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[1] The student who desires to give a wider consideration to figures of thought and speech will, therefore, have a guide to follow, and 1 would not venture to assert that he could have a better. But I would ask him to read these passages of Cicero with reference to my own views on this subject. For I intend to speak only of those figures of thought which depart from the direct method of statement, and I note that a similar procedure has been adopted by a number of learned scholars.
[2] On the other hand, all those embellishments which differ in character from these are none the less virtues whose importance is such that without them all oratory will be little less than unintelligible. For how can the judge be adequately instructed unless lucidity characterise our performance of the following tasks: explanation, proposition, promise of proofs, definition, distinction, exposition of our own opinion, logical conclusion, defence by anticipation, introduction of comparisons or precedents, disposition and distribution, interruption, repression of those who interrupt us, antithesis, exculpation and personal attack?
[3] Again, what would eloquence do if deprived of the artifices of amplification and its opposite? of which the first requires the gift of signifying more than we say, that is
emphasis, together with exaggeration and overstatement of the truth, while the latter requires the power to diminish and palliate. What scope is there for the stronger emotions if the orator is not allowed to give free rein to his speech, to flame out in anger, to reproach, to wish or execrate? Or for the milder emotions without the assistance of commendation, conciliation and humour?
[4] What pleasure can an orator hope to produce, or what impression even of the most moderate learning, unless he knows how to fix one point in the minds of the audience by repetition, and another by dwelling on it, how to digress from and return to his theme, to divert the blame from himself and transfer it to another, or to decide what points to omit and what to ignore as negligible? It is qualities such as these that give life and vigour to oratory; without them it lies torpid like a body lacking the breath to stir its limbs.
[5] But more than the mere possession of these qualities is required; they must be deployed, each in their proper place and with such variety that every sound may bewitch the hearer with all the charm of music. But these qualities are as a rule open and direct, manifesting themselves without disguise. They do, however, as I have said, admit of
figures, as the instances to which I shall proceed will show.
[6] What is more common than to
ask or
enquire? For both terms are used indifferently, although the one seems to imply a desire for knowledge, and the other a desire to prove something. But whichever term we use, the thing which they represent admits a variety of figures. We will begin with those which serve to increase the force and cogency of proof to which I assign the first place.
[7] A simple question may be illustrated by the line:
1
On the other hand, a question involves a figure, whenever it is employed not to get information, but to emphasise our point, as in the following examples:
2
But who are ye and from what shores are come?
What was that sword of yours doing, Tubero, that was drawn on the field of Pharsalus?
and
How long, Catiline, will you abuse our patience?
and
Do you not see that your plots are all laid bare?
with the whole passage that follows. [8] How much greater is the fire of his words as they stand than if he had said,
You have abused our patience a long time,
and
Your plots are all laid bare.
We may also ask what cannot be denied, as
Was Gaius Fidiculanius Falcula, I ask you, brought to justice?
3
Or we may put a question to which it is difficult to reply, as in the common forms,
How is it possible?
How can that be?
[9] Or we may ask a question with a view to throw odium on the person to whom it is addressed, as in the words placed by Seneca in the mouth of Medea:
4
Or our aim may be to excite pity, as is the case with the question asked by Sinon in Virgil:
5
Or to embarrass our opponent and to deprive him of the power to feign ignorance of our meaning, as Asinius does in the following sentence:
What lands dost bid me seek?
Alas, what lands, lie cried,
What seas can now receive me?
Do you hear? The will which we impugn is the work of a madman, not of one who lacked natural affection.
In fact questions admit of infinite variety. [10] They may serve our indignation, as in the line:
Aen. i. 48.
Or they may still express wonder, as in:
Aen. iii. 56.
Again, at times they may express a sharp command,
Are any left
That still adore Juno's divinity?
To what dost thou not drive the hearts of men,
Accursed greed of gold?
[11] as in:
Aen. iv. 592.
Or we may ask ourselves, as in the phrase of Terence,
Will they not rush to arms and follow forth
From all the city?
What, then, shall I do?
6
[12] A figure is also involved in a reply, when one question is asked and another is answered, because it suits the respondent's purpose better to do so, or because it aggravates the charge brought against the accused. For example, a witness for the prosecution was asked whether he had been cudgelled by the plaintiff, and replied,
And what is more, I had done him no harm.
Or the purpose may be to elude a charge, a very common form of reply. The advocate says,
I ask if you killed the man?
The accused replies,
He was a robber.
The advocate asks,
Have you occupied the farm?
The accused replies,
It was my own.
[13] Again, the answer may be of such a kind as to make defence precede confession. For example, in the
Eclogues
7
of Virgil, when one shepherd asks:
the other replies:
Did I not see you, villain, snare a goat
Of Damon's?
I vanquished him in song, and should he not
Pay me the prize, my due?
[14] Akin to this kind of answer is the dissimulatory reply, which is employed solely with the purpose of raising a laugh, and has therefore been treated in its appropriate place.
8
If it were meant seriously, it would be tantamount to a confession. Further, there is the practice of putting the question and answering it oneself, which may have quite a pleasing effect. Take as an example the following passage from the
pro Ligario,
9
where Cicero says,
Before whom do I say this? Before one who, although he was aware of these facts, yet restored me to my country even before he had seen me.
[15] A different form of fictitious question is to be found in the
pro Caelio.
Some one will say, 'Is this your moral discipline? Is this the training you would give young men?'
with the whole passage that follows. Then comes his reply,
Gentlemen, if there were any man with such vigour of mind, with such innate virtue and self-control, etc.
