Search the Perseus Catalog for:

← Previous Next →

Summary of the Work

I STATED in my first book that my work was to start from the Social war, the Hannibalian war, and the war for the possession of Coele-Syria . In the same book I stated my reasons for devoting my first two books to a sketch of the period preceding those events. I will now, after a few prefatory remarks as to the scope of my own work, address myself to giving a complete account of these wars, the causes which led to them, and which account for the proportions to which they attained.

The one aim and object, then, of all that I have undertaken¹ to write is to show how, when, and why all the known parts of the world fell under the dominion of Rome . Now as this great event admits of being exactly dated as to its beginning, duration, and final accomplishment, I think it will be advantageous to give, by way of preface, a summary statement of the most important phases in it between the beginning and the end. For I think I shall thus best secure to the student an adequate idea of my whole plan; for as the comprehension of the whole is a help to the understanding of details, and the knowledge of details of great service to the clear conception of the whole; believing that the best and clearest knowledge is that which is obtained from a combination of these, I will preface my whole history by a brief summary of its contents.

I have already described its scope and limits. As to its several parts, the first consists of the above mentioned wars, while the conclusion or closing scene is the fall of the Macedonian monarchy. The time included between these limits is fifty-three years; and never has an equal space embraced events of such magnitude and importance. ² In describing them I shall start from the 140th Olympiad and shall arrange my exposition in the following order:

Plan: Causes of Wars

First I shall indicate the causes of the Punic or ³ Hannibalian war: and shall have to describe how the Carthaginians entered Italy ; broke up the Roman power there; made the Romans tremble for their safety and the very soil of their country; and contrary to all calculation acquired a good prospect of surprising Rome itself.

I shall next try to make it clear how in the same period⁴ Philip of Macedon , after finishing his war with the Aetolians, and subsequently settling the affairs of Greece , entered upon a design of forming an offensive and defensive alliance with Carthage .

Then I shall tell how Antiochus and Ptolemy Philopator⁵ first quarrelled and finally went to war with each other for the possession of Coele-Syria .

Next how the Rhodians and Prusias went to war with the⁶ Byzantines, and compelled them to desist from exacting dues from ships sailing into the Pontus .

At this point I shall pause in my narrative to introduce a⁷ disquisition upon the Roman Constitution, in which I shall show that its peculiar character contributed largely to their success, not only in reducing all Italy to their authority, and in acquiring a supremacy over the Iberians and Gauls besides, but also at last, after their conquest of Carthage , to their conceiving the idea of universal dominion.

Along with this I shall introduce another⁸ digression on the fall of Hiero of Syracuse .

After these digressions will come the disturbances in⁹ Egypt ; how, after the death of King Ptolemy, Antiochus and Philip entered into a compact for the partition of the dominions of that monarch’s infant son. I shall describe their treacherous dealings, Philip laying hands upon the islands of the Aegean , and Caria and Samos , Antiochus upon Coele-Syria and Phoenicia .

Plan: Events in Greece

Next, after a summary recapitulation of the proceedings of ¹⁰ the Carthaginians and Romans in Iberia , Libya , and Sicily , I shall, following the changes of events, shift the scene of my story entirely to Greece . Here I shall first describe the naval battles of Attalus and the Rhodians against Philip; and the war between Philip and Rome , the persons engaged, its circumstances, and result.

Next to this I shall have to record the wrath of the Aetolians,¹¹ in consequence of which they invited the aid of Antiochus, and thereby gave rise to what is called the Asiatic war against Rome and the Achaean league. Having stated the causes of this war, and described the crossing of Antiochus into Europe , I shall have to show first in what manner he was driven from Greece ; secondly, how, being defeated in the war, he was forced to cede all his territory west of Taurus; and thirdly, how the Romans, after crushing the insolence of the Gauls, secured undisputed possession of Asia , and freed all the nations on the west of Taurus from the fear of barbarian inroads and the lawless violence of the Gauls.

Next, after reviewing the disasters of the Aetolians and¹² Cephallenians, I shall pass to the wars waged by Eumenes against Prusias and the Gauls; as well as that carried on in alliance with Ariarathes against Pharnaces.

Finally, after speaking of the unity and settlement of the¹³ Peloponnese , and of the growth of the commonwealth of Rhodes , I shall add a summary of my whole work, concluding by an account of the expedition of Antiochus Epiphanes against Egypt ; of the war against Perseus; and the destruction of the Macedonian monarchy. Throughout the whole narrative it will be shown how the policy adopted by the Romans in one after another of these cases, as they arose, led to their eventual conquest of the whole world.

Extension of the First Plan of the Work

And if our judgment of individuals and constitutions, for praise or blame, could be adequately formed from a simple consideration of their successes or defeats, I must necessarily have stopped at this point, and have concluded my history as soon as I reached these last events in accordance with my original plan. For at this point the fifty-three years were coming to an end, and the progress of the Roman power had arrived at its consummation. And, besides, by this time the acknowledgment had been extorted from all that the supremacy of Rome must be accepted, and her commands obeyed. ¹⁴ But in truth, judgments of either side founded on the bare facts of success or failure in the field are by no means final. It has often happened that what seemed the most signal successes have, from ill management, brought the most crushing disasters in their train; while not unfrequently the most terrible calamities, sustained with spirit, have been turned to actual advantage. I am bound, therefore, to add to my statement of facts a discussion on the subsequent policy of the conquerors, and their administration of their universal dominion: and again on the various feelings and opinions entertained by other nations towards their rulers. And I must also describe the tastes and aims of the several nations, whether in their private lives or public policy. The present generation will learn from this whether they should shun or seek the rule of Rome ; and future generations will be taught whether to praise and imitate, or to decry it. The usefulness of my history, whether for the present or the future, will mainly lie in this. For the end of a policy should not be, in the eyes either of the actors or their historians, simply to conquer others and bring all into subjection. Nor does any man of sense go to war with his neighbours for the mere purpose of mastering his opponents; nor go to sea for the mere sake of the voyage; nor engage in professions and trades for the sole purpose of learning them. In all these cases the objects are invariably the pleasure, honour, or profit which are the results of the several employments. Accordingly the object of this work shall be to ascertain exactly what the position of the several states was, after the universal conquest by which they fell under the power of Rome , until the commotions and disturbances which broke out at a later period. These I designed to make the starting-point of what may almost be called a new work, partly because of the greatness and surprising nature of the events themselves, but chiefly because, in the case of most of them, I was not only an eye-witness, but in some cases one of the actors, and in others the chief director.

The True Theory of Historical Causes

The events I refer to are the wars of Rome against the ¹⁵ Celtiberians and Vaccaei; those of Carthage against Massinissa, king of Libya ; and those of Attalus and Prusias in Asia . Then also Ariarathes, King of Cappadocia , having been ejected from his throne by Orophernes through the agency of King Demetrius, recovered his ancestral power by the help of Attalus; while Demetrius, son of Seleucus, after twelve years’ possession of the throne of Syria , was deprived of it, and of his life at the same time, by a combination of the other kings against him. Then it was, too, that the Romans restored to their country those Greeks who had been charged with guilt in the matter of the war with Perseus, after formally acquitting them of the crimes alleged against them. Not long afterwards the same people turned their hands against Carthage : at first with the intention of forcing its removal to some other spot, but finally, for reasons to be afterwards stated, with the resolution of utterly destroying it. Contemporaneous with this came the renunciation by the Macedonians of their friendship to Rome , and by the Lacedaemonians of their membership of the Achaean league, to which the disaster that befell all Greece alike owed its beginning and end.

This is my purpose: but its fulfilment must depend upon whether Fortune protracts my life to the necessary length. I am persuaded, however, that, even if the common human destiny does overtake me, this theme will not be allowed to lie idle for want of competent men to handle it; for there are many besides myself who will readily undertake its completion. But having given the heads of the most remarkable events, with the object of enabling the reader to grasp the general scope of my history as well as the arrangement of its several parts, I must now, remembering my original plan, go back to the point at which my history starts.

Causes of the Second Punic War

Some historians of the Hannibalian war, when they wish ¹⁶ to point out to us the causes of this contest between Rome and Carthage , allege first the siege of Saguntum by the Carthaginians, and, secondly, their breach of treaty by crossing the river called by the natives the Iber. ¹⁷ But though I should call these the first actions in the war, I cannot admit them to be its causes. One might just as well say that the crossing of Alexander the Great into Asia was the cause of the Persian war, and the descent of Antiochus upon Demetrias the cause of his war with Rome . ¹⁸ In neither would it be a probable or true statement. In the first case, this action of Alexander’s could not be called the cause of a war, for which both he and his father Philip in his lifetime had made elaborate preparations: and in the second case, we know that the Aetolian league had done the same, with a view to a war with Rome , before Antiochus came upon the scene. Such definitions are only worthy of men who cannot distinguish between a first overt act and a cause or pretext; and who do not perceive that a cause is the first in a series of events of which such an overt act is the last. I shall therefore regard the first attempt to put into execution what had already been determined as a beginning, but I shall look for causes in the motives which suggested such action and the policy which dictated it; for it is by these, and the calculations to which they give rise, that men are led to decide upon a particular line of conduct. The Soundness of this method will be proved by the following considerations. The true causes and origin of the invasion of Persia by Alexander are patent to everybody. ¹⁹²⁰ They were, first, the return march of the Greeks under Xenophon through the country from the upper Satrapies; in the course of which, though throughout Asia all the populations were hostile, not a single barbarian ventured to face them: secondly, the invasion of Asia by the Spartan king Agesilaus, in which, though he was obliged by troubles in Greece to return in the middle of his expedition without effecting his object, he yet found no resistance of any importance or adequacy. It was these circumstances which convinced Philip of the cowardice and inefficiency of the Persians; and comparing them with his own high state of efficiency for war, and that of his Macedonian subjects, and placing before his eyes the splendour of the rewards to be gained by such a war, and the popularity which it would bring him in Greece , he seized on the pretext of avenging the injuries done by Persia to Greece , and determined with great eagerness to undertake this war; and was in fact at the time of his death engaged in making every kind of preparation for it.

Here we have the cause and the pretext of the Persian war. Alexander’s expedition into Asia was the first action in it.

Fabius Pictor on the Cause of the Punic War

So too of the war of Antiochus with Rome . The cause²¹ was evidently the exasperation of the Aetolians, who, thinking that they had been slighted in a number of instances at the end of the war with Philip, not only called in the aid of Antiochus, but resolved to go to every extremity in satisfying the anger which the events of that time had aroused in them. This was the cause. As for the pretext, it was the liberation of Greece , which they went from city to city with Antiochus proclaiming, without regard to reason or truth; while the first act in the war was the descent of Antiochus upon Demetrias .

My object in enlarging upon this distinction is not to attack the historians in question, but to rectify the ideas of the studious. A physician can do no good to the sick who does not know the causes of their ailments; nor can a statesman do any good who is unable to conceive the manner, cause, and source of the events with which he has from time to time to deal. Surely the former could not be expected to institute a suitable system of treatment for the body; nor the latter to grapple with the exigencies of the situation, without possessing this knowledge of its elements. There is nothing, therefore, which we ought to be more alive to, and to seek for, than the causes of every event which occurs. For the most important results are often produced by trifles; and it is invariably easier to apply remedial measures at the beginning, before things have got beyond the stage of conception and intention.

The Credibility of Fabius Pictor

Now the Roman annalist Fabius asserts that the cause of the Hannibalian war, besides the injury inflicted upon Saguntum , was the encroaching and ambitious spirit of Hasdrubal. Having secured great power in Iberia , he returned to Libya with the design of destroying the constitution and reducing Carthage to a despotism. But the leading statesmen, getting timely warning of his intention, banded themselves together and successfully opposed him. Suspecting this Hasdrubal retired from Libya , and thenceforth governed Iberia entirely at his own will without taking any account whatever of the Carthaginian Senate. This policy had had in Hannibal from his earliest youth a zealous supporter and imitator; and when he succeeded to the command in Iberia he continued it: and accordingly, even in the case of this war with Rome , was acting on his own authority and contrary to the wish of the Carthaginians; for none of the men of note in Carthage approved of his attack upon Saguntum . This is the statement of Fabius, who goes on to say, that after the capture of that city an embassy arrived in Carthage from Rome demanding that Hannibal should be given up on pain of a declaration of war.

Now what answer could Fabius have given if we had put the following question to him? What better chance or opportunity could the Carthaginians have had of combining justice and interest? According to your own account they disliked the proceeding of Hannibal: why did they not submit to the demands of Rome by surrendering the author of the injury; and thus get rid of the common enemy of the state without the odium of doing it themselves, and secure the safety of their territory by ridding themselves of the threatened war—all of which they could have effected by merely passing a decree? If this question were put, I say, it would admit of no answer. The fact is that, so far from doing anything of the sort, they maintained the war in accordance with Hannibal’s policy for seventeen years; and refused to make terms until, at the end of a most determined struggle, they found their own city and persons in imminent danger of destruction.

First Cause of the Second Punic War

I do not allude to Fabius and his annals from any fear of their wearing such an air of probability in themselves as to gain any credit,—for the fact is that his assertions are so contrary to reason, that it does not need any argument of mine to help his readers to perceive it,—but I wished to warn those who take up his books not to be misled by the authority of his name, but to be guided by facts. For there is a certain class of readers in whose eyes the personality of the writer is of more account than what he says. They look to the fact that Fabius was a contemporary and a member of the Senate, and assume without more ado that everything he says may be trusted. My view, however, is that we ought not to hold the authority of this writer lightly: yet at the same time that we should not regard it as all-sufficient; but in reading his writings should test them by a reference to the facts themselves.

This is a digression from my immediate subject, which is²² the war between Carthage and Rome . The cause of this war we must reckon to be the exasperation of Hamilcar, surnamed Barcas, the father of Hannibal. The result of the war in Sicily had not broken the spirit of that commander. He regarded himself as unconquered; for the troops at Eryx which he commanded were still sound and undismayed: and though he yielded so far as to make a treaty, it was a concession to the exigencies of the times brought on by the defeat of the Carthaginians at sea. But he never relaxed in his determined purpose of revenge; and, had it not been for the mutiny of the mercenaries at Carthage , he would at once have sought and made another occasion for bringing about a war, as far as he was able to do so: as it was, he was preoccupied by the domestic war, and had to give his attention entirely to that.

Second Cause of the War

When the Romans, at the conclusion of this mercenary ²³ war, proclaimed war with Carthage , the latter at first was inclined to resist at all hazards, because the goodness of her cause gave her hopes of victory,—as I have shown in my former book, without which it would be impossible to understand adequately either this or what is to follow. The Romans, however, would not listen to anything: and the Carthaginians therefore yielded to the force of circumstances; and though feeling bitterly aggrieved, yet being quite unable to do anything, evacuated Sardinia , and consented to pay a sum of twelve hundred talents, in addition to the former indemnity paid them, on condition of avoiding the war at that time. This is the second and the most important cause of the subsequent war. For Hamilcar, having this public grievance in addition to his private feelings of anger, as soon as he had secured his country’s safety by reducing the rebellious mercenaries, set at once about securing the Carthaginian power in Iberia with the intention of using it as a base of operations against Rome . ²⁴ So that I record as a third cause of the war the Carthaginian success in Iberia : for it was the confidence inspired by their forces there which encouraged them to embark upon it. It would be easy to adduce other facts to show that Hamilcar, though he had been dead ten years at its commencement, largely contributed to bring about the second Punic war, but what I am about to say will be sufficient to establish the fact.

Hannibal’s Oath

When, after his final defeat by the Romans, Hannibal had at last quitted his country and was staying at the court of Antiochus, the warlike attitude of the Aetolian league induced the Romans to send ambassadors to Antiochus, that they might be informed of the king’s intentions. ²⁵These ambassadors found that Antiochus was inclined to the Aetolian alliance, and was eager for war with Rome ; they accordingly paid great court to Hannibal with a view of bringing him into suspicion with the king. And in this they entirely succeeded. As time went on the king became ever more and more suspicious of Hannibal, until at length an opportunity occurred for an explanation of the alienation that had been thus secretly growing up between them. ²⁶ Hannibal then defended himself at great length, but without success, until at last he made the following statement: When my father was about to go on his Iberian expedition I was nine years old: and as he was offering the sacrifice to Zeus I stood near the altar. The sacrifice successfully performed, my father poured the libation and went through the usual ritual. He then bade all the other worshippers stand a little back, and calling me to him asked me affectionately whether I wished to go with him on his expedition. Upon my eagerly assenting, and begging with boyish enthusiasm to be allowed to go, he took me by the right hand and led me up to the altar, and bade me lay my hand upon the victim and swear that I would never be friends with Rome . So long, then, Antiochus, as your policy is one of hostility to Rome , you may feel quite secure of having in me a most thoroughgoing supporter. But if ever you make terms or friendship with her, then you need not wait for any slander to make you distrust me and be on your guard against me; for there is nothing in my power that I would not do against her.

Statesmen Must Pay Attention to Motives

Antiochus listened to this story, and being convinced that it was told with genuine feeling and sincerity, gave up all his suspicions, And we, too, must regard this as an unquestionable proof of the animosity of Hamilcar and of the aim of his general policy; which, indeed, is also proved by facts. For he inspired his son-in-law Hasdrubal and his son Hannibal with a bitterness of resentment against Rome which nothing could surpass. Hasdrubal, indeed, was prevented by death from showing the full extent of his purpose; but time gave Hannibal abundant opportunity to manifest the hatred of Rome which he had inherited from his father.

The most important thing, then, for statesmen to observe is the motives of those who lay aside old enmities or form new friendships; and to ascertain when their consent to treaties is a mere concession to the necessities of the hour, and when it is the indication of a real consciousness of defeat. In the former case they must be on their guard against such people lying in wait for an opportunity; while in the latter they may unhesitatingly impose whatever injunctions are necessary, in full reliance on the genuineness of their feelings whether as subjects or friends. So much for the causes of the war. I will now relate the first actions in it.

Hannibal Succeeds to Command in Spain

The Carthaginians were highly incensed by their loss of Sicily , but their resentment was heightened still more, as I have said, by the transaction as to Sardinia , and by the addition recently made to their tribute. Accordingly, when the greater part of Iberia had fallen into their power, they were on the alert to seize any opportunity that presented itself of retaliating upon Rome . At the death of Hasdrubal, to whom they had committed the command in Iberia after the death of Hamilcar, they waited at first to ascertain the feelings of the army; but when news came from thence that the troops had elected Hannibal as commander in-chief, a popular assembly was at once held, and the choice of the army confirmed by a unanimous vote. ²⁷ As soon as he had taken over the command, Hannibal set out to subdue the tribe of the Olcades; and, having arrived before their most formidable city Althaea, he pitched his camp under its walls; and by a series of energetic and formidable assaults succeeded before long in taking it: by which the rest of the tribe were overawed into submission to Carthage . ²⁸Having imposed a contribution upon the towns, and thus become possessed of a large sum of money, he went to the New Town to winter. There, by a liberal treatment of the forces under his command, giving them an instalment of their pay at once and promising the rest, he established an excellent feeling towards himself in the army, as well as great hopes for the future.

Hannibal Attacks the Vaccaei

Next summer he set out on another expedition against the Vaccaei, in which he took Salmantica by ²⁹ assault, but only succeeded in storming Arbucala, owing to the size of the town and the number and valour of its inhabitants, after a laborious siege. After this he suddenly found himself in a position of very great danger on his return march: being set upon by the Carpesii, the strongest tribe in those parts, who were joined also by neighbouring tribes, incited principally by refugees of the Olcades, but roused also to great wrath by those who escaped from Salmantica . If the Carthaginians had been compelled to give these people regular battle, there can be no doubt that they would have been defeated: but as it was, Hannibal, with admirable skill and caution, slowly retreated until he had put the Tagus between himself and the enemy; and thus giving battle at the crossing of the stream, supported by it and the elephants, of which he had about forty, he gained, to every one’s surprise, a complete success. For when the barbarians attempted to force a crossing at several points of the river at once, the greater number of them were killed as they left the water by the elephants, who marched up and down along the brink of the river and caught them as they were coming out. Many of them also were killed in the river itself by the cavalry, because the horses were better able than the men to stand against the stream, and also because the cavalry were fighting on higher ground than the infantry which they were attacking. At length Hannibal turned the tables on the enemy, and, recrossing the river, attacked and put to flight their whole army, to the number of more than a hundred thousand men. After the defeat of this host, no one south of the Iber rashly ventured to face him except the people of Saguntum . From that town Hannibal tried his best to keep aloof; because, acting on the suggestions and advice of his father Hamilcar, he did not wish to give the Romans an avowed pretext for war until he had thoroughly secured the rest of the country.

Hannibal Defies the Romans

But the people of Saguntum kept sending ambassadors ³⁰ to Rome , partly because they foresaw what was coming, and trembled for their own existence, and partly that the Romans might be kept fully aware of the growing power of the Carthaginians in Iberia . For a long time the Romans disregarded their words: but now they sent out some commissioners to see what was going on. Just at that time Hannibal had finished the conquests which he intended for that season, and was going into winter quarters at the New Town again, which was in a way the chief glory and capital town of the Carthaginians in Iberia . He found there the embassy from Rome , granted them an interview, and listened to the message with which they were charged. It was a strong injunction to him to leave Saguntum alone, as being under the protection of Rome ; and not to cross the Iber, in accordance with the agreement come to in the time of Hasdrubal. ³¹ To this Hannibal answered with all the heat of youth, inflamed by martial ardour, recent success, and his long-standing hatred of Rome . He charged the Romans with having a short time before, when on some political disturbances arising in the town they had been chosen to act as arbitrators, seized the opportunity to put some of the leading citizens to death; and he declared that the Carthaginians would not allow the Saguntines to be thus treacherously dealt with, for it was the traditional policy of Carthage to protect all persons so wronged. At the same time he sent home for instructions as to what he was to do in view of the fact that the Saguntines were injuring certain of their subject allies. And altogether he was in a state of unreasoning anger and violent exasperation, which prevented him from availing himself of the real causes for war, and made him take refuge in pretexts which would not admit of justification, after the manner of men whose passions master all considerations of equity. How much better it would have been to demand of Rome the restoration of Sardinia , and the remission of the tribute, which she had taken an unfair opportunity to impose on pain of a declaration of war. As it was, he said not a word of the real cause, but alleged the fictitious one of the matter of Saguntum ; and so got the credit of beginning the war, not only in defiance of reason, but still more in defiance of justice. The Roman ambassadors, finding that there must undoubtedly be a war, sailed to Carthage to enter the same protest before the people there. They expected, however, that they would have to fight not in Italy , but in Iberia , and that they would have Saguntum as a base of operations.

War in Illyria

Wherefore the Senate, by way of preparing to undertake this business, and foreseeing that the war ³² would be severe and protracted, and at a long distance from the mother country, determined to make Illyria safe. For it happened that, just at this time, Demetrius of Pharos was sacking and subduing to his authority the cities of Illyria which were subject to Rome , and had sailed beyond Lissus , in violation of the treaty, with fifty galleys, and had ravaged many of the Cyclades . For he had quite forgotten the former kindnesses done him by Rome , and had conceived a contempt for its power, when he saw it threatened first by the Gauls and then by Carthage ; and he now rested all his hopes on the royal family of Macedonia , because he had fought on the side of Antigonus, and shared with him the dangers of the war against Cleomenes. These transactions attracted the observation of the Romans; who, seeing that the royal house of Macedonia was in a flourishing condition, were very anxious to secure the country east of Italy ; feeling convinced that they would have ample time to correct the rash folly of the Illyrians, and rebuke and chastise the ingratitude and temerity of Demetrius. But they were deceived in their calculations. For Hannibal anticipated their measures by the capture of Saguntum : the result of which was that the war took place not in Iberia , but close to Rome itself, and in various parts throughout all Italy . ³³ However, with these ideas fixed in their minds, the Romans despatched Lucius Aemilius just before summer to conduct the Illyrian campaign in the first year of the 140th Olympiad.

