Plato, Republic, ed. John Burnet, 9.583

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[583] 583a
τριῶν ἄρʼ οὐσῶν τῶν ἡδονῶν ἡ τούτου τοῦ μέρους τῆς ψυχῆς ᾧ μανθάνομεν ἡδίστη ἂν εἴη, καὶ ἐν ᾧ ἡμῶν τοῦτο ἄρχει, ὁ τούτου βίος ἥδιστος;
πῶς δʼ οὐ μέλλει; ἔφη· κύριος γοῦν ἐπαινέτης ὢν ἐπαινεῖ τὸν ἑαυτοῦ βίον ὁ φρόνιμος.
τίνα δὲ δεύτερον, εἶπον, βίον καὶ τίνα δευτέραν ἡδονήν φησιν ὁ κριτὴς εἶναι;
δῆλον ὅτι τὴν τοῦ πολεμικοῦ τε καὶ φιλοτίμου· ἐγγυτέρω γὰρ αὐτοῦ ἐστιν ἢ ἡ τοῦ χρηματιστοῦ.
ὑστάτην δὴ τὴν τοῦ φιλοκερδοῦς, ὡς ἔοικεν.
τί μήν; ἦ δʼ ὅς. 583b
ταῦτα μὲν τοίνυν οὕτω δύʼ ἐφεξῆς ἂν εἴη καὶ δὶς νενικηκὼς ὁ δίκαιος τὸν ἄδικον· τὸ δὲ τρίτον Ὀλυμπικῶς τῷ σωτῆρί τε καὶ τῷ Ὀλυμπίῳ Διί, ἄθρει ὅτι οὐδὲ παναληθής ἐστιν ἡ τῶν ἄλλων ἡδονὴ πλὴν τῆς τοῦ φρονίμου οὐδὲ καθαρά, ἀλλʼ ἐσκιαγραφημένη τις, ὡς ἐγὼ δοκῶ μοι τῶν σοφῶν τινος ἀκηκοέναι. καίτοι τοῦτʼ ἂν εἴη μέγιστόν τε καὶ κυριώτατον τῶν πτωμάτων.
πολύ γε· ἀλλὰ πῶς λέγεις; 583c
ὧδʼ, εἶπον, ἐξευρήσω, σοῦ ἀποκρινομένου ζητῶν ἅμα.
Ἐρώτα δή, ἔφη.
λέγε δή, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ· οὐκ ἐναντίον φαμὲν λύπην ἡδονῇ;
καὶ μάλα.
οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ μήτε χαίρειν μήτε λυπεῖσθαι εἶναί τι;
εἶναι μέντοι.
μεταξὺ τούτοιν ἀμφοῖν ἐν μέσῳ ὂν ἡσυχίαν τινὰ περὶ ταῦτα τῆς ψυχῆς; ἢ οὐχ οὕτως αὐτὸ λέγεις;
οὕτως, ἦ δʼ ὅς.
ἆρʼ οὖν μνημονεύεις, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, τοὺς τῶν καμνόντων λόγους, οὓς λέγουσιν ὅταν κάμνωσιν;
ποίους;
ὡς οὐδὲν ἄρα ἐστὶν ἥδιον τοῦ ὑγιαίνειν, ἀλλὰ σφᾶς 583d ἐλελήθει, πρὶν κάμνειν, ἥδιστον ὄν.
μέμνημαι, ἔφη.
οὐκοῦν καὶ τῶν περιωδυνίᾳ τινὶ ἐχομένων ἀκούεις λεγόντων ὡς οὐδὲν ἥδιον τοῦ παύσασθαι ὀδυνώμενον;
ἀκούω.
καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις γε οἶμαι πολλοῖς τοιούτοις αἰσθάνῃ γιγνομένους τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, ἐν οἷς, ὅταν λυπῶνται, τὸ μὴ λυπεῖσθαι καὶ τὴν ἡσυχίαν τοῦ τοιούτου ἐγκωμιάζουσιν ὡς ἥδιστον, οὐ τὸ χαίρειν.
τοῦτο γάρ, ἔφη, τότε ἡδὺ ἴσως καὶ ἀγαπητὸν γίγνεται, ἡσυχία. 583e
καὶ ὅταν παύσηται ἄρα, εἶπον, χαίρων τις, ἡ τῆς ἡδονῆς ἡσυχία λυπηρὸν ἔσται.
ἴσως, ἔφη.
ὃ μεταξὺ ἄρα νυνδὴ ἀμφοτέρων ἔφαμεν εἶναι, τὴν ἡσυχίαν, τοῦτό ποτε ἀμφότερα ἔσται, λύπη τε καὶ ἡδονή.
ἔοικεν.
ἦ καὶ δυνατὸν τὸ μηδέτερα ὂν ἀμφότερα γίγνεσθαι;
οὔ μοι δοκεῖ.
καὶ μὴν τό γε ἡδὺ ἐν ψυχῇ γιγνόμενον καὶ τὸ λυπηρὸν κίνησίς τις ἀμφοτέρω ἐστόν· ἢ οὔ;
ναί.

