Plato Republic 9.583

ὁ κριτὴς κτλ. ὁ κριτής is the φιλόσοφος, as αὐτοῦ in the next sentence shews. There is therefore no reference to 580 B. For πολεμικοῦ Herwerden proposes φιλονίκου, very arbitrarily: see on 582 C. It is worth noting that the conclusion of this argument incidentally furnishes a further reply to the objection raised by Adimantus in IV 419 A ff., viz. that Plato's guardians cannot possibly be happy.

ταῦτα μὲν κτλ. The political and psychological λόγοι have registered their votes, and it only remains for us to hear the verdict of the metaphysical, to which Plato characteristically assigns the greatest value ( καίτοι —πτωμάτων below). See on 577 C. Plato's theory of true or pure and false or impure pleasures reappears in the Philebus. Both dialogues teach (1) that Pleasure consists in πλήρωσις, (2) that the majority of bodily pleasures are not pleasures at all, but only λυπῶν ἀπαλλαγαί, and (3) that there are other—true or pure—pleasures (e.g. smell) which are not preceded or followed by pain. The last generation of scholars mostly placed the Republic after the Philebus. I am inclined to agree with more recent critics in thinking it earlier (see on VI 506 B and Jackson in Journal of Philology XXV pp. 65—82), but the greater degree of elaboration which marks the treatment of this subject in the Philebus may be and has been accounted for on either hypothesis. Aristotle also touches on the question of Mixed and Unmixed Pleasures in Eth. Nic. VII 12. 1152^{b} ff., especially 1152^{b} 35—1153^{a} 7, ib. 15. 1154^{a} 22—^{b} 31 and again in X. 2—5, especially 2. 1173^{a} 22—^{b} 20. The present section is further important in the history of ethics for its clear distinction between the μέση κατάστασις and the two extremes; a distinction already noted by the Cyrenaics (RP^{7}. § 208^{b}) and afterwards adopted by Epicurus (ib. § 380 ff.).

δύο and

δὶς refer of course to the two preceding proofs 577 B—580 C and 580 C—583 A.

τὸ δὲ τρίτον κτλ. The libations at banquets (according to the Schol. on Phil. 66 D : cf. also Schol. on Charm. 167 A and on Pind. Isthm. 5. 7 with Hesych. s. v. τρίτος κρατήρ and Pollux VI 15, 100) were offered in the following sequence: (1) to Olympian Zeus and the Olympian gods, (2) to the heroes, (3) to Zeus Soter. Hence the proverb τὸ τρίτον τῷ σωτῆρι, with which Plato sometimes introduces the third or culminating stage in an argument, demonstration, or the like ( Phil. and Charm. ll. cc., Laws III 692 A, Epp. VII 340 A). In the present instance there is also an allusion to the Olympic games, as appears from Ὀλυμπικῶς (‘Olympic-wise’). Stallbaum conjectures that competitors at Olympia were in the habit of making their third libation “non uni tantum Διὶ σωτῆρι, sed sicuti consentaneum fuit, τῷ σωτῆρί τε καὶ τῷ Ὀλυμπίῳ Διί”: but there is no authority for this idea. Is Plato thinking of the πένταθλον, in which it was necessary to win in three (probably leaping, discusthrowing, javelin-throwing) out of the five events in order to obtain the prize (see P. Gardner in J. of H. Studies I p. 217, where the evidence is quoted)? Schneider takes this view: but the words τῶν πτωμάτων below make it clear that the reference is only to wrestling. The point manifestly is, that as in wrestling the third throw decided the contest between two athletes (Schol. on Aesch. Eum. 592 et al.), so here the δίκαιος wins after he has thrice defeated the ἄδικος (cf. also Euthyd. 277 C ). I think Ὀλυμπικῶς is intended to suggest that the contest between justice and injustice is the greatest of all moral, as the Olympic was of all physical, παλαίσματα: the victors ζήσουσι τοῦ μακαριστοῦ βίου δ\ν οἱ ὀλυμπιονῖκαι ζῶσι μακαριώτερον (V 465 D note). Compare Phaedr. 256 B τῶν τριῶν παλαισμάτων τῶν ὡς ἀληθῶς Ὀλυμπιακῶν ἓν νενικήκασιν. Plato adds the epithet τῷ Ὀλυμπίῳ de suo: in an Olympic contest Zeus Soter is also in the truest sense Olympian too, although in banquets Zeus Olympius received only the first, and not also the third libation. With similar and even greater emphasis on the word Ὀλυμπίῳ Pindar prays for an Olympic victory for Phylacidas in the words εἴη δὲ τρίτον | σωτῆρι πορσαίνοντας Ὀλυμπίῳ Αἴγιναν κάτα | σπένδειν μελιφθόγγοις ἀοιδαῖς ( Isthm. l.c.: see Donaldson ad loc.).

