Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, Theodor Braun (Translator), 6.10

Search the Perseus Catalog for:

← Previous Next →

„Ich sage euch, daß ihr darauf ausgeht, euch durch den
Zug nach Sizilien zu den vielen Feinden, die ihr hier zurück
laßt, noch neue auf den Hals zu ziehen. Ihr glaubt vielleicht,
ihr hättet doch Frieden geschlossen, und der werde von Bestand
sein. Ja, solange ihr euch auf keine neuen Unternehmungen
einlaßt, wird freilich dem Namen nach Friede sein. Denn
so weit ist es durch Treibereien hier bei uns und unseren
Gegnern schon gekommen. Aber sobald wir mit einem an
sehnlichen Teile unserer Streitkräfte eine Niederlage erleben,
werden unsere Feinde sofort über uns herfallen; denn einmal
haben sie den Frieden eben nur in der Not nach einem un
glücklichen Kriege unter drückenderen Bedingungen geschlossen
als wir, und dann enthält der Vertrag auch für uns zweifel
hafte Punkte genug. Zudem sind mehrere Staaten, und keines
wegs die schwächsten, dem Frieden noch nicht einmal beigetreten,
sondern entweder mit uns noch in offenem Kriege oder doch
nur, weil die Lakedämonier noch nicht losschlagen, auch ihrer
seits durch den zehntägigen Waffenstillstand vorläufig gebunden.
Böte sich ihnen Gelegenheit, uns anzugreifen, weil wir unsere
Kräfte geteilt, womit wir es jetzt so eilig haben, so würden sie
sich gewiß nicht lange besinnen, uns mit den sizilischen
Griechen zu Leibe zu gehen, die sie schon längst so gern zu
Bundesgenossen gehabt hätten. Das müssen wir im Auge
behalten, um unser schwankendes Staatsschiff nicht neuen Ge
fahren auszusetzen, und nicht nach Ausdehnung unserer Herr
schaft trachten, bevor wir die jetzige befestigt haben. Die seit
Jahren aufsässigen thrakischen Chalkidier sind immer noch un
bezwungen, und auch anderswo auf dem Festlande steht es
mit dem Gehorsam vielfach noch recht bedenklich. Freilich,
wenn unseren Bundesgenossen in Egesta ein Unrecht wider-
fährt, sind wir gleich bei der Hand, ihnen beizustehen; gilt
es aber, uns selbst des Unrechts zu erwehren, das unsere
Bundesgenossen uns durch ihren Abfall schon lange angetan
haben, so hat eS damit keine Eile.

History of the Peloponnesian War. Thucydides. Theodor Braun (Translator). Leipzig. 1917.

Current edition First1KGreek

Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs (German) (Thucydides. Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs. Braun, Theodor, translator. Leipzig: Insel-Verlag, 1917.)

Editions (1)

Ἱστορίαι Perseus (Thucydides. Historiae, Vol 1-2. Jones, Henry Stuart, editor. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1910. (1942 printing).) — 6.10.1 focus

[1] ‘φημὶ γὰρ ὑμᾶς πολεμίους πολλοὺς ἐνθάδε ὑπολιπόντας καὶ ἑτέρους ἐπιθυμεῖν ἐκεῖσε πλεύσαντας δεῦρο ἐπαγαγέσθαι.

[2] καὶ οἴεσθε ἴσως τὰς γενομένας ὑμῖν σπονδὰς ἔχειν τι βέβαιον, αἳ ἡσυχαζόντων μὲν ὑμῶν ὀνόματι σπονδαὶ ἔσονται (οὕτω γὰρ ἐνθένδε τε ἄνδρες ἔπραξαν αὐτὰ καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων), σφαλέντων δέ που ἀξιόχρεῳ δυνάμει ταχεῖαν τὴν ἐπιχείρησιν ἡμῖν οἱ ἐχθροὶ ποιήσονται, οἷς πρῶτον μὲν διὰ ξυμφορῶν ἡ ξύμβασις καὶ ἐκ τοῦ αἰσχίονος ἢ ἡμῖν κατ’ ἀνάγκην ἐγένετο, ἔπειτα ἐν αὐτῇ ταύτῃ πολλὰ τὰ ἀμφισβητούμενα ἔχομεν.

