Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria, ed. Harold Edgeworth Butler, 9.3

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[1] verborum vero figurae et mutatae sunt semper et, utcunque valuit consuetudo, mutantur. itaque , si antiquum sermonem nostro comparemus, paene iam quidquid loquimur figura est, ut hac re invidere, non ut veteres et Cicero praecipue, hanc rem, et incumbere illi, non in illum, et plenum vino non vini, et huic non hunc adulari iam dicitur et mille alia; utinamque non peiora vincant.

[2] verum schemata λέξεως duorum sunt generum: alterum loquendi rationem vocant, alterum maxime collocatione exquisitum est. quorum tametsi utrumque convenit orationi, tamen possis illud grammaticum hoc rhetoricum magis dicere. prius fit iisdem generibus quibus vitia. esset enim orationis schema vitium, si non peteretur, sed accideret.

[3] verum auctoritate, vetustate, consuetudine plerumque defenditur, saepe etiam ratione quadam. ideoque , cum sit a simplici rectoque loquendi genere deflexa, virtus est, si habet probabile aliquid, quod sequatur. una tamen in re maxime utilis, ut cotidiani ac semper eodem modo formati sermonis fastidium levet et nos a vulgari dicendi genere defendat.

[4] quodsi quis parce et, cum res poscet, utetur; velut asperso quodam condimento iucundior erit; at qui nimium adfectaverit, ipsam illam gratiam varietatis amittet. quanquam sunt quaedam figurae ita receptae, ut paene iam hoc ipsum nomen effugerint; quae etiamsi fuerint crebriores, consuetas aures minus ferient.

[5] nam secretae et extra vulgarem usum positae ideoque magis notabiles, ¹ ut novitate aurem excitant, ita copia satiant, et se non obvias fuisse dicenti sed conquisitas et ex omnibus latebris extractas congestasque declarant.

[6] fiunt ergo et circa genus figurae in nominibus; nam et oculis capti talpae et timidi dammae dicuntur a Vergilio; sed subest ratio, quia sexus uterque altero significatur, tamque mares esse talpas dammasque quam feminas certum est; et in verbis, ut fabricatus est gladium et inimicum poenitus es.

[7] quod mirum minus est, quia in natura verborum est et quae facimus patiendi modo saepe dicere, ut arbitror, suspicor, et contra faciendi quae patimur, ut vapulo; ideoque frequens permutatio est et pleraque utroque modo efferuntur: luxuriatur, luxuriat; fluctuatur, fluctuat; adsentior, adsentio.

[8] est figura et in numero, vel cum singulari pluralis subiungitur, gladio pugnacissima gens Romani ( gens enim ex multis), vel ex diverso,

qui² non risere parentes,

nec deus hunc mensa dea nec dignata cubili est;

Ex illis enim, qui non risere, hic quem non dignata.

[9] * satura est

sed nostrum istud vivere triste

aspexi ,

cum infinito verbo sit usus pro appellatione; nostram enim vitam vult intelligi. utimur et verbo pro participio,

magnum dat ferre talentum,

tanquam ferendum, et participio pro verbo, volo datum.

[10] interim etiam dubitari potest, cui vitio simile sit schema: ut in hoc

virus est vitium fugere:

aut enim partes orationis mutat ex illo virtus est fuga vitiorum, aut casus ex illo virtutis est vilium fugere; multo tamen hoc utroque excitatius. iunguntur interim schemata: Sthenelus sciens pugnae; est enim scitus Sthenelus³ pugnandi.

[11] transferuntur et tempora: Timarchides negat esse ei periculum a securi, (praesens enim pro praeterito positum est) et status:

hoc Ithacus velit;

et, ne morer, per omnia genera per quae fit soloecismus.

[12] haec quoque est, quam ἑτεροίωσιν vocant, cui non dissimilis ἐξαλλαγή dicitur, ut apud Sallustium neque ea res falsum me habuit et duci probare. ex quibus fere praeter novitatem brevitas etiam peti solet. unde eo usque processum est, ut non paeniturum pro non acturo paenitentiam et visuros ad videndum missos idem auctor dixerit.

[13] quae ille quidem fecerit schemata, an idem vocari possint, videndum, quia recepta sint. nam receptis etiam vulgo auctore contenti sumus: ut nunc evaluit rebus agentibus, quod Pollio in Labieno damnat, et contumeliam fecit, quod a Cicerone reprehendi notum est; ad fici enim contumelia dicebant.

[14] alia commendatio vetustatis, cuius amator unice Vergilius fuit:

vel cum se pavidum contra mea iurgia iactat.—

⁴

progeniem sed enim Troiano a sanguine duci

audierat .

Quorum similia apud veteres tragicos comicosque sunt plurima.

[15] illud et in consuetudine remansit enimvero. his amplius apud eundem:

nam quis te iuuenum confidentissime,

quo sermonis initium fit. sed

tam magis illa tremens et tristibus effera flammis,

quam magis effuso crudescunt sanguine pugnae.

Quod est versum ex illo: quam magis aerumna urget, tam magis ad malefaciendum viget.

[16] pleni talibus antiqui sunt; initio Eunuchi Terentius quid igitur faciam? inquit. alius : ain⁵ tandem leno? Catullus in Epithalamio,

dum innupta manet, dum cara suis est,

cum prius dum significet quoad, sequens usque eo.

[17] ex Graeco vero translata vel Sallustii plurima, quale est, vulgus amat fieri, vel Horatii, nam id maxime probat, nec ciceris, nec longae invidit avenae, vel Vergilii,

Tyrrhenum navigat aequor.

sed iam vulgatum actis quoque, saucius pectus.

[18] ex eadem parte figurarum priore dicto ⁶ et adiectio est, quae videri potest supervacua, sed non sine gratia est:

nam neque Parnasi vobis iuga, nam neque Pindi;

potest enim deesse alterum nam. et apud Horatium illud,

Fabriciumque ,

hunc et intonsis ⁷ Curium capillis.

sed detractiones, quae in complexu sermonis aut vitium habent aut figuram;

accede ad ignem, iam calesces plus satis.

plus enim quam satis est.

[19] nam de altera quae detractione pluribus dicendum ⁸ est. utimur vulgo et comparativis pro absolutis, ut cum se quis infirmiorem esse dicet; duo inter se comparativa committimus: si te, Catilina, comprehendi, si interfici iussero, credo, erit verendum mihi, ne non potius hoc omnes boni serius a me quam quisquam crudelius factum esse dicat.

[20] sunt et illa non similia soloecismo quidem, sed tamen numerum mutantia, quae et tropis adsignari solent, ut de uno pluraliter dicamus:

sed nos immensum spatiis confecimus aequor;

et de pluribus singulariter,

haud secus ac patriis acer Romanus in armis.

Specie diversa sed genere eadem et haec sunt,

[21]

neve tibi ad solem vergant vineta cadentem.—

ne mihi tum molles sub divo carpere somnos,

neu dorso nemoris libeat iacuisse per herbas,

non enim nescio cui alii prius nec postea sibi uni, sed omnibus praecipit. sed de nobis loquimur tanquam de aliis: dicit Seruius, negat Tullius.

[22] sed nostra persona utimur pro aliena, et alios pro aliis fingimus. utriusque rei exemplum pro Caecina. Pisonem , adversae partis advocatum, adloquens Cicero dicit, restituisse te dixti; nego me ex edicto praetoris restitutum esse; verum enim est illud; restituisse se ⁹ Aebutius dixit, Caecina nego me ex edicto praetoris restitutum esse; et ipsum dixti, excussa syllaba, figura in verbo.

[23] illa quoque ex eodem genere possunt videri: unum quod interpositionem vel interclusionem dicimus, Graeci παρένθεσιν, παρέμπτωσιν vocant, dum continuationi sermonis medius aliqui sensus intervenit: ego cum te ( mecum enim saepissime loquitur ) patriae reddidissem; cui adiiciunt hyperbaton,

[24] quod inter tropos esse noluerunt; alterum, quod est ei figurae sententiarum, quae ἀποστροφή dicitur, simile, sed non sensum mutat, verum formam eloquendi:

Decios, Marios magnosque Camillos,

Scipiadas duros bello et te, maxime Caesar.

[25] acutius adhuc in Polydoro,

fas omne abrumpit, Polydorum obtruncat et auro

vi potitur. quid non mortalia pectora cogis

auri sacra fames?

hoc, qui tam parva momenta nominibus discreverunt, μετάβασιν vocant, quam et aliter fieri putant:

quid loquor? aut ubi sum?

[26] coniunxit autem παρένθεσιν et ἀποστροφήν Vergilius illo loco,

haud procul inde citae Mettum in diversa quadrigae

distulerant , (at tu dictis Albane maneres!)

raptabatque viri mendacis viscera Tullus.

Haec schemata aut his similia,

[27] quae erunt per mutationem, adiectionem, detractionem, ordinem, et convertunt in se auditorem nec languere patiuntur subinde aliqua notabili figura excitatum, et habent quandam ex illa vitii similitudine gratiam, ut in cibis interim acor ipse iucundus est. quod continget, si neque supra modum multae fuerint nec eiusdem generis aut iunctae aut frequentes, quia satietatem ut varietas earum, ita raritas effugit.

[28] illud est acrius genus, quod non tantum in ratione positum est loquendi, sed ipsis sensibus cum gratiam tum etiam vires accommodat. E quibus primum sit, quod fit adiectione. plura sunt genera; nam et verba geminantur, vel amplificandi gratia, ut occidi , occidi, non Sp. Maelium; alterum est enim quod indicat, alterum quod adfirmat; vel miserandi, ut

A Corydon, Corydon.

[29] quae eadem figura nonnunquam per ironiam ad elevandum convertitur. similis geminationis post aliquam interiectionem repetitio est, sed paulo etiam vehementior: bona , miserum me! ( consumptis enim lacrimis tamen infixus haeret animo dolor ) bona, inquam, Cn. Pompeii acerbissimae voci subiecta praeconis. — vivis et vivis non ad deponendam, sed ad confirmandam audaciam.

[30] sed ab iisdem verbis plura acriter et instanter incipiunt: nihilne te nocturnum praesidium Palatii, nihil urbis vigiliae, nihil timor populi, nihil consensus bonorum omnium, nihil hic munitissimus habendi senatus locus, nihil horum ora uultusque mouerunt? et in iisdem desinunt: quis eos postulavit? Appius . Quis produxit? Appius .

