expositione, alia per orationem a dicente parari et secundum orationem fieri. nam quid dicente opus esset, si iucunda comparerent etiam sine oratione?

ex iis autem quae ad dictionem pertinent unum est genus contemplationis quod figuras dictionis complectitur, quas cognitas habere est artis histrionalis et eius qui talem architecturam profitetur, veluti quid sit mandatum et quid precatio et enarratio et comminatio et interrogatio et responsio, et si quid aliud eiusdem generis.

nam ex horum intellectu aut ignoratione nulla in poeticam vituperatio manat, quae quidem operae pretium sit. quid enim est quod quis existimet peccatum esse in iis quae reprehendit Protagoras, quod precari se opinatus imperet dicens "iram cane dea?” iubere enim, inquit, facere aliquid aut non praeceptio est.

quare mittatur haec ratio, ut quae ad aliam artem et non ad poeticam pertineat.

1.

18.1 TOUTE Tragedie eſt compoſée d'un nœud & d'un denoüement. Les incidens qui arrivent du dehors & tres ſouvent même une partie de ceux que le Poëte tire de ſon ſujet, font le nœud. Tout le reſte c'eſt le denoüement,

2.

18.2 J'appelle le nœud toute cette partie de la Tragedie depuis le commencement juſqu'à l'endroit, où les choſes changent de face; & j'appelle le denoüement tout ce qui eſt depuis l'endroit, où ce changement a commencé juſqu'à la fin. 18.3 Par exemple, dans le Lyncée de Theodecte, tout ce qui arrive juſqu'à la priſe de ce jeune Prince, c'eſt le nœud; & le denoüement commence à l'endroit où cet enfant fait des regrets ſur ſa mort en accuſant les deſtinées de cruauté & d'injuſtice.

3.

18.4 Il a été dit que la Tragedie a quatre parties, il y a auſſi quatre eſpeces de Tragedie. 18.5 La premiere eſt la Tragedie implexe, qui conſiſte toute entiere dans la péripetie & la reconnoiſſance. 18.6 La ſeconde eſt la pathetique comme les Ajax & les Ixions: 18.7 La troiſiéme la morale, comme les Phthiotides & le Pelée; 18.8 Et la quatrième enfin, comme les Phorcydes, le Promethee, & tout ce qui ſe paſſe dans les enfers.

4.

18.9 Il faut tâcher de réüſſir dans ces quatre eſpeces, ou au moins dans la plus grande partie & dans les plus importantes, ſur tout aujourd'huy, où l'on ne cherche qu'à critiquer les Poëtes; car, parce qu'il y a eu des hommes excellens dans chacun de ces genres, on prétend qu'un ſeul doit les ſurpaſſer tous dans ce que chacun d'eux a eu de propre & de particulier.

5.

18.10 Il me ſemble auſſi qu'il n'eſt pas juſte de prétendre qu'une piece eſt la même qu'une autre, ou qu'elle eſt differente, lorſque le ſujet eſt le même, ou qu'il eſt different. Il eſt à mon avis plus raiſonnable de dire cela des pieces qui ont le même nœud & le même denoüement, ou dont le nœud & le denoüement ſont tout autres.

6.

18.11 La plupart des Poëtes, aprés avoir fort bien fait le noeud de leurs pieces, en font fort mal le denoüement; 18.12 mais il faut réüſſir également dans l'un & dans l'autre.

7.

18.13 Sur toutes choſes, il faut bien ſe ſouvenir, comme on l'a déja dit ſouvent, de ne pas faire de la Tragedie un Tiſſu Epique. J'appelle Tiſſu Epique, un Tiſſu de pluſieurs fables, comme ſi quelqu'un mettoit toute l'Iliade dans une ſeule Tragedie. 18.14 Dans le Poëme Epique chacune de ſes parties reçoit ſa juſte grandeur, à cauſe de l'étendüe de ce Poëme, mais dans la Tragedie il en arrive tout autrement qu'on n'avoit penſé; 18.15 & l'on peut ſe convaincre de cette verité par le mauvais ſuccez qu'ont eu tous ceux qui ont mis, par exemple, toute la ruine de Troye dans une ſeule piece, & qui n'ont pas traitté ce ſujet là par parties, comme Euripide a traitté ſa Niobe ou ſa Medée, ou comme Eſchyle. Car ou ils ont vû tomber leurs pieces, ou ils ont été toûjours vaincus. 18.16 Et c'eſt là uniquement ce qui a été cauſe du malheur d'Agathon, car d'ailleurs tous ces Poëtes ſont merveilleux dans les péripeties & dans les denoüemens ſimples, qui ne laiſſent pas d'être tragiques, & de faire beau-coup de plaiſir. 18.17 Car le tragique & l'agreable ſe trouvent lorſqu'on voit, par exemple, qu'un homme ſage, mais méchant, eſt trompé, comme un Siſyphe, ou qu'un vaillant homme, mais injuſte, eſt vaincu. 18.18 Tout cela eſt vray-ſemblable, car, comme dit Agathon, Il eſt dans la vray ſemblance qu'il arrive pluſieurs choſes contre la vray-ſemblance.

8.