[3] εἰσὶ δ’ οἳ οὐδὲ ταύτην πω τὴν ὁμολογίαν ἐδέξαντο, καὶ οὐχ οἱ ἀσθενέστατοι· ἀλλ’ οἱ μὲν ἄντικρυς πολεμοῦσιν, οἱ δὲ καὶ διὰ τὸ Λακεδαιμονίους ἔτι ἡσυχάζειν δεχημέροις σπονδαῖς καὶ αὐτοὶ κατέχονται.

[4] τάχα δ’ ἂν ἴσως, εἰ δίχα ἡμῶν τὴν δύναμιν λάβοιεν, ὅπερ νῦν σπεύδομεν, καὶ πάνυ ἂν ξυνεπιθοῖντο μετὰ Σικελιωτῶν, οὓς πρὸ πολλῶν ἂν ἐτιμήσαντο ξυμμάχους γενέσθαι ἐν τῷ πρὶν χρόνῳ.

[5] ὥστε χρὴ σκοπεῖν τινὰ αὐτὰ καὶ μὴ μετεώρῳ τε 〈τῇ〉 πόλει ἀξιοῦν κινδυνεύειν καὶ ἀρχῆς ἄλλης ὀρέγεσθαι πρὶν ἣν ἔχομεν βεβαιωσώμεθα, εἰ Χαλκιδῆς γε οἱ ἐπὶ Θρᾴκης ἔτη τοσαῦτα ἀφεστῶτες ἀφ’ ἡμῶν ἔτι ἀχείρωτοί εἰσι καὶ ἄλλοι τινὲς κατὰ τὰς ἠπείρους ἐνδοιαστῶς ἀκροῶνται. ἡμεῖς δὲ Ἐγεσταίοις δὴ οὖσι ξυμμάχοις ὡς ἀδικουμένοις ὀξέως βοηθοῦμεν· ὑφ’ ὧν δ’ αὐτοὶ πάλαι ἀφεστώτων ἀδικούμεθα, ἔτι μέλλομεν ἀμύνεσθαι.

Translations (9)

The History of the Grecian War Perseus (Thucydides. The English works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury. Hobbes, Thomas. translator. London: John Bohn, 1843.) — 6.10.1 focus

[1] "For I say that going thither you leave many enemies here behind you, and more you endeavour to draw hither.

[2] You perhaps think that the league will be firm that you have made with the Lacedaemonians; which, though as long as you stir not, may continue a league in name (for so some have made it of their own side ), yet if any considerable forces of ours chance to miscarry, our enemies will soon renew the war, as having made the peace constrained by calamities, and upon terms of more dishonour and necessity than ourselves; besides, in the league itself we have many things controverted. And some there be that refuse utterly to accept it, and they none of the weakest;

[3] whereof some are now in open war against us, and others, because the Lacedaemonians stir not, maintain only a truce with us from ten to ten days, and so are contented yet to hold their hands.

[4] But, peradventure, when they shall hear that our power is distracted, which is the thing we now hasten to do, they will be glad to join in the war with the Sicilians against us, the confederacy of whom they would heretofore have valued above many other.

[5] It behoveth us therefore to consider of these things and not to run into new dangers when the state of our own city hangeth unsettled, nor seek a new dominion before we assure that which we already have. For the Chalcideans of Thrace, after so many years' revolt, are yet unreduced; and from others in divers parts of the continent we have but doubtful obedience. But the Egestaeans, being forsooth our confederates and wronged, they in all haste must be aided; though to right us on those by whom we have a long time ourselves been wronged, that we defer.

History of the Peloponnesian War Perseus (Thucydides. History of the Peloponnesian War. Crawley, Richard, translator. London and Toronto: J. M. Dent and Sons Ltd.; New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., 1914.) — 6.10.1 focus

[1] I affirm, then, that you leave many enemies behind you here to go yonder and bring more back with you.

[2] You imagine, perhaps, that the treaty which you have made can be trusted; a treaty that will continue to exist nominally, as long as you keep quiet—for nominal it has become, owing to the practices of certain men here and at Sparta—but which in the event of a serious reverse in any quarter would not delay our enemies a moment in attacking us; first, because the convention was forced upon them by disaster and was less honourable to them than to us; and secondly, because in this very convention there are many points that are still disputed.

[3] Again, some of the most powerful states have never yet accepted the arrangement at all. Some of these are at open war with us; others (as the Lacedaemonians do not yet move) are restrained by truces renewed every ten days,

[4] and it is only too probable that if they found our power divided, as we are hurrying to divide it, they would attack us vigorously with the Siceliots, whose alliance they would have in the past valued as they would that of few others.