[31] quanquam hoc exemplum ad aliud quoque schema pertinet, cuius et initia inter se et fines iidem sunt, quis et quis, Appius et Appius . quale est: qui sunt, qui foedera saepe ruperunt? Carthaginienses. qui sunt, qui crudelissime bellum gesserunt? Carthaginienses. qui sunt, qui Italiam deformarunt? Carthaginienses. qui sunt, qui sibi ignosci postulant? Carthaginienses.

[32] etiam in contrapositis vel comparativis solet respondere primorum verborum alterna repetitio, quod modo huius esse loci potius dixi: vigilas tu de node, ut tuis consultatoribus respondeas; ille, ut eo quo intendit mature cum exercitu perveniat. te gallorum, illum buccinarum cantus exsuscitat. tu actionem instituis; ille aciem instruit. tu caves, ne consultores tui, ille, ne urbes aut castra capiantur.

[33] sed hac gratia non fuit contentus orator, vertit in contrarium eandem figuram: ille tenet et scit, ut hostium copiae, tu, ut aquae pluviae arceantur. ille exercitatus in propagandis finibus, tu in regendis.

[34] possunt media quoque respondere vel primis, ut

te nemus Angitiae, vitrea te Fucinus unda;

vel ultimis ut haec navis onusta praeda Siciliensi, cum et ipsa esset ex praeda. nec quisquam dubitabit. idem fieri posse iteratis utrinque mediis. respondent primis et ultima: multi et graves dolores inventi parentibus et propinquis multi.

[35] est et illud repetendi genus, quod simul ¹⁰ proposita iterat et dividit:

Iphitus et Pelias mecum, quorum Iphitus aevo

iam gravior, Pelias et vulnere tardus Ulixi.

Ἐπάνοδος dicitur Graece, nostri regressionem vocant. nec solum in eodem sensu,

[36] sed etiam in diverso eadem verba contra sumuntur: principum dignitas erat paene par, non par fortasse eorum qui sequebantur. interim variatur casibus haec et generibus retractatio: magnus est dicendi labor, magna res et cetera; et apud Rutilium longa περιόδῳ sed haec initia sententiarum sunt: pater hic tuus? patrem nunc appellas? patris tui filius es?

[37] fit casibus modo hoc schema, quod πολύπτωτον vocant. constat aliis etiam modis, ut pro Cluentio: quod autem tempus veneni dandi? illo die? illa frequentia? per quem porro datum? unde sumptum? quae porro interceptio poculi?

[38] cur non de integro autem datum? hanc rerum, coniunctam diversitatem Caecilius μεταβολήν vocat, qualis est pro Cluentio locus in Oppianicum: illum tabulas publicas Larini censorias corrupisse decuriones universi iudicaverunt, cum illo nemo orationem, nemo rem ullam contrahebat, nemo illum ex tam multis cognatis et adfinibus tutorem unquam liberis suis scripsit, et deinceps adhuc multa.

[39] ut haec in unum congeruntur, ita contra ilia dispersa sunt, quae a Cicerone dissipata dici puto:

hic segetes, illic ueniunt felicius uuae,

arborei fetus alibi,

et deinceps.

[40] ilia vero apud Ciceronem mira figurarum mixtura deprehenditur, in qua et primum verbum ¹¹ longo post intervallo redditum est ultimum et media primis et mediis ultima congruunt: vestrum iam hic factum reprehenditur, patres conscripti, non meum; ac pulcherrimum quidem factum, verum, ut dixi, non meum, sed vestrum.

[41] hanc frequentiorem repetitionem πλοκήν vocant, quae fit ex permixtis figuris, ut supra dixi, utque se habet epistola ad Brutum, ego cum in gratiam redierim cum Appio Claudio, et redierim per Cn.

[42] Pompeium, ego ergo cum redierim. sed in iisdem sententiis crebrioribus mutata declinationibus iteratione verborum: ut apud Persium,

usque adeone

scire tuum nihil est, nisi te scire hoc sciat alter?

Sed apud Ciceronem, neque enim poterant iudicio et hi damnari, qui iudicabant.

[43] sed sensus quoque toti, quemadmodum coeperunt, desinunt: venit ex Asia. hoc ipsum quam novum! tribunus plebis venit ex Asia. * eadem tamen periodo et verbum primum ultimum ¹² refertur, tertium iam sermone, adiectum est enim verumtamen venit. interim sententia quidem repetitur, sed non eodem ¹³ verborum ordine: quid Cleomenes facere potuit? non enim possum quemquam insimulare falso. quid , inquam, magno opere potuit Cleomenes facere? ¹⁴

[44] prioris etiam sententiae verbum ultimum ac sequentis primum ¹⁵ frequenter est idem, quo quidem schemate utuntur poetae saepius:

Pierides, vos haec facietis maxima Gallo,

Gallo , cuius amor tantum mihi crescit in horas.

Sed ne oratores quidem raro: hic tamen vivit; vivit? immo vero etiam in senatum venit.

[45] aliquando , sicut in geminatione verborum diximus, initia quoque et clausulae sententiarum alis, sed non alio tendentibus verbis inter se consonant. initia hoc modo: dediderim periculis omnibus, obtulerim insidiis, obiecerim invidiae. rursus clausulae ibidem statim, vos enim statuistis, vos sententiam dixistis, vos iudicavistis. hoc alii συνωνυμίαν alii disiunctionem vocant, utrumque, etiamsi est diversum, recte; nam est nominum idem significantium separatio. congregantur quoque verba idem significantia. quae cum ita sint, Catilina, perge quo coepisti; egredere aliquando ex urbe, patent portae, proficiscere.

[46] et in eundem alio libro: abiit , excessit, erupit, evasit. hoc Caecilio πλεονασμός videtur, id est, abundans super necessitatem oratio, sicut illa vidi oculos ante ipse meos. in illo enim vidi inest ipse. verum id, ut alio quoque loco dixi, cum supervacua oneratur adiectione, vitium est, cum auget aut manifestat sententiam sicut hic, virtus. fidi , ipse, ante oculos, totidem sunt adfectus. cur tamen haec proprie nomine tali notarit,

[47] non video. nam et geminatio et repetitio et qualiscunque adiectio πλεονασμός videri potest. nec verba modo, sed sensus quoque idem facientes acervantur: perturbatio istum mentis et quaedam scelerum offusa caligo et ardentes furiarum faces excitarunt.

[48] congeruntur et diversa: mulier , tyranni saeva crudelitas, patris amor, ira praeceps, temeritatis dementia. sed apud Ovidium:

sed grave Nereidum numen, sed corniger Ammon,

sed quae visceribus veniebat belua ponti

exsaturanda meis.

Inveni, qui et hoc πλοκήν¹⁶ vocaret:

[49] cui non adsentior, cum sit unius figurae, mixta quoque et idem et diversum significantia, quod et ipsum διαλλαγὴν vocant. quaero ab inimicis, sintne haec investigate, comperta, ¹⁷ patefacta, sublata, deleta, exstincta per me. investigata , comperta, patefacta aliud ostendunt; sublata, deleta, extincta sunt inter se similia, sed non etiam prioribus.

[50] sed hoc autem exemplum et superius aliam quoque efficiunt figuram, quae, quia coniunctionibus caret, dissolutio vocatur, apta, cum quid instantius dicimus; nam et singula inculcantur et quasi plura fiunt. ideoque utimur hac figura non in singulis modo verbis, sed sententiis etiam, ut Cicero dicit contra contionem Metelli: qui indicabantur, eos vocari, custodiri, ad senatum adduci iussi; in senatum sunt introducti, et totus hic locus talis est. hoc genus et βραχυλογίαν vocant, quae potest esse copulata dissolutio. contrarium illud ¹⁸ est schema, quod coniunctionibus abundat. illud ἀσύνδετον, hoc πολυσύνδετον dicitur.

[51] sed hoc est vel iisdem saepius repetitis, ut

tectumque laremque

armaque Amyclaeumque canem Cressamque pharetram;

vel diversis:

[52] arma virumque — multum ille et terris — multa quoque.

[53] adverbia quoque et pronomina variantur, hic illum vidi iuvenem, — bis senos cui nostra dies, — hic mihi responsum primus dedit ille petenti. sed utrumque horum acervatio est, ¹⁹ tantum iuncta aut dissoluta.

[54] omnibus scriptores sua nomina dederunt, sed varia et ut cuique fingenti placuit. fons quidem unus, quia acriora facit et instantiora quae dicimus et vim quandam prae se ferentia velut saepius erumpentis adfectus. gradatio , quae dicitur κλῖμαξ apertiorem habet artem et magis adfectatam ideoque esse rarior debet.

[55] est autem ipsa quoque adiectionis; repetit enim quae dicta sunt et, priusquam ad aliud descendat, in prioribus resistit. eius exemplum ex Graeco notissimo transferatur: non enim dixi quidem sed non ²⁰ scripsi, nec scripsi quidem²¹ sed non obii legationem, nec²² obii quidem legationem²³ sed non persuasi Thebanis.

[56] sint tamen tradita et Latina: Africano virtutem industria, virtus gloriam, gloria aemulos comparavit. et Calvi: non ergo magis pecuniarum repetundarum quam maiestatis, neque maiestatis magis quam Plautiae legis, neque Plautiae legis magis quam ambitus, neque ambitus magis quam omnium legum iudicia perierunt. ²⁴

[57] invenitur apud poetas quoque, ut apud Homerum de sceptro, quod a Iove ad Agamemnonem usque deducit, et apud nostrum etiam tragicum:

Iove propagatus est, ut perhibent, Tantalus,

ex Tantalo ortus Pelops, ex Pelope autem satus

Atreus , qui nostrum porro propagat genus.

[58] at quae per detractionem fiunt figurae, brevitatis novitatisque maxime gratiam petunt; quarum una est ea, quam libro proximo in figuras ex συνεκδοχῇ distuli, cum subtractum verbum aliquod satis ex ceteris intelligitur: ut Caelius in Antonium, stupere gaudio Graecus: simul enim auditur coepit. Cicero ad Brutum: sermo nullus scilicet nisi de te; quid enim potius? tum Flavius, Cras, inquit, tabellarii, et ego ibidem has inter cenam exaravi.

[59] cui similia sunt illa meo quidem iudicio, in quibus verba decenter pudoris gratia subtrahuntur:

nouimus et qui te, transversa tuentibus hircis,

sed quo, sed faciles Nymphae risere, sacello.

Hanc quidam aposiopesin putant, frustra.

[60] nam illa quid taceat incertum est aut certe longiore sermone explicandum, hic unum verbum et manifestum quidem desideratur; quod si aposiopesis est, nihil non, in quo deest aliquid, idem appellabitur. ego ne ²⁵ illud quidem aposiopesin semper voco,

[61] in quo res quaecunque relinquitur intelligenda, ut ea quae in epistolis Cicero: data Lupercalibus, quo die Antonius Caesari; non enim obticuit sed ²⁶ lusit, quia nihil aliud intelligi poterat quam hoc, diadema imposuit.

