It is, moreover, evident from what has been said,
that it is not the function of the poet to relate what
has happened, but what may happen, — what is possible
according to the law of probability or necessity.
The
poet and the historian differ not by writing in verse or
in prose. The work of Herodotus might be put into
verse, and it would still be a species of history, with
metre no less than without it. The true difference is
that one relates what has happened, the other what may
happen.
Poetry, therefore, is a more philosophical and
a higher thing than history: for poetry tends to express
the universal, history the particular.
By the universal
I mean how a person of a certain type will on occasion
speak or act, according to the law of probability or
necessity; and it is this universality at which poetry
aims in the names she attaches to the personages.
The
particular is — for example — what Alcibiades did or
suffered. In Comedy this is already apparent: for here
the poet first constructs the plot on the lines of prob-
ability, and then inserts characteristic names; — unlike
the lampooners who write about particular individuals.
But tragedians still keep to real names, the reason being
that what is possible is credible: what has not happened
we do not at once feel sure to be possible: but what has
happened is manifestly possible: otherwise it would not
have happened.
Still there are even some tragedies in
which there are only one or two well known names, the rest
being fictitious. In others, none are well known, — as
in Agathon's Antheus, where incidents and names alike
are fictitious, and yet they give none the less pleasure.
We must not, therefore, at all costs keep to the received
legends, which are the usual subjects of Tragedy.
Indeed,
it would be absurd to attempt it; for even subjects that
are known are known only to a few, and yet give pleasure
to all. It clearly follows that the poet or 'maker'
should be the maker of plots rather than of verses;
since he is a poet because he imitates, and what he
imitates are actions.
And even if he chances to take
an historical subject, he is none the less a poet; for
there is no reason why some events that have actually
happened should not conform to the law of the probable
and possible, and in virtue of that quality in them he is
their poet or maker.
Of all plots and actions the epeisodic
are the worst. I call a plot 'epeisodic' in which the episodes or
acts succeed one another without probable or necessary sequence.
Bad poets compose such pieces by their own fault, good
poets, to please the players; for, as they write show
pieces for competition, they stretch the plot beyond its
capacity, and are often forced to break the natural con-
tinuity.
But again, Tragedy is an imitation not only of a
complete action, but of events inspiring fear or pity.
Such an effect is best produced when the events come on
us by surprise; and the effect is heightened when, at the
same time, they follow as cause and effect.
The tragic
wonder will then be greater than if they happened of
themselves or by accident; for even coincidences are most
striking when they have an air of design. We may
instance the statue of Mitys at Argos, which fell upon his
murderer while he was a spectator at a festival, and killed
him. Such events seem not to be due to mere chance.
Plots, therefore, constructed on these principles are
necessarily the best.
Poetics. Aristotle. S. H. Butcher (Translator). London. 1911.
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