Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, Theodor Braun (Translator), 6.11

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„Und doch würden wir diese wohl bezwingen und in
Gehorsam halten können, schwerlich aber imstande sein, die da
drüben bei der weiten Entfernung und ihrer großen Menge
selbst nach einem Siege dauernd unserer Herrschaft zu unter
werfen. Es wäre doch eine Torheit, jemand anzugreifen, dem
gegenüber man auch nach einem Siege die Herrschaft nicht würde
behaupten können, im Fall einer Niederlage aber schlechter
stände als vorher. Nach meiner Meinung hätten wir von den
sizilischen Griechen, wenigstens unter den jetzigen Verhältnissen,
wahrscheinlich weniger zu fürchten, wenn es den Syrakusern
gelänge, sie sämtlich ihrer Herrschaft zu unterwerfen, womit
uns die Egester hauptsächlich bange machen wollen. Jetzt
nämlich würden wohl einzelne den Lakedämoniern zu Gefallen
sich am Kriege gegen uns beteiligen. Dann aber würde eS
wahrscheinlich zwischen den beiden Großmächten überhaupt
nicht zum Kriege kommen. Denn wie sie jetzt mit Hilfe der
Peloponnesier unsere Macht zu stürzen denken, so würden diese
dann wahrscheinlich die ihrige zu vernichten suchen. Vor uns
aber würden die dortigen Griechen den meisten Respekt haben,
wenn wir überhaupt nicht kämen oder ihnen höchstens unsere
Macht einmal zeigten und dann gleich wieder abzögen. Sollten
wir aber gar eine Niederlage erleiden, so würden sie nnS
vollends verachten und mit unseren hiesigen Feinden alsbald
gemeinshcaftliche Sache gegen uns machen. Denn wir alle
wissen, wie man das weit Entfernte, bevor man es aus eigener
Erfahrung kennt, zu bewundern pflegt. So ist es auch euch,
Athener, jetzt ja mit den Lakedämoniern und ihren Verbündeten
gegangen. Früher fürchtetet ihr euch vor ihnen; jetzt aber, wo
ihr sie wider Erwarten besiegt habt, verachtet ihr sie und wollt
sogar Sizilien erobern. Wir sollten uns aber durch das
Unglück unserer Feinde nicht zum Übermut verführen lassen,
sondern froh sein, ihre Pläne vereitelt zu haben. Auch dürfen
wir nicht vergessen, daß die Lakedämonier, um ihre Schmach
auszuwetzen, nach wie vor nur darauf sinnen, uns wo
möglich irgendwie zu demütigen und ihre Ehre wiederher
zustellen, grade weil sie von jeher so hohen Wert auf den
Ruf der Tapferkeit legen. Bei ruhiger Erwägung also handelt
es sich für uns jetzt nicht um das bißchen Egesta, das nicht
mal griechisch ist, sondern darum, uns den Lakedämoniern und
ihren oligarchischen Gelüsten gegenüber keine Blöße zu geben.

History of the Peloponnesian War. Thucydides. Theodor Braun (Translator). Leipzig. 1917.

Current edition First1KGreek

Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs (German) (Thucydides. Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs. Braun, Theodor, translator. Leipzig: Insel-Verlag, 1917.)

Editions (1)

Ἱστορίαι Perseus (Thucydides. Historiae, Vol 1-2. Jones, Henry Stuart, editor. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1910. (1942 printing).) — 6.11.1 focus

[1] καίτοι τοὺς μὲν κατεργασάμενοι κἂν κατάσχοιμεν· τῶν δ’ εἰ καὶ κρατήσαιμεν, διὰ πολλοῦ γε καὶ πολλῶν ὄντων χαλεπῶς ἂν ἄρχειν δυναίμεθα. ἀνόητον δ’ ἐπὶ τοιούτους ἰέναι ὧν κρατήσας τε μὴ κατασχήσει τις καὶ μὴ κατορθώσας μὴ ἐν τῷ ὁμοίῳ καὶ πρὶν ἐπιχειρῆσαι ἔσται.

[2] Σικελιῶται δ’ ἄν μοι δοκοῦσιν, ὥς γε νῦν ἔχουσι, καὶ ἔτι ἂν ἧσσον δεινοὶ ἡμῖν γενέσθαι, εἰ ἄρξειαν αὐτῶν Συρακόσιοι· ὅπερ οἱ Ἐγεσταῖοι μάλιστα ἡμᾶς ἐκφοβοῦσιν.

[3] νῦν μὲν γὰρ κἂν ἔλθοιεν ἴσως Λακεδαιμονίων ἕκαστοι χάριτι, ἐκείνως δ’ οὐκ εἰκὸς ἀρχὴν ἐπὶ ἀρχὴν στρατεῦσαι· ᾧ γὰρ ἂν τρόπῳ τὴν ἡμετέραν μετὰ Πελοποννησίων ἀφέλωνται, εἰκὸς ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ τὴν σφετέραν διὰ τοῦ αὐτοῦ καθαιρεθῆναι.

[4] ἡμᾶς δ’ ἂν οἱ ἐκεῖ Ἕλληνες μάλιστα μὲν ἐκπεπληγμένοι εἶεν εἰ μὴ ἀφικοίμεθα, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ εἰ δείξαντες τὴν δύναμιν δι’ ὀλίγου ἀπέλθοιμεν· τὰ γὰρ διὰ πλείστου πάντες ἴσμεν θαυμαζόμενα καὶ τὰ πεῖραν ἥκιστα τῆς δόξης δόντα. εἰ δὲ σφαλείημέν τι, τάχιστ’ ἂν ὑπεριδόντες μετὰ τῶν ἐνθάδε ἐπιθοῖντο.

[5] ὅπερ νῦν ὑμεῖς ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐς Λακεδαιμονίους καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους πεπόνθατε· διὰ τὸ παρὰ γνώμην αὐτῶν πρὸς ἃ ἐφοβεῖσθε τὸ πρῶτον περιγεγενῆσθαι, καταφρονήσαντες ἤδη καὶ Σικελίας ἐφίεσθε.

[6] χρὴ δὲ μὴ πρὸς τὰς τύχας τῶν ἐναντίων ἐπαίρεσθαι, ἀλλὰ τὰς διανοίας κρατήσαντας θαρσεῖν, μηδὲ Λακεδαιμονίους ἄλλο τι ἡγήσασθαι ἢ διὰ τὸ αἰσχρὸν σκοπεῖν ὅτῳ τρόπῳ ἔτι καὶ νῦν, ἢν δύνωνται, σφήλαντες ἡμᾶς τὸ σφέτερον ἀπρεπὲς εὖ θήσονται, ὅσῳ καὶ περὶ πλείστου καὶ διὰ πλείστου δόξαν ἀρετῆς μελετῶσιν.

[7] ὥστε οὐ περὶ τῶν ἐν Σικελίᾳ Ἐγεσταίων ἡμῖν, ἀνδρῶν βαρβάρων, ὁ ἀγών, εἰ σωφρονοῦμεν, ἀλλ’ ὅπως πόλιν δι’ ὀλιγαρχίας ἐπιβουλεύουσαν ὀξέως φυλαξόμεθα.

Translations (9)

The History of the Grecian War Perseus (Thucydides. The English works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury. Hobbes, Thomas. translator. London: John Bohn, 1843.) — 6.11.1 focus

[1] "And yet if we should reduce the Chalcideans into subjection, we could easily also keep them so; but the Sicilians, though we vanquish them, yet being many and far off, we should have much ado to hold them in obedience. Now it were madness to invade such, whom conquering you cannot keep, and failing, should lose the means for ever after to attempt the same again.

[2] As for the Sicilians, it seemeth unto me, at least as things now stand, that they shall be of less danger to us if they fall under the dominion of the Syracusians than they are now; and yet this is it that the Egestaeans would most affright us with.

[3] For now the states of Sicily, in several, may perhaps be induced, in favour of the Lacedaemonians, to take part against us; whereas then, being reduced into one, it is not likely they would hazard with us state against state. For by the same means that they, joining with the Peloponnesians, may pull down our dominion, by the same it would be likely that the Peloponnesians would subvert theirs.

[4] The Grecians there will fear us most if we go not at all; next, if we but show our forces and come quickly away. But if any misfortune befall us, they will presently despise us and join with the Grecians here to invade us. For we all know that those things are most admired which are farthest off, and which least come to give proof of the opinion conceived of them.

[5] And this, Athenians, is your own case with the Lacedaemonians and their confederates, whom because beyond your hope you have overcome in those things for which at first you feared them, you now in contempt of them turn your arms upon Sicily.

[6] But we ought not to be puffed up upon the misfortunes of our enemies, but to be confident then only when we have mastered their designs. Nor ought we to think that the Lacedaemonians set their minds on anything else but how they may yet for the late disgrace repair their reputation, if they can, by our overthrow, and the rather because they have so much and so long laboured to win an opinion in the world of their valour.

[7] The question with us therefore, if we be well advised, will not be of the Egestaeans in Sicily, but how we may speedily defend our city against the insidiation of them that favour the oligarchy.

History of the Peloponnesian War Perseus (Thucydides. History of the Peloponnesian War. Crawley, Richard, translator. London and Toronto: J. M. Dent and Sons Ltd.; New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., 1914.) — 6.11.1 focus

[1] And yet the latter, if brought under, might be kept under; while the Sicilians, even if conquered, are too far off and too numerous to be ruled without difficulty. Now it is folly to go against men who could not be kept under even if conquered, while failure would leave us in a very different position from that which we occupied before the enterprise.

[2] The Siceliots, again, to take them as they are at present, in the event of a Syracusan conquest (the favourite bugbear of the Egestaeans), would to my thinking be even less dangerous to us than before.

[3] At present they might possibly come here as separate states for love of Lacedaemon ; in the other case one empire would scarcely attack another; for after joining the Peloponnesians to overthrow ours, they could only expect to see the same hands overthrow their own in the same way.

[4] The Hellenes in Sicily would fear us most if we never went there at all, and next to this, if after displaying our power we went away again as soon as possible. We all know that that which is farthest off and the reputation of which can least be tested, is the object of admiration; at the least reverse they would at once begin to look down upon us, and would join our enemies here against us.

[5] You have yourselves experienced this with regard to the Lacedaemonians and their allies, whom your unexpected success, as compared with what you feared at first, has made you suddenly despise, tempting you further to aspire to the conquest of Sicily .

[6] Instead, however, of being puffed up by the misfortunes of your adversaries, you ought to think of breaking their spirit before giving yourselves up to confidence, and to understand that the one thought awakened in the Lacedaemonians by their disgrace is how they may even now, if possible, overthrow us and repair their dishonour; inasmuch as military reputation is their oldest and chiefest study.

[7] Our struggle, therefore, if we are wise, will not be for the barbarian Egestaeans in Sicily , but how to defend ourselves most effectually against the oligarchical machinations of Lacedaemon .

Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs First1KGreek (Thucydides. Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs. Wahrmund, Adolf, translator. Stuttgart: Krais and Hoffmann, 1864.) — 6.11 focus

„Und doch könnten wir diese leicht bewältigen und im
Zaum halten, über jene aber, auch wenn wir sie besiegt hätten,
könnten wir ihrer Entfernung und großen Zahl wegen eine Herrschaft nur
mit großer Schwierigkeit ausüben. Es hat aber keinen Sinn und
Verstand, gegen solche zu Felde zu ziehen, die man im Falle des
Sieges nicht niederhalten kann, und zu denen man im Fall der
Niederlage nicht mehr im gleichen Machtverhältniß steht, wie vor dem
Angriff auf sie. Die Sikelioten aber, so wie es jetzt mit ihnen steht,
scheinen mir keineswegs gefährlich für uns, und noch viel weniger,
wenn einmal die Syrakusier sie alle beherrshcen sollten, womit uns ¹

die Egestaner vorzüglich zu schrecken suchen. Denn nach dem jetzigen
Stand der Dinge könnte wohl der eine oder andere Staat auf
Sicilien aus Freundschaft den Lakedämoniern zu Hülse kommen, in
jenem Falle aber ist es gegen alle Wahrscheinlichkeit, daß ein über
Andere herrshcender Staat gegen seines Gleichen einen Krieg
unternähme. Denn wie sie in diesem Falle unsere Herrschaft in
Verbindung mit den Lakedämoniern gestürzt hätten, ganz ebenso und
von eben denselben ^ würde dann ihre Macht gestürzt werden müssen.
Wir aber könnten die dortigen Hellenen am allerbesten in Furcht
halten, wenn wir gar nicht hingingen, oder auch, wenn wir ihnen
einmal unsere Macht aus der Nähe zeigten und wieder umkehrten.
Blieben wir aber ihnen gegenüber im Nachtheil, so könnten sie uns
leicht verachten und mit den hiesigen Feinden über uns kommen.
Denn wir wissen ja Alle, daß immer das Entfernteste und was noch
keine Gelegenheit gegeben hat, die Wahrheit seines Rufes zu
erproben, am meisten bewundert wird, wie es ja auch in Bezug auf die
Lakedämonier und ihre Bundesgenossen ergangen ist. Weil ihr aber
wider Erwarten über das gesiegt habt, was ihr anfänglich gefürchtet,
so verachtet ihr sie jetzt schon und denkt an die Eroberung Siciliens.
Man darf sich aber nicht wegen der Unfälle, welche die Feinde betroffen
haben, überheben, sondern erst dann zuversichtlich sein, wenn man
ihre ganzen Entwürfe zu nichte gemacht hat. Auch dürft ihr nicht
glauben, daß die Lakedämonier auf irgend etwas Anderes sinnen, als,
wie sie auch unter den jetzigen Verhältnissen auf irgend eine Weise
durch unser Verderben ihren hohen Ruf wieder herstellen können,
zumal sie ja auch alle Zeit her und vor Allem ihren Ruhm in die
Tapferkeit setzen. Für uns also — sofern wir Verstand zeigen —
ist jetzt die Aufgabe nicht, den barbarischen Egestanern auf Sieilien
zu Liebe einen Krieg zu führen, sondern einen Staat scharf zu
überwachen, der unter der Form einer Oligarchie verderbliche Pläne gegen
uns schmiedet."

Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponèse First1KGreek (Thucydides. Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponnése, Vol. 1-2. Zévort, Marie Charles, translator. Paris: Charpentier, 1852.) — 6.11 focus

XI. « Et pourtant, ces peuples une fois soumis, nous pourrions maintenir sur eux notre autorité; tandis qu’en Sicile, même vainqueurs, la distance et le nombre des ennemis ne nous permettraient que bien difficilement d’établir notre domination. Or il est insensé de marcher contre un peuple dont la défaite n’assure pas la soumission, et avec lequel un échec ne vous laisse plus dans la même situation qu’auparavant¹. Les Siciliens, bien peu redoutables, ce me semble, dans l’état actuel, le seront bien moins encore sous la domination des Syracusains, dont les Égestains nous font un épouvantail : maintenant, en effet, chacun d’eux pourrait, à la rigueur, venir nous attaquer, pour complaire aux Lacédémoniens; mais dans la seconde éventualité, il n’est pas vraisemblable qu’un empire ² attaque un autre empire. Car lorsque, unis aux Péloponnésiens, ils auraient détruit notre domination, la leur pourrait l’être également -par les Péloponnésiens. Si nous voulons nous rendre redoutables aux Grecs de Sicile, le mieux est de ne pas aller chez eux · nous pouvons encore arriver au même but, mais à un degré moindre, en leur montrant notre puissance et en nous retirant après une courte apparition. Si au contraire nous éprouvions le moindre échec, ils nous mépriseraient, et ne tarderaient pas à s’unir aux Grecs d’ici pour nous attaquer : car on admire, nous le savons tous, ce qui est très-éloigné, ce dont la renommée n’a pas encore été soumise à l’épreuve³, C'est précisément ce qui vous arrive maintenant, Athéniens, à l’égard des Lacédémoniens et de leurs alliés : pour les avoir vaincus, bien au delà de votre attente si on compare le résultat à vos premières craintes, vous en êtes venus à les dédaigner, et déjà vous portez vos vues jusque sur la Sicile. Ce n’est pas de la mauvaise fortune de ses adversaires qu’on doit s’enorgueillir : c’est quand la pensée même est subjuguée chez eux qu’on peut prendre confiance; soyons persuadés, au contraire, que les Lacédémoniens, au milieu de leur humiliation, ne songent maintenant encore qu’à une seule chose, aux moyens de nous renverser et d’effacer leur propre honte; d’autant mieux que ce qui les préoccupe par-dessus tout et sans relâche, c’est l’application à se faire une réputation de bravoure. Aussi n’est-ce pas des Égestains, d’un peu- ⁴ pie barbare de Sicile, qu’il s’agit pour nous, si nous sommes sages, mais bien des moyens de nous mettre sûrement en garde contre les menées oligarchiques de notre rivale.

Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponnése First1KGreek (Thucydides. Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponnése. Bétant, Élie-Ami, translator. Paris: Librairie de L. Hachette, 1863.) — 6.11 focus

« Si nous venions à bout de les réduire, il y aurait moyen de les contenir. Pour ceux de Sicile, nous aurions beau les vaincre, il nous serait presque impossible, vu leur éloignement et leur grand nombre, de les faire rester dans le devoir. Or il est insensé de marcher contre des peuples que la victoire ne pourra soumettre, tandis qu’un échec suffit pour qu’on ne puisse plus les attaquer avec le même avantage.

« A mon avis, les Grecs de Sicile, dans leur état présent, nous sont peu redoutables. Ils le seraient bien moins s’ils devenaient sujets de Syracuse, ce qui est le grand épouvantail agité par lesËgestains. Aujourd’hui, divisés comme ils le sont, ils pourraient marcher contre nous par complaisance pour Lacédémone; mais, dans l’autre hypothèse, il n’est pas à présumer qu’un empire s’attaque à un autre empire. Supposez en effet que, d’accord,avec les Péloponésiens, ils parvinssent à détruire notre domination ; la leur, selon toute apparence, subirait le même sort de la part des mêmes hommes. Pour nous, le meilleur moyen d’imposer aux Grecs de ces contrées, c’est de nous en tenir à distance ou de n’y faire qu’une courte apparition pour leur montrer notre puissance, et de nous retirer aussitôt après. Autrement, au premier échec de nos armes, ils ne manqueraient pas de nous mépriser et de se joindre à nos anciens adversaires. Nous savons tous qu’on admire ce qui est lointaint ce qui n’a pas encore donné la mesure de ses forces. Vous Pavez éprouvé vous-mêmes à Fégard des Lacédémoniens et de leurs alliés. Pour avoir triomphé d’eux contrairement à votre attente et à vos premières appréhensions, vous en êtes venus à les dédaigner et déjà même à convoiter la Sicile. Or il ne faut pas se prévaloir des revers de ses ennemis, mais attendre pour prendre confiance que Ton ait terrassé leur orgueil.

« Ne croyez pas que les Lacédémoniens, dans leur abaissement actuel, aient d’autre ambition que de déjouer , s’il se peut, nos projets, et d’effacer une tache compromettante ponr leur réputation si lentement et si laborieusement acquise. Aussi n’est-ce pas des Ëgestains , peuple barbare , que nous devons nous préoccuper, si nous sommes sages, mais plutôt des meilleurs moyens de prévenir les embûches d’un gouvernement oligarchique.

History of the Peloponnesian War First1KGreek (Thucydides, Vol. 1-4. Smith, Charles Foster, translator. London and Cambridge, MA: Heinemann and Harvard University Press, 1919-1923.) — 6.11.1 focus

[1] "And yet these, if once brought under control, we might also keep under control; but the Siceliots, even if we should get the better of them, we should find it hard to govern, far off as they are and formidable in numbers. But it is folly to go against men when victory will not bring control over them and failure will not leave matters in the same condition as before the attack was made.

[2] The Siceliots, moreover, it seems to me, at least as things now stand, would be even less dangerous to us if the Syracusans should acquire rule over them—that prospect with which the Egestaeans especially try to terrify us.

[3] For now they might perhaps come against us singly out of regard for the Lacedaemonians, but in the other case,¹ it is not likely that an imperial city would make war against an imperial city; for by whatsoever means they, in concert with the Peloponnesians, might despoil us of our sway, by the same means very likely would their own empire be pulled down by these same Peloponnesians.

[4] And as to us, the Hellenes there would be most in awe, first, if we should not come at all; next, if after showing our power we should after a brief interval depart. For it is, as we all know, things that are farthest off and least allow a test of their reputation which excite wonder; but if we should suffer a defeat, they would very quickly despise us and join our enemies here in attacking us.

[5] And just this has been your experience, men of Athens, with regard to the Lacedaemonians and their allies: because you have got the better of them beyond your expectation—in comparison with what you feared at first—you despise them now and aim even at the conquest of Sicily.

[6] You have no right, however, to be elated at the misfortunes of your opponents, but only when you have mastered their spirits should you feel confidence; nor must you believe that the Lacedaemonians, on account of their humiliation, have anything else in view than to discover in what way they may even yet defeat us and retrieve their own dishonour—the more so as they have been in the highest degree and for the longest time courting a reputation for valour.

[7] And so the issue before us, if we are prudent, is not the fate of the Egestaeans, a barbaric people in Sicily, but how we shall keep a sharp watch upon a state which is intriguing against us with the devices of oligarchy.

History of the Peloponnesian War First1KGreek (Thucydides. The history of the Peloponnesian War, Volume 1-2. Dale, Henry, translator. London: Heinemann and Henry G. Bohn, 1851-1852.) — 6.11.1 focus

[1] "And yet the latter, if subdued, might be kept in subjection by us; but the former, even if we conquered them, we should hardly be able to govern, so far off and so numerous as they are. But it is folly to go against men whom we could not keep under, if we conquered them; while, if we did not succeed in the attempt, we should not be in the same position as we were before making it.

[2] Again, regarding the present condition of the Siceliots, they appear to me even still less likely to be formidable to us, if the Syracusans should have dominion over them; that supposition with which the Segestans especially try to frighten us.

[3] For at present they might, perhaps, come hither as separate states, to oblige the Lacedaemonians; but in the other case, it is not likely that they should undertake the expedition, empire against empire: for in the same manner as they, in conjunction with the Lacedaemonians, had taken away ours, it is probable that they would have their own taken away by the same Peloponnesians, ¹ and by the same principle.

[4] And the Greeks in those parts would be most in awe of us, if we did not go there at all; and next to that, if after making a demonstration of our power we retired in a short time: but if we should meet with any reverses they would very quickly despise us, and attack us in concert with our enemies here. For we all know that what is farthest off is most admired, and what gives the least room for having its fame tested.

[5] And this has at present been your case, Athenians, with reference to the Lacedaemonians and their allies; from having, contrary to your expectation, gained the advantage over them, (comparing your present position with the fears you at first entertained,) you have despised them, and are now desiring the conquest of Sicily.

[6] You ought not, however, to be elated through the misfortunes of your adversaries, but then only to feel confident when you have mastered their spirits; nor should you think that the Lacedaemonians are doing ought but considering, in consequence of their disgrace, in what way they may even now, if possible, overthrow us, and bring their own discredit to a happy termination; especially as they have studied a reputation for bravery, as a thing of the greatest importance, and for the greatest length of time.

[7] So that our great struggle will be, if we are wise, not for the Segestans in Sicily, men who are barbarians, but that we may vigorously guard against a state which is plotting against us ² by the spread of oligarchical principles.

Historia Belli Peloponnesiaci First1KGreek (Historia Belli Peloponnesiaci. Haase, Friedrich, translator. Paris: Firmin Didot, 1869.) — 6.11.1 focus

[1] « Atqui hos quidem si in nostram potestatem redegerimus, facile retinere poterimus; illis vero, quamris superiores fuerimus, quia longo intervallo distant et qub permulti suut, aegre poterimus imperare. Amentia vero est, bellum iis inferre, quos, si viceris, io potestate tua retinere nequeas, et si rem non feliciter gesseris, eamdem eos invadendi facultatem, quam prius, non sis habiturus.

[2] Sicilienses autem, ut quidem nunc se habent, mihi videntor multo etiam minus nobis formidabiles fore, si Syracusani iis imperent; qua re potissimum Egestoi nos territant.

[3] Nunc enim fortasse vernant, ut quique Lacedaemonio* rum favore ducuntur; at illo modo verisimile non est, fore, ut imperium imperio bellum inferat; quo enim modo cum Peloponnesiis nostrum imperium nobis eripuerint, verisimile est, ab iisdem Peloponnesiis ipsorum etiam imperium eodem modo eversum iri.

[4] Porro Graeci, qui illic sunt, maxime quidem nos extimescent, si eo non transmiserimus; deinde vero, si ostentatis nostris opibus brevi discesserimus : sed si quam cladem acceperimus, illi celerrime spr-ritu sumpto una cum iis, qui hic sunt, nos adorientur. Quae enim a nobis longissime distant, et quae famae nullum specimen dederunt, omnes haec admirationi esse scimus.

[5] Id quod nunc vobis, Athenienses, in Lacedaemoniis eorumque sociis accidit, qui, quoniam praeter opinionem eos superastis in illis rebus, in quibus eos antea formidabatis , jam illis contemptis, Siciliam etiam affectatis.