[62] altera est per detractionem figura, de qua modo dictum, cui coniunctiones eximuntur. tertia , quae dicitur ἐπεζευγμένον in qua unum ad verbum plures sententiae referuntur, quarum unaquaeque desideraret illud, si sola poneretur. id accidit aut praeposito verbo, ad quod reliqua respiciant: vicit pudorem libido, timorem audacia, rationem amentia; aut illato, quo plura cluduntur: neque enim is es, Catilina, ut te aut pudor unquam a turpitudine aut metus a periculo aut ratio a furore revocaverit.

[63] medium quoque potest esse, quod et prioribus et sequentibus sufficiat. iungit autem et diversos sexus, ut cum marem feminamque filios dicimus, et singularia pluralibus miscet.

[64] sed haec adeo sunt vulgaria, ut sibi artem figurarum adserere non possint. illud plane figura est, qua diversa sermonis forma coniungitur:

sociis tunc, arma capessant,

edico , et dira bellum cum genie gerendum.

Quamvis enim pars bello posterior participio insistat, utrique convenit illud edico. non utique detractionis gratia factam coniunctionem συνοικείωσιν vocant, quae duas res diversas colligat:

tam deest avaro, quod habet, quam quod non habet.

Huic diversam volunt esse distinctionem,

[65] cui dant nomen παραδιαστολήν qua similia discernuntur: ²⁷ cum te pro astuto sapientem appelles, pro confidente, fortem, pro illiberali diligentem. quod totum pendet ex finitione, ideoque an figura sit dubito. cui contraria est ea, qua fit ex vicino transitus ad diversa ut similia: brevis esse laboro, obscurus fio, et quae sequuntur.

[66] tertium est genus figurarum, quod aut similitudine aliqua vocum aut paribus aut contrariis convertit in se aures et animos excitat. hinc est παρονομασία, quae dicitur adnominatio. ea non uno modo fieri solet: ex vicinia (quadam praedicti nominis ducta casibus declinat, ut Domitius Afer pro Cloatilla, mulier omnium rerum imperita, in omnibus rebus infelix;

[67] et cum verbo idem verbum plus significans subiungitur: quando homo hostis, homo. quibus exemplis sum in aliud usus, sed in uno ἔμφασις est ²⁸ geminatio. παρονομασίᾳ contrarium est, quod eodem verbo quasi falsum arguitur: Quae lex privatis hominibus esse lex non uidebatur.

[68] cui confinis est ἀντανάκλασις eiusdem verbi contraria significatio. cum Proculeius> quereretur de filio, quod is mortem suam expectaret, et ille dixisset, se vero non exspectare: Immo, inquit, rogo exspectes. non ex eodem sed ex vicino diversum ²⁹ accipitur, cum supplicio adficiendum dicas, quem supplicatione dignum iudicaris.

[69] aliter quoque voces aut eaedem diversa in significatione ponuntur aut productione tantum vel correptione mutatae; quod etiam in iocis frigidum equidem tradi inter praecepta miror, eorumque exempla vitandi potius quam imitandi gratia pono:

[70] amari iucundum est, si curetur, ne quid insist amari. avium dulcedo ad avium ducit; et apud Ovidium ludentem:

cur ego non dicam, Furia, te furiam?

Cornificius hanc traductionem vocat,

[71] videlicet alterius intellectus ad alterum. sed elegantius, quod est positum in distinguenda rei proprietate: hanc rei publicae pestem paulisper reprimi, non in perpetuum comprimi posse. sed quae praepositionibus in contrarium mutantur: non emissus ex urbe, sed immissius in urbem esse videatur. melius atque acrius, quod cum figura iucundum est tum etiam sensu valet: Emit morte immortalitatem.

[72] illa leviora: Non Pisonum sed pistorum et ex oratore arator. pessimum vero: ne patres conscripti videantur circumscripti; — raro evenit sed vehementer venit. sed³⁰ contingit, ut aliqui sensus vehemens et acer venustatem aliquam non eadem ex voce ³¹ non dissona accipiat.

[73] sed cur me prohibeat pudor uti domestico exemplo? pater meus contra eum, qui se legationi immoriturum dixerat, deinde vix paucis diebus insumptis re infecta redierat, non exigo, ut inmoriaris legationi; immorare. nam et valet sensus ipse et in verbis tantum distantibus iucunde consonat vox, praesertim non captata, sed velut oblata, cum altero suo sit usus, alterum ab adversario acceperit.

[74] magnae veteribus curae fuit gratiam dicendi et paribus et contrariis acquirere. Gorgias in hoc immodicus, copiosus aetate utique prima Isocrates fuit. delectatus est his etiam M. Tullius, verum et modum adhibuit non ingratae, nisi copia redundet, voluptati et rem alioqui leuem sententiarum pondere implevit. nam per se frigida et inanis adfectatio, cum in acres incidit sensus, innatam gratiam ³² videtur habere non arcessitam.

[75] similium fere quadruplex ratio est. nam est primum, quotiens verbum verbo aut non dissimile valde quaeritur, ut

puppesque tuae pubesque tuorum;

et sic in hac calamitosa fama quasi in aliqua perniciosissima flamma, et non enim tam spes laudanda quam res est, aut certe par et extremis syllabis consonans: non verbis, sed armis.

[76] sed hoc quoque, quotiens in sententias acres incidit, pulchrum est: quantum possis, in eo semper experire, it prosis. hoc est πάρισον, ut plerisque placuit. Theo Stoicus πάρισον existimat, quod sit e membris non dissimilibus.

[77] secundum , ut clausula similiter cadat, syllabis iisdem in ultimam partem collatis: ὁμοιοτέλευτον vocant ³³ similem duarum sententiarum vel plurium finem: non modo ad salutem eius exstinguendam, sed etiam gloriam per tales viros infingendam. ex quibus fere fiunt, non tamen ut semper utique ultimis consonent, quae τρίκωλα dicuntur: vicit pudorem libido, timorem audacia, rationem amentia. sed in quaternas quoque ac plures haec ratio ire sententias potest. fit etiam singulis verbis: Hecuba hoc dolet, pudet, piget; et abiit , excessit, erupit, evasit.

[78] tertium est, quod in eosdem casus cadit, ὁμοιόπτωτον dicitur. sed neque, quod finem habet similem, utique in eundem venit finem ὁμοιόπτωτον, quia ὁμοιόπτωτον est tantum casu simile, etiamsi dissimilia sint quae declinentur; nec tantum in fine deprehenditur, sed respondentibus ³⁴ vel primis inter se vel mediis vel extremis vel etiam permutatis his, ut media primis et summa mediis accommodentur, et quocunque modo accommodari potest.

[79] neque enim semper paribus syllabis constat, ut est apud Afrum, amisso nuper infelicis aulae si non ³⁵ praesidio inter pericula tamen solacio inter adversa. eius fere videntur optima, in quibus initia sententiarum et fines, consentiunt, ut hic praesidio solacio, pericula adversa,³⁶ paene ³⁷ ut similia sint verbis et paribus cadant et eodem modo desinant.

[80] etiam ut sint, quod est quartum, membris aequalibus, quod ἰσόκωλον dicitur: si , quantum in agro locisque desertis audacia potest, tantum in foro atque iudiciis impudentia valeret ἰσόκωλον est et ὁμοιόπτωτον habet; non minus nunc in causa cederet Aulus Caecina Sexti Aebutii impudentiae, quam tum in vi facienda cessit audaciae, ἰσόκωλον, ὁμοιόπτωτον, ὁμοιοτέλευτον. accedit et ex illa figura gratia, qua nomina dixi mutatis casibus repeti: non minus cederet quam cessit. at hoc ³⁸ ὁμοιοτέλευτον et παρονομασία est: neminem alteri posse dare in matrimonium, nisi penes quem sit patrimonium.

[81] contrapositum autem vel, ut quidam vocant, contentio ( ἀντίθετον dicitur) non uno fit modo. nam et fit, si singula singulis opponuntur, ut in eo quod modo dixi, uicit pudorem libido, timorem audacia, et bina binis: non nostri ingenii, vestri auxilii est, et sententiae sententiis: dominetur in contionibus, iaceat in iudiciis.

[82] cui commodissime subiungitur et ea species, quam distinctionem diximus: odit populus Romanus privatam luxuriam, publicam magnificentiam diligit; et, quae sunt simili casu, dissimili sententia in ultimo locata: ut quod in tempore mali fuit, nihil obsit, quod in causa boni fuit, prosit.

[83] nec semper contrapositum subiungitur, ut in hoc, est igitur, haec iudices, non scripta sed nata lex, verum, sicut Cicero dicit, de singulis rebus propositis refertur ad singula, ut in eo quod sequitur, quam non didicimus, accepimus, legimus, verum ex natura ipsa arripuimus, hausimus, expressimus.

[84] nec semper, quod adversum est, contra ponitur, quale est apud Rutilium, nobis primis dii immortales fruges dederunt; nos, quod soli accepimus, in omnes terras distribuimus.

[85] fit etiam adsumpta illa figura, qua verba declinata repetuntur, quod ἀντιμεταβολή dicitur: non , ut edam, vivo, sed, ut vivam, edo. et quod apud Ciceronem conversum ita est, ut, cum mutationem casus habeat, etiam similiter desinat: ut et sine invidia culpa plectatur et sine culpa invidia ponatur.

[86] et eodem cluditur verbo: ut quod dicit de se. Roscio , etenim , cum artifex eiusmodi est, ut solus videatur dignus qui in scena, spectetur, tum vir eiusmodi est, ut solus dignus esse videatur, qui eo non accedat. est et in nominibus ex diverso collocatis sua gratia: si consul Antonius, Brutus hostis; si conservator rei publicae Brutus, hostis Antonius.

[87] olim plura de figuris quam necesse erat, et adhuc erunt, qui putent esse figuram: incredibile est, ( quod dico, sed verum; ἀνθυποφοράν vocant; et aliquis hoc semel tulit, nemo ³⁹ bis, ego ter, διέξοδον et longius evectus sum sed redeo ad propositum, ἄφοδον.

[88] quaedam verborum figurae paulum figuris sententiarum declinantur, ut dubitatio. nam cum est in re, priori parti adsignanda est, cum in verbo, sequenti; sive me malitiam sive stultitiam dicere oportet.

