1.
mvp-aristotle-comment-342
1.
mvp-aristotle-comment-343
1451a36
φανερὸν δὲ κτέ.
In Aristotle's view a history is a chronicle, or register, of events taken just as they came in order of time, however separate and disconnected they may have been in themselves (
23, 1459 a 21
).
The present distinction between a history, in this sense of the term, and a poetic story is a corollary to what he lays down in chaps. 7-8 on the unity and logical coherence of the parts in a well-constructed story.
The action in such a story is a
πρᾶξις μία καὶ ὅλη (
6, 1449 b 32
), i. e. a whole with a beginning, middle, and end (
7, 1450 b 26
) ; each incident resulting from something that goes before it, and the entire series from the state of things presupposed, as the
ἀρχή of the whole, at the opening.
Given a personage of a certain character and in a certain position as the beginning of the story, all the rest must be the natural or necessary consequence of this initial situation.
Hence it follows that the incidents in the poetic story are not only possible but also always possible, because they are such as may or must happen at any time, whenever the man and the circumstances are found together.
Aristotle accordingly notes two great points of contrast between history and poetry: (1) whereas the former is a record of actual events (
τὰ γενόμενα), the latter describes rather possible incidents of another kind,
τὰ δυνατὰ κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ἢ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον (a 38); (2) whereas the one tells us what is true only of some particular person (or persons) at a particular time, the other tells us something universally true (
τὰ καθόλου b 7), something that will hold good at all times of all persons of the same type in a similar set of circumstances.
1.
mvp-aristotle-comment-344
1451a38
τὰ δυνατά
scil.
γενέσθαι (comp. b 32).
The qualifying
κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ἢ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον excludes the third kind of
δυνατά, viz.
τὰ γενόμενα.
These also are obviously possible (see b 17 and
De interpr. 13, 23 a 7
), but as mere
γενόμενα they belong to history rather than poetry.
A little further on, however (b 29), Aristotle explains that under certain conditions even historic incidents may be a legitimate subject for poetry.
2.
mvp-aristotle-comment-345
οὐ τῷ ἢ ἔμμετρα λέγειν κτέ.
see
1, 1447 b 17
, where it is shown that metre is only one of the accidents of poetry.
2.
mvp-aristotle-comment-346
1451b4
διαφέρει
scil.
ὁ ἱστορικὸς τοῦ ποιητοῦ.
3.
mvp-aristotle-comment-347
σπουδαιότερον
is the opposite of
φαυλότερον.
In Plato also
σπουδαῖος (v. Ast, Lex. s.v.) is applied to things in the sense of
axius spoudēs, 'of serious value or interest', as the opposite of either 'trivial' (
φαῦλος) or 'ludicrous' (
γελοῖος: see on
4, 1448 b 34
).
Poetry, as Aristotle conceives it, is 'more philosophic', because of the large and generalized view of human nature which it implies; it tells us in effect what all men of a certain character may or must do in a certain set of circumstances, whereas historic truth is limited to particular times and persons.
A great master of rhetoric, Diderot, has enlarged on this text in a well-known passage in his
Éloge de Richardson (
Œuvres t. 3 p. 18 ed. 1821
):
'O Richardson! j'oserai dire que l'histoire la plus vraie est pleine de mensonges, et que ton roman est plein de vérités. L'histoire peint quelques individus; tu peins l'espèce humaine: l'histoire attribue à quelques individus ce qu'ils n'ont ni dit, ni fait; tout ce que tu attribues à l'homme, il l'a dit et fait l'histoire n'embrasse qu'une portion de la durée, qu'un point de la surface du globe; tu as embrassé tous les lieux et tous les temps. Le cœur humain, qui a été, est et sera toujours le même, est le modèle d'après lequel tu copies. Si l'on appliquait au meilleur historien une critique sévère, y en a-t-il aucun qui la soutînt comme toi? Sous ce point de vue, j'oserai dire que souvent l'histoire est un mauvais roman; et que le roman, comme tu l'as fait, est une bonne histoire. O peintre de la nature c'est toi qui ne mens jamais.'