Hannibal Takes Saguntum

But Hannibal had started from New Carthage and was ³⁴ leading his army straight against Saguntum. This city is situated on the sea-ward foot of the mountain chain on which the frontiers of Iberia and Celtiberia converge, and is about seven stades from the sea. The district cultivated by its inhabitants is exceedingly productive, and has a soil superior to any in all Iberia . Under the walls of this town Hannibal pitched his camp and set energetically to work on the siege, foreseeing many advantages that would accrue if he could take it. Of these the first was that he would thereby disappoint the Romans in their expectation of making Iberia the seat of war: a second was that he would thereby strike a general terror, which would render the already obedient tribes more submissive, and the still independent ones more cautious of offending him: but the greatest advantage of all was that thereby he would be able to push on his advance, without leaving an enemy on his rear. Besides these advantages, he calculated that the possession of this city would secure him abundant supplies for his expedition, and create an enthusiasm in the troops excited by individual acquisitions of booty; while he would conciliate the goodwill of those who remained at Carthage by the spoils which would be sent home. With these ideas he pressed on the siege with energy: sometimes setting an example to his soldiers by personally sharing in the fatigues of throwing up the siege works; and sometimes cheering on his men and recklessly exposing himself to danger. After a siege extending to the eighth month, in the course of which he endured every kind of suffering and anxiety, he finally succeeded in taking the town.³⁵ An immense booty in money, slaves, and property fell into his hands, which he disposed of in accordance with his original design. The money he reserved for the needs of his projected expedition; the slaves were distributed according to merit among his men; while the property was at once sent entire to Carthage . The result answered his expectations: the army was rendered more eager for action; the home populace more ready to grant whatever he asked; and he himself was enabled, by the possession of such abundant means, to carry out many measures that were of service to his expedition.

Demetrius Fortifies Dimale

While this was taking place, Demetrius, discovering ³⁶ the intentions of Rome , threw a sufficient garrison into Dimale and victualled it in proportion. In the other towns he put those who were opposed to him to death, and placed the chief power in the hands of his own partisans; and selecting six thousand of the bravest of his subjects, quartered them in Pharos. When the Consul arrived in Illyria with his army, he found the enemies of Rome confident in the strength of Dimale and the elaborate preparations in it, and encouraged to resistance by their belief in its impregnability; he determined, therefore, to attack that town first, in order to strike terror into the enemy. Accordingly, after addressing an exhortation to the several officers of the legions, and throwing up siege works at several points, he began the siege in form. In seven days he took the town by assault, which so dismayed the enemy, that envoys immediately appeared from all the towns, surrendering themselves unconditionally to the protection of Rome . The Consul accepted their submission: and after imposing such conditions as appeared suitable to the several cases, he sailed to Pharos to attack Demetrius himself. Being informed that the city there was strongly fortified, thronged with excellent soldiers, and well-furnished with provisions and all other munitions of war, he began to entertain misgivings that the siege would be long and difficult; and therefore, with a view to these difficulties, he adopted on the spur of the moment the following strategem. He crossed to the island by night with his whole army. The greater part of it he disembarked at a spot where the ground was well-wooded and low; while with only twenty ships he sailed at daybreak to the harbour nearest the town. The smallness of the number of the ships moved only the contempt of Demetrius when he saw them, and he immediately marched out of the town down to the harbour to oppose the landing of the enemy.

Illyrian War Successfully Finished

A violent struggle at once began: and, as it went on, ³⁷ division after division of the troops in the city came down to support him, until at length the whole force had poured out to take part in the engagement. The Romans who had landed in the night arrived at the critical moment, after a march by an obscure route; and seizing a strong position on some rising ground between the city and the harbour, efficiently cut off from the city the troops that had sallied out. When Demetrius became aware of what had taken place, he desisted from opposing the disembarkation; and having rallied his men and addressed the ranks, he put them in motion, with the resolution of fighting a pitched battle with the troops on the hill. When the Romans saw the Illyrian advance being made in good order and with great spirit, they formed their ranks and charged furiously. At the same moment the Roman troops which had just effected their landing, seeing what was going on, charged the enemy on the rear, who being thus attacked on both sides, were thrown into great disorder and confusion. The result was that, finding both his van and his rear in difficulties, Demetrius fled. Some of his men retreated towards the city; but most of them escaped by bye-paths into various parts of the island. Demetrius himself made his way to some galleys which he kept at anchor at a solitary point on the coast, with a view to every contingency; and going on board, he sailed away at nightfall, and arrived unexpectedly at the court of King Philip, where he passed the remainder of his life:—a man whose undoubted boldness and courage were unsupported by either prudence or judgment. His end was of a piece with the whole tenor of his life; for while endeavouring at the instigation of Philip to seize Messene , he exposed himself during the battle with a careless rashness which cost him his life; of which I shall speak in detail when I come to that period.

The Consul Aemilius having thus taken Pharos at a blow, levelled the city to the ground; and then having become master of all Illyria , and having ordered all its affairs as he thought right, returned towards the end of the summer to Rome , where he celebrated a triumph amid expressions of unmixed approval; for people considered that he had managed this business with great prudence and even greater courage.

Rome’s Reaction to the Fall of Saguntum

But when news came to Rome of the fall of Saguntum , ³⁸ there was indeed no debate on the question of war, as some historians assert; who even add the speeches delivered on either side. But nothing could be more ridiculous. For is it conceivable that the Romans should have a year before proclaimed war with the Carthaginians in the event of their entering the territory of Saguntum , and yet, when the city itself had been taken, should have debated whether they should go to war or no? Just as absurd are the wonderful statements that the senators put on mourning, and that the fathers introduced their sons above twelve years old into the Senate House, who, being admitted to the debate, refrained from divulging any of its secrets even to their nearest relations. All this is as improbable as it is untrue; unless we are to believe that Fortune, among its other bounties, granted the Romans the privilege of being men of being men of the world from their cradles. I need not waste any more words upon such compositions as those of Chaereas and Sosilus;³⁹ which, in my judgment, are more like the gossip of the barber’s shop and the pavement than history.

The truth is that, when the Romans heard of the disaster⁴⁰ at Saguntum , they at once elected envoys, whom they despatched in all haste to Carthage with the offer of two alternatives, one of which appeared to the Carthaginians to involve disgrace as well as injury if they accepted it, while the other was the beginning of a great struggle and of great dangers. For one of these alternatives was the surrender of Hannibal and his staff to Rome , the other was war. When the Roman envoys arrived and declared their message to the Senate, the choice proposed to them between these alternatives was listened to by the Carthaginians with indignation. Still they selected the most capable of their number to state their case, which was grounded on the following pleas.

Romans Demand Surrender of Hannibal

Passing over the treaty made with Hasdrubal, as not having ever been made, and, if it had, as not being binding on them because made without their consent (and on this point they quoted the precedent of the Romans themselves, who in the Sicilian war repudiated the terms agreed upon and accepted by Lutatius, as having been made without their consent)—passing over this, they pressed with all the vehemence they could, throughout the discussion, the last treaty made in the Sicilian war; in which they affirmed that there was no clause relating to Iberia , but one expressly providing security for the allies of both parties to the treaty. Now, they pointed out that the Saguntines at that time were not allies of Rome , and therefore were not protected by the clause. To prove their point, they read the treaty more than once aloud. On this occasion the Roman envoys contented themselves with the reply that, while Saguntum was intact, the matter in dispute admitted of pleadings and of a discussion on its merits; but that, that city having been treacherously seized, they had only two alternatives,—either to deliver the persons guilty of the act, and thereby make it clear that they had no share in their crime, and that it was done without their consent; or, if they were not willing to do that, and avowed their complicity in it, to take the consequences.

The question of treaties between Rome and Carthage was referred to in general terms in the course of this debate: but I think a more particular examination of it will be useful both to practical statesmen, who require to know the exact truth of the matter, in order to avoid mistakes in any critical deliberation; and to historical students, that they may not be led astray by the ignorance or partisan bias of historians; but may have before them a conspectus, acknowledged to be accurate, of the various compacts which have been made between Rome and Carthage from the earliest times to our own day.

Treaties between Rome and Carthage

The first treaty between Rome and Carthage was made in the year of Lucius Junius Brutus and Marcus Horatius, the first Consuls appointed after the expulsion of the kings, by which men also the temple of Jupiter Capitolinus was consecrated. This was twenty-eight years before the invasion of Greece by Xerxes. ⁴¹ Of this treaty I append a translation, as accurate as I could make it,—for the fact is that the ancient language differs so much from that at present in use, that the best scholars among the Romans themselves have great difficulty in interpreting some points in it, even after much study. The treaty is as follows:—

There shall be friendship between the Romans and their allies, and the Carthaginians and their allies, on these conditions:

Neither the Romans nor their allies are to sail beyond the Fair Promontory, unless driven by stress of weather or the fear of enemies. If any one of them be driven ashore he shall not buy or take aught for himself save what is needful for the repair of his ship and the service of the gods, and he shall depart within five days.

Men landing for traffic shall strike no bargain save in the presence of a herald or town-clerk. Whatever is sold in the presence of these, let the price be secured to the seller on the credit of the state—that is to say, if such sale be in Libya or Sardinia .

If any Roman comes to the Carthaginian province in Sicily he shall enjoy all rights enjoyed by others. The Carthaginians shall do no injury to the people of Ardea , Antium , Laurentium, Circeii , Tarracina , nor any other people of the Latins that are subject to Rome .

From those townships even which are not subject to Rome ⁴² they shall hold their hands; and if they take one shall deliver it unharmed to the Romans. They shall build no fort in Latium ; and if they enter the district in arms, they shall not stay a night therein.

Division of Territory

The Fair Promontory here referred to is that which lies immediately to the north of Carthage ; south of which the Carthaginians stipulated that the Romans should not sail with ships of war, because, as I imagine, they did not wish them to be acquainted with the coast near Byzacium, or the lesser Syrtis, which places they call Emporia, owing to the productiveness of the district. The treaty then goes on to say that, if any one of them is driven thither by stress of weather or fear of an enemy, and stands in need of anything for the worship of the gods and the repair of his vessel, this and no more he may take; and all those who have come to anchor there must necessarily depart within five days. To Carthage , and all the country on the Carthaginian side of the Fair Promontory in Libya , to Sardinia , and the Carthaginian province of Sicily , the treaty allows the Romans to sail for mercantile purposes; and the Carthaginians engage their public credit that such persons shall enjoy absolute security.

It is clear from this treaty that the Carthaginians speak of Sardinia and Libya as belonging to them entirely; but, on the other hand, make a distinction in the case of Sicily , and only stipulate for that part of it which is subject to Carthage . Similarly, the Romans also only stipulate concerning Latium ; the rest of Italy they do not mention, as not being under their authority.

Treaties Between Rome and Carthage

After this treaty there was a second, in which we find ⁴³ that the Carthaginians have included the Tyrians and the township of Utica in addition to their former territory; and to the Fair Promontory Mastia and Tarseium are added, as the points east of which the Romans are not to make marauding expeditions or found a city. The treaty is as follows: There shall be friendship between the Romans and their allies, and the Carthaginians, Tyrians, and township of Utica , on these terms: The Romans shall not maraud, nor traffic, nor found a city east of the Fair Promontory, Mastia, Tarseium. If the Carthaginians take any city in Latium which is not subject to Rome , they may keep the prisoners and the goods, but shall deliver up the town. If the Carthaginians take any folk, between whom and Rome a peace has been made in writing, though they be not subject to them, they shall not bring them into any harbours of the Romans; if such an one be so brought ashore, and any Roman lay claim to him,⁴⁴ he shall be released. In like manner shall the Romans be bound towards the Carthaginians.

If a Roman take water or provisions from any district within the jurisdiction of Carthage , he shall not injure, while so doing, any between whom and Carthage there is peace and friendship. Neither shall a Carthaginian in like case. If any one shall do so, he shall not be punished by private vengeance, but such action shall be a public misdemeanour.

In Sardinia and Libya no Roman shall traffic nor found a city; he shall do no more than take in provisions and refit his ship. If a storm drive him upon-those coasts, he shall depart within five days.

In the Carthaginian province of Sicily and in Carthage he may transact business and sell whatsoever it is lawful for a citizen to do. In like manner also may a Carthaginian at Rome .

Once more in this treaty we may notice that the Carthaginians emphasise the fact of their entire possession of Libya and Sardinia , and prohibit any attempt of the Romans to land in them at all; and on the other hand, in the case of Sicily , they clearly distinguish their own province in it. So, too, the Romans, in regard to Latium , stipulate that the Carthaginians shall do no wrong to Ardea , Antium , Circeii , Tarracina , all of which are on the seaboard of Latium , to which alone the treaty refers.

The Third Treaty

A third treaty again was made by Rome at the time of ⁴⁵ the invasion of Pyrrhus into Sicily ; before the Carthaginians undertook the war for the possession of Sicily . This treaty contains the same provisions as the two earlier treaties with these additional clauses:—

If they make a treaty of alliance with Pyrrhus, the Romans or Carthaginians shall make it on such terms as not to preclude the one giving aid to the other, if that one’s territory is attacked.

If one or the other stand in need of help, the Carthaginians shall supply the ships, whether for transport or war; but each people shall supply the pay for its own men employed on them.

The Carthaginians shall also give aid by sea to the Romans if need be; but no one shall compel the crews to disembark against their will.

Provision was also made for swearing to these treaties. In the case of the first, the Carthaginians were to swear by the gods of their ancestors, the Romans by Jupiter Lapis, in accordance with an ancient custom; in the case of the last treaty, by Mars and Quirinus.

The form of swearing by Jupiter Lapis was this. The commissioner for swearing to the treaty took a stone in his hand, and, having taken the oath in the name of his country, added these words, If I abide by this oath may he bless me; but if I do otherwise in thought or act, may all others be kept safe each in his own country, under his own laws, in enjoyment of his own goods, household gods, and tombs,—may I alone be cast out, even as this stone is now. And having uttered these words he throws the stone from his hand.

Treaties Between Rome and Carthage

Seeing that such treaties exist and are preserved to ⁴⁶ this day, engraved on brass in the treasury of the Aediles in the temple of Jupiter Capitolinus, the historian Philinus certainly does give us some reason to be surprised at him. Not at his ignorance of their existence: for even in our own day those Romans and Carthaginians, whose age placed them nearest to the times, and who had the reputation of taking the greatest interest in public affairs, were unaware of it. But what is surprising is, that he should have ventured on a statement exactly opposite: That there was a treaty between Rome and Carthage , in virtue of which the Romans were bound to keep away from the whole of Sicily , the Carthaginians from the whole of Italy ; and that the Romans broke the treaty and their oath when they first crossed over to Sicily . Whereas there does not exist, nor ever has existed, any such written compact at all. Yet this assertion he makes in so many words in his second book. I referred to this in the preface of my work, but reserved a more detailed discussion of it to this place; which was necessary, because the assertion of Philinus has misled a considerable number of people on this point. I have nothing to say if a man chooses to attack the Romans for crossing into Sicily , on the grounds of their having taken the Mamertines into alliance at all; or in having thus acted in answer to their request, after these men’s treachery to Rhegium as well as Messene : but if any one supposes that in so crossing they broke oaths or treaties, he is manifestly ignorant of the truth.

The Fourth Treaty

At the end of the first Punic war another treaty was ⁴⁷ made, of which the chief provisions were these: The Carthaginians shall evacuate Sicily and all islands lying between Italy and Sicily .

The allies of neither of the parties to the treaty shall be attacked by the other.

Neither party shall impose any contribution, nor erect any public building, nor enlist soldiers in the dominions of the other, nor make any compact of friendship with the allies of the other.

The Carthaginians shall within ten years pay to the Romans two-thousand two-hundred talents, and a thousand on the spot; and shall restore all prisoners, without ransom, to the Romans.

Afterwards, at the end of the Mercenary war in Africa , the⁴⁸ Romans went so far as to pass a decree for war with Carthage , but eventually made a treaty to the following effect: The Carthaginians shall evacuate Sardinia , and pay an additional twelve hundred talents.

Finally, in addition to these treaties, came that negotiated⁴⁹ with Hasdrubal in Iberia , in which it was stipulated that the Carthaginians should not cross the Iber with arms.

Such were the mutual obligations established between Rome and Carthage from the earliest times to that of Hannibal.

No Reasonable Pretext for Rome to Claim Sardinia

As we find then that the Roman invasion of Sicily was not in contravention of their oaths, so we must acknowledge in the case of the second proclamation of war, in consequence of which the treaty for the evacuation of Sardinia was made, that it is impossible to find any reasonable pretext or ground for the Roman action. ⁵⁰ The Carthaginians were beyond question compelled by the necessities of their position, contrary to all justice, to evacuate Sardinia , and to pay this enormous sum of money. For as to the allegation of the Romans, that they had during the Mercenary war been guilty of acts of hostility to ships sailing from Rome ,—that was barred by their own act in restoring, without ransom, the Carthaginian prisoners, in gratitude for similar conduct on the part of Carthage to Romans who had landed on their shores; a transaction which I have spoken of at length in my previous book.⁵¹

These facts established, it remains to decide by a thorough investigation to which of the two nations the origin of the Hannibalian war is to be imputed.

The Roman Case For War

I have explained the pleas advanced by the Carthaginians; I must now state what is alleged on the contrary by the Romans, For though it is true that in this particular interview, owing to their anger at the fall of Saguntum , they did not use these arguments, yet they were appealed to on many occasions, and by many of their citizens. ⁵²First, they argued that the treaty of Hasdrubal could not be ignored, as the Carthaginians had the assurance to do: for it did not contain the clause, which that of Lutatius did, making its validity conditional on its ratification by the people of Rome ; but Hasdrubal made the agreement absolutely and authoritatively that the Carthaginians should not cross the Iber in arms.

Next they alleged that the clause in the treaty respecting Sicily , which by their own admission stipulated that the allies of neither party should be attacked by the other, did not refer to then existing allies only, as the Carthaginians interpreted it; for in that case a clause would have been added, disabling either from making new alliances in addition to those already existing, or excluding allies, taken subsequently to the making of the treaty, from its benefits. But since neither of these provisions was made, it was plain that both the then existing allies, and all those taken subsequently on either side, were entitled to reciprocal security. And this was only reasonable. For it was not likely that they would have made a treaty depriving them of the power, when opportunity offered, of taking on such friends or allies as seemed to their interest; nor, again, if they had taken any such under their protection, was it to be supposed that they would allow them to be injured by any persons whatever. But, in fact, the main thing present in the minds of both parties to the treaty was, that they should mutually agree to abstain from attacking each other’s allies, and on no account admit into alliance with themselves the allies of the other: and it was to subsequent allies that this particular clause applied, Neither shall enlist soldiers, or impose contributions on the provinces or allies of the other; and all shall be alike secure of attack from the other side.

Both Sides Are in the Wrong

These things being so, they argued that it was beyond controversy that Saguntum had accepted the protection of Rome , several years before the time of Hannibal. The strongest proof of this, and one which would not be contested by the Carthaginians themselves, was that, when political disturbances broke out at Saguntum , the people chose the Romans, and not the Carthaginians, as arbitrators to settle the dispute and restore their constitution, although the latter were close at hand and were already established in Iberia .

I conclude, then, that if the destruction of Saguntum is to⁵³ be regarded as the cause of this war, the Carthaginians must be acknowledged to be in the wrong, both in view of the treaty of Lutatius, which secured immunity from attack for the allies of both parties, and in view of the treaty of Hasdrubal, which disabled the Carthaginians from passing the Iber with arms.⁵⁴ If on the other hand the taking Sardinia from them, and imposing the heavy money fine which accompanied it, are to be regarded as the causes, we must certainly acknowledge that the Carthaginians had good reason for undertaking the Hannibalian war: for as they had only yielded to the pressure of circumstances, so they seized a favourable turn in those circumstances to revenge themselves on their injurers.

The Value of Such Discussions

Some uncritical readers may perhaps say that such minute discussion on points of this kind is unnecessary. And if any man were entirely self-sufficing in every event, I might allow that the accurate knowledge of the past, though a graceful accomplishment, was perhaps not essential: but as long as it is not in mere mortals to say this, either in public or private affairs,—seeing that no man of sense, even if he is prosperous for the moment, will ever reckon with certainty on the future, —then I say that such knowledge is essential, and not merely graceful. For take the three commonest cases. Suppose, first, a statesman to be attacked either in his own person or in that of his country: or, secondly, suppose him to be anxious for a forward policy and to anticipate the attack of an enemy: or, lastly, suppose him to desire to maintain the status quo. In all these cases it is history alone that can supply him with precedents, and teach him how, in the first case, to find supporters and allies; in the second, to incite co-operation; and in the third, to give vigour to the conservative forces which tend to maintain, as he desires, the existing state of things. In the case of contemporaries, it is difficult to obtain an insight into their purposes; because, as their words and actions are dictated by a desire of accommodating themselves to the necessity of the hour, and of keeping up appearances, the truth is too often obscured. Whereas the transactions of the past admit of being tested by naked fact; and accordingly display without disguise the motives and purposes of the several persons engaged; and teach us from what sort of people to expect favour, active kindness, and assistance, or the reverse. They give us also many opportunities of distinguishing who would be likely to pity us, feel indignation at our wrongs, and defend our cause,—a power that contributes very greatly to national as well as individual security. Neither the writer nor the reader of history, therefore, should confine his attention to a bare statement of facts: he must take into account all that preceded, accompanied, or followed them. For if you take from history all explanation of cause, principle, and motive, and of the adaptation of the means to the end, what is left is a mere panorama without being instructive; and, though it may please for the moment, has no abiding value.

This History is Not Difficult to Understand

Another mistake is to look upon my history as difficult to obtain or master, because of the number and size of the books. Compare it in these particulars with the various writings of the episodical historians. Is it not much easier to purchase and read my forty books, which are as it were all in one piece, and so to follow with a comprehensive glance the events in Italy , Sicily , and Libya from the time of Pyrrhus to the fall of Carthage , and those in the rest of the world from the flight of Cleomenes of Sparta , continuously, to the battle between the Achaeans and Romans at the Isthmus? To say nothing of the fact that the compositions of these historians are many times as numerous as mine, it is impossible for their readers to get any certain information from them: first, because most of them differ in their account of the same transactions; and secondly, because they omit contemporary history,—the comparative review of which would put a very different complexion upon events to that derived from isolated treatment,—and are unable to touch upon the most decisive events at all. For, indeed, the most important parts of history are those which treat the events which follow or accompany a certain course of conduct, and pre-eminently so those which treat of causes. For instance, we see that the war with Antiochus took its rise from that with Philip; that with Philip from the Hannibalian; and the Hannibalian from the Sicilian war: and though between these wars there were numerous events of various character, they all converged upon the same consummation. Such a comprehensive view may be obtained from universal history, but not from the histories of particular wars, such as those with Perseus or Philip; unless we fondly imagine that, by reading the accounts contained in them of the pitched battles, we gain a knowledge of the conduct and plan of the whole war. This of course is not the case; and in the present instance I hope that there will be as wide a difference between my history and such episodical compositions, as between real learning and mere listening.

Hannibal’s Preparations

To resume the story of the Carthaginians and the Roman ⁵⁵ deputies.⁵⁶ To the arguments of the former the ambassadors made no answer, except that the senior among them, in the presence of the assembly, pointed to the folds of his toga and said that in them he carried peace and war, and that he would bring out and leave with them whichever they bade him. The Carthaginian Suffete⁵⁷ bade him bring out whichever of the two he chose: and upon the Roman saying that it should be war, a majority of the senators cried out in answer that they accepted it. It was on these terms that the Senate and the Roman ambassadors parted.

Meanwhile Hannibal, upon going into winter quarters at⁵⁸ New Carthage, first of all dismissed the Iberians to their various cities, with the view of their being prepared and vigorous for the next campaign. Secondly, he instructed his brother Hasdrubal in the management of his government in Iberia , and of the preparations to be made against Rome , in case he himself should be separated from him. Thirdly, he took precautions for the security of Libya , by selecting with prudent skill certain soldiers from the home army to come over to Iberia , and certain from the Iberian army to go to Libya ; by which interchange he secured cordial feeling of confidence between the two armies. The Iberians sent to Libya were the Thersitae, the Mastiani, as well as the Oretes and Olcades, mustering together twelve hundred cavalry and thirteen thousand eight hundred and fifty foot. Besides these there were eight hundred and seventy slingers from the Balearic Isles, whose name, as that of the islands they inhabit, is derived from the word ballein, to throw, because of their peculiar skill with the sling. Most of these troops he ordered to be stationed at Metagonia in Libya , and the rest in Carthage itself. And from the cities in the district of Metagonia he sent four thousand foot also into Carthage , to serve at once as hostages for the fidelity of their country, and as an additional guard for the city. With his brother Hasdrubal in Iberia he left fifty quinqueremes, two quadriremes, and five triremes, thirty-two of the quinqueremes being furnished with crews, and all five of the triremes; also cavalry consisting of four hundred and fifty Libyophenicians and Libyans, three hundred Lergetae, eighteen hundred Numidians of the Massolian, Massaesylian, Maccoeian, and Maurian tribes, who dwell by the ocean; with eleven thousand eight hundred and fifty Libyans, three hundred Ligures, five hundred of the Balearic Islanders, and twenty-one elephants.

