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9.1
BUT it is evident from what has been said, that it is not the province of a poet to relate things which have happened, but such as might have happened, and such things as are possible according to probability, or which would necessarily have happened1.
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For an historian and a poet do not differ from each other, because the one writes in verse and the other in prose;
9.2
for the history of Herodotus might be written in verse, and yet it would be no less a history
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with metre, than without metre. But they differ in this, that the one speaks of things which have happened, and the other of such as might have happened.
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9.3
Hence, poetry is more philosophic, and more deserving of attention, than history. For poetry speaks more of universals,
9.4
but history of particulars. But universal consists indeed in relating or performing certain things which happen to a man of a certain description, either probably or necessarily, [to which the aim of poetry is directed in giving names 2;] but particular consists in narrating what, [for example,]
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Alci blades did, or what he suffered. in comedy, therefore, this is now become evident. For [comic poets] having composed a fable through things of a probable nature, they thus give whatever names they please
to their characters,
9.5
and do not, like Iambic poets, write poems about particular persons.
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9.6
But in tragedy they cling to real names. The cause, however, of this is that the possible is credible. Things, therefore, which have not yet been done, we do not yet believe to be possible; but it is evident that things which have been done are possible; for they would not have been done, if they were impossible.
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Not, indeed,
9.7
but that in some tragedies there are one or two of known names, and the rest are feigned; but in others there is no known name; as, for instance, in the Flower of Agatho. For in this tragedy, the things and the names are alike feigned, and yet it delights no less.
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9.8
Hence, one must not seek to adhere entirely to traditional fables, which are the subjects of tragedy. For it is ridiculous to make this the object of search, because even known subjects are known but to a few, though at the same time they
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delight all men.
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9.9
From these things, therefore, it is evident that a poet ought rather to be the author of fables than of metres, inasmuch as he is a poet from imitation, and he imitates actions. Hence, though it should happen that he relates things which have happened, he is no less a poet.
9.10
For nothing hinders but that some actions which have happened, are such as might both probably
and possibly have happened, and by [the narration of] such he is a poet.