.
3.
mvp-aristotle-comment-348
μᾶλλον τὰ καθόλου
μᾶλλον implies a qualification, which reappears in another form in b 9
οὗ στοχάζεται ἡ ποίησις ὀνόματα ἐπιτιθεμένη.
Poetry deals with 'characters' rather than actual individuals, and with universal rather than particular truth.
Its universality, however, is somewhat disguised by the proper names it attaches to its characters, which acquire in this way a certain resemblance to the real personages of history.
A reason for the retention in Tragedy of traditional names is given further on, in b 15.
3.
mvp-aristotle-comment-349
1451b7
τὰ καθόλου... τὰ καθ᾿ ἕκαστον
The present explanation of the terms may be compared with that in
De interpr. 7, 17 a 39
λέγω δὲ καθόλου μὲν ὃ ἐπὶ πλειόνων πέφυκε κατηγορεῖσθαι, καθ᾿ ἕκαστον δὲ μὴ, οἷον ἄνθρωπος μὲν τῶν καθόλου, Καλλίας δὲ τῶν καθ᾿ ἕκαστον
; comp. also
Rhet. 1. 2, 1356 b 28
οὐδεμία δὲ τέχνη σκοπεῖ τὸ καθ᾿ ἕκαστον, οἷον ἡ ἰατρικὴ (οὐ) τί Σωκράτει τὸ ὑγιεινόν ἐστιν ἢ Καλλίᾳ, ἀλλὰ τί τῷ τοιῷδε ἢ τοῖς τοιοῖσδε
. —
2. 4, 1382 a 4
ἡ μὲν ὁργὴ ἀεὶ περὶ τὰ καθ᾿ ἕκαστα, οἷον Καλλίᾳ ἢ Σωκράτει, τὸ δὲ μίσος καὶ πρὸς τὰ γένη
.
For a similar use of
καθόλου see
17, 1455 b 1
.
The element of 'universality' in Greek Tragedy, as Aristotle understands it, means no more than is indicated in his present distinction between a poem and a history; and it is in no wise peculiar to Tragedy.
Aristotle tells us it was to be seen in the Comedy of his time (b 11); and it is found in just the same way in the modern novel—even in the historical and in the so-called realistic novel.
In all these forms of imaginative literature the personages are, as we say, 'characters', in other words, ideal personalities, made to act and speak in accordance with the law of character which the author has assumed for each.
The novel, however (owing in some degree to its length), admits of characters of a subtlety and complexity which would have been simply impossible in the ancient Drama.
The Greek dramatist was practically restricted to the larger and more obvious types of character, which did not require much explanation to make them intelligible to his public in the brief space of time allotted to his work.
4.
mvp-aristotle-comment-350
ὀνόματα ἐπιτιθεμένη
=
καίπερ ὀνόματα ἐπιτιθεμένη; comp.
25, 1461 a 30
οὐ πινόντων οἶνον
.
The characters in the Drama are 'universals', i. e. types of character rather than actual individuals; that is what poetry really means them to be, notwithstanding the individualizing proper names it attaches to them.
The alternative rendering of
ὀνόματα ἐπιτιθεμένη, 'in giving names to its personages' (
'dum nomina imponit'
Heinsius
), would imply that the names were definitely chosen as significant of character.
This would be true to some extent of those in Comedy (see infra on b 13
τὰ τυχόντα ὀνόματα), but not of those in Tragedy.
As abstracts of character the personages ought to have general names, like those in Theophrastus, instead of the individualizing proper names given them in Drama.
For the use of the middle verb in this connexion comp.
21, 1457 b 34
and
Homer Od. 8. 552
οὐ μὲν γάρ τις πάμπαν ἀνώνυμός ἐστ᾿ ἀνθρώπων ... ἀλλ᾿ ἐπὶ πᾶσι τίθενται, ἐπεί κε τέκωσι, τοκῆες
.