[5] A man ought, therefore, to consider these points, and not to think of running risks with a country placed so critically, or of grasping at another empire before we have secured the one we have already; for in fact the Thracian Chalcidians have been all these years in revolt from us without being yet subdued, and others on the continents yield us but a doubtful obedience. Meanwhile the Egestaeans, our allies, have been wronged, and we run to help them, while the rebels who have so long wronged us still wait for punishment.

Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs First1KGreek (Thucydides. Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs. Wahrmund, Adolf, translator. Stuttgart: Krais and Hoffmann, 1864.) — 6.10 focus

„Ich sage euch also, daß ihr hier sehr zahlreiche Feinde
zurücklasset und trotzdem dorthin fahren wollt, um euch noch neue dazu
in's Land herein zu ziehen. Vielleicht glaubt ihr, die mit euch
geschlossenen Waffenstilltsandsverträge hätten Kraft und Bestand, aber
die haben sie nur dem Namen nach und nur so lange, als ihr selber
euch ruhig verhalten werdet — und daß dem so ist, daS haben
Männer von hier28) und aus der Zahl eurer Feinde^) durchzusetzen
gewußt — sobald eure Macht aber nur einen einigermaßen
beträchtlichen Verlust erlitten haben wird, werden eure Feinde ohne viel ¹²³
Federlesens über euch herfallen, um so mehr, da sie nur in Folge ihrer ⁴
Unglücksfälle und in weniger ehrenvoller Lage, als die unsrige, durch
die Noth zum Vertrage bewogen wurden. Dann haben wir auch in
diesem Vertrage selbst viel streitige Punkte, und es find sogar auch
solche da, welche nicht einmal diesen Vertrag angenommen haben, und
die find eben nicht die schwächsten, sondern die Einen führen offenen
Krieg mit uns 2°), und die Andern werden durch einen Waffenstillstand,
der alle zehn Tage erneuert werden muß, beschwichtigt, weil die
Lakedämonier selbst sich noch ruhig verhalten. Sehen sie aber erst unsere
Macht getrennt, was wir eben jetzt so eifrig und eilig thun wollen,
so werden sie uns ganz gewiß über den Hals kommen und fich mit
den Sikelioten verbinden, welche sie sich schon in früherer Zeit vor
vielen Andern als Bundesgenossen wünschten. Das also muß man
wohl in's Auge fassen und nicht den Staat, der wie ein Schiff auf
der Höhe der Wogen schwebt, der Gefahr des Untergangs aussetzen.
Wir dürfen nicht nach neuer Herrschaft tsreben, so lange unsere jetzige
nicht befestigt ist, — oder find etwa nicht die Chalkidier an der
Thrakischen Gränze so viele Jahre im offenen Aufruhr gegen uns
und noch immer nicht unterworfen, und steht es nicht auch mit
Andern auf dem Festland sehr zweifelhaft? Freilich, den Egestanern,
unsern Bundesgenossen, müssen wir mit allem Eifer zu Hülfe eilen,
weil man ihnen Unrecht thut, aber die zu bestrafen, die uns selbst
schon lange Zeit her durch ihren Abfall Schaden thun, zögern und
zaudern wir."

Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponèse First1KGreek (Thucydides. Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponnése, Vol. 1-2. Zévort, Marie Charles, translator. Paris: Charpentier, 1852.) — 6.10 focus

X. « En effet, je le déclare, vous embarquer pour la Sicile quand vous laissez ici de nombreux ennemis, c’est vouloir ici même vous en attirer de nouveaux. Vous croyez sans doute que les traités conclus par vous¹ ont quelque solidité : tant que vous resterez tranquilles, vous aurez la paix, de nom du moins (car on a si bien fait et ici et chez nos adversaires que ce n’est plus autre chose); mais si vos armées éprouvent quelque notable échec, aussitôt vos ennemis s’empresseront de vous attaquer : d’abord parce qu’ils n’ont fait la paix que par nécessité, dans des circonstances critiques et à des conditions moins honorables pour eux que pour nous; ensuite parce que nous avons, dans ce traité même, bien des points contestés. Il est même des peuples qui n’ont pas encore accepté la trêve, et ce ne sont pas les plus faibles : les uns nous font ouvertement la guerre², les autres ne sont retenus que par l’inaction des Lacédémoniens et par une simple trêve de dix jours avec nous. Qui sait si, profitant de cette division de nos forces que nous avons en ce moment ³⁴ tant de hâte d’opérer, ils ne nous attaqueront pas tous ensemble, d’accord avec les Siciliens, dont naguère ils auraient mis l'alliance à si haut prix? Voilà ce qu’on doit considérer, au lieu d’aller, quand la république est encore loin du port, chercher d’autres périls, ambitionner d’autres conquêtes, avant d’avoir affermi ce que nous possédons; les Chalcidiens de l’Épithrace, révoltés contre nous depuis tant d’années, ne sont pas encore rentrés sous notre dépendance; sur plusieurs points du continent, nous n’obtenons qu’une obéissance douteuse; et nous, qui mettons tant d’ardeur à secourir les Égestains nos alliés, à venger leur offense, nous tardons encore à venger une offense personnelle sur des sujets depuis longtemps révoltés!

Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponnése First1KGreek (Thucydides. Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponnése. Bétant, Élie-Ami, translator. Paris: Librairie de L. Hachette, 1863.) — 6.10 focus

« Je soutiens qu’entreprendre cette expédition lainteae, c’est vouloir , aux nombreux ennemis que nous laissons derrière nous, en ajouter de nouveaux et les. attirer ici. Tous croyez peut-être que la paix récemment conclue a quelque soKdité. Cette paix, tant que vous serez tranquilles, subsistera de nom — c’est à quoi l’ont réduite les intrigues pratiquées soit chez nous, soit ailleurs ; — mais au moindre échec que nous viendrons à subir, nos ennemis s'empresseront de nous attaquer: d'abord paree qu’ils- ont traité à La suite de rêvas, par nécessité, à des conditions humiliantes ; puis parce que le texte du traité laisse plusieurs points en litige. Il est même tels peuples — et ce ne sont pas les moins puissants — qui n’ont pas encore accepté cette paix. Les uns nous font une guerre ouverte, les autres ne sont retenus que par l’inaction des Lacédémoniens et par des armistices de dix jours. Qui sait si tnwh vant nos forces divisées—et c’est à quoi nous travaillées présentement, — ils ne seront pas tentés de nous attaquer, de concert avec les Grecs de Sicile, dont naguère ils eusses! mis l’alliance à un si haut prix ?

« C’est là ce qu’il nous faut envisager, au lieu d’aller, quand la situation de notre république est si incertaine , mous jeter dans des périls pour étendre notre domination avant de l’avmr affermie. Les Chalcidéens du littoral de la Thrace, révolté» depuis tant d’années, sont encore insoumis; certains peuplesèa continent ne montrent qu’une obéissance douteuse ; et nous, qui sommes si prompts à prendre fait et cause pour les Égestains, nous différons de venger nos propres outrages sur des sujets dès longtemps insurgés.

History of the Peloponnesian War First1KGreek (Thucydides, Vol. 1-4. Smith, Charles Foster, translator. London and Cambridge, MA: Heinemann and Harvard University Press, 1919-1923.) — 6.10.1 focus

[1] "I say, then, that you, leaving behind you many enemies here, are bent upon sailing there land bringing upon you here still other enemies.

[2] And you think perhaps that the treaty which has been made affords you some security—a treaty which indeed, as long as you are quiet, will be a treaty in name (for so certain men here and among our enemies have managed these matters); but should you perchance suffer defeat with a considerable force, our foes will be quick to make their attack upon us. For the compact in the first place was concluded by them under compulsion through stress of misfortune and with less credit to them than to us; and, besides, in the compact itself there are many disputed points.

[3] There are also some states which have not as yet accepted even this agreement, and these not the weakest; on the contrary, some of them are at open war with us, while others again, merely because the Lacedaemonians still keep quiet, are themselves also kept in restraint by a truce renewable every ten days.

[4] But very probably, if they should find our power divided—the very thing we are now so anxious to bring about—they would eagerly join in an attack upon us along with the Siceliots, whose alliance they would heretofore have given much to obtain.

[5] And so we must consider these matters and resolve not to run into danger while the state is still amid the waves, and reach out after another empire before we have secured that which we have, seeing that the Chalcidians in Thrace, after so many years of revolt from us, are still unsubdued, while others at various points on the mainland render us a dubious allegiance. But we, it seems, must rush to bring aid to Egestaeans, being, forsooth, our allies, on the ground that they are wronged, while on those by whose revolt we ourselves have long been wronged we still delay to inflict punishment.

