Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria, ed. Harold Edgeworth Butler, 9.2

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[1] ergo cui latius complecti conformationes verborum ac sententiarum placuerit, habet quod sequatur nec adfirmare ausim quicquam esse melius; sed haec ad propositi mei rationem legat. nam mihi de his sententiarum figuris dicere in animo est, quae ab illo simplici modo indicandi recedunt; quod item multis doctissimis viris video placuisse.

[2] omnia tamen illa, etiam quae sunt alterius modi lumina, adeo sunt virtutes orationis ut sine iis nulla intelligi fere possit oratio. nam quomodo iudex doceri potest, si desit illustris explanatio, propositio, promissio, finitio, seiunctio, expositio sententiae suae, rationis apta conclusio, praemunitio, similitudo, exemplum, digestio, distributio, interpellatio, interpellantis coercitio, contentio, purgatio, laesio?

[3] quid vero agit omnino eloquentia detractis amplificandi minuendique rationibus? quarum prior desiderat illam plus quam dixeris significationem, id est ἔμφασιν, et supralationem veritatis et traiectionem; haec altera extenuationem deprecationemque. qui adfectus erunt vel concitati detracta voce libera et effrenatiore, iracundia, obiurgatione, optatione, exsecratione? vel illi mitiores, nisi adiuvantur commendatione, conciliatione, ad hilaritatem impulsione?

[4] quae delectatio aut quod mediocriter saltem docti hominis indicium, nisi alia repetitione, alia commoratione infigere, digredi a re et redire ad propositum suum scierit, removere a se, in alium traiicere, quae relinquenda, quae contemnenda sint iudicare? motus est in his orationis atque actus, quibus detractis iacet et velut agitante corpus spiritu caret.

[5] quae cum adesse debent, tum disponenda atque varianda sunt, ut auditorem, quod in fidibus fieri videmus, omni sono mulceant. verum ea plerumque recta sunt nec se fingunt, sed confitentur. admittunt autem, ut dixi, figuras, quod vel ex proxima doceri potest.

[6] quid enim tam commune quam interrogare vel percontari? nam utroque utimur indifferenter, quanquam ¹ alterum noscendi, alterum arguendi gratia videtur adhiberi. at ea res, utrocunque dicitur modo, etiam multiplex habet schema. incipiamus enim ab iis, quibus acrior ac vehementior fit probatio, quod primo loco posuimus.

[7] simplex est sic rogare,

sed vos qui tandem? quibus aut venistis ab oris?

Figuratum autem, quotiens non sciscitandi gratia adsumitur, sed instandi, quid enim tuus ille, Tubero, destrictus in acie Pharsalica gladius agebat? et, quousque tandem abutere, Catilina, patientia nostra? et, patere tua consilia non sentis? et totus denique hic locus.

[8] quanto enim magis ardet quam si diceretur, diu abuteris patientia nostra, et patent tua consilia. interrogamus etiam quod negari non possit, dixitne tandem causam C. Fidiculanius Falcula? aut ubi respondendi difficilis est ratio, ut vulgo uti solemus, quo modo?

[9] qui fieri potest? aut invidiae gratia, ut Medea apud Senecam, quas peti terras iubes? aut miserationis, ut Sinon apud Vergilium,

heu quae me tellus, inquit, quae me aequora possunt

accipere ?

aut instandi et auferendae dissimulationis, ut Asinius, audisne ? furiosum, inquam, non inofficiosum testamentum reprehendimus.

[10] totum hoc plenum est varietatis; nam et indignationi convenit:

et quisquam numen Iunonis adoret?

et admirationi:

quid non mortalia pectora cogis,

auri sacra fames?

[11] est interim acrius imperandi genus:

non arma expedient totaque ex urbe sequentur?

et ipsi nosmet rogamus, quale est illud Terentianum quid igitur faciam?

[12] est aliqua etiam in respondendo figura, cum aliud interroganti ad aliud, quia sic utilius sit, occurritur, tum augendi criminis gratia, ut testis in reum rogatus, an ab reo fustibus vapulasset, et innocens, inquit; tum declinandi, quod est frequentissimum: quaero , an occideris hominem; respondetur, latronem ; An fundum occupaveris; respondetur, meum .

[13] ut confessionem praecedat defensio, ut apud Vergilium in Bucolicis dicenti,

non ego te vidi Damonis, pessime, caprum

excipere insidiis?

occurritur:

an mihi cantando victus non redderet ille?

Cui est confinis dissimulatio,

[14] non alibi quam in risu posita ideoque tractata suo loco. nam serio si fiat, pro confessione est. ceterum et interrogandi se ipsum et respondendi sibi solent esse non ingratae vices, ut Cicero pro Ligario, apud quem igitur hoc dico? nempe apud eum, qui, cum hoc sciret, tamen me, antequam vidit, rei publicae reddidit.

[15] aliter pro Caelio ficta interrogatione: dicet aliquis, Haec igitur est tua disciplina? sic tu instituis adulescentis? et totus locus. deinde : ego , si quis, iudices, hoc robore animi atque hac indole virtutis ac continentiae fuit, et cetera. cui diversum est, cum alium rogaveris, non exspectare responsum sed statim subiicere: domus tibi deerat? at habebas; pecunia superabat? at egebas. quod schema quidam per suggestionem vocant.

[16] fit et comparatione: uter igitur facilius suae sententiae rationem redderet? et aliis modis tum brevius, tum latius, tum de una re, tum de pluribus. mire vero in causis valet praesumptio, quae πρόλημψις dicitur, cum id quod obiici potest occupamus. id neque in aliis partibus rarum est et praecipue prooemio convenit.

[17] sed , quanquam generis unius, diversas species habet. est enim quaedam praemunitio, qualis Ciceronis contra Q. Caecilium, quod ad accusandum descendat qui semper defenderit; quaedam confessio, ut pro Rabirio Postumo, quem sua quoque sententia reprehendendum fatetur, quod pecuniam regi crediderit; quaedam praedictio, ut dicam enim non augendi criminis gratia; quaedam emendatio, ut rogo , ignoscatis mihi, si longius sum evectus; frequentissima praeparatio, cum pluribus verbis, vel quare facturi quid simus vel quare fecerimus, dici solet.

[18] verborum quoque vis ac proprietas confirmatur vel praesumptione: quanquam illa non poena, sed prohibitio sceleris fuit; aut reprehensione: cives , inquam, si hoc eos nomine appellari fas est. adfert aliquam fidem veritatis et dubitatio,

[19] cum simulamus quaerere nos, unde incipiendum, ubi desinendum, quid potissimum dicendum, an omnino dicendum sit? cuiusmodi exemplis plena sunt omnia, sed unum interim sufficit: equidem , quod ad me attinet, quo me vertam nescio. negem fuisse infamiam iudicii corrupti? et cetera.

[20] hoc etiam in praeteritum valet; nam et dubitasse nos fingimus. A quo schemate non procul abest illa, quae dicitur communicatio, cum aut ipsos adversarios consulimus, ut Domitius Afer pro Cloatilla: nescit trepida, quid liceat feminae, quid coniugem deceat; forte vos in illa solitudine obvios casus miserae mulieri obtulit; tu, frater, vos, paterni amici, quod consilium datis?

[21] aut cum iudicibus quasi deliberamus, quod est frequentissimum: quid suadetis? et vos interrogo, et quid tandem fieri oportuit? et Cato, cedo , si vos in eo loco essetis, quid aliud fecissetis? et alibi: communem rem agi putatote ac vos huic rei praepositos esse.

[22] sed nonnunquam communicantes aliquid inexspectatum subiungimus, quod et per se schema est, ut in Verrem Cicero, quid deinde? quid censetis? furtum fortasse aut praedam aliquam ? Deinde, cum diu suspendisset iudicum animos, subiecit, quod multo esset improbius. hoc Celsus sustentationem vocat.

[23] est autem duplex; nam contra frequenter, cum exspectationem gravissimorum fecimus, ad aliquid quod sit leve aut nullo modo criminosum descendimus. sed quia non tantum per communicationem fieri solet, παράδοξον alii nominarunt, id est inopinatum.

[24] illis non accedo qui schema esse existimant etiam, si quid nobis ipsis dicamus inexspectatum accidisse, ut Pollio, nunquam fore credidi, iudices, ut, reo Scauro, ne quid in eius iudicio gratia valeret, precarer.

[25] paene idem fons est illius, quam permissionem vocant, qui communicationis, cum aliqua ipsis iudicibus relinquimus aestimanda, aliqua nonnunquam adversariis quoque, ut Calvus Vatinio, perfrica frontem et dic te digniorem, qui praetor fieres, quam Catonem.

[26] quae vero sunt augendis adfectibus accommodatae figurae, constant maxime simulatione. namque et irasci nos et gaudere et timere et admirari et dolere et indignari et optare, quaeque sunt similia his, fingimus. unde sunt illa, liberatus sum: respiravi; et bene habet; et quae amentia est haec? et O tempora, o mores! et Miserum me! consumptis enim lacrimis infixus tamen pectori haeret dolor; et

magnae nunc hiscite terrae.

[27] quod exclamationem quidam vocant ponuntque inter figuras orationis. haec quotiens vera sunt, non sunt in ea forma, de qua nunc loquimur, at simulata et arte composita procul dubio schemata sunt existimanda. quod idem dictum sit de oratione libera, quam Cornificius licentiam vocat, Graeci παῤῥησίαν. Quid enim minus figuratum quam vera libertas? Sed frequenter sub hac facie latet adulatio.

[28] nam Cicero cum dicit pro Ligario, suscepto bello, Caesar, gesto iam etiam ex parte magna, nulla vi coactus consilio ac uoluntate mea ad ea arma profectus sum, quae erant sumpta contra te, non solum ad utilitatem Ligarii respicit, sed magis laudare victoris clementiam non potest.

[29] in illa vero sententia, quid autem aliud egimus, Tubero, nisi ut, quod hic potest, nos possemus? admirabiliter utriusque partis facit bonam causam, sed hoc eum demeretur, cuius mala fuerat. illa adhuc audaciora et maiorum (ut Cicero existimat) laterum, fictiones personarum, quae προσωποποιΐαι dicuntur. mire namque cum variant orationem, tum excitant.

[30] his et adversariorum cogitationes velut secum loquentium protrahimus (qui tamen ita demum a fide non abhorrent, si ea locutos finxerimus, quae cogitasse eos non sit absurdum), et nostros cum aliis sermones et aliorum inter se credibiliter introducimus, et suadendo, obiurgando, querendo, laudando, miserando personas idoneas damus.