5.
mvp-aristotle-comment-351
ἤδη
i. e. now that the New Comedy has taken the place of the Old (see on
5, 1449 b 8
), Comedy instead of satirizing individuals (like Cleon or Socrates) tells imaginary stories of imaginary personages labelled with imaginary names.
5.
mvp-aristotle-comment-352
1451b13
διὰ τῶν εἰκότων
The same use of the preposition is found in
26, 1462 a 16
δι᾿ ἧς αἱ ἡδοναὶ συνίστανται
.
It denotes the basis or chief ingredient in a compound, as it often does in later Greek, e. g. in expressions like
τὸ δι᾿ ἀλόης,
τὸ διὰ κολοκυνθίδος, etc. in the medical writers; comp. also
Dionysius Hal. 5 p. 14 R.
διὰ γὰρ τῶν εὐτελεστάτων τε καὶ ταπεινοτάτων ὀνομάτων πέπλεκται πᾶσα ἡ λέξις
.
5.
mvp-aristotle-comment-353
οὕτω
the reading of
Ac, is too idiomatic to be lightly surrendered (comp.
Bon. Ind. 546 b 13
).
The Arabic version is said to imply not
οὕτω but
οὐ; the same Arabic word, however, which Dr. Margoliouth renders by
nequaquam, would seem to occur also in the Arabic text in
6, 1450 a 30
, where it may be taken to represent
οὔπω.
One may suspect, therefore, that the Greek reading before the Syriac translator in the present passage was
οὔπω, a mere corruption of
οὕτω.
5.
mvp-aristotle-comment-354
τὰ τυχόντα ὀνόματα
Ritter has a note here on the names of the characters in the New Comedy.
Aristotle's point is this. In the Old Comedy the names of the chief characters were already fixed and prescribed for the poet, because actually borne by the persons whom he wished to satirize. Socrates, Cleon, Agathon, Euripides are instances of such names in Aristophanes.
But in the New Comedy the names were not thus fixed. In calling a soldier Thraso or Pyrgopolinices, for instance, the poet did not mean to satirize some actual person of that name; the name was a matter of choice or accident—invented it may be by the poet himself, or borrowed by him from his predecessors or from life.
Such names may no doubt be stock-names, or have a certain conventional or etymological appropriateness as suggestive of certain types of character (comp.
Dieterich, Pulcinella p. 45
); but they obviously stand on quite a different footing from the real names in Aristophanes.
Names also like Phormio, Chremes, Menedemus, etc., were in Comedy fictitious names, though outside Comedy they may have been borne by real persons (comp. on
21
).
5.
mvp-aristotle-comment-355
1451b14
ὑποτιθέασιν
'lay down as a foundation,' so that the story may look like one founded on fact (comp.
17, 1455 b 12
).
5.
mvp-aristotle-comment-356
ἰαμβοποιοί
see on
4, 1448 b 27
and
5, 1449 b 8
.
6.
mvp-aristotle-comment-357
τῶν γενομένων ὀνομάτων ἀντέχονται
comp.
Evanthius De Comoedia 4, 2 (Kaibel, CGF. 1 p. 66)
omnis comoedia de fictis est argumentis; tragoedia saepe ab historica fide petitur
.
The reading
γενομένων has been questioned, but (as it seems to me) without sufficient reason.
τὰ γενόμενα ὀνόματα are the already existing names, as fixed in history or legend (
γνώριμα b 20), in contradistinction to a newly-invented name (comp.
τὰ ὀνόματα πεποίηται b 22
), or one which, whether new or not, is arbitrarily assigned to a character by the poet (
τὰ τυχόντα ὀνόματα b 13
) at the time of writing.
6.
mvp-aristotle-comment-358
1451b16
πιθανόν
(comp.
πιστεύομεν in the next line) is the Greek equivalent of our modern term 'convincing', and practically synonymous with
εἰκός (comp.
24, 1460 a 27
) and
ἔνδοξον (
Bon. Ind. 593 a 35
).