History of the Peloponnesian War First1KGreek (Thucydides. The history of the Peloponnesian War, Volume 1-2. Dale, Henry, translator. London: Heinemann and Henry G. Bohn, 1851-1852.) — 6.10.1 focus

[1] "I say then, that you wish, though leaving many enemies behind you here, to bring hither fresh ones besides, by sailing there.

[2] And you fancy, perhaps, that the treaty that has been made by you affords some ground of confidence. But though, as long as you remain quiet, that will, indeed, be a treaty—in name, (for to this condition have certain persons here and amongst your enemies brought it by their intrigues,) yet if we are ever defeated with any considerable force, those who hate us will quickly make an attack upon us; seeing, in the first place, that the arrangement was made of necessity by them, under circumstances of disaster, and of greater discredit to them than to us; and, secondly, that in this very arrangement we have many subjects open to debate.

[3] There are some, too, who have not yet acceded even to this composition, such as it is, and those not the least powerful states; but some of them are at war with us downright, and, in the case of others, because the Lacedaemonians remain quiet at present, they too are restrained by truces from one ten days to another.

[4] But probably, if they should find our power divided, (which we are now so anxious to bring about,) they would with all their might attack us, in conjunction with the Siceliots, whose alliance they would in time past have valued ¹ most highly.

[5] Every one therefore ought to look to this, and not presume to run risks with a state so unsettled, and to grasp at another empire before we have secured the one we have; seeing that the Chalcidians Thrace-ward, though they have revolted from us so many years, are still unsubdued; and there are some others on the different coasts of the mainland who yield us but a doubtful obedience. And so we are quick to succour the Segestans, who are our allies, for sooth, as being injured; but on those by whose revolt we have ourselves long ago been injured, we still defer to avenge ourselves.

Historia Belli Peloponnesiaci First1KGreek (Historia Belli Peloponnesiaci. Haase, Friedrich, translator. Paris: Firmin Didot, 1869.) — 6.10.1 focus

[1] « Etenim dico vos multis hostibus hic relictis alios etiam illuc trajiciendo cupere huc attrahere.

[2] Et opinamini fortasse foedera,quae inistis, aliquid firmitudinisbabere, quae quidem verbo tenus, dum vos nihil movebitis, foder» erunt (sic enim ut fierent, et quidam ex nostris et ex adrer-sariis egerunt), sed si quis justus exercitus noster aliquam cladem accipiat, hostes celeriter nos invadent, quippe qui primum quidem propter clades vi necessitatis coacti cum majore, quam nos, dedecore compositionem fecerunt; deinde vero in hac ipsa compositione multa controversa habemus.

[3] Praeterea sunt etiam, qui ne has quidem pactiones admiserunt, iique non infirmissimi; sed alii quidem palam bellum gerunt, alii vero, quod Lacedaemonii adhuc quiescunt, ipsi quoque decem dierum induciis adhuc se continent.

[4] Sed fortasse, si nostras opes distractas deprehenderint, id quod nunc urgemus, vel libentissime nos adorientur una cum Siciliensibus, quorum societatem sibi adjunctam antes plurimi aestimassent.

[5] Quamobrem haec quispiam considerare debet, et non suspensis nostrae reipublicae rebus pericula snbire, neque aliud imperium affectare, priusqoam id, quod habemus, stabiliverimus, si quidem Chalcidenses, qui sunt in Thracia, quamvis tot annos a nobis jam defecerint, tamen in nostram potestatem nondum sunt redacti, et alii nonnulli in variis continentis partibus dubie parent. Nos vero Egestaeis scilicet sociis ut iqjuriam patientibus alacriter succurrimus; a quibus autem propter defectionem jampridem violamur, illo* ulcisci adhuc cunctamur.

La storia di Tucidide First1KGreek (Thucydides. Della storia di Tucidide volgarizzata libri otto. Anonymous translator. Florence: Tipografia Galileiana, 1835.) — 6.10 focus

