Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, Theodor Braun (Translator), 5.7

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Kleon rührte sich indes eine Zeitlang nicht von der Stelle,
sah sich dann aber schließlich doch gezwungen, zu tun, was
Brasidas erwartet hatte. Denn seine Leute murrten über das
lange Stillsitzen und hielten sich darüber auf, was bei seiner
ungeschickten und schwächlichen Führung einem so erfahrenen
und kühnen Gegner gegenüber aus der Sache werden solle,
wie sie auch nur ungern mit ihm zu Felde gezogen wären.
Als er das merkte, brach er auf, um sie durch längeres Still
sitzen nicht noch unzufriedener zu machen, und setzte sich in
Marsch. Er rechnete dabei auf ebenso glücklichen Erfolg wie
bei der Unternehmung gegen Pylos, worauf er sich so viel zu
gute tat. Daß man sich ihm zur Schlacht stellen würde, dachte
er gar nicht. Nur um eine Übersicht über die Gegend zu ge
winnen, sagte er, begäbe er sich stromaufwärts, und wartete
auf Verstärkungen. Aber für den Fall, daß er schlagen müsse,
eine günstige Stellung zu wählen, hielt er nicht für nötig,
meinte vielmehr, die Stadt einfach einschließen und mit Sturm
nehmen zu können. Bei Amphipolis angelangt, ließ er sein
Heer auf einer abschüssigen Höhe haltmachen und betrachtete
sich selbst die sumpfige Niederung am Strymon und die Lage
der Stadt nach Thrakien hin. Dabei glaubte er, jeden Augen
blick ohne Schwertstreich wieder abziehen zu können; denn auf
der Mauer ließ sich niemand sehen, und ebensowenig kam vor
den Toren jemand zum Vorschein, die alle verschlossen blieben.
Deshalb bedauerte er schon, kein Sturmzeug mitgebracht zu
haben, sonst hätte er ja die von Truppen entblößte Stadt
gleich nehmen können.

History of the Peloponnesian War. Thucydides. Theodor Braun (Translator). Leipzig. 1917.

Current edition First1KGreek

Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs (German) (Thucydides. Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs. Braun, Theodor, translator. Leipzig: Insel-Verlag, 1917.)

Editions (1)

Ἱστορίαι Perseus (Thucydides. Historiae, Vol 1-2. Jones, Henry Stuart, editor. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1910. (1942 printing).) — 5.7.1 focus

[1] ὁ δὲ Κλέων τέως μὲν ἡσύχαζεν, ἔπειτα ἠναγκάσθη ποιῆσαι ὅπερ ὁ Βρασίδας προσεδέχετο.

[2] τῶν γὰρ στρατιωτῶν ἀχθομένων μὲν τῇ ἕδρᾳ, ἀναλογιζομένων δὲ τὴν ἐκείνου ἡγεμονίαν πρὸς οἵαν ἐμπειρίαν καὶ τόλμαν μετὰ οἵας ἀνεπιστημοσύνης καὶ μαλακίας γενήσοιτο καὶ οἴκοθεν ὡς ἄκοντες αὐτῷ ξυνῆλθον, αἰσθόμενος τὸν θροῦν καὶ οὐ βουλόμενος αὐτοὺς διὰ τὸ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ καθημένους βαρύνεσθαι, ἀναλαβὼν ἦγεν.

[3] καὶ ἐχρήσατο τῷ τρόπῳ ᾧπερ καὶ ἐς τὴν Πύλον εὐτυχήσας ἐπίστευσέ τι φρονεῖν· ἐς μάχην μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲ ἤλπισέν οἱ ἐπεξιέναι οὐδένα, κατὰ θέαν δὲ μᾶλλον ἔφη ἀναβαίνειν τοῦ χωρίου, καὶ τὴν μείζω παρασκευὴν περιέμενεν, οὐχ ὡς τῷ ἀσφαλεῖ, ἢν ἀναγκάζηται, περισχήσων, ἀλλ’ ὡς κύκλῳ περιστὰς βίᾳ αἱρήσων τὴν πόλιν.

[4] ἐλθών τε καὶ καθίσας ἐπὶ λόφου καρτεροῦ πρὸ τῆς Ἀμφιπόλεως τὸν στρατὸν αὐτὸς ἐθεᾶτο τὸ λιμνῶδες τοῦ Στρυμόνος καὶ τὴν θέσιν τῆς πόλεως ἐπὶ τῇ Θρᾴκῃ ὡς ἔχοι.

[5] ἀπιέναι τε ἐνόμιζεν, ὁπόταν βούληται, ἀμαχεί· καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲ ἐφαίνετο οὔτ’ ἐπὶ τοῦ τείχους οὐδεὶς οὔτε κατὰ πύλας ἐξῄει, κεκλῃμέναι τε ἦσαν πᾶσαι. ὥστε καὶ μηχανὰς ὅτι οὐκ ἀνῆλθεν ἔχων, ἁμαρτεῖν ἐδόκει· ἑλεῖν γὰρ ἂν τὴν πόλιν διὰ τὸ ἐρῆμον.

Translations (9)

The History of the Grecian War Perseus (Thucydides. The English works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury. Hobbes, Thomas. translator. London: John Bohn, 1843.) — 5.7.1 focus

[1] Cleon for a while lay still, but was afterwards forced to do as was expected by Brasidas.

[2] For the soldiers being angry with their stay there, and recounting with themselves what a command his would be, and with what ignorance and cowardice against what skill and boldness of the other, and how they came forth with him against their wills, he perceived their muttering, and being unwilling to offend them with so long a stay in one place, dislodged and led them forward.

[3] And he took the same course there, which having succeeded well before at Pylus gave him cause to think himself to have some judgment. For he thought not that any body would come forth to give him battle, and gave out he went up principally to see the place, and stayed for greater forces, not to secure him in case he should be compelled to fight, but that he might therewith environ the city on all sides at once, and in that manner take it by force.

[4] So he went up and set his army down on a strong hill before Amphipolis, standing himself to view the fens of the river Strymon and the situation of the city towards Thrace;

[5] and thought he could have retired again at his pleasure, without battle. For neither did any man appear upon the walls nor come out of the gates, which were all fast shut. Insomuch as he thought he had committed an error in coming without engines, because he thought he might by such means have won the city, as being without defendants.

History of the Peloponnesian War Perseus (Thucydides. History of the Peloponnesian War. Crawley, Richard, translator. London and Toronto: J. M. Dent and Sons Ltd.; New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., 1914.) — 5.7.1 focus

[1] After remaining quiet for some time, Cleon was at length obliged to do as Brasidas expected.

[2] His soldiers, tired of their inactivity, began also seriously to reflect on the weakness and incompetence of their commander and the skill and valor that would be opposed to him, and on their own original unwillingness to accompany him. These murmurs coming to the ears of Cleon, he resolved not to disgust the army by keeping it in the same place, and broke up his camp and advanced.

[3] The temper of the general was what it had been at Pylos , his success on that occasion having given him confidence in his capacity. He never dreamed of any one coming out to fight him, but said that he was rather going up to view the place; and if he waited for his reinforcements it was not in order to make victory secure in case he should be compelled to engage, but to be enabled to surround and storm the city.

[4] He accordingly came and posted his army upon a strong hill in front of Amphipolis , and proceeded to examine the lake formed by the Strymon, and how the town lay on the side of Thrace .

[5] He thought to retire at pleasure without fighting, as there was no one to be seen upon the wall or coming out of the gates, all of which were shut. Indeed, it seemed a mistake not to have brought down engines with him; he could then have taken the town, there being no one to defend it.

Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs First1KGreek (Thucydides. Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs. Wahrmund, Adolf, translator. Stuttgart: Krais and Hoffmann, 1864.) — 5.7 focus

Eine Zeit lang nun hielt sich Kleon ruhig, dann wurde er
aber doch genöthigt zu< thun, was Brasidas erwartet hatte. Seine
Soldaten waren nämlich über das unthätige Stillsitzen unwirsch und
stellten Vergleiche an, mit welchem Unverstände und welcher
Mattherzigkeit gegenüber solcher Erfahrung und Kühnheit der Feldzug von
Seiten des Kleon werde geführt werden; dazu waren sie schon von
Haus aus nur widerwillig unter seiner Führung ausgezogen. Da er
nun den Wind merkte und nicht wollte, daß sie sich durch längeres
unthätiges Verweilen belästigt fühlten, so hieß er sie aufbrechen und
führte sie aus Ei'on. Und auf dieselbe Art, die ihm bei Pylos so
glückliche Früchte getragen hatte, — weßhalb er sich denn auch sehr klug
dünkte — verfuhr er auch hier. Er glaubte nämlich gar nicht, daß
Einer zur Schlacht gegen ihn ausziehen werde, sondern sagte, daß er
nur ausziehe, um die Gegend in Augenschein zu nehmen. Er kam
also und ließ sein Heer vor Amphipolis auf einem starken Hügel
Stellung nehmen, während er selbst die Sumpfgegend des Strymon
und die Lage der Stadt gegen Thrakien hin untersuchte. Er dachte
aber, zu jeder Zeit, wann er nur wolle, ohne Kampf abziehen zu
können; denn weder zeigte sich Jemand auf den Mauern, noch zogen
welche zu den Thoren heraus, sondern es blieben diese alle geschlossen.
Deßhalb rechnete er es sich auch als einen Fehler an, daß er keine
Maschinen von Athen mitgenommen habe; denn mit diesen, dachte
er, hätte er die von Vertheidigern entblößte Stadt gewiß genommen.

Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponèse First1KGreek (Thucydides. Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponnése, Vol. 1-2. Zévort, Marie Charles, translator. Paris: Charpentier, 1852.) — 5.7 focus

VII. Cléon, après s’être tenu d’abord en repos, fut ensuite forcé de faire ce qu’attendait Brasidas; ses soldats s’ennuyaient de leur inaction; ils dissertaient entre eux de son incapacité pour le commandement, de tant d’ignorance et de lâcheté qui allaient être opposées à tant de science et de courage, de la répugnance avec laquelle ils l’avaient suivi. Cléon, instruit de ces rumeurs, et ne voulant pas les lasser en les retenant trop longtemps dans le même lieu, leva le camp et se porta en avant. Il agit comme à Pylos, où le succès lui avait persuadé qu’il avait quelque capacité; il comptait, du reste, que personne ne sortirait pour l’attaquer, et ne gagnait la hauteur, disait-il, que pour mieux découvrir la place; s’il attendait du renfort, ce n’était pas pour s’assurer la supériorité, dans le cas où il lui faudrait combattre, mais pour entourer la ville et l’emporter de vive force. Il s’avança donc, et fit camper son armée sur une colline, dans une forte position, en face d’Amphipolis. De là il contemplait le lac formé par le Strymon et l’assiette de la ville du côté de la Thrace; il croyait pouvoir, à volonté, se retirer sans combat : car personne ne se montrait sur les remparts, personne ne sortait des portes, qui toutes restaient fermées. Il se reprochait même, comme une faute, de n’avoir pas amené des machines, se disant que, dans l’état d’abandon où se trouvait la ville, il l’eût emportée.

Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponnése First1KGreek (Thucydides. Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponnése. Bétant, Élie-Ami, translator. Paris: Librairie de L. Hachette, 1863.) — 5.7 focus

Ctéon ne remuait pas encore; mais enfin il fut obligé de faire ce que Brasidas attendait. En effet ses soldats, fatigués de leur inaction, se prirent Il considérer comment il les allait conduire; à combien d’expérience et d’audace il opposerait son ineptie et sa pusillanimité ; enfin avec quelle répugnance ils avaient quitté leurs foyers pour le suivre. Informé de ces murmures, Qiéon ste voulut pas que ses soldats s’ennuyassent de leur immobilité. Il leva le camp et se mit en marche: La manoeuvre qu’il employa fut la même qui lui avait réussi à Pylos et im avait fait croire à son génie. Il pensait que personne n’oserait l’attaquer. Il montait, disait-il, pour une simple exploration; s’il attendait du renfort, ce n’était pas pour s’assurer, en cas d’engagement, la supériorité du nombre, mais pour investir la place et l’emporter de haute lutte.

Il s’avança âme et prit position en face d’Amphipolis sur une colline escarpée ; puis il alla jeter un .coup d’œü sur le lac formé par le Strymon¹ et sur le site de la ville du côté de Thrace. Il croyait pouvoir à son gré se retirer sans combat. Personne ne se montrait sur les murs; personne ne sortait des portes, qui toutes étaient fermées. Aussi regrettait-il de n’avoir pas amené des machines, s’imaginant qu'il aurait pu prendre la ville, dans l’abandon où elle se trouvait.

History of the Peloponnesian War First1KGreek (Thucydides, Vol. 1-4. Smith, Charles Foster, translator. London and Cambridge, MA: Heinemann and Harvard University Press, 1919-1923.) — 5.7.1 focus

[1] Cleon kept quiet for a while, then was forced to do just what Brasidas had expected.

[2] For when the soldiers began to be annoyed at sitting still and to discuss the quality of his leadership—what experience and daring there was on the other side and what incompetence and cowardice would be pitted against it, and how unwillingly they had come with him from home—he became aware of their grumbling, and unwilling that they should be exasperated by remaining inactive in the same place, marched out with them.

[3] He adopted the same course in which he had been successful at Pylos and so had acquired confidence in his own wisdom; for he had no expectation that anybody would come against him for battle, but he was going up, he said, rather to reconnoitre the place; and in fact he was waiting for the larger force,¹ not with a view to gaining the victory without risk should he be forced to fight, but to surrounding the town and taking it by force of arms.

[4] Accordingly he went and posted his force on a strong hill before Amphipolis, and was himself surveying the marshy part of the Strymon and the situation of the city in respect to the surrounding Thracian country, and he thought that he could withdraw whenever he pleased without a battle;

[5] for no one was visible on the wall or was seen coming out by the gates, which were all closed. He therefore thought that he had made a mistake in coming up without storming-machines; for he might have taken the town, since it was undefended.

History of the Peloponnesian War First1KGreek (Thucydides. The history of the Peloponnesian War, Volume 1-2. Dale, Henry, translator. London: Heinemann and Henry G. Bohn, 1851-1852.) — 5.7.1 focus

[1] Cleon remained quiet for some time, but was then compelled to do what Brasidas had expected.

[2] For his soldiers being annoyed at sitting still, and reflecting, with regard to his command, against what skill and daring in the enemy, with what ignorance and cowardice in himself it would be held, and how unwillingly they had accompanied him from home, he perceived their murmers; and not wishing them to be exasperated by remaining stationary in the same place, he broke up his camp and led them forward.

[3] And ¹ he adopted the same plan as he had also succeeded with at Pylus, and therefore felt confident in his own discernment. For that any one would come out against him to battle, he had not so much as a thought; but said that he was going up rather to see the place, and was waiting for his more numerous forces; not for the purpose of gaining a victory without any risk, should he be compelled to engage, but of surrounding the city on all sides, and so taking it by storm.

[4] Having come, therefore, and posted his army on a strong hill in front of Amphipolis, he himself proceeded to reconnoitre the lake formed by the Strymon, and what was the position of the city on the side of Thrace.

[5] He thought to retire, whenever he pleased, without a battle; for indeed there was neither any one seen on the wall, nor did any one come out through the gates, but they were all closed: so that he even considered he had made a mistake in not having come down with engines; for he believed that in that case he might have taken the city.

Historia Belli Peloponnesiaci First1KGreek (Historia Belli Peloponnesiaci. Haase, Friedrich, translator. Paris: Firmin Didot, 1869.) — 5.7.1 focus

[1] Cleo vero primo quidem quiescebat, deinde vero coactus est faccre, quod Brasidas exspectabat.

[2] Quum enim milites diuturnum illud otium moleste ferrent, et reputarent, quale futurum esset illius imperium, quanta cum impentia et ignavia conjunctum adversus quantam peritiam et audaciam, et domo jam ut eum inviti secuti essent, ille quum rumorem istum sensisset ipsosque, quod in eodem loco desiderent, gravari nollet, motis castris discedebat.

[3] Et usus est eadem ratione, qua quum apud Pylum rem feliciter gessisset, aliquid se sapere putavit; ad pugnam enim ne exspectavit quidem, ut quis contra se prodiret, sed potius se adseendere dicebat, ut locum inspiceret, et majorem apparatum exspectabat, non ut firmissimo copiarum praesidio, m cogeretur, hostem circumfunderet, sed ut urbem copiis undique circumdatam vi expugnaret.

[4] Profectus igitur, castrisque in colle natura munito ante Amphipolin positis, ipse contemplabatur Strymonis stagna, et qualis esset urbis situs Thraciam versus.

[5] Et existimabat, se, quotiescunque voluisset, sine certamine illinc discessurum; nemo enim vel supra muros conspiciebatur, vel portis exibat, omnesque clausae erant. Quamobrem etiam existimabat se peccasse, quod sine machinis eo venisset; capturum enim se urbem fuisse, quod esset deserta.

La storia di Tucidide First1KGreek (Thucydides. Della storia di Tucidide volgarizzata libri otto. Anonymous translator. Florence: Tipografia Galileiana, 1835.) — 5.7 focus

Cleone frattanto stava quieto, ma fu poi costretto a fare come Brasida aveva preveduto. Poiché i soldati annolatl da quella dimora andavano confrontando la capitaneria di Cleone e di Brasida , considerando l’imperìzia ed il languore di quello verso la pratica e l’ardire di questo, e la repugnanza colla quale avevano lasciate le case loro per seguirlo. Laonde Cleone intesi questi bisbigli, non vo; fendo che si adirassero per quel soggiornare nel medesimo luogo, levò il campo e fece appunto quello che aveva fatto , a Pilo, ove per quel felice successo levossi in fiducia di : essere uomo di senno. Imperocché sperava che nessuno verrebbe incontro a combatterlo ; e diceva di salire più in alto per avere il prospetto del paese, ed aspettava maggior fornimento non già per bisogno di assicurarsi della vittoria se fosse astretto a combattere, ma per espugnare a viva forza la città cingendola intorno. Giunto adunque sopra una forte : collina dirimpetto ad Àmfipoli vi accampò l’esercito, e da per sé osservava i paduli formati dallo Strimone e la situazione della città dalla parte di Tracia ; e stimava di poter quindi ritirarsi quando gli piacesse, senza combattere, poiché nessuno si affacciava di su le mura , né veruno usciva dalle , porte che tutte erano chiuse. Talché giudicava d’ avere errato a non portar seco le macchine colle quali avrebbe fespugnato quella città abbandonata.

Thucydides History of the Peloponnesian War 5.7

Theodor Braun (Translator)

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