[31] quin deducere deos in hoc genere dicendi et inferos excitare concessum est; urbes etiam populique vocem accipiunt. ac sunt quidam, qui has demum προσωποποιΐας dicant, in quibus et corpora et verba fingimus; sermones hominum adsimulatos dicere διαλόγους malunt, quod Latinorum quidam dixerunt sermocinationem.

[32] ego iam recepto more utrumque eodem modo appellavi. nam certe sermo fingi non potest, ut non personae sermo fingatur. sed in his, quae natura non permittit, hoc modo mollior fit figura: etenim si mecum patria, quae mihi vita mea multo est carior, si cuncta Italia, si omnis res publica sic loquatur, 'M. Tulli, quid agis?' Illud audacius genus: quae tecum, Catilina, sic agit et quodammodo tacita loquitur, 'Nullum iam aliquot annis facinus exstitit nisi per te.'

[33] commode etiam aut nobis aliquas ante oculos esse rerum, personarum, vocum imagines fingimus, aut eadem adversariis aut iudicibus non accidere miramur: qualia sunt videtur mihi, et nonne videtur tibi? sed magna quaedam vis eloquentiae desideratur. falsa enim et incredibilia natura necesse est aut magis moveant, quia supra vera sunt, aut pro vanis accipiantur, quia vera non sunt.

[34] ut dicta autem quaedam, ita scripta quoque fingi solent, quod facit Asinius pro Liburnia: mater mea, quae mihi cum carissima, tum dulcissima fuit, quaeque mihi vixit bisque eodem die vitam dedit et reliqua; deinde exheres esto. haec cum per se figura est, tum duplicatur, quotiens sicut in hac causa ad imitationem alterius scripturae componitur.

[35] nam contra recitabatur testamentum: P. Novanius Gallio, cui ego omnia meritissimo volo et debeo pro eius animi in me summa voluntate et adiectis deinceps aliis, heres esto. incipit esse quodammodo παρῳδή, quod nomen ductum a canticis ad aliorum similitudinem modulatis abusive etiam in versificationis ac sermonum imitatione servatur.

[36] sed formas quoque fingimus saepe, ut Famam Vergilius, ut Voluptatem ac Virtutem (quemadmodum a Xenophonte traditur) Prodicus, ut Mortem ac Vitam, quas contendentes in satura tradit Ennius. est et incertae personae ficta oratio, hic aliquis, et, Dicat aliquis.

[37] est et iactus sine persona sermo:

hic Dolopum manus., hic saeuus tendebat Achilles.

Quod fit mixtura figurarum, cum προσωποποιΐᾳ accedit illa, quae est orationis per detractionem; detractum est enim, quis diceret. vertitur interim προσωποποιΐα in speciem narrandi. unde apud historicos reperiuntur obliquae adlocutiones, ut in T. Livii primo statim, urbes quoque ut cetera ex infimo nasci; deinde, quas sua virtus ac dii iuvent, magnas opes sibi magnumque nomen facere.

[38] aversus quoque a iudice sermo, qui dicitur ἀποστροφή mire movet, sive aduersarios invadimus: quid enim tuus ille, Tubero, in acie Pharsalica? sive ad invocationem aliquam convertimur: vos enim iam ego, Albani tumuli atque luci; sive ad invidiosam implorationem: O leges Porciae legesque Semproniae! sed illa quoque vocatur aversio,

[39] quae a proposita quaestione abducit audientem:

non ego cum Danais Troianam excindere gentem

Aulide iuravi—.

Quod fit et multis et variis figuris, cum aut aliud exspectasse nos aut maius aliquid timuisse simulamus aut plus videri posse ignorantibus, quale est prooemium pro Caelio.

[40] ilia vero, ut ait Cicero, sub oculos subiectio tum fieri solet, cum res non gesta indicatur, sed ut sit gesta ostenditur, nec universa, sed per partes; quem locum proximo libro subiecimus evidentiae, et Celsus hoc nomen isti figurae dedit. ab allis ὑποτύπωσις dicitur proposita quaedam forma rerum ita expressa verbis, ut cerni potius videatur quam audiri: ipse inflammatus scelere et furore in forum venit, ardebant oculi, toto ex ore crudelitas eminebat.

[41] nec solum quae facta sint aut fiant, sed etiam quae futura sint aut futura fuerint imaginamur. mire tractat hoc Cicero pro Milone, quae facturus fuerit Clodius, si praeturam invasisset. sed haec quidem translatio temporum, quae proprie μετάστασις dicitur, ιν διατυπώσει² verecundior apud priores fuit. praeponebant enim talia, credite vos intueri, ut Cicero, haec , quae non vidistis oculis, animis cernere potestis.

[42] novi vero et praecipue declamatores audacius nec mehercule sine motu quodam imaginantur, ut et Seneca ³ in controversia, cuius summa est, quod pater filium et novercam inducente altero filio in adulterio deprehensos occidit: duc , sequor; accipe hanc senilem manum et quocunque vis imprime.

[43] et post paulo, aspice , inquit, quod diu non credidisti. ego vero non video, nox oboritur et crassa caligo. habet haec figura manifestius aliquid; non enim narrari res, sed agi videtur.

[44] locorum quoque dilucida et significans descriptio eidem ⁴ virtuti adsignatur a quibusdam; alii τοπογραφίαν dicunt. Εἰρωνείαν inveni qui dissimulationem vocaret; quo nomine quia parum totius huius figurae vires videntur ostendi, nimirum sicut in plerisque erimus Graeca appellatione contenti. igitur Εἰρωνεία quae est schema, ab illa, quae est tropos, genere ipso nihil admodum distat; (in utroque enim contrarium ei quod dicitur intelligendum est) species vero prudentius intuenti diversas esse facile est deprehendere. primum ,

[45] quod tropos apertior est et, quanquam aliud dicit ac sentit, non aliud tamen simulat. nam et omnia circa fere recta sunt: ut illud in Catilinam, A quo repudiatus ad sodalem tuum, virum optimum, Metellum demigrasti. in duobus demum verbis est ironia, ergo etiam brevior est tropos.

[46] at in figura totius voluntatis fictio est apparens magis quam confessa, ut illic verba sint verbis diversa, hic sensus sermoni et voci ⁵ et tota interim causae conformatio; cum etiam vita universa ironiam habere videatur, qualis est visa Socratis; nam ideo dictus εἴρων, agens imperitum et admiratorem aliorum tanquam sapientium; ut, quemadmodum ἀλληγορίαν facit continua μεταφορὰ sic hoc schema faciat tropos ille contextus.

[47] quaedam vero genera huius figurae nullam cum tropis habent societatem, ut illa statim prima, quae dicitur a negando, quam nonnulli ἀντίφρασιν vocant: non agam tecum iure summo, non dicam, quod forsitan obtinerem;⁶ et quid ego istius decreta, quid rapinas, quid hereditatum possessiones datas, quid ereptas proferam? et Mitto illam primam libidinis iniuriam, et Ne illa quidem testimonia recito, quae dicta sunt de HS sescentis milibus, et possum dicere.

[48] quibus generibus per totas interim quaestiones decurrimus: ut Cicero, hoc ego si sic agerem, tanquam mihi modi esset diluendum, haec pluribus dicerem. Εἰρωνεία est, et cum similes imperantibus vel permittentibus sumus:

I, sequere Italiam venti;

et cum ea,

[49] quae nolumus videri in adversariis esse, concedimus eis. id acrius fit, cum eadem in nobis sunt et in adversario non sunt:

meque timoris

argue tu, Drance, quando tot caedis acervos

Teucrorum tua dextra dedit.

Quod idem contra valet, cum aut ea, quae a nobis absunt, aut etiam quae in aduersarios recidunt, quasi fatemur:

me duce Dardanius Spartam expugnauit adulter.

Nec in personis tantum,

[50] sed et in rebus versatur haec contraria dicendi quam quae intelligi velis ratio, ut totum pro Quinto Ligario prooemium et illae elevationes: videlicet , O dii boni! —

scilicet is superis labor est.

—et ille pro Oppio locus:

[51] O amorem mirum! O benivolentiam singularem! non procul absunt ab hac simulatione res inter se similes, confessio nihil nocitura, qualis est: habes igitur, Tubero, quod est accusatori maxime optandum, confitentem reum; et concessio, cum aliquid etiam iniquum videmur causae fiducia pati: metum virgarum nauarchus nobilissimae civitatis pretio redemit: humanum est; et pro Cluentio de invidia: dominetur in contionibus, iaceat in iudiciis; tertia consensio, ut pro eodem, iudicium esse corruptum.

[52] haec evidentior figura est, cum alicui rei assentimur, quae est futura pro nobis; verum id accidere sine adversarii vitio non potest. quaedam etiam velut laudamus, ut Cicero in Verrem circa crimen Apollonii Drepanitani: gaudeo etiam, si quid ab eo abstulisti, et abs te nihil rectius factum esse dico. interim augemus crimina,

[53] quae ex facili aut diluere possimus aut negare, quod est frequentius quam ut exemplum desideret. interim hoc ipso fidem detrahimus illis, quod sint tam gravia, ut pro Roscio Cicero, cum immanitatem parricidii quanquam per se manifestam tamen etiam vi orationis exaggerat. Ἀποσιώπησις,

[54] quam idem Cicero reticentiam, Celsus obticentiam, nonnulli interruptionem appellant, et ipsa ostendit aliquid adfectus vel irae, ut.

quos ego—sed motos praestat componere fluctus;

vel sollicitudinis et quasi religionis: an huius ille legis, quam Clodius a se inventam gloriatur, mentionem facere ausus esset vivo Milone, non dicam console? de nostrum omnium — non audeo totum dicere; cui simile est in prooemio pro Ctesiphonte Demosthenis.

[55] vel alio transeundi gratia: Cominius autem — tametsi ignoscite mihi, iudices. in quo est et illa (si tamen inter schemata numerari debet, cum aliis etiam pars causae videatur) digressio; abit enim causa in laudes Cn. Pompeii, idque fieri etiam sine ἀποσιωπήσει potuit.

[56] nam brevior illa, ut ait Cicero, a re digressio plurimis fit modis. sed haec exempli gratia sufficient: tum C. Varenus, is qui a familia Anchariana occisus est; hoc, quaeso, iudices, diligenter attendite; et pro Milone et aspexit me illis quidem oculis, quibus tum solebat, cum omnibus omnia minabatur.

[57] est alia non quidem reticentia, quae sit imperfecti sermonis, sed tamen praecisa velut ante legitimum finem oratio: ut illud nimis urgeo, commoveri videtur adolescens; et quid plura? ⁷ ipsum adolescentem dicere audistis. imitatio morum alienorum, quae ἠθοποιία vel, ut alii malunt, μίμησις dicitur, iam inter leniores adfectus numerari potest; est enim posita fere in eludendo, sed versatur et in factis et in dictis. in factis, quod est ὑποτυπώσει vicinum; in dictis, quale est apud Terentium:

at ego nesciebam, quorsum tu ires. parvula

hinc est abrepta, eduxit mater pro sua,

soror dicta est: cupio abducere, ut reddam suis.