10
A different method is to ask a question and not to wait for a reply, but to subjoin the reply at once yourself. For example,
Had you no house? Yes, you had one. Had you money and to spare? No, you were in actual want.
11
This is a figure which some call
suggestion.[16] Again, a question may involve
comparison, as, for instance,
Which of the two then could more easily assign a reason for his opinion?
12
There are other forms of question as well, some concise, some developed at greater length, some dealing with one thing only, others with several.
Anticipation, or, as the Greeks call it,
πρόληψις, whereby we forestall objections, is of extraordinary value in pleading; it is frequently employed in all parts of a speech, but is especially useful in the
exordium.[17] However, it forms a genus in itself, and has several different species. One of these is the defence by anticipation, such as Cicero employs against Quintus Caecilius,
13
where he points out that though previously he himself has always appeared for the defence, he is now undertaking a prosecution. Another is a form of
confession, such as he introduces in his defence of Rabirius Postumus,
14
where he admits that he himself regards his client as worthy of censure for lending money to the king. Another takes the form of
prediction, as in the phrase,
For I will say without any intention of aggravating the charge.
Again, there is a form of
self-correction, such as,
I beg you to pardon me, if I have been carried too far.
And, most frequent of all, there is
preparation, whereby we state fully why we are going to do something or have done it. [18]
Anticipation may also be employed to establish the meaning or
propriety of words, as in the following case,
Although that was not a punishment, but merely a prevention of crime,
15
while the same effect may be produced by
qualification, as in the following sentence,
Citizens, I say, if I may call them by that name.
16
[19] Again, hesitation may lend an impression of truth to our statements, when, for example, we pretend to be at a loss, where to begin or end, or to decide what especially requires to be said or not to be said at all. All speeches are full of such instances, but for the present one will be enough.
As for myself, I know not where to turn. Shall I deny that there was a scandalous rumour that the jury had been bribed, etc.?
17
[20] This device may also be employed to cover the past; for we may equally pretend that we
had felt hesitation on the subject. This figure is akin to that known as
communication, when we actually take our opponents into consultation, as Domitius Afer does in his defence of Cloatilla.
She is so agitated that she does not know what is permitted to a woman or what becomes a wife. It may be that chance has brought you into contact with the unhappy woman in her helpless plight. What counsel do you give her, you her brother, and you, her father's friends?
[21] Or we may admit the judges to our deliberations, a device which is frequently called into play. We may say,
What do you advise?
or,
I ask you,
or,
What, then, should have been done?
Cato, for example, says,
Come now, if you had been in his place, what else would you have done?
And in another passage,
Imagine this to be a matter which concerns us all, and assume you have been placed in charge of the whole affair.
[22] Sometimes, however, in such forms of communication we may add something unexpected, a device which is in itself a
figure, as Cicero does in the
Verrines:
What then? What think you? Perhaps you expect to hear of some theft or plunder.
18
Then, after keeping the minds of the judges in suspense for a considerable time, he adds something much worse. This figure is termed
suspension by Celsus. It has two forms. [23] For we may adopt exactly the opposite procedure to that just mentioned, and after raising expectation of a sequel of the most serious nature, we may drop to something which is of a trivial character, and may even imply no offence at all. But since this does not necessarily involve any form of
communication, some have given it the name of
paradox or
surprise.
[24] I do not agree with those who extend the name
of figure to a statement that something has happened unexpectedly to the speaker himself, like the following passage from Pollio:
Gentlemen, I never thought it would come to pass that, when Scaurus was the accused, I should have to entreat you not to allow influence to carry any weight on his behalf.
[25] The figure known as
concession springs from practically the same source as
communication; it occurs when we leave some things to the judgment of the jury, or even in some cases of our opponents, as when Calvus says to Vatinius,
Summon all your assurance and assert that you have a better claim than Cato to be elected praetor.
[26] The
figures best adapted for intensifying emotion consist chiefly in simulation. For we may feign that we are angry, glad, afraid, filled with wonder, grief or indignation, or that we wish something, and so on. Hence we get passages like the following:
Unknown.
To this some give the name of
exclamation,
I am free, I breathe again,
19
or,
It is well,
or,
What madness is this?
20
or,
Alas! for these degenerate days!
21
or,
Woe is me; for though all my tears are shed my grief still clings to me deep-rooted in my heart,
22
or,
Gape now, wide earth.
[27] and include it among
figures of speech. When, however, such exclamations are genuine, they do not come under the head of our present topic: it is only those which are simulated and artfully designed which can with any certainty be regarded as
figures. The same is true of free speech, which Corificius
23
calls
licence, and the Greeks
παῤῥησία. For what has less of the
figure about it than true freedom? On the other hand, freedom of speech may frequently be made a cloak for flattery.
[28] For when Cicero in his defence for Ligarius says,
After war had begun, Caesar, and was well on its way to a conclusion, I deliberately, of my own free will and under no compulsion, joined the forces of your opponents,
24
he has in his mind something more than a desire to serve the interests of Ligarius, for there is no better way of praising the clemency of the victor. [29] On the other hand, in the sentence,
What else was our aim, Tubero, than that we might secure the power which he now holds?
25
he succeeds with admirable art in representing the cause of both parties as being good, and in so doing mollifies him whose cause was really bad. A bolder form of
figure, which in Cicero's opinion
26
demands greater effort, is
impersonation, or
προσωποποιΐα This is a device which lends wonderful variety and animation to oratory. [30] By this means we display the inner thoughts of our adversaries as though they were talking with themselves (but we shall only carry conviction if we represent them as uttering what they may reasonably be supposed to have had in their minds); or without sacrifice of credibility we may introduce conversations between ourselves and others, or of others among themselves, and put words of advice, reproach, complaint, praise or pity into the mouths of appropriate persons.