Republic. Plato. ed. John Burnet. Oxford. 1905.

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Πολιτεία (Greek) (Platonis Opera Tomus IV: Tetralogia VIII. Burnet, John, editor. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1905.)

Translations (1)

Republic Perseus (Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vol. 5-6. Shorey, Paul, translator. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1935-37 (printing).) — 9.583 focus

[583] 583a There being, then, three kinds of pleasure, the pleasure of that part of the soul whereby we learn is the sweetest, and the life of the man in whom that part dominates is the most pleasurable. How could it be otherwise? he said. At any rate the man of intelligence speaks with authority when he commends his own life. And to what life and to what pleasure, I said, does the judge assign the second place? Obviously to that of the warrior and honor-loving type, for it is nearer to the first than is the life of the money-maker. And so the last place belongs to the lover of gain, as it seems. Surely, said he. 583b
That, then, would be two points in succession and two victories for the just man over the unjust. And now for the third in the Olympian fashion to the saviour¹ and to Olympian Zeus—observe that other pleasure than that of the intelligence is not altogether even real² or pure,³ but is a kind of scene-painting,⁴ as I seem to have heard from some wise man⁵; and yet⁶ this would be the greatest and most decisive overthrow.⁷ Much the greatest. But what do you mean? I shall discover it, I said, 583c if you will answer my questions while I seek. Ask, then, he said. Tell me, then, said I, do we not say that pain is the opposite of pleasure? We certainly do. And is there not such a thing as a neutral state⁸ There is. Is it not intermediate between them, and in the mean,⁹ being a kind of quietude of the soul in these respects? Or is not that your notion of it? It is that, said he. Do you not recall the things men say in sickness? What sort of things? Why, that after all there is nothing sweeter than to be well,¹⁰ 583d though they were not aware that it is the highest pleasure before they were Ill. I remember, he said. And do you not hear men afflicted with severe pain saying that there is no greater pleasure than the cessation of this suffering? I do. And you perceive, I presume, many similar conditions in which men while suffering pain praise freedom from pain and relief from that as the highest pleasure, and not positive delight. Yes, he said, for this in such cases is perhaps what is felt as pleasurable and acceptable—peace. 583e And so, I said, when a man’s delight comes to an end, the cessation of pleasure will be painful. It may be so, he said. What, then,we just now described as the intermediate state between the two—this quietude—will sometimes be both pain and pleasure. It seems so Is it really possible for that which is neither to become both¹¹? I think not. And further, both pleasure and pain arising in the soul are a kind of motion,¹² are they not? 584a Yes.

Commentary

Commentary on Plato, Republic (Plato. The Republic, Vol 1-2. Adam, James, editor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1902-1903.) focus

ὁ κριτὴς κτλ. ὁ κριτής is the φιλόσοφος, as αὐτοῦ in the next sentence shews. There is therefore no reference to 580 B. For πολεμικοῦ Herwerden proposes φιλονίκου, very arbitrarily: see on 582 C. It is worth noting that the conclusion of this argument incidentally furnishes a further reply to the objection raised by Adimantus in IV 419 A ff., viz. that Plato's guardians cannot possibly be happy.

ταῦτα μὲν κτλ. The political and psychological λόγοι have registered their votes, and it only remains for us to hear the verdict of the metaphysical, to which Plato characteristically assigns the greatest value ( καίτοι —πτωμάτων below). See on 577 C. Plato's theory of true or pure and false or impure pleasures reappears in the Philebus. Both dialogues teach (1) that Pleasure consists in πλήρωσις, (2) that the majority of bodily pleasures are not pleasures at all, but only λυπῶν ἀπαλλαγαί, and (3) that there are other—true or pure—pleasures (e.g. smell) which are not preceded or followed by pain. The last generation of scholars mostly placed the Republic after the Philebus. I am inclined to agree with more recent critics in thinking it earlier (see on VI 506 B and Jackson in Journal of Philology XXV pp. 65—82), but the greater degree of elaboration which marks the treatment of this subject in the Philebus may be and has been accounted for on either hypothesis. Aristotle also touches on the question of Mixed and Unmixed Pleasures in Eth. Nic. VII 12. 1152^{b} ff., especially 1152^{b} 35—1153^{a} 7, ib. 15. 1154^{a} 22—^{b} 31 and again in X. 2—5, especially 2. 1173^{a} 22—^{b} 20. The present section is further important in the history of ethics for its clear distinction between the μέση κατάστασις and the two extremes; a distinction already noted by the Cyrenaics (RP^{7}. § 208^{b}) and afterwards adopted by Epicurus (ib. § 380 ff.).