οὐδὲ παναληθὴς ‐‐ καθαρά . In what sense is pleasure said by Plato to be pure and true? It is pure when unadulterated by pain, whether antecedent, present or consequent; and there is also perhaps in Plato's use of the epithet ‘pure’ a relic or hint of the old half ceremonial, half-religious idea of ‘pure from taint’: see App. III and Rohde Psyche^{2} II pp. 281 ff. al. But in its deepest signification the truth or purity of Pleasure involves the ontological theory that soul and its sustenance (knowledge etc.) have more part in Being and Truth than Body and its food: the spiritual and not the material is the true. See also on 586 E and especially Nettleship Lect. and Rem. II pp. 322—327, where the farther bearings of Plato's theory are admirably traced.

πλὴν τῆς τοῦ φρονίμου . Cf. Phaed. 69 B , C.

ἐσκιαγραφημένη . See on II 365 C. Bodily pleasure is ἐσκιαγραφημένη in the fullest sense of the word, because it depends on contrast and balance of pleasure with pleasure, and pleasure with pain (584 A), just as perspective produces its effect by the contrast of light and shade (586 B). Similarly in Phaed. 69 B Plato hints that the so-called virtue which consists in bartering one bodily pleasure for another is σκιαγραφία τις—καὶ οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς οὐδ’ ἀληθὲς ἔχουσα, and ib. 81 B the soul is said to be γεγοητευμένη ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ (sc. τοῦ σώματος) ὑπό τε τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ ἡδονῶν. Cf. also Phil. 44 C αὐτὸ τοῦτο αὐτῆς (sc. τῆς ἡδονῆς) ἐπαγωγὸν γοήτευμα, ἀλλ’ οὐχ ἡδονὴν εἶναι. In each of these passages there is probably a conscious reminiscence of Orphic doctrines: see next note and App. IV.

τῶν σοφῶν alludes, I believe, to Orphic or Pythagorean ascetics, who preached the doctrine σῶμα σῆμα and regarded bodily pleasure as essentially false and impure: see especially Rohde Psyche^{2} II pp. 121—130, and 161—166. Evidence for this view is given in App. IV, where the other interpretations are also discussed.

καίτοι is hardly ‘et vero’ ‘and surely’ (as Kugler takes it de part. τοί etc. p. 18, comparing Gorg. 452 E , Theaet. 187 C al.), but rather ‘quamquam’ ‘and yet’ (sc. ‘strong as were the other two proofs,’ or the like): “und das wäre doch wohl” Schneider.

τὸ μήτε χαίρειν κτλ. This τρίτη διάθεσις is described in Phil. 32 E ff.: cf. ib. 42 E ff. and Tim. 64 C ff.

μεταξὺ κτλ. : ‘something which is intermediate between these two, a sort of repose of the soul so far as these are concerned.’ Herwerden is fain to cancel either μεταξύ or ἐν μέσῳ: but the fulness of expression is characteristic. See Introd. § 5.

ἡσυχίαν : whereas λύπη and ἡδονή are κινήσεις 583 E.

ἆρ’ οὐ . Three inferior MSS have ἆρ’ οὖν, which is easier; but ἆρ’ οὐ is much more lively, and not more abrupt than e.g. πολεμήσομεν τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο, ὦ Γλαύκων; II 373 E (quoted by Schneider). The stylistic effect is exactly like Lucretius' ‘Nonne vides’ etc.: e.g. II 263 al.