18.19 Il faut auſſi que le Chœur joüe le rolle d'un Acteur, qu'il faſſe une partie du tout, & qu'il ne chante rien qui ne convienne au ſujet, & qui ne concoure à l'avancement de l'action, comme dans Sophocle, & non pas, comme dans Euripide. 18.20 Dans tous les autres Poëtes, c'eſt encore pis, car les Chœurs n'appartiennent pas plus aux ſujets qu'ils traittent, qu'à toute autre Tragedie. C'eſt pourquoy ils ne chantent plus que des chanſons inſerées ſans aucun raport. Agathon eſt le premier qui a introduit ce mauvais uſage. Cependant quelle difference peut-on mettre entre chanter des chanſons inſerées, & tranſporter de longs diſcours d'une piece dans une autre, ou un Epiſode entier ?

Tquanto alle coſe, che fon'nel Diſcorſo, nella Rettotica ſen'è parlato. ¹

Che inuero tal ragionamento è più propio di quella inſtitutione. Nel Difcorſo fi dicono eſſere tutte quelle coſe, che col parlare ſi debbono andare preparando;

delle quali parte ne conſiſte in dimostrare, & in foluere, & in eccitare gli affetti;

come è la Mifericordia, ò il Timore, ò l'Ira, ò altre fimili perturbationi:& parte d'eſſe ne conſiſte circa alla Amplificatione, & alla Diminutione.

Et è manifeſto, che nelle ſopradette parti e' biſogni vſare; l'Ampli fication' dico, & la Diminutione dalle medeſime fpetre cioè quando e' s'habbia à preparar coſe compaſsio neuoli,ò terribili, ò grandi,ò verifimili.

Doue nondimanco è da vſare queſta diſtintione, che certe coſe è di neceſsità, che appariſchino ſenza aiuto alcuno di dottrina; & certe altre le debbe, chi dice, preparare co parlare:anzi debbe fare, che elle interuenghino per for za d'effo.

Imperoche qual farebbe l'uffitio di chi dice, ſe le coſe appariſsino piaceuoli; ma non per via del parlare? Vanto alla Locutione, vna parte di lei ſta in cofiderare le figure d'effa, lequali s'appartengono à ſapere all'arte Iſtriouica; ò à chi ſia prepo fto à tale arte:che cofa, dico, fia il Commandamento, che il Prego, che la Narratione, che il Minacciò, che l'Interrogatione, che la Riſpoſta, ò qualunche altra cofa, che à queſte ſia ſimigliante.

Concioſia che' per ſapere,ò non ſaper queſte coſe, la Poetica non ne ſia incari cata per tal cagione di carico, che meriti il pregio. Imperoche chi farebbe mai, che ſtimaſſe eſſere errore in quelle coſe, che Protagora mette per errore?cioè quan do vno penſando di pregare inquel cambio comandi in queſto modo. L'ira contami, o Dea. Perchè il dire, che vn faccia, ò non faccia-vna coſa, dice egli, e' vn comandamento. ²

Laſsiſi pertanto queſta confideratione, come ſe ella fuſſe d'altra faculta, & non propia diqueſta.

Ac de aliis quidem iam dictum est.

reliquum vero est de elocutione vel sententia dicere. ac quae pertinent quidem ad sententiam, in libris de rhetorica posita sunt: hoc enim methodi illius magis est proprium. sunt autem secundum sententiam ea quaecunque ab oratione paranda sunt.

et eorum partes sunt tum demon¿ strare et solvere,

tum perturbationes parare, ut misericordiam vel metum vel iram et quaecunque talia, tum praeterea amplificare et diminuere.

manifestum autem est et in actionibus utendum esse iisdem formis, cum miserabilia aut terribilia aut magna aut verisimilia parare oportuerit;

nisi quod ea sola differentia est, quod haec quidem apparere sine doctrina oportet, quae vero in oratione posita sunt, a dicente parari et per orationem fieri.

quod enim esset dicentis munus, si apparerent iucunda et non per orationem? eorum vero quae pertinent ad elocutionem una species est contemplationis, quae considerat figuras elocutionis, quas scire est histrionicae, et eius qui talem habeat architectonicam, ut quid sit mandatum et quid precatio et narratio et mina et interrogatio et responsio, et si quid aliud huiusmodi.

ab horum enim cognitione vel ignorantia nulla reprehensio in poeticam affertur, quae curanda sit. qui enim fieri potest ut aliquis existimet errorem commissum esse in iis quae Protagoras reprehendit, quod putans precari praecipit, dicens 'iram diya cane?" nam iubere, inquit, ut aliquid faciat aut non faciat praeceptio est.

quamobrem omittatur, ut quae alterius et non poeticae sit contemplatio.

De aliis quidem igitur iam dictum est. Reliquum autem de locutione aut ratiocinatione dicere.

Que quidem igitur circa dianoiam (idest ratiocinationem) in hiis que de rethorica supponantur; hoc enim proprium magis illius methodi.

Sunt autem secundum dianoiam hec, quecumque a ratione oportet preparari

Partes autem horum demonstrareque et solvere et passiones preparare, puta miserationem aut terrorem aut iram et quecumque talia, et adhuc magnitudinem et parvitatem.