The accuracy of this enumeration of Hannibal’s Iberian⁵⁹ establishment need excite no surprise, though it is such as a commander himself would have some difficulty in displaying; nor ought I to be condemned at once of imitating the specious falsehoods of historians: for the fact is that I myself found on Lacinium⁶⁰ a bronze tablet, which Hannibal had caused to be inscribed with these particulars when he was in Italy ; and holding it to be an entirely trustworthy authority for such facts, I did not hesitate to follow it.

Hannibal Contacts the Celts

Though Hannibal had taken every precaution for the security of Libya and Iberia , he yet waited for the messengers whom he expected to arrive from the Celts. He had thoroughly acquainted himself with the fertility and populousness of the districts at the foot of the Alps and in the valley of the Padus , as well as with the warlike courage of the men; but most important of all, with their hostile feelings to Rome derived from the previous war, which I described in my last book, with the express purpose of enabling my readers to follow my narrative. He therefore reckoned very much on the chance of their co-operation; and was careful to send messages to the chiefs of the Celts, whether dwelling actually on the Alps or on the Italian side of them, with unlimited promises; because he believed that he would be able to confine the war against Rome to Italy , if he could make his way through the intervening difficulties to these parts, and avail himself of the active alliance of the Celts. When his messengers returned with a report that the Celts were ready to help him and all eagerness for his approach; and that the passage of the Alps , though laborious and difficult, was not, however, impossible, he collected his forces from their winter quarters at the approach of spring. Just before receiving this report he had learnt the circumstances attending the Roman embassy at Carthage . Encouraged by the assurance thus given him, that he would be supported by the popular sentiment at home, he no longer disguised from his army that the object of the forthcoming campaign was Rome ; and tried to inspire them with courage for the undertaking. He explained to them how the Romans had demanded the surrender of himself and all the officers of the army: and pointed out the fertility of the country to which they were going, and the good-will and active alliance which the Celts were prepared to offer them. When the crowd of soldiers showed an enthusiastic readiness to accompany him, he dismissed the assembly, after thanking them, and naming the day on which he intended to march.

Hannibal Crosses the Pyrenees

These measures satisfactorily accomplished while he was ⁶¹ in winter quarters, and the security of Libya and Iberia being sufficiently provided for; when the appointed day arrived, Hannibal got his army in motion, which consisted of ninety thousand infantry and about twelve thousand cavalry. After crossing the Iber, he set about subduing the tribes of the Ilurgetes and Bargusii, as well as the Aerenosii and Andosini, as far as the Pyrenees . When he had reduced all this country under his power, and taken certain towns by storm, which he did with unexpected rapidity, though not without severe fighting and serious loss; he left Hanno in chief command of all the district north of the Iber, and with absolute authority over the Burgusii, who were the people that gave him most uneasiness on account of their friendly feeling towards Rome . He then detached from his army ten thousand foot and a thousand horse for the service of Hanno,—to whom also he entrusted the heavy baggage of the troops that were to accompany himself,—and the same number to go to their own land. The object of this last measure was twofold: he thereby left a certain number of well-affected persons behind him; and also held out to the others a hope of returning home, both to those Iberians who were to accompany him on his march, and to those also who for the present were to remain at home, so that there might be a general alacrity to join him if he were ever in want of a reinforcement. He then set his remaining troops in motion unencumbered by heavy baggage, fifty thousand infantry and nine thousand cavalry, and led them through the Pyrenees to the passage of the river Rhone . The army was not so much numerous, as highly efficient, and in an extraordinary state of physical training from their continuous battles with the Iberians.

Geography of Hannibal’s March

But as a knowledge of topography is necessary for the right understanding of my narrative, I must state the places from which Hannibal started, through which he marched, and into which he descended when he arrived in Italy . Nor must I, like some historians, content myself with mentioning the mere names of places and rivers, under the idea that that is quite sufficient to give a clear knowledge. My opinion is that, in the case of well-known places, the mention of names is of great assistance; but that, in the case of unknown countries, names are no better than unintelligible and unmeaning sounds: for the understanding having nothing to go upon, and being unable by referring to something known to translate the words into thought, the narrative becomes confused and vague, and conveys no clear idea. A plan therefore must be discovered, whereby it shall be possible, while speaking of unknown countries, to convey real and intelligible notions.

The first, most important, and most general conception is that of the division of the heaven into four quarters, which all of us that are capable of a general idea at all know as east, west, south, and north. The next is to arrange the several parts of the globe according to these points, and always to refer in thought any place mentioned to one or other of them. We shall thus get an intelligible and familiar conception of places which we do not know or have never seen.

Three Geographic Divisions of the World

This principle established as universally applicable to ⁶² the world, the next point will be to make the geography of our own part of it intelligible by a corresponding division.

It falls, then, into three divisions, each distinguished by a particular name,— Asia , Libya , Europe .⁶³ The boundaries are respectively the Don, the Nile , and the Straits of the Pillars of Hercules. Asia lies between the Don and the Nile , and lies under that portion of the heaven which is between the northeast and the south. Libya lies between the Nile and the Pillars of Hercules, and falls beneath the south portion of the heaven, extending to the south-west without a break, till it reaches the point of the equinoctial sunset, which corresponds with the Pillars of Hercules. These two divisions of the earth, therefore, regarded in a general point of view, occupy all that part which is south of the Mediterranean from east to west. Europe with respect to both of these lies to the north facing them, and extending continuously from east to west. Its most important and extensive part lies under the northern sky between the river Don and the Narbo , which is only a short distance west of Marseilles and the mouths by which the Rhone discharges itself into the Sardinian Sea. From Narbo is the district occupied by the Celts as far as the Pyrenees , stretching continuously from the Mediterranean to the Mare Externum. The rest of Europe south of the Pyrenees , to the point where it approaches the Pillars of Hercules, is bounded on one side by the Mediterranean, on the other by the Mare Externum: and that part of it which is washed by the Mediterranean as far as the Pillars of Hercules is called Iberia , while the part which lies along the Outer or Great Sea has no general name, because it has but recently been discovered, and is inhabited entirely by barbarous tribes, who are very numerous, and of whom I will speak in more detail hereafter.

Unknown Areas in the North and the South

But as no one up to our time has been able to settle in regard to those parts of Asia and Libya , where they approach each other in the neighbourhood of Ethiopia , whether the continent is continuous to the south, or is surrounded by the sea, so it is in regard to the part between Narbo and the Don: none of us as yet knows anything of the northern extent of this district, and anything we can ever know must be the result of future exploration; and those who rashly venture by word of mouth or written statements to describe this district must be looked upon as ignorant or romancing. ⁶⁴

My object in these observations was to prevent my narrative being entirely vague to those who were unacquainted with the localities. I hoped that, by keeping these broad distinctions in mind, they would have some definite standard to which to refer every mention of a place, starting from the primary one of the division of the sky into four quarters. For, as in the case of physical sight, we instinctively turn our faces to any object pointed at; so in the case of the mind, our thoughts ought to turn naturally to localities as they are mentioned from time to time.

It is time now to return to the story we have in hand.

The Length of Hannibal’s March

At this period the Carthaginians were masters of the ⁶⁵ whole Mediterranean coast of Libya from the Altars of Philaenus,⁶⁶ opposite the Great Syrtis, to the Pillars of Hercules, a seaboard of over sixteen thousand stades. They had also crossed the strait of the Pillars of Hercules, and got possession of the whole seaboard of Iberia on the Mediterranean as far as the Pyrenees , which separate the Iberes from the Celts—that is, for a distance of about eight thousand stades: for it is three thousand from the Pillars to New Carthage, from which Hannibal started for Italy ; two thousand six hundred from thence to the Iber; and from that river to Emporium again sixteen hundred; from which town, I may add, to the passage of the Rhone is a distance of about sixteen hundred stades: for all these distances have now been carefully measured by the Romans and marked with milestones at every eighth stade.⁶⁷ After crossing the river there was a march up stream along its bank of fourteen hundred stades, before reaching the foot of the pass over the Alps into Italy . The pass itself was about twelve hundred stades, which being crossed would bring him into the plains of the Padus in Italy . So that the whole length of his march from New Carthage was about nine thousand stades, or 1125 Roman miles. Of the country he had thus to traverse he had already passed almost half in mere distance, but in the difficulties the greater part of his task was still before him. ⁶⁸

Gauls Attack the Military Colonies

While Hannibal was thus engaged in effecting a passage over the Pyrenees , where he was greatly alarmed at the extraordinary strength of the positions occupied by the Celts; the Romans, having heard the result of the embassy to Carthage , and that Hannibal had crossed the Iber earlier than they expected, at the head of an army, voted to send Publius Cornelius Scipio with his legions into Iberia , and Tiberius Sempronius Longus into Libya . And while the Consuls were engaged in hastening on the enrolment of their legions and other military preparations, the people were active in bringing to completion the colonies which they had already voted to send into Gaul . They accordingly caused the fortification of these towns to be energetically pushed on, and ordered the colonists to be in residence within thirty days: six thousand having been assigned to each colony.⁶⁹ One of these colonies was on the south bank of the Padus , and was called Placentia ; the other on the north bank, called Cremona . But no sooner had these colonies been formed, than the Boian Gauls, who had long been lying in wait to throw off their loyalty to Rome , but had up to that time lacked an opportunity, encouraged by the news that reached them of Hannibal’s approach, revolted; thus abandoning the hostages which they had given at the end of the war described in my last book. The ill-feeling still remaining towards Rome enabled them to induce the Insubres to join in the revolt; and the united tribes swept over the territory recently allotted by the Romans, and following close upon the track of the flying colonists, laid siege to the Roman colony of Mutina , in which the fugitives had taken refuge. Among them were the triumviri or three commissioners who had been sent out to allot the lands; of whom one—Gaius Lutatius—was an ex-consul, the other two ex-praetors.⁷⁰ These men having demanded a parley with the enemy, the Boii consented: but treacherously seized them upon their leaving the town, hoping by their means to recover their own hostages. The praetor Lucius Manlius was on guard in the district with an army; and as soon as he heard what had happened, he advanced with all speed to the relief of Mutina . But the Boii, having got intelligence of his approach, prepared an ambuscade; and as soon as his army had entered a certain wood, they rushed out upon it from every side and killed a large number of his men. The survivors at first fled with precipitation: but having gained some higher ground, they rallied sufficiently to enable them with much difficulty to effect an honourable retreat. Even so, the Boii followed close upon their heels, and besieged them in a place called the village of Tannes.⁷¹ When the news arrived at Rome , that the fourth legion was surrounded and closely besieged by the Boii, the people in all haste despatched the legions which had been voted to the Consul Publius, to their relief, under the command of a Praetor; and ordered the Consul to enrol two more legions for himself from the allies.

The Consuls Set Out to Iberia and Libya

Such was the state of Celtic affairs from the beginning to the arrival of Hannibal; thus completing the course of events which I have already had occasion to describe.

Meanwhile the Consuls, having completed the necessary⁷² preparations for their respective missions, set sail at the beginning of summer—Publius to Iberia , with sixty ships, and Tiberius Sempronius to Libya , with a hundred and sixty quinqueremes. The latter thought by means of this great fleet to strike terror into the enemy; and made vast preparations at Lilybaeum , collecting fresh troops wherever he could get them, as though with the view of at once blockading Carthage itself.

Publius Cornelius coasted along Liguria , and crossing in⁷³ five days from Pisae to Marseilles , dropped anchor at the most eastern mouth of the Rhone , called the Mouth of Marseilles ,⁷⁴ and began disembarking his troops. For though he heard that Hannibal was already crossing the Pyrenees , he felt sure that he was still a long way off, owing to the difficulty of his line of country, and the number of the intervening Celtic tribes. But long before he was expected, Hannibal had arrived at the crossing of the Rhone , keeping the Sardinian Sea on his right as he marched, and having made his way through the Celts partly by bribes and partly by force. Being informed that the enemy were at hand, Publius was at first incredulous of the fact, because of the rapidity of the advance; but wishing to know the exact state of the case,—while staying behind himself to refresh his troops after their voyage, and to consult with the Tribunes as to the best ground on which to give the enemy battle,—he sent out a reconnoitring party, consisting of three hundred of his bravest horse; joining with them as guides and supports some Celts, who chanced to be serving as mercenaries at the time in Marseilles .

The Passage of the Rhone

Meanwhile Hannibal had reached the river and was ⁷⁵ trying to get across it where the stream was single, at a distance of four days’ march from the sea. He did all he could to make the natives living by the river friendly to him, and purchased from them all their canoes of hollow trunks, and wherries, of which there were a large number, owing to the extensive sea traffic of the inhabitants of the Rhone valley. He got from them also the timber suited to the construction of these canoes; and so in two days had an innumerable supply of transports, every soldier seeking to be independent of his neighbour, and to have the means of crossing in his own hands. But now a large multitude of barbarians collected on the other side of the stream to hinder the passage of the Carthaginians. When Hannibal saw them, he came to the conclusion that it would be impossible either to force a passage in the face of so large a body of the enemy, or to remain where he was, for fear of being attacked on all sides at once: and he accordingly, on the third night, sent forward a detachment of his army with native guides, under the command of Hanno, the son of the Suffete⁷⁶ Bomilcar. ⁷⁷ This force marched up stream along the bank for two hundred stades, until they arrived at a certain spot where the stream is divided by an eyot, and there halted. They found enough wood close at hand to enable them, by nailing or tying it together, to construct within a short time a large number of rafts good enough for temporary use; and on these they crossed in safety, without any one trying to stop them. Then, seizing upon a strong position, they kept quiet for the rest of the day: partly to refresh themselves after their fatigues, and at the same time to complete their preparations for the service awaiting them, as they had been ordered to do. Hannibal was preparing to proceed much in the same way with the forces left behind with himself; but his chief difficulty was in getting the elephants across, of which he had thirty-seven.

Hannibal’s Troops Begin to Cross

When the fifth night came, however, the division ⁷⁸ which had crossed first started before daybreak to march down the opposite bank of the river and attack the barbarians; while Hannibal, having his men in readiness, began to attempt the passage of the river. He had filled the wherries with the heavy-armed cavalry, and the canoes with the most active of his foot; and he now arranged that the wherries should cross higher up the stream, and the canoes below them, that the violence of the current might be broken by the former, and the canoes cross more safely. The plan for the horses was that they should swim at the stern of the wherries, one man on each side of the stern guiding three or four with leading reins: so that a considerable number of horses were brought over at once with the first detachment. When they saw what the enemy meant to do, the barbarians, without forming their ranks, poured out of their entrenchments in scattered groups, feeling no doubt of being able to stop the crossing of the Carthaginians with ease. As soon as Hannibal saw by the smoke, which was the signal agreed upon, that the advanced detachment on the other side was approaching, he ordered all to go on board, and the men in charge of the transports to push out against the stream. This was promptly done: and then began a most anxious and exciting scene. Cheer after cheer rose from the men who were working the boats, as they struggled to outstrip each other, and exerted themselves to the utmost to overcome the force of the current. On the edge of either bank stood the two armies: the one sharing in the struggles of their comrades by sympathy, and shouting encouragement to them as they went; while the barbarians in front of them yelled their war-cries and challenged them to battle. While this was going on the barbarians had abandoned their tents, which the Carthaginians on that side of the river suddenly and unexpectedly seized. Some of them proceeded to set fire to the camp, while the greater number went to attack the men who were standing ready to resist the passage. Surprised by this unlooked for event, some of the barbarians rushed off to save their tents, while others prepared to resist the attack of the enemy, and were now actually engaged. Seeing that everything was going as he had intended, Hannibal at once formed the first division as it disembarked: and after addressing some encouraging words to it, closed with the barbarians, who, having no time to form their ranks, and being taken by surprise, were quickly repulsed and put to flight.

Hannibal Addresses His Men

Being thus master of the passage of the river, and ⁷⁹ victorious over those who opposed him, the first care of the Carthaginian leader was to bring his whole army across. This being expeditiously accomplished, he pitched his camp for that night by the river-side, and on the morrow, when he was told that the Roman fleet was anchored off the mouths of the river, he detached five hundred Numidian horsemen to reconnoitre the enemy and find out their position, their numbers, and what they were going to do; and at the same time selected suitable men to manage the passage of the elephants. These arrangements made, he summoned a meeting of his army and introduced Magilus and the other chiefs who had come to him from the valley of the Padus , and caused them to declare to the whole army, by means of an interpreter, the resolutions passed by their tribes. ⁸⁰ The points which were the strongest encouragement to the army were, first, the actual appearance of envoys inviting them to come, and promising to take part in the war with Rome ; secondly, the confidence inspired by their promise of guiding them by a route where they would be abundantly supplied with necessaries, and which would lead them with speed and safety into Italy ; and lastly, the fertility and vast extent of the country to which they were going, and the friendly feelings of the men with whose assistance they were about to fight the armies of Rome .

Such was the substance of the speeches of the Celts. When they had withdrawn, Hannibal himself rose, and after reminding the soldiers of what they had already achieved, and pointing out that, though they had under his counsel and advice engaged in many perilous and dangerous enterprises, they had never failed in one, he bade them not lose courage now that the most serious part of their undertaking was accomplished. The Rhone was crossed: they had seen with their own eyes the display of goodwill and zeal of their allies. Let this convince them that they should leave the rest to him with confidence; and while obeying his orders show themselves men of courage and worthy of their former deeds. These words being received with shouts of approval, and other manifestations of great enthusiasm, on the part of the soldiers, Hannibal dismissed the assembly with words of praise to the men and a prayer to the gods on their behalf; after giving out an order that they should refresh themselves, and make all their preparations with despatch, as the advance must begin on the morrow.

Skirmish between Reconnoitring Parties

When the assembly had been dismissed, the reconnoitring party of Numidians returned in headlong flight, after losing more than half their numbers. Not far from the camp they had fallen in with a party of Roman horse, who had been sent out by Publius on the same errand; and an engagement took place with such fury on either side, that the Romans and Celts lost a hundred and forty men, and the Numidians more than two hundred. After this skirmish, the Romans pursued them up to the Carthaginian entrenchments: and having surveyed it, they hastened back to announce to the Consul the presence of the enemy. As soon as they arrived at the Roman camp with this intelligence, Publius put his baggage on board ship, and marched his men up the bank of the river, with the earnest desire of forcing the enemy to give him battle.

But at sunrise on the day after the assembly, Hannibal having stationed his whole cavalry on the rear, in the direction of the sea, so as to cover the advance, ordered his infantry to leave the entrenchment and begin their march; while he himself waited behind for the elephants, and the men who had not yet crossed the river.

The Crossing of the Elephants

The mode of getting the elephants across was as ⁸¹ follows. They made a number of rafts strongly compacted, which they lashed firmly two and two together, so as to form combined a breadth of about fifty feet, and brought them close under the bank at the place of crossing. To the outer edge of these they lashed some others and made them join exactly; so that the whole raft thus constructed stretched out some way into the channel, while the edges towards the stream were made fast to the land with ropes tied to trees which grew along the brink, to secure the raft keeping its place and not drifting down the river. These combined rafts stretching about two hundred feet across the stream, they joined two other very large ones to the outer edges, fastened very firmly together, but connected with the others by ropes which admitted of being easily cut. To these they fastened several towing lines, that the wherries might prevent the rafts drifting down stream, and might drag them forcibly against the current and so get the elephants across on them. Then they threw a great deal of earth upon all the rafts, until they had raised the surface to the level of the bank, and made it look like the path on the land leading down to the passage. The elephants were accustomed to obey their Indian riders until they came to water, but could never be induced to step into water: they therefore led them upon this earth, putting two females in front whom the others obediently followed. When they had set foot on the rafts that were farthest out in the stream, the ropes were cut which fastened these to the other rafts, the towing lines were pulled taut by the wherries, and the elephants, with the rafts on which they stood, were quickly towed away from the mound of earth. When this happened, the animals were terror-stricken; and at first turned round and round, and rushed first to one part of the raft and then to another, but finding themselves completely surrounded by the water, they were too frightened to do anything, and were obliged to stay where they were. And it was by repeating this contrivance of joining a pair of rafts to the others, that eventually the greater part of the elephants were got across. Some of them, however, in the middle of the crossing, threw themselves in their terror into the river: but though their Indian riders were drowned, the animals themselves got safe to land, saved by the strength and great length of their probosces; for by raising these above the water, they were enabled to breathe through them, and blow out any water that got into them, while for the most part they got through the river on their feet.

Previous Histories of this March either False or Inconsistent

The elephants having been thus got across, Hannibal formed them and the cavalry into a rearguard, and marched up the river bank away from the sea in an easterly direction, as though making for the central district of Europe .

The Rhone rises to the north-west of the Adriatic Gulf on the northern slopes of the Alps ,⁸² and flowing westward, eventually discharges itself into the Sardinian Sea. It flows for the most part through a deep valley, to the north of which lives the Celtic tribe of the Ardyes; while its southern side is entirely walled in by the northern slopes of the Alps , the ridges of which, beginning at Marseilles and extending to the head of the Adriatic, separate it from the valley of the Padus , of which I have already had occasion to speak at length. It was these mountains that Hannibal now crossed from the Rhone valley into Italy .

Some historians of this passage of the Alps , in their desire to produce a striking effect by their descriptions of the wonders of this country, have fallen into two errors which are more alien than anything else to the spirit of history,—perversion of fact and inconsistency. Introducing Hannibal as a prodigy of strategic skill and boldness, they yet represent him as acting with the most conspicuous indiscretion; and then, finding themselves involved in an inextricable maze of falsehood, they try to cut the knot by the introduction of gods and heroes into what is meant to be genuine history. They begin by saying that the Alps are so precipitous and inaccessible that, so far from horses and troops, accompanied too by elephants, being able to cross them, it would be very difficult for even active men on foot to do so: and similarly they tell us that the desolation of this district is so complete, that, had not some god or hero met Hannibal’s forces and showed them the way, they would have been hopelessly lost and perished to a man.

Such stories involve both the errors I have mentioned,— they are both false and inconsistent.

Absurd Premises of Other Historians

For could a more irrational proceeding on the part of a general be imagined than that of Hannibal, if, when in command of so numerous an army, on whom the success of his expedition entirely depended, he allowed himself to remain in ignorance of the roads, the lie of the country, the route to be taken, and the people to which it led, and above all as to the practicability of what he was undertaking to do? They, in fact, represent Hannibal, when at the height of his expectation of success, doing what those would hardly do who have utterly failed and have been reduced to despair,—that is, to entrust themselves and their forces to an unknown country. And so, too, what they say about the desolation of the district, and its precipitous and inaccessible character, only serves to bring their untrustworthiness into clearer light. For first, they pass over the fact that the Celts of the Rhone valley had on several occasions before Hannibal came, and that in very recent times, crossed the Alps with large forces, and fought battles with the Romans in alliance with the Celts of the valley of the Padus , as I have already stated. And secondly, they are unaware of the fact that a very numerous tribe of people inhabit the Alps . Accordingly in their ignorance of these facts they take refuge in the assertion that a hero showed Hannibal the way. They are, in fact, in the same case as tragedians, who, beginning with an improbable and impossible plot, are obliged to bring in a deus ex machina to solve the difficulty and end the play. The absurd premises of these historians naturally require some such supernatural agency to help them out of the difficulty: an absurd beginning could only have an absurd ending. For of course Hannibal did not act as these writers say he did; but, on the contrary, conducted his plans with the utmost prudence. He had thoroughly informed himself of the fertility of the country into which he designed to descend, and of the hostile feelings of its inhabitants towards Rome ; and for his journey through the difficult district which intervened he employed native guides and pioneers, whose interests were bound up with his own. I speak with confidence on these points, because I have questioned persons actually engaged on the facts; and have inspected the country, and gone over the Alpine pass myself, in order to inform myself of the truth and see with my own eyes.

