[1] And Hippocrates himself, with the forces of the city, was ready when time should serve to march; but sent Demosthenes before with forty galleys to Naupactus, to the end that he should levy an army of Acarnanians and other their confederates in these quarters, and sail to Siphae to receive it by treason. And a day was set down betwixt them on which these things should have been done together.

[2] Demosthenes, when he arrived and found the Oeniades by compulsion of the rest of Acarnania entered into the Athenian confederation and had himself raised all the confederates thereabouts, made war first upon Salynthius and the Agraeans, and having taken in other places thereabouts, stood ready, when the time should require, to go to Siphae.

[1] Such was the plot in contemplation. Hippocrates with a force raised at home awaited the proper moment to take the field against the Boeotians; while he sent on Demosthenes with the forty ships above mentioned to Naupactus , to raise in those parts an army of Acarnanians and of the other allies, and sail and receive Siphae from the conspirators; a day having been agreed on for the simultaneous execution of both these operations.

[2] Demosthenes on his arrival found Oeniadae already compelled by the united Acarnanians to join the Athenian confederacy, and himself raising all the allies in those countries marched against and subdued Salynthius and the Agraeans; after which he devoted himself to the preparations necessary to enable him to be at Siphae by the time appointed.

[1] Such was the plot which was then under way. It was the purpose of Hippocrates, when the proper moment should arrive, to take troops from Athens and in person make an expedition into Boeotia; meanwhile he was sending Demosthenes in advance with a fleet of forty ships to Naupactus, in order that he should first collect in this region an army of Acarnanians and of other allies of Athens and then sail to Siphae, in expectation of its being betrayed; and a day was agreed upon between the two generals for doing these two things simultaneously.

[2] Upon his arrival at Naupactus, Demosthenes found that Oeniadae had already been forced by all the rest of the Acarnanians to join the Athenian alliance; he himself then raised all the allied forces in that district, and after first making an expedition against Salynthius and the Agraeans ¹ and securing these, proceeded with his other preparations so as to be present at Siphae when needed.

[1] Now Hippocrates himself, with a force raised at home, was ready, when the time came, to take the field against the Boeotians; but Demosthenes he sent on before, with the forty ships mentioned, to Naupactus; that after raising in those quarters an army of Acamanians and the other allies, he might sail to Siphae, in expectation of its being betrayed to him: and the day had been fixed between them on which they were simultaneously to carry out these plans.

[2] Accordingly, Demosthenes went to Naupactus, and finding $Aeniadae compelled by all the Acarnanians to join the Athenian confederacy, and having himself raised all the allies on that side, and marched first against Salynthius and the Agraeans, and reduced them to subjection, he proceeded to make his other preparations for going at the proper time to Siphae.

[1] Hippocrates autem cum urbanis copiis, quum tempus opportunum afforet, ipse quidem bellum Boeotis illaturus erat, Demosthenem vero cum quadraginta navibus Naupactum praemiserat, ut coacto ex illis locis exercitu Acarnanum et ceterorum sociorum ad Siphas navigaret, quippe proditione eas capturus; dies autem inter eos con-stiluta erat, qua haec confici oportebat.

[2] Demosthenes autem quum eo pervenisset, et (Eniadas ab universis Acarnanibus in Atheniensium societatem adactos reppe* risset et ipse omnia sociorum, qui in illa regione erant, auxilia evocasset, adversus Salynthium et Agraeos primum cum exercitu profectus, ceterisque rebus in suam potestatem redactis, sese praeparabat, ut, quando opus esset, ad Siphas occurreret.

[1] Akanthier! Die Absicht Spartas bei Aussendung meines Heeres ist keine andere, als den Zweck unseres Krieges mit Athen, als welchen wir in der Kriegserklärung die Befreiung Griechenlands angekündigt, zur Wirklichkeit zu machen. An unserm späten Erscheinen aber ist die durch die bisherigen Feldzüge getäuschte Hoffnung schuld, euch den Kampf zu ersparen und in kurzer Zeit allein mit Athen fertig zu werden; und es kann uns dasselbe um so weniger zum Vorwurf gemacht werden, da wir jetzt die erste Gelegenheit ergreifen, hieher zu kommen und auch euch zur Theilnahme an dem Vernichtungskampfe einzuladen. Um so mehr befremdet es mich, aus dem Sperren der Thore auf eine unfreundliche Stimmung bei euch schliessen zu müssen. In dem guten Glauben, in euch längst, vor unserer Ankunft schon, entschiedene Bundesgenossen zu finden, denen wir nur willkommen sein würden, haben wir Lacedämonier die Gefahr nicht angesehen, die mit einem so weiten Marsch durch fremdes Gebiet verbunden war, und jedes mögliche Opfer gebracht, — und wie, ihr solltet ganz andere Gesinnungen hegen, solltet eurer eigenen und aller Griechen Befreiung euch widersetzen wollen? Denn nicht allein, dass ihr zu dem Feinde stehet, es müsste auch alle folgenden Städte zurückhaltend und besorgt machen, wenn gleich anfangs eine so ansehnliche und einflussreiche Stadt wie die eurige mich abwiese. Der Glaube an meine Sendung wäre dahin ² , man argwohnte nur Böses in der Freiheit, die ich bringe ³ , oder sähe in meinem Heere einen zu schwachen und nichtssagenden Schutz gegen Athens drohende Rache. Zwar es war dasselbe Heer, mit dem ich vor Nisäa zog, wo die Athener trotz ihrer Uebermacht keinen Angriff wagten, und ein so zahlreiches Heer wie das nisäische würden sie ohnehin in keinem Fall gegen euch über's Meer schicken. ⁴