[31] Nay, we are even allowed in this form of speech to bring down the gods from heaven and raise the dead, while cities also and peoples may find a voice. There are some authorities who restrict the term
imepersonation to cases where both persons and words are fictitious, and prefer to call imaginary conversations between men by the Greek name of
dialogue, which some
27
translate by the Latin
semnocinatio.
[32] For my own part, I have included both under the same generally accepted term, since we cannot imagine a speech without we also imagine a person to utter it. But when we lend a voice to things to which nature has denied it, we may soften down the
figure in the way illustrated by the following passage:
For if my country, which is far dearer to me than life itself, if all Italy, if the whole commonwealth were to address me thus, 'Marcus Tullius, what dost thou?
28
A bolder figure of the same kind may be illustrated by the following:
Your country, Catiline, pleads with you thus, and though she utters never a word, cries to you, 'For not a few years past no crime has come to pass save through your doing!'
29
[33] It is also convenient at times to pretend that we have before our eyes the images of things, persons or utterances, or to marvel that the same is not the case with our adversaries or the judges; it is with this design that we use phrases such as
It seems to me,
or
Does it not seem to you?
But such devices make a great demand on our powers of eloquence. For with things which are false and incredible by nature there are but two alternatives: either they will move our hearers with exceptional force because they are beyond the truth, or they will be regarded as empty nothings because they are not the truth. [34] But we may introduce not only imaginary sayings, but imaginary writings as well, as is done by Asinius in his defence of Liburnia:
Let my mother, who was the object of my love and my delight, who lived for me and gave me life twice in one day
30
(and so on) inherit nought of my property.
This is in itself a figure, and is doubly so whenever, as in the present case, it imitates a document produced by the opposing party. [35] For a will had been read out by the prosecution, in the following form:
Let Publius Novanius Gallio, to whom as my benefactor I will and owe all that is good, as a testimony to the great affection which he has borne me (then follow other details) be my heir.
In this case the
figure borders on
parody, a name drawn from songs sung in imitation of others, but employed by an abuse of language to designate imitation in verse or prose. [36] Again, we often personify the abstract, as Virgil
31
does with Fame, or as Xenophon
32
records that Prodicus did with Virtue and Pleasure, or as Ennius does when, in one of his satires, he represents Life and Death contending with one another. We may also introduce some imaginary person without identifying him, as we do in the phrases,
At this point some one will interpose,
or,
Some one will say.
[37] Or speech may be inserted without any mention of the speaker, as in the line:
33
This involves a mixture of
figures, since to
impersonalion we add the
figure known as
ellipse, which in this case consists in the omission of any indication as to who is speaking. At times
impersonation takes the form of narrative. Thus we find indirect speeches in the historians, as at the opening of Livy's first book
34
:
Here the Dolopian host
Camped, here the fierce Achilles pitched his tent.
That cities, like other things, spring from the humblest origins, and that those who are helped by their own valour and the favour of heaven subsequently win great power and a great name for themselves.
Apostrophe also, [38] which consists in the diversion of our address from the judge, is wonderfully stirring, whether we attack our adversary as in the passage,
What was that sword of yours doing, Tubero, in the field of Pharsalus?
35
or turn to make some invocation such as,
For I appeal to you, hills and groves of Alba,
36
or to entreaty that will bring odium on our opponents, as in the cry,
O Porcian and Sempronian laws.
37
[39] But the term
apostrophe is also applied to utterances that divert the attention of the hearer from the question before them, as in the following passage:
Aen. iv. 425. Dido is urging Anna to approach Aeneas and induce Aeneas to postpone his departure. Dido is no enemy from whom he need fly.
There are a number of different figures by which this effect may be produced. We may, for instance, pretend that we expected something different or feared some greater disaster, or that the judges in their ignorance of the facts may regard some point as of more importance than it really is: an example of this latter device is to be found in the exordium to Cicero's defence of Caelius.
I swore not with the Greeks
At Aulis to uproot the race of Troy.
[40] With regard to the figure which Cicero
38
calls
ocular denonstration, this comes into play when we do not restrict ourselves to mentioning that something was done, but proceed to show how it was done, and do so not merely on broad general lines, but in full detail. In the last book
39
I classified this figure under the head of
vivid illustration, while Celsus actually terms it by this name. Others give the name of
ὑποτύπωσις to any representation of facts which is made in such vivid language that they appeal to the eye rather than the ear. The following will show what I mean:
He came into the forum on fire with criminal madness: his eyes blazed and cruelty was written in every feature of his countenance.
40
[41] Nor is it only past or present actions which we may imagine: we may equally well present a picture of what is likely to happen or might have happened. This is done with extraordinary skill by Cicero in his defence of Milo,
41
where he shows what Clodius would have done, had he succeeded in securing the praetorship. But this
transference of time, which is technically called
μετάστασις was more modestly used in
vivid description by the old orators. For they would preface it by words such as
Imagine that you see
: take, for example, the words of Cicero
42
:
Though you cannot see this with your bodily eyes, you can see it with the mind's eye.
[42] Modern authors, however, more especially the declaimers, are bolder, indeed they show the utmost animation in giving rein to their imagination; witness the following passages from Seneca's treatment of the controversial theme in which a father, guided by one of his sons, finds another son in the act of adultery with his stepmother and kills both culprits.
Lead me, I follow, take this old hand of mine and direct it where you will.
