εἰς ἓν κεφάλαιον κτλ.
Plato recognised three varieties in
τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν, corresponding respectively to the oligarchical, democratical, and tyrannical man (VIII 558 D note). In the present chapter these varieties again recede into the background. This apparent ‘Inconsequenz,’ together with other reasons, led Krohn to suppose that the whole of this proof, as well as the next, was written at a different time from the rest of Books VIII and IX (
Pl. St. pp. 221 ff. Cf. Pfleiderer
Zur Lösung etc. p. 75. Krohn has since retracted his view: see his
Pl. Fr. p. 104). But the unity of the
ἐπιθυμητικόν
as such has never been sacrificed, since each of its varieties are also expressions of desire; and Plato is therefore fully justified in setting it over against
φιλόσοφον and
θυμοειδές. To have compared each of its varieties separately with the two higher principles would have greatly lengthened and complicated Plato's proof; and he reserves this point for another mode of treatment at a later opportunity (587 C note). Why does he select the word
φιλοχρήματον (s.
φιλοκερδές) to denote the
ἐπιθυμητικόν here? He wishes to find a
single word to contrast with
φιλόσοφον and
φιλόνικον (s.
φιλότιμον). The word
ἐπιθυμητικόν itself is excluded, because we have agreed that the
φιλόσοφον and
φιλόνικον have also
ἐπιθυμίαι of their own (580 D), and, as
φιλοχρήματον made its appearance in each of the three forms of
ἐπιθυμία (VIII 551 A, 553 C, 555 A, 558 D, 561 A, 568 D, IX 572 C, 573 D), it is the best summary description available. Plato himself claims no more for it, and that is why he says
μάλιστα ἂν εἰς ἓν κεφάλαιον ἀπερειδοίμεθα. Cf. Grimmelt
de reip. Pl. comp. et unit. pp. 73 ff.
οὐ ‐‐ μέντοι
. See on I 339 B.
φιλόνικον
. For the spelling of this word see VIII 548 C note and my note on
Prot. 336 E
. The present passage and also 586 C, D below conclusively prove that Plato connected the word with
νίκη and not with
νεῖκος, from which indeed it could not be derived without doing violence to the laws of the Greek language (cf. Schanz Vol. VI p. x). Now Plato certainly did not write
νείκη, but
νίκη: and it is therefore highly improbable that he wrote
φιλόνεικος. φιλόνικος has also considerable support from the inferior MSS of the
Republic. The substitution of
ει for long
ι became extremely common in imperial times, especially in proper names derived from
νίκη (Meisterhans^{3} p. 49), and even
ἐνείκων and the like are also found on late inscriptions (e.g. CIG 1585). In the case of
φιλόνεικος the error was apparently established by Plutarch's time: see his
Ages. 5. 4. The meaning ‘lover of strife’ is often unsuitable in Plato; where it suits, it is secondary and derivative, for the lover of victory must also love strife:
non sine pulvere palma. For an exhaustive discussion of the question the student may be referred to Schmidt
Ethik d. alten Griechen I pp. 386—391. While admitting that ‘
φιλόνικος and its derivatives are far more frequent in Attic writers,’ Schmidt is inclined to admit the existence of
φιλόνεικος as a separate word, connected with
νείκη as a byeform—so he thinks—of
νεῖκος: but
νείκη, at least in classical Greek, is only a conjecture on Aeschylus
Ag. 1378 and
Eum. 903: and in Plato, at all events, there is, I believe, no case in which
φιλόνικος does not give the meaning required by the context.
ἥκιστα τούτων
: ‘less than any of them,’ lit. ‘least of these’ three
εἴδη of soul. There is no good reason for suspecting the text; for although strictly speaking the
φιλόσοφον can only care for
σοφία, the
φιλόσοφος, who presently (581 C ff.) takes the place of the
φιλόσοφον, is not wholly indifferent to either (582 B, C): he merely cares much less for them than the
φιλόνικος and
φιλοχρήματος do.
τούτων is necessary to bring out the contrast:
ἥκιστα alone, proposed by Baiter, or
ἥκιστα πάντων (W. H. Thompson) would express too much.
διὰ ταῦτα δὴ κτλ.
Cf. Arist.
Eth. Nic. I 3. 1095^{b} 17 ff.
τρεῖς
γάρ εἰσι μάλιστα οἱ προὔχοντες (sc.
βίοι),
ὅ τε νῦν εἰρημένος (i.e.
ὁ ἀπολαυστικὸς )
καὶ ὁ πολιτικὸς (i.e.
ὁ φιλότιμος here)
καὶ τρίτος ὁ θεωρητικός.
λέγομεν κτλ.
‘And for this reason we say that the primary classes of men are also three in number’ etc.?