[89] item correctionis eadem ratio est; nam quod illic dubitat, hic emendat. etiam in personae fictione accidere quidam idem putaverunt, ut in verbis esset haec figura: crudelitatis mater est avaritia, et apud Sallustium in Ciceronem O Romule Arpinas, et apud Menandrum Oedipus Thriasius. haec omnia copiosius sunt exsecuti, qui non ut partem operis transcurrerunt, sed proprie libros huic operi dedicaverunt, sicut Caecilius, Dionysius, Rutilius, Cornificius, Visellius aliique non pauci; sed non minor erit eorum, qui vivunt, gloria.

[90] ut fateor autem verborum quoque figuras posse plures reperiri a quibusdam, ita iis, quae ab auctoribus claris traduntur, meliores non adsentior. nam in primis M. Tullius multas in tertio De Oratore libro posuit, quas in Oratore postea scripto transeundo videtur ipse damnasse; quarum pars est, quae sententiarum potius quam uerborum sit: ut imminutio, improvisum, imago, sibi ipsi responsio, digressio, permissio, contrarium (hoc enim puto, quod dicitur ἐναντιότης ), sumpta ex adverso probatio.

[91] quaedam omnino non sunt figurae, sicut ordo, dinumeratio, circumscriptio, sive hoc nomine significatur comprehensa breviter sententia sive finitio; nam et hoc Cornificius atque Rutilius schema λέξεως putant. verborum autem concinna transgressio, id est hyperbaton, quod Caecilius quoque putat schema, a nobis est inter tropos ⁴⁰ posita.

[92] sed mutatio, si ⁴¹ ea est, quam Rutilius ἀλλοίωσιν vocat, dissimilitudinem ostendit horminum, rerum, factorum; quae si latius fiat, figura non est, si angustius, in ἀντίθετον cadet; si vero haec appellatio significat ὑπαλλαγήν, satis de ea dictum est.

[93] quod vero schema est ad propositum subiecta ratio, quod Rutilius αἰτιολογίαν vocat? nam de illo dubitari possit, an schema sit distributis subiecta ratio, quod apud eundem primo loco positum est.

[94] προσαπόδοσιν dicit, quae, ut maxime, servetur sane in pluribus propositis, quia aut singulis statim ratio subiiciatur, ut est apud C. Antonium, sed neque accusatorem eum metuo, quod sum innocens; neque competitorem vereor, quod sum Antonius; neque consulem spero, quod est Cicero;

[95] aut positis duobus vel tribus eodem ordine singulis continua reddatur, quale apud Brutum de dictatura Cn. Pompeii, praestat enim nemini imperare quam alicui servire; sine illo enim vivere honeste licet, cum hoc vivendi nulla condicio est.

[96] sed et uni rei multiplex ratio subiungitur, ut apud Vergilium,

sire inde occultas vires et pabula terrae

pinguia concipiunt, sive illis omne per ignem

excoquitur vitium—et totus locus;

seu plures calor ille vias,—Seu durat magis.

Relationem quid accipi velit, non liquet mihi.

[97] nam si ἀνάκλασιν aut ἐπάνοδον dicit, de omnibus locuti sumus. sed quidquid id est, neque hoc neque superiora in Oratore repetit. sola est in eo libro posita pariter inter figuras uerborum exclamatio, quam sententiae potius puto (adfectus enim est), de ⁴² ceteris omnibus consentio.

[98] adiicit his Caecilius περίφρασιν, de qua dixi; Cornificius interrogationem, ratiocinationem, subiectionem, transitionem, occultationem, praeterea sententiam, membrum, articulos, interpretationem, conclusionem. quorum priora alterius generis sunt schemata, sequentia schemata omnino non sunt.

[99] item Rutilius praeter ea, quae apud alios quoque sunt, παρομολογίαν, ἀναγκαῖον, ἠθοποιίαν, δικαιολογίαν, πρόλημψιν, χαρακτηρισμόν, βραχυλογίαν, παρασιώπησιν, παῤῥησίαν de quibus idem dico. nam eos quidem auctores, qui nullum prope tinem fecerunt exquirendis nominibus, praeteribo, qui etiam, quae sunt argumentorum, figuris ascripserunt. ego illud de iis etiam, quae vere sunt,

[100] adiiciam breviter, sicut ornent orationem opportune positae, ita ineptissimas esse, cum immodice petantur. sunt qui neglecto rerum pondere et viribus sententiarum, si vel inania verba in hos modos depravarunt, summos se iudicent artifices ideoque non desinant eas nectere, quas sine substantia sectari tam est ridiculum quam quaerere habitum gestumque sine corpore.

[101] sed ne eae quidem, quae recte fiunt, densandae sunt nimis; nam et vultus mutatio oculorumque coniectus multum in actu valet; sed si quis ducere os exquisitis modis et frontis ac luminum inconstantia trepidare non desinat, rideatur. sed oratio ⁴³ habet rectam quandam velut faciem, quae ut stupere immobili rigore non debebit, ita saepius in ea, quam natura dedit, specie continenda est.

[102] sciendum vero in primis, quid quisque in orando postulet locus, quid persona, quid tempus; maior enim pars harum figurarum posita est in delectatione. ubi vero atrocitate, invidia, miseratione pugnandum est, quis ferat contrapositis et pariter cadentibus et consimilibus irascentem, flentem, rogantem cum in his rebus cura uerborum deroget adfectibus fidem et ubicunque ars ostentatur, veritas abesse videatur.

Institutio Oratoria. Quintilian. ed. Harold Edgeworth Butler. Cambridge, Mass.. 1920-1922.

Sponsored by Perseus Project, Tufts University.

Funding provided by Tufts University.

Current edition Perseus

Institutio Oratoria (Quintilian. Institutio Oratoria, Volume 1-4. Butler, Harold Edgeworth, editor. Cambridge, Mass; London: Harvard University Press, William Heinemann Ltd., 1920-1922.)

Translations (1)

Institutio Oratoria Perseus (Quintilian. Institutio Oratoria, Volume 1-4. Butler, Harold Edgeworth, translator. Cambridge, Mass; London: Harvard University Press, William Heinemann Ltd., 1920-1922.) — 9.2 focus

[1] The student who desires to give a wider consideration to figures of thought and speech will, therefore, have a guide to follow, and 1 would not venture to assert that he could have a better. But I would ask him to read these passages of Cicero with reference to my own views on this subject. For I intend to speak only of those figures of thought which depart from the direct method of statement, and I note that a similar procedure has been adopted by a number of learned scholars.

[2] On the other hand, all those embellishments which differ in character from these are none the less virtues whose importance is such that without them all oratory will be little less than unintelligible. For how can the judge be adequately instructed unless lucidity characterise our performance of the following tasks: explanation, proposition, promise of proofs, definition, distinction, exposition of our own opinion, logical conclusion, defence by anticipation, introduction of comparisons or precedents, disposition and distribution, interruption, repression of those who interrupt us, antithesis, exculpation and personal attack?

[3] Again, what would eloquence do if deprived of the artifices of amplification and its opposite? of which the first requires the gift of signifying more than we say, that is emphasis, together with exaggeration and overstatement of the truth, while the latter requires the power to diminish and palliate. What scope is there for the stronger emotions if the orator is not allowed to give free rein to his speech, to flame out in anger, to reproach, to wish or execrate? Or for the milder emotions without the assistance of commendation, conciliation and humour?

[4] What pleasure can an orator hope to produce, or what impression even of the most moderate learning, unless he knows how to fix one point in the minds of the audience by repetition, and another by dwelling on it, how to digress from and return to his theme, to divert the blame from himself and transfer it to another, or to decide what points to omit and what to ignore as negligible? It is qualities such as these that give life and vigour to oratory; without them it lies torpid like a body lacking the breath to stir its limbs.

[5] But more than the mere possession of these qualities is required; they must be deployed, each in their proper place and with such variety that every sound may bewitch the hearer with all the charm of music. But these qualities are as a rule open and direct, manifesting themselves without disguise. They do, however, as I have said, admit of figures, as the instances to which I shall proceed will show.

[6] What is more common than to ask or enquire? For both terms are used indifferently, although the one seems to imply a desire for knowledge, and the other a desire to prove something. But whichever term we use, the thing which they represent admits a variety of figures. We will begin with those which serve to increase the force and cogency of proof to which I assign the first place.

[7] A simple question may be illustrated by the line: ¹

But who are ye and from what shores are come?

On the other hand, a question involves a figure, whenever it is employed not to get information, but to emphasise our point, as in the following examples: ²

What was that sword of yours doing, Tubero, that was drawn on the field of Pharsalus?

and

How long, Catiline, will you abuse our patience?

and

Do you not see that your plots are all laid bare?

with the whole passage that follows.

[8] How much greater is the fire of his words as they stand than if he had said,

You have abused our patience a long time,

and

Your plots are all laid bare.

We may also ask what cannot be denied, as

Was Gaius Fidiculanius Falcula, I ask you, brought to justice?

³ Or we may put a question to which it is difficult to reply, as in the common forms,

How is it possible?

How can that be?

[9] Or we may ask a question with a view to throw odium on the person to whom it is addressed, as in the words placed by Seneca in the mouth of Medea: ⁴

What lands dost bid me seek?

Or our aim may be to excite pity, as is the case with the question asked by Sinon in Virgil: ⁵

Alas, what lands, lie cried,

What seas can now receive me?

Or to embarrass our opponent and to deprive him of the power to feign ignorance of our meaning, as Asinius does in the following sentence:

Do you hear? The will which we impugn is the work of a madman, not of one who lacked natural affection.

In fact questions admit of infinite variety.

[10] They may serve our indignation, as in the line:

Are any left

That still adore Juno's divinity?

Aen. i. 48.

Or they may still express wonder, as in:

To what dost thou not drive the hearts of men,

Accursed greed of gold?

Aen. iii. 56.

Again, at times they may express a sharp command,

[11] as in:

Will they not rush to arms and follow forth

From all the city?

Aen. iv. 592.

Or we may ask ourselves, as in the phrase of Terence,

What, then, shall I do?

⁶

[12] A figure is also involved in a reply, when one question is asked and another is answered, because it suits the respondent's purpose better to do so, or because it aggravates the charge brought against the accused. For example, a witness for the prosecution was asked whether he had been cudgelled by the plaintiff, and replied,

And what is more, I had done him no harm.

Or the purpose may be to elude a charge, a very common form of reply. The advocate says,

I ask if you killed the man?

The accused replies,

He was a robber.

The advocate asks,

Have you occupied the farm?

The accused replies,

It was my own.

[13] Again, the answer may be of such a kind as to make defence precede confession. For example, in the Eclogues⁷ of Virgil, when one shepherd asks:

Did I not see you, villain, snare a goat

Of Damon's?

the other replies:

I vanquished him in song, and should he not

Pay me the prize, my due?