et Dico adunque che navigando in Sicilia , voi, lasciati qua molti nemici, volete attirarne degli altri. E credete voi forse che la tregua successa abbia qualche fermezza ? Ma sappiate che ella manterrà questo nome fino a che voi state quieti (che tale l’hanno resa alcuni dei nostri e degli avversari ), e che a una sconfitta di qualche parte considerevole del nostro esercito, i nemici ci saranno subito addosso ; primo perchè (attese le loro calamità) quella convenzione fu per essi forzata, e più disonorevole che per noi ; dipoi perchè in essa abbiamo molti articoli in controversia. Anzi vi sono di quelli (nè già de’più deboli ) che quest’accordo non approvarono, e che apertamente ci guerreggiano ; altri, siccome i Lacedemoni non si muovono, così anchressi sono ritenuti dalla tregua dei dieci giorni. Ma forse, e senza forse, se troveranno divise le forze nostre ( lo che noi affrettiamo ) , ci assalteranno animosamente insieme coi Siciliani, l’alleanza de9 quali avrebbero per l’innanzi avuta cara sopra molte cose. Laonde questo è ciò che dobbiamo osservare, invece di volere arrischiarci mentre la Repubblica tentenna, ed ambire nuovo impero prima d’aver fermato quello che abbiamo. I Calcidesi di Tracia , ribelli nostri da tant’anni, non sono ancora soggiogati ; alcuni altri di terraferma sono instabili nell’obbedienza : e noi ci affrettiamo a soccorrere gli Egestei come oppressi, che al più ci sono alleati , e tranquilliamo ancora a vendicarci delle ingiurie di coloro che da gran tempo ci souo ribelli ?

Commentary

Commentary on Thucydides: Book 6 (Thucydides, Book VI. Marchant, Edgar C., editor. London: Macmillan and Company, 1909.) focus

τὸν Τεμενἰτην —(1) the wall was built so as to en close the T., or precinct of Apollo's temple, which was part of the Neapolis; (2) it was πρὸς τῇ πόλει, adjoining the city wall; (3) it was παρὰ πᾶν τὸ πρὸς τὰς Ἐπιπολὰς ὁρῶν, ‘running all along the ground that looks towards Epipolae.’ This is not clear; but it implies ( a) a wall of considerable length, ( b) a wall that did not project far to the west. 3

ἐντὸς ποιησάμενοι —‘taking into it.’

δῑ ἐλάσσονος —‘that the shorter distance (at which the A. would otherwise be able to build) might not render it easy to invest them in case of a defeat’; i.e. the object of the new outwork was to increase the length of wall that the A. would have to build if they attempted to invest Syr. With δῑ ἐλάσσονος ‘at a less distance’ cf. διὰ πολλοῦ, δῑ ὀλίγου, διὰ τοσούτου. It was esp. from the cliff to the harbour that the distance was increased; and from c. 103, 1 it appears that the A. had to cover a distance of some eight stadia in this direction.

τὰ Μέγαρα φρούριον —‘as an ontpost,’ sc. ἐτείχιζον. Cf. II. 32 ἐτειχίσθη Ἀταλάντη φρούριον. Megara was before deserted; see c. 49, 4 and c. 4, 1 n. It now becomes a northern outpost of Syr.: Poppo explains that the object was to prevent the A. from making Megara a naval station.

ἐν τῷ Ὀ .—see c. 70, 4. The palisades were not constructed at Leon and Thapsus (c. 97, 1), and so must have been chiefly for the great harbour (Poppo).

τὴν ἐπὶ Λάχητος —sec c. 1, 1 n., and cf. c. 6, 1. From c. 52, 1 it appears that Camarina held that this treaty had been superseded by the treaty of Gela in 424 B.C., and in c. 67, 2 we hear of Camarina sending some slight help to Syr. But now Camarina acts with caution. The treaty of 424 was only σπονδαί ( IV. 65 ), a cessation of hostilities, whereas the treaty of 427 between Cam. and Athens was ξυμμαχία. In 422 Cam. had sided with Athens. In c. 78, 4 Hermocrates exaggerates the importance of the σπονδαί of 424 in the words μὴ μαλακῶς ὥσπερ νῦν ξυμμαχεῖν: and in c. 79, 1 he mmimises the importance of the ξυμμαχία of 427 by treating it as an ἐπιμαχία, or defensive alliance—which it was not. The resnlt of the debate that follows is that Cam. remains nentral. She joined Syr. in 413 ( VII. 33 ).

πέμψαι ἂ ἔπεμψαν —expressive of blame or contempt; cf. Herod. II. 49 ποιεῦσι τὰ ποιεῦσι. μὴ οὐκέτι β.—ὕποπτοι has the construction of a verb of fearing, as also have ὑποτοπῆσαι, ὑποπτεύειν, ὑπόνοια .

προσχωρῶσι —sc. μή. κατά = ‘owing to.’

προδιαβάλλειν —‘prejudice them against the A.’

Thucydides History of the Peloponnesian War 6.10

Theodor Braun (Translator)

Search the Perseus Catalog for:

Current edition First1KGreek

Commentary

Stable identifiers