λέγομεν (see cr. n.) is the reading of all MSS except
ΑΠ
q^{1}, and Schneider is right, I think, in retaining it, not only because these three
γένη have been named before (IV 435 E), but still more because the classification was apparently a familiar one: see Stewart on Arist. l.c. For the orthographical error see
Introd. § 5. I take
τριττά as predicative: the hyperbaton is not, I think, a difficult one, because the stress of the voice falls on
τριττά, and to my ear it sounds more idiomatic than
τὰ πρῶτα γένη τριττὰ εἶναι would be. A possible alternative would be to take
εἶναι with
φιλόσοφον κτλ. (‘that the three primary classes of men are lovers of wisdom’ etc.), but this is somewhat less natural and satisfactory, in view especially of
καὶ ἡδονῶν κτλ. The words
τὰ πρῶτα mean ‘the first’ or ‘original,’ as in Aristotle's
πρώτη ὕλη, the Stoic
πρῶται ἀρεταί and the like: it would be possible to subdivide each of these primary classes into
δεύτερα γένη, τρίτα γένη etc. It should be mentioned that Shorey (
A. J. Ph. VIII p. 364), reading
λέγωμεν, renders ‘we may begin by assuming,’ but it is harsh to separate
τὰ πρῶτα from
γένη, and the adverbial
τὰ πρῶτα generally, if not always, refers
back to something said or done ‘at the beginning.’
ὑποκείμενα
. The singular
ὑποκείμενον (see cr. n.), retained by Schneider and all other editors except Baiter, is questionable Greek. In such cases the adjective, participle, or verb agrees with the whole and not with the part.
ὑποκείμενα is little inferior to
ὑποκείμενον in authority and the corruption was easy. Cf. VIII 550 E note
τὸν ἑαυτοῦ κτλ.
Cf. Pind.
Frag. 215 B
ergk
ἄλλο δ’ ἄλλοισιν νόμισμα, σφετέραν δ’ αἰνεῖ δίκαν ἕκαστος and
Gorg. 484 E
ff.
ὅ γε
. See cr. n. Hermann's conjecture is, I now think, right. We may perhaps explain
τε as
ἀνακόλουθον (cf. II 373 B note) and taken up in
τί δὲ ὁ φιλότιμος; κτλ., but
γε is much livelier and better: ‘the money-maker, at all events’ etc. Cf. VIII 556 A note If
γε is right, we should not, as Hermann does, make the sentence interrogative.
ἀργύριον ποιεῖ
: ‘produces money.’
ποριεῖ (Badham) is a neat conjecture; but the text is sound: cf.
χρήματα ποιεῖν Arist.
Pol. A 9. 1258^{a} 11.
καπνὸν καὶ φλυαρίαν
. This contemptuous, half-proverbial, use of
καπνὸς is illustrated by Blaydes on
Ar.
Clouds 320
.
τὸν δὲ φιλόσοφον κτλ.
‘But the lover of knowledge, said I, what value shall we suppose that he assigns to the other pleasures compared with that of knowing how the truth stands and always enjoying a kindred sort of pleasure while he learns? Will he not think them very far away?’ (viz. from
ἡ τοῦ εἰδέναι
κτλ.). The
χρηματιστικός considers the pleasures of honour and learning
οὐδενὸς ἀξίας, compared with his own; the
φιλότιμος similarly,
mutatis mutandis; what then does the
φιλόσοφος consider
his pleasures to be compared with the others? What are his pleasures? Let us see. He either
knows (i.e. has learnt) the truth in any given instance or is getting to know (i.e. is
learning) it; his pleasures are therefore that of knowing and that of learning, i.e.
τοιοῦτόν τι τῆς ἡδονῆς, for the pleasures of learning are akin to those of knowing. From each of these pleasures those of gain and fame are far removed. With the general sense, cf.
Phaed. 64 D
: for the use of
ἐν IV 429 C, D: for
τοιούτῳ τινὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς
Xen.
An. I 7. 5
ἐν τοιούτῳ εἷναι τοῦ κινδύνου προσιόντος: and for the position of
τῆς ἡδονῆς Braun
de hyperb. Pl. II p. 4, where many examples of similar hyperbata are quoted. The MSS read
ποιώμεθα (see cr. n.), but Graser's emendation is in my opinion certainly right. I have taken
τῆς ἡδονῆς with
τοιούτῳ τινί: others wrongly, as I believe, join it to
οὐ πάνυ πόρρω. See on the whole passage App. III.
οὐ πάνυ πόρρω
: sc.
οἰώμεθα νομίζειν; as before.
ἀναγκαίας
:
necessarias, quippe ceteris nihil indigentem nisi
necessitas cogeret (after Stallbaum). Hence
τῷ ὄντι: see on VI 511 B.
δεῖ εἰδέναι
: we should not
suppose (
οἴεσθαι), but be sure of it. Badham's conjecture
διείλου (
ad Euthyd. p. 98) is wholly needless and inept.
ἀμφισβητοῦνται
: ‘are in dispute’ (Jowett). For this somewhat irregular use of the passive cf. Cope's
Rhetoric of Aristotle I p. 299. It is tempting to make the verb middle (‘dispute with one another’), as in
Laws 957 D, and suppose that the pleasures are personified, as the two lives are in Prodicus' apologue of Heracles at the cross-roads (
Xen.
Mem. II 1. 21
ff.).
αὐτῶν in
τίς αὐτῶν will then mean
τῶν ηδονῶν, and not
τῶν ἀνδρῶν. But on such a theory, instead of
αὐτὸς ὁ βίος, we should rather have had
αὐτοὶ οἱ βίοι: and on the whole it is doubtless better to acquiesce in the ordinary interpretation, which is also more in harmony with
τριῶν ὄντων τῶν ἀνδρῶν κτλ. below.