[59] sed nostrorum quoque dictorum factorumque similis imitatio est per relationem, nisi quod frequentius asseverat quam eludit: dicebam habere eos actorem Q. Caecilium. sunt et illa iucunda et ad commendationem cum varietate tum etiam ipsa natura plurimum prosunt, quae simplicem quandam et non praeparatam ostendendo orationem minus nos suspectos iudici faciunt.

[60] Hinc est quasi paenitentia dicti, ut pro Caelio sed quid ego ita gravem personam introduxi? et quibus utimur vulgo: imprudens incidi. vel cui quaerere nos, quid dicamus, fingimus: Quid reliquum est? et Num quid omisi et cum ibidem invenire, ut ait Cicero: unum etiam mihi relicum huiusmodi modi est; et aliud ex alio succurrit mihi.

[61] unde etiam venusti transitus fiunt; non quia transitus ipse sit schema, ut Cicero, narrato Pisonis exemplo, qui anulum sibi cudi ab aurifice in tribunali suo iusserat, velut hoc in memoriam inductus adiecit: hic modo me commonuit Pisonis anulus, quod totum effluxerat. quam mullis istum putatis hominibus honestis de digitis anulos aureos abstulisse? et cum aliqua velut ignoramus: sed earum rerum artifice, quem? quemnam? recte admones, Polyclitum esse dicebant.

[62] quod quidem non in hoc tantum valet. quibusdam enim, dum aliud agere videmur, aliud efficimus, sicut hic Cicero consequitur, ne, cum morbum in signis atque tabulis obiiciat Verri, ipse quoque earum rerum studiosus esse credatur. et Demosthenes iurando per interfectos in Marathone et Salamine id agit, ut minore invidia cladis apud Chaeroneam acceptae laboret.

[63] faciunt illa quoque iucundam orationem, aliqua mentione habita differre et deponere apud memoriam iudicis et reposcere quae deposueris, et iterare ⁸ quaedam schemate aliquo, (non enim est ipsa per se iteratio schema) et excipere aliqua et dare actioni varios velut vultus. gaudet enim res varietate, et sicut oculi diversarum aspectu rerum magis detinentur, ita semper animis praestat, in quod se velut novum intendant.

[64] est emphasis etiam inter figuras, cum ex aliquo dicto latens aliquid eruitur, ut apud Vergilium non licuit thalami expertem sine crimine vitam Degere more ferae? quamquam enim de matrimonio queritur Dido, tamen huc erumpit eius adfectus, ut sine thalamis vitam non hominum putet, sed ferarum. aliud apud Ovidium genus, apud quem Zmyrna nutrici amorem patris sic confitetur;

O, dixit, felicem coniuge matrem

Huic vel confinis vel eadem est,

[65] qua nunc utimur plurimum. iam enim ad id genus, quod et frequentissimum est et exspectari maxime credo, veniendum est, in quo per quandam suspicionem quod non dicimus accipi volumus, non utique contrarium, ut in Εἰρωνείᾳ, sed aliud latens et auditori quasi inveniendum. quod , ut supra ostendi, iam fere solum schema a nostris vocatur, et unde controversiae figuratae dicuntur.

[66] eius triplex usus est: unus si dicere palam parum tutum est, alter si non decet, tertius qui venustatis modo gratia adhibetur et ipsa novitate ac varietate magis, quam si relatio ⁹ sit recta, delectat.

[67] ex his, quod est primum, frequens in scholis est. nam et pactiones deponentium imperium tyrannorum et post bellum civile senatus consulta finguntur et capitale est obiicere anteacta, ut, quod in foro non expedit, illic nec liceat. sed schematum condicio non eadem est. quamlibet enim apertum, quod modo et aliter intelligi possit, in illos tyrannos bene dixeris, quia periculum tantum, non etiam offensa vitatur. quod si ambiguitate sententiae possit eludi, nemo non illi furto favet.

[68] vera negotia nunquam adhuc habuerunt hanc silentii necessitatem; sed aliam huic similem, verum multo ad agendum difficiliorem, cum personae potentes obstant, sine quarum reprehensione teneri causa non possit.

[69] ideoque hoc parcius et circumspectius faciendum est, quia nihil interest, quomodo offendas, et aperta figura perdit hoc ipsum quod figura est. ideoque a quibusdam tota res repudiatur, sive intelligatur sive non intelligatur. sed licet modum adhibere; in primis, ne sint manifestae. non erunt autem, si non ex verbis dubiis et quasi duplicibus petentur, quale est in suspecta nuru, duxi uxorem, quae patri placuit;

[70] aut, quod est multo ineptius, compositionibus ambiguis, ut in illa controversia, in qua infamis amore filiae virginis pater raptam eam interrogat, a quo vitiata sit, quis te, inquit, rapuit? tu , pater, nescis?

[71] res ipsae perducant iudicem ad suspicionem, et amoliamur cetera, ut hoc solum supersit; in quo multum etiam adfectus iuvant et interrupta silentio dictio et cunctationes. sic enim fiet, ut iudex quaerat illud nescio quid ipse, quod fortasse non crederet, si audiret, et ei, quod a se inventum existimat, credat.

[72] sed ne si optimae quidem sint, esse debent frequentes. nam densitate ipsa figurae aperiuntur, nec offensae minus habent, sed auctoritatis; nec pudor videtur, quod non palam obiicias, sed diffidentia. in summa, sic maxime iudex credit figuris, si nos putat nolle dicere.

[73] equidem et in personas incidi tales et in rem quoque, quod est magis rarum, quae obtineri nisi hac arte non posset. ream tuebar, quae subiecisse dicebatur mariti testamentum, et dicebantur chirographum marito exspiranti heredes dedisse; et verum erat.

[74] nam , quia per leges institui uxor non poterat heres, id fuerat actum, ut ad eam bona per hoc tacitum fideicommissum pervenirent. et caput quidem tueri facile erat, si hoc diceremus palam, sed peribat hereditas. ita ergo fuit nobis agendum, ut iudices illud intelligerent factum, delatores non possent apprehendere ut dictum; et contigit utrumque. quod non inseruissem, veritus opinionem iactantiae, nisi probare voluissem in foro quoque esse his figuris locum. quaedam etiam,

[75] quae probare non possis, figura potius spargenda sunt. haeret enim nonnunquam telum illud occultum, et hoc ipso, quod non apparet, eximi non potest; at si idem dicas palam, et defenditur et probandum est.

[76] cum autem obstat nobis personae reverentia, (quod secundum posuimus genus) tanto cautius dicendum est, quanto validius bonos inhibet pudor quam metus. hic vero tegere nos iudex quod sciamus et verba vi quadam veritatis erumpentia credat coercere. nam quanto magis ¹⁰ aut ipsi, in quos dicimus, aut iudices aut adsistentes oderint hanc maledicendi lasciviam, si velle nos credant? aut quid interest quomodo dicatur,

[77] cum et res et animus intelligitur? quid dicendo denique proficimus, nisi ut palam sit facere nos quod ipsi sciamus non esse faciendum? atqui praecipue prima, quibus praecipere coeperam, tempora hoc vitio laborarunt. dicebant enim libenter tales controversias, quae difficultatis gratia placent, cum sint multo faciliores.

[78] nam rectum genius adprobari nisi maximis viribus non potest; haec deverticula et anfractus suffugia sunt infirmitatis, ut qui cursu parum valent, flexu eludant, cum haec, quae adfectatur, ratio sententiarum non procul a ratione iocandi abhorreat. adiuvat etiam, quod auditor gaudet intelligere, et favet ingenio suo et alio dicente se laudat.

[79] itaque non solum, si persona obstaret rectae orationi, (quo in genere saepius modo quam figuris opus est) decurrebant ad schemata, sed faciebant illis locum etiam, ubi inutiles ac nefariae essent, ut si ¹¹ pater, qui infamem in matrem filium secreto occidisset, reus malae tractationis iacularetur in uxorem obliquis sententiis. nam quid impurius, quam retinuisse talem?

[80] quid porro tam contrarium quam eum, qui accusetur, quia summum nefas suspicatus de uxore videatur, confirmare id ipsa defensione, quod diluendum est? at si iudicum sumerent animum, scirent, quam eiusmodi actionem laturi non fuissent, multoque etiam minus, cum in parentes abominanda crimina spargerentur.

[81] et quatenus huc incidimus, paulo plus scholis demus. nam et in his educatur orator, et in eo, quomodo declamatur, positum est etiam, quomodo agatur. dicendum ergo de iis quoque, in quibus non asperas figuras, sed palam contrarias causae plerique fecerunt: tyrannidis adfectatae damnatis torqueatur, ut conscios indicet; accusator eius optet, quod volet. patrem quidam damnavit, ¹² optat, ne is torqueatur; paler ei contra dicit.

[82] nemo se tenuit agens pro patre, quin figuras in filium faceret, tanquam illum conscium in tormentis nominaturus. quo quid stultius? nam cum hoc iudices intellexerint, aut non torquebitur, cum ideo torqueri velit, aut torto non credetur.

[83] at credibile est, hoc eum velle. fortasse ; dissimulet ergo, ut efficiat. sed nobis (declamatoribus dico) quid proderit hoc intellexisse, nisi dixerimus? ergo , si vere ageretur, similiter consilium illud latens prodidissemus? quid ? si neque utique verum est, et habere alias hic damnatus contradicendi causas potest, vel quod legem conservandam putet, vel quod nolit accusatori debere beneficium, vel (quod ego maxime sequerer) ut innocentem se esse in tormentis pertendat?

[84] quare ne illud quidem semper succurret sic dicentibus, patrocinium hoc voluit, qui controversiam finxit. fortasse enim noluit; sed esto, voluerit: continuone, si ille stulte cogitavit, nobis quoque stulte dicendum est? at ego in causis agendis frequenter non puto intuendum, quid litigator velit.

[85] est et ille in hoc genere frequens error, ut putent aliud quosdam dicere aliud velle, praecipue cum in themate est aliquem, ut sibi mori liceat, postulare, ut in illa controversia, qui aliquando fortiter fecerat et alio bello petierat, ut militia vacaret ex lege quod quinquagenarius esset, adversante filio ire in aciem coactus deseruit. filius , qui fortiter eodem proelio fecerat, incolumitatem eius optat; contra dicit pater.

non enim,

inquiunt,

mori vult, sed invidiam filio facere.