[14] Akin to this kind of answer is the dissimulatory reply, which is employed solely with the purpose of raising a laugh, and has therefore been treated in its appropriate place. ⁸ If it were meant seriously, it would be tantamount to a confession. Further, there is the practice of putting the question and answering it oneself, which may have quite a pleasing effect. Take as an example the following passage from the pro Ligario,⁹ where Cicero says,

Before whom do I say this? Before one who, although he was aware of these facts, yet restored me to my country even before he had seen me.

[15] A different form of fictitious question is to be found in the pro Caelio.

Some one will say, 'Is this your moral discipline? Is this the training you would give young men?'

with the whole passage that follows. Then comes his reply,

Gentlemen, if there were any man with such vigour of mind, with such innate virtue and self-control, etc.

¹⁰ A different method is to ask a question and not to wait for a reply, but to subjoin the reply at once yourself. For example,

Had you no house? Yes, you had one. Had you money and to spare? No, you were in actual want.

¹¹ This is a figure which some call suggestion.

[16] Again, a question may involve comparison, as, for instance,

Which of the two then could more easily assign a reason for his opinion?

¹² There are other forms of question as well, some concise, some developed at greater length, some dealing with one thing only, others with several. Anticipation, or, as the Greeks call it, πρόληψις, whereby we forestall objections, is of extraordinary value in pleading; it is frequently employed in all parts of a speech, but is especially useful in the exordium.

[17] However, it forms a genus in itself, and has several different species. One of these is the defence by anticipation, such as Cicero employs against Quintus Caecilius, ¹³ where he points out that though previously he himself has always appeared for the defence, he is now undertaking a prosecution. Another is a form of confession, such as he introduces in his defence of Rabirius Postumus, ¹⁴ where he admits that he himself regards his client as worthy of censure for lending money to the king. Another takes the form of prediction, as in the phrase,

For I will say without any intention of aggravating the charge.

Again, there is a form of self-correction, such as,

I beg you to pardon me, if I have been carried too far.

And, most frequent of all, there is preparation, whereby we state fully why we are going to do something or have done it.

[18] Anticipation may also be employed to establish the meaning or propriety of words, as in the following case,

Although that was not a punishment, but merely a prevention of crime,

¹⁵ while the same effect may be produced by qualification, as in the following sentence,

Citizens, I say, if I may call them by that name.

¹⁶

[19] Again, hesitation may lend an impression of truth to our statements, when, for example, we pretend to be at a loss, where to begin or end, or to decide what especially requires to be said or not to be said at all. All speeches are full of such instances, but for the present one will be enough.

As for myself, I know not where to turn. Shall I deny that there was a scandalous rumour that the jury had been bribed, etc.?

¹⁷

[20] This device may also be employed to cover the past; for we may equally pretend that we had felt hesitation on the subject. This figure is akin to that known as communication, when we actually take our opponents into consultation, as Domitius Afer does in his defence of Cloatilla.

She is so agitated that she does not know what is permitted to a woman or what becomes a wife. It may be that chance has brought you into contact with the unhappy woman in her helpless plight. What counsel do you give her, you her brother, and you, her father's friends?

[21] Or we may admit the judges to our deliberations, a device which is frequently called into play. We may say,

What do you advise?

or,

I ask you,

or,

What, then, should have been done?

Cato, for example, says,

Come now, if you had been in his place, what else would you have done?

And in another passage,

Imagine this to be a matter which concerns us all, and assume you have been placed in charge of the whole affair.

[22] Sometimes, however, in such forms of communication we may add something unexpected, a device which is in itself a figure, as Cicero does in the Verrines:

What then? What think you? Perhaps you expect to hear of some theft or plunder.

¹⁸ Then, after keeping the minds of the judges in suspense for a considerable time, he adds something much worse. This figure is termed suspension by Celsus. It has two forms.

[23] For we may adopt exactly the opposite procedure to that just mentioned, and after raising expectation of a sequel of the most serious nature, we may drop to something which is of a trivial character, and may even imply no offence at all. But since this does not necessarily involve any form of communication, some have given it the name of paradox or surprise.

[24] I do not agree with those who extend the name of figure to a statement that something has happened unexpectedly to the speaker himself, like the following passage from Pollio:

Gentlemen, I never thought it would come to pass that, when Scaurus was the accused, I should have to entreat you not to allow influence to carry any weight on his behalf.

[25] The figure known as concession springs from practically the same source as communication; it occurs when we leave some things to the judgment of the jury, or even in some cases of our opponents, as when Calvus says to Vatinius,

Summon all your assurance and assert that you have a better claim than Cato to be elected praetor.

[26] The figures best adapted for intensifying emotion consist chiefly in simulation. For we may feign that we are angry, glad, afraid, filled with wonder, grief or indignation, or that we wish something, and so on. Hence we get passages like the following:

I am free, I breathe again,

¹⁹ or,

It is well,

or,

What madness is this?

²⁰ or,

Alas! for these degenerate days!

²¹ or,

Woe is me; for though all my tears are shed my grief still clings to me deep-rooted in my heart,

²² or,

Gape now, wide earth.

Unknown.

To this some give the name of exclamation,

[27] and include it among figures of speech. When, however, such exclamations are genuine, they do not come under the head of our present topic: it is only those which are simulated and artfully designed which can with any certainty be regarded as figures. The same is true of free speech, which Corificius ²³ calls licence, and the Greeks παῤῥησία. For what has less of the figure about it than true freedom? On the other hand, freedom of speech may frequently be made a cloak for flattery.

[28] For when Cicero in his defence for Ligarius says,

After war had begun, Caesar, and was well on its way to a conclusion, I deliberately, of my own free will and under no compulsion, joined the forces of your opponents,

²⁴ he has in his mind something more than a desire to serve the interests of Ligarius, for there is no better way of praising the clemency of the victor.

[29] On the other hand, in the sentence,

What else was our aim, Tubero, than that we might secure the power which he now holds?

²⁵ he succeeds with admirable art in representing the cause of both parties as being good, and in so doing mollifies him whose cause was really bad. A bolder form of figure, which in Cicero's opinion ²⁶ demands greater effort, is impersonation, or προσωποποιΐα This is a device which lends wonderful variety and animation to oratory.

[30] By this means we display the inner thoughts of our adversaries as though they were talking with themselves (but we shall only carry conviction if we represent them as uttering what they may reasonably be supposed to have had in their minds); or without sacrifice of credibility we may introduce conversations between ourselves and others, or of others among themselves, and put words of advice, reproach, complaint, praise or pity into the mouths of appropriate persons.

[31] Nay, we are even allowed in this form of speech to bring down the gods from heaven and raise the dead, while cities also and peoples may find a voice. There are some authorities who restrict the term imepersonation to cases where both persons and words are fictitious, and prefer to call imaginary conversations between men by the Greek name of dialogue, which some ²⁷ translate by the Latin semnocinatio.

[32] For my own part, I have included both under the same generally accepted term, since we cannot imagine a speech without we also imagine a person to utter it. But when we lend a voice to things to which nature has denied it, we may soften down the figure in the way illustrated by the following passage:

For if my country, which is far dearer to me than life itself, if all Italy, if the whole commonwealth were to address me thus, 'Marcus Tullius, what dost thou?

²⁸ A bolder figure of the same kind may be illustrated by the following:

Your country, Catiline, pleads with you thus, and though she utters never a word, cries to you, 'For not a few years past no crime has come to pass save through your doing!'

²⁹

[33] It is also convenient at times to pretend that we have before our eyes the images of things, persons or utterances, or to marvel that the same is not the case with our adversaries or the judges; it is with this design that we use phrases such as

It seems to me,

Does it not seem to you?

But such devices make a great demand on our powers of eloquence. For with things which are false and incredible by nature there are but two alternatives: either they will move our hearers with exceptional force because they are beyond the truth, or they will be regarded as empty nothings because they are not the truth.

[34] But we may introduce not only imaginary sayings, but imaginary writings as well, as is done by Asinius in his defence of Liburnia:

Let my mother, who was the object of my love and my delight, who lived for me and gave me life twice in one day ³⁰ (and so on) inherit nought of my property.

This is in itself a figure, and is doubly so whenever, as in the present case, it imitates a document produced by the opposing party.

[35] For a will had been read out by the prosecution, in the following form:

Let Publius Novanius Gallio, to whom as my benefactor I will and owe all that is good, as a testimony to the great affection which he has borne me (then follow other details) be my heir.

In this case the figure borders on parody, a name drawn from songs sung in imitation of others, but employed by an abuse of language to designate imitation in verse or prose.

[36] Again, we often personify the abstract, as Virgil ³¹ does with Fame, or as Xenophon ³² records that Prodicus did with Virtue and Pleasure, or as Ennius does when, in one of his satires, he represents Life and Death contending with one another. We may also introduce some imaginary person without identifying him, as we do in the phrases,

At this point some one will interpose,

or,

Some one will say.

[37] Or speech may be inserted without any mention of the speaker, as in the line: ³³

Here the Dolopian host

Camped, here the fierce Achilles pitched his tent.

This involves a mixture of figures, since to impersonalion we add the figure known as ellipse, which in this case consists in the omission of any indication as to who is speaking. At times impersonation takes the form of narrative. Thus we find indirect speeches in the historians, as at the opening of Livy's first book ³⁴ :

That cities, like other things, spring from the humblest origins, and that those who are helped by their own valour and the favour of heaven subsequently win great power and a great name for themselves.

Apostrophe also,

[38] which consists in the diversion of our address from the judge, is wonderfully stirring, whether we attack our adversary as in the passage,

What was that sword of yours doing, Tubero, in the field of Pharsalus?

³⁵ or turn to make some invocation such as,

For I appeal to you, hills and groves of Alba,

³⁶ or to entreaty that will bring odium on our opponents, as in the cry,

O Porcian and Sempronian laws.

³⁷

[39] But the term apostrophe is also applied to utterances that divert the attention of the hearer from the question before them, as in the following passage:

I swore not with the Greeks

At Aulis to uproot the race of Troy.

Aen. iv. 425. Dido is urging Anna to approach Aeneas and induce Aeneas to postpone his departure. Dido is no enemy from whom he need fly.

There are a number of different figures by which this effect may be produced. We may, for instance, pretend that we expected something different or feared some greater disaster, or that the judges in their ignorance of the facts may regard some point as of more importance than it really is: an example of this latter device is to be found in the exordium to Cicero's defence of Caelius.