[43] And a little later,
See, he says, what for so long you refused to believe. As for myself, I cannot see, night and thick darkness veil my eyes.
This figure is too dramatic: for the story seems to be acted, not narrated. [44] Some include the clear and vivid description of places under the same heading, while others call it
topography. I have found some who speak of
irony as
dissimulation, but, in view of the fact that this latter name does not cover the whole range of this figure, I shall follow my general rule and rest content with the Greek term.
Irony involving a
figure does not differ from the
irony which is a
trope, as far as its
genus is concerned, since in both cases we understand something which is the opposite of what is actually said; on the other hand, a careful consideration of the
species of
irony will soon reveal the fact that they differ.
[45] In the first place, the
trope is franker in its meaning, and, despite the fact that it implies something other than it says, makes no pretence about it. For the context as a rule is perfectly clear, as, for example, in the following passage from the Catilinarian orations.
43
Rejected by him, you migrated to your boon-companion, that excellent gentleman Metellus.
In this case the irony lies in two words, and is therefore a specially concise form of
trope.[46] But in the
figurative form of irony the speaker disguises his entire meaning, the disguise being apparent rather than confessed. For in the
trope the conflict is purely verbal, while in the
figure the meaning, and sometimes the whole aspect of our case, conflicts with the language and the tone of voice adopted; nay, a man's whole life may be coloured with
irony, as was the case with Socrates, who was called an
ironist because he assumed the role of an ignorant man lost in wonder at the wisdom of others. Thus, as continued
metaphor develops into
allegory, so a sustained series of
tropes develops into this
figure.
[47] There are, however, certain kinds of
this figure which have no connexion with
tropes. In the first place, there is the
figure which derives its name from negation and is called by some
ἀντίφρασις. Here is an example:
I will not plead against you according to the rigour of the law, I will not press the point which I should perhaps be able to make good
44
; or again,
Why should I mention his decrees, his acts of plunder, his acquisition, whether by cession or by force, of certain inheritances?
45
or
I say nothing of the first wrong inflicted by his lust
; or
I do not even propose to produce the evidence given concerning the 600,000 sesterces
; [48] or
I might say, etc.
46
Such kinds of irony may even be sustained at times through whole sections of our argument, as, for instance, where Cicero
47
says,
If I were to plead on this point as though there were some real charge to refute, I should speak at greater length.
It is also
irony when we assume the tone of command or concession, as in Virgil's
48
Go!
Follow the winds to Italy;
[49] or when we concede to our opponents qualities which we are unwilling that they should seem to possess. This is specially effective when we possess these qualities and they do not, as in the following passage,
49
A like result is produced by reversing this method when we pretend to own to faults which are not ours or which even recoil upon the heads of our opponents, as for example,
Aen. x. 92. Juno ironically pretends to have brought about the rape of Helen, which was in reality the work of Venus.
Brand
me as coward, Drances, since thy sword
Has slain such hosts of Trojans.
'Twas I that led the Dardan gallant on
To storm the bridal bed of Sparta's queen!
[50] Further, this device of saying the opposite of what we desire to imply is not merely restricted to persons, but may be extended to things, witness the whole of the
exordium of the
pro Ligario and disparaging phrases such as
Aen. iv,. 379. Dido mocks the excuse of Aeneas that he had received the direct command of heaven to leave Carthage.
Forsooth,
ye great gods!
or
Fit task, I ween, for gods!
[51] Another example is provided by the following passage from the
pro Oppio,
What wondrous love! what extraordinary benevolence!
Akin to
irony also are the following
figures, which have a strong family resemblance:
confession of a kind that can do our case no harm, such as the following
50
:
You have now, Tubero, the advantage most desired by an accuser: the accused confesses his guilt
; secondly,
concession, when we pretend to admit something actually unfavourable to ourselves by way of showing our confidence in our cause, as in the following passage
51
:
The commander of a ship from a distinguished city paid down a sum of money to rid himself of the fear of a scourging which hung over his head; it shows Verres' humanity
; or again, in the
pro Cluentio,
52
where Cicero is speaking of the prejudice aroused against his client,
Let it prevail in the public assembly, but be silent in the courts of law
; thirdly,
agreement, as when Cicero,
53
in the same speech, agrees that the jury was bribed. [52] This last form of
figure becomes more striking when we agree to something which is really likely to tell in our favour; but such an opportunity can only occur through weakness on the part of our opponent Sometimes we may even praise some action of our opponent, as Cicero does in his prosecution of Verres
54
when dealing with the charge in connexion with Apollonius of Drepanum:
Nay, it is a real pleasure to me to think that you took something from him, and I say that you never did a juster action in your life.
[53] At times we may exaggerate charges against ourselves which we can easily refute or deny; this device is too common to require any illustration. At other times we may by this same method make the charges brought against us seem incredible just because of their gravity: thus Cicero in his defence of Roscius,
55
by the sheer force of his eloquence, exaggerates the horror of parricide, despite the fact that it requires no demonstration.
[54]
Aposiopesis, which Cicero
56
calls
reticentia, Celsus
obticentia, and some
interruptio, is used to indicate passion or anger, as in the line:
57
Or it may serve to give an impression of anxiety or scruple, as in the following:
58
Whom I—
But better first these billows to assuage.
Would he have dared to mention this law of which Clodius boasts he was the author, while Milo was alive, I will not say was consul? For as regards all of us—I do not dare to complete the sentence.
There is a similar instance in the exordium of Demosthenes' speech in defence of Ctesiphon.