δύο and

δὶς refer of course to the two preceding proofs 577 B—580 C and 580 C—583 A.

τὸ δὲ τρίτον κτλ. The libations at banquets (according to the Schol. on Phil. 66 D : cf. also Schol. on Charm. 167 A and on Pind. Isthm. 5. 7 with Hesych. s. v. τρίτος κρατήρ and Pollux VI 15, 100) were offered in the following sequence: (1) to Olympian Zeus and the Olympian gods, (2) to the heroes, (3) to Zeus Soter. Hence the proverb τὸ τρίτον τῷ σωτῆρι, with which Plato sometimes introduces the third or culminating stage in an argument, demonstration, or the like ( Phil. and Charm. ll. cc., Laws III 692 A, Epp. VII 340 A). In the present instance there is also an allusion to the Olympic games, as appears from Ὀλυμπικῶς (‘Olympic-wise’). Stallbaum conjectures that competitors at Olympia were in the habit of making their third libation “non uni tantum Διὶ σωτῆρι, sed sicuti consentaneum fuit, τῷ σωτῆρί τε καὶ τῷ Ὀλυμπίῳ Διί”: but there is no authority for this idea. Is Plato thinking of the πένταθλον, in which it was necessary to win in three (probably leaping, discusthrowing, javelin-throwing) out of the five events in order to obtain the prize (see P. Gardner in J. of H. Studies I p. 217, where the evidence is quoted)? Schneider takes this view: but the words τῶν πτωμάτων below make it clear that the reference is only to wrestling. The point manifestly is, that as in wrestling the third throw decided the contest between two athletes (Schol. on Aesch. Eum. 592 et al.), so here the δίκαιος wins after he has thrice defeated the ἄδικος (cf. also Euthyd. 277 C ). I think Ὀλυμπικῶς is intended to suggest that the contest between justice and injustice is the greatest of all moral, as the Olympic was of all physical, παλαίσματα: the victors ζήσουσι τοῦ μακαριστοῦ βίου δ\ν οἱ ὀλυμπιονῖκαι ζῶσι μακαριώτερον (V 465 D note). Compare Phaedr. 256 B τῶν τριῶν παλαισμάτων τῶν ὡς ἀληθῶς Ὀλυμπιακῶν ἓν νενικήκασιν. Plato adds the epithet τῷ Ὀλυμπίῳ de suo: in an Olympic contest Zeus Soter is also in the truest sense Olympian too, although in banquets Zeus Olympius received only the first, and not also the third libation. With similar and even greater emphasis on the word Ὀλυμπίῳ Pindar prays for an Olympic victory for Phylacidas in the words εἴη δὲ τρίτον | σωτῆρι πορσαίνοντας Ὀλυμπίῳ Αἴγιναν κάτα | σπένδειν μελιφθόγγοις ἀοιδαῖς ( Isthm. l.c.: see Donaldson ad loc.).

οὐδὲ παναληθὴς ‐‐ καθαρά . In what sense is pleasure said by Plato to be pure and true? It is pure when unadulterated by pain, whether antecedent, present or consequent; and there is also perhaps in Plato's use of the epithet ‘pure’ a relic or hint of the old half ceremonial, half-religious idea of ‘pure from taint’: see App. III and Rohde Psyche^{2} II pp. 281 ff. al. But in its deepest signification the truth or purity of Pleasure involves the ontological theory that soul and its sustenance (knowledge etc.) have more part in Being and Truth than Body and its food: the spiritual and not the material is the true. See also on 586 E and especially Nettleship Lect. and Rem. II pp. 322—327, where the farther bearings of Plato's theory are admirably traced.

πλὴν τῆς τοῦ φρονίμου . Cf. Phaed. 69 B , C.

