From what we have said it will be seen that the poet's
function is to describe, not the thing that has happened, but
a kind of thing that might happen, i. e. what is possible as
being probable or necessary.
The distinction between his-
torian and poet is not in the one writing prose and the
other verse-you might put the work of Herodotus into
verse, and it would still be a species of history; it consists
really in this, that the one describes the thing that has been,
and the other a kind of thing that might be.
Hence poetry
is something more philosophic and of graver import than
history, since its statements are of the nature rather of
universals, whereas those of history are singulars.
By a
universal statement I mean one as to what such or such
a kind of man will probably or necessarily say or do-which
is the aim of poetry, though it affixes proper names to the
characters; by a singular statement, one as to what, say,
Alcibiades did or had done to him.
In Comedy this has
become clear by this time; it is only when their plot is
already made up of probable incidents that they give it
a basis of proper names, choosing for the purpose any names
that may occur to them, instead of writing like the old
iambic poets about particular persons.
In Tragedy, how-
ever, they still adhere to the historic names; and for this
reason: what convinces is the possible; now whereas we are
not yet sure as to the possibility of that which has not hap-
pened, that which has happened is manifestly possible, else
it would not have come to pass.
Nevertheless even in
Tragedy there are some plays with but one or two known
names in them, the rest being inventions; and there are
some without a single known name, e. g. Agathon's Antheus,
in which both incidents and names are of the poet's inven-
tion; and it is no less delightful on that account.
So that one
must not aim at a rigid adherence to the traditional stories
on which tragedies are based. It would be absurd, in fact,
to do so, as even the known stories are only known to a few,
though they are a delight none the less to all.
It is evident from the above that the poet must be more
the poet of his stories or Plots than of his verses, inasmuch
as he is a poet by virtue of the imitative element in his work,
and it is actions that he imitates.
And if he should come
to take a subject from actual history, he is none the less
a poet for that; since some historic occurrences may very
well be in the probable and possible order of things; and
it is in that aspect of them that he is their poet.
Of simple Plots and actions the episodic are the worst.
I call a Plot episodic when there is neither probability nor
necessity in the sequence of its episodes.
Actions of this
sort bad poets construct through their own fault, and good
ones on account of the players. His work being for public
performance, a good poet often stretches out a Plot beyond
its capabilities, and is thus obliged to twist the sequence
of incident.
Tragedy, however, is an imitation not only of a complete
action, but also of incidents arousing pity and fear.
Such
incidents have the very greatest effect on the mind when
they occur unexpectedly and at the same time in consequence
of one another; there is more of the marvellous in them
then than if they happened of themselves or by mere chance.
Even matters of chance seem most marvellous if there is
an appearance of design as it were in them; as for instance
the statue of Mitys at Argos killed the author of Mitys'
death by falling down on him when a looker-on at a public
spectacle; for incidents like that we think to be not without
a meaning.
A Plot, therefore, of this sort is necessarily
finer than others.
Poetics. Aristotle. Ingram Bywater (Translator), ed. Gilbert Murray. Oxford. 1909.