[40] With regard to the figure which Cicero ³⁸ calls ocular denonstration, this comes into play when we do not restrict ourselves to mentioning that something was done, but proceed to show how it was done, and do so not merely on broad general lines, but in full detail. In the last book ³⁹ I classified this figure under the head of vivid illustration, while Celsus actually terms it by this name. Others give the name of ὑποτύπωσις to any representation of facts which is made in such vivid language that they appeal to the eye rather than the ear. The following will show what I mean:

He came into the forum on fire with criminal madness: his eyes blazed and cruelty was written in every feature of his countenance.

⁴⁰

[41] Nor is it only past or present actions which we may imagine: we may equally well present a picture of what is likely to happen or might have happened. This is done with extraordinary skill by Cicero in his defence of Milo, ⁴¹ where he shows what Clodius would have done, had he succeeded in securing the praetorship. But this transference of time, which is technically called μετάστασις was more modestly used in vivid description by the old orators. For they would preface it by words such as

Imagine that you see

: take, for example, the words of Cicero ⁴² :

Though you cannot see this with your bodily eyes, you can see it with the mind's eye.

[42] Modern authors, however, more especially the declaimers, are bolder, indeed they show the utmost animation in giving rein to their imagination; witness the following passages from Seneca's treatment of the controversial theme in which a father, guided by one of his sons, finds another son in the act of adultery with his stepmother and kills both culprits.

Lead me, I follow, take this old hand of mine and direct it where you will.

[43] And a little later,

See, he says, what for so long you refused to believe. As for myself, I cannot see, night and thick darkness veil my eyes.

This figure is too dramatic: for the story seems to be acted, not narrated.

[44] Some include the clear and vivid description of places under the same heading, while others call it topography. I have found some who speak of irony as dissimulation, but, in view of the fact that this latter name does not cover the whole range of this figure, I shall follow my general rule and rest content with the Greek term. Irony involving a figure does not differ from the irony which is a trope, as far as its genus is concerned, since in both cases we understand something which is the opposite of what is actually said; on the other hand, a careful consideration of the species of irony will soon reveal the fact that they differ.

[45] In the first place, the trope is franker in its meaning, and, despite the fact that it implies something other than it says, makes no pretence about it. For the context as a rule is perfectly clear, as, for example, in the following passage from the Catilinarian orations. ⁴³

Rejected by him, you migrated to your boon-companion, that excellent gentleman Metellus.

In this case the irony lies in two words, and is therefore a specially concise form of trope.

[46] But in the figurative form of irony the speaker disguises his entire meaning, the disguise being apparent rather than confessed. For in the trope the conflict is purely verbal, while in the figure the meaning, and sometimes the whole aspect of our case, conflicts with the language and the tone of voice adopted; nay, a man's whole life may be coloured with irony, as was the case with Socrates, who was called an ironist because he assumed the role of an ignorant man lost in wonder at the wisdom of others. Thus, as continued metaphor develops into allegory, so a sustained series of tropes develops into this figure.

[47] There are, however, certain kinds of this figure which have no connexion with tropes. In the first place, there is the figure which derives its name from negation and is called by some ἀντίφρασις. Here is an example:

I will not plead against you according to the rigour of the law, I will not press the point which I should perhaps be able to make good

⁴⁴ ; or again,

Why should I mention his decrees, his acts of plunder, his acquisition, whether by cession or by force, of certain inheritances?

⁴⁵ or

I say nothing of the first wrong inflicted by his lust

; or

I do not even propose to produce the evidence given concerning the 600,000 sesterces

;

[48] or

I might say, etc.

⁴⁶ Such kinds of irony may even be sustained at times through whole sections of our argument, as, for instance, where Cicero ⁴⁷ says,

If I were to plead on this point as though there were some real charge to refute, I should speak at greater length.

It is also irony when we assume the tone of command or concession, as in Virgil's ⁴⁸

Go!

Follow the winds to Italy;

[49] or when we concede to our opponents qualities which we are unwilling that they should seem to possess. This is specially effective when we possess these qualities and they do not, as in the following passage, ⁴⁹

Brand me as coward, Drances, since thy sword

Has slain such hosts of Trojans.

A like result is produced by reversing this method when we pretend to own to faults which are not ours or which even recoil upon the heads of our opponents, as for example,

'Twas I that led the Dardan gallant on

To storm the bridal bed of Sparta's queen!

Aen. x. 92. Juno ironically pretends to have brought about the rape of Helen, which was in reality the work of Venus.

[50] Further, this device of saying the opposite of what we desire to imply is not merely restricted to persons, but may be extended to things, witness the whole of the exordium of the pro Ligario and disparaging phrases such as

Forsooth,

ye great gods!

Fit task, I ween, for gods!

Aen. iv,. 379. Dido mocks the excuse of Aeneas that he had received the direct command of heaven to leave Carthage.

[51] Another example is provided by the following passage from the pro Oppio,

What wondrous love! what extraordinary benevolence!

Akin to irony also are the following figures, which have a strong family resemblance: confession of a kind that can do our case no harm, such as the following ⁵⁰ :

You have now, Tubero, the advantage most desired by an accuser: the accused confesses his guilt

; secondly, concession, when we pretend to admit something actually unfavourable to ourselves by way of showing our confidence in our cause, as in the following passage ⁵¹ :

The commander of a ship from a distinguished city paid down a sum of money to rid himself of the fear of a scourging which hung over his head; it shows Verres' humanity

; or again, in the pro Cluentio,⁵² where Cicero is speaking of the prejudice aroused against his client,

Let it prevail in the public assembly, but be silent in the courts of law

; thirdly, agreement, as when Cicero, ⁵³ in the same speech, agrees that the jury was bribed.

[52] This last form of figure becomes more striking when we agree to something which is really likely to tell in our favour; but such an opportunity can only occur through weakness on the part of our opponent Sometimes we may even praise some action of our opponent, as Cicero does in his prosecution of Verres ⁵⁴ when dealing with the charge in connexion with Apollonius of Drepanum:

Nay, it is a real pleasure to me to think that you took something from him, and I say that you never did a juster action in your life.

[53] At times we may exaggerate charges against ourselves which we can easily refute or deny; this device is too common to require any illustration. At other times we may by this same method make the charges brought against us seem incredible just because of their gravity: thus Cicero in his defence of Roscius, ⁵⁵ by the sheer force of his eloquence, exaggerates the horror of parricide, despite the fact that it requires no demonstration.

[54] Aposiopesis, which Cicero ⁵⁶ calls reticentia, Celsus obticentia, and some interruptio, is used to indicate passion or anger, as in the line: ⁵⁷

Whom I—

But better first these billows to assuage.

Or it may serve to give an impression of anxiety or scruple, as in the following: ⁵⁸

Would he have dared to mention this law of which Clodius boasts he was the author, while Milo was alive, I will not say was consul? For as regards all of us—I do not dare to complete the sentence.

There is a similar instance in the exordium of Demosthenes' speech in defence of Ctesiphon. ⁵⁹

[55] Again it may be employed as a means of transition, as, for example, ⁶⁰

Cominius, however— nay, pardon me, gentlemen.

This last instance also involves digression, if indeed digression is to be counted among figures, since some authorities regard it as forming one of the parts of a speech. ⁶¹ For at this point the orator diverges to sing the praises of Gnaeus Pompeius, which he might have done without any recourse to aposiopesis.

[56] For as Cicero ⁶² says, the shorter form of digression may be effected in a number of different ways. The following passages will, however, suffice as examples:

Then Gaius Varenus, that is, the Varenus who was killed by the slaves of Ancharius:—I beg you, gentlemen, to give careful attention to what I am about to say ⁶³ ;

the second is from the pro Milone ⁶⁴ :

Then he turned on me that glance, which it was his wont to assume, when he threatened all the world with every kind of violence.

[57] There is also another kind of figure, which is not aposiopesis, since that involves leaving a sentence unfinished, but consists in bringing our words to a close before the natural point for their conclusion. The following is an example ⁶⁵ :

I am pressing my point too far; the young man appears to be moved

; or ⁶⁶

Why should I say more? you heard the young man tell the story himself.

The imitation of other persons' characteristics,

[58] which is styled ἠθοποιί͂α or, as some prefer μίμησις may be counted among the devices which serve to excite the gentler emotions. For it consists mainly in banter, though it may be concerned either with words or deeds. If concerned with the latter, it closely resembles ὑποτύπωσις while the following passage from Terence ⁶⁷ will illustrate it as applied to words:

I didn't see your drift. 'A little girl was stolen from this place; my mother brought her up as her own daughter. She was known as my sister. I want to get her away to restore her to her relations.'

[59] We may, however, imitate our own words and deeds in a similar fashion by relating some act or statement, though in such cases the speaker more frequently does so to assert his point than for the sake of banter, as, for example, in the following, ⁶⁸

I said that they had Quintus Caecilius to conduct the prosecution.

There are other devices also which are agreeable in themselves and serve not a little to commend our case both by the introduction of variety and by their intrinsic naturalness, since by giving our speech an appearance of simplicity and spontaneity they make the judges more ready to accept our statements without suspicion.

[60] Thus we may feign repentance for what we have said, as in the pro Caelio,⁶⁹ where Cicero says,

But why did I introduce so respectable a character?

Or we may use some common phrase, such as,

I didn't mean to say that.

⁷⁰ Or we may pretend that we are searching for what we should say, as in the phrases,

What else is there?

Have I left anything out?

Or we may pretend to discover something suggested by the context, as when Cicero ⁷¹ says,

One more charge, too, of this sort still remains for me to deal with,

One thing suggests another.

[61] Such methods will also provide us with elegant transitions, although transition is not itself to be ranked among figures: for example, Cicero, ⁷² after telling the story of Piso, who ordered a goldsmith to make a ring before him in court, adds, as though this story had suggested it to him,

This ring of Piso's reminds me of something which had entirely slipped my memory. How many gold rings do you think Verres has stripped from the fingers of honourable men?

Or we may affect ignorance on certain points, as in the following passage ⁷³ :

But who was the sculptor who made those statues? Who was he? Thank you for prompting me, you are right; they said it was Polyclitus.

[62] This device may serve for other purposes as well. For there are means of this kind whereby we may achieve an end quite other than that at which we appear to be aiming, as, for example, Cicero does in the passage just quoted. For while he taunts Verres with a morbid passion for acquiring statues and pictures, he succeeds in creating the impression that he personally has no interest in such subjects. So, too, when Demosthenes ⁷⁴ swears by those who fell at Marathon and Salamis, his object is to lessen the odium in which he was involved by the disaster at Chaeronea.

