Thucydides History of the Peloponnesian War 1.33

[1] "Now if you yield unto us in what we request, this coincidence on our part of need will on your part be honourable for many reasons. First, in this respect, that you lend your help to such as have suffered and not to such as have committed the injustice. And next, considering that you receive into league such as have at stake their whole fortune, you shall so place your benefit as to have a testimony of it, if ever any can be so, indelible.

[2] Besides this, the greatest navy but your own is ours. Consider then, what rarer hap, and of greater grief to your enemies, can befall you than that that power which you would have prized above any money or other requital should come voluntarily and without all danger or cost present itself to your hands, bringing with it reputation amongst most men, a grateful mind from those you defend, and strength to yourselves. All which have not happened at once to many. And few there be of those that sue for league that come not rather to receive strength and reputation than to confer it.

[3] If any here think that the war wherein we may do you service will not at all be, he is in an error and seeth not how the Lacedaemonians, through fear of you, are already in labour of the war; and that the Corinthians, gracious with them and enemies to you, making way for their enterprise, assault us now in the way to the invasion of you hereafter, that we may not stand amongst the rest of their common enemies, but that they may be sure beforehand either to weaken us or to strengthen their own estate.

[4] It must therefore be your part, we offering and you accepting the league, to begin with them and to anticipate plotting rather than to counterplot against them.

„Euch aber, wenn ihr uns willfahrt, wird der Zufall, der
uns als Hilfsbedürftige zu euch führt, in mancher Hinsicht Vortheil
bringen. Für's Erste werdet ihr Unrechtleidenden Hilfe leisten und ¹
nicht solchen, welche Anderen Schaden zufügen; dann bietet ihr eure
Hand solchen, die um ihre höchsten Güter kämpfen, und werdet sie
euch in unauslöschlicher Dankbarkeit verbinden, und endlich besitzen
wir eine Flotte, die außer der eurigen jede andere übertrifft.
Ueberleget, ob es einen selteneren und euren Feinden unerwünschteren
Glücksfall geben kann, als wenn eine Macht, die ihr gern mit viel Geld und
Gunst auf eure Seite gezogen hättet, ganz aus eigenem Antrieb und
ohne alle Gefahren und Kosten euerseits sich anbietet, die noch dazu
vor der Welt eure edle Gesinnung in's Licht stellt, euch die
Dankbarkeit derer sichert, denen eure Hilfe wird, und eure eigene Macht
vergrößert. So viel Gutes vereint ist zu jeder Zeit nur Wenigen zu
Theil geworden, und selten bringen die, welche um
Bundesgenossenschaften bitten, denen, welche sie darum angehen, die gleiche Sicherung
ihrer Macht und des guten Rufes zu, die sie selbst von jenen zu
empfangen gekommen sind. Wenn aber Jemand glaubt, daß der
Kriegsfall nicht eintreten werde, für welchen wir euch von Nutzen sein
könnten, so irrt er sich und merkt nicht, wie die Lakedämonier aus Furcht
vor Ench bereits auf Krieg sinnen, und daß die Korinther, die eure
Feinde sind, bei jenen aber viel vermögen, vorerst mit uns fertig zu
werden wünschen, um dann gegen euch loszugehen, damit wir nicht in
gemeinsamer Feindschaft gegen sie zusammenstehen, und damit sie von
Zweien wenigstens Eins erreichen, nämlich entweder uns Schaden
zuzufügen, oder ihre eigene Macht zu vermehren. Unsere ^gemeinsames
Sache nun ist es, ihnen den Vorsprung abzugewinnen, indem wir
euch die Kampfgenossenschaft antragen, und ihr sie annehmt, um dann
selbst mit dem Angriff zuvorzukommen, anstatt hinterher auf
Vertheidigung zu denken."

XXXIII. « Si vous cédez à nos prières, ce sera pour vous une chose heureuse, à bien des égards, que nous ayons eu besoin de votre appui ; d’abord vous viendrez en aide à un peuple victime d’une injustice et qui ne porte aucun préjudice aux autres ; ensuite, en nous accueillant au moment des plus grands périls, vous nous rendez un service signalé et à jamais mémorable ; enfin notre flotte est, après la vôtre, la plus nombreuse de la Grèce. Songez combien est rare et heureux pour vous, combien affligeant pour vos ennemis un pareil concours de circonstances : une puissance dont l’alliance ne vous eût point paru achetée trop cher au prix de riches trésors et d’une vive reconnaissance, est là, qui s’offre d’elle-même, qui se livre, sans danger ni dépense pour vous ! Vous obtenez du même coup réputation de justice, reconnaissance de ceux que vous secourez, et accroissement de puissance pour vous-mêmes ! avantages qui, dans la suite des siècles, ne se sont offerts que bien rarement réunis. Car il est bien rare qu'un peuple, sollicitant une alliance, apporte à ceux qu’il implore autant de sécurité et d’éclat qu’il doit en recevoir luimême.