59
[55] Again it may be employed as a means of transition, as, for example,
60
Cominius, however— nay, pardon me, gentlemen.
This last instance also involves
digression, if indeed digression is to be counted among
figures, since some authorities regard it as forming one of the parts of a speech.
61
For at this point the orator diverges to sing the praises of Gnaeus Pompeius, which he might have done without any recourse to
aposiopesis.[56] For as Cicero
62
says, the shorter form of
digression may be effected in a number of different ways. The following passages will, however, suffice as examples:
Then Gaius Varenus, that is, the Varenus who was killed by the slaves of Ancharius:—I beg you, gentlemen, to give careful attention to what I am about to say
63
;
the second is from the pro Milone
64
:
Then he turned on me that glance, which it was his wont to assume, when he threatened all the world with every kind of violence.
[57] There is also another kind of figure, which is not aposiopesis, since that involves leaving a sentence unfinished, but consists in bringing our words to a close before the natural point for their conclusion. The following is an example
65
:
I am pressing my point too far; the young man appears to be moved
; or
66
Why should I say more? you heard the young man tell the story himself.
The imitation of other persons' characteristics, [58] which is styled
ἠθοποιί͂α or, as some prefer
μίμησις may be counted among the devices which serve to excite the gentler emotions. For it consists mainly in banter, though it may be concerned either with words or deeds. If concerned with the latter, it closely resembles
ὑποτύπωσις while the following passage from Terence
67
will illustrate it as applied to words:
I didn't see your drift. 'A little girl was stolen from this place; my mother brought her up as her own daughter. She was known as my sister. I want to get her away to restore her to her relations.'
[59] We may, however, imitate our own words and deeds in a similar fashion by relating some act or statement, though in such cases the speaker more frequently does so to assert his point than for the sake of banter, as, for example, in the following,
68
I said that they had Quintus Caecilius to conduct the prosecution.
There are other devices also which are agreeable in themselves and serve not a little to commend our case both by the introduction of variety and by their intrinsic naturalness, since by giving our speech an appearance of simplicity and spontaneity they make the judges more ready to accept our statements without suspicion. [60] Thus we may feign repentance for what we have said, as in the
pro Caelio,
69
where Cicero says,
But why did I introduce so respectable a character?
Or we may use some common phrase, such as,
I didn't mean to say that.
70
Or we may pretend that we are searching for what we should say, as in the phrases,
What else is there?
or
Have I left anything out?
Or we may pretend to discover something suggested by the context, as when Cicero
71
says,
One more charge, too, of this sort still remains for me to deal with,
or
One thing suggests another.
[61] Such methods will also provide us with elegant transitions, although transition is not itself to be ranked among figures: for example, Cicero,
72
after telling the story of Piso, who ordered a goldsmith to make a ring before him in court, adds, as though this story had suggested it to him,
This ring of Piso's reminds me of something which had entirely slipped my memory. How many gold rings do you think Verres has stripped from the fingers of honourable men?
Or we may affect ignorance on certain points, as in the following passage
73
:
But who was the sculptor who made those statues? Who was he? Thank you for prompting me, you are right; they said it was Polyclitus.
[62] This device may serve for other purposes as well. For there are means of this kind whereby we may achieve an end quite other than that at which we appear to be aiming, as, for example, Cicero does in the passage just quoted. For while he taunts Verres with a morbid passion for acquiring statues and pictures, he succeeds in creating the impression that he personally has no interest in such subjects. So, too, when Demosthenes
74
swears by those who fell at Marathon and Salamis, his object is to lessen the odium in which he was involved by the disaster at Chaeronea.
[63] We may further lend charm to our speech by deferring the discussion of some points after just mentioning them, thus depositing them in the safe keeping of the judge's memory and afterwards reclaiming our deposit; or we may employ some figure to enable us to repeat certain points (for repetition is not in itself a figure) or may make especial mention of certain things and vary the aspect of our pleading. For eloquence delights in variety, and just as the eye is more strongly attracted by the sight of a number of different things, so oratory supplies a continuous series of novelties to rivet the attention of the mind.
[64]
Emphasis may be numbered among figures also, when some hidden meaning is extracted from some phrase, as in the following passage from Virgil:
Aen. iv. 550.
For although Dido complains of marriage, yet her passionate outburst shows that she regards life without wedlock as no life for man, but for the beasts of the field. A different kind of emphasis is found in Ovid, where Zmyrna confesses to her nurse her passion for her father in the following words:
Met. x. 422.
Might I not have lived,
From wedlock free, a life without a stain,
Happy as beasts are happy?
O mother, happy in thy spouse!
[65] Similar, if not identical with this figure is another, which is much in vogue at the present time. For I must now proceed to the discussion of a class of figure which is of the commonest occurrence and on which I think I shall be expected to make some comment. It is one whereby we excite some suspicion to indicate that our meaning is other than our words would seem to imply; but our meaning is not in this case contrary to that which we express, as is the case in
ironq, but rather a hidden meaning which is left to the hearer to discover. As I have already pointed out,
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modern rhetoricians practically restrict the name of
figure to this device, from the use of which
figured controversial themes derive their name.
[66] This class of figure may be employed under three conditions: first, if it is unsafe to speak openly; secondly, if it is unseemly to speak openly; and thirdly, when it is employed solely with a view to the elegance of what we say, and gives greater pleasure by reason of the novelty and variety thus introduced than if our meaning had been expressed in straightforward language.