Palam autem quod et in rebus ab eisdem speciebus oportet uti, quando aut miserabilia aut dira aut magna aut verisimilia oportet exhibere;

preter quam tantum differt, quod hec quidem oportet apparere sine doctrina, hec autem in sermone a dicente preparari et preter rationem fieri. Quid enim utique sit dicentis opus, apparebit idea et non propter sermonem. —

Eorum autem que circa locutionem una quidem est species theorie scemata locutionis, que scire est ypocritice et habentis talem architectonicam, puta quid mandatum et quid oratio et narratio et comminatio et interrogatio et responsio et si quid aliud tale.

Preter enim horum cognitionem aut ignorantiam nulla in poeticam increpatio fertur, que sit digna studio. Quid enim utique quis existimet peccasse que Protagoras increpat, quod orare putans precipit dicens «insaniam vide dea» ? Nam iubere, inquit, facere aliquid aut non preceptio est.

Propter quod pretermittatur tamquam alterius et non poetice ens theorema. —

‏اما فى الانواع الاخر فقد قلنا فينبغى الان ان نتكلم فى المقولة وفى الضمير والذهن

‏وقد وصعت الاشيا التى هى نحو الذهن والضمير فى كتاب البلاغة وذلك ان هذا هو من شان تلك الصناعة ومما يخصها

‏والاشيا التى فى الذهن قد يجب ان ترتب وتعد تحت القول

‏واجزا هذه هى ان يبين وان يستقر للالم بمنزلة الحزن او الخوف او الحرد او اشباه هذه وايضا الكبر والصغر

‏وظاهر ان فى الامور ايضا من هذه الصور والخلق ينبغى ان يستعمل متى كان اما الاحزان واما الصفات واما العظايم ويستعد التى هى حقايق

‏غير [ال] ان مقدار الفرق فى هذا هو ان منها يرى دايما بلا تعطيم ومنها ما يعدها الذى يتكلم والقايل وهى خارج عن القول والا فما فعل ذلك الذى اما ان يقول واما ان يبين فيه اللذات وليس سٮٮ القول

‏ونوع النظر للتى هى نحو المقولة هو نوعا واحدا مٮلا اشكال المقولة وهذه ترى للاخر بالوجوه والذى له مثل اعنى البنا وصناعة القيام عليه بمنزلة ما الامر وما الصلاة او حديث او حرض او سوال او جواب وان كان شى اخر مما هو نظير لهذه

‏وذلك انه لا شى اخر خارج عن علم هذه ولا علم من ما هو تهجين يوتا به فى صناعة الشعر يستحق الحرص والعناية والا فماذا للانسان ان يتوهم انه وقع الزلل فى التى كان فروطاغورس يهجن بها من انه كان يامر [ٮطں] عـٮر ما كاں يطں ان يصلى ويقول خبرى انه الاله على السخطة والحرد وذلك انه زعم ان معنى انه امر بان يفعل شى او لا يفعل هو امر

‏ولذلك لٮحلا ذلك الصناعة لا على انه من شان صناعة الشعرا

‏اما فى الانواع الاخر فقد قلنا فينبغى الان ان نتكلم فى المقولة وفى الضمير والذهن

‏وقد وصعت الاشيا التى هى نحو الذهن والضمير فى كتاب البلاغة وذلك ان هذا هو من شان تلك الصناعة ومما يخصها

‏والاشيا التى فى الذهن قد يجب ان ترتب وتعد تحت القول

‏واجزا هذه هى ان يبين وان يستقر للالم بمنزلة الحزن او الخوف او الحرد او اشباه هذه وايضا الكبر والصغر

‏وظاهر ان فى الامور ايضا من هذه الصور والخلق ينبغى ان يستعمل متى كان اما الاحزان واما الصفات واما العظايم ويستعد التى هى حقايق

‏غير [ال] ان مقدار الفرق فى هذا هو ان منها يرى دايما بلا تعطيم ومنها ما يعدها الذى يتكلم والقايل وهى خارج عن القول

‏والا فما فعل ذلك الذى اما ان يقول واما ان يبين فيه اللذات وليس سٮٮ القول

‏ونوع النظر للتى هى نحو المقولة هو نوعا واحدا مٮلا اشكال المقولة وهذه ترى للاخر بالوجوه والذى له مثل اعنى البنا وصناعة القيام عليه بمنزلة ما الامر وما الصلاة او حديث او حرض او سوال او جواب وان كان شى اخر مما هو نظير لهذه

‏وذلك انه لا شى اخر خارج عن علم هذه ولا علم من ما هو تهجين يوتا به فى صناعة الشعر يستحق الحرص والعناية

‏والا فماذا للانسان ان يتوهم انه وقع الزلل فى التى كان فروطاغورس يهجن بها من انه كان يامر [ٮطں] عـٮر ما كاں يطں ان يصلى ويقول خبرى انه الاله على السخطة والحرد

‏وذلك انه زعم ان معنى انه امر بان يفعل شى او لا يفعل هو امر

‏ولذلك لٮحلا ذلك الصناعة لا على انه من شان صناعة الشعرا