Plato, Republic, ed. John Burnet, 9.582

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[582]
ὅτε δὴ οὖν, εἶπον, ἀμφισβητοῦνται ἑκάστου τοῦ εἴδους αἱ ἡδοναὶ καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ βίος, μὴ ὅτι πρὸς τὸ κάλλιον καὶ αἴσχιον ζῆν μηδὲ τὸ χεῖρον καὶ ἄμεινον, ἀλλὰ πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ 582a ἥδιον καὶ ἀλυπότερον, πῶς ἂν εἰδεῖμεν τίς αὐτῶν ἀληθέστατα λέγει;
οὐ πάνυ, ἔφη, ἔγωγε ἔχω εἰπεῖν.
ἀλλʼ ὧδε σκόπει· τίνι χρὴ κρίνεσθαι τὰ μέλλοντα καλῶς κριθήσεσθαι; ἆρʼ οὐκ ἐμπειρίᾳ τε καὶ φρονήσει καὶ λόγῳ; ἢ τούτων ἔχοι ἄν τις βέλτιον κριτήριον;
καὶ πῶς ἄν; ἔφη.
σκόπει δή· τριῶν ὄντων τῶν ἀνδρῶν τίς ἐμπειρότατος πασῶν ὧν εἴπομεν ἡδονῶν; πότερον ὁ φιλοκερδής, μανθάνων αὐτὴν τὴν ἀλήθειαν οἷόν ἐστιν, ἐμπειρότερος δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι τῆς 582b ἀπὸ τοῦ εἰδέναι ἡδονῆς, ἢ ὁ φιλόσοφος τῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ κερδαίνειν;
πολύ, ἔφη, διαφέρει. τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἀνάγκη γεύεσθαι τῶν ἑτέρων ἐκ παιδὸς ἀρξαμένῳ· τῷ δὲ φιλοκερδεῖ, ὅπῃ πέφυκε τὰ ὄντα μανθάνοντι, τῆς ἡδονῆς ταύτης, ὡς γλυκεῖά ἐστιν, οὐκ ἀνάγκη γεύεσθαι οὐδʼ ἐμπείρῳ γίγνεσθαι, μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ προθυμουμένῳ οὐ ῥᾴδιον.
πολὺ ἄρα, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, διαφέρει τοῦ γε φιλοκερδοῦς ὁ φιλόσοφος ἐμπειρίᾳ ἀμφοτέρων τῶν ἡδονῶν. 582c
πολὺ μέντοι.
τί δὲ τοῦ φιλοτίμου; ἆρα μᾶλλον ἄπειρός ἐστι τῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ τιμᾶσθαι ἡδονῆς ἢ ἐκεῖνος τῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ φρονεῖν;
ἀλλὰ τιμὴ μέν, ἔφη, ἐάνπερ ἐξεργάζωνται ἐπὶ ὃ ἕκαστος ὥρμηκε, πᾶσιν αὐτοῖς ἕπεται—καὶ γὰρ ὁ πλούσιος ὑπὸ πολλῶν τιμᾶται καὶ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος καὶ σοφός—ὥστε ἀπό γε τοῦ τιμᾶσθαι, οἷόν ἐστιν, πάντες τῆς ἡδονῆς ἔμπειροι· τῆς δὲ τοῦ ὄντος θέας, οἵαν ἡδονὴν ἔχει, ἀδύνατον ἄλλῳ γεγεῦσθαι πλὴν τῷ φιλοσόφῳ. 582d
ἐμπειρίας μὲν ἄρα, εἶπον, ἕνεκα κάλλιστα τῶν ἀνδρῶν κρίνει οὗτος.
πολύ γε.
καὶ μὴν μετά γε φρονήσεως μόνος ἔμπειρος γεγονὼς ἔσται.
τί μήν;
ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ διʼ οὗ γε δεῖ ὀργάνου κρίνεσθαι, οὐ τοῦ φιλοκερδοῦς τοῦτο ὄργανον οὐδὲ τοῦ φιλοτίμου, ἀλλὰ τοῦ φιλοσόφου.
τὸ ποῖον;
διὰ λόγων που ἔφαμεν δεῖν κρίνεσθαι. ἦ γάρ;
ναί.
λόγοι δὲ τούτου μάλιστα ὄργανον.
πῶς δʼ οὔ;
οὐκοῦν εἰ μὲν πλούτῳ καὶ κέρδει ἄριστα ἐκρίνετο τὰ 582e κρινόμενα, ἃ ἐπῄνει ὁ φιλοκερδὴς καὶ ἔψεγεν, ἀνάγκη ἂν ἦν ταῦτα ἀληθέστατα εἶναι.
πολλή γε.
εἰ δὲ τιμῇ τε καὶ νίκῃ καὶ ἀνδρείᾳ, ἆρʼ οὐχ ἃ ὁ φιλότιμός τε καὶ φιλόνικος;
δῆλον.
ἐπειδὴ δʼ ἐμπειρίᾳ καὶ φρονήσει καὶ λόγῳ;
ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, ἃ ὁ φιλόσοφός τε καὶ ὁ φιλόλογος ἐπαινεῖ, ἀληθέστατα εἶναι.