« Que si quelqu’un de vous ne croit pas à l’éventualité d’une guerre dans laquelle nous puissions vous être utiles, il se trompe ; il ne voit pas que les Lacédémoniens désirent la guerre parce qu’ils vous redoutent ; que les Corinthiens, puissants par eux-mêmes et animés de sentiments hostiles à votre égard, commencent par nous attaquer aujourd’hui pour en venir ensuite à vous, de crainte que notre union contre eux, cimentée par une haine commune, ne leur fasse manquer le double but qu’ils se proposent, nous nuire, et affermir leur propre puissance. Notre intérêt réciproque est de prendre les devants, nous en vous offrant, vous en acceptant notre alliance ; mieux vaut prévenir leurs desseins que d'avoir à les déjouer.

« Les circonstances qui nous obligent à demander votre protection auront pour vous, si vous nous l’accordez, divers avantages : d’abord vous soutiendrez des opprimés contre des oppresseurs; puis en accueillant un peuple menacé dans ses plus chers intérêts, vous lui rendrez un service dont il gardera une mémoire éternelle; enfin nous possédons, après vous, la marine la plus forte. Et considérez si ce n’est pas le coup de fortune le plus rare pour vous, le plus fâcheux pour vos ennemis, que de voir une puissance, dont naguère l’accession vous eût paru sans prix et eût mérité votre gratitude, venir à vous d’elle-même, se donnant sans qu’il vous en coûte ni dépense ni danger, et vous procurant l’approbation universelle, la reconnaissance de vos protégés et un surcroît de forces pour vous-mêmes, avantages qu’il est presque sans exemple de trouver réunis. Rarement ceux qui sollicitent une alliance apportent à leurs alliés futurs autant de gloire et de force qu’ils en, reçoivent.

« Si quelqu’un de vous croit qu’il n’éclatera point de guerre où nous puissions vous être utiles, il s’abuse et ne s’aperçoit pas que les Lacédémoniens, par suite de la crainte que vous leur inspirez, brûlent de prendre les armes ; tandis que les Corinthiens, qui ont de l’ascendant sur eux et qui vous sont hostiles, cherchent maintenant à nous soumettre pour vous attaquer ensuite. Ils veulent nous empêcher, vous et nous, d’unir contre eux nos inimitiés; ils veulent saisir l’occasion de nous affaiblir ou de se fortifier eux-mêmes. Notre devoir à nous, c’est de prendre les devants, les uns en offrant, les autres en acceptant cette alliance, et de prévenir leurs attaques plutôt que d’avoir à les repousser.

[1] " For yourselves, if you concede what we ask, by a happy concurrence of events Athens can get both honour and advantage in many ways: first, you will be giving your aid to those who are wronged and not to those who injure others; next, by taking into alliance men whose most vital interests are at stake, you will lay up for yourselves a claim for gratitude with a record which will abide in our memories for ever;

[2] and, lastly, we have a navy greater than any but your own. Think of it now, what good fortune could be rarer, more vexatious to your foes, than this—that the power which you would have accounted it worth much money and gratitude to acquire should become yours unbidden, offering itself to you without danger or expense, and bringing you, besides, a good name before the world, gratitude from those wio are to receive your help, and enhanced strength for yourselves? To few in all history have such opportunities fallen all at the same time, and few are they who, when they beg for an alliance, come offering to those to whom they make their appeal as large a degree of security and honour as they expect to receive.
  "

[3] Now as to the war which would give us occasion to be of service, if anyone of you thinks it will not occur he errs in judgment, and fails to perceive that the Lacedaemonians, through fear of you, are eager for war, and that the Corinthians, who have great influence with them and are enemies of yours, ¹ are making a beginning with us now ² with a view to a subsequent attack upon you, in order that we may not be led by our common hatred to take our stand together against them, and that they may not fail, before we unite, to attain their two objects—to harm us and to strengthen themselves.

[4] It is our business, on the other hand, to get the start of them—we offering and you accepting the alliance—and to forestall their schemes rather than to counteract them.

