[1] As they sailed by the coast of Laconia and had intelligence that the Peloponnesian fleet was at Corcyra already, Eurymedon and Sophocles hasted to Corcyra; but Demosthenes willed them to put in first at Pylus, and when they had done what was requisite there, then to proceed in their voyage. But whilst they denied to do it, the fleet was driven into Pylus by a tempest that then arose by chance.

[2] And presently Demosthenes required them to fortify the place, alleging that he came with them for no other purpose, and showing how there was great store of timber and stone and that the place itself was naturally strong and desert, both it and a great deal of the country about. For it lieth from Sparta about four hundred furlongs in the territory that, belonging once to the Messenians, is called by the Lacedaemonians Coryphasion.

[3] But they answered him that there were many desert promontories in Peloponnesus, if they were minded to put the city to charges in taking them in. But there appeared unto Demosthenes a great difference between this place and other places, because there was here a haven, and the Messenians, the ancient inhabitants thereof, speaking the same language the Lacedaemonians did, would both be able to annoy them much by excursions thence and be also faithful guardians of the place.

[1] Off Laconia they heard that the Peloponnesian ships were already at Corcyra , upon which Eurymedon and Sophocles wished to hasten to the island, but Demosthenes required them first to touch at Pylos and do what was wanted there, before continuing their voyage. While they were making objections, a squall chanced to come on and carried the fleet into Pylos .

[2] Demosthenes at once urged them to fortify the place, it being for this that he had come on the voyage, and made them observe there was plenty of stone and timber on the spot, and that the place was strong by nature, and together with much of the country round unoccupied; Pylos , or Coryphasium, as the Lacedaemonians call it, being about forty-five miles distant from Sparta , and situated in the old country of the Messenians.

[3] The commanders told him that there was no lack of desert headlands in Peloponnese if he wished to put the city to expense by occupying them. He, however, thought that this place was distinguished from others of the kind by having a harbour close by; while the Messenians, the old natives of the country, speaking the same dialect as the Lacedaemonians, could do them the greatest mischief by their incursions from it, and would at the same time be a trusty garrison.

[1] Now when the Athenians arrived off the coast of Laconia and learned that the Peloponnesian fleet was already at Corcyra, Eurymedon and Sophocles were for pressing on to Corcyra, but Demosthenes urged them to put in at Pylos first, do there what was to be done, and then continue their voyage. They objected; but a storm came on, as it happened, and carried the fleet to Pylos. And Demosthenes at once urged them to fortify the place, as it was for this purpose that he had sailed with them;

[2] and he showed them that there was at hand an abundance of wood and stone, that the position was naturally a strong one, and that not only the place itself but also the neighbouring country for a considerable distance was unoccupied; for Pylos is about four hundred stadia distant from Sparta and lies in the land that was once Messenia; but the Lacedaemonians call the place Coryphasium.

[3] The other generals said there were many unoccupied headlands in the Peloponnesus, which he could seize if he wished to put the city to expense. Demosthenes, however, thought that this place had advantages over any other; not only was there a harbour close by, but also the Messenians, who originally owned this land and spoke the same dialect as the Lacedaemonians, would do them the greatest injury if they made this place their base of operations, and would at the same time be a trustworthy garrison of it.

[1] When, on their voyage, they were off Laconia, and heard that the Peloponnesian ships were already at Corcyra, Eurymedon and Sophocles were for hastening thither, but Demosthenes desired them to touch first at Pylus, and after doing what was necessary, then to proceed on their voyage. While they were making objections, a storm happened to come on, and carried the fleet to Pylus.

[2] So Demosthenes immediately begged them to fortify the place, (for this, he said, was his object in sailing with them,) and showed them that there was great abundance of timber and stone, and that the post was a strong one, and unoccupied, both itself and a considerable distance of the country round. For Pylus is about four hundred stades from Sparta, and is situated in what was once the Messenian territory, being called by the Lacedaemonians Coryphasium. But the commanders said that there were many unoccupied promontories in the Peloponnese, if he wished to put the state to expense by occupying them.

