[1] But for us both, if ever it were good to agree, it is surely so at this present and before any irreparable accident be interposed. Whereby we should be compelled, besides the common, to bear you a particular eternal hatred, and you be deprived of the commodities we now offer you.

[2] Let us be reconciled while matters stand undecided, and whilst you have gained reputation and our friendship, and we not suffered dishonour and but indifferent loss. And we shall not only ourselves prefer peace before war, but also give a cessation of their miseries to all the rest of the Grecians, who will acknowledge it rather from you than us. For they make war not knowing whether side begun; but if an end be made, which is now for the most part in your own hands, the thanks will be yours.

[3] And by decreeing the peace, you may make the Lacedaemonians your sure friends, inasmuch as they call you to it and are therein not forced but gratified.

[4] Wherein consider how many commodities are like to ensue. For if we and you go one way, you know the rest of Greece, being inferior to us, will honour us in the highest degree.

[1] To apply this to ourselves: if peace was ever desirable for both parties, it is surely so at the present moment, before anything irremediable befall us and force us to hate you eternally, personally as well as politically, and you to miss the advantages that we now offer you.

[2] While the issue is still in doubt, and you have reputation and our friendship in prospect, and we the compromise of our misfortune before anything fatal occur, let us be reconciled, and for ourselves choose peace instead of war, and grant to the rest of the Hellenes a remission from their sufferings, for which be sure they will think they have chiefly you to thank. The war that they labour under they know not which began, but the peace that concludes it, as it depends on your decision, will by their gratitude he laid to your door.

[3] By such a decision you can become firm friends with the Lacedaemonians at their own invitation, which you do not force from them, but oblige them by accepting.

[4] And from this friendship consider the advantages that are likely to follow: when Attica and Sparta are at one, the rest of Hellas , be sure, will remain in respectful inferiority before its heads.’

[1] "Now, if ever, reconciliation is desirable for us both, before some irreparable disaster has come upon either of us and prevented it; should that befall, we shall inevitably cherish toward each other an undying personal hatred, over and above that which we now feel as public enemies, and you ¹ will be deprived of the advantages ² we now offer.

[2] While, therefore, the issue of the war is still in doubt, while your reputation is enhanced and you may have our friendship also, and while our disaster admits of a reasonable settlement and no disgrace as yet has befallen us, let us be reconciled; and let us for ourselves choose peace instead of war, and give a respite from evils to all the other Hellenes. And they will count you especially the authors of the peace; for although they were drawn into the war without knowing which of us began it, yet if a settlement is effected, the decision of which at this time rests chiefly with you, it is to you they will ascribe their gratitude.

[3] And so, if you decide for peace, it is in your power to win the steadfast friendship of the Lacedaemonians, which they freely offer and you may secure by acting, not with violence, but with generosity.

[4] Pray consider all the advantages which may well be involved in such a course; for if you and we agree be assured that the rest of the Hellenic world, since it will be inferior to us in power, will pay us the greatest deference."

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[1] « Nobis vero utrisque, si unquam alias, nunc profecto gratiae reconciliatio est peropportuna, priusquam gravius aliquod malum interea nos opprimat, cujus causa necesse sit praeter publicas adversus vos privatas etiam inimicitias easque sempiternas suscipere, vos vero rebus privari, ad quas nunc vos provocamus.

[2] Quare dum belli eventus adhuc est anceps, vos quidem, cum gloriae nostraeque amicitiae accessione, noe vero, antequam dedecus aliquod nobis accidat, cum mediocri jactura in gratiam redeamus, et quum ipsi bello pacem anteponamus, tum etiam ceteris Graecis malorum requiem demus; qui hujus quoque rei vos praecipuos auctores existimabunt. Bello enim vexantur nescientes, utri nostrum belli fuerint auctores; sed si gratis reconciliatio fiat, cujus nunc penes vos nuqor est potestas, boc beneficium vobis acceptum referent.

[3] Et si rem per* spiciatis, facultas vobis adest, Lacedaemonios firmos vobis amicos efficiendi ita ut et ipsi ad hoc vos provocarint, et vos gratia potius quam vi usi sitis.

[4] Hac autem in re quot bona inesse credibile sit, considerate; nobis mim vobisque eadem dicentibus scitis ceteros quidem Graecos, quod sunt inferiores, iis quae summa sunt, honorem habituros. »

[1] Akanthier! Die Absicht Spartas bei Aussendung meines Heeres ist keine andere, als den Zweck unseres Krieges mit Athen, als welchen wir in der Kriegserklärung die Befreiung Griechenlands angekündigt, zur Wirklichkeit zu machen. An unserm späten Erscheinen aber ist die durch die bisherigen Feldzüge getäuschte Hoffnung schuld, euch den Kampf zu ersparen und in kurzer Zeit allein mit Athen fertig zu werden; und es kann uns dasselbe um so weniger zum Vorwurf gemacht werden, da wir jetzt die erste Gelegenheit ergreifen, hieher zu kommen und auch euch zur Theilnahme an dem Vernichtungskampfe einzuladen. Um so mehr befremdet es mich, aus dem Sperren der Thore auf eine unfreundliche Stimmung bei euch schliessen zu müssen. In dem guten Glauben, in euch längst, vor unserer Ankunft schon, entschiedene Bundesgenossen zu finden, denen wir nur willkommen sein würden, haben wir Lacedämonier die Gefahr nicht angesehen, die mit einem so weiten Marsch durch fremdes Gebiet verbunden war, und jedes mögliche Opfer gebracht, — und wie, ihr solltet ganz andere Gesinnungen hegen, solltet eurer eigenen und aller Griechen Befreiung euch widersetzen wollen? Denn nicht allein, dass ihr zu dem Feinde stehet, es müsste auch alle folgenden Städte zurückhaltend und besorgt machen, wenn gleich anfangs eine so ansehnliche und einflussreiche Stadt wie die eurige mich abwiese. Der Glaube an meine Sendung wäre dahin ² , man argwohnte nur Böses in der Freiheit, die ich bringe ³ , oder sähe in meinem Heere einen zu schwachen und nichtssagenden Schutz gegen Athens drohende Rache. Zwar es war dasselbe Heer, mit dem ich vor Nisäa zog, wo die Athener trotz ihrer Uebermacht keinen Angriff wagten, und ein so zahlreiches Heer wie das nisäische würden sie ohnehin in keinem Fall gegen euch über's Meer schicken. ⁴