The word was sufficiently established to be applied even by Xenophon to a work of art which has a look of life and reality:
Mem. 3. 10, 7
ὁμοιότερά τε τοῖς ἀληθινοῖς καὶ πιθανώτερα ποιεῖς φαίνεσθαι
.
In
17, 1455 a 30
πιθανός
is said of a person, the poet who writes 'convincingly'.
The adv.
πιθανῶς has the same sense in
Aristophanes Thesm. 266
ἁνὴρ μὲν ἡμῖν οὗτοσὶ καὶ δὴ γυνὴ τὸ γ᾿ εἶδος· ἢν λαλῇς δ᾿, ὅπως τῷ φθέγματι γυναικιεῖς εὖ καὶ πιθανῶς
('play the woman well and convincingly').
ἐνίαις
see on
8, 1451 a 18
for this appositional use of the word.
7.
mvp-aristotle-comment-359
1451b19
Ἀνθεῖ
was first suggested, somewhat tentatively, by
Welcker in his Gr. Tragödien p. 995
.
'The Flower' would certainly be a very strange title for a Greek tragedy.
The play being on a purely fictitious story, the names also of the characters, instead of being taken over from legend or history, were fictions, and due to the choice of the poet himself.
But they need not be supposed to have been new or newly-coined names.
Ἀνθεύς, for instance, seems to have been known already in mythical history as the name of certain legendary personages; and not so very long after Agathon's time it was actually borne by an Athenian citizen (
Kirchner, Prosopographia Attica 953
).
In this respect, therefore, it was in just the same position as so many of the names in Comedy, Chremes, Menedemus, Phormio, and the like.
7.
mvp-aristotle-comment-360
εὐφραίνει
an incidental recognition of pleasure as the immediate end of Tragedy (see
14, 1453 b 12
, and
Döring, Kunstlehre des Aristoteles p. 104
).
εὐφραίνειν serves as a transitive to
χαίρειν:
Top. 2. 6, 112 b 21
ἔτι καὶ εἰ αὐτὸ αὐτῷ συμβεβηκὸς ἔθηκεν ὡς ἕτερον διὰ τὸ ἕτερον εἶναι ὄνομα, καθάπερ Πρόδικος διῃρεῖτο τὰς ἡδονὰς εἰς χαρὰν καὶ τέρψιν καὶ εὐφροσύνην· ταῦτα γὰρ πάντα τοῦ αὐτοῦ, τῆς ἡδονῆς, ὀνόματά ἐστιν
.
εἰ οὖν τις τὸ χαίρειν τῷ εὐφραίνεσθαι φήσει συμβεβηκέναι, αὐτὸ ἂν αὐτῷ φαίη συμβεβηκέναι
.
—
Eth. E. 3. 2, 1231 a 6
τῶν ὀσμῶν ταύταις χαίρουσιν ὅσαι κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς εὐφραίνουσιν
.
The word may describe the pleasurable effect of anything, e. g. that of a painting (
Poet. 6, 1450 a 2
), of music (
Pol. 8. 5, 1339 b 24
), and of odours (
Eth. E. l. c.
;
Rhet. 3. 4, 1407 a 10
).
ὥστ᾿ οὐ πάντως ἂν εἴη ζητητέον
Spengel suggested that the
εἶναι of the MS. should be bracketed.
In these negative statements of result with
ὥστε οὐ, which are so common in Aristotle, the verb is usually either in the indicative, (1) expressed or (2) understood, or (3) in the potential optative, as the following passages from the Organon may suffice to show:
(1)
An. pr. 1. 36, 48 a 36
ὥστε οὐκ ἔσται μέσον τοῦ ΑΒ
. —
Top. 8. 11, 151 b 30
ὥστε οὐ τῷ ταῦτ᾿ εἶναι γίνεται ὁ συλλογισμός
(comp.
Poet. 22, 1458 a 5
).
(2)
An. pr. 1. 32, 47 a 35
ὥστ᾿ οὐκ εἴ τι συμβαίνει τεθέντων τινῶν, πειρατέον ἀνάγειν εὐθύς
. —
Top. 6. 5, 142 a 4
ὥστ᾿ οὐδὲ πρὸς τὸν αὐτὸν ἀεὶ ὁ αὐτὸς ὁρισμὸς ἀποδοτέος
(comp.