τοῦτο γὰρ κτλ. The argument is as follows. While suffering pain, men are apt to look upon the ἡσυχία from pain as the highest pleasure. Perhaps (suggests Glauco) at such a time the neutral state is in point of fact found positively pleasant and welcome by them. Socrates proceeds to shew (by a reductio ad absurdum proof) that Glauco's suggestion is untenable. ‘In that case,’ he argues, ‘ ἡσυχία from pleasure will in like manner be positively painful: and thus the neutral state, which we declared to be between the two extremes, will upon occasions be both, viz. both pleasure and pain.’ Glauco allows that that which is neither cannot become both, and Socrates proceeds: In this instance the ‘both’ is a κίνησις, and the ‘neither’ a ἡσυχία, and lies, as we have seen, between the two: so that it is wrong to identify the absence of pain with pleasure or the absence of pleasure with pain. Hence your suggestion is erroneous: οὐκ ἔστιν ἄρα τοῦτο, ἀλλὰ φαίνεται κτλ. See below on 584 A. The argument is really complete when Glauco says οὔ μοι δοκεῖ, but the words καὶ μὴν τό γε ἡδύ introduce a new reason for refusing to identify ἡσυχία with pleasure or with pain, by explicitly stating for the first time that pleasure and pain are each of them a κίνησις. ἡσυχία and κίνησις are mutually exclusive notions. Cf. Phil. 43 D —44 B, where the reasoning follows nearly the same lines. See also next note.

ἀμφότερα ‐‐ ἡδονή . Does Plato mean that the neutral state will sometimes be both painful and pleasant at one and the same time,—or only at one time painful and at another pleasant? According to Gorg. 497 C ff., in eating when hungry, drinking when thirsty etc., we cease from pain and pleasure simultaneously, so that in such a case the neutral state will appear to be both pleasant and painful. But the rest of the argument does not support this interpretation; and in the corresponding passage of the Philebus (43 D) we have τὸ δὲ μηδέτερα τούτων ἔσθ’ ἡμῖν ὅπως θάτερα γένοιτ’ ἄν. The simpler view should therefore be adopted.

κίνησις . In Pleasure the κίνησις is πλήρωσις, in pain, κένωσις, as is afterwards pointed out (585 A note).

οὐχὶ ‐‐ μέντοι κτλ. See I 339 B note It is safer to construe ὀρθῶς with ἡγεῖσθαι than with ἔστι (as D. and V. translate). Cf. Euthyph. 5 E ταῦτα ὀρθῶς ἂν εἴη οὕτω γιγνόμενα, where ὀρθῶς belongs to γιγνόμενα, or to a γιγνόμενα understood.

οὐκ ἔστιν κτλ. contradicts Glauco's suggestion τοῦτο γὰρ—ἡσυχία 583 D. There is no reality about this (as you suggest): it is only a φάντασμα—the neutral state appearing pleasant by the side of pain, being, in fact, a sort of σκιαγραφία, as we said in 583 B. On γοητεία see 583 B note

αἳ οὐκ ἐκ λυπῶν κτλ. are the so-called ‘pure’ pleasures of Phil. 51 B ff. τὰς περί τε τὰ καλὰ λεγόμενα χρώματα καὶ περὶ τὰ σχήματα καὶ τῶν ὀσμῶν τὰς πλείστας καὶ τὰς τῶν φθόγγων καὶ ὅσα τὰς ἐνδείας ἀναισθήτους ἔχοντα καὶ ἀλύπους τὰς πληρώσεις αἰσθητὰς καὶ ἡδείας, καθαρὰς λυπῶν, παραδίδωσιν. They are never preceded by pain, but may, according to the Philebus, be preceded by κένωσις and ἔνδεια, so long as these are imperceptible; and they are caused by πλήρωσις no less than the pleasures which are called impure, although the πλήρωσις in the case of the pure pleasures is ἀληθεστέρα: cf. 585 B and Tim. 65 A .

ἵνα μὴ πολλάκις κτλ. : ‘in case, perhaps, you should suppose in the present instance’ etc. (sc. as you did in the other 583 D). μὴ πολλάκις is ‘ne forte’ (IV 422 C note), and ἐν τῷ παρόντι refers to the example which Socrates is about to give. Glauco's ποῦ δή asks for an explanation of ἐν τῷ παρόντι, just as ποίας invites Socrates to specify the ἡδονὰς αἳ οὐκ ἐκ λυπῶν εἰσίν. The English translators are in error.

πολλαὶ μὲν κτλ. In spite of this passage and Phil. 51 B ff. Aristotle seems actually to insinuate that Plato made all pleasures conditional on release from pain: see Stewart on Eth. Nic. X 2. 1173^{b} 12 ff.

ὀσμάς . Has Heraclitus' curious fragment (38 Bywater) αἱ ψυχαὶ ὀσμῶνται καθ’ ᾅδην any bearing on this doctrine of the ‘purity’ of smell? If the soul, after it is ‘purified’ from the body by death, still retains this sense, presumably ὀσμὴ is (in Orphic language) ‘pure.’ It is possible enough that Plato's whole theory of ‘pure pleasures’ was suggested by some such early theological notion, though he afterwards developed it in his own way. See however Rohde Psyche^{2} II p. 152 note Aristotle also looks upon smell as a painless pleasure: see Eth. Nic. X 2. 1173^{b} 18 ff. et al.

αἵ γε ‐‐ ἡδοναὶ κτλ. The emphasis is on διὰ τοῦ σώματος. All pleasures belong of course to the soul ( Tim. 64 B ); but some come through the body, while others—the pleasures of knowledge, for example, according to Plato—do not (cf. Theaet. 184 E —185 E and generally Phil. 47 D ff.). Most of the former class—smell is an exception— and the greatest among them ( τἀφροδίσια Phil. 65 C ) are only λυπῶν ἀπαλλαγαί (cf. Phaedr. 258 E , Phil. 45 A —47 B and Arist. Eth. Nic. VII 13. 1153^{a} 33, 15. 1154^{a} 26 ff.), and so ‘mixed’ and unreal: compare the picture of the χαραδριοῦ βίος in Gorg. 494 B ff. The same is true of the purely spiritual pleasures and pains which come from the anticipation of these ‘mixed’ pleasures and pains. On the pleasures and pains of anticipation see Phil. 32 C ff.

προησθήσεις is a Platonic coinage not found elsewhere. The reading προαισθήσεις ( Ξ and Vind. B) held its ground till Bekker; but προησθήσεις had already been conjectured by Floyer Sydenham (Lupton in Cl. Rev. II p. 228).

προλυπήσεις : thus for example τὸ πρὸ τῶν λυπηρῶν (sc. ἐλπιζόμενον) is φοβερὸν καὶ ἀλγεινόν ( Phil. l. c.). If bodily pleasure is ‘mixed,’ the same must be true of bodily pain: and so the προλυπήσεις as well as the προησθήσεις of anticipation are ‘mixed’ ( κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔχουσιν). Fear for example (which is προσδοκία κακοῦ) is a ‘mixed’ pain: see Phil. 47 E .

νομίζεις κτλ. This is the popular conception of ‘above’ and ‘below’ held also by most of the philosophers, e.g. Heraclitus, the Pythagoreans, Anaxagoras, the Atomists (RP^{7}. §§ 29, 68 A, 124 B notes, 149 B notes), and even Aristotle ( Phys. IV 4. 212^{a} 24 ff.), and found also in the Phaedo (109 ff.). In the Timaeus, on the other hand, Plato takes a different and more scientific view: φύσει γὰρ δή τινας τόπους δύο εἶναι διειληφότας διχῇ τὸ πᾶν ἐναντίους τὸν μὲν κάτω,—τὸν δ)ἄνω— οὐκ ὀρθὸν οὐδαμῇ νομίζειν κτλ. (62 C ff.). It is possible (with Solomon Cl. Rev. III p. 418) to construe the divergence as “an incidental proof of the distance separating the Republic from the Timaeus,” especially as the myth in Book X agrees with the view of Above and Below given here: but too much stress should not be laid on the present passage, which is intended only as an illustration and nothing more.

οἴει οὖν ἄν τινα κτλ. Cf. Phaed. 109 C .

εἰ καὶ κτλ. : ‘if men also who are ignorant of truth’ etc. καί sc. like ὁ μὴ ἔμπειρος τοῦ ἀληθινῶς ἄνω τε ὄντος κτλ. in our simile. Three deterioris notae MSS have εἰ καὶ οἱ ἄπειροι, and Hermann conjectures οἱ for καί: but cf. the use of εἰ καί in X 597 A. The article is not necessary, and ought not to be introduced without better MS authority.