ἐσκιαγραφημένη . See on II 365 C. Bodily pleasure is ἐσκιαγραφημένη in the fullest sense of the word, because it depends on contrast and balance of pleasure with pleasure, and pleasure with pain (584 A), just as perspective produces its effect by the contrast of light and shade (586 B). Similarly in Phaed. 69 B Plato hints that the so-called virtue which consists in bartering one bodily pleasure for another is σκιαγραφία τις—καὶ οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς οὐδ’ ἀληθὲς ἔχουσα, and ib. 81 B the soul is said to be γεγοητευμένη ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ (sc. τοῦ σώματος) ὑπό τε τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ ἡδονῶν. Cf. also Phil. 44 C αὐτὸ τοῦτο αὐτῆς (sc. τῆς ἡδονῆς) ἐπαγωγὸν γοήτευμα, ἀλλ’ οὐχ ἡδονὴν εἶναι. In each of these passages there is probably a conscious reminiscence of Orphic doctrines: see next note and App. IV.

τῶν σοφῶν alludes, I believe, to Orphic or Pythagorean ascetics, who preached the doctrine σῶμα σῆμα and regarded bodily pleasure as essentially false and impure: see especially Rohde Psyche^{2} II pp. 121—130, and 161—166. Evidence for this view is given in App. IV, where the other interpretations are also discussed.

καίτοι is hardly ‘et vero’ ‘and surely’ (as Kugler takes it de part. τοί etc. p. 18, comparing Gorg. 452 E , Theaet. 187 C al.), but rather ‘quamquam’ ‘and yet’ (sc. ‘strong as were the other two proofs,’ or the like): “und das wäre doch wohl” Schneider.

τὸ μήτε χαίρειν κτλ. This τρίτη διάθεσις is described in Phil. 32 E ff.: cf. ib. 42 E ff. and Tim. 64 C ff.

μεταξὺ κτλ. : ‘something which is intermediate between these two, a sort of repose of the soul so far as these are concerned.’ Herwerden is fain to cancel either μεταξύ or ἐν μέσῳ: but the fulness of expression is characteristic. See Introd. § 5.

ἡσυχίαν : whereas λύπη and ἡδονή are κινήσεις 583 E.

ἆρ’ οὐ . Three inferior MSS have ἆρ’ οὖν, which is easier; but ἆρ’ οὐ is much more lively, and not more abrupt than e.g. πολεμήσομεν τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο, ὦ Γλαύκων; II 373 E (quoted by Schneider). The stylistic effect is exactly like Lucretius' ‘Nonne vides’ etc.: e.g. II 263 al.

τοῦτο γὰρ κτλ. The argument is as follows. While suffering pain, men are apt to look upon the ἡσυχία from pain as the highest pleasure. Perhaps (suggests Glauco) at such a time the neutral state is in point of fact found positively pleasant and welcome by them. Socrates proceeds to shew (by a reductio ad absurdum proof) that Glauco's suggestion is untenable. ‘In that case,’ he argues, ‘ ἡσυχία from pleasure will in like manner be positively painful: and thus the neutral state, which we declared to be between the two extremes, will upon occasions be both, viz. both pleasure and pain.’ Glauco allows that that which is neither cannot become both, and Socrates proceeds: In this instance the ‘both’ is a κίνησις, and the ‘neither’ a ἡσυχία, and lies, as we have seen, between the two: so that it is wrong to identify the absence of pain with pleasure or the absence of pleasure with pain. Hence your suggestion is erroneous: οὐκ ἔστιν ἄρα τοῦτο, ἀλλὰ φαίνεται κτλ. See below on 584 A. The argument is really complete when Glauco says οὔ μοι δοκεῖ, but the words καὶ μὴν τό γε ἡδύ introduce a new reason for refusing to identify ἡσυχία with pleasure or with pain, by explicitly stating for the first time that pleasure and pain are each of them a κίνησις. ἡσυχία and κίνησις are mutually exclusive notions. Cf. Phil. 43 D —44 B, where the reasoning follows nearly the same lines. See also next note.

ἀμφότερα ‐‐ ἡδονή . Does Plato mean that the neutral state will sometimes be both painful and pleasant at one and the same time,—or only at one time painful and at another pleasant? According to Gorg. 497 C ff., in eating when hungry, drinking when thirsty etc., we cease from pain and pleasure simultaneously, so that in such a case the neutral state will appear to be both pleasant and painful. But the rest of the argument does not support this interpretation; and in the corresponding passage of the Philebus (43 D) we have τὸ δὲ μηδέτερα τούτων ἔσθ’ ἡμῖν ὅπως θάτερα γένοιτ’ ἄν. The simpler view should therefore be adopted.

κίνησις . In Pleasure the κίνησις is πλήρωσις, in pain, κένωσις, as is afterwards pointed out (585 A note).

Plato Republic 9.583

ed. John Burnet

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