Metaph. Z 12, 1038 a 12
).
(3)
An. post. 1. 12, 77 b 12
ὥστ᾿ οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἐν ἀγεωμετρήτοις περὶ γεωμετρίας διαλεκτέον
. —
An. pr. 1. 16, 36 a 14
ὥστε οὐδενὶ ἢ οὐ παντὶ τῷ Γ τὸ Β ἐνδέχοιτ᾿ ἂν ὑπάρχειν
. —
Top. 6. 12, 149 b 2
ὥστ᾿ οὐκ ἂν εἴη χρῶμα πυρὶ μεμιγμένον
. —
Soph. el. 6, 168 b 4
ὥστ᾿ εἰ ὁ ἔλεγχος συλλογισμός τις, οὐκ ἂν εἴη ὁ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἔλεγχος
.
Two instances of
εἶναι for
ἂν εἴη are to be found in MSS. of great antiquity and value, one in
Par. A of Plato (
Tim. 17 B
), and the other in
Kb of the
Nicomachean Ethics (
8. 2, 1155 b 20
).
The error may have arisen either from the omission of
an, a word very apt to be lost in MSS., or through
ὥστ᾿ οὐ being misread and turned into
ὡς τοῦ (as it has been in fact in
Ac).
9.
mvp-aristotle-comment-361
δῆλον οὖν ἐκ τούτων
refers back to the distinction drawn in the earlier part of the chap.
1451 b 1-5
between a poetic story and a history; a history was said to be still a history even if put into a metrical form. From this
Aristotle once more (
V. I. 1447 b 11
) draws the conclusion that the story is a more essential part of a poem than the language or versification.
9.
mvp-aristotle-comment-362
ὅσῳ ποιητὴς κτέ.
is added as a further reason for regarding the story (rather than the verse) as the great and essential thing in a poem. The argument, which might have been more clearly stated, tacitly assumes what we have been told of the
μῦθος and its pre-eminent importance in chap.
6
. The poet's function, says
Aristotle, is to imitate (
ποιητὴς κατὰ τὴν μίμησιν), and it is actions that he imitates (
μιμεῖται δὲ τὰς πράξεις): but the
μῦθος in a poem is what represents the action (
τῆς μὲν πράξεως ὁ μύθος ἡ μίμησις,
6, 1450 a 4
); the
μύθος therefore is the poet's first business, and he must be accordingly a
ποιητὴς τῶν μύθων, μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν μέτρων.
9.
mvp-aristotle-comment-363
ποιητὴς κατὰ τὴν μίμησιν:
1, 1447 b 15
οὐχ ὡς κατὰ τὴν μίμησιν ποιητὰς ἀλλὰ κοινῇ κατὰ τὸ μέτρον προσαγορεύοντες
.
Vahlen, in the discussion on this chapter in his
Beiträge, maintains that
μίμησις may involve the idea of a poetic reconstruction of the traditional materials: '
Also die nach dem Gesetz der Wahrscheinlichkeit und Nothwendigkeit vollzogene dichterische Umbildung (μίμησις) des gegebenen, von Sage oder Geschichte überlieferten Stoffes macht den dramatischen Dichter aus' (
Beitr. 1 p. 29).
Such a meaning can hardly be ascribed to
μίμησις (see on
1, 1447 a 16
); it is rather part of the general idea of
ποίησις (see on
1, 1447 b 23
), which in the case of a traditional story implies a certain free handling of the materials to adapt them to the purposes of poetry (
comp.
14, 1453 b 25
).
10.
mvp-aristotle-comment-364
κἂν ἄρα συμβῇ γενόμενα ποιεῖν,
Up to this point the subject of a poem has been assumed to be always a
μύθος, a fictitious story (see on
5, 1449 b 9
), either invented by the poet himself (
b 12, b 21
) or adapted from legend.