[86] equidem rideo, quod illi sic timent tanquam ipsi morituri et in consilium suos metus ferunt, obliti tot exemplorum circa voluntariam mortem, causarum quoque, quas habet factus ex viro forti desertor. sed de una controversia loqui ¹³ supervacuum est.

[87] ego in universum neque oratoris puto esse unquam praevaricari, neque litem intelligo, in qua pars utraque idem velit, neque tam stultum quemquam, qui, si vivere vult, mortem potius male petat quam omnino non petat.

[88] non tamen nego esse controversias huiusmodi figuratas, ut est illa, reus parricidii, quod fratrem occidisset, damnatum iri videbatur; pater pro testimonio dixit cum se iubente fecisse; absolutum abdicat. nam neque in totum filio parcit nec, quod priore iudicio adfirmavit, mutare palam potest et, ut non durat ultra poenam abdicationis, ita abdicat tamen; et alioqui figura in patrem plus facit, quam licet, in filium minus.

[89] ut autem nemo contra id, quod vult, dicit, ita potest melius aliquid velle quam dicit, quo modo ille abdicatus, qui a patre, ut filium expositum et ab eo educatum solutis alimentis recipiat, postulat, revocari fortasse mavult, non tamen quod petit non vult.

[90] est latens et illa significatio qua, cum ius asperius petitur a iudice fit tamen spes aliqua clementiae, non palam, ne paciscamur, sed per quandam credibilem suspicionem, ut in multis controversiis, sed in hac quoque: raptor , nisi intra tricesimum diem et raptae patrem et suum exoraverit, pereat; qui exorato raptae patre suum non exorat, agit cum eo dementia.

[91] nam si promittat hic pater, lis tollitur; si nullam spem faciat, ut non demens, crudelis certe videatur et a se iudicem avertat. latro igitur optime, occides ergo? — si potero. remissius et pro suo ingenio pater Gallio, dura , anime, dura; here fortior fuisti.

[92] confinia sunt his celebrata apud Graecos schemata, per quae res asperas mollius significant. nam Themistocles suasisse existimatur Atheniensibus, ut urbem apud deos deponerent, quia durum erat dicere, ut relinquerent. et , qui Victorias aureas in usum belli conflari volebat, ita declinavit, victoriis utendum esse. totum autem allegoriae simile est aliud dicere aliud intelligi velle.

[93] quaesitum etiam est, quomodo responderi contra figuras oporteret. et quidam semper ex diverso aperiendas putaverunt, sicut latentia vitia rescinduntur. idque sane frequentissime faciendum est; aliter enim dilui obiecta non possunt, utique cum quaestio in eo consistit, quod figurae petunt. at cum maledicta sunt tantum, et non intelligere interim bonae conscientiae est.

[94] atque etiam si fuerint crebriores figurae quam ut dissimulari possint, postulandum est, ut nescio quid illud, quod adversarii obliquis sententiis significare voluerint, si fiducia sit, obiiciant palam, aut certe non exigant ut, quod ipsi non audent dicere, id iudices non modo intelligant, sed etiam credant.

[95] utilis aliquando etiam dissimulatio est, ut in eo (nota enim fabula est), qui, cum esset contra eum dictum, iura per paris ¹⁴ tui cineres, paratum se esse respondit, et iudex condicione usus est, clamante multum advocato schemata de rerum natura tolli, ut protinus etiam praeceptum sit, eiusmodi figuris utendum temere non esse.

[96] tertium est genus, in quo sola melius dicendi petitur occasio; ideoque id Cicero non putat esse positum in contentione. tale est illud, quo idem utitur in Clodium: quibus iste, qui omnia sacrificia nosset, facile ab se deos placari posse arbitrabatur.

[97] ironia quoque in hoc genere materiae frequentissima est. sed eruditissimum longe, si per aliam rem alia indicetur, ut adversus tyrannum, qui sub pacto abolitionis dominationem deposuerat, agit competitor, mihi in te dicere non licet, tu in me die et potes; nuper te volui occidere.

[98] frequens illud est nec magnopere captandum, quod petitur a iureiurando, ut pro exheredato, ita mihi contingat herede, filio mori. nam et in totum iurare, nisi ubi necesse est, gravi viro parum convenit, et est a Seneca dictum eleganter, non patronorum hoc esse, sed testium. nec meretur fidem qui sententiolae gratia iurat, nisi si potest tam bene quam Demosthenes, ut supra dixi.

[99] levissimum autem longe genus ex verbo, etiamsi est apud Ciceronem in Clodiam, praesertim quam omnes amicam omnium potius quam cuiusquam inimicam putaverunt.

[100] comparationem equidem video figuram quoque ¹⁵ esse, cum sit interim probationis, interim etiam causae genus, et sit talis eius forma, qualis est pro Murena, vigilas tu de nocte, ut tuis consultoribus respondeas, ille, ut eo, quo contendit, ¹⁶ mature cum exercitu perveniat; te gallorum illum buccinarum cantus exsuscitat et cetera.

[101] nescio an orationis potius quam sententiae sit. id enim solum mutatur, quod non universa universis, sed singula singulis opponuntur. et Celsus tamen et non negligens auctor Visellius in hac eam parte posuerunt, Rutilius quidem Lupus in utroque genere, idque ἀντίθετον vocat.

[102] praeter illa vero, quae Cicero inter lumina posuit sententiarum, multa alia et idem Rutilius Gorgian secutus, non illum Leontinum, sed alium sui temporis, cuius quattuor libros in unum suum transtulit, et Celsus, videlicet Rutilio accedens, posuerunt schemata:

[103] consummationem, quam Graecus διαλλαγήν vocat, cum plura argumenta ad unum effectum deducuntur; consequens, ille ἐπακολούθησιν, de quo nos in argumentis diximus; collectionem, qui apud illum est συλλογισμός minas, id est κατάπληξιν exhortationem, συλλογισμός Quorum nihil non rectum est, nisi cum aliquam ex iis, de quibus locuti sumus, figuram accipit.

[104] praeter haec Celsus excludere, asseverare, detrectare, excitare iudicem, proverbiis uti, et versibus et ioco et invidia et invocatione intendere crimen (quod est δείνωσις ), adulari, ignoscere, fastidire, admonere, satisfacere, precari, corripere, figuras putat.

[105] partitionem quoque et propositionem et divisionem et rerum duarum cognationem, quod est, ut idem valeant quae videntur esse diversa, ut non is demum sit veneficus, qui vitam abstulit data potione, sed etiam qui mentem; quod est in parte finitionis.

[106] Rutilius sive Gorgias, ἀναγκαῖον, ἀνάμνησιν, ἀνθυποφορὰν, ἀνθυποφοράν, παραύξησιν, προέκθεσιν, quod est dicere quid fieri oportuerit, deinde quid factum sit; ἐναντιότητα unde sint enthymemata κατ᾽ ἐναντίωσιν,¹⁷ μετάληψιν etiam, quo statu Hermagoras utitur. Visellius , quanquam paucissimas faciat figuras, ἐνθύμημα tamen, quod commentum vocat, et, rationem appellans, ἐπιχείρημα inter eas habet. quod quidem recipit quodammodo et Celsus; nam consequens an epichirema sit dubitat. Visellius adiicit et sententiam.

[107] invenio , qui aggregent his διασκευάς, ἀπαγορεύσις, παραδιηγήσεις. sed ut haec non sunt schemata, sic alia vel sint forsitan ac nos fugerint vel etiam nova fieri adhuc possint, eiusdem tamen naturae cuius sunt ea de quibus dictum est.

Institutio Oratoria. Quintilian. ed. Harold Edgeworth Butler. Cambridge, Mass.. 1920-1922.

Sponsored by Perseus Project, Tufts University.

Funding provided by Tufts University.

Current edition Perseus

Institutio Oratoria (Quintilian. Institutio Oratoria, Volume 1-4. Butler, Harold Edgeworth, editor. Cambridge, Mass; London: Harvard University Press, William Heinemann Ltd., 1920-1922.)

Translations (1)

Institutio Oratoria Perseus (Quintilian. Institutio Oratoria, Volume 1-4. Butler, Harold Edgeworth, translator. Cambridge, Mass; London: Harvard University Press, William Heinemann Ltd., 1920-1922.) — 9.2 focus

[1] The student who desires to give a wider consideration to figures of thought and speech will, therefore, have a guide to follow, and 1 would not venture to assert that he could have a better. But I would ask him to read these passages of Cicero with reference to my own views on this subject. For I intend to speak only of those figures of thought which depart from the direct method of statement, and I note that a similar procedure has been adopted by a number of learned scholars.

[2] On the other hand, all those embellishments which differ in character from these are none the less virtues whose importance is such that without them all oratory will be little less than unintelligible. For how can the judge be adequately instructed unless lucidity characterise our performance of the following tasks: explanation, proposition, promise of proofs, definition, distinction, exposition of our own opinion, logical conclusion, defence by anticipation, introduction of comparisons or precedents, disposition and distribution, interruption, repression of those who interrupt us, antithesis, exculpation and personal attack?

[3] Again, what would eloquence do if deprived of the artifices of amplification and its opposite? of which the first requires the gift of signifying more than we say, that is emphasis, together with exaggeration and overstatement of the truth, while the latter requires the power to diminish and palliate. What scope is there for the stronger emotions if the orator is not allowed to give free rein to his speech, to flame out in anger, to reproach, to wish or execrate? Or for the milder emotions without the assistance of commendation, conciliation and humour?

[4] What pleasure can an orator hope to produce, or what impression even of the most moderate learning, unless he knows how to fix one point in the minds of the audience by repetition, and another by dwelling on it, how to digress from and return to his theme, to divert the blame from himself and transfer it to another, or to decide what points to omit and what to ignore as negligible? It is qualities such as these that give life and vigour to oratory; without them it lies torpid like a body lacking the breath to stir its limbs.

[5] But more than the mere possession of these qualities is required; they must be deployed, each in their proper place and with such variety that every sound may bewitch the hearer with all the charm of music. But these qualities are as a rule open and direct, manifesting themselves without disguise. They do, however, as I have said, admit of figures, as the instances to which I shall proceed will show.

[6] What is more common than to ask or enquire? For both terms are used indifferently, although the one seems to imply a desire for knowledge, and the other a desire to prove something. But whichever term we use, the thing which they represent admits a variety of figures. We will begin with those which serve to increase the force and cogency of proof to which I assign the first place.

[7] A simple question may be illustrated by the line: ¹

But who are ye and from what shores are come?

On the other hand, a question involves a figure, whenever it is employed not to get information, but to emphasise our point, as in the following examples: ²

What was that sword of yours doing, Tubero, that was drawn on the field of Pharsalus?

and

How long, Catiline, will you abuse our patience?

and

Do you not see that your plots are all laid bare?

with the whole passage that follows.

