τὸ πρότερον κτλ.
The reference is to VIII 567 and supra 576 A, B.
ἢ πρότερον might of course have been spared, and Herwerden
more suo cuts it out; but the sentence gains in weight by the addition.
νῦν ἤδη
(‘nunc demum’) is fully illustrated by Jecht
de usu part.
ἤδη
in Pl. dialog. pp. 44 f.
ὥσπερ ὁ διὰ πάντων κτλ.
The comparison is borrowed from the Athenian method of judging in musical or dramatic competitions. According to Petersen, who in his Dorpat program
über die Preisrichter der Grossen Dionysien zu Athen (1878) has carefully investigated the whole subject, the mode of procedure was as follows. Some time before the festival a number of qualified persons were selected by the
βουλευταί in cooperation with the
χορηγοί, and their names deposited in 10 urns, one for each
φυλή. On the day of the contest, one name was drawn from each urn, and the ten judges thereby constituted, after witnessing the performance, each wrote down in his
γραμματεῖον the order in which he arranged the several competitors. Of these ten judges five were next selected by lot, and the final verdict was given in accordance with the votes already registered by these five. The most important piece of evidence in support of this theory is furnished by Lysias 4. 3
ἐβουλόμην δ) ἂν μὴ ἀπολαχεῖν αὐτὸν κριτὴν Διονυσίοις, <*>ν) ὑμῖν φανερὸς ἐγένετο ἐμοὶ διηλλαγμένος, κρίνας τὴν ἐμὴν φυλὴν νικᾶν· νῦν δὲ ἔγραψε μὲν ταῦτα εἰς τὸ γραμματεῖον, ἀπέλαχε δέ. In none of the ancient authorities, which are fully cited by Petersen, do we find the expression
ὁ διὰ πάντων κριτής: but Petersen thinks the phrase may perhaps denote any one of the surviving five,
who had lasted through all the stages, having been originally chosen by the Senate, and afterwards by lot on the two remaining opportunities. The singular number, according to Petersen, is generic, as in
Laws 659 A, B and elsewhere. It is true of course that the matter could not always be brought to an immediate issue in this way; for, to take a single instance, in a case where there were, let us say, three competitors, the votes of the five judges might result in a tie between two competitors for each of the three prizes. Thus we might have:
πέντε ὄντας
: viz. in all.
εἰσῆλθον κτλ.
“in scenam ingressi sunt” (Stallbaum). In dramatic and musical contests the victor's name was publicly proclaimed by a herald (see Müller l. c. p. 372 note 2): hence
μισθωσώμεθα κτλ. pursues the comparison introduced by
ὥσπερ ὁ διὰ πάντων κτλ. Cf. also
Phil. 66 A
πάντῃ δὴ φήσεις—ὑπό τε ἀγγέλων πέμπων καὶ παροῦσι φράζων ὡς ἡδονὴ κτῆμα οὐκ ἔστι πρῶτον κτλ. (the result arrived at in the dialogue). For the verbal play in
Ἀρίστωνος—τὸν ἄριστον cf. II 368 A note
ἐάν τε λανθάνωσιν κτλ.
is said with reference to the challenge in II 367 E.
εἶεν δὴ κτλ.
After the political follows the psychological argument: see 577 C note
δὲ ἰδέ
. My correction of
δεῖ δέ (the reading of the best MSS: see cr. n.) has been generally accepted. The reading
δὲ δεῖ is intrinsically unsatisfactory, and can only be an attempt to ‘emend’
δεῖ δέ. See
Cl. Rev. XI p. 349.
δέξεται κτλ.
: ‘it will admit also of another demonstration.’ The subject is simply ‘our thesis,’ as stated just before in the conclusion of the first argument (580 C). Cf. (with Stallbaum) V 453 D
οὐ γὰρ εὐκόλῳ ἔοικεν and
Phaed. 69 E
τοῖς δὲ πολλοῖς ἀπιστίαν παρέχει (unjustly bracketed by Schanz), where the subject similarly ‘latet in antegressis.’ Idiomatic expressions like
δηλώσει (VI 497 C note),
δείξει etc. belong to a somewhat different category. It is impossible to extract any satisfactory sense out of the passage if (with Schneider alone of all the editors) we retain
τὸ λογιστικόν (see cr. n.) or
λογιστικόν, the latter of which occurs before
δέξεται in many MSS. The Oxford editors, with much probability, suggest that
λογιστικόν is the relic of some such gloss on
τριχῇ as we actually find in Par. K, viz.
λογιστικον. ἐπιθυμητικὸν θυμικον (
sic).
ἡδοναὶ κτλ.
Hitherto in the
Republic the words Pleasure and Desire have, with few exceptions (e.g. I 328 D, VI 485 D, VIII 554 E al.), had an evil, or at least unmoral, connotation. The view now put forward, viz. that each ‘part’ of soul has its own pleasures and desires differing in point of virtue and vice (cf. VI 505 C) like the ‘parts’ to which they belong, is related not only to the theory of the
Philebus but also to the Aristotelian analysis of pleasure in
Eth. Nic. X cc. 3—5.
ἰδία
. Paris A has
ἰδίᾳ—see cr. n.— “multo minus concinne” (Schneider). Cf.
ἰδίῳ αὐτοῦ infra E.
ἀρχαὶ κτλ.
Any one of the three may hold rule in the soul. The reference in
ἦν is to IV 436 A ff.
ὃ μέγιστον κτλ.
: viz.
ἐπιθυμία. The words
τούτῳ ἐπωνομάσαμεν mean ‘we gave the name of
ἐπιθυμία to this part,’ when we called it
ἐπιθυμητικόν (
ἐπιθυμητικὸν γὰρ κτλ.). Cf. (with Stallbaum)
Theaet. 185 C
ᾧ τὸ ἔστιν ἐπονομάζεις,
Crat. 420 B
and elsewhere. J. and C. wrongly understand
τούτῳ as instrumental. The variant
τοῦτο has little authority and is much inferior: still worse is
τούτου which Madvig (
Adv. Cr. I p. 431) ‘suspicatur fuisse.’
ἐπιθυμητικὸν κτλ.
IV 439 D. The lowest part of soul was called
φιλοχρήματον in IV 436 E et al.: see next note.