[63] We may further lend charm to our speech by deferring the discussion of some points after just mentioning them, thus depositing them in the safe keeping of the judge's memory and afterwards reclaiming our deposit; or we may employ some figure to enable us to repeat certain points (for repetition is not in itself a figure) or may make especial mention of certain things and vary the aspect of our pleading. For eloquence delights in variety, and just as the eye is more strongly attracted by the sight of a number of different things, so oratory supplies a continuous series of novelties to rivet the attention of the mind.

[64] Emphasis may be numbered among figures also, when some hidden meaning is extracted from some phrase, as in the following passage from Virgil:

Might I not have lived,

From wedlock free, a life without a stain,

Happy as beasts are happy?

Aen. iv. 550.

For although Dido complains of marriage, yet her passionate outburst shows that she regards life without wedlock as no life for man, but for the beasts of the field. A different kind of emphasis is found in Ovid, where Zmyrna confesses to her nurse her passion for her father in the following words:

O mother, happy in thy spouse!

Met. x. 422.

[65] Similar, if not identical with this figure is another, which is much in vogue at the present time. For I must now proceed to the discussion of a class of figure which is of the commonest occurrence and on which I think I shall be expected to make some comment. It is one whereby we excite some suspicion to indicate that our meaning is other than our words would seem to imply; but our meaning is not in this case contrary to that which we express, as is the case in ironq, but rather a hidden meaning which is left to the hearer to discover. As I have already pointed out, ⁷⁵ modern rhetoricians practically restrict the name of figure to this device, from the use of which figured controversial themes derive their name.

[66] This class of figure may be employed under three conditions: first, if it is unsafe to speak openly; secondly, if it is unseemly to speak openly; and thirdly, when it is employed solely with a view to the elegance of what we say, and gives greater pleasure by reason of the novelty and variety thus introduced than if our meaning had been expressed in straightforward language.

[67] The first of the three is of common occurrence in the schools, where we imagine conditions laid down by tyrants on abdication and decrees passed by the senate after a civil war, and it is a capital offence to accuse a person with what is past, what is not expedient in the courts being actually prohibited in the schools. But the conditions governing the employment of figures differ in the two cases. For we may speak against the tyrants in question as openly as we please without loss of effect, provided always that what we say is susceptible of a different interpretation, since it is only danger to ourselves, and not offence to them, that we have to avoid.

[68] And if the danger can be avoided by any ambiguity of expression, tile speaker's cunning will meet with universal approbation. On the other hand, the actual business of the courts has never yet involved such necessity for silence, though at times they require something not unlike it, which is much more embarrassing for the speaker, as, for example, when he is hampered by the existence of powerful personages, whom he must censure if he is to prove his case.

[69] Consequently he must proceed with greater wariness and circumspection; since the actual manner in which offence is given is a matter of indifference, and if a figure is perfectly obvious, it ceases to be a figure. Therefore such devices are absolutely repudiated by some authorities, whether the meaning of the figure be intelligible or not. But it is possible to employ such figuress in moderation, the primary consideration being that they should not be too obvious. And this fault can be avoided, if the figre does not depend on the employment of words of doubtful or double meaning, such, for instance, as the words which occur in the theme of the suspected daughter-in-law: ⁷⁶

I married the wife who pleased my father.

[70] It is important, too, that the figure should not depend on ambiguous collocations of words (a trick which is far more foolish than the last); an example of this is to be found in the controversial theme, where a father, accused of a criminal passion for his unmarried daughter, asks her for the name of her ravisher.

Who dishonoured you?

he says. She replies:

My father, do you not know?

⁷⁷

[71] The facts themselves must be allowed to excite the suspicions of the judge, and we must clear away all other points, leaving nothing save what will suggest the truth. In doing this we shall find emotional appeals, hesitation and words broken by silences most effective. For thus the judge will be led to seek out the secret which he would not perhaps believe if he heard it openly stated, and to believe in that which he thinks he has found out for himself. But however excellent our figures,

[72] they must not be too numerous. For overcrowding will make them obvious, and they will become ineffective without becoming inoffensive, while the fact that we make no open accusation will seem to be due not to modesty, but to lack of confidence in our own cause. In fact, we may sum up the position thus: our figures will have most effect upon the judge when he thinks that we use them with reluctance.

[73] I myself have come across persons whom it was impossible to convince by other means: I have even come across a much rarer thing, namely, a case which could only be proved by recourse to such devices. I was defending a woman who was alleged to have forged her husband's will, and the heirs were stated to have given a bond ⁷⁸ to the husband on his deathbed, which latter assertion was true.

[74] For since the wife could not legally be appointed his heir, this procedure was adopted to enable the property to be transferred to her by a secret conveyance in trust. Now it was easy for me to secure the woman's acquittal, by openly mentioning the existence of the bond; but this would have involved her loss of the inheritance. I had, therefore, to plead in such a way that the judges should understand that the bond had actually been given, but that informers might be unable to avail themselves of any statement of mine to that effect. And I was successful in both my aims. The fear of seeming to boast my own skill would have deterred me from mentioning this case, but for the fact that I wished to demonstrate that there was room for the employment of these figures even in the courts.

[75] Some things, again, which cannot be proved, may, on the other hand, be suggested by the employment of some figure. For at times such hidden shafts will stick, and the fact that they are not noticed will prevent their being drawn out, whereas if the same point were stated openly, it would be denied by our opponents and would have to be proved.

[76] When, however, it is respect for some person that hampers us (which I mentioned as the second condition ⁷⁹ under which such figures may be used), all the greater caution is required because the sense of shame is a stronger deterrent to all good men than fear. In such cases the judge must be impressed with the fact that we are hiding what we know and keeping back the words which our natural impulse to speak out the truth would cause to burst from our lips. For those against whom we are speaking, together with the judges and our audience, would assuredly be all the more incensed by such toying with detraction, if they thought that we were inspired by deliberate malice.

[77] And what difference does it make how we express ourselves, when both the facts and our feelings are clearly understood? And what good shall we do by expressing ourselves thus except to make it clear that we are doing what we ourselves know ought not to be done? And yet in the days when I first began to teach rhetoric, this failing was only too common. For declaimers selected by preference those themes which attracted them by their apparent difficulty, although as a matter of fact they were much easier than many others.

[78] For straightforward eloquence requires the highest gifts to commend itself to the audience, while these circuitous and indirect methods are merely the refuge of weakness, for those who use them are like men who, being unable to escape from their pursuers by speed, do so by doubling, since this method of expression, which is so much affected, is really not far removed from jesting. Indeed it is positively assisted by the tact that the hearer takes pleasure in detecting the speaker's concealed meaning, applauds his own penetration and regards another man's eloquence as a compliment to himself.

[79] Consequently it was not merely in cases where respect for persons prevented direct speaking (a circumstance which as a rule calls for caution rather than figures ) that they would have recourse to figurative methods, but they made room for them even under circumstances where they were useless or morally inadmissible, as for example in a case where a father, who had secretly slain his son whom he suspected of incest with his mother, and was accused of ill-treating his wife, was made to bring indirect insinuations against his wife.

[80] But what could be more discreditable to the accused than that he should have kept such a wife? What could be more damaging than that he who is accused because he appears to have harboured the darkest suspicions against his wife, should by his defence confirm the charge which he is required to refute? If such speakers had only placed themselves in the position of the judges, they would have realised how little disposed they would have been to put up with pleading on such lines, more especially in cases where the most abominable crimes were insinuated against parents.

[81] However, since we have lighted on this topic, let us devote a little more time to considering the practice of the schools. For it is in the schools that the orator is trained, and the methods adopted in pleading ultimately depend on the methods employed in declamation. I must therefore say something of those numerous cases in which figures have been employed which were not merely harsh, but actually contrary to the interests of the case.

A man condemned for attempting to establish himself as tyrant shall be tortured to make him reveal the names of his accomplices. The accuser shall choose what reward he pleases. A certain man has secured the condemnation of his father and demands as his reward that he should not be tortured. The father opposes his choice.

[82] Everyone who pleaded for the father indulged in figurative insinuations against the son, on the assumption that the father would, when tortured, be likely to name him as one of his accomplices. But what could be more foolish? For as soon as the judges grasp their point, they will either refuse to put him to the torture in view of his motive for desiring to be tortured, or will refuse to believe any confession he may make under torture. But, it will be urged,

[83] it is possible that this was his motive. May be. But he should then disguise his motive, in order that he may effect his purpose. But what will it profit us (and by us I mean the declaimers) to have realised this motive, unless we declare it as well? Well, then, if the case were being actually pleaded in the courts, should we have disclosed this secret motive in such a way? Again, if this is not the real motive, the condemned man may have other reasons for opposing his son; he may think that the law should be carried out or be unwilling to accept such a kindness from the hands of his accuser, or (and this is the line on which I personally should insist) he may intend to persist in declaring his innocence even under torture.

[84] Consequently the usual excuse advanced by such declaimers to the effect that the inventor of the theme meant the defence to proceed on these lines, will not always serve their purpose. It is possible that this was not the inventor's wish. However, let us assume that it was. Are we then to speak like fools merely because he thought like a fool? Personally I hold that, even in actual cases, we should often disregard the wishes of the litigant.

[85] Further, in such cases speakers fall into the frequent error of assuming that certain persons say one thing and mean another: this is more especially the case where it is assumed that a man asks permission to die. Take, for example, the following controversial theme.

A man who had shown himself a heroic soldier in the past, on the occasion of a subsequent war demanded exemption from service in accordance with the law, on the ground that he was fifty years of age, but exemption being refused owing to the opposition of his son, he deserted on being compelled to go into the fight. The son, who had borne himself like a hero in the same battle, asks for his father's pardon as a reward. The father opposes his choice.

Yes,

they say,

that is due not to his desire to die, but to bring odium on his son.

For my part,

[86] I laugh at the fears which they manifest on his behalf, as though they were in peril of death themselves, and at the way in which they allow their terror to influence their line of pleading; for they forget how many precedents there are for suicide and how many reasons there may be why a hero turned deserter should wish for death.

[87] But it would be waste of time to expatiate on one controversial theme. I would lay it down as a general rule that an orator should never put forward a plea that is tantamount to collusion, and I cannot imagine a lawsuit arising in which both parties have the same design, nor conceive that any man who wishes to live could be such a fool as to put forward an absurd plea for death, when he might refrain from pleading for it at all. ⁸⁰ I do not, however,

[88] deny that there are controversial themes of this kind where figures may legitimately be employed, as, for example, the following:

A man was accused of unnatural murder on the ground that he had killed his brother, and it seemed probable that he would be condemned. His father gave evidence in his defence, stating that the murder had been committed on his orders. The son was acquitted, but disinherited by the father.