[8] How much greater is the fire of his words as they stand than if he had said,

You have abused our patience a long time,

and

Your plots are all laid bare.

We may also ask what cannot be denied, as

Was Gaius Fidiculanius Falcula, I ask you, brought to justice?

³ Or we may put a question to which it is difficult to reply, as in the common forms,

How is it possible?

How can that be?

[9] Or we may ask a question with a view to throw odium on the person to whom it is addressed, as in the words placed by Seneca in the mouth of Medea: ⁴

What lands dost bid me seek?

Or our aim may be to excite pity, as is the case with the question asked by Sinon in Virgil: ⁵

Alas, what lands, lie cried,

What seas can now receive me?

Or to embarrass our opponent and to deprive him of the power to feign ignorance of our meaning, as Asinius does in the following sentence:

Do you hear? The will which we impugn is the work of a madman, not of one who lacked natural affection.

In fact questions admit of infinite variety.

[10] They may serve our indignation, as in the line:

Are any left

That still adore Juno's divinity?

Aen. i. 48.

Or they may still express wonder, as in:

To what dost thou not drive the hearts of men,

Accursed greed of gold?

Aen. iii. 56.

Again, at times they may express a sharp command,

[11] as in:

Will they not rush to arms and follow forth

From all the city?

Aen. iv. 592.

Or we may ask ourselves, as in the phrase of Terence,

What, then, shall I do?

⁶

[12] A figure is also involved in a reply, when one question is asked and another is answered, because it suits the respondent's purpose better to do so, or because it aggravates the charge brought against the accused. For example, a witness for the prosecution was asked whether he had been cudgelled by the plaintiff, and replied,

And what is more, I had done him no harm.

Or the purpose may be to elude a charge, a very common form of reply. The advocate says,

I ask if you killed the man?

The accused replies,

He was a robber.

The advocate asks,

Have you occupied the farm?

The accused replies,

It was my own.

[13] Again, the answer may be of such a kind as to make defence precede confession. For example, in the Eclogues⁷ of Virgil, when one shepherd asks:

Did I not see you, villain, snare a goat

Of Damon's?

the other replies:

I vanquished him in song, and should he not

Pay me the prize, my due?

[14] Akin to this kind of answer is the dissimulatory reply, which is employed solely with the purpose of raising a laugh, and has therefore been treated in its appropriate place. ⁸ If it were meant seriously, it would be tantamount to a confession. Further, there is the practice of putting the question and answering it oneself, which may have quite a pleasing effect. Take as an example the following passage from the pro Ligario,⁹ where Cicero says,

Before whom do I say this? Before one who, although he was aware of these facts, yet restored me to my country even before he had seen me.

[15] A different form of fictitious question is to be found in the pro Caelio.

Some one will say, 'Is this your moral discipline? Is this the training you would give young men?'

with the whole passage that follows. Then comes his reply,

Gentlemen, if there were any man with such vigour of mind, with such innate virtue and self-control, etc.

¹⁰ A different method is to ask a question and not to wait for a reply, but to subjoin the reply at once yourself. For example,

Had you no house? Yes, you had one. Had you money and to spare? No, you were in actual want.

¹¹ This is a figure which some call suggestion.

[16] Again, a question may involve comparison, as, for instance,

Which of the two then could more easily assign a reason for his opinion?

¹² There are other forms of question as well, some concise, some developed at greater length, some dealing with one thing only, others with several. Anticipation, or, as the Greeks call it, πρόληψις, whereby we forestall objections, is of extraordinary value in pleading; it is frequently employed in all parts of a speech, but is especially useful in the exordium.

[17] However, it forms a genus in itself, and has several different species. One of these is the defence by anticipation, such as Cicero employs against Quintus Caecilius, ¹³ where he points out that though previously he himself has always appeared for the defence, he is now undertaking a prosecution. Another is a form of confession, such as he introduces in his defence of Rabirius Postumus, ¹⁴ where he admits that he himself regards his client as worthy of censure for lending money to the king. Another takes the form of prediction, as in the phrase,

For I will say without any intention of aggravating the charge.

Again, there is a form of self-correction, such as,

I beg you to pardon me, if I have been carried too far.

And, most frequent of all, there is preparation, whereby we state fully why we are going to do something or have done it.

[18] Anticipation may also be employed to establish the meaning or propriety of words, as in the following case,

Although that was not a punishment, but merely a prevention of crime,

¹⁵ while the same effect may be produced by qualification, as in the following sentence,

Citizens, I say, if I may call them by that name.

¹⁶

[19] Again, hesitation may lend an impression of truth to our statements, when, for example, we pretend to be at a loss, where to begin or end, or to decide what especially requires to be said or not to be said at all. All speeches are full of such instances, but for the present one will be enough.

As for myself, I know not where to turn. Shall I deny that there was a scandalous rumour that the jury had been bribed, etc.?

¹⁷

[20] This device may also be employed to cover the past; for we may equally pretend that we had felt hesitation on the subject. This figure is akin to that known as communication, when we actually take our opponents into consultation, as Domitius Afer does in his defence of Cloatilla.

She is so agitated that she does not know what is permitted to a woman or what becomes a wife. It may be that chance has brought you into contact with the unhappy woman in her helpless plight. What counsel do you give her, you her brother, and you, her father's friends?

[21] Or we may admit the judges to our deliberations, a device which is frequently called into play. We may say,

What do you advise?

or,

I ask you,

or,

What, then, should have been done?

Cato, for example, says,

Come now, if you had been in his place, what else would you have done?

And in another passage,

Imagine this to be a matter which concerns us all, and assume you have been placed in charge of the whole affair.

[22] Sometimes, however, in such forms of communication we may add something unexpected, a device which is in itself a figure, as Cicero does in the Verrines:

What then? What think you? Perhaps you expect to hear of some theft or plunder.

¹⁸ Then, after keeping the minds of the judges in suspense for a considerable time, he adds something much worse. This figure is termed suspension by Celsus. It has two forms.

[23] For we may adopt exactly the opposite procedure to that just mentioned, and after raising expectation of a sequel of the most serious nature, we may drop to something which is of a trivial character, and may even imply no offence at all. But since this does not necessarily involve any form of communication, some have given it the name of paradox or surprise.

[24] I do not agree with those who extend the name of figure to a statement that something has happened unexpectedly to the speaker himself, like the following passage from Pollio:

Gentlemen, I never thought it would come to pass that, when Scaurus was the accused, I should have to entreat you not to allow influence to carry any weight on his behalf.

[25] The figure known as concession springs from practically the same source as communication; it occurs when we leave some things to the judgment of the jury, or even in some cases of our opponents, as when Calvus says to Vatinius,

Summon all your assurance and assert that you have a better claim than Cato to be elected praetor.

[26] The figures best adapted for intensifying emotion consist chiefly in simulation. For we may feign that we are angry, glad, afraid, filled with wonder, grief or indignation, or that we wish something, and so on. Hence we get passages like the following:

I am free, I breathe again,

¹⁹ or,

It is well,

or,

What madness is this?

²⁰ or,

Alas! for these degenerate days!

²¹ or,

Woe is me; for though all my tears are shed my grief still clings to me deep-rooted in my heart,

²² or,

Gape now, wide earth.

Unknown.

To this some give the name of exclamation,

[27] and include it among figures of speech. When, however, such exclamations are genuine, they do not come under the head of our present topic: it is only those which are simulated and artfully designed which can with any certainty be regarded as figures. The same is true of free speech, which Corificius ²³ calls licence, and the Greeks παῤῥησία. For what has less of the figure about it than true freedom? On the other hand, freedom of speech may frequently be made a cloak for flattery.

[28] For when Cicero in his defence for Ligarius says,

After war had begun, Caesar, and was well on its way to a conclusion, I deliberately, of my own free will and under no compulsion, joined the forces of your opponents,

²⁴ he has in his mind something more than a desire to serve the interests of Ligarius, for there is no better way of praising the clemency of the victor.

[29] On the other hand, in the sentence,

What else was our aim, Tubero, than that we might secure the power which he now holds?

²⁵ he succeeds with admirable art in representing the cause of both parties as being good, and in so doing mollifies him whose cause was really bad. A bolder form of figure, which in Cicero's opinion ²⁶ demands greater effort, is impersonation, or προσωποποιΐα This is a device which lends wonderful variety and animation to oratory.

[30] By this means we display the inner thoughts of our adversaries as though they were talking with themselves (but we shall only carry conviction if we represent them as uttering what they may reasonably be supposed to have had in their minds); or without sacrifice of credibility we may introduce conversations between ourselves and others, or of others among themselves, and put words of advice, reproach, complaint, praise or pity into the mouths of appropriate persons.

[31] Nay, we are even allowed in this form of speech to bring down the gods from heaven and raise the dead, while cities also and peoples may find a voice. There are some authorities who restrict the term imepersonation to cases where both persons and words are fictitious, and prefer to call imaginary conversations between men by the Greek name of dialogue, which some ²⁷ translate by the Latin semnocinatio.

[32] For my own part, I have included both under the same generally accepted term, since we cannot imagine a speech without we also imagine a person to utter it. But when we lend a voice to things to which nature has denied it, we may soften down the figure in the way illustrated by the following passage:

For if my country, which is far dearer to me than life itself, if all Italy, if the whole commonwealth were to address me thus, 'Marcus Tullius, what dost thou?

²⁸ A bolder figure of the same kind may be illustrated by the following:

Your country, Catiline, pleads with you thus, and though she utters never a word, cries to you, 'For not a few years past no crime has come to pass save through your doing!'

²⁹

[33] It is also convenient at times to pretend that we have before our eyes the images of things, persons or utterances, or to marvel that the same is not the case with our adversaries or the judges; it is with this design that we use phrases such as

It seems to me,

Does it not seem to you?

But such devices make a great demand on our powers of eloquence. For with things which are false and incredible by nature there are but two alternatives: either they will move our hearers with exceptional force because they are beyond the truth, or they will be regarded as empty nothings because they are not the truth.

[34] But we may introduce not only imaginary sayings, but imaginary writings as well, as is done by Asinius in his defence of Liburnia:

Let my mother, who was the object of my love and my delight, who lived for me and gave me life twice in one day ³⁰ (and so on) inherit nought of my property.

This is in itself a figure, and is doubly so whenever, as in the present case, it imitates a document produced by the opposing party.

[35] For a will had been read out by the prosecution, in the following form:

Let Publius Novanius Gallio, to whom as my benefactor I will and owe all that is good, as a testimony to the great affection which he has borne me (then follow other details) be my heir.

In this case the figure borders on parody, a name drawn from songs sung in imitation of others, but employed by an abuse of language to designate imitation in verse or prose.