Republic. Plato. ed. John Burnet. Oxford. 1905.

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Current edition Perseus

Πολιτεία (Greek) (Platonis Opera Tomus IV: Tetralogia VIII. Burnet, John, editor. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1905.)

Translations (1)

Republic Perseus (Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vol. 5-6. Shorey, Paul, translator. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1935-37 (printing).) — 9.582 focus

[582] We may be sure of that, he said.
Since, then, there is contention between the several types of pleasure and the lives themselves, not merely as to which is the more honorable or the more base, or the worse or the better, but which is actually the more pleasurable¹ or free from pain, 582a how could we determine which of them speaks most truly? In faith, I cannot tell, he said. Well, consider it thus: By what are things to be judged, if they are to be judged² rightly? Is it not by experience, intelligence and discussion³? Or could anyone name a better criterion than these? How could he? he said. Observe, then. Of our three types of men, which has had the most experience of all the pleasures we mentioned? Do you think that the lover of gain by study of the very nature of truth has more experience 582b of the pleasure that knowledge yields than the philosopher has of that which results from gain? There is a vast difference, he said; for the one, the philosopher, must needs taste of the other two kinds of pleasure from childhood; but the lover of gain is not only under no necessity of tasting or experiencing the sweetness of the pleasure of learning the true natures of things,⁴ but he cannot easily do so even if he desires and is eager for it. The lover of wisdom, then, said I, far surpasses the lover of gain in experience of both kinds of pleasure. 582c Yes, far. And how does he compare with the lover of honor? Is he more unacquainted with the pleasure of being honored than that other with that which comes from knowledge? Nay, honor, he said, if they achieve their several objects, attends them all; for the rich man is honored by many and the brave man and the wise, so that all are acquainted with the kind of pleasure that honor brings; but it is impossible for anyone except the lover of wisdom to have savored the delight that the contemplation of true being and reality brings. 582d Then, said I, so far as experience goes, he is the best judge of the three. By far. And again, he is the only one whose experience will have been accompanied⁵ by intelligence. Surely. And yet again, that which is the instrument, or ὄργανον, of judgement⁶ is the instrument, not of the lover of gain or of the lover of honor, but of the lover of wisdom. What is that? It was by means of words and discussion⁷ that we said the judgement must be reached; was it not? Yes. And they are the instrument mainly of the philosopher. Of course. Now if wealth and profit were the best criteria by which things are judged, 582e the things praised and censured by the lover of gain would necessarily be truest and most real. Quite necessarily. And if honor, victory and courage, would it not be the things praised by the lover of honor and victory? Obviously. But since the tests are experience and wisdom and discussion, what follows? Of necessity, he said, that the things approved by the lover of wisdom and discussion are most valid and true.

Commentary

Commentary on Plato, Republic (Plato. The Republic, Vol 1-2. Adam, James, editor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1902-1903.) focus

τῶν ἑτέρων . “Glauco simul utrisque philosophum praefert experientia, quoniam Socrates quis omnium experientissimus esset voluptatum rogaverat” (viz. in 582 A τριῶν ὄντων κτλ.) Schneider. The English translators take τῶν ἑτέρων as ‘the other’ (Jowett), viz. ‘gain’; but that would be τοῦ ἑτέρου.