Scipio Is Too Late To Stop Hannibal

Three days after Hannibal had resumed his march, the ⁸³ Consul Publius arrived at the passage of the river. He was in the highest degree astonished to find the enemy gone: for he had persuaded himself that they would never venture to take this route into Italy , on account of the numbers and fickleness of the barbarians who inhabited the country. But seeing that they had done so, he hurried back to his ships and at once embarked his forces. He then despatched his brother Gnaeus to conduct the campaign in Iberia , while he himself turned back again to Italy by sea, being anxious to anticipate the enemy by marching through Etruria to the foot of the pass of the Alps .

Meanwhile, after four days’ march from the passage of the⁸⁴ Rhone , Hannibal arrived at the place called the Island, a district thickly inhabited and exceedingly productive of corn. Its name is derived from its natural features: for the Rhone and Isara flowing on either side of it make the apex of a triangle where they meet, very nearly of the same size and shape as the delta of the Nile , except that the base of the latter is formed by the sea into which its various streams are discharged, while in the case of the former this base is formed by mountains difficult to approach or climb, and, so to speak, almost inaccessible. When Hannibal arrived in this district he found two brothers engaged in a dispute for the royal power, and confronting each other with their armies. The elder sought his alliance and invited his assistance in gaining the crown: and the advantage which such a circumstance might prove to him at that juncture of his affairs being manifest, he consented; and having joined him in his attack upon his brother, and aided in expelling him, he obtained valuable support from the victorious chieftain. For this prince not only liberally supplied his army with provisions, but exchanged all their old and damaged weapons for new ones, and thus at a very opportune time thoroughly restored the efficiency of the troops: he also gave most of the men new clothes and boots, which proved of great advantage during their passage of the mountains. But his most essential service was that, the Carthaginians being greatly alarmed at the prospect of marching through the territory of the Allobroges, he acted with his army as their rearguard, and secured them a safe passage as far as the foot of the pass.

Hannibal Harassed By the Natives

Having in ten days’ march accomplished a distance ⁸⁵ of eight hundred stades along the river bank, Hannibal began the ascent of the Alps ,⁸⁶ and immediately found himself involved in the most serious dangers. For as long as the Carthaginians were on the plains, the various chiefs of the Allobroges refrained from attacking them from fear of their cavalry, as well as of the Gauls who were escorting them. But when these last departed back again to their own lands, and Hannibal began to enter the mountainous region, the chiefs of the Allobroges collected large numbers of their tribe and occupied the points of vantage in advance, on the route by which Hannibal’s troops were constrained to make their ascent. If they had only kept their design secret, the Carthaginian army would have been entirely destroyed: as it was, their plans became known, and though they did much damage to Hannibal’s army, they suffered as much themselves. For when that general learnt that the natives were occupying the points of vantage, he halted and pitched his camp at the foot of the pass, and sent forward some of his Gallic guides to reconnoitre the enemy and discover their plan of operations. The order was obeyed: and he ascertained that it was the enemy’s practice to keep under arms, and guard these posts carefully, during the day, but at night to retire to some town in the neighbourhood. Hannibal accordingly adapted his measures to this strategy of the enemy. He marched forward in broad daylight, and as soon as he came to the mountainous part of the road, pitched his camp only a little way from the enemy. At nightfall he gave orders for the watch-fires to be lit; and leaving the main body of his troops in the camp, and selecting the most suitable of his men, he had them armed lightly, and led them through the narrow parts of the road during the night, and seized on the spots which had been previously occupied by the enemy: they having, according to their regular custom, abandoned them for the nearest town.

The Gauls Attack the Baggage Train

When day broke the natives saw what had taken place, ⁸⁷ and at first desisted from their attempts; but presently the sight of the immense string of beasts of burden, and of the cavalry, slowly and painfully making the ascent, tempted them to attack the advancing line. Accordingly they fell upon it at many points at once; and the Carthaginians sustained severe losses, not so much at the hands of the enemy, as from the dangerous nature of the ground, which proved especially fatal to the horses and beasts of burden. For as the ascent was not only narrow and rough, but flanked also with precipices, at every movement which tended to throw the line into disorder, large numbers of the beasts of burden were hurled down the precipices with their loads on their backs. And what added more than anything else to this sort of confusion were the wounded horses; for, maddened by their wounds, they either turned round and ran into the advancing beasts of burden, or, rushing furiously forward, dashed aside everything that came in their way on the narrow path, and so threw the whole line into disorder. Hannibal saw what was taking place, and knowing that, even if they escaped this attack, they could never survive the loss of all their baggage, he took with him the men who had seized the strongholds during the night and went to the relief of the advancing line. Having the advantage of charging the enemy from the higher ground he inflicted a severe loss upon them, but suffered also as severe a one in his own army; for the commotion in the line now grew worse, and in both directions at once—thanks to the shouting and struggling of these combatants: and it was not until he had killed the greater number of the Allobroges, and forced the rest to fly to their own land, that the remainder of the beasts of burden and the horses got slowly, and with difficulty, over the dangerous ground. Hannibal himself rallied as many as he could after the fight, and assaulted the town from which the enemy had sallied; and finding it almost deserted, because its inhabitants had been all tempted out by the hope of booty, he got possession of it: from which he obtained many advantages for the future as well as for the present. The immediate gain consisted of a large number of horses and beasts of burden, and men taken with them; and for future use he got a supply of corn and cattle sufficient for two or three days: but the most important result of all was the terror inspired in the next tribes, which prevented any one of those who lived near the ascent from lightly venturing to meddle with him again.

Treachery of the Gauls

Here he pitched a camp and remained a day, and started again. For the next three days he accomplished a certain amount of his journey without accident. But on the fourth he again found himself in serious danger. For the dwellers along his route, having concerted a plan of treachery, met him with branches and garlands, which among nearly all the natives are signs of friendship, as the herald’s staff is among the Greeks. Hannibal was cautious about accepting such assurances, and took great pains to discover what their real intention and purpose were. The Gauls however professed to be fully aware of the capture of the town, and the destruction of those who had attempted to do him wrong; and explained that those events had induced them to come, because they wished neither to inflict nor receive any damage; and finally promised to give him hostages. For a long while Hannibal hesitated and refused to trust their speeches. But at length coming to the conclusion that, if he accepted what was offered, he would perhaps render the men before him less mischievous and implacable; but that, if he rejected them, he must expect undisguised hostility from them, he acceded to their request, and feigned to accept their offer of friendship. The barbarians handed over the hostages, supplied him liberally with cattle, and in fact put themselves unreservedly into his hands; so that for a time Hannibal’s suspicions were allayed, and he employed them as guides for the next difficulty that had to be passed. They guided the army for two days: and then these tribes collected their numbers, and keeping close up with the a certain difficult and precipitous gorge.

The White Rock

Hannibal’s army would now have certainly been utterly ⁸⁸ destroyed, had it not been for the fact that his fears were still on the alert, and that, having a prescience of what was to come, he had placed his baggage and cavalry in the van and his hoplites in the rear. These latter covered his line, and were able to stem the attack of the enemy, and accordingly the disaster was less than it would otherwise have been. As it was, however, a large number of beasts of burden and horses perished; for the advantage of the higher ground being with the enemy, the Gauls moved along the slopes parallel with the army below, and by rolling down boulders, or throwing stones, reduced the troops to a state of the utmost confusion and danger; so that Hannibal with half his force was obliged to pass the night near a certain white rock,⁸⁹ which afforded them protection, separated from his horses and baggage which he was covering; until after a whole night’s struggle they slowly and with difficulty emerged from the gorge.

Next morning the enemy had disappeared: and Hannibal, having effected a junction with his cavalry and baggage, led his men towards the head of the pass, without falling in again with any important muster of the natives, though he was harassed by some of them from time to time; who seized favourable opportunities, now on his van and now on his rear, of carrying off some of his baggage. ⁹⁰ His best protection was his elephants; on whatever parts of the line they were placed the enemy never ventured to approach, being terrified at the unwonted appearance of the animals. The ninth day’s march brought him to the head of the pass: and there he encamped for two days, partly to rest his men and partly to allow stragglers to come up. Whilst they were there, many of the horses who had taken fright and run away, and many of the beasts of burden that had got rid of their loads, unexpectedly appeared: they had followed the tracks of the army and now joined the camp.

The Descent Into Italy

But by this time, it being nearly the period of the setting of the Pleiads,⁹¹ the snow was beginning to be thick on the heights; and seeing his men in low spirits, owing both to the fatigue they had gone through, and that which still lay before them, Hannibal called them together and tried to cheer them by dwelling on the one possible topic of consolation in his power, namely the view of Italy: which lay stretched out in both directions below those mountains, giving the Alps the appearance of a citadel to the whole of Italy . By pointing therefore to the plains of the Padus , and reminding them of the friendly welcome which awaited them from the Gauls who lived there, and at the same time indicating the direction of Rome itself, he did somewhat to raise the drooping spirits of his men.

Next day he began the descent, in which he no longer⁹² met with any enemies, except some few secret pillagers; but from the dangerous ground and the snow he lost almost as many men as on the ascent. For the path down was narrow and precipitous, and the snow made it impossible for the men to see where they were treading, while to step aside from the path, or to stumble, meant being hurled down the precipices. The troops however bore up against the fatigue, having now grown accustomed to such hardships; but when they came to a place where the path was too narrow for the elephants or beasts of burden to pass,—and which, narrowed before by landslips extending about a stade and a half, had recently been made more so by another landslip,—then once more despondency and consternation fell upon the troops. Hannibal’s first idea was to avoid this mauvais pas by a detour, but this route too being made impossible by a snow-storm, he abandoned the idea.

Snow

The effect of the storm was peculiar and extraordinary. For the present fall of snow coming ⁹³ upon the top of that which was there before, and had remained from the last winter, it was found that the former, being fresh, was soft and offered no resistance to the foot; but when the feet reached the lower frozen snow, they could no longer make any impression upon it, but the men found both their feet slipping from under them, as though they were on hard ground with a layer of mud on the top. And a still more serious difficulty followed: for not being able to get a foothold on the lower snow, when they fell and tried to get themselves up by their hands and knees, the men found themselves plunging downwards quicker and quicker, along with everything they laid hold of, the ground being a very steep decline. The beasts, however, when they fell did break through this lower snow as they struggled to rise, and having done so were obliged to remain there with their loads, as though they were frozen to it, both from the weight of these loads and the hardness of the old snow. Giving up, therefore, all hope of making this detour, he encamped upon the ridge after clearing away the snow upon it. He then set large parties of his men to work, and, with infinite toil, began constructing a road on the face of the precipice. One day’s work sufficed to make a path practicable for beasts of burden and horses; and he accordingly took them across at once, and having pitched his camp at a spot below the snow line, he let them go in search of pasture; while he told off the Numidians in detachments to proceed with the making of the road; and after three days’ difficult and painful labour he got his elephants across, though in a miserable condition from hunger. For the tops of the Alps , and the parts immediately below them, are completely treeless and bare of vegetation, because the snow lies there summer and winter; but about half-way down the slopes on both sides they produce trees and shrubs, and are, in fact, fit for human habitation.

Hannibal Reaches the Plains

So Hannibal mustered his forces and continued the descent; and on the third day after passing the precipitous path just described he reached the plains. From the beginning of his march he had lost many men by the hands of the enemy, and in crossing rivers, and many more on the precipices and dangerous passes of the Alps ; and not only men in this last way, but horses and beasts of burden in still greater numbers. The whole march from New Carthage had occupied five months, the actual passage of the Alps fifteen days; and he now boldly entered the valley of the Padus , and the territory of the Insubres, with such of his army as survived, consisting of twelve thousand Libyans and eight thousand Iberians, and not more than six thousand cavalry in all, as he himself distinctly states on the column erected on the promontory of Lacinium to record the numbers.

At the same time, as I have before stated, Publius having left his legions under the command of his brother Gnaeus, with orders to prosecute the Iberian campaign and offer an energetic resistance to Hasdrubal, landed at Pisae with a small body of men. Thence he marched through Etruria, and taking over the army of the Praetors which was guarding the country against the Boii, he arrived in the valley of the Padus; and, pitching his camp there, waited for the enemy with an eager desire to give him battle.

The Limits of History

Having thus brought the generals of the two nations ⁹⁴ and the war itself into Italy , before beginning the campaign, I wish to say a few words about what I conceive to be germane or not to my history.

I can conceive some readers complaining that, while devoting a great deal of space to Libya and Iberia , I have said little or nothing about the strait of the Pillars of Hercules, the Mare Externum, or the British Isles , and the manufacture of tin in them, or even of the silver and gold mines in Iberia itself, of which historians give long and contradictory accounts. It was not, let me say, because I thought these subjects out of place in history that I passed them over; but because, in the first place, I did not wish to be diffuse, or distract the attention of students from the main current of my narrative; and, in the next place, because I was determined not to treat of them in scattered notices or casual allusions, but to assign them a distinct time and place, and at these, to the best of my ability, to give a trustworthy account of them. On the same principle I must deprecate any feeling of surprise if, in the succeeding portions of my history, I pass over other similar topics, which might seem naturally in place, for the same reasons. Those who ask for dissertations in history on every possible subject, are somewhat like greedy guests at a banquet, who, by tasting every dish on the table, fail to really enjoy any one of them at the time, or to digest and feel any benefit from them afterwards. Such omnivorous readers get no real pleasure in the present, and no adequate instruction for the future.

Necessity of Refuting Past Errors

There can be no clearer proof, than is afforded by these particular instances, that this department of historical writing stands above all others in need of study and correction. For as all, or at least the greater number of writers, have endeavoured to describe the peculiar features and positions of the countries on the confines of the known world, and in doing so have, in most cases, made egregious mistakes, it is impossible to pass over their errors without some attempt at refutation; and that not in scattered observations or casual remarks, but deliberately and formally. But such confutation should not take the form of accusation or invective. While correcting their mistakes we should praise the writers, feeling sure that, had they lived to the present age, they would have altered and corrected many of their statements. The fact is that, in past ages, we know of very few Greeks who undertook to investigate these remote regions, owing to the insuperable difficulties of the attempt. The dangers at sea were then more than can easily be calculated, and those on land more numerous still. And even if one did reach these countries on the confines of the world, whether compulsorily or voluntarily, the difficulties in the way of a personal inspection were only begun: for some of the regions were utterly barbarous, others uninhabited; and a still greater obstacle in way of gaining information as to what he saw was his ignorance of the language of the country. And even if he learnt this, a still greater difficulty was to preserve a strict moderation in his account of what he had seen, and despising all attempts to glorify himself by traveller’s tales of wonder, to report for our benefit the truth and nothing but the truth.

Recent Advances in Geography

All these impediments made a true account of these regions in past times difficult, if not impossible. Nor ought we to criticise severely the omissions or mistakes of these writers: rather they deserve our praise and admiration for having in such an age gained information as to these places, which distinctly advanced knowledge. In our own age, however, the Asiatic districts have been opened up both by sea and land owing to the empire of Alexander, and the other places owing to the supremacy of Rome . Men too of practical experience in affairs, being released from the cares of martial or political ambition, have thereby had excellent opportunities for research and inquiry into these localities; and therefore it will be but right for us to have a better and truer knowledge of what was formerly unknown. And this I shall endeavour to establish, when I find a fitting opportunity in the course of my history. I shall be especially anxious to give the curious a full knowledge on these points, because it was with that express object that I confronted the dangers and fatigues of my travels in Libya , Iberia , and Gaul , as well as of the sea which washes the western coasts of these countries; that I might correct the imperfect knowledge of former writers, and make the Greeks acquainted with these parts of the known world.

After this digression, I must go back to the pitched battles between the Romans and Carthaginians in Italy .

Hannibal Attacks the Taurini

After arriving in Italy with the number of troops ⁹⁵ which I have already stated, Hannibal pitched his camp at the very foot of the Alps , and was occupied, to begin with, in refreshing his men. For not only had his whole army suffered terribly from the difficulties of transit in the ascent, and still more in the descent of the Alps , but it was also in evil case from the shortness of provisions, and the inevitable neglect of all proper attention to physical necessities. Many had quite abandoned all care for their health under the influence of starvation and continuous fatigue; for it had proved impossible to carry a full supply of food for so many thousands over such mountains, and what they did bring was in great part lost along with the beasts that carried it. So that whereas, when Hannibal crossed the Rhone, he had thirty-eight thousand infantry, and more than eight thousand cavalry, he lost nearly half in the pass, as I have shown above; while the survivors had by these long continued sufferings become almost savage in look and general appearance. Hannibal therefore bent his whole energies to the restoration of the spirits and bodies of his men, and of their horses also.⁹⁶ When his army had thus sufficiently recovered, finding the Taurini, who live immediately under the Alps , at war with the Insubres and inclined to be suspicious of the Carthaginians, Hannibal first invited them to terms of friendship and alliance; and, on their refusal, invested their chief city and carried it after a three days’ siege. Having put to the sword all who had opposed him, he struck such terror into the minds of the neighbouring tribes, that they all gave in their submission out of hand. The other Celts inhabiting these plains were also eager to join the Carthaginians, according to their original purpose; but the Roman legions had by this time advanced too far, and had intercepted the greater part of them: they were therefore unable to stir, and in some cases were even obliged to serve in the Roman ranks. This determined Hannibal not to delay his advance any longer, but to strike some blow which might encourage those natives who were desirous of sharing his enterprise.

Approach of Scipio

When he heard, while engaged on this design, that Publius had already crossed the Padus with his army, and was at no great distance, he was at first inclined to disbelieve the fact, reflecting that it was not many days since he had left him near the passage of the Rhone , and that the voyage from Marseilles to Etruria was a long and difficult one. He was told, moreover, that from the Tyrrhenian Sea to the Alps through Italian soil was a long march, without good military roads. But when messenger after messenger confirmed the intelligence with increased positiveness, he was filled with amazement and admiration at the Consul’s plan of campaign, and promptness in carrying it out. The feelings of Publius were much the same: for he had not expected that Hannibal would even attempt the passage of the Alps with forces of different races, or, if he did attempt it, that he could escape utter destruction. Entertaining such ideas he was immensely astonished at his courage and adventurous daring, when he heard that he had not only got safe across, but was actually besieging certain towns in Italy . Similar feelings were entertained at Rome when the news arrived there. For scarcely had the last rumour about the taking of Saguntum by the Carthaginians ceased to attract attention, and scarcely had the measures adopted in view of that event been taken,—namely the despatch of one Consul to Libya to besiege Carthage , and of the other to Iberia to meet Hannibal there,— than news came that Hannibal had arrived in Italy with his army, and was already besieging certain towns in it. ⁹⁷ Thrown into great alarm by this unexpected turn of affairs, the Roman government sent at once to Tiberius at Lilybaeum , telling him of the presence of the enemy in Italy , and ordering him to abandon the original design of his expedition, and to make all haste home to reinforce the defences of the country. Tiberius at once⁹⁸ collected the men of the fleet and sent them off, with orders to go home by sea; while he caused the Tribunes to administer an oath to the men of the legions that they would all appear at a fixed day at Ariminum by bedtime. Ariminum is a town on the Adriatic, situated at the southern boundary of the valley of the Padus . In every direction there was stir and excitement: and the news being a complete surprise to everybody, there was everywhere a great and irrepressible anxiety as to the future.

Gallic Prisoners

The two armies being now within a short distance of each other, Hannibal and Publius both thought it necessary to address their men in terms suitable to the occasion.

The manner in which Hannibal tried to encourage his army was this. He mustered the men, and caused some youthful prisoners whom he had caught when they were attempting to hinder his march on the Alpine passes, to be brought forward. They had been subjected to great severities with this very object, loaded with heavy chains, half-starved, and their bodies a mass of bruises from scourging. Hannibal caused these men to be placed in the middle of the army, and some suits of Gallic armour, such as are worn by their kings when they fight in single combat, to be exhibited; in addition to these he placed there some horses, and brought in some valuable military cloaks. He then asked these young prisoners, which of them were willing to fight with each other on condition of the conqueror taking these prizes, and the vanquished escaping all his present miseries by death. Upon their all answering with a loud shout that they were desirous of fighting in these single combats, he bade them draw lots; and the pair, on whom the first lot fell, to put on the armour and fight with each other. As soon as the young men heard these orders, they lifted up their hands, and each prayed the gods that he might be one of those to draw the lot. And when the lots were drawn, those on whom they fell were overjoyed, and the others in despair. When the fight was finished, too, the surviving captives congratulated the one who had fallen no less than the victor, as having been freed from many terrible sufferings, while they themselves still remained to endure them. And in this feeling the Carthaginian soldiers were much disposed to join, all pitying the survivors and congratulating the fallen champion.

Harangues of Hannibal and Scipio

Having by this example made the impression he desired upon the minds of his troops, Hannibal ⁹⁹ then came forward himself and said, that he had exhibited these captives in order that they might see in the person of others a vivid representation of what they had to expect themselves, and might so lay their plans all the better in view of the actual state of affairs. Fortune had summoned them to a life and death contest very like that of the two captives, and in which the prize of victory was the same. For they must either conquer, or die, or fall alive into the hands of their enemies; and the prize of victory would not be mere horses and military cloaks, but the most enviable position in the world if they became masters of the wealth of Rome : or if they fell in battle their reward would be to end their life fighting to their last breath for the noblest object, in the heat of the struggle, and with no sense of pain; while if they were beaten, or from desire of life were base enough to fly, or tried to prolong that life by any means except victory, every sort of misery and misfortune would be their lot: for it was impossible that any one of them could be so irrational or senseless, when he remembered the length of the journey he had performed from his native land, and the number of enemies that lay between him and it, and the size of the rivers he had crossed, as to cherish the hope of being able to reach his home by flight. They should therefore cast away such vain hopes, and regard their position as being exactly that of the combatants whom they had but now been watching. For, as in their case, all congratulated the dead as much as the victor, and commiserated the survivors; so they should think of the alternatives before themselves, and should, one and all, come upon the field of battle resolved, if possible, to conquer, and, if not, to die. Life with defeat was a hope that must by no means whatever be entertained. If they reasoned and resolved thus, victory and safety would certainly attend them: for it never happened that men who came to such a resolution, whether of deliberate purpose or from being driven to bay, were disappointed in their hope of beating their opponents in the field. And when it chanced, as was the case with the Romans, that the enemy had in most cases a hope of quite an opposite character, from the near neighbourhood of their native country making flight an obvious means of safety, then it was clear that the courage which came of despair would carry the day.

When he saw that the example and the words he had spoken had gone home to the minds of the rank and file, and that the spirit and enthusiasm which he aimed at inspiring were created, he dismissed them for the present with commendations, and gave orders for an advance at daybreak on the next morning.

Scipio Crosses the Ticinus

About the same day Publius Scipio, having now crossed the Padus , and being resolved to make a farther advance across the Ticinus , ordered those who were skilled in such works to construct a bridge across this latter river; and then summoned a meeting of the remainder of his army and addressed them: dwelling principally on the reputation of their country and of the ancestors’ achievements. But he referred particularly to their present position, saying, that they ought to entertain no doubt of victory, though they had never as yet had any experience of the enemy; and should regard it as a piece of extravagant presumption of the Carthaginians to venture to face Romans, by whom they had been so often beaten, and to whom they had for so many years paid tribute and been all but slaves. And when in addition to this they at present knew thus much of their mettle,—that they dared not face them, what was the fair inference to be drawn for the future? Their cavalry, in a chance encounter on the Rhone with those of Rome , had, so far from coming off well, lost a large number of men, and had fled with disgrace to their own camp; and the general and his army, as soon as they knew of the approach of his legions, had beat a retreat, which was exceedingly like a flight, and, contrary to their original purpose, had in their terror taken the road over the Alps . And it was evident that Hannibal had destroyed the greater part of his army; and that what he had left was feeble and unfit for service, from the hardships they had undergone: in the same way he had lost the majority of his horses, and made the rest useless from the length and difficult nature of the journey. They had, therefore, only to show themselves to the enemy. But, above all, he pointed out that his own presence at their head ought to be special encouragement to them: for that he would not have left his fleet and Spanish campaign, on which he had been sent, and have come to them in such haste, if he had not seen on consideration that his doing so was necessary for his country’s safety, and that a certain victory was secured to him by it.