[36] Again, we often personify the abstract, as Virgil ³¹ does with Fame, or as Xenophon ³² records that Prodicus did with Virtue and Pleasure, or as Ennius does when, in one of his satires, he represents Life and Death contending with one another. We may also introduce some imaginary person without identifying him, as we do in the phrases,

At this point some one will interpose,

or,

Some one will say.

[37] Or speech may be inserted without any mention of the speaker, as in the line: ³³

Here the Dolopian host

Camped, here the fierce Achilles pitched his tent.

This involves a mixture of figures, since to impersonalion we add the figure known as ellipse, which in this case consists in the omission of any indication as to who is speaking. At times impersonation takes the form of narrative. Thus we find indirect speeches in the historians, as at the opening of Livy's first book ³⁴ :

That cities, like other things, spring from the humblest origins, and that those who are helped by their own valour and the favour of heaven subsequently win great power and a great name for themselves.

Apostrophe also,

[38] which consists in the diversion of our address from the judge, is wonderfully stirring, whether we attack our adversary as in the passage,

What was that sword of yours doing, Tubero, in the field of Pharsalus?

³⁵ or turn to make some invocation such as,

For I appeal to you, hills and groves of Alba,

³⁶ or to entreaty that will bring odium on our opponents, as in the cry,

O Porcian and Sempronian laws.

³⁷

[39] But the term apostrophe is also applied to utterances that divert the attention of the hearer from the question before them, as in the following passage:

I swore not with the Greeks

At Aulis to uproot the race of Troy.

Aen. iv. 425. Dido is urging Anna to approach Aeneas and induce Aeneas to postpone his departure. Dido is no enemy from whom he need fly.

There are a number of different figures by which this effect may be produced. We may, for instance, pretend that we expected something different or feared some greater disaster, or that the judges in their ignorance of the facts may regard some point as of more importance than it really is: an example of this latter device is to be found in the exordium to Cicero's defence of Caelius.

[40] With regard to the figure which Cicero ³⁸ calls ocular denonstration, this comes into play when we do not restrict ourselves to mentioning that something was done, but proceed to show how it was done, and do so not merely on broad general lines, but in full detail. In the last book ³⁹ I classified this figure under the head of vivid illustration, while Celsus actually terms it by this name. Others give the name of ὑποτύπωσις to any representation of facts which is made in such vivid language that they appeal to the eye rather than the ear. The following will show what I mean:

He came into the forum on fire with criminal madness: his eyes blazed and cruelty was written in every feature of his countenance.

⁴⁰

[41] Nor is it only past or present actions which we may imagine: we may equally well present a picture of what is likely to happen or might have happened. This is done with extraordinary skill by Cicero in his defence of Milo, ⁴¹ where he shows what Clodius would have done, had he succeeded in securing the praetorship. But this transference of time, which is technically called μετάστασις was more modestly used in vivid description by the old orators. For they would preface it by words such as

Imagine that you see

: take, for example, the words of Cicero ⁴² :

Though you cannot see this with your bodily eyes, you can see it with the mind's eye.

[42] Modern authors, however, more especially the declaimers, are bolder, indeed they show the utmost animation in giving rein to their imagination; witness the following passages from Seneca's treatment of the controversial theme in which a father, guided by one of his sons, finds another son in the act of adultery with his stepmother and kills both culprits.

Lead me, I follow, take this old hand of mine and direct it where you will.

[43] And a little later,

See, he says, what for so long you refused to believe. As for myself, I cannot see, night and thick darkness veil my eyes.

This figure is too dramatic: for the story seems to be acted, not narrated.

[44] Some include the clear and vivid description of places under the same heading, while others call it topography. I have found some who speak of irony as dissimulation, but, in view of the fact that this latter name does not cover the whole range of this figure, I shall follow my general rule and rest content with the Greek term. Irony involving a figure does not differ from the irony which is a trope, as far as its genus is concerned, since in both cases we understand something which is the opposite of what is actually said; on the other hand, a careful consideration of the species of irony will soon reveal the fact that they differ.

[45] In the first place, the trope is franker in its meaning, and, despite the fact that it implies something other than it says, makes no pretence about it. For the context as a rule is perfectly clear, as, for example, in the following passage from the Catilinarian orations. ⁴³

Rejected by him, you migrated to your boon-companion, that excellent gentleman Metellus.

In this case the irony lies in two words, and is therefore a specially concise form of trope.

[46] But in the figurative form of irony the speaker disguises his entire meaning, the disguise being apparent rather than confessed. For in the trope the conflict is purely verbal, while in the figure the meaning, and sometimes the whole aspect of our case, conflicts with the language and the tone of voice adopted; nay, a man's whole life may be coloured with irony, as was the case with Socrates, who was called an ironist because he assumed the role of an ignorant man lost in wonder at the wisdom of others. Thus, as continued metaphor develops into allegory, so a sustained series of tropes develops into this figure.

[47] There are, however, certain kinds of this figure which have no connexion with tropes. In the first place, there is the figure which derives its name from negation and is called by some ἀντίφρασις. Here is an example:

I will not plead against you according to the rigour of the law, I will not press the point which I should perhaps be able to make good

⁴⁴ ; or again,

Why should I mention his decrees, his acts of plunder, his acquisition, whether by cession or by force, of certain inheritances?

⁴⁵ or

I say nothing of the first wrong inflicted by his lust

; or

I do not even propose to produce the evidence given concerning the 600,000 sesterces

;

[48] or

I might say, etc.

⁴⁶ Such kinds of irony may even be sustained at times through whole sections of our argument, as, for instance, where Cicero ⁴⁷ says,

If I were to plead on this point as though there were some real charge to refute, I should speak at greater length.

It is also irony when we assume the tone of command or concession, as in Virgil's ⁴⁸

Go!

Follow the winds to Italy;

[49] or when we concede to our opponents qualities which we are unwilling that they should seem to possess. This is specially effective when we possess these qualities and they do not, as in the following passage, ⁴⁹

Brand me as coward, Drances, since thy sword

Has slain such hosts of Trojans.

A like result is produced by reversing this method when we pretend to own to faults which are not ours or which even recoil upon the heads of our opponents, as for example,

'Twas I that led the Dardan gallant on

To storm the bridal bed of Sparta's queen!

Aen. x. 92. Juno ironically pretends to have brought about the rape of Helen, which was in reality the work of Venus.

[50] Further, this device of saying the opposite of what we desire to imply is not merely restricted to persons, but may be extended to things, witness the whole of the exordium of the pro Ligario and disparaging phrases such as

Forsooth,

ye great gods!

Fit task, I ween, for gods!

Aen. iv,. 379. Dido mocks the excuse of Aeneas that he had received the direct command of heaven to leave Carthage.

[51] Another example is provided by the following passage from the pro Oppio,

What wondrous love! what extraordinary benevolence!

Akin to irony also are the following figures, which have a strong family resemblance: confession of a kind that can do our case no harm, such as the following ⁵⁰ :

You have now, Tubero, the advantage most desired by an accuser: the accused confesses his guilt

; secondly, concession, when we pretend to admit something actually unfavourable to ourselves by way of showing our confidence in our cause, as in the following passage ⁵¹ :

The commander of a ship from a distinguished city paid down a sum of money to rid himself of the fear of a scourging which hung over his head; it shows Verres' humanity

; or again, in the pro Cluentio,⁵² where Cicero is speaking of the prejudice aroused against his client,

Let it prevail in the public assembly, but be silent in the courts of law

; thirdly, agreement, as when Cicero, ⁵³ in the same speech, agrees that the jury was bribed.

[52] This last form of figure becomes more striking when we agree to something which is really likely to tell in our favour; but such an opportunity can only occur through weakness on the part of our opponent Sometimes we may even praise some action of our opponent, as Cicero does in his prosecution of Verres ⁵⁴ when dealing with the charge in connexion with Apollonius of Drepanum:

Nay, it is a real pleasure to me to think that you took something from him, and I say that you never did a juster action in your life.

[53] At times we may exaggerate charges against ourselves which we can easily refute or deny; this device is too common to require any illustration. At other times we may by this same method make the charges brought against us seem incredible just because of their gravity: thus Cicero in his defence of Roscius, ⁵⁵ by the sheer force of his eloquence, exaggerates the horror of parricide, despite the fact that it requires no demonstration.

[54] Aposiopesis, which Cicero ⁵⁶ calls reticentia, Celsus obticentia, and some interruptio, is used to indicate passion or anger, as in the line: ⁵⁷

Whom I—

But better first these billows to assuage.

Or it may serve to give an impression of anxiety or scruple, as in the following: ⁵⁸

Would he have dared to mention this law of which Clodius boasts he was the author, while Milo was alive, I will not say was consul? For as regards all of us—I do not dare to complete the sentence.

There is a similar instance in the exordium of Demosthenes' speech in defence of Ctesiphon. ⁵⁹

[55] Again it may be employed as a means of transition, as, for example, ⁶⁰

Cominius, however— nay, pardon me, gentlemen.

This last instance also involves digression, if indeed digression is to be counted among figures, since some authorities regard it as forming one of the parts of a speech. ⁶¹ For at this point the orator diverges to sing the praises of Gnaeus Pompeius, which he might have done without any recourse to aposiopesis.

[56] For as Cicero ⁶² says, the shorter form of digression may be effected in a number of different ways. The following passages will, however, suffice as examples:

Then Gaius Varenus, that is, the Varenus who was killed by the slaves of Ancharius:—I beg you, gentlemen, to give careful attention to what I am about to say ⁶³ ;

the second is from the pro Milone ⁶⁴ :

Then he turned on me that glance, which it was his wont to assume, when he threatened all the world with every kind of violence.

[57] There is also another kind of figure, which is not aposiopesis, since that involves leaving a sentence unfinished, but consists in bringing our words to a close before the natural point for their conclusion. The following is an example ⁶⁵ :

I am pressing my point too far; the young man appears to be moved

; or ⁶⁶

Why should I say more? you heard the young man tell the story himself.

The imitation of other persons' characteristics,

[58] which is styled ἠθοποιί͂α or, as some prefer μίμησις may be counted among the devices which serve to excite the gentler emotions. For it consists mainly in banter, though it may be concerned either with words or deeds. If concerned with the latter, it closely resembles ὑποτύπωσις while the following passage from Terence ⁶⁷ will illustrate it as applied to words:

I didn't see your drift. 'A little girl was stolen from this place; my mother brought her up as her own daughter. She was known as my sister. I want to get her away to restore her to her relations.'

[59] We may, however, imitate our own words and deeds in a similar fashion by relating some act or statement, though in such cases the speaker more frequently does so to assert his point than for the sake of banter, as, for example, in the following, ⁶⁸

I said that they had Quintus Caecilius to conduct the prosecution.