[67] The first of the three is of common occurrence in the schools, where we imagine conditions laid down by tyrants on abdication and decrees passed by the senate after a civil war, and it is a capital offence to accuse a person with what is past, what is not expedient in the courts being actually prohibited in the schools. But the conditions governing the employment of figures differ in the two cases. For we may speak against the tyrants in question as openly as we please without loss of effect, provided always that what we say is susceptible of a different interpretation, since it is only danger to ourselves, and not offence to them, that we have to avoid.
[68] And if the danger can be avoided by any ambiguity of expression, tile speaker's cunning will meet with universal approbation. On the other hand, the actual business of the courts has never yet involved such necessity for silence, though at times they require something not unlike it, which is much more embarrassing for the speaker, as, for example, when he is hampered by the existence of powerful personages, whom he must censure if he is to prove his case.
[69] Consequently he must proceed with greater wariness and circumspection; since the actual manner in which offence is given is a matter of indifference, and if a figure is perfectly obvious, it ceases to be a figure. Therefore such devices are absolutely repudiated by some authorities, whether the meaning of the figure be intelligible or not. But it is possible to employ such
figuress in moderation, the primary consideration being that they should not be too obvious. And this fault can be avoided, if the
figre does not depend on the employment of words of doubtful or double meaning, such, for instance, as the words which occur in the theme of the suspected daughter-in-law:
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I married the wife who pleased my father.
[70] It is important, too, that the
figure should not depend on ambiguous collocations of words (a trick which is far more foolish than the last); an example of this is to be found in the controversial theme, where a father, accused of a criminal passion for his unmarried daughter, asks her for the name of her ravisher.
Who dishonoured you?
he says. She replies:
My father, do you not know?
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[71] The facts themselves must be allowed to excite the suspicions of the judge, and we must clear away all other points, leaving nothing save what will suggest the truth. In doing this we shall find emotional appeals, hesitation and words broken by silences most effective. For thus the judge will be led to seek out the secret which he would not perhaps believe if he heard it openly stated, and to believe in that which he thinks he has found out for himself. But however excellent our
figures,
[72] they must not be too numerous. For overcrowding will make them obvious, and they will become ineffective without becoming inoffensive, while the fact that we make no open accusation will seem to be due not to modesty, but to lack of confidence in our own cause. In fact, we may sum up the position thus: our figures will have most effect upon the judge when he thinks that we use them with reluctance.
[73] I myself have come across persons whom it was impossible to convince by other means: I have even come across a much rarer thing, namely, a case which could only be proved by recourse to such devices. I was defending a woman who was alleged to have forged her husband's will, and the heirs were stated to have given a bond
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to the husband on his deathbed, which latter assertion was true.
[74] For since the wife could not legally be appointed his heir, this procedure was adopted to enable the property to be transferred to her by a secret conveyance in trust. Now it was easy for me to secure the woman's acquittal, by openly mentioning the existence of the bond; but this would have involved her loss of the inheritance. I had, therefore, to plead in such a way that the judges should understand that the bond had actually been given, but that informers might be unable to avail themselves of any statement of mine to that effect. And I was successful in both my aims. The fear of seeming to boast my own skill would have deterred me from mentioning this case, but for the fact that I wished to demonstrate that there was room for the employment of these
figures even in the courts.
[75] Some things, again, which cannot be proved, may, on the other hand, be suggested by the employment of some
figure. For at times such hidden shafts will stick, and the fact that they are not noticed will prevent their being drawn out, whereas if the same point were stated openly, it would be denied by our opponents and would have to be proved.
[76] When, however, it is respect for some person that hampers us (which I mentioned as the second condition
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under which such
figures may be used), all the greater caution is required because the sense of shame is a stronger deterrent to all good men than fear. In such cases the judge must be impressed with the fact that we are hiding what we know and keeping back the words which our natural impulse to speak out the truth would cause to burst from our lips. For those against whom we are speaking, together with the judges and our audience, would assuredly be all the more incensed by such toying with detraction, if they thought that we were inspired by deliberate malice.
[77] And what difference does it make how we express ourselves, when both the facts and our feelings are clearly understood? And what good shall we do by expressing ourselves thus except to make it clear that we are doing what we ourselves know ought not to be done? And yet in the days when I first began to teach rhetoric, this failing was only too common. For declaimers selected by preference those themes which attracted them by their apparent difficulty, although as a matter of fact they were much easier than many others.
[78] For straightforward eloquence requires the highest gifts to commend itself to the audience, while these circuitous and indirect methods are merely the refuge of weakness, for those who use them are like men who, being unable to escape from their pursuers by speed, do so by doubling, since this method of expression, which is so much affected, is really not far removed from jesting. Indeed it is positively assisted by the tact that the hearer takes pleasure in detecting the speaker's concealed meaning, applauds his own penetration and regards another man's eloquence as a compliment to himself.
[79] Consequently it was not merely in cases where respect for persons prevented direct speaking (a circumstance which as a rule calls for caution rather than
figures ) that they would have recourse to
figurative methods, but they made room for them even under circumstances where they were useless or morally inadmissible, as for example in a case where a father, who had secretly slain his son whom he suspected of incest with his mother, and was accused of ill-treating his wife, was made to bring indirect insinuations against his wife.
[80] But what could be more discreditable to the accused than that he should have kept such a wife? What could be more damaging than that he who is accused because he appears to have harboured the darkest suspicions against his wife, should by his defence confirm the charge which he is required to refute? If such speakers had only placed themselves in the position of the judges, they would have realised how little disposed they would have been to put up with pleading on such lines, more especially in cases where the most abominable crimes were insinuated against parents.