τί δὲ τοῦ φιλοτίμου ; ‘and how does he stand in relation to the lover of honour?’ Supply διαφέρει ὁ φιλόσοφος, or rather a more general idea of comparison out of διαφέρει: cf. 585 D and X 597 D. We must beware of translating ‘but what of the lover of honour?’ (D. and V.), as if τοῦ φιλοτίμου were here equivalent to περὶ τοῦ φιλοτίμου (V 470 A note). This error caused Groen v. Prinsterer ( Prosop. Pl. p. 210) to suggest ἆρα μᾶλλον ἔμπειρός ἐστι τῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ φρονεῖν ἡδονῆς, ἢ ἐκεῖνος τῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ τιμᾶσθαι; with which the translation of Davies and Vaughan also agrees. The subject of ἄπειρός ἐστι is of course ὁ φιλόσοφος, and ἐκεῖνος means ὁ φιλότιμος.

ὁ ἀνδρεῖος represents ὁ φιλότιμος: cf. ἀνδρείᾳ 582 E and πολεμικοῦ 583 A note

τοῦ ὄντος . The presence of such metaphysical terms in this and the succeeding proof is what chiefly encourages Pfleiderer ( Zur Lösung etc. pp. 74 ff.) and some others to maintain that §§ 580— 587 were written at a later period than the rest of this Book, most of which they believe to be earlier than V 471 C—VII inclusive. See also on 581 A. Others with much more reason find in these expressions a strong argument in defence of the structural unity of the Republic; for it would seem that τῆς τοῦ ὄντος θέας and the like presuppose the discussions of Book VII. See Zeller^{4} II p. 561 note

κρίνει . Bekker's conjecture κρινεῖ is unnecessary.

μετά γε φρονήσεως corresponds to φρονήσει in 582 A. Plato is taking the three requisites in order. The ἐμπειρία of the φιλόσοφος is alone intelligent, and, without φρόνησις, ἐμπειρία is no more than a sort of ἄτεχνος τριβή ( Phaedr. 260 E : cf. Gorg. 463 B ). It is indeed quite true, as Nettleship reminds us ( Lect. and Rem. II p. 322), that the higher kind of man learns more from the experience which he shares with the lower kind without having to go through nearly the same amount of it.

ἀλλὰ μὴν κτλ. Bosanquet observes that “this is perhaps a good argument to prove that the man of culture is preeminently competent to appraise the value of different ideals of life, but it is not a good argument to prove that he is a good judge of degrees of agreeable feeling in lives fundamentally different from his own” (similarly Nettleship l. c. p. 321). True; but that is not the point. Plato is attempting to prove that the φιλόσοφος is the best judge, not of ‘the degrees of agreeable feeling’ experienced, in one particular kind of life, but of the relative pleasure of three different kinds of life, and his reasoning, granted that pleasures can be compared at all, is perfectly legitimate. Each of the three men pronounces his own life not merely pleasant, but pleasanter than those of the other two: how then are we to decide? Nothing but argument will help us, and the φιλόσοφος is the only one of the triad who possesses that weapon. It should be observed that throughout this part of the discussion Plato takes it for granted that some kinds of pleasure are in point of fact more pleasant than others. At present his object is to discover what these are, but in the argument which is still to come (585 B ff.), he grapples with the metaphysical question—for to him it was a question, not of psychology, but of metaphysics—and attempts to shew that pleasures contain more or less of pleasure according as there is in them more or less of truth.

ἔφαμεν κτλ. The reference is to 582 A. λόγοι means ‘rational arguments,’ ‘reasoning’ (cf. VI 511 B note), and τούτου is of course τοῦ φιλοσόφου, not τοῦ κρίνειν, as Stallbaum thinks.

ἀληθέστατα here and in ἀληθέστατα εἶναι below contains a hint of the theory which is afterwards developed in 585 B ff., where the various kinds of pleasure are shewn to be different in respect of reality and truth.

φιλόνικος . See on 581 B.

ἀνάγκη, ἔφη κτλ. supplies the apodosis to ἐπειδὴ—λόγῳ: cf. supra 577 B note

Plato Republic 9.582

ed. John Burnet

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