Aristotle, however, now remembers that there may be such a thing as an historical play, one with incidents taken from actual history (
γενόμενα). Such incidents, he explains, are legitimate subjects for poetry, if they admit of being exhibited as probable and natural, as well as actual occurrences. It is only in this aspect, and on this condition, that they are admissible in poetry; as so many mere facts they belong to the domain of history.
κἂν ἄρα =
καὶ ἐὰν ἄρα,
the
ἄpa implying that the supposition is not very probable (
Kühner,
Gr. Gr. 2. 2 p. 324).
11.
mvp-aristotle-comment-365
τῶν δὲ ἁπλῶν μύθων κτέ.
An episodic story, as here defined, offends against the rule of unity and consecutiveness of incident laid down in chap.
8
.
Aristotle's theory is that in a well-constructed story every incident is wanted (
8, 1451 a 32
); so that a plot with irrelevant incidents violates a fundamental principle of dramatic construction. Plots of this faulty kind, he adds, are sometimes produced even by good poets through the practical exigencies of the theatre; as a play is expected to be of a certain length, if the story proves too short, it may have to be artificially lengthened out by the insertion of superfluous episodes.
Tyrwhitt points to the
Prometheus as an instance of this: '
Fabulae ἐπεισοδιώδους luculentum satis exemplum habemus Promethea Aeschyli. Episodia enim Oceani, 284-396. et Iûs, 563-885. nec inter se, neque cum fabula principali ullam habent connexionem aut necessariam aut verisimilem Satis manifestum est et Io et Oceanum, et ipsas etiam Oceanidas, quae chorum constituunt, in id tantum sine ulla verisimilitudine induci, ut argumentum tenue in iustam Tragoediae magnitudinem extendant.'
The episodic plot is mentioned here because of its resemblance to a history, since its incidents have no more necessary interconnexion than those in a chronicle. The paragraph, therefore, is a very natural sequel to the preceding discussion (
b 1-32
); and it is in its right place where it stands. Those who wish to find another place for it do so mainly on the ground that the text presupposes the distinction between the
ἁπλοῦς and the
πεπλεγμένος μῦθος explained in the next chapter. This anticipatory use of a technical term, however, is not so uncommon in
Aristotle. Thus—to say nothing of his use of
κάθαρσις in
6, 1449 b 28-
we find him talking of
περιπέτεια and
ἀναγνώρισις or
ἀναγνωρισμός in
6, 1450 a 34
and
10, 1452 a 16
, and giving an explanation of them afterwards in chap.
11
. Besides this it has to be remembered that the expression
ἁπλοῦς μύθος need not be assumed to have been an invention of
Aristotle's; for it may very well have been merely adopted by him as one of the already existing terms of dramatic criticism (see
infra on
ἐπεισοδιώδεις, and on
6, 1449 b 33, 1450 a 34
).
Another difficulty was found in the text by
Tyrwhitt, who proposed to remove it by reading
τῶν δὲ ἄλλων μύθων, a suggestion which the
Arabic Version is believed to confirm. The traditional reading
τῶν δὲ ἁπλῶν μύθων is supposed to restrict the fault in question to the
ἁπλοῦς μύθος, whereas the same fault was no doubt quite possible in the
πεπλεγμένος μύθος also. No such restriction, however, is involved in the text. All that
Aristotle implies here is a distinction between the worst form of the
ἁπλοῦς μύθος and the worst form of the
πεπλεγμένος μύθος. The worst fault in the one is the irrelevant episode. That in the other is no doubt the
ἀναγνώρισις διὰ σημείων, which is so emphatically condemned in
16, 1454 b 20
as the least artistic of Discoveries.
11.
mvp-aristotle-comment-366
ἐπεισοδιώδεις.