The weight and influence of the speaker, as well as their belief in his words, roused great enthusiasm among the men; which Scipio acknowledged, and then dismissed them with the additional injunction that they should hold themselves in readiness to obey any order sent round to them.

Cavalry Engagement on the Ticinus

Next day both generals led their troops along the river ¹⁰⁰ Padus , on the bank nearest the Alps , the Romans having the stream on their left, the Carthaginians on their right; and having ascertained on the second day, by means of scouts, that they were near each other, they both halted and remained encamped for that day: but on the next, both taking their cavalry, and Publius his sharp-shooters also, they hurried across the plain to reconnoitre each other’s forces. As soon as they came within distance, and saw the dust rising from the side of their opponents, they drew up their lines for battle at once. Publius put his sharp-shooters and Gallic horsemen in front, and bringing the others into line, advanced at a slow pace. Hannibal placed his cavalry that rode with bridles, and was most to be depended on, in his front, and led them straight against the enemy; having put the Numidian cavalry on either wing to take the enemy on the flanks. The two generals and the cavalry were in such hot haste to engage, that they closed with each other before the sharp-shooters had an opportunity of discharging their javelins at all. Before they could do so, they left their ground, and retreated to the rear of their own cavalry, making their way between the squadrons, terrified at the approaching charge, and afraid of being trampled to death by the horses which were galloping down upon them. The cavalry charged each other front to front, and for a long time maintained an equal contest; and a great many men dismounting on the actual field, there was a mixed fight of horse and foot. The Numidian horse, however, having outflanked the Romans, charged them on the rear: and so the sharp-shooters, who had fled from the cavalry charge at the beginning, were now trampled to death by the numbers and furious onslaught of the Numidians; while the front ranks originally engaged with the Carthaginians, after losing many of their men and inflicting a still greater loss on the enemy, finding themselves charged on the rear by the Numidians, broke into flight: most of them scattering in every direction, while some of them kept closely massed round the Consul.

Scipio Crosses the Po

Publius then broke up his camp, and marched through the ¹⁰¹ plains to the bridge over the Padus , in haste to get his legions across before the enemy came up. He saw that the level country where he was then was favourable to the enemy with his superiority in cavalry. He was himself disabled by a wound;¹⁰² and he decided that it was necessary to shift his quarters to a place of safety.¹⁰³ For a time Hannibal imagined that Scipio would give him battle with his infantry also: but when he saw that he had abandoned his camp, he went in pursuit of him as far as the bridge over the Ticinus ; but finding that the greater part of the timbers of this bridge had been torn away, while the men who guarded the bridge were left still on his side of the river, he took them prisoners to the number of about six hundred; and being informed that the main army was far on its way, he wheeled round and again ascended the Padus in search of a spot in it which admitted of being easily bridged. After two days’ march he halted and constructed a bridge over the river by means of boats. He committed the task of bringing over the army to Hasdrubal;¹⁰⁴ while he himself crossed at once, and busied himself in receiving the ambassadors who arrived from the neighbouring districts. For no sooner had he gained the advantage in the cavalry engagement, than all the Celts in the vicinity hastened to fulfil their original engagement by avowing themselves his friends, supplying him with provisions, and joining the Carthaginian forces. After giving these men a cordial reception, and getting his own army across the Padus , he began to march back again down stream, with an earnest desire of giving the enemy battle. Publius, too, had crossed the river and was now encamped under the walls of the Roman colony Placentia . There he made no sign of any intention to move; for he was engaged in trying to heal his own wound and those of his men, and considered that he had a secure base of operations where he was. A two days’ march from the place where he had crossed the Padus brought Hannibal to the neighbourhood of the enemy; and on the third day he drew out his army for battle in full view of his opponents: but as no one came out to attack. he pitched his camp about fifty stades from them.

The Gauls Join Hannibal

But the Celtic contingent of the Roman army, seeing ¹⁰⁵ that Hannibal’s prospects looked the brighter of the two, concerted their plans for a fixed time, and waited in their several tents for the moment of carrying them out. When the men within the rampart of the camp had taken their supper and were gone to bed, the Celts let more than half the night pass, and just about the time of the morning watch armed themselves and fell upon the Romans who were quartered nearest to them; killed a considerable number, and wounded not a few; and, finally, cutting off the heads of the slain, departed with them to join the Carthaginians, to the number of two thousand infantry and nearly two hundred cavalry. They were received with great satisfaction by Hannibal; who, after addressing them encouragingly, and promising them all suitable rewards, sent them to their several cities, to declare to their compatriots what they had done, and to urge them to make alliance with him: for he knew that they would now all feel compelled to take part with him, when they learnt the treachery of which their fellow-countrymen had been guilty to the Romans. Just at the same time the Boii came in, and handed over to him the three Agrarian Commissioners, sent from Rome to divide the lands; whom, as I have already related, they had seized by a sudden act of treachery at the beginning of the war. Hannibal gratefully acknowledged their good intention, and made a formal alliance with those who came: but he handed them back their prisoners, bidding them keep them safe, in order to get back their own hostages from Rome , as they intended at first.

Publius regarded this treachery as of most serious importance; and feeling sure that the Celts in the¹⁰⁶ neighbourhood had long been ill-disposed, and would, after this event, all incline to the Carthaginians, he made up his mind that some precaution for the future was necessary. The next night, therefore, just before the morning watch, he broke up his camp and marched for the river Trebia, and the high ground near it, feeling confidence in the protection which the strength of the position and the neighbourhood of his allies would give him.

Tiberius Sempronius Joins Scipio

When Hannibal was informed of Scipio’s change of ¹⁰⁷ quarters, he sent the Numidian horse in pursuit at once, and the rest soon afterwards, following close behind with his main army. The Numidians, finding the Roman camp empty, stopped to set fire to it: which proved of great service to the Romans; for if they had pushed on and caught up the Roman baggage, a large number of the rear-guard would have certainly been killed by the cavalry in the open plains. But as it was, the greater part of them got across the River Trebia in time; while those who were after all too far in the rear to escape, were either killed or made prisoners by the Carthaginians.

Scipio, however, having crossed the Trebia occupied the¹⁰⁸ first high ground; and having strengthened his camp with trench and palisade, waited the arrival of his colleague, Tiberius Sempronius, and his army; and was taking the greatest pains to cure his wound, because he was exceedingly anxious to take part in the coming engagement. Hannibal pitched his camp about forty stades from him. While the numerous Celts inhabiting the plains, excited by the good prospects of the Carthaginians, supplied his army with provisions in great abundance, and were eager to take their share with Hannibal in every military operation or battle.

When news of the cavalry engagement reached Rome , the disappointment of their confident expectations caused a feeling of consternation in the minds of the people. Not but that plenty of pretexts were found to prove to their own satisfaction that the affair was not a defeat. Some laid the blame on the Consul’s rashness, and others on the treacherous lukewarmness of the Celts, which they concluded from their recent revolt must have been shown by them on the field. But. after all, as the infantry was still unimpaired, they made up their minds that the general result was still as hopeful as ever. Accordingly, when Tiberius and his legions arrived at Rome , and marched through the city, they believed that his mere appearance at the seat of war would settle the matter.

His men met Tiberius at Ariminum , according to their¹⁰⁹ oath, and he at once led them forward in all haste to join Publius Scipio. The junction effected, and a camp pitched by the side of his colleague, he was naturally obliged to refresh his men after their forty days’ continuous march between Ariminum and Lilybaeum : but he went on with all preparations for a battle; and was continually in conference with Scipio, asking questions as to what had happened in the past, and discussing with him the measures to be taken in the present.

A Skirmish Near the Trebia

Meanwhile Hannibal got possession of Clastidium , by ¹¹⁰ the treachery of a certain Brundisian, to whom it had been entrusted by the Romans. Having become master of the garrison and the stores of corn, he used the latter for his present needs; but took the men whom he had captured with him, without doing them any harm, being desirous of showing by an example the policy he meant to pursue; that those whose present position towards Rome was merely the result of circumstances should not be terrified, and give up hope of being spared by him. The man who betrayed Clastidium to him he treated with extraordinary honour, by way of tempting all men in similar situations of authority to share the prospects of the Carthaginians. But afterwards, finding that certain Celts who lived in the fork of the Padus and the Trebia, while pretending to have made terms with him, were sending messages to the Romans at the same time, believing that they would thus secure themselves from being harmed by either side, he sent two thousand infantry with some Celtic and Numidian cavalry with orders to devastate their territory. This order being executed, and a great booty obtained, the Celts appeared at the Roman camp beseeching their aid. ¹¹¹ Tiberius had been all along looking out for an opportunity of striking a blow: and at once seized on this pretext for sending out a party, consisting of the greater part of his cavalry, and a thousand sharp-shooters of his infantry along with them; who having speedily come up with the enemy on the other side of the Trebia, and engaged them in a sharp struggle for the possession of the booty, forced the Celts and Numidians to beat a retreat to their own camp. Those who were on duty in front of the Carthaginian camp quickly perceived what was going on, and brought some reserves to support the retreating cavalry; then the Romans in their turn were routed, and had to retreat to their camp. At this Tiberius sent out all his cavalry and sharp-shooters; whereupon the Celts again gave way, and sought the protection of their own camp. The Carthaginian general being unprepared for a general engagement, and thinking it a sound rule not to enter upon one on every casual opportunity, or except in accordance with a settled design, acted, it must be confessed, on this occasion with admirable generalship. He checked their flight when his men were near the camp, and forced them to halt and face about; but he sent out his aides and buglers to recall the rest, and prevented them from pursuing and engaging the enemy any more. So the Romans after a short halt went back, having killed a large number of the enemy, and lost very few themselves.

Tiberius Sempronius Plans to Attack

Excited and overjoyed at this success Tiberius was ¹¹² all eagerness for a general engagement. Now, it was in his power to administer the war for the present as he chose, owing to the ill-health of Publius Scipio; yet wishing to have his colleague’s opinion in support of his own, he consulted him on this subject. Publius however took quite an opposite view of the situation. He thought his legions would be all the better for a winter under arms; and that the fidelity of the fickle Celts would never stand the test of want of success and enforced inactivity on the part of the Carthaginians: they would be certain, he thought, to turn against them once more. Besides, when he had recovered from his wound, he hoped to be able to do good service to his country himself. With these arguments he tried to dissuade Tiberius from his design. The latter felt that every one of these arguments were true and sound; but, urged on by ambition and a blind confidence in his fortune, he was eager to have the credit of the decisive action to himself, before Scipio should be able to be present at the battle, or the next Consuls arrive to take over the command; for the time for that to take place was now approaching. As therefore he selected the time for the engagement from personal considerations, rather than with a view to the actual circumstances of the case, he was bound to make a signal failure.

Hannibal took much the same view of the case as Scipio, and was therefore, unlike him, eager for a battle; because, in the first place, he wished to avail himself of the enthusiasm of the Celts before it had at all gone off: in the second place, he wished to engage the Roman legions while the soldiers in them were raw recruits without practice in war: and, in the third place, because he wished to fight the battle while Scipio was still unfit for service: but most of all because he wanted to be doing something and not to let the time slip by fruitlessly; for when a general leads his troops into a foreign country, and attempts what looks like a desperate undertaking, the one chance for him is to keep the hopes of his allies alive by continually striking some fresh blow.

Such were Hannibal’s feelings when he knew of the intended attack of Tiberius .

Hannibal Prepares An Ambush

Now he had some time before remarked a certain ¹¹³ piece of ground which was flat and treeless, and yet well suited for an ambush, because there was a stream in it with a high overhanging bank thickly covered with thorns and brambles. Here he determined to entrap the enemy. The place was admirably adapted for putting them off their guard; because the Romans were always suspicious of woods, from the fact of the Celts invariably choosing such places for their ambuscades, but felt no fear at all of places that were level and without trees: not knowing that for the concealment and safety of an ambush such places are much better than woods; because the men can command from them a distant view of all that is going on: while nearly all places have sufficient cover to make concealment possible,—a stream with an overhanging bank, reeds, or ferns, or some sort of bramble-bushes,—which are good enough to hide not infantry only, but sometimes even cavalry, if the simple precaution is taken of laying conspicuous arms flat upon the ground and hiding helmets under shields. Hannibal had confided his idea to his brother Mago and to his council, who had all approved of the plan. Accordingly, when the army had supped, he summoned this young man to his tent, who was full of youthful enthusiasm, and had been trained from boyhood in the art of war, and put under his command a hundred cavalry and the same number of infantry. These men he had himself earlier in the day selected as the most powerful of the whole army, and had ordered to come to his tent after supper. Having addressed and inspired them with the spirit suitable to the occasion, he bade each of them select ten of the bravest men of their own company, and to come with them to a particular spot in the camp. The order having been obeyed, he despatched the whole party, numbering a thousand cavalry and as many infantry, with guides, to the place selected for the ambuscade; and gave his brother directions as to the time at which he was to make the attempt. At daybreak he himself mustered the Numidian cavalry, who were conspicuous for their powers of endurance; and after addressing them, and promising them rewards if they behaved with gallantry, he ordered them to ride up to the enemy’s lines, and then quickly cross the river, and by throwing showers of darts at them tempt them to come out: his object being to get at the enemy before they had had their breakfast, or made any preparations for the day. The other officers of the army also he summoned, and gave them similar instructions for the battle, ordering all their men to get breakfast and to see to their arms and horses.

Preparations for Battle

As soon as Tiberius saw the Numidian horse approaching, he immediately sent out his cavalry by itself ¹¹⁴ with orders to engage the enemy, and keep them in play, while he despatched after them six thousand foot armed with javelins, and got the rest of the army in motion, with the idea that their appearance would decide the affair: for his superiority in numbers, and his success in the cavalry skirmish of the day before, had filled him with confidence. But it was now mid-winter and the day was snowy and excessively cold, and men and horses were marching out almost entirely without having tasted food; and accordingly, though the troops were at first in high spirits, yet when they had crossed the Trebia, swollen by the floods which the rain of the previous night had brought down from the high ground above the camp, wading breast deep through the stream, they were in a wretched state from the cold and want of food as the day wore on.¹¹⁵ While the Carthaginians on the contrary had eaten and drunk in their tents, and got their horses ready, and were all anointing and arming themselves round the fires. Hannibal waited for the right moment to strike, and as soon as he saw that the Romans had crossed the Trebia, throwing out eight thousand spearmen and slingers to cover his advance, he led out his whole army. When he had advanced about eight stades from the camp, he drew up his infantry, consisting of about twenty thousand Iberians, Celts, and Libyans, in one long line, while he divided his cavalry and placed half on each wing, amounting in all to more than ten thousand, counting the Celtic allies; his elephants also he divided between the two wings, where they occupied the front rank.¹¹⁶ Meanwhile Tiberius had recalled his cavalry because he saw that they could do nothing with the enemy. For the Numidians when attacked retreated without difficulty, scattering in every direction, and then faced about again and charged, which is the peculiar feature of their mode of warfare. But he drew up his infantry in the regular Roman order, consisting of sixteen thousand citizens and twenty thousand allies; for that is the complete number of a Roman army in an important campaign, when the two Consuls are compelled by circumstances to combine forces.¹¹⁷ He then placed the cavalry on either wing, numbering four thousand, and advanced against the enemy in gallant style, in regular order, and at a deliberate pace.

The Battle of the Trebia

When the two forces came within distance, the lightarmed troops in front of the two armies ¹¹⁸ closed with each other. In this part of the battle the Romans were in many respects at a disadvantage, while the Carthaginians had everything in their favour. For the Roman spearmen had been on hard service ever since daybreak, and had expended most of their weapons in the engagement with the Numidians, while those weapons which were left had become useless from being long wet. Nor were the cavalry, or indeed the whole army, any better off in these respects. The case of the Carthaginians was exactly the reverse: they had come on the field perfectly sound and fresh, and were ready and eager for every service required of them. As soon, therefore, as their advanced guard had retired again within their lines, and the heavy-armed soldiers were engaged, the cavalry on the two wings of the Carthaginian army at once charged the enemy with all the effect of superiority in numbers, and in the condition both of men and horses secured by their freshness when they started. The Roman cavalry on the contrary retreated: and the flanks of the line being thus left unprotected, the Carthaginian spearmen and the main body of the Numidians, passing their own advanced guard, charged the Roman flanks: and, by the damage which they did them, prevented them from keeping up the fight with the troops on their front. The heavy-armed soldiers, however, who were in the front rank of both armies, and in the centre of that, maintained an obstinate and equal fight for a considerable time.

The Romans Retreat to Placentia

Just then the Numidians, who had been lying in ¹¹⁹ ambush, left their hiding-place, and by a sudden charge on the centre of the Roman rear produced great confusion and alarm throughout the army. Finally both the Roman wings, being hard pressed in front by the elephants, and on both flanks by the light-armed troops of the enemy, gave way, and in their flight were forced upon the river behind them. After this, while the centre of the Roman rear was losing heavily, and suffering severely from the attack of the Numidian ambuscade, their front, thus driven to bay, defeated the Celts and a division of Africans, and, after killing a large number of them, succeeded in cutting their way through the Carthaginian line. Then seeing that their wings had been forced off their ground, they gave up all hope of relieving them or getting back to their camp, partly because of the number of the enemy’s cavalry, and partly because they were hindered by the river and the pelting storm of rain which was pouring down upon their heads.¹²⁰ They therefore closed their ranks, and made their way safely to Placentia , to the number of ten thousand. Of the rest of the army the greater number were killed by the elephants and cavalry on the bank of the Trebia; while those of the infantry who escaped, and the greater part of the cavalry, managed to rejoin the ten thousand mentioned above, and arrived with them at Placentia . Meanwhile the Carthaginian army pursued the enemy as far as the Trebia; but being prevented by the storm from going farther, returned to their camp. They regarded the result of the battle with great exultation, as a complete success; for the loss of the Iberians and Africans had been light, the heaviest having fallen on the Celts. But from the rain and the snow which followed it, they suffered so severely, that all the elephants except one died, and a large number of men and horses perished from the cold.

Better Success in Spain

Fully aware of the nature of his disaster, but wishing to conceal its extent as well as he could from the people at home, Tiberius sent messengers to announce that a battle had taken place, but that the storm had deprived them of the victory. For the moment this news was believed at Rome ; but when soon afterwards it became known that the Carthaginians were in possession of the Roman camp, and that all the Celts had joined them: while their own troops had abandoned their camp, and, after retiring from the field of battle, were all collected in the neighbouring cities; and were besides being supplied with necessary provisions by sea up the Padus , the Roman people became only too certain of what had really happened in the battle. ¹²¹ It was a most unexpected reverse, and it forced them at once to urge on with energy the remaining preparations for the war. They reinforced those positions which lay in the way of the enemy’s advance; sent legions to Sardinia and Sicily , as well as garrisons to Tarentum , and other places of strategical importance; and, moreover, fitted out a fleet of sixty quinqueremes. The Consuls designate, Gnaeus Servilius and Gaius Flaminius, were collecting the allies and enrolling the citizen legions, and sending supplies to Ariminum and Etruria, with a view of going to the seat of war by those two routes. They sent also to king Hiero asking for reinforcements, who sent them five hundred Cretan archers and a thousand peltasts. In fact they pushed on their preparations in every direction with energy. For the Roman people are most formidable, collectively and individually, when they have real reason for alarm.

Gnaeus Scipio in Spain

While these events were happening in Italy , Gnaeus Cornelius Scipio, who had been left by his brother Publius in command of the fleet, setting sail from the mouth of the Rhone, came to land with his whole squadron at a place in Iberia called Emporium. Starting from this town, he made descents upon the coast, landing and besieging those who refused to submit to him along the seaboard as far as the Iber; and treating with every mark of kindness those who acceded to his demands, and taking all the precautions he could for their safety. When he had garrisoned those towns on the coast that submitted, he led his whole army inland, having by this time a not inconsiderable contingent of Iberian allies; and took possession of the towns on his line of march, some by negotation and some by force of arms. The Carthaginian troops which Hannibal had left in that district under the command of Hanno, lay entrenched to resist him under the walls of a town called Cissa.

Defeating this army in a pitched battle, Gnaeus not only got possession of a rich booty, for the whole baggage of the army invading Italy had been left under its charge, but secured the friendly alliance of all the Iberian tribes north of the Iber, and took both Hanno, the general of the Carthaginians, and Andobales, the general of the Iberians, prisoners. The latter was despot of central Iberia , and had always been especially inclined to the side of Carthage .

Immediately he learnt what had happened, Hasdrubal crossed the Iber to bring aid. There he ascertained that the Roman troops left in charge of the fleet had abandoned all precautions, and were trading on the success of the land forces to pass their time in ease. He therefore took with him eight thousand infantry and one thousand cavalry of his own army, and finding the men of the fleet scattered about the country, he killed a great many of them and forced the rest to fly for refuge to their ships. He then retired across the Iber again, and employed himself in fortifying and garrisoning the posts south of the river, taking up his winter quarters at New Carthage. When Gnaeus rejoined his fleet, he punished the authors of the disaster according to the Roman custom; and then collected his land and sea forces together in Tarraco , and there took up his winter quarters; and by dividing the booty equally between his soldiers, inspired them at once with affection towards himself and eagerness for future service. Such was the course of the Iberian campaign.

Hannibal’s Treatment of Roman Prisoners

At the beginning of the following spring, Gaius Flaminius marched his army through Etruria, and ¹²² pitched his camp at Arretium ; while his colleague Gnaeus Servilius on the other hand went to Ariminum , to await the advance of the enemy in that direction.

Passing the winter in the Celtic territory, Hannibal kept¹²³ his Roman prisoners in close confinement, supplying them very sparingly with food; while he treated their allies with great kindness from the first, and finally called them together and addressed them, alleging, that he had not come to fight against them, but against Rome in their behalf; and that, therefore, if they were wise, they would attach themselves to him: because he had come to restore freedom to the Italians, and to assist them to recover their cities and territory which they had severally lost to Rome . With these words he dismissed them without ransom to their own homes: wishing by this policy to attract the inhabitants of Italy to his cause, and to alienate their affections from Rome , and to awaken the resentment of all those who considered themselves to have sufered by the loss of harbours or cities under the Roman rule.

Hannibal Marches Southward

While he was in these winter quarters also he practised a ruse truly Punic. Being apprehensive that from the fickleness of their character, and the newness of the tie between himself and them, the Celts might lay plots against his life, he caused a number of wigs to be made for him, suited in appearance to men of various ages; and these he constantly varied, changing at the same time his clothes also to harmonise with the particular wig which he wore. He thus made it hard to recognise him, not only for those who met him suddenly, but even for his intimates. But seeing that the Celts were discontented at the lengthened continuance of the war within their borders, and were in a state of restless hurry to invade the enemy’s territory,—on the pretence of hatred for Rome , but in reality from love of booty,—he determined to break up his camp as soon as possible, and satisfy the desires of his army. Accordingly as soon as the change of season set in, by questioning those who were reputed to know the country best, he ascertained that the other roads leading into Etruria were long and well known to the enemy, but that the one which led through the marshes was short, and would bring them upon Flaminius as a surprise.¹²⁴ This was what suited his peculiar genius, and he therefore decided to take this route. But when the report was spread in his army that the general was going to lead them through some marshes, every soldier felt alarmed at the idea of the quagmires and deep sloughs which they would find on this march.

Hannibal Goes Through the Marsh

But after a careful inquiry as to what part of the road ¹²⁵ was firm or boggy, Hannibal broke up his camp and marched out. He placed the Libyans and Iberians and all his best soldiers in the van, and the baggage within their lines, that there might be plenty of provisions for their immediate needs. Provisions for the future he entirely neglected. Because he calculated that on reaching the enemy’s territory, if he were beaten he should not require them, and if he were victorious he would find abundance in the open country. Behind this vanguard he placed the Celts, and in the rear of all the cavalry. He entrusted the command of the rear-guard to his brother Mago, that he might see to the security of all, and especially to guard against the cowardice and impatience of hard labour which characterised the Celts; in order that, if the difficulty of the route should induce them to turn back, he might intercept them by means of the cavalry and force them to proceed. In point of fact, the Iberians and Libyans, having great powers of endurance and being habituated to such fatigues, and also because when they marched through them the marshes¹²⁶ were fresh and untrodden, accomplished their march with a moderate amount of distress: but the Celts advanced with great difficulty, because the marshes were now disturbed and trodden into a deep morass: and being quite unaccustomed to such painful labours, they bore the fatigue with anger and impatience; but were hindered from turning back by the cavalry in their rear. All however suffered grievously, especially from the impossibility of getting sleep on a continuous march of four days and three nights through a route which was under water: but none suffered so much, or lost so many men, as the Celts. Most of his beasts of burden also slipping in the mud fell and perished, and could then only do the men one service: they sat upon their dead bodies, and piling up baggage upon them so as to stand out above the water, they managed to get a snatch of sleep¹²⁷ for a short portion of the night. Another misfortune was that a considerable number of the horses lost their hoofs by the prolonged march through bog. Hannibal himself was with difficulty and much suffering got across riding on the only elephant left alive, enduring great agony from a severe attack of ophthalmia, by which he eventually lost the sight of one eye, because the time and the difficulties of the situation did not admit of his waiting or applying any treatment to it.