[3] He, however, considered that this was a more advantageous post than any other, inasmuch as there was a harbour close by, and the Messenians, who in early times were connected with the place, and spoke the same dialect with the Lacedaemonians, would do them very great injury by their excursions from it, and at the same time be trusty guardians of the place.

[1] Quum autem inter navigandum e regione agri Laconici essent, et acciperent Peloponnesiorum naves ad Corcyram jam appulisse, Eurymedon quidem et Sophocles ad Corcyram tendere properabant, Demosthenes vero eos hortabatur, ut primum Pylum appellerent, deinde peractis rebus, quae peragendae essent, navigationis cursum conficerent; illis vero contradicentibus fQrte fortuna tempestas exorta classem Pylum detulit.

[2] Atque statim Demosthenes postulabat, ut locus ille muniretur, (hac enim de causa se cum illis navigasse), et demonstrabat magnam esse lignorum lapidumquc copiam, et locum natura munitum esse, et quum ipsum, [tum etiam magnum illius agn tractum circumcirca desertum esse; distat enim Pylus a

Sparto stadia circiter quadringenta, et sita est in eo agro, qui olim erat Messenius; Lacedaemonii autem Coryphasion vocant.

[3] Uli vero dicebant, multa esse Peloponnesi promontoria deserta, si in iis occupandis civitatem exhaurire velit. Huic autem locus iste longe commodior quam ullus alius esse videbatur, tum quod ei portus adjaceret, tum etiam Messenios, quibus haec terra antiquitus domestica esset, et qui eadem, qua Lacedaemonii, lingua uterentur, illinc prodeuntes plurima damna iis inferre posse, et simul eos certos illius loci custodes futuros.

[1] Akanthier! Die Absicht Spartas bei Aussendung meines Heeres ist keine andere, als den Zweck unseres Krieges mit Athen, als welchen wir in der Kriegserklärung die Befreiung Griechenlands angekündigt, zur Wirklichkeit zu machen. An unserm späten Erscheinen aber ist die durch die bisherigen Feldzüge getäuschte Hoffnung schuld, euch den Kampf zu ersparen und in kurzer Zeit allein mit Athen fertig zu werden; und es kann uns dasselbe um so weniger zum Vorwurf gemacht werden, da wir jetzt die erste Gelegenheit ergreifen, hieher zu kommen und auch euch zur Theilnahme an dem Vernichtungskampfe einzuladen. Um so mehr befremdet es mich, aus dem Sperren der Thore auf eine unfreundliche Stimmung bei euch schliessen zu müssen. In dem guten Glauben, in euch längst, vor unserer Ankunft schon, entschiedene Bundesgenossen zu finden, denen wir nur willkommen sein würden, haben wir Lacedämonier die Gefahr nicht angesehen, die mit einem so weiten Marsch durch fremdes Gebiet verbunden war, und jedes mögliche Opfer gebracht, — und wie, ihr solltet ganz andere Gesinnungen hegen, solltet eurer eigenen und aller Griechen Befreiung euch widersetzen wollen? Denn nicht allein, dass ihr zu dem Feinde stehet, es müsste auch alle folgenden Städte zurückhaltend und besorgt machen, wenn gleich anfangs eine so ansehnliche und einflussreiche Stadt wie die eurige mich abwiese. Der Glaube an meine Sendung wäre dahin ² , man argwohnte nur Böses in der Freiheit, die ich bringe ³ , oder sähe in meinem Heere einen zu schwachen und nichtssagenden Schutz gegen Athens drohende Rache. Zwar es war dasselbe Heer, mit dem ich vor Nisäa zog, wo die Athener trotz ihrer Uebermacht keinen Angriff wagten, und ein so zahlreiches Heer wie das nisäische würden sie ohnehin in keinem Fall gegen euch über's Meer schicken. ⁴