For in this case he does not pardon his son entirely, but cannot openly withdraw the evidence that he gave in the first trial, and while he does not inflict any worse penalty than disinheritance, he does not shrink from that. Further, the employment of the figure tells more heavily against the father than is fair and less against the son. ⁸¹

[89] But, while no one ever speaks against the view which he wishes to prevail, he may wish something of greater importance than what he actually says. Thus the disinherited son who asks his father to take back another son whom he had exposed, and who had been brought up by himself, on payment for his maintenance, while he may prefer that he himself should be reinstated, may all the same be perfectly sincere in his demand on behalf of his brother. Again, a kind of tacit hint may be employed, which,

[90] while demanding the utmost rigour of the law from the judges, suggests a loophole for clemency, not openly, for that would imply a pledge on our part, but by giving a plausible suspicion of our meaning. This device is employed in a number of controversial themes, among them the following.

A ravisher, unless within thirty days he secure pardon both from his own father and the father of the ravished girl, shall be put to death. A man who has succeeded in securing pardon from the father of the girl, but not from his own, accuses the latter of madness.

[91] Here if the father pledges himself to pardon him, the dispute falls to the ground. If, on the other hand, he holds out no hope of pardon, though he will not necessarily be regarded as mad, he will certainly give the impression of cruelty and will prejudice the judge against him. Latro therefore showed admirable skill when he made the son say,

You will kill me then?

and the father reply,

Yes, if I can.

⁸² The elder Gallio treats the theme with greater tenderness, as was natural to a man of his disposition. He makes the father say,

Be firm, my heart, be firm. Yesterday you were made of sterner stuff.

[92] Akin to this are those figures of which the Greeks are so fond, by means of which they give gentle expression to unpleasing facts. Themistocles, for example, is believed to have urged the Athenians to commit their city to the protection of heaven, because to urge them to abandon it would have been too brutal an expression. Again the statesman ⁸³ who advised that certain golden images of Victory should be melted down as a contribution to the war funds, modified his words by saying that they should make a proper use of their victories. But all such devices which consist in saying one thing, while intending something else to be understood, have a strong resemblance to allegory.

[93] It has also been asked how figures may best be met. Some hold that they should always be exposed by the antagonist, just as hidden ulcers are laid open by the surgeon. It is true that this is often the right course, being the only means of refuting the charges which have been brought against us, and this is more especially the case when the question turns on the very point at which the figures are directed. But when the figures are merely employed as vehicles of abuse, it will sometimes even be wisest to show that we have a clear conscience by ignoring them.

[94] Nay, even if too many figures have been used to permit us to take such a course, we may ask our opponents, if they have any confidence in the righteousness of their cause, to give frank and open expression to the charges which they have attempted to suggest by indirect hints, or at any rate to refrain from asking the judges not merely to understand, but even to believe things which they themselves are afraid to state in so many words.

[95] It may even at times be found useful to pretend to misunderstand them; for which we may compare the well known story of the man who, when his opponent cried,

Swear by the ashes of your father,

⁸⁴ replied that he was ready to do so, whereupon the judge accepted the proposal, much to the indignation of the advocate, who protested that this would make the use of figures absolutely impossible; we may therefore lay it down as a general rule that such figures should only be used with the utmost caution.

[96] There remains the third class of figure designed merely to enhance the elegance of our style, for which reason Cicero expresses the opinion that such figures are independent of the subject in dispute. As an illustration I may quote the figure which he uses in his speech ⁸⁵ against Clodius:

By these means he, being familiar with all our holy rites, thought that he might easily succeed in appeasing the gods.

[97] Irony also is frequently employed in this connexion. But by far the most artistic device is to indicate one thing by allusion to another; take the case where a rival candidate speaks against an ex-tyrant who had abdicated on condition of his receiving an amnesty ⁸⁶ :

I am not permitted to speak against you. Do you speak against me, as you may. But a little while ago I wished to kill you.

[98] Another common device is to introduce an oath, like the speaker who, in defending a disinherited man, cried,

So may I die leaving a son to be my heir.

⁸⁷ But this is not a figure which is much to be recommended, for as a rule the introduction of an oath, unless it is absolutely necessary, is scarcely becoming to a self-respecting man. Seneca made a neat comment to this effect when he said that oaths were for the witness and not for the advocate. Again, the advocate who drags in an oath merely for the sake of some trivial rhetorical effect, does not deserve much credit, unless he can do this with the masterly effect achieved by Demosthenes, which I mentioned above. ⁸⁸

[99] But by far the most trivial form of figure is that which turns on a single word, although we find such a figure directed against Clodia by Cicero ⁸⁹ :

Especially when everybody thought her the friend of all men rather than the enemy of any.

[100] I note that comparison is also regarded as a figure, although at times it is a form of proof, ⁹⁰ and at others the whole case may turn upon it, ⁹¹ while its form may be illustrated by the following passage from the pro Murena:⁹²

You pass wakeful nights that you may be able to reply to your clients; he that he and his army may arrive betimes at their destination. You are roused by cockcrow, he by the bugle's reveille,

and so on.

[101] I am not sure, however, whether it is so much a figure of thought as of speech. For the only difference lies in the fact that universals are not contrasted with universals, but particulars with particulars. Celsus, however, and that careful writer Visellius regard it as a figure of thought, while Rutilius Lupus regards it as belonging to both, and calls it antithesis.

[102] To the figures placed by Cicero among the ornaments of thought Rutilius (following the views of Gorgias, a contemporary, whose four books he transferred to his own work, and who is not to be confused with Georgias of Leontini) and Celsus (who follows Rutilius) would add a number of others, such as:

[103] concentration, which the Greek calls διαλλαγή⁹³ a term employed when a number of different arguments are used to establish one point: consequence, which Gorgias calls ἐπακολούθησις and which I have already discussed under the head of argument ⁹⁴ : inference, which Gorgias terms συλλογισμός threats, that is, κατάπληξις exhortation, or παραινετικόν But all of these are perfectly straightforward methods of speaking, unless combined with some one of the figures which I have discussed above.

[104] Besides these, Celsus considers the following to be figures: exclusion, asseveration, refusal, ⁹⁵ excitement of the judge, the use of proverbs, the employment of quotations from poetry, jests, invidious remarks or invocation to intensify a charge (which is identical with δείνωσις ) flattery, pardon, disdain, admonition, apology, entreaty and rebuke.

[105] He even includes partition, proposition, division and affinity between two separate things, by which latter he means that two things apparently different signify the same: for example, not only the man who murders another by administering a deadly draught is to be regarded as a poisoner, but also the man who deprives another of his wits by giving him some drug, a point which depends on definition.

[106] To these Rutilius or Gorgias add ἀναγκαῖον that is, the representation of the necessity of a thing, ἀνάμνησις or reminding, ἀνθυποφορά that is, replying to anticipated objections, ἀντίῤῥησις or refutation, παραύξησις or amplification, προέκθεσις which means pointing out what ought to have been done, and then what actually has been done, ἐναντιότης, or arguments from opposites ⁹⁶ (whence we get enthymemes styled κατ᾽ ἐναντίωσιν ), and even μετάληψις, which Hermagoras considers a basis.⁹⁷ Visellius, although he makes the number of figures but small, includes among them the enthymeme, which he calls commentum, and the epicheireme, which he calls ratio.⁹⁸ This view is also partially accepted by Celsus, who is in doubt whether consequence is not to be identified with the epicheireme.

[107] Visellius also adds general reflexions to the list. I find others who would add to these διασκευή⁹⁹ or enhancement, ἀπαγόρευσις or prohibition, and παραδιήγησις or incidental narrative. But though these are not figures, there may be others which have slipped my notice, or are yet to be invented: still, they will be of the same nature as those of which I have spoken above.

Notes on the current edition

Institutio Oratoria

1. notabiles, Lochmann: nobiles, MSS.

2. qui, Politianus: cui, MSS. of Quintilian and Virgil.

3. scitus Sthenelus, vulgo: sciusticus, B: scius cus, A: sciens scitus, cod. monac .: suus scenalus, cod. arqentor .

4. fingit, MSS. of Virgil.

5. alius: ain, Halm : alius in, AG: allusit, some late MSS.

6. priore dicto is meaningless and the sense of ex eadem parte is obscure (?= Graecisms ).

7. incomptis, MSS. of Horace.

8. quae bracketed by Halm: dicendum, Regius : adiiciendum, MSS.

9. se added by Halm.

10. simul, Spalding : semel, MSS.

11. primum verbum, Halm : primo verbo, MSS.

12. primum ultimum, suggested by Halm: ultimum primum,

13. sed non eodem, added by Meister.

14. the text is as given by the best MSS. of Cicero. the best MSS. of Quintilian, however, read facere Cleomenes potuit.

15. primum added by Badius.

16. after πλοκήν followed by late MSS. continues: usque deducit et apud nostrum etiam tragicum. Iove propagatus est ut perhibent Tantalus ( see sect. 57) per me et investigata, etc.

17. before patefacta MSS. give idē or id est, which, if pate. facta be correct, must be deleted. alternately Halm deletes id est patefacta as a gloss, also expunging deleta.

18. illud, Halm : ut, AG.

19. eat, Spalding : et, MSS.

20. Omitted by MSS.

21. Omitted by MSS.

22. Omitted by MSS.

23. Omitted by MSS.

24. iudicia perierunt, aquila Romanus: est, MSS.

25. ego ne, Spalding : nego, AG.

26. sed added by Halm.

27. qua similia discernuntur, Regius : quia simili discernunt, AG.

28. ἔμφασις estet, E. Wöffin: CPACIC est, A: fassis, falsis, fallis, other MSS.

29. vicino diversum, sch ütz: diverso vicinum, MSS.

30. sed, Halm : sic, MSS.

31. voce, added by Christ.

32. innatam, 2nd hand of A.: inata, AG.: gratiam added by Meister.

33. vocant, added by Cappcronnier.

34. respondentibus, Halm : respondent, AG.

35. infelicis aulae si non, an early emendation: infelicis auleis non, MSS. Halm conjectures infelicibus ausis non modo p.i.p., sed etiam solacio i.a.

36. pericula adversa, inserted by G Laubmann.

37. paene ut, ed. ald : pedem et, MSS.

38. at hoc, Halm : ad hue, AG.

39. nemo, Badius : nego, MSS.

40. tropos, added by Burmann.

41. si, Halm : etsi, MSS.

42. de, Halm : et, MSS.

43. oratio, Regius : orator, MSS.

Quintilian Institutio Oratoria 9.3

ed. Harold Edgeworth Butler

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