Flaminius in Hannibal’s Way

Having crossed the marshes in this unexpected ¹²⁸ manner, Hannibal found Flaminius in Etruria encamped under the walls of Arretium . For the present he pitched his camp close to the marshes, to refresh his army, and to investigate the plans of his enemies and the lie of the country in his front. And being informed that the country before him abounded in wealth, and that Flaminius was a mere mob-orator and demagogue, with no ability for the actual conduct of military affairs, and was moreover unreasonably confident in his resources; he calculated that, if he passed his camp and made a descent into the district beyond, partly for fear of popular reproach and partly from a personal feeling of irritation, Flaminius would be unable to endure to watch passively the devastation of the country, and would spontaneously follow him wherever he went; and being eager to secure the credit of a victory for himself, without waiting for the arrival of his colleague, would give him many opportunities for an attack.

A General Must Know his Enemy’s Character

And in making these calculations Hannibal showed his ¹²⁹ consummate prudence and strategical ability. For it is mere blind ignorance to believe that there can be anything of more vital importance to a general than the knowledge of his opponent’s character and disposition. As in combats between individuals or ranks, he who would conquer must observe carefully how it is possible to attain his object, and what part of his enemy appears unguarded or insufficiently armed,— so must a commander of an army look out for the weak place, not in the body, but in the mind of the leader of the hostile force. For it has often happened before now that, from mere idleness and lack of energy, men have let not only the welfare of the state, but even their private fortunes fall to ruin: some are so addicted to wine that they cannot sleep without bemusing their intellects with drink; and others so infatuated in their pursuit of sensual pleasures, that they have not only been the ruin of their cities and fortunes, but have forfeited life itself with disgrace. In the case of individuals, however, cowardice and sloth bring shame only on themselves; but when it is a commander-in-chief that is concerned, the disaster affects all alike and is of the most fatal consequence. It not only infects the men under him with an inactivity like his own; but it often brings absolute dangers of the most serious description upon those who trust such a general. For rashness, temerity, and uncalculating impetuosity, as well as foolish ambition and vanity, give an easy victory to the enemy. And are the source of numerous dangers to one’s friends: for a man who is the prey of such weaknesses falls the easiest victim to every stratagem, ambush or ruse. The general then who can gain a clear idea of his opponent’s weaknesses, and direct his attack on the point where he is most open to it, will very soon be the victor in the campaign. For as a ship, if you deprive it of its steerer, falls with all its crew into the hands of the enemy; so, in the case of an army in war, if you outwit or out-manœuvre its general, the whole will often fall into your hands.

Flaminius Enticed Out

Nor was Hannibal mistaken in his calculations in ¹³⁰ regard to Flaminius. For no sooner had he left the neighbourhood of Faesulae , and, advancing a short way beyond the Roman camp, made a raid upon the neighbouring country, than Flaminius became excited, and enraged at the idea that he was despised by the enemy: and as the devastation of the country went on, and he saw from the smoke that rose in every direction that the work of destruction was proceeding, he could not patiently endure the sight. Some of his officers advised that they should not follow the enemy at once nor engage him, but should act on the defensive, in view of his great superiority in cavalry; and especially that they should wait for the other Consul, and not give battle until the two armies were combined. But Flaminius, far from listening to their advice, was indignant at those who offered it; and bade them consider what the people at home would say at the country being laid waste almost up to the walls of Rome itself, while they remained encamped in Etruria on the enemy’s rear. Finally, with these words, he set his army in motion, without any settled plan of time or place; but bent only on falling in with the enemy, as though certain victory awaited him. For he had managed to inspire the people with such confident expectations, that the unarmed citizens who followed his camp in hope of booty, bringing chains and fetters and all such gear, were more numerous than the soldiers themselves.

Meanwhile Hannibal was advancing on his way to Rome through Etruria, keeping the city of Cortona and its hills on his left, and the Thrasymene lake on his right; and as he marched, he burned and wasted the country with a view of rousing the wrath of the enemy and tempting him to come out. And when he saw Flaminius get well within distance, and observed that the ground he then occupied was suited to his purpose, he bent his whole energies on preparing for a general engagement.

Hannibal Takes a Position in the Valley

The route which he was following led through a low ¹³¹ valley enclosed on both sides by long lines of lofty hills. Of its two ends, that in front was blocked by an abrupt and inaccessible hill, and that on the rear by the lake, between which and the foot of the cliff there is only a very narrow defile leading into this valley. Making his way to the end of the valley along the bank of the lake, Hannibal posted himself with the Spanish and Libyan troops on the hill immediately in front of him as he marched, and pitched a camp on it; but sent his Balearic slingers and light-armed troops by a détour, and stationed them in extended order under the cover of the hills to the right of the valley; and by a similar détour placed the Gauls and cavalry under the cover of hills to the left, causing them also to extend their line so far as to cover the entrance of the defile running between the cliff and lake into the valley.¹³²

Having made these preparations during the night, and having thus enclosed the valley with ambuscades, Hannibal remained quiet. In pursuit of him came Flaminius, in hot haste to close with the enemy. It was late in the evening before he pitched his camp on the border of the lake; and at daybreak next morning, just before the morning watch, he led his front maniples forward along the borders of the lake into the valley with a view of engaging the enemy.

The Disaster At the Thrasymene Lake

The day was exceedingly misty: and as soon as the ¹³³ greater part of the Roman line was in the valley, and the leading maniples were getting close to him, Hannibal gave the signal for attack; and at the same time sent orders to the troops lying in ambush on the hills to do the same, and thus delivered an assault upon the enemy at every point at once. Flaminius was taken completely by surprise: the mist was so thick, and the enemy were charging down from the upper ground at so many points at once, that not only were the Centurions and Tribunes unable to relieve any part of the line that was in difficulties, but were not even able to get any clear idea of what was going on: for they were attacked simultaneously on front, rear, and both flanks. The result was that most of them were cut down in the order of march, without being able to defend themselves: exactly as though they had been actually given up to slaughter by the folly of their leader. Flaminius himself, in a state of the utmost distress and despair, was attacked and killed by a company of Celts. As many as fifteen thousand Romans fell in the valley, who could neither yield nor defend themselves, being habituated to regard it as their supreme duty not to fly or quit their ranks. But those who were caught in the defile between the lake and the cliff perished in a shameful, or rather a most miserable, manner: for being thrust into the lake, some in their frantic terror endeavoured to swim with their armour on, and presently sank and were drowned; while the greater number, wading as far as they could into the lake, remained there with their heads above water; and when the cavalry rode in after them, and certain death stared them in the face, they raised their hands and begged for quarter, offering to surrender, and using every imaginary appeal for mercy; but were finally despatched by the enemy, or, in some cases, begged the favour of the fatal blow from their friends, or inflicted it on themselves. A number of men, however, amounting perhaps to six thousand, who were in the valley, defeated the enemy immediately in front of them; but though they might have done much to retrieve the fortune of the day, they were unable to go to the relief of their comrades, or get to the rear of their opponents, because they could not see what was going on. They accordingly pushed on continually to the front, always expecting to find themselves engaged with some of the enemy: until they discovered that, without noticing it, they were issuing upon the higher ground. But when they were on the crest of the hills, the mist broke and they saw clearly the disaster which had befallen them; and being no longer able to do any good, since the enemy was victorious all along the line, and in complete possession of the ground, they closed their ranks and made for a certain Etrurian village. After the battle Maharbal was sent by Hannibal with the Iberians and light-armed troops to besiege the village; and seeing themselves surrounded by a complication of dangers, they laid down their arms and surrendered on condition of their lives being spared. Such was the end of the final engagement between the Romans and Carthaginians in Etruria.

Roman Reaction

When the prisoners who had surrendered on terms ¹³⁴ were with the other prisoners brought to Hannibal, he had them all collected together to the number of more than fifteen thousand, and began by saying that Maharbal had no authority to grant them their lives without consulting him. He then launched out into an invective against Rome : and when he had finished that, he distributed all the prisoners who were Romans among the companies of his army to be held in safe keeping; but allowed all the allies to depart without ransom to their own country, with the same remark as he had made before, that he was not come to fight against Italians, but in behalf of Italians against Rome . He then gave his army time to refresh themselves after their fatigue, and buried those of highest rank who had fallen in his army, amounting to about thirty; the total number of his loss being fifteen hundred, most of whom were Celts. He then began considering, in conjunction with his brother and friends, where and how he should continue his attack, for he now felt confident of ultimate success.

When the news of this disaster reached Rome , the chief¹³⁵ men of the state could not, in view of the gravity of the blow, conceal its extent or soften it down, but were forced to assemble the people and tell them the truth. When the Praetor, therefore, from the Rostra said, We have been beaten in a great battle, there was such a consternation, that those who had been present at the battle as well as at this meeting, felt the disaster to be graver than when they were on the field of battle itself. And this feeling of the people was not to be wondered at. For many years they had been unaccustomed to the word or the fact of defeat, and they could not now endure reverse with patience or dignity. The Senate, however, rose to the occasion, and held protracted debates and consultations as to the future, anxiously considering what it was the duty of all classes to do, and how they were to do it.

A Second Disaster in Etruria

About the same time as the battle of Thrasymene, ¹³⁶ the Consul Gnaeus Servilius, who had been stationed on duty at Ariminum ,—which is on the coast of the Adriatic, where the plains of Cis-Alpine Gaul join the rest of Italy , not far from the mouths of the Padus ,—having heard that Hannibal had entered Etruria and was encamped near Flaminius, designed to join the latter with his whole army. But finding himself hampered by the difficulty of transporting so heavy a force, he sent Gaius Centenius forward in haste with four thousand horse, intending that he should be there before himself in case of need. But Hannibal, getting early intelligence after the battle of Thrasymene of this reinforcement of the enemy, sent Maharbal with his light-armed troops, and a detachment of cavalry, who falling in with Gaius, killed nearly half his men at the first encounter; and having pursued the remainder to a certain hill, on the very next day took them all prisoners. The news of the battle of Thrasymene was three days’ old at Rome , and the sorrow caused by it was, so to speak, at its hottest, when this further disaster was announced. The consternation caused by it was no longer confined to the people. The Senate now fully shared in it; and it was resolved that the usual annual arrangements for the election of magistrates should be suspended, and a more radical remedy be sought for the present dangers; for they came to the conclusion that their affairs were in such a state, as to require a commander with absolute powers.

Feeling now entirely confident of success, Hannibal rejected the idea of approaching Rome for the present; but traversed the country plundering it without resistance, and directing his march towards the coast of the Adriatic. ¹³⁷ Having passed through Umbria and Picenum, he came upon the coast after a ten days’ march with such enormous booty, that the army could neither drive nor carry all the wealth which they had taken, and after killing a large number of people on his road. For the order was given, usual in the storming of cities, to kill all adults who came in their way; an order which Hannibal was prompted to give now by his deep-seated hatred of Rome .¹³⁸

Quintus Fabius Maximus

Pitching his camp on the shore of the Adriatic, in a district extraordinarily rich in every kind of produce, he took great pains to refresh his men and restore their health, and no less so that of the horses. For the cold and squalor of a winter spent in Gallia Cis-Alpina without the protection of a roof, and then the painful march through the marshes, had brought upon most of the horses, and the men as well, an attack of scurvy and all its consequences. Having therefore now got possession of a rich country, he got his horses into condition again, and restored the bodies and spirits of his soldiers; and made the Libyans change their own for Roman arms selected for the purpose, which he could easily do from being possessed of so many sets stripped from the bodies of the enemy. He now sent messengers, too, to Carthage by sea, to report what had taken place, for this was the first time he had reached the sea since he entered Italy . The Carthaginians were greatly rejoiced at the news: and took measures with enthusiasm for forwarding supplies to their armies, both in Iberia and Italy .

Meanwhile the Romans had appointed Quintus Fabius Dictator,¹³⁹ a man distinguished no less for his wisdom than his high birth; as is still commemorated by the fact that the members of his family are even now called Maximi, that is Greatest, in honour of his successful achievements.¹⁴⁰ A Dictator differs from the Consuls in this, that each Consul is followed by twelve lictors, the Dictator by twenty-four. Again, the Consuls have frequently to refer to the Senate to enable them to carry out their proposed plans; but the Dictator is absolute, and when he is appointed all other magistrates in Rome are at once deprived of power, except the Tribunes of the People.¹⁴¹ I shall, however, take another opportunity of speaking in more detail about these officers. With the Dictator they appointed Marcus Minucius master of the horse; this is an officer under the Dictator, and takes his place when engaged elsewhere.

Hannibal Marches Through Iapygia

Though Hannibal shifted his quarters from time to time for short distances in one direction or another, he remained in the neighbourhood of the Adriatic; and by bathing his horses with old wine, of which he had a great store, cured them of the scab and got them into condition again. By a similar treatment he cured his men of their wounds, and got the others into a sound state of health and spirits for the service before them. After traversing with fire and sword the territories of Praetutia,¹⁴² Hadriana, Marrucina, and Frentana, he started on his road to Iapygia. This district is divided among three peoples, each with a district name, Daunii [Peucetii], and Messapii. Hannibal first invaded the territory of the Daunii, beginning from Luceria, a Roman colony, and laid the country waste. He next encamped near Vibo, and overran the territory of Arpi , and plundered all Daunia without resistance.

Meanwhile Fabius, after offering the usual sacrifice to the¹⁴³ gods upon his appointment, started with his master of the horse, and four legions which had been enrolled for the purpose; and having effected a junction near Daunia with the troops that had come to the rescue from Ariminum , he relieved Gnaeus of his command on shore and sent him with an escort to Rome , with orders to be ready with help for any emergency, in case the Carthaginians made any movement by sea. Fabius himself, with his master of the horse, took over the command of the whole army and pitched his camp opposite the Carthaginians, near a place called Aecae ,¹⁴⁴ about six miles from the enemy.

Fabius Defers Battle

When Hannibal learnt that Fabius had arrived, he ¹⁴⁵ determined to terrify the enemy by promptly attacking. He therefore led out his army, approached the Roman camp, and there drew up his men in order of battle; but when he had waited some time, and nobody came out to attack him, he drew off and retired to his own camp. For Fabius, having made up his mind to incur no danger and not to risk a battle, but to make the safety of his men his first and greatest object, kept resolutely to this purpose. At first he was despised for it, and gave rise to scandalous insinuations that he was an utter coward and dared not face an engagement: but in course of time he compelled everybody to confess and allow that it was impossible for any one to have acted, in the existing circumstances, with greater discretion and prudence. And it was not long before facts testified to the wisdom of his policy. Nor was it wonderful that it was so. For the forces of his opponents had been trained from their earliest youth without intermission in war; had a general who had grown up with them and from childhood had been instructed in the arts of the camp; had won many battles in Iberia , and twice running had beaten the Romans and their allies: and, what was more than all, had thoroughly made up their minds that their one hope of safety was in victory. In every respect the circumstances of the Roman army were the exact opposite of these; and therefore, their manifest inferiority making it impossible for Fabius to offer the enemy battle, he fell back upon those resources in which the Romans had the advantage of the enemy; clung to them; and conducted the war by their means: and they were—an inexhaustible supply of provisions and of men.

Hannibal Enters Campania

He, then, during the following months, kept his army continually hovering in the neighbourhood of the enemy, his superior knowledge of the country enabling him to occupy beforehand all the posts of vantage; and having supplies in abundance on his rear, he never allowed his soldiers to go on foraging expeditions, or get separated, on any pretence, from the camp; but keeping them continually massed together and in close union, he watched for favourable opportunities of time and place; and by this method of proceeding captured and killed a large number of the enemy, who in their contempt of him straggled from their camp in search of plunder. His object in these manœuvres was twofold,—to gradually diminish the limited numbers of the enemy: and to strengthen and renew by such successes in detail the spirits of his own men, which had been depressed, to begin with, by the general defeat of their armies. But nothing would induce him to agree to give his enemy a set battle. ¹⁴⁶ This policy however was by no means approved of by his master of the horse, Marcus. He joined in the general verdict, and decried Fabius in every one’s hearing, as conducting his command in a cowardly and unenterprising spirit; and was himself eager to venture upon a decisive engagement.

Meanwhile the Carthaginians, after wasting these districts,¹⁴⁷ crossed the Apennines ; and descending upon Samnium, which was rich and had been free from war for many years past, found themselves in possession of such an abundance of provisions, that they could get rid of them neither by use nor waste. They overran also the territory of Beneventum , which was a Roman colony; and took the town of Venusia , which was unwalled and richly furnished with every kind of property. All this time the Romans were following on his rear, keeping one or two days’ march behind him, but never venturing to approach or engage the enemy. Accordingly, when Hannibal saw that Fabius plainly meant to decline a battle, but yet would not abandon the country altogether, he formed the bold resolution of penetrating to the plains round Capua ; and actually did so as far as Falernum, convinced that thereby he should do one of two things,—force the enemy to give him battle, or make it evident to all that the victory was his, and that the Romans had abandoned the country to him. This he hoped would strike terror into the various cities, and cause them to be eager to revolt from Rome . For up to that time, though the Romans had been beaten in two battles, not a single city in Italy had revolted to the Carthaginians; but all maintained their fidelity, although some of them were suffering severely; —a fact which may show us the awe and respect which the Republic had inspired in its allies.

Fertility and Beauty of the Plains Near Capua

Hannibal, however, had not adopted this plan without good reason. For the plains about Capua are the best in Italy for fertility and beauty and proximity to the sea, and for the commercial harbours, into which merchants run who are sailing to Italy from nearly all parts of the world. They contain, moreover, the most famous and beautiful cities of Italy . On its seaboard are Sinuessa , Cumae , Puteoli , Naples , and Nuceria; and inland to the north there are Cales and Teanum, to the east and south [Caudium¹⁴⁸] and Nola . In the centre of these plains lies the richest of all the cities, that of Capua . No tale in all mythology wears a greater appearance of probability than that which is told of these, which, like others remarkable for their beauty, are called the Phlegraean plains; for surely none are more likely for beauty and fertility to have been contended for by gods. In addition to these advantages, they are strongly protected by nature and difficult of approach; for one side is protected by the sea, and the rest by a long and high chain of mountains, through which there are but three passes from the interior, narrow and difficult, one from Samnium [a second from Latium ¹⁴⁹] and a third from Hirpini. So that if the Carthaginians succeeded in fixing their quarters in these plains, they would have the advantage of a kind of theatre, in which to display the terrors of their power before the gaze of all Italy ; and would make a spectacle also of the cowardice of their enemies in shrinking from giving them battle, while they themselves would be proved beyond dispute to be masters of the country.

Hannibal Selects Winter Quarters

With this view Hannibal crossed from Samnium by ¹⁵⁰ the pass of the hill called Eribianus,¹⁵¹ and encamped on the bank of the river Vulturnus, which almost divides these plains in half. His camp was on the side of the river towards Rome , but he overran the whole plain with foraging parties. Though utterly aghast at the audacity of the enemy’s proceedings, Fabius stuck all the more firmly to the policy upon which he had determined. But his colleague Minucius, and all the centurions and tribunes of the army, thinking that they had caught the enemy in an excellent trap, were of opinion that they should make all haste into the plains, and not allow the most splendid part of the country to be devastated. Until they reached the spot, Fabius hurried on, and feigned to share their eager and adventurous spirit; and, when he was near the ager Falernus, he showed himself on the mountain skirts and kept in a line with the enemy, that he might not be thought by the allies to abandon the country: but he would not let his army descend into the plain, being still unwilling to risk a general engagement, partly for the same reasons as before, and partly because the enemy were conspicuously superior in cavalry.

After trying to provoke his enemies, and collecting an¹⁵² unlimited amount of booty by laying waste the whole plain, Hannibal began taking measures for removing: wishing not to waste his booty, but to stow it in some safe place, which he might also make his winter quarters; that the army might not only be well off for the present, but might have abundant supplies all through the winter. Fabius, learning that he meditated returning the same way as he came, and seeing that the pass was a narrow one, and extremely well suited for an attack by ambush, placed about four thousand men at the exact spot that he would have to pass; while he, with the main body of his troops, encamped on a hill which commanded the entrance of the pass.

The Cattle With the Burning Fagots

Fabius hoped when the Carthaginians came thither, and encamped on the plain immediately under the foot of the hill, that he would be able to snatch away their plunder without any risk to himself; and, most of all, might even put an end to the whole war by means of the excellent situation for an attack in which he now was. ¹⁵³ He was accordingly wholly intent on forming plans for this purpose, anxiously considering in what direction and in what manner he should avail himself of the advantages of the ground, and which of his men were to be the first to attack the enemy. Whilst his enemies were making these preparations for the next day, Hannibal, guessing the truth, took care to give them no time or leisure for executing their design; but summoning Hasdrubal, the captain of his pioneers, ordered him, with all speed, to make as many fagots of dry wood of all sorts as possible, and selecting two thousand of the strongest of the working oxen from the booty, to collect them outside the camp. When this was done, he summoned the pioneers, and pointed out to them a certain ridge lying between the camp and the gorge by which he meant to march. To this ridge they were to drive the oxen, when the order was given, as actively and energetically as they could, until they came to the top. Having given these instructions, he bade them take their supper and go to rest betimes. Towards the end of the third watch of the night he led the pioneers out of the camp, and ordered them to tie the fagots to the horns of the oxen. The men being numerous, this did not take long to do; and he then ordered them to set the fagots all alight, and to drive the oxen off and force them to mount the ridge; and placing his light-armed troops behind them he ordered them to assist the drivers up to a certain distance: but, as soon as the beasts had got well started, to take open order and pass them at the double, and, with as much noise as possible, make for the top of the ridge; that, if they found any of the enemy there, they might close with and attack them at once. At the same time he himself led the main army towards the narrow gorge of the pass,—his heavy-armed men in front, next to them the cavalry, then the booty, and the Iberians and Celts bringing up the rear.

Fabius Returns to Rome

The Romans who were guarding the gorge, no sooner saw these fiery fagots advancing to the heights, than, quitting the narrow part of the pass, they made for the ridge to meet the enemy. But when they got near the oxen, they were puzzled by the lights, imagining them to be something more dangerous than they really were; and when the Carthaginian light-armed troops came on to the ground, after some slight skirmishing between the two parties, upon the oxen rushing in among them, they separated and took up their positions on different heights and waited for daybreak, not being able to comprehend what was taking place.

Partly because he was at a loss to understand what¹⁵⁴ was happening, and, in the words of the poet, some deep design suspecting;¹⁵⁵ and partly that, in accordance with his original plan, he was determined not to risk a general engagement, Fabius remained quietly within his camp: while Hannibal, finding everything going as he designed, led his army and booty in safety through the gorge, the men who had been set to guard the narrow road having abandoned their post. At daybreak, seeing the two troops fronting each other on the heights, he sent some Iberian companies to the light-armed troops, who engaged the Romans, and, killing a thousand of them, easily relieved his own light-armed troops and brought them down to the main body.

Having thus effected his departure from the Falernian plain, Hannibal thenceforth busied himself in looking out for a place in which to winter, and in making the necessary preparations, after having inspired the utmost alarm and uncertainty in the cities and inhabitants of Italy . ¹⁵⁶ Though Fabius meanwhile was in great disrepute among the common people, for having let his enemy escape from such a trap, he nevertheless refused to abandon his policy; and being shortly afterwards obliged to go to Rome to perform certain sacrifices, he handed over the command of his legions to his master of the horse, with many parting injunctions, not to be so anxious to inflict a blow upon the enemy, as to avoid receiving one himself. Marcus, however, paid no heed to the advice, and, even while Fabius was speaking, had wholly resolved to risk a general engagement.