An
ἐπεισοδιώδης μύθος is a plot in which the continuity of the action is not maintained. That the term was fairly established in this sense is shown by the metaphorical use of it in
Metaph.Λ 10, 1076 a 1
ἐπεισοδιώδη τὴν τοῦ παντὸς οὐσίαν ποιοῦσιν οὐθὲν γὰρ ἡ ἑτέρα τῇ ἑτέρᾳ συμβάλλεται οὖσα ἢ μὴ οὖσα
. —
Ν 3, 1090 b 19
οὐκ ἔοικε δ᾽ ἡ φύσις ἐπεισοδιώδης οὖσα ... ὥσπερ μοχθηρὰ τραγῳδία
.
11.
mvp-aristotle-comment-367
τὰ ἐπεισόδια
for the origin of the term see on
12, 1452 b 20
. In this definition of the
ἐπεισοδιώδης μύθος, as also in
4, 1449 a 28
and
18, 1456 a 33,
ἐπεισόδιον
has the technical sense given it in
12, 1452 b 20
ἐπεισόδιον δὲ μέρος ὅλον τραγῳδίας τὸ μεταξὺ ὅλων χορικῶν μελῶν
, 'an episode is all that comes in in the interspace between two entire choral songs'. In other words the
ἐπεισόδια together with the
πρόλογος and
ἔξοδος are the acted parts of the play, the 'acts', as we should say. The term, however, often has the more general meaning of an 'insertion'; a sense which takes us back to the early days of the Drama, when Tragedy was still essentially choral, and the episode, or acted part, was only a sort of interlude in the singing. There are several instances even in the Poetics of this sense of the word. In
17, 1455 b 13
the accessories worked into the story are termed 'episodes'—the process of working them in being
ἐπεισοδιοῦν (
v.
17, 1455 b 1; 24, 1459 b 30
); and in
23, 1459 a 36
the Catalogue of the Ships is said to be one of the 'episodes' in the
Iliad. The
adj.
ἐπεισοδιώδης in the present context involves the same notion; the
ἐπεισοδιώδης μύθος is one with acts or incidents inserted into it,
i. e. only loosely connected with the main course of the story.
11b.
mvp-aristotle-comment-368
ὑποκριτάς,
κριτάς, the reading of certain of the apographs, has an air of plausibility, but it is difficult to see how the judges, whatever their weaknesses, could be responsible for the particular fault under consideration, the undue lengthening out of the story through the insertion of irrelevant episodes. The statement in the text has to be read in the light of that in
7, 1451 a 6
, where
Aristotle draws a distinction between the theoretical and the practical limit of length, and explains that the latter depends on conditions imposed by the public performances (
πρὸς τοὺς ἀγῶνας καὶ τὴν αἴσθησιν). As every play, as an acting play (
comp.
ἀγωνίσματα in the context), has by custom to be of a certain length, the poet, if his story proves too short, may have to spin it out (
παρὰ τὴν δύναμιν παρατείναντες) by the insertion of additional incidents, which will break the sequence of the story (
διαστρέφειν τὸ ἐφεξῆς, 1452 a 1).
11b.
mvp-aristotle-comment-369
διὰ τοὺς ὑποκριτάς,
'with a view to the actors,' may be taken as equivalent to
διὰ τὴν ὑπόκρισιν, 'because the play has to be acted' (
comp.
Ueberweg
ad loc.); the more concrete form of expression makes an antithesis to the
δι' αὐτούς in
36
. A much less probable interpretation of these words is that the actors are assumed to put pressure on the poet to make him provide them with parts of sufficient importance.
11b.
mvp-aristotle-comment-370
ἀγωνίσματα:
see on
6, 1450 b 18
;
comp. Schol.
Eurip.
Phoen. 88
ὦ κλεινὸν οἶκοις : ἡ τοῦ δράματος διάθεσις ἐνταῦθα ἀγωνιστικωτέρα γίνεται τὰ γὰρ τῆς Ἰοκάστης παρελκόμενά εἰσι καὶ ἕνεκα τοῦ θεάτρου ἐκτέταται (
v.
Trendelenburg,
Gramm. gr. de arte tragica iudiciorum rel. p. 91).
11b.
mvp-aristotle-comment-371
παρατείναντες.