There are other devices also which are agreeable in themselves and serve not a little to commend our case both by the introduction of variety and by their intrinsic naturalness, since by giving our speech an appearance of simplicity and spontaneity they make the judges more ready to accept our statements without suspicion.

[60] Thus we may feign repentance for what we have said, as in the pro Caelio,⁶⁹ where Cicero says,

But why did I introduce so respectable a character?

Or we may use some common phrase, such as,

I didn't mean to say that.

⁷⁰ Or we may pretend that we are searching for what we should say, as in the phrases,

What else is there?

Have I left anything out?

Or we may pretend to discover something suggested by the context, as when Cicero ⁷¹ says,

One more charge, too, of this sort still remains for me to deal with,

One thing suggests another.

[61] Such methods will also provide us with elegant transitions, although transition is not itself to be ranked among figures: for example, Cicero, ⁷² after telling the story of Piso, who ordered a goldsmith to make a ring before him in court, adds, as though this story had suggested it to him,

This ring of Piso's reminds me of something which had entirely slipped my memory. How many gold rings do you think Verres has stripped from the fingers of honourable men?

Or we may affect ignorance on certain points, as in the following passage ⁷³ :

But who was the sculptor who made those statues? Who was he? Thank you for prompting me, you are right; they said it was Polyclitus.

[62] This device may serve for other purposes as well. For there are means of this kind whereby we may achieve an end quite other than that at which we appear to be aiming, as, for example, Cicero does in the passage just quoted. For while he taunts Verres with a morbid passion for acquiring statues and pictures, he succeeds in creating the impression that he personally has no interest in such subjects. So, too, when Demosthenes ⁷⁴ swears by those who fell at Marathon and Salamis, his object is to lessen the odium in which he was involved by the disaster at Chaeronea.

[63] We may further lend charm to our speech by deferring the discussion of some points after just mentioning them, thus depositing them in the safe keeping of the judge's memory and afterwards reclaiming our deposit; or we may employ some figure to enable us to repeat certain points (for repetition is not in itself a figure) or may make especial mention of certain things and vary the aspect of our pleading. For eloquence delights in variety, and just as the eye is more strongly attracted by the sight of a number of different things, so oratory supplies a continuous series of novelties to rivet the attention of the mind.

[64] Emphasis may be numbered among figures also, when some hidden meaning is extracted from some phrase, as in the following passage from Virgil:

Might I not have lived,

From wedlock free, a life without a stain,

Happy as beasts are happy?

Aen. iv. 550.

For although Dido complains of marriage, yet her passionate outburst shows that she regards life without wedlock as no life for man, but for the beasts of the field. A different kind of emphasis is found in Ovid, where Zmyrna confesses to her nurse her passion for her father in the following words:

O mother, happy in thy spouse!

Met. x. 422.

[65] Similar, if not identical with this figure is another, which is much in vogue at the present time. For I must now proceed to the discussion of a class of figure which is of the commonest occurrence and on which I think I shall be expected to make some comment. It is one whereby we excite some suspicion to indicate that our meaning is other than our words would seem to imply; but our meaning is not in this case contrary to that which we express, as is the case in ironq, but rather a hidden meaning which is left to the hearer to discover. As I have already pointed out, ⁷⁵ modern rhetoricians practically restrict the name of figure to this device, from the use of which figured controversial themes derive their name.

[66] This class of figure may be employed under three conditions: first, if it is unsafe to speak openly; secondly, if it is unseemly to speak openly; and thirdly, when it is employed solely with a view to the elegance of what we say, and gives greater pleasure by reason of the novelty and variety thus introduced than if our meaning had been expressed in straightforward language.

[67] The first of the three is of common occurrence in the schools, where we imagine conditions laid down by tyrants on abdication and decrees passed by the senate after a civil war, and it is a capital offence to accuse a person with what is past, what is not expedient in the courts being actually prohibited in the schools. But the conditions governing the employment of figures differ in the two cases. For we may speak against the tyrants in question as openly as we please without loss of effect, provided always that what we say is susceptible of a different interpretation, since it is only danger to ourselves, and not offence to them, that we have to avoid.

[68] And if the danger can be avoided by any ambiguity of expression, tile speaker's cunning will meet with universal approbation. On the other hand, the actual business of the courts has never yet involved such necessity for silence, though at times they require something not unlike it, which is much more embarrassing for the speaker, as, for example, when he is hampered by the existence of powerful personages, whom he must censure if he is to prove his case.

[69] Consequently he must proceed with greater wariness and circumspection; since the actual manner in which offence is given is a matter of indifference, and if a figure is perfectly obvious, it ceases to be a figure. Therefore such devices are absolutely repudiated by some authorities, whether the meaning of the figure be intelligible or not. But it is possible to employ such figuress in moderation, the primary consideration being that they should not be too obvious. And this fault can be avoided, if the figre does not depend on the employment of words of doubtful or double meaning, such, for instance, as the words which occur in the theme of the suspected daughter-in-law: ⁷⁶

I married the wife who pleased my father.

[70] It is important, too, that the figure should not depend on ambiguous collocations of words (a trick which is far more foolish than the last); an example of this is to be found in the controversial theme, where a father, accused of a criminal passion for his unmarried daughter, asks her for the name of her ravisher.

Who dishonoured you?

he says. She replies:

My father, do you not know?

⁷⁷

[71] The facts themselves must be allowed to excite the suspicions of the judge, and we must clear away all other points, leaving nothing save what will suggest the truth. In doing this we shall find emotional appeals, hesitation and words broken by silences most effective. For thus the judge will be led to seek out the secret which he would not perhaps believe if he heard it openly stated, and to believe in that which he thinks he has found out for himself. But however excellent our figures,

[72] they must not be too numerous. For overcrowding will make them obvious, and they will become ineffective without becoming inoffensive, while the fact that we make no open accusation will seem to be due not to modesty, but to lack of confidence in our own cause. In fact, we may sum up the position thus: our figures will have most effect upon the judge when he thinks that we use them with reluctance.

[73] I myself have come across persons whom it was impossible to convince by other means: I have even come across a much rarer thing, namely, a case which could only be proved by recourse to such devices. I was defending a woman who was alleged to have forged her husband's will, and the heirs were stated to have given a bond ⁷⁸ to the husband on his deathbed, which latter assertion was true.

[74] For since the wife could not legally be appointed his heir, this procedure was adopted to enable the property to be transferred to her by a secret conveyance in trust. Now it was easy for me to secure the woman's acquittal, by openly mentioning the existence of the bond; but this would have involved her loss of the inheritance. I had, therefore, to plead in such a way that the judges should understand that the bond had actually been given, but that informers might be unable to avail themselves of any statement of mine to that effect. And I was successful in both my aims. The fear of seeming to boast my own skill would have deterred me from mentioning this case, but for the fact that I wished to demonstrate that there was room for the employment of these figures even in the courts.

[75] Some things, again, which cannot be proved, may, on the other hand, be suggested by the employment of some figure. For at times such hidden shafts will stick, and the fact that they are not noticed will prevent their being drawn out, whereas if the same point were stated openly, it would be denied by our opponents and would have to be proved.

[76] When, however, it is respect for some person that hampers us (which I mentioned as the second condition ⁷⁹ under which such figures may be used), all the greater caution is required because the sense of shame is a stronger deterrent to all good men than fear. In such cases the judge must be impressed with the fact that we are hiding what we know and keeping back the words which our natural impulse to speak out the truth would cause to burst from our lips. For those against whom we are speaking, together with the judges and our audience, would assuredly be all the more incensed by such toying with detraction, if they thought that we were inspired by deliberate malice.

[77] And what difference does it make how we express ourselves, when both the facts and our feelings are clearly understood? And what good shall we do by expressing ourselves thus except to make it clear that we are doing what we ourselves know ought not to be done? And yet in the days when I first began to teach rhetoric, this failing was only too common. For declaimers selected by preference those themes which attracted them by their apparent difficulty, although as a matter of fact they were much easier than many others.

[78] For straightforward eloquence requires the highest gifts to commend itself to the audience, while these circuitous and indirect methods are merely the refuge of weakness, for those who use them are like men who, being unable to escape from their pursuers by speed, do so by doubling, since this method of expression, which is so much affected, is really not far removed from jesting. Indeed it is positively assisted by the tact that the hearer takes pleasure in detecting the speaker's concealed meaning, applauds his own penetration and regards another man's eloquence as a compliment to himself.

[79] Consequently it was not merely in cases where respect for persons prevented direct speaking (a circumstance which as a rule calls for caution rather than figures ) that they would have recourse to figurative methods, but they made room for them even under circumstances where they were useless or morally inadmissible, as for example in a case where a father, who had secretly slain his son whom he suspected of incest with his mother, and was accused of ill-treating his wife, was made to bring indirect insinuations against his wife.

[80] But what could be more discreditable to the accused than that he should have kept such a wife? What could be more damaging than that he who is accused because he appears to have harboured the darkest suspicions against his wife, should by his defence confirm the charge which he is required to refute? If such speakers had only placed themselves in the position of the judges, they would have realised how little disposed they would have been to put up with pleading on such lines, more especially in cases where the most abominable crimes were insinuated against parents.

[81] However, since we have lighted on this topic, let us devote a little more time to considering the practice of the schools. For it is in the schools that the orator is trained, and the methods adopted in pleading ultimately depend on the methods employed in declamation. I must therefore say something of those numerous cases in which figures have been employed which were not merely harsh, but actually contrary to the interests of the case.

A man condemned for attempting to establish himself as tyrant shall be tortured to make him reveal the names of his accomplices. The accuser shall choose what reward he pleases. A certain man has secured the condemnation of his father and demands as his reward that he should not be tortured. The father opposes his choice.

[82] Everyone who pleaded for the father indulged in figurative insinuations against the son, on the assumption that the father would, when tortured, be likely to name him as one of his accomplices. But what could be more foolish? For as soon as the judges grasp their point, they will either refuse to put him to the torture in view of his motive for desiring to be tortured, or will refuse to believe any confession he may make under torture. But, it will be urged,

[83] it is possible that this was his motive. May be. But he should then disguise his motive, in order that he may effect his purpose. But what will it profit us (and by us I mean the declaimers) to have realised this motive, unless we declare it as well? Well, then, if the case were being actually pleaded in the courts, should we have disclosed this secret motive in such a way? Again, if this is not the real motive, the condemned man may have other reasons for opposing his son; he may think that the law should be carried out or be unwilling to accept such a kindness from the hands of his accuser, or (and this is the line on which I personally should insist) he may intend to persist in declaring his innocence even under torture.

[84] Consequently the usual excuse advanced by such declaimers to the effect that the inventor of the theme meant the defence to proceed on these lines, will not always serve their purpose. It is possible that this was not the inventor's wish. However, let us assume that it was. Are we then to speak like fools merely because he thought like a fool? Personally I hold that, even in actual cases, we should often disregard the wishes of the litigant.