Hasdrubal Equips a Fleet

While these things were going on in Italy , Hasdrubal, who was in command in Iberia , having during the winter repaired the thirty ships left him by his brother, and manned ten additional ones, got a fleet of forty decked vessels to sea, at the beginning of the summer, from New Carthage, under the command of Hamilcar; and at the same time collected his land forces, and led them out of their winter quarters. ¹⁵⁷ The fleet coasted up the country, and the troops marched along the shore towards the Iber. Suspecting their design, Gnaeus Scipio was for issuing from his winter quarters and meeting them both by land and sea. But hearing of the number of their troops, and the great scale on which their preparations had been made, he gave up the idea of meeting them by land; and manning thirty-five ships, and taking on board the best men he could get from his land forces to serve as marines, he put to sea, and arrived on the second day near the mouth of the Iber. Here he came to anchor, at a distance of about ten miles from the enemy, and sent two swift-sailing Massilian vessels to reconnoitre. For the sailors of Marseilles were the first in every service of difficulty and danger, and ready at the shortest notice to do whatever was required of them; and, in fact, Marseilles has distinguished itself above all other places, before and since, in fidelity to Rome , and never more so than in the Hannibalian war. The ships sent to reconnoitre having reported that the enemy’s fleet was lying off the mouth of the Iber, Scipio put to sea with all speed, wishing to surprise them.

Naval Success of the Romans In Spain

But being informed in good time by his look-out ¹⁵⁸ men that the enemy were bearing down upon him, Hasdrubal drew up his troops on the beach, and ordered his crews to go on board; and, when the Romans hove in sight, gave the signal for the attack, determined to fight the enemy at sea. But, after engaging, the Carthaginians made but a short struggle for victory, and very soon gave way. For the support of the troops on the beach did less service in encouraging them to attack, than harm in offering them a safe place of retreat. Accordingly, after losing two ships with their crews, and the oars and marines of four others, they gave way and made for the land; and when the Romans pressed on with spirit in pursuit, they ran their ships ashore, and leaping from the vessels fled for refuge to the troops. The Romans came boldly close to land, towed off such of the vessels as could be got afloat, and sailed away in great exultation at having beaten the enemy at the first blow, secured the mastery of the sea, and taken twenty-five of the enemy’s ships.

In Iberia therefore, after this victory, the Roman prospects had begun to brighten. But when news of this reverse arrived at Carthage , the Carthaginians at once despatched a fleet of seventy ships, judging it to be essential to their whole design that they should command the sea. These ships touched first at Sardinia and then at Pisae in Italy , the commanders believing that they should find Hannibal there. But the Romans at once put to sea to attack them from Rome itself, with a fleet of a hundred and twenty quinqueremes; and hearing of this expedition against them, the Carthaginians sailed back to Sardinia , and thence returned to Carthage . Gnaeus Servilius, who was in command of this Roman fleet, followed the Carthaginians for a certain distance, believing that he should fall in with them; but, finding that he was far behind, he gave up the attempt. He first put in at Lilybaeum , and afterwards sailed to the Libyan island of Cercina ; and after receiving a sum of money from the inhabitants on condition of not laying waste the country, he departed. On his return voyage he took the island of Cossyrus, and having put a garrison into its small capital, returned to Lilybaeum . There he placed the fleet, and shortly afterwards went off himself to join the land army.

Spanish Hostages Given Up To the Scipios

When the Senate heard of Gnaeus Scipio’s naval success, believing it to be advantageous or rather ¹⁵⁹ essential not to relax their hold on Iberia , but to press on the war there against Carthage with redoubled vigour, they prepared a fleet of twenty ships, and put them under the command of Publius Scipio; and in accordance with arrangements already made, despatched him with all speed to join his brother Gnaeus, and carry on the Iberian campaign in conjunction with him. Their great anxiety was lest the Carthaginians should get the upper hand in Iberia , and thus possessing themselves of abundant supplies and recruits, should get a more complete mastery of the sea, and assist the invasion of Italy , by sending troops and money to Hannibal. Regarding therefore the Iberian war as of the utmost importance, they sent these ships and Publius Scipio to that country; who, when he arrived in Iberia , effected a junction with his brother and did most substantial service to the State. For up to that time the Romans had not ventured to cross the Iber; but had thought themselves fortunate if they could secure the friendship and allies of the tribes up to that river. They now however did cross it, and for the first time had the courage to attempt a movement on the other side: their designs being greatly favoured also by an accidental circumstance.

When the two brothers, after overawing the Iberian tribes that lived near the passage of the Iber, had arrived before the city of Saguntum , they pitched their camp about forty stades from it, near the temple of Aphrodite, selecting the position as offering at once security from the attacks of the enemy, and a means of getting supplies by sea: for their fleet was coasting down parallel with them.

Treason of Abilyx

Here an event occurred which produced a decisive ¹⁶⁰ change in their favour. When Hannibal was about to start for Italy , from the Iberian towns whose loyalty he suspected he took the sons of their leading men as hostages, and placed them all in Saguntum , because of the strength of that town and his confidence in the fidelity of those who were left in charge of it. Now there was a certain Iberian there named Abilyx, who enjoyed the highest character and reputation with his countrymen, and was believed to be especially well disposed and loyal to the Carthaginians. Seeing how affairs were going, and believing that the fortune of the Romans was in the ascendant, he formed in his own mind a scheme, worthy of an Iberian and barbarian, for giving up the hostages. Convinced that he might obtain a high place in the favour of Rome , if he gave a proof of his fidelity at a critical moment, he made up his mind to turn traitor to Carthage and put the hostages in the hands of the Romans. He began his machinations by addressing himself to Bostar, the Carthaginian general who had been despatched by Hasdrubal to prevent the Romans from crossing the river, but, not venturing to do this, had retreated, and was now encamped in the region of Saguntum next the sea. To this man, who was of a guileless and gentle character, and quite disposed to trust him, Abilyx now introduced the subject of the hostages. He argued that the Romans having now crossed the Iber, the Carthaginians could no longer hold Iberia by terror, but stood now in need of the good feeling of their subjects: seeing then that the Romans had actually approached Saguntum and were besieging it, and that the city was in danger,—if he were to take the hostages and restore them to their parents and cities, he would not only frustrate the ambitious scheme of the Romans, who wished above all things by getting possession of the hostages to have the credit of doing this; but would also rouse a feeling of goodwill towards Carthage in all the cities, for having taken thought for the future and provided for the safety of the hostages. He would, too, much enhance the favour by personally managing this business: for if he restored these boys to their homes, he would provoke the gratitude, not only of their parents, but of the people at large also, by giving a striking instance of the magnanimous policy of Carthage towards her allies. He might even expect large rewards for himself from the families that recovered their children; for all those, who thus unexpectedly got into their hands the dearest objects of their affection, would vie with each other in heaping favours on the author of such a service. By these and similar arguments he persuaded Bostar to fall in with his proposals.

The Boys are Restored to Their Native Cities

Abilyx then went away, after arranging a fixed day on which he would appear with everything necessary for conveying the boys. At night he made his way to the Roman lines, and, having fallen in with some Iberians serving in the Roman army, was by them conducted to the generals; to whom he discoursed at great length on the revulsion of feeling of the Iberians in their favour, which would be caused if they got possession of the hostages: and finally offered to put the boys in their hands. Publius Scipio received the proposal with extreme eagerness: and, promising him large rewards, he agreed with him on a day, hour, and place at which a party were to be waiting to receive him. After returning home, Abilyx next went with a band of chosen friends to Bostar; and, after receiving the boys, left the camp at night, as though he wished not to be seen by the Roman camp as he passed it, and came at the appointed time to the place arranged, and there handed over all the boys to the Roman officers. Publius treated Abilyx with special honour, and employed him in restoring the boys to their native cities, along with certain of his own friends. He accordingly went from city to city, giving them a visible proof by the restoration of the boys of the Roman mildness and magnanimity, in contrast to the Carthaginian suspiciousness and harshness; and bidding them also observe that he had found it necessary to change sides, he induced many Iberians to join the Roman alliance. Bostar was thought, in thus surrendering the hostages to the enemy, to have behaved more like a child than became a man of his age, and was in serious danger of his life. For the present, however, as it was getting late in the season, both sides began dispersing into winter quarters; the Romans having made an important step towards success in the matter of the boys.

Hannibal In Apulia

Such was the position of affairs in Iberia . To ¹⁶¹ return to Hannibal, whom we left having just effected the passage from the Falernian plain. Hearing from his scouts that there was abundance of corn in the district round Luceria and Geronium, and that Geronium was an excellent place to store it in, he determined to make his winter quarters there; and accordingly marched thither byway of Mount Liburnum. And having come to Geronium, which is about two hundred stades from Luceria, he first endeavoured to win over the inhabitants by promises, offering them pledges of his good faith; but when no one would listen to him, he determined to lay siege to the town. Having taken it without much delay, he put the inhabitants to the sword; but preserved most of the houses and walls, because he wished to use them as granaries for his winter camp: and having encamped his army in front of it, he fortified his position with trench and palisade. Having finished these labours, he sent out two-thirds of the army to collect corn, with orders to bring home every day, each division for the use of its own men, as much as the regular heads of this department would usually supply: while with the remaining third of his army he kept watch over his camp, and occupied certain places with a view of protecting the foraging parties in case they were attacked. The district being mostly very accessible and flat, and the harvesting party being almost innumerable, and the season moreover being at the very best stage for such operations, the amount of corn collected every day was very great.

Successes of Minucius

When Minucius took over the command from ¹⁶² Fabius, he at first kept along the line of hills, feeling certain that he would sooner or later fall in with the Carthaginians; but when he heard that Hannibal had already taken Geronium, and was collecting the corn of the country, and had pitched his camp in front of the town, he changed the direction of his march, and descended from the top of the hills by way of a ridge leading down into the plains. Arriving at the height which lies in the territory of Larinum , and is called Calena, he encamped round its foot, being eager on any terms whatever to engage the enemy. When Hannibal saw the enemy approaching, he sent a third of his army foraging for corn, but took the other two-thirds with him, and, advancing sixteen stades from Geronium towards the enemy, pitched a camp upon a piece of rising ground, with a view at once of overawing his opponents, and affording safety to his foraging parties: and there being another elevation between him and the two armies, which was near, and conveniently placed for an attack upon the enemy’s lines, he sent out about two thousand light-armed troops in the night and seized it. At daybreak when Minucius saw these men, he took his own light-armed troops and assaulted the hill. After a gallant skirmish the Romans prevailed; and subsequently their whole camp was transferred to this place. For a certain time Hannibal kept his men for the most part within their lines, because the camps were so close to each other; but, after the lapse of some days, he was obliged to divide them into two parties, one for pasturing the animals, and one for gathering corn: being very anxious to carry out his design of avoiding the destruction of his booty, and of collecting as much corn as possible, that his men might have abundant food during the winter, and his horses and beasts of burden as much so; for the chief hope of his army rested on his cavalry.

The Romans Capture the Carthaginian Foragers

It was then that Minucius, seeing the great part of ¹⁶³ the enemy scattered about the country on these services, selected the exact hour of the day when they would be away to lead out his army. Having come close to the Carthaginian lines he drew out his heavy-armed troops there; and then, dividing his cavalry and light-armed into detachments, sent them in search of the foragers, ordering them to give no quarter. This put Hannibal into a great difficulty: for he was not strong enough to accept battle with the enemy drawn up outside his lines, or to relieve those of his men who were scattered about the country. The Romans meanwhile who had been sent to take the foragers found a great number of them scattered about, and killed them; while the troops drawn up in front of the camp grew so contemptuous of the enemy, that they even began to pull down their palisade, and all but assaulted the Carthaginians. Hannibal was in a very dangerous position: but in spite of the storm that had suddenly fallen on him, he held his ground, repulsing the enemy when they approached and defending, though with difficulty, the rampart; until Hasdrubal came to his relief with about four thousand of the foraging parties, who had fled for refuge from the country and collected within the lines near Geronium. This encouraged Hannibal to make a sally: and having got into order of battle a short distance from the camp, he just managed with difficulty to avert the threatened danger. After killing large numbers of the enemy in the struggle at the camp, and still more in the open country, Minucius for the present retired, but with great hopes for the future; and on the morrow, the Carthaginians having abandoned their lines on the hill, he went up and occupied their position. For Hannibal being alarmed lest the Romans should go by night and find the camp at Geronium undefended, and become masters of his baggage and stores, determined to retire thither himself and again fix his quarters there. After this the Carthaginians were more timid and cautious in their manner of foraging; while the Romans on the other hand acted with greater boldness and recklessness.

Minucius Made Co-Dictator

An exaggerated account of this success reached Rome , ¹⁶⁴ and caused excessive exultation: first, because in their gloomy prospects some sort of change for the better had at last shown itself; and, secondly, because the people could now believe that the ill success and want of nerve, which had hitherto attended the legions, had not arisen from the cowardice of the men, but the timidity of their leader. Wherefore everybody began finding fault with and depreciating Fabius, as failing to seize his opportunities with spirit; while they extolled Minucius to such a degree for what had happened, that a thing was done for which there was no precedent. They gave him absolute power as well as Fabius, believing that he would quickly put an end to the campaign; and so there were two Dictators made for carrying on the same war, which had never happened at Rome before. When Minucius was informed of his popularity with the people, and of the office bestowed upon him by the citizens, he felt doubly incited to run all risks and act with daring boldness against the enemy. Fabius rejoined the army with sentiments not in the least changed by what had happened, but rather fixed still more immovably on his original policy. Seeing, however, that Minucius was puffed up with pride, and inclined to offer him a jealous opposition at every turn, and was wholly bent on risking an engagement, he offered him the choice of two alternatives: either to command the whole army on alternate days with him; or that they should separate their two armies, and each command their respective part in their own way. Minucius joyfully accepting the second alternative, they divided the men and encamped separately about twelve stades apart.

Minucius In Difficulties

Partly from observing what was taking place, and ¹⁶⁵ partly from the information of prisoners, Hannibal knew of the mutual jealousy of the two generals, and the impetuosity and ambition of Minucius. Looking upon what was happening in the enemy’s camp as rather in his favour than otherwise, he set himself to deal with Minucius; being anxious to put an end to his bold methods and check in time his adventurous spirit. There being then an elevation between his camp and that of Minucius, which might prove dangerous to either, he resolved to occupy it; and, knowing full well that, elated by his previous success, Minucius would be certain to move out at once to oppose his design, he concerted the following plan. The country round the hill being bare of trees, but having much broken ground and hollows of every description, he despatched some men during the night, in bodies of two and three hundred, to occupy the most favourable positions, numbering in all five hundred horse and five thousand light-armed and other infantry: and in order that they might not be observed in the morning by the enemy’s foraging parties, he seized the hill at daybreak with his light-armed troops. When Marcus saw what was taking place, he looked upon it as an excellent opportunity; and immediately despatched his light-armed troops, with orders to engage the enemy and contest the possession of the position; after these he sent his cavalry, and close behind them he led his heavy-armed troops in person, as on the former occasion, intending to repeat exactly the same manœuvres.

Cautious Fabius Saves the Day

As the day broke, and the thoughts and eyes of all were engrossed in observing the combatants on the hill, the Romans had no suspicion of the troops lying in ambush. But as Hannibal kept pouring in reinforcements for his men on the hill, and followed close behind them himself with his cavalry and main body, it was not long before the cavalry also of both sides were engaged. The result was that the Roman lightarmed troops, finding themselves hard pressed by the numbers of the cavalry, caused great confusion among the heavy-armed troops by retreating into their lines; and the signal being given at the same time to those who were in ambush, these latter suddenly showed themselves and charged: whereby not only the Roman light-armed troops, but their whole army, were in the greatest danger. At that moment Fabius, seeing what was taking place, and being alarmed lest they should sustain a complete defeat, led out his forces with all speed and came to the relief of his imperilled comrades.¹⁶⁶ At his approach the Romans quickly recovered their courage; and though their lines were entirely broken up, they rallied again round their standards, and retired under cover of the army of Fabius, with a severe loss in the light-armed division, and a still heavier one in the ranks of the legions, and that too of the bravest men. Alarmed at the freshness and perfect order of the relieving army, Hannibal retired from the pursuit and ceased fighting. To those who were actually engaged it was quite clear that an utter defeat had been brought about by the rashness of Minucius, and that their safety on this and previous occasions had been secured by the caution of Fabius; while those at home had a clear and indisputable demonstration of the difference between the rashness and bravado of a soldier, and the farseeing prudence and cool calculation of a general. Taught by experience the Romans joined camps once more, and for the future listened to Fabius and obeyed his orders: while the Carthaginians dug a trench across the space between the knoll and their own lines, and threw up a palisade round the crest of the captured hill; and, having placed a guard upon it, proceeded thenceforth with their preparations for the winter unmolested.

New Consuls Elected

The Consular elections being now come, the Romans ¹⁶⁷ elected Lucius Aemilius and Gaius Terentius. On their appointment the Dictators laid down their offices, and the Consuls of the previous year, Gnaeus Servilius and Marcus Regulus— who had been appointed after the death of Flaminius,—were invested with pro-consular authority by Aemilius; and, taking the command at the seat of war, administered the affairs of the army independently. Meanwhile Aemilius, in consultation with the Senate, set at once to work to levy new soldiers, to fill up the numbers of the legions required for the campaign, and despatched them to headquarters; enjoining at the same time upon Servilius that he should by no means hazard a general engagement, but contrive detailed skirmishes, as sharp and as frequent as he could, for the sake of practising the raw recruits, and giving them courage for a pitched battle: for they held the opinion that their former defeats were owing, as much as anything else, to the fact that they were employing troops newly levied and entirely untrained. The Senate also sent the Praetor Lucius Postumius into Gaul , to affect a diversion there, and induce the Celts who were with Hannibal to return home. They also took measures for recalling the fleet that had wintered at Lilybaeum , and for sending to the commanders in Iberia such supplies as were necessary for the service. Thus the Consul and Senate were busied with these and other preparations for the campaign; and Servilius, having received his instructions from the Consuls, carried them out in every particular. The details of this part of the campaign, therefore, I shall omit to record; for nothing of importance or worth remembering occurred, partly in consequence of these instructions, and partly from circumstances; but there were a considerable number of skirmishes and petty engagements, in which the Roman commanders gained a high reputation for courage and prudence.

Hannibal Occupies Cannae

Thus through all that winter and spring the two ¹⁶⁸ armies remained encamped facing each other. But when the season for the new harvest was come, Hannibal began to move from the camp at Geronium; and making up his mind that it would be to his advantage to force the enemy by any possible means to give him battle, he occupied the citadel of a town called Cannae, into which the corn and other supplies from the district round Canusium were collected by the Romans, and conveyed thence to the camp as occasion required. The town itself, indeed, had been reduced to ruins the year before: but the capture of its citadel and the material of war contained in it, caused great commotion in the Roman army; for it was not only the loss of the place and the stores in it that distressed them, but the fact also that it commanded the surrounding district. They therefore sent frequent messages to Rome asking for instructions: for if they approached the enemy they would not be able to avoid an engagement, in view of the fact that the country was being plundered, and the allies all in a state of excitement.¹⁶⁹ The Senate passed a resolution that they should give the enemy battle: they, however, bade Gnaeus Servilius wait, and despatched the Consuls to the seat of war. It was to Aemilius that all eyes turned, and on him the most confident hopes were fixed; for his life had been a noble one, and he was thought to have managed the recent Illyrian war with advantage to the State. The Senate determined to bring eight legions into the field, which had never been done at Rome before, each legion consisting of five thousand men besides allies. For the Romans, as I have stated before,¹⁷⁰ habitually enrol four legions each year, each consisting of about four thousand foot and two hundred horse; and when any unusual necessity arises, they raise the number of foot to five thousand and of the horse to three hundred. Of allies, the number in each legion is the same as that of the citizens, but of the horse three times as great. Of the four legions thus composed, they assign two to each of the Consuls for whatever service is going on. Most of their wars are decided by one Consul and two legions, with their quota of allies; and they rarely employ all four at one time and on service. But on this occasion, so great was the alarm and terror of what would happen, they resolved to bring not only four but eight legions into the field.

Aemilius Paulus Harangues the Army

With earnest words of exhortation, therefore, to ¹⁷¹ Aemilius, putting before him the gravity in every point of view of the result of the battle, they despatched him with instructions to seek a favourable opportunity to fight a decisive battle with a courage worthy of Rome . Having arrived at the camp and united their forces, they made known the will of the Senate to the soldiers, and Aemilius exhorted them to do their duty in terms which evidently came from his heart. He addressed himself especially to explain and excuse the reverses which they had lately experienced; for it was on this point particularly that the soldiers were depressed and stood in need of encouragement. ¹⁷² The causes, he argued, of their defeats in former battles were many, and could not be reduced to one or two. But those causes were at an end; and no excuse existed now, if they only showed themselves to be men of courage, for not conquering their enemies. Up to that time both Consuls had never been engaged together, or employed thoroughly trained soldiers: the combatants on the contrary had been raw levies, entirely unexperienced in danger; and what was most important of all, they had been so entirely ignorant of their opponents, that they had been brought into the field, and engaged in a pitched battle with an enemy that they had never once set eyes on. Those who had been defeated on the Trebia were drawn up on the field at daybreak, on the very next morning after their arrival from Sicily ; while those who had fought in Etruria, not only had never seen the enemy before, but did not do so even during the very battle itself, owing to the unfortunate state of the atmosphere.

Paulus’s Speech Continued

But now the conditions were quite different. For in the first place both Consuls were with the army: and were not only prepared to share the danger themselves, but had also induced the Consuls of the previous year to remain and take part in the struggle. While the men had not only seen the arms, order, and numbers of the enemy, but had been engaged in almost daily fights with them for the last two years. The conditions therefore under which the two former battles were fought being quite different, it was but natural that the result of the coming struggle should be different too. For it would be strange or rather impossible that those who in various skirmishes, where the numbers of either side were equal, had for the most part come off victorious, should, when drawn up all together, and nearly double of the enemy in number, be defeated.

Wherefore, men of the army, he continued, seeing that we have every advantage on our side for securing a victory, there is only one thing necessary,—your determination, your zeal! And I do not think I need say more to you on that point. To men serving others for pay, or to those who fight as allies on behalf of others, who have no greater danger to expect than meets them on the field, and for whom the issues at stake are of little importance,—such men may need words of exhortation. But men who, like you, are fighting not for others, but themselves,—for country, wives, and children; and for whom the issue is of far more momentous consequence than the mere danger of the hour, need only to be reminded: require no exhortation. For who is there among you who would not wish if possible to be victorious; and next, if that may not be, to die with arms in his hands, rather than to live and see the outrage and death of those dear objects which I have named? Wherefore, men of the army, apart from any words of mine, place before your eyes the momentous difference to you between victory and defeat, and all their consequences. Enter upon this battle with the full conviction, that in it your country is not risking a certain number of legions, but her bare existence. For she has nothing to add to such an army as this, to give her victory, if the day now goes against us. All she has of confidence and strength rests on you; all her hopes of safety are in your hands. Do not frustrate those hopes: but pay back to your country the gratitude you owe her; and make it clear to all the world that the former reverses occurred, not because the Romans are worse men than the Carthaginians, but from the lack of experience on the part of those who were then fighting, and through a combination of adverse circumstances. With such words Aemilius dismissed the troops.