[81] However, since we have lighted on this topic, let us devote a little more time to considering the practice of the schools. For it is in the schools that the orator is trained, and the methods adopted in pleading ultimately depend on the methods employed in declamation. I must therefore say something of those numerous cases in which
figures have been employed which were not merely harsh, but actually contrary to the interests of the case.
A man condemned for attempting to establish himself as tyrant shall be tortured to make him reveal the names of his accomplices. The accuser shall choose what reward he pleases. A certain man has secured the condemnation of his father and demands as his reward that he should not be tortured. The father opposes his choice.
[82] Everyone who pleaded for the father indulged in
figurative insinuations against the son, on the assumption that the father would, when tortured, be likely to name him as one of his accomplices. But what could be more foolish? For as soon as the judges grasp their point, they will either refuse to put him to the torture in view of his motive for desiring to be tortured, or will refuse to believe any confession he may make under torture. But, it will be urged,
[83] it is possible that this was his motive. May be. But he should then disguise his motive, in order that he may effect his purpose. But what will it profit us (and by
us I mean the declaimers) to have realised this motive, unless we declare it as well? Well, then, if the case were being actually pleaded in the courts, should we have disclosed this secret motive in such a way? Again, if this is not the real motive, the condemned man may have other reasons for opposing his son; he may think that the law should be carried out or be unwilling to accept such a kindness from the hands of his accuser, or (and this is the line on which I personally should insist) he may intend to persist in declaring his innocence even under torture.
[84] Consequently the usual excuse advanced by such declaimers to the effect that the inventor of the theme meant the defence to proceed on these lines, will not always serve their purpose. It is possible that this was not the inventor's wish. However, let us assume that it was. Are we then to speak like fools merely because he thought like a fool? Personally I hold that, even in actual cases, we should often disregard the wishes of the litigant.
[85] Further, in such cases speakers fall into the frequent error of assuming that certain persons say one thing and mean another: this is more especially the case where it is assumed that a man asks permission to die. Take, for example, the following controversial theme.
A man who had shown himself a heroic soldier in the past, on the occasion of a subsequent war demanded exemption from service in accordance with the law, on the ground that he was fifty years of age, but exemption being refused owing to the opposition of his son, he deserted on being compelled to go into the fight. The son, who had borne himself like a hero in the same battle, asks for his father's pardon as a reward. The father opposes his choice.
Yes,
they say,
that is due not to his desire to die, but to bring odium on his son.
For my part, [86] I laugh at the fears which they manifest on his behalf, as though they were in peril of death themselves, and at the way in which they allow their terror to influence their line of pleading; for they forget how many precedents there are for suicide and how many reasons there may be why a hero turned deserter should wish for death.
[87] But it would be waste of time to expatiate on one controversial theme. I would lay it down as a general rule that an orator should never put forward a plea that is tantamount to collusion, and I cannot imagine a lawsuit arising in which both parties have the same design, nor conceive that any man who wishes to live could be such a fool as to put forward an absurd plea for death, when he might refrain from pleading for it at all.
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I do not, however,
[88] deny that there are controversial themes of this kind where
figures may legitimately be employed, as, for example, the following:
A man was accused of unnatural murder on the ground that he had killed his brother, and it seemed probable that he would be condemned. His father gave evidence in his defence, stating that the murder had been committed on his orders. The son was acquitted, but disinherited by the father.
For in this case he does not pardon his son entirely, but cannot openly withdraw the evidence that he gave in the first trial, and while he does not inflict any worse penalty than disinheritance, he does not shrink from that. Further, the employment of the
figure tells more heavily against the father than is fair and less against the son.
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[89] But, while no one ever speaks against the view which he wishes to prevail, he may wish something of greater importance than what he actually says. Thus the disinherited son who asks his father to take back another son whom he had exposed, and who had been brought up by himself, on payment for his maintenance, while he may prefer that he himself should be reinstated, may all the same be perfectly sincere in his demand on behalf of his brother. Again, a kind of tacit hint may be employed, which,
[90] while demanding the utmost rigour of the law from the judges, suggests a loophole for clemency, not openly, for that would imply a pledge on our part, but by giving a plausible suspicion of our meaning. This device is employed in a number of controversial themes, among them the following.
A ravisher, unless within thirty days he secure pardon both from his own father and the father of the ravished girl, shall be put to death. A man who has succeeded in securing pardon from the father of the girl, but not from his own, accuses the latter of madness.
[91] Here if the father pledges himself to pardon him, the dispute falls to the ground. If, on the other hand, he holds out no hope of pardon, though he will not necessarily be regarded as mad, he will certainly give the impression of cruelty and will prejudice the judge against him. Latro therefore showed admirable skill when he made the son say,
You will kill me then?
and the father reply,
Yes, if I can.
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The elder Gallio treats the theme with greater tenderness, as was natural to a man of his disposition. He makes the father say,
Be firm, my heart, be firm. Yesterday you were made of sterner stuff.
[92] Akin to this are those
figures of which the Greeks are so fond, by means of which they give gentle expression to unpleasing facts. Themistocles, for example, is believed to have urged the Athenians to commit their city to the protection of heaven, because to urge them to abandon it would have been too brutal an expression. Again the statesman
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who advised that certain golden images of Victory should be melted down as a contribution to the war funds, modified his words by saying that they should make a proper use of their victories. But all such devices which consist in saying one thing, while intending something else to be understood, have a strong resemblance to
allegory.
[93] It has also been asked how
figures may best be met. Some hold that they should always be exposed by the antagonist, just as hidden ulcers are laid open by the surgeon. It is true that this is often the right course, being the only means of refuting the charges which have been brought against us, and this is more especially the case when the question turns on the very point at which the
figures are directed. But when the
figures are merely employed as vehicles of abuse, it will sometimes even be wisest to show that we have a clear conscience by ignoring them.
[94] Nay, even if too many figures have been used to permit us to take such a course, we may ask our opponents, if they have any confidence in the righteousness of their cause, to give frank and open expression to the charges which they have attempted to suggest by indirect hints, or at any rate to refrain from asking the judges not merely to understand, but even to believe things which they themselves are afraid to state in so many words.
[95] It may even at times be found useful to pretend to misunderstand them; for which we may compare the well known story of the man who, when his opponent cried,
Swear by the ashes of your father,
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replied that he was ready to do so, whereupon the judge accepted the proposal, much to the indignation of the advocate, who protested that this would make the use of
figures absolutely impossible; we may therefore lay it down as a general rule that such
figures should only be used with the utmost caution. [96] There remains the third class of figure designed merely to enhance the elegance of our style, for which reason Cicero expresses the opinion that such
figures are independent of the subject in dispute. As an illustration I may quote the
figure which he uses in his speech
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against Clodius:
By these means he, being familiar with all our holy rites, thought that he might easily succeed in appeasing the gods.
[97]
Irony also is frequently employed in this connexion. But by far the most artistic device is to indicate one thing by allusion to another; take the case where a rival candidate speaks against an ex-tyrant who had abdicated on condition of his receiving an amnesty
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:
I am not permitted to speak against you. Do you speak against me, as you may. But a little while ago I wished to kill you.
[98] Another common device is to introduce an oath, like the speaker who, in defending a disinherited man, cried,
So may I die leaving a son to be my heir.
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But this is not a
figure which is much to be recommended, for as a rule the introduction of an oath, unless it is absolutely necessary, is scarcely becoming to a self-respecting man. Seneca made a neat comment to this effect when he said that oaths were for the witness and not for the advocate. Again, the advocate who drags in an oath merely for the sake of some trivial rhetorical effect, does not deserve much credit, unless he can do this with the masterly effect achieved by Demosthenes, which I mentioned above.
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[99] But by far the most trivial form of
figure is that which turns on a single word, although we find such a figure directed against Clodia by Cicero
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:
Especially when everybody thought her the friend of all men rather than the enemy of any.
[100] I note that
comparison is also regarded as a
figure, although at times it is a form of proof,
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and at others the whole case may turn upon it,
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while its form may be illustrated by the following passage from the
pro Murena:
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You pass wakeful nights that you may be able to reply to your clients; he that he and his army may arrive betimes at their destination. You are roused by cockcrow, he by the bugle's reveille,
and so on. [101] I am not sure, however, whether it is so much a
figure of thought as of
speech. For the only difference lies in the fact that universals are not contrasted with universals, but particulars with particulars. Celsus, however, and that careful writer Visellius regard it as a
figure of thought, while Rutilius Lupus regards it as belonging to both, and calls it
antithesis.
[102] To the
figures placed by Cicero among the ornaments of thought Rutilius (following the views of Gorgias, a contemporary, whose four books he transferred to his own work, and who is not to be confused with Georgias of Leontini) and Celsus (who follows Rutilius) would add a number of others, such as:
[103]
concentration, which the Greek calls
διαλλαγή
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a term employed when a number of different arguments are used to establish one point:
consequence, which Gorgias calls
ἐπακολούθησις and which I have already discussed under the head of argument
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:
inference, which Gorgias terms
συλλογισμός
threats, that is,
κατάπληξις
exhortation, or
παραινετικόν But all of these are perfectly straightforward methods of speaking, unless combined with some one of the
figures which I have discussed above.
[104] Besides these, Celsus considers the following to be
figures: exclusion, asseveration, refusal,
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excitement of the judge, the use of proverbs, the employment of quotations from poetry, jests, invidious remarks or invocation to intensify a charge (which is identical with
δείνωσις ) flattery, pardon, disdain, admonition, apology, entreaty and rebuke.
[105] He even includes partition, proposition, division and affinity between two separate things, by which latter he means that two things apparently different signify the same: for example, not only the man who murders another by administering a deadly draught is to be regarded as a poisoner, but also the man who deprives another of his wits by giving him some drug, a point which depends on
definition.
[106] To these Rutilius or Gorgias add
ἀναγκαῖον that is, the representation of the necessity of a thing,
ἀνάμνησις or reminding,
ἀνθυποφορά that is, replying to anticipated objections,
ἀντίῤῥησις or refutation,
παραύξησις or amplification,
προέκθεσις which means pointing out what ought to have been done, and then what actually has been done,
ἐναντιότης, or arguments from opposites
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(whence we get
enthymemes styled
κατ᾽ ἐναντίωσιν ), and even
μετάληψις, which Hermagoras considers a
basis.
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Visellius, although he makes the number of
figures but small, includes among them the
enthymeme, which he calls
commentum, and the
epicheireme, which he calls
ratio.
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This view is also partially accepted by Celsus, who is in doubt whether
consequence is not to be identified with the
epicheireme.
[107] Visellius also adds
general reflexions to the list. I find others who would add to these
διασκευή
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or enhancement,
ἀπαγόρευσις or prohibition, and
παραδιήγησις or incidental narrative. But though these are not figures, there may be others which have slipped my notice, or are yet to be invented: still, they will be of the same nature as those of which I have spoken above.
Institutio Oratoria. Quintilian. Harold Edgeworth Butler (Translator). Cambridge, Mass.. 1920-1922.
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