[85] Further, in such cases speakers fall into the frequent error of assuming that certain persons say one thing and mean another: this is more especially the case where it is assumed that a man asks permission to die. Take, for example, the following controversial theme.

A man who had shown himself a heroic soldier in the past, on the occasion of a subsequent war demanded exemption from service in accordance with the law, on the ground that he was fifty years of age, but exemption being refused owing to the opposition of his son, he deserted on being compelled to go into the fight. The son, who had borne himself like a hero in the same battle, asks for his father's pardon as a reward. The father opposes his choice.

Yes,

they say,

that is due not to his desire to die, but to bring odium on his son.

For my part,

[86] I laugh at the fears which they manifest on his behalf, as though they were in peril of death themselves, and at the way in which they allow their terror to influence their line of pleading; for they forget how many precedents there are for suicide and how many reasons there may be why a hero turned deserter should wish for death.

[87] But it would be waste of time to expatiate on one controversial theme. I would lay it down as a general rule that an orator should never put forward a plea that is tantamount to collusion, and I cannot imagine a lawsuit arising in which both parties have the same design, nor conceive that any man who wishes to live could be such a fool as to put forward an absurd plea for death, when he might refrain from pleading for it at all. ⁸⁰ I do not, however,

[88] deny that there are controversial themes of this kind where figures may legitimately be employed, as, for example, the following:

A man was accused of unnatural murder on the ground that he had killed his brother, and it seemed probable that he would be condemned. His father gave evidence in his defence, stating that the murder had been committed on his orders. The son was acquitted, but disinherited by the father.

For in this case he does not pardon his son entirely, but cannot openly withdraw the evidence that he gave in the first trial, and while he does not inflict any worse penalty than disinheritance, he does not shrink from that. Further, the employment of the figure tells more heavily against the father than is fair and less against the son. ⁸¹

[89] But, while no one ever speaks against the view which he wishes to prevail, he may wish something of greater importance than what he actually says. Thus the disinherited son who asks his father to take back another son whom he had exposed, and who had been brought up by himself, on payment for his maintenance, while he may prefer that he himself should be reinstated, may all the same be perfectly sincere in his demand on behalf of his brother. Again, a kind of tacit hint may be employed, which,

[90] while demanding the utmost rigour of the law from the judges, suggests a loophole for clemency, not openly, for that would imply a pledge on our part, but by giving a plausible suspicion of our meaning. This device is employed in a number of controversial themes, among them the following.

A ravisher, unless within thirty days he secure pardon both from his own father and the father of the ravished girl, shall be put to death. A man who has succeeded in securing pardon from the father of the girl, but not from his own, accuses the latter of madness.

[91] Here if the father pledges himself to pardon him, the dispute falls to the ground. If, on the other hand, he holds out no hope of pardon, though he will not necessarily be regarded as mad, he will certainly give the impression of cruelty and will prejudice the judge against him. Latro therefore showed admirable skill when he made the son say,

You will kill me then?

and the father reply,

Yes, if I can.

⁸² The elder Gallio treats the theme with greater tenderness, as was natural to a man of his disposition. He makes the father say,

Be firm, my heart, be firm. Yesterday you were made of sterner stuff.

[92] Akin to this are those figures of which the Greeks are so fond, by means of which they give gentle expression to unpleasing facts. Themistocles, for example, is believed to have urged the Athenians to commit their city to the protection of heaven, because to urge them to abandon it would have been too brutal an expression. Again the statesman ⁸³ who advised that certain golden images of Victory should be melted down as a contribution to the war funds, modified his words by saying that they should make a proper use of their victories. But all such devices which consist in saying one thing, while intending something else to be understood, have a strong resemblance to allegory.

[93] It has also been asked how figures may best be met. Some hold that they should always be exposed by the antagonist, just as hidden ulcers are laid open by the surgeon. It is true that this is often the right course, being the only means of refuting the charges which have been brought against us, and this is more especially the case when the question turns on the very point at which the figures are directed. But when the figures are merely employed as vehicles of abuse, it will sometimes even be wisest to show that we have a clear conscience by ignoring them.

[94] Nay, even if too many figures have been used to permit us to take such a course, we may ask our opponents, if they have any confidence in the righteousness of their cause, to give frank and open expression to the charges which they have attempted to suggest by indirect hints, or at any rate to refrain from asking the judges not merely to understand, but even to believe things which they themselves are afraid to state in so many words.

[95] It may even at times be found useful to pretend to misunderstand them; for which we may compare the well known story of the man who, when his opponent cried,

Swear by the ashes of your father,

⁸⁴ replied that he was ready to do so, whereupon the judge accepted the proposal, much to the indignation of the advocate, who protested that this would make the use of figures absolutely impossible; we may therefore lay it down as a general rule that such figures should only be used with the utmost caution.

[96] There remains the third class of figure designed merely to enhance the elegance of our style, for which reason Cicero expresses the opinion that such figures are independent of the subject in dispute. As an illustration I may quote the figure which he uses in his speech ⁸⁵ against Clodius:

By these means he, being familiar with all our holy rites, thought that he might easily succeed in appeasing the gods.

[97] Irony also is frequently employed in this connexion. But by far the most artistic device is to indicate one thing by allusion to another; take the case where a rival candidate speaks against an ex-tyrant who had abdicated on condition of his receiving an amnesty ⁸⁶ :

I am not permitted to speak against you. Do you speak against me, as you may. But a little while ago I wished to kill you.

[98] Another common device is to introduce an oath, like the speaker who, in defending a disinherited man, cried,

So may I die leaving a son to be my heir.

⁸⁷ But this is not a figure which is much to be recommended, for as a rule the introduction of an oath, unless it is absolutely necessary, is scarcely becoming to a self-respecting man. Seneca made a neat comment to this effect when he said that oaths were for the witness and not for the advocate. Again, the advocate who drags in an oath merely for the sake of some trivial rhetorical effect, does not deserve much credit, unless he can do this with the masterly effect achieved by Demosthenes, which I mentioned above. ⁸⁸

[99] But by far the most trivial form of figure is that which turns on a single word, although we find such a figure directed against Clodia by Cicero ⁸⁹ :

Especially when everybody thought her the friend of all men rather than the enemy of any.

[100] I note that comparison is also regarded as a figure, although at times it is a form of proof, ⁹⁰ and at others the whole case may turn upon it, ⁹¹ while its form may be illustrated by the following passage from the pro Murena:⁹²

You pass wakeful nights that you may be able to reply to your clients; he that he and his army may arrive betimes at their destination. You are roused by cockcrow, he by the bugle's reveille,

and so on.

[101] I am not sure, however, whether it is so much a figure of thought as of speech. For the only difference lies in the fact that universals are not contrasted with universals, but particulars with particulars. Celsus, however, and that careful writer Visellius regard it as a figure of thought, while Rutilius Lupus regards it as belonging to both, and calls it antithesis.

[102] To the figures placed by Cicero among the ornaments of thought Rutilius (following the views of Gorgias, a contemporary, whose four books he transferred to his own work, and who is not to be confused with Georgias of Leontini) and Celsus (who follows Rutilius) would add a number of others, such as:

[103] concentration, which the Greek calls διαλλαγή⁹³ a term employed when a number of different arguments are used to establish one point: consequence, which Gorgias calls ἐπακολούθησις and which I have already discussed under the head of argument ⁹⁴ : inference, which Gorgias terms συλλογισμός threats, that is, κατάπληξις exhortation, or παραινετικόν But all of these are perfectly straightforward methods of speaking, unless combined with some one of the figures which I have discussed above.

[104] Besides these, Celsus considers the following to be figures: exclusion, asseveration, refusal, ⁹⁵ excitement of the judge, the use of proverbs, the employment of quotations from poetry, jests, invidious remarks or invocation to intensify a charge (which is identical with δείνωσις ) flattery, pardon, disdain, admonition, apology, entreaty and rebuke.

[105] He even includes partition, proposition, division and affinity between two separate things, by which latter he means that two things apparently different signify the same: for example, not only the man who murders another by administering a deadly draught is to be regarded as a poisoner, but also the man who deprives another of his wits by giving him some drug, a point which depends on definition.

[106] To these Rutilius or Gorgias add ἀναγκαῖον that is, the representation of the necessity of a thing, ἀνάμνησις or reminding, ἀνθυποφορά that is, replying to anticipated objections, ἀντίῤῥησις or refutation, παραύξησις or amplification, προέκθεσις which means pointing out what ought to have been done, and then what actually has been done, ἐναντιότης, or arguments from opposites ⁹⁶ (whence we get enthymemes styled κατ᾽ ἐναντίωσιν ), and even μετάληψις, which Hermagoras considers a basis.⁹⁷ Visellius, although he makes the number of figures but small, includes among them the enthymeme, which he calls commentum, and the epicheireme, which he calls ratio.⁹⁸ This view is also partially accepted by Celsus, who is in doubt whether consequence is not to be identified with the epicheireme.

[107] Visellius also adds general reflexions to the list. I find others who would add to these διασκευή⁹⁹ or enhancement, ἀπαγόρευσις or prohibition, and παραδιήγησις or incidental narrative. But though these are not figures, there may be others which have slipped my notice, or are yet to be invented: still, they will be of the same nature as those of which I have spoken above.

Notes on the current edition

Institutio Oratoria

1. quanquam, Spalding : quam cum, A: cum, B.

2. ιν διατυπώσει vulgo: indiatyposi, B: incliatibosi, A.

3. ut et Seneca, vulgo: ut Seneca, cod. bamb .: ut, cod. bern .: et, A.

4. eider, Regius : eiusdem, B: huic, A (2nd hand): virtuti, A: virtutis, B.

5. sermoni et voci, Halm : sermonis et ioci, AB.

6. debeam forsitan obtinere, MSS. of Cicero.

7. ne multa, Cicero .

8. iterare, Halm : sperare, B: separare A (m.2).

9. si relatio, A (si r by 2nd hand ): si elatio, B.

10. quanto magis, Halm : quo minus, AB

11. si, Regius : is, MSS.

12. quidam damnavit, B: qui accusavit, A.

13. loqui, B: sequi contrarium, A.

14. patris, Seneca (Contr. 7), Seton.: patroni, MSS.

15. quoque, Halm : non, MSS.

16. intendit, MSS. of Cicero.

17. κατ᾽ ἐναντίωσιν. Kayser : ΚΑΤΑΙΤΙΑΞΙϜ, A : ΚΑΤΑΙΚΚΤΙΑΞΙΝ, B.

Quintilian Institutio Oratoria 9.2

ed. Harold Edgeworth Butler

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