Skirmishes Before Cannae

Next morning the two Consuls broke up their camp, ¹⁷³ and advanced to where they heard that the enemy were entrenched. On the second day they arrived within sight of them, and pitched their camp at about fifty stades’ distance. But when Aemilius observed that the ground was flat and bare for some distance round, he said that they must not engage there with an enemy superior to them in cavalry; but that they must rather try to draw him off, and lead him to ground on which the battle would be more in the hands of the infantry. But Gaius Terentius being, from inexperience, of a contrary opinion, there was a dispute and misunderstanding between the leaders, which of all things is the most dangerous. ¹⁷⁴ It is the custom, when the two Consuls are present, that they should take the chief command on alternate days; and the next day happening to be the turn of Terentius, he ordered an advance with a view of approaching the enemy, in spite of the protests and active opposition of his colleague. Hannibal set his light-armed troops and cavalry in motion to meet him, and charging the Romans while they were still marching, took them by surprise and caused a great confusion in their ranks.¹⁷⁵ The Romans repulsed the first charge by putting some of their heavy-armed in front; and then sending forward their light-armed and cavalry, began to get the best of the fight all along the line: the Carthaginians having no reserves of any importance, while certain companies of the legionaries were mixed with the Roman light-armed, and helped to sustain the battle. Nightfall for the present put an end to a struggle which had not at all answered to the hopes of the Carthaginians. But next day Aemilius, not thinking it right to engage, and yet being unable any longer to lead off his army, encamped with twothirds of it on the banks of the Aufidus , the only river which flows right through the Apennines ,—that chain of mountains which forms the watershed of all the Italian rivers, which flow either west to the Tuscan sea, or east to the Hadriatic. This chain is, I say, pierced by the Aufidus , which rises on the side of Italy nearest the Tuscan Sea, and is discharged into the Hadriatic. For the other third of his army he caused a camp to be made across the river, to the east of the ford, about ten stades from his own lines, and a little more from those of the enemy; that these men, being on the other side of the river, might protect his own foraging parties, and threaten those of the enemy.

Hannibal Encourages his Troops

Then Hannibal, seeing that his circumstances called ¹⁷⁶ for a battle with the enemy, being anxious lest his troops should be depressed by their previous reverse, and believing that it was an occasion which required some encouraging words, summoned a general meeting of his soldiers. When they were assembled, he bid them all look round upon the country, and asked them, What better fortune they could have asked from the gods, if they had had the choice, than to fight in such ground as they saw there, with the vast superiority of cavalry on their side? And when all signified their acquiescence in such an evident truth, he added: First, then, give thanks to the gods: for they have brought the enemy into this country, because they designed the victory for us. And, next to me, for having compelled the enemy to fight,—for they cannot avoid it any longer,—and to fight in a place so full of advantages for us. But I do not think it becoming in me now to use many words in exhorting you to be brave and forward in this battle. When you had had no experience of fighting the Romans this was necessary, and I did then suggest many arguments and examples to you. But now seeing that you have undeniably beaten the Romans in three successive battles of such magnitude, what arguments could have greater influence with you in confirming your courage than the actual facts? Now, by your previous battles you have got possession of the country and all its wealth, in accordance with my promises: for I have been absolutely true in everything I have ever said to you. But the present contest is for the cities and the wealth in them: and if you win it, all Italy will at once be in your power; and freed from your present hard toils, and masters of the wealth of Rome , you will by this battle become the leaders and lords of the world. This, then, is a time for deeds, not words: for by God’s blessing I am persuaded that I shall carry out my promises to you forthwith. His words were received with approving shouts, which he acknowledged with gratitude for their zeal; and having dismissed the assembly, he at once formed a camp on the same bank of the river as that on which was the larger camp of the Romans.

The Armies Face To Face

Next day he gave orders that all should employ themselves in making preparations and getting themselves into a fit ¹⁷⁷ state of body. On the day after that he drew out his men along the bank of the river, and showed that he was eager to give the enemy battle. But Aemilius, dissatisfied with his position, and seeing that the Carthaginians would soon be obliged to shift their quarters for the sake of supplies, kept quiet in his camps, strengthening both with extra guards. After waiting a considerable time, when no one came out to attack him, Hannibal put the rest of the army into camp again, but sent out his Numidian horse to attack the enemy’s water parties from the lesser camp. These horsemen riding right up to the lines and preventing the watering, Gaius Terentius became more than ever inflamed with the desire of fighting, and the soldiers were eager for a battle, and chafed at the delay. For there is nothing more intolerable to mankind than suspense; when a thing is once decided, men can but endure whatever out of the catalogue of evils it is their misfortune to undergo.

But when the news arrived at Rome that the two armies¹⁷⁸ were face to face, and that skirmishes between advanced parties of both sides were daily taking place, the city was in a state of high excitement and uneasiness; the people dreading the result, owing to the disasters which had now befallen them on more than one occasion; and foreseeing and anticipating in their imaginations what would happen if they were utterly defeated. All the oracles preserved at Rome were in everybody’s mouth; and every temple and house was full of prodigies and miracles: in consequence of which the city was one scene of vows, sacrifices, supplicatory processions, and prayers. For the Romans in times of danger take extraordinary pains to appease gods and men, and look upon no ceremony of that kind in such times as unbecoming or beneath their dignity.

The Order of Battle

When he took over the command on the following ¹⁷⁹ day, as soon as the sun was above the horizon, Gaius Terentius got the army in motion from both the camps. Those from the larger camp he drew up in order of battle, as soon as he had got them across the river, and bringing up those of the smaller camp he placed them all in the same line, selecting the south as the aspect of the whole. The Roman horse he stationed on the right wing along the river, and their foot next them in the same line, placing the maniples, however, closer together than usual, and making the depth of each maniple several times greater than its front. The cavalry of the allies he stationed on the left wing, and the light-armed troops he placed slightly in advance of the whole army, which amounted with its allies to eighty thousand infantry and a little more than six thousand horse. At the same time Hannibal brought his Balearic slingers and spearmen across the river, and stationed them in advance of his main body; which he led out of their camp, and, getting them across the river at two spots, drew them up opposite the enemy. On his left wing, close to the river, he stationed the Iberian and Celtic horse opposite the Roman cavalry; and next to them half the Libyan heavy-armed foot; and next to them the Iberian and Celtic foot; next, the other half of the Libyans, and, on the right wing, the Numidian horse. Having now got them all into line he advanced with the central companies of the Iberians and Celts; and so arranged the other companies next these in regular gradations, that the whole line became crescent-shaped, diminishing in depth towards its extremities: his object being to have his Libyans as a reserve in the battle, and to commence the action with his Iberians and Celts.

Arms of the Libyans, Iberians, and Celts

The armour of the Libyans was Roman, for Hannibal had armed them with a selection of the spoils taken in previous battles. The shield of the Iberians and Celts was about the same size, but their swords were quite different. For that of the Roman can thrust with as deadly effects as it can cut, while the Gallic sword can only cut, and that requires some room. And the companies coming alternately,—the naked Celts, and the Iberians with their short linen tunics bordered with purple stripes, the whole appearance of the line was strange and terrifying. The whole strength of the Carthaginian cavalry was ten thousand, but that of their foot was not more than forty thousand, including the Celts. Aemilius commanded on the Roman right, Gaius Terentius on the left, Marcus Atilius and Gnaeus Servilius, the Consuls of the previous year, on the centre. The left of the Carthaginians was commanded by Hasdrubal, the right by Hanno, the centre by Hannibal in person, attended by his brother Mago. And as the Roman line faced the south, as I said before, and the Carthaginian the north, the rays of the rising sun did not inconvenience either of them.

The Battle of Cannae

The battle was begun by an engagement between ¹⁸⁰ the advanced guard of the two armies; and at first the affair between these light-armed troops was indecisive. But as soon as the Iberian and Celtic cavalry got at the Romans, the battle began in earnest, and in the true barbaric fashion: for there was none of the usual formal advance and retreat; but when they once got to close quarters, they grappled man to man, and, dismounting from their horses, fought on foot. But when the Carthaginians had got the upper hand in this encounter and killed most of their opponents on the ground,— because the Romans all maintained the fight with spirit and determination,—and began chasing the remainder along the river, slaying as they went and giving no quarter; then the legionaries took the place of the light-armed and closed with the enemy. For a short time the Iberian and Celtic lines stood their ground and fought gallantly; but; presently overpowered by the weight of the heavy-armed lines, they gave way and retired to the rear, thus breaking up the crescent. The Roman maniples followed with spirit, and easily cut their way through the enemy’s line; since the Celts had been drawn up in a thin line, while the Romans had closed up from the wings towards the centre and the point of danger. For the two wings did not come into action at the same time as the centre: but the centre was first engaged, because the Gauls, having been stationed on the arc of the crescent, had come into contact with the enemy long before the wings, the convex of the crescent being towards the enemy. ¹⁸¹ The Romans, however, going in pursuit of these troops, and hastily closing in towards the centre and the part of the enemy which was giving ground, advanced so far, that the Libyan heavy-armed troops on either wing got on their flanks. Those on the right, facing to the left, charged from the right upon the Roman flank; while those who were on the left wing faced to the right, and, dressing by the left, charged their right flank,¹⁸² the exigency of the moment suggesting to them what they ought to do. Thus it came about, as Hannibal had planned, that the Romans were caught between two hostile lines of Libyans—thanks to their impetuous pursuit of the Celts. Still they fought, though no longer in line, yet singly, or in maniples, which faced about to meet those who charged them on the flanks.

The Slaughter At Cannae

Though he had been from the first on the right wing, and had taken part in the cavalry engagement, Lucius Aemilius still survived. Determined to act up to his own exhortatory speech, and seeing that the decision of the battle rested mainly on the legionaries, riding up to the centre of the line he led the charge himself, and personally grappled with the enemy, at the same time cheering on and exhorting his soldiers to the charge. Hannibal, on the other side, did the same, for he too had taken his place on the centre from the commencement. The Numidian horse on the Carthaginian right were meanwhile charging the cavalry on the Roman left; and though, from the peculiar nature of their mode of fighting, they neither inflicted nor received much harm, they yet rendered the enemy’s horse useless by keeping them occupied, and charging them first on one side and then on another. But when Hasdrubal, after all but annihilating the cavalry by the river, came from the left to the support of the Numidians, the Roman allied cavalry, seeing his charge approaching, broke and fled. At that point Hasdrubal appears to have acted with great skill and discretion. Seeing the Numidians to be strong in numbers, and more effective and formidable to troops that had once been forced from their ground, he left the pursuit to them; while he himself hastened to the part of the field where the infantry were engaged, and brought his men up to support the Libyans. Then, by charging the Roman legions on the rear, and harassing them by hurling squadron after squadron upon them at many points at once, he raised the spirits of the Libyans, and dismayed and depressed those of the Romans.¹⁸³ It was at this point that Lucius Aemilius fell, in the thick of the fight, covered with wounds: a man who did his duty to his country at that last hour of his life, as he had throughout its previous years, if any man ever did.¹⁸⁴ As long as the Romans could keep an unbroken front, to turn first in one direction and then in another to meet the assaults of the enemy, they held out; but the outer files of the circle continually falling, and the circle becoming more and more contracted, they at last were all killed on the field; and among them Marcus Atilius and Gnaeus Servilius, the Consuls of the previous year, who had shown themselves brave men and worthy of Rome in the battle. While this struggle and carnage were going on, the Numidian horse were pursuing the fugitives, most of whom they cut down or hurled from their horses; but some few escaped into Venusia , among whom was Gaius Terentius, the Consul, who thus sought a flight, as disgraceful to himself, as his conduct in office had been disastrous to his country.

Superiority in Cavalry Wins Battles

Such was the end of the battle of Cannae , in which both sides fought with the most conspicuous gallantry, the conquered no less than the conquerors. This is proved by the fact that, out of six thousand horse, only seventy escaped with Gaius Terentius to Venusia , and about three hundred of the allied cavalry to various towns in the neighbourhood. Of the infantry ten thousand were taken prisoners in fair fight, but were not actually engaged in the battle: of those who were actually engaged only about three thousand perhaps escaped to the towns of the surrounding district; all the rest died nobly, to the number of seventy thousand, the Carthaginians being on this occasion, as on previous ones, mainly indebted for their victory to their superiority in cavalry: a lesson to posterity that in actual war it is better to have half the number of infantry, and the superiority in cavalry, than to engage your enemy with an equality in both. On the side of Hannibal there fell four thousand Celts, fifteen hundred Iberians and Libyans, and about two hundred horse.

The ten thousand Romans who were captured had not,¹⁸⁵ as I said, been engaged in the actual battle; and the reason was this. Lucius Aemilius left ten thousand infantry in his camp that, in case Hannibal should disregard the safety of his own camp, and take his whole army on to the field, they might seize the opportunity, while the battle was going on, of forcing their way in and capturing the enemy’s baggage; or if, on the other hand, Hannibal should, in view of this contingency, leave a guard in his camp, the number of the enemy in the field might thereby be diminished. These men were captured in the following circumstances. Hannibal, as a matter of fact, did leave a sufficient guard in his camp; and as soon as the battle began, the Romans, according to their instructions, assaulted and tried to take those thus left by Hannibal. At first they held their own: but just as they were beginning to waver, Hannibal, who was by this time gaining a victory all along the line, came to their relief, and routing the Romans, shut them up in their own camp; killed two thousand of them; and took all the rest prisoners. In like manner the Numidian horse brought in all those who had taken refuge in the various strongholds about the district, amounting to two thousand of the routed cavalry.

The Consequences of the Battle of Cannae

The result of this battle, such as I have described it, ¹⁸⁶ had the consequences which both sides expected. For the Carthaginians by their victory were thenceforth masters of nearly the whole of the Italian coast which is called Magna Graecia. Thus the Tarentines immediately submitted; and the Arpani and some of the Campanian states invited Hannibal to come to them; and the rest were with one consent turning their eyes to the Carthaginians: who, accordingly, began now to have high hopes of being able to carry even Rome itself by assault.

On their side the Romans, after this disaster, despaired of retaining their supremacy over the Italians, and were in the greatest alarm, believing their own lives and the existence of their city to be in danger, and every moment expecting that Hannibal would be upon them.¹⁸⁷ For, as though Fortune were in league with the disasters that had already befallen them to fill up the measure of their ruin, it happened that only a few days afterwards, while the city was still in this panic, the Praetor who had been sent to Gaul fell unexpectedly into an ambush and perished, and his army was utterly annihilated by the Celts. In spite of all, however, the Senate left no means untried to save the State. It exhorted the people to fresh exertions, strengthened the city with guards, and deliberated on the crisis in a brave and manly spirit. And subsequent events made this manifest. For though the Romans were on that occasion indisputably beaten in the field, and had lost reputation for military prowess; by the peculiar excellence of their political constitution, and the prudence of their counsels, they not only recovered their supremacy over Italy , by eventually conquering the Carthaginians, but before very long became masters of the whole world.

I shall, therefore, end this book at this point, having now¹⁸⁸ recounted the events in Iberia and Italy , embraced by the 140th Olympiad. When I have arrived at the same period in my history of Greece during this Olympiad, I shall then fulfil my promise of devoting a book to a formal account of the Roman constitution itself; for I think that a description of it will not only be germane to the matter of my history, but will also be of great help to practical statesmen, as well as students, either in reforming or establishing other constitutions.

Histories. Polybius. Evelyn S. Shuckburgh (Translator). London. 1889.

Sponsored by Perseus Project, Tufts University.

Funding provided by Robert B. Strassler.

Current edition Perseus

The Histories (English) (Polybius. Vols. 1-2. Shuckburgh, Evelyn S., translator. London, New York, NY: Macmillan and Co., 1889.)

Editions (1)

Ἱστορίαι Perseus (Polybius. Vols. 1-4. Büttner-Wobst, Theodor, editor. Leipzig: Teubner, 1893.) — 3.1 focus

[1] ὅτι μὲν ἀρχὰς ὑποτιθέμεθα τῆς αὑτῶν πραγματείας τόν τε συμμαχικὸν καὶ τὸν Ἀννιβιακόν, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις τὸν περὶ Κοίλης Συρίας πόλεμον, ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ μὲν τῆς ὅλης συντάξεως, τρίτῃ δὲ ταύτης ἀνώτερον βύβλῳ δεδηλώκαμεν·

[2] ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰς αἰτίας, διʼ ἃς ἀναδραμόντες τοῖς χρόνοις πρὸ τούτων τῶν καιρῶν συνεταξάμεθα τὰς πρὸ ταύτης βύβλους, ἐν αὐτῇ ʼκείνῃ διεσαφήσαμεν.

[3] νῦν δὲ πειρασόμεθα τοὺς προειρημένους πολέμους καὶ τὰς αἰτίας, ἐξ ὧν ἐγένοντο καὶ διʼ ἃς ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ηὐξήθησαν, μετʼ ἀποδείξεως ἐξαγγέλλειν, βραχέα προειπόντες ὑπὲρ τῆς αὑτῶν πραγματείας.

[4] ὄντος γὰρ ἑνὸς ἔργου καὶ θεάματος ἑνὸς τοῦ σύμπαντος, ὑπὲρ οὗ γράφειν ἐπικεχειρήκαμεν, τοῦ πῶς καὶ πότε καὶ διὰ τί πάντα τὰ γνωριζόμενα μέρη τῆς οἰκουμένης ὑπὸ τὴν Ῥωμαίων δυναστείαν ἐγένετο,

[5] τούτου δʼ ἔχοντος καὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν γνωριζομένην καὶ τὸν χρόνον ὡρισμένον καὶ τὴν συντέλειαν ὁμολογουμένην, χρήσιμον ἡγούμεθʼ εἶναι καὶ τὸ περὶ τῶν μεγίστων ἐν αὐτῷ μερῶν, ὅσα μεταξὺ κεῖται τῆς ἀρχῆς καὶ τοῦ τέλους, κεφαλαιωδῶς ἐπιμνησθῆναι καὶ προεκθέσθαι.

[6] μάλιστα γὰρ οὕτως ὑπολαμβάνομεν τοῖς φιλομαθοῦσι παρασκευάσειν ἱκανὴν ἔννοιαν τῆς ὅλης ἐπιβολῆς.

[7] πολλὰ μὲν γὰρ προλαμβανούσης τῆς ψυχῆς ἐκ τῶν ὅλων πρὸς τὴν κατὰ μέρος τῶν πραγμάτων γνῶσιν, πολλὰ δʼ ἐκ τῶν κατὰ μέρος πρὸς τὴν τῶν ὅλων ἐπιστήμην, ἀρίστην ἡγούμενοι τὴν ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ἐπίστασιν καὶ θέαν ἀκόλουθον τοῖς εἰρημένοις ποιησόμεθα τὴν προέκθεσιν τῆς αὑτῶν πραγματείας.

[8] τὴν μὲν οὖν καθόλου τῆς ὑποθέσεως ἔμφασιν καὶ τὴν περιγραφὴν ἤδη δεδηλώκαμεν.

[9] τῶν δὲ κατὰ μέρος ἐν αὐτῇ γεγονότων ἀρχὰς μὲν εἶναι συμβαίνει τοὺς προειρημένους πολέμους, καταστροφὴν δὲ καὶ συντέλειαν τὴν κατάλυσιν τῆς ἐν Μακεδονίᾳ βασιλείας, χρόνον δὲ τὸν μεταξὺ τῆς ἀρχῆς καὶ τοῦ τέλους ἔτη πεντήκοντα τρία,

[10] περιέχεσθαι δʼ ἐν τούτῳ τηλικαύτας καὶ τοιαύτας πράξεις, ὅσας οὐδεὶς τῶν προγεγονότων καιρῶν ἐν ἴσῳ περιέλαβε διαστήματι.

[11] περὶ ὧν ἀπὸ τῆς ἑκατοστῆς καὶ τετταρακοστῆς ὀλυμπιάδος ἀρξάμενοι τοιάνδε

[1] τινὰ ποιησόμεθα τὴν ἔφοδον τῆς ἐξηγήσεως. ὑποδείξαντες γὰρ τὰς αἰτίας, διʼ ἃς ὁ προδεδηλωμένος συνέστη Καρχηδονίοις καὶ Ῥωμαίοις πόλεμος, ὁ προσαγορευθεὶς Ἀννιβιακός,

[2] ἐροῦμεν ὡς εἰς Ἰταλίαν ἐμβαλόντες Καρχηδόνιοι καὶ καταλύσαντες τὴν Ῥωμαίων δυναστείαν εἰς μέγαν μὲν φόβον ἐκείνους ἤγαγον περὶ σφῶν καὶ τοῦ τῆς πατρίδος ἐδάφους, μεγάλας δʼ ἔσχον αὐτοὶ καὶ παραδόξους ἐλπίδας, ὡς καὶ τῆς Ῥώμης αὐτῆς ἐξ ἐφόδου κρατήσοντες.

[3] ἑξῆς δὲ τούτοις πειρασόμεθα διασαφεῖν ὡς κατὰ τοὺς αὐτοὺς καιροὺς Φίλιππος μὲν ὁ Μακεδὼν διαπολεμήσας Αἰτωλοῖς καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα συστησάμενος τὰ κατὰ τοὺς Ἕλληνας ἐπεβάλετο κοινωνεῖν Καρχηδονίοις τῶν αὐτῶν ἐλπίδων,

[4] Ἀντίοχος δὲ καὶ Πτολεμαῖος ὁ Φιλοπάτωρ ἠμφισβήτουν, τέλος δʼ ἐπολέμησαν ὑπὲρ Κοίλης Συρίας πρὸς ἀλλήλους,

[5] Ῥόδιοι δὲ καὶ Προυσίας ἀναλαβόντες πρὸς Βυζαντίους πόλεμον ἠνάγκασαν αὐτοὺς ἀποστῆναι τοῦ παραγωγιάζειν τοὺς πλέοντας εἰς τὸν Πόντον.

[6] στήσαντες δʼ ἐπὶ τούτων τὴν διήγησιν τὸν ὑπὲρ τῆς Ῥωμαίων πολιτείας συστησόμεθα λόγον, ᾧ κατὰ τὸ συνεχὲς ὑποδείξομεν ὅτι μέγιστα συνεβάλετʼ αὐτοῖς ἡ τοῦ πολιτεύματος ἰδιότης πρὸς τὸ μὴ μόνον ἀνακτήσασθαι τὴν Ἰταλιωτῶν καὶ Σικελιωτῶν δυναστείαν, ἔτι δὲ τὴν Ἰβήρων προσλαβεῖν καὶ Κελτῶν ἀρχήν, ἀλλὰ τὸ τελευταῖον καὶ πρὸς τὸ κρατήσαντας τῷ πολέμῳ Καρχηδονίων ἔννοιαν σχεῖν τῆς τῶν ὅλων ἐπιβολῆς.

[7] ἅμα δὲ τούτοις κατὰ παρέκβασιν δηλώσομεν τὴν κατάλυσιν τῆς Ἱέρωνος τοῦ Συρακοσίου δυναστείας.

[8] οἷς ἐπισυνάψομεν τὰς περὶ τὴν Αἴγυπτον ταραχὰς καὶ τίνα τρόπον Πτολεμαίου τοῦ βασιλέως μεταλλάξαντος τὸν βίον συμφρονήσαντες Ἀντίοχος καὶ Φίλιππος ἐπὶ διαιρέσει τῆς τοῦ καταλελειμμένου παιδὸς ἀρχῆς ἤρξαντο κακοπραγμονεῖν καὶ τὰς χεῖρας ἐπιβάλλειν Φίλιππος μὲν τοῖς κατʼ Αἴγαιον καὶ Καρίαν καὶ Σάμον, Ἀντίοχος δὲ τοῖς κατὰ Κοίλην Συρίαν καὶ Φοινίκην.

[1] μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα συγκεφαλαιωσάμενοι τὰς ἐν Ἰβηρίᾳ καὶ Λιβύῃ καὶ Σικελίᾳ πράξεις Ῥωμαίων καὶ Καρχηδονίων μεταβιβάσομεν τὴν διήγησιν ὁλοσχερῶς εἰς τοὺς κατὰ τὴν Ἑλλάδα τόπους ἅμα ταῖς τῶν πραγμάτων μεταβολαῖς.

[2] ἐξηγησάμενοι δὲ τὰς Ἀττάλου καὶ Ῥοδίων ναυμαχίας πρὸς Φίλιππον, ἔτι δὲ τὸν Ῥωμαίων καὶ Φιλίππου πόλεμον, ὡς ἐπράχθη καὶ διὰ τίνων καὶ τί τὸ τέλος ἔσχεν,

[3] τούτῳ συνάπτοντες τὸ συνεχὲς μνησθησόμεθα τῆς Αἰτωλῶν ὀργῆς, καθʼ ἣν Ἀντίοχον ἐπισπασάμενοι τὸν ἀπὸ τῆς Ἀσίας Ἀχαιοῖς καὶ Ῥωμαίοις ἐξέκαυσαν πόλεμον.

[4] οὗ δηλώσαντες τὰς αἰτίας καