Plato Republic 9.584

οὐχὶ ‐‐ μέντοι κτλ. See I 339 B note It is safer to construe ὀρθῶς with ἡγεῖσθαι than with ἔστι (as D. and V. translate). Cf. Euthyph. 5 E ταῦτα ὀρθῶς ἂν εἴη οὕτω γιγνόμενα, where ὀρθῶς belongs to γιγνόμενα, or to a γιγνόμενα understood.

οὐκ ἔστιν κτλ. contradicts Glauco's suggestion τοῦτο γὰρ—ἡσυχία 583 D. There is no reality about this (as you suggest): it is only a φάντασμα—the neutral state appearing pleasant by the side of pain, being, in fact, a sort of σκιαγραφία, as we said in 583 B. On γοητεία see 583 B note

αἳ οὐκ ἐκ λυπῶν κτλ. are the so-called ‘pure’ pleasures of Phil. 51 B ff. τὰς περί τε τὰ καλὰ λεγόμενα χρώματα καὶ περὶ τὰ σχήματα καὶ τῶν ὀσμῶν τὰς πλείστας καὶ τὰς τῶν φθόγγων καὶ ὅσα τὰς ἐνδείας ἀναισθήτους ἔχοντα καὶ ἀλύπους τὰς πληρώσεις αἰσθητὰς καὶ ἡδείας, καθαρὰς λυπῶν, παραδίδωσιν. They are never preceded by pain, but may, according to the Philebus, be preceded by κένωσις and ἔνδεια, so long as these are imperceptible; and they are caused by πλήρωσις no less than the pleasures which are called impure, although the πλήρωσις in the case of the pure pleasures is ἀληθεστέρα: cf. 585 B and Tim. 65 A .

ἵνα μὴ πολλάκις κτλ. : ‘in case, perhaps, you should suppose in the present instance’ etc. (sc. as you did in the other 583 D). μὴ πολλάκις is ‘ne forte’ (IV 422 C note), and ἐν τῷ παρόντι refers to the example which Socrates is about to give. Glauco's ποῦ δή asks for an explanation of ἐν τῷ παρόντι, just as ποίας invites Socrates to specify the ἡδονὰς αἳ οὐκ ἐκ λυπῶν εἰσίν. The English translators are in error.

πολλαὶ μὲν κτλ. In spite of this passage and Phil. 51 B ff. Aristotle seems actually to insinuate that Plato made all pleasures conditional on release from pain: see Stewart on Eth. Nic. X 2. 1173^{b} 12 ff.

ὀσμάς . Has Heraclitus' curious fragment (38 Bywater) αἱ ψυχαὶ ὀσμῶνται καθ’ ᾅδην any bearing on this doctrine of the ‘purity’ of smell? If the soul, after it is ‘purified’ from the body by death, still retains this sense, presumably ὀσμὴ is (in Orphic language) ‘pure.’ It is possible enough that Plato's whole theory of ‘pure pleasures’ was suggested by some such early theological notion, though he afterwards developed it in his own way. See however Rohde Psyche^{2} II p. 152 note Aristotle also looks upon smell as a painless pleasure: see Eth. Nic. X 2. 1173^{b} 18 ff. et al.

αἵ γε ‐‐ ἡδοναὶ κτλ. The emphasis is on διὰ τοῦ σώματος. All pleasures belong of course to the soul ( Tim. 64 B ); but some come through the body, while others—the pleasures of knowledge, for example, according to Plato—do not (cf. Theaet. 184 E —185 E and generally Phil. 47 D ff.). Most of the former class—smell is an exception— and the greatest among them ( τἀφροδίσια Phil. 65 C ) are only λυπῶν ἀπαλλαγαί (cf. Phaedr. 258 E , Phil. 45 A —47 B and Arist. Eth. Nic. VII 13. 1153^{a} 33, 15. 1154^{a} 26 ff.), and so ‘mixed’ and unreal: compare the picture of the χαραδριοῦ βίος in Gorg. 494 B ff. The same is true of the purely spiritual pleasures and pains which come from the anticipation of these ‘mixed’ pleasures and pains. On the pleasures and pains of anticipation see Phil. 32 C ff.

προησθήσεις is a Platonic coinage not found elsewhere. The reading προαισθήσεις ( Ξ and Vind. B) held its ground till Bekker; but προησθήσεις had already been conjectured by Floyer Sydenham (Lupton in Cl. Rev. II p. 228).

προλυπήσεις : thus for example τὸ πρὸ τῶν λυπηρῶν (sc. ἐλπιζόμενον) is φοβερὸν καὶ ἀλγεινόν ( Phil. l. c.). If bodily pleasure is ‘mixed,’ the same must be true of bodily pain: and so the προλυπήσεις as well as the προησθήσεις of anticipation are ‘mixed’ ( κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔχουσιν). Fear for example (which is προσδοκία κακοῦ) is a ‘mixed’ pain: see Phil. 47 E .

νομίζεις κτλ. This is the popular conception of ‘above’ and ‘below’ held also by most of the philosophers, e.g. Heraclitus, the Pythagoreans, Anaxagoras, the Atomists (RP^{7}. §§ 29, 68 A, 124 B notes, 149 B notes), and even Aristotle ( Phys. IV 4. 212^{a} 24 ff.), and found also in the Phaedo (109 ff.). In the Timaeus, on the other hand, Plato takes a different and more scientific view: φύσει γὰρ δή τινας τόπους δύο εἶναι διειληφότας διχῇ τὸ πᾶν ἐναντίους τὸν μὲν κάτω,—τὸν δ)ἄνω— οὐκ ὀρθὸν οὐδαμῇ νομίζειν κτλ. (62 C ff.). It is possible (with Solomon Cl. Rev. III p. 418) to construe the divergence as “an incidental proof of the distance separating the Republic from the Timaeus,” especially as the myth in Book X agrees with the view of Above and Below given here: but too much stress should not be laid on the present passage, which is intended only as an illustration and nothing more.

οἴει οὖν ἄν τινα κτλ. Cf. Phaed. 109 C .

εἰ καὶ κτλ. : ‘if men also who are ignorant of truth’ etc. καί sc. like ὁ μὴ ἔμπειρος τοῦ ἀληθινῶς ἄνω τε ὄντος κτλ. in our simile. Three deterioris notae MSS have εἰ καὶ οἱ ἄπειροι, and Hermann conjectures οἱ for καί: but cf. the use of εἰ καί in X 597 A. The article is not necessary, and ought not to be introduced without better MS authority.