The story being too short, they stretch it out, as it were, to make it fill up the time. This can only be done in two ways, either by a diffuse treatment of the incidents (
comp.
26, 1462 b 2-7
), or by the insertion of additional incidents not wanted for the main purpose of the story. A similar combination of a present and an aorist participle is found in
16, 1455 a 2
ἀκούων ... καὶ μνησθείς
, and in
22, 1458 b 19
ποιήσαντος... μετατιθέντος
.
1452a
11b.
mvp-aristotle-comment-372
1452a1
διαστρέφειν ... τὸ ἐφεξῆς:
comp.
Aeschylus
Suppl. 1017
ἴχνος τὸ πρόσθεν οὐ διαστρέψω φρενός. The sense is that a side incident is introduced, one not in the natural course of the story—not in line with the rest.
11b.
mvp-aristotle-comment-373
ἀναγκάζονται.
They do so because they cannot help it, not like the inferior order of poets, through their own fault (
δι' αὐτούς). For another instance of
ἀναγκάζεσθαι see
14, 1454 a 12
.
11c.
mvp-aristotle-comment-374
καὶ μάλιστα.
The
καί emphasizes
μάλιστα (
comp. De sensu
3, 440 b 12
;
De part. an.
1. 5, 643 a 24
; also
Riddell,
Digest of Idioms § 133). At this point
Aristotle recognizes a new element of interest in Tragedy, the element of surprise, but only incidentally, in order to bring it under the canon of construction laid down in chap. 7. The
φοβερὰ καὶ ἐλεεινά of Tragedy, he says, have the very greatest effect on the mind, when they come in unexpectedly, but at the same time as the natural or necessary consequence of incidents within the play itself (
δι' ἄλληλα).
τὸ ... θαυμαστόν,
the element of the marvellous, is recognized as a legitimate source of interest in Tragedy in
24, 1460 a 12
.
Teichmüller has a lengthy discussion on it (
Aristotelische Forschungen 2 p. 282
sqq.).
12.
mvp-aristotle-comment-375
οὕτως,
i. e. if they come about
δι' ἄλληλα, through incidents in the preceding part of the play.
12.
mvp-aristotle-comment-376
ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου καὶ τῆς τύχης.
Aristotle treats the two terms here as synonymous, though a distinction is drawn between them in
Phys.2. 4-6
, (
Bon.
Ind. 780 b 33;
comp.
Torstrik,
Hermes 9 p. 425).
12.
mvp-aristotle-comment-377
ὥσπερ ἐπίτηδες:
De caelo 2. 8, 290 a 33
ἡ φύσις... ἔοικεν ὥσπερ ἐπίτηδες ἀφελεῖν πάντα δι᾽ ὧν ἐνεδέχετο προϊέναι καθ αὐτά.
12.
mvp-aristotle-comment-378
ἀνδριὰς ὁ τοῦ Μίτυος κτέ.
Excerpted by the compiler of the
De mirab. ausc.156, 846 a 22
. The same story is told, apparently from another source, by
Plutarch,
De sera num. vind. 553 D
καὶ τὸ Μίτυος τοῦ Ἀργείου κατὰ στάσιν ἀναιρεθέντος ἀνδριάντα χαλκοῦν ἐν ἀγορᾷ θέας οὖσης ἐμπεσεῖν τῷ κτείναντι τὸν Μίτυν καὶ ἀνελεῖν. A certain
Mitys of Argos is mentioned in [
Demosthenes]
59, 33
in connexion with an occurrence which took place in
B.C. 374.
12.
mvp-aristotle-comment-379
θεωροῦντι
is usually understood to mean 'when he was looking at it' ('
spectanti incidens,'
Tyrwhitt;
comp.
Bon.
Ind. 328 b 5). But as the parallel in
Plutarch has
θέας οὖσης,
Dacier would seem to be right in translating it by '
au milieu d' une grande fête', taking it in the sense of 'being present at a
θεωρία, or public spectacle'.
13.
mvp-aristotle-comment-380
ὥστε
see on
7, 1451 a 3
.