[1] "Now if you are persuaded by us, the occurrence of our request will be honourable to you in many respects: first, because you will be granting the assistance to men who are injured, and not injuring others: in the next place, by receiving men who have their highest interests at stake, you would bestow the obligation with testimony [to the fact] ¹ that would, as far as possible, be always remembered;

[2] and, [lastly,] we are in possession of a navy the largest except yours. And consider what good fortune is more rare, or what more annoying to the enemy, than if that power, the addition of which to yours you would have valued above much money and favour, come of its own accord, offering itself without dangers and expense; and moreover affording, in the eyes of the world at large, a character for goodness, and to those whom you will assist, obligation; and to yourselves, strength; all of which advantages together have fallen to the lot of few indeed in the whole course of time: and few are there who, when begging alliance, go conferring safety and honour on the men whose aid they invoke, no less than to receive them.

[3] And as for the war in which we should be useful, if any of you do not think that it will arise, he is deceived in his opinion; and does not observe that the Lacedaemonians, through their fear of you, are longing for war and that the Corinthians have power with them, and are hostile to you, and are now first subduing us with a view to attacking you, that we may not stand with each other in common hostility to them; and that they may not fail to gain one of two advantages, either to injure us, or to strengthen themselves.

[4] But it is our business, on the contrary, to be beforehand with them, by our offering and your accepting the alliance; and to plot against them first, rather than to meet their plots against us.

[1] « Erit autem, si nos audieritis, casus hic, qui nobis petendi necessitatem attulit, vobis multis nominibus honorificus, primum quidem, quod iis, qui injuriam patiuntur, non autem aliis nocent, opem feretis, deinde vero, si in maximarum rerum discrimen adductos recipiatis, beneficium quam fieri potest maxime cum aeterno testimonio collocetis; et classem habemus, quae, vestra excepta, omnium maxima est.

[2] Ac considerate, quaenam rarior prosperitatis occasio, quaeve hostibus molestior esse possil, quam si ea potentia, quam vobis esse adjunctam magnae pecuniae, magnaeque gratiae anteposuissetis, adsit sponte sua, sine periculis et sumptu se ipsam offerens et praeterea apud multitudinem quidem afTerens virtutis opinionem; illis vero, quibus opem feretis, gratiam, et vobis ipsis potentiam. Quae ex omni temporum memoria perpaucis simul omnia contigerunt; paucique sunt, qui illis, a quibus belli societatem petunt, praesidium et ornamentum haud minus daturi, quam ab ipsis accepturi veniant.

[3] Bellum autem, in quo vobis utiles esse possimus, si quis vestrum sit, qui nullum fore arbitretur, is profecto fallitur opinione, nec videt, Lacedaemonios vestrae potentiae metu belli gerendi cupidos esse, et Corinthios apud illos multum valere vobisque inimicos esse, et, dum nos primos nunc aggrediuntur, gradum facere ad vos invadendos, ne communi odio in eos conspiremus, neve alterutro frustrentur, ut prius aut nobis damnum inferant, aut sihimet firmitudinem comparent.

[4] Nostrum contra est antevertere illos, dum nos ollerimus, vos accipitis societatem, et insidias struere potius, quam defendere.

« Ma se ci compiacerete, la congiuntura del nostro bisogno per voi sarà bella per molti rispetti. Primieramente porterete soccorso a gente ingiuriata, non già che offende altrui : dipoi, perchè avendoci accolti mentre corriamo gli estremi rischi, tal grazia ne compartirete di cui resterà la più indelebile ricordanza. Di più , dalla vostra in fuori, abbiam noi flotta la più considerabile : ora , osservate qual più rara felice occasione per voi, o più molesta ai nemici dar si possa, di quella che una potenza ( ad aggiugnervi la quale avreste speso tanto denaro e tanta gratitudine ) si offra di per sè stessa , dandosi a voi senza niuna vostra spesa o pericolo, che inoltre fama vi arrechi di virtù verso il pubblico, ingeneri riconoscenza in chi soccorriate, ed a voi medesimi aggiunga forza e vigore. Vantaggi invero che , tutti insieme riuniti, si sono in ogni tempo conseguiti da pochi : e ben rari son quelli che, domandando allenza , si presentino a coloro cui la domandano per recare, più presto che per ricevere, sicurezza e decoro. E se taluno crede che non nascerà la guerra, per la quale noi potremmo esservi utili , la sbaglia nel suo pensiero , e non s’accorge che i Lacedemoni, per la paura che han di voi, non veggon l' ora di farvi guerra ; che i Corintii , da per se potenti , sono anche vostri nemici , e che ora incominciano dal preoccupar noi per farsi strada ad assalir voi, affinchè voi e noi animati da odio comune non ci mettiamo d’accordo contro di loro , e così vadano falliti in una di queste due mire, o di abbatter noi, o di afforzare sè stessi.