[6] Atqui oportet non propter adversariorum casus animos extollere, sed animos cohibendo confidere; neque existimare, Lacedaemonios quicquam aliud quam propter acceptae cladis ignominiam speculari, quanam ratione vel nunc quoque, si possint, labefactatis nobis, suam ignominiam deleant, idque tanto magis, quanto illi maximo et studio et tempore virtutis opinionem obtinere meditantur.

[7] Quare non de Egestaeis in Sicilia, viris barbaris, certamen nobis est, si eapimue, sed ut civitatem, quae per oligarcbiam nobis insidiatur, strenue caveamus.

La storia di Tucidide First1KGreek (Thucydides. Della storia di Tucidide volgarizzata libri otto. Anonymous translator. Florence: Tipografia Galileiana, 1835.) — 6.11 focus

« Eppure abbattendo questi ultimi potremo tenerli in dovere ; dove ancorché vinciamo i Siciliani difficilmente potremo dominarli a cagione della lontananza e moltitudine. Ora è stoltezza andar contro gente, vincendo la quale tu non possa ritenerla ; e non vincendola, tu t’abbi a trovar peggio che prima d'averla assaltata. E parmi che i Siciliani, nel loro stato presente, sieno per noi vie meno da temere, di quello che se i Siracusani gli sottomettano ; di che principalmente gli Egestei ci fanno temere. Conciossiachè, divisi come or sono, potrebbe ciascun popolo venir contro di noi per gratuirsi i Lacedemoni : ma in quell’altro modo non è presumibile che un impero vada contro un altro impero ; sendo che, siccome costoro coiPeloponnesi torrebbero a noi il nostro, cosi per l' istessa ragione i Peloponnesi probabilmente torrebbero ad essi il loro. A volere sbigottir veramente i Greci di Sicilia, o bisogna non andar colà, o almeno ritornarsene ben presto dopo aver mostrato le forze nostre ; perciocché tutti sappiamo che le cose lontane e che non hanno dato riprova dell’opinione che se ne ha , mettono di sé maraviglia. Che se avessimo una sconfitta ci piglierebbero subito in disprezzo, e co’Greci di là ci assalirebbero. E tale é appunto ora il caso vostro, o Ateniesi, rispetto ai Lacedemoni e loro alleati : perchè siccome gli avete superati contro Aspettativa in quel genere di guerra nel quale innanzi gli temevate, cosi ora gli dispregiate ed aspirate anche alla Sicilia. Badate però che non bisogna inorgoglire per le disgrazie dei nemici, ma prender fiducia quando si abbia depresso il loro animo , e stimare che i Lacedemoni mossi dalla vergogna non altro facciano che speculare in che modo possano , abbassati noi, trovare un bel compenso al proprio disdoro ; tanto più che con moltissima cura e da moltissimo tempo van facendo procaccio di opinione di valore. Per lo che , se abbiamo senno , non dobbiamo pigliar gara per genti barbare , quali sono gli Egestei di Sicilia, ma guardarci animosamente da una città che per la sua oligarchia c insidia.

Commentary

Commentary on Thucydides: Book 6 (Thucydides, Book VI. Marchant, Edgar C., editor. London: Macmillan and Company, 1909.) focus

τὴν π. δύναμιν —obj. of δείσαντες, while αὐτήν is obj. of καταπλαγῆτε.

καταπλαγῆτε — i.e. that fear may induce Camarina to join the A.

τοὺς . . λόγους —depends on δείσαντες. μέλλοντας is contrasted with παροῦσαν, λόγους with δύναμιν. ‘We sent out our cmbassy, not from a fear that . . but from a fear that the words that they intended to address to you before you could hear what we have to say, might persuade you.’ Notice that πρίν τι . . ἀκοῦσαι precedes μή, and consequently belongs to τοὺς μέλλοντας, not to πείσωσιν.

ᾗ πυνθάνεσθε —sc. ἥκειν: but ἥν is direct obj. of ὑπονοοῦμεν. (So Classen; Kruger and others explain ᾗ as attracted for ἥν, and ἥν as left unattracted for the sake of variety, but this is scaicely probable.)

κατοικίσαι . . ἐξοικἰσαι —paronomasia, adnominatio; cf. c. 76, 4 ἀξυνετωτέρου, κακοξυνετωτέρου: 79, 2 ἀλόγως . . εὐλόγῳ. It is very common in Thuc. See c. 72, 4.

τὰς μὲν ἐκει = πόλεις —Aegina, Scione, and Melos are especially referred to.

Χαλκιδέων —see c. 3, 3. The Chalcidians of Euboea are said to be ‘enslaved’ because their independence is gone. δουλεία often denotes the opposite of αὐτονομία .

δουλωσαμένους ἔχειν —cf. c. 39, 2 n. There is again an enthymeme here. See on c. 10, 5.

ἰδέᾳ —‘method.’

ἐκεῖνα — i.e. τὰ ἐκεῖ, their possessions in Greece.

ἔσχον , ‘obtamed.’ With

πειρῶνται supply σχεῖν, the infin. or partic. being often omitted with verbs that require the completion: e.g. v. 80 οὐ μέντοι εὐθύς γε ἀπέστη ἀλλὰ διενοεῖτο (sc. ἀποστῆναι) ὅτι καὶ τοὺς Ἀργείους ἑώρα (sc. ἀποστάντας).

ἡγεμόνες γάρ —the likelihood that the view expressed is correct is shown by an example from previous events. This is the argument known as τὸ εἰκός supported by παραδείγματα. There is another instance in c. 79, 1.

ἑκόντων τῶν τε Ἰώνων —cf. I. 95 ἐν τῇδε τῇ ἡγεμονίᾳ ἤδη βιαίου ὄντος (sc. Pausanias) . . οὐχ ἤκιστα οἱ Ἴωνες . . φοιτῶντες πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἠξίουν αὐτοὺς ἡγεμόνας σφῶν γενέσθαι. Herod. VIII. 3 ἀπείλοντο τὴν ἡγεμονἰαν τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους. Ath. Pol. c. 23 ἐπὶ τὴν ἀπόστασιν τὴν τῶν Ἰώνων ἀπὸ τῆς τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων συμμαχίας Ἀριστείδης ἦν ὁ προτρέψας. This was in 478-477 B.C. ἀπὸ σφῶν—τῶν Ἀθηναίων, i.e. ὅσοι ἄποικοι αὐτῶν ἦσαν (Schol.). Poppo quotes I. 12 Ἴωνας Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ νησιωτῶν τοὺς πολλοὺς ᾤκισαν (Ionia and the Cyclades).

ὡς ἐπὶ τοῦ Μ. τιμωρίᾳ —this was the primary object of the new confederacy.

τοὺς μέν —depends on κατεστρέψαντο. λιποστρατίαν is obj. to ἐπενεγκόντες. Plut. Cim. c. 11 of the allies, ἄνδρας καὶ ναῦς ὡς ἐτάχθησαν οὐ παρεῖχον .

ἐπ) ἀλλήλους στρατεύειν —sc. ἐπενεγκόντες: others were charged with making war on one another. This occurred in the case of Samos and Miletus ( I. 115 ).

τοῖς δέ —governed by ἐπενεγκόντες, in accordance with custom where a common object of a partic. and verb is near the partic. Cf. c. 77, 2.

εἶχον —sc. ἐπενεγκεῖν. Cf. I. 99 αἰτίαι ἄλλαι τε ἦσαν τῶν ἀποστάσεων καὶ μέγισται αἱ τῶν φόρων καὶ νεῶν ἔκδειαι .

κατεστρέψαντο —cf. Ath. Pol. c. 24 λαβόντες τὴν ἀρχὴν τοῖς συμμάχοις δεσποτικωτέρως ἐχρῶντο.

καὶ οὐ περὶ κτλ — ‘so, it seems ( ἄρα ironical), Athens was not contending for the freedom of Greece nor Greece for her own when they resisted the Persians: Athens resisted them in order to substitute dependence on herself for dependence on them; Greece resisted to secure a change to a new master, who had not less sense, but made a worse use of his cleverness’; i.e., as Freeman says, ‘the other Gks. had simply exchanged the Mede for a master of greater understand ing, but of understanding used only for mischief,’ as they found afterwaids.

οἱ δ’ ἐπί —strictly this should be οἱ δὲ δ. μεταβολῆς, still depending on περὶ δέ.

δεσπότου μ .—cf. c. 18, 7 n. The artificiality of this passage is censured by Dion. Hal.

Thucydides History of the Peloponnesian War 6.11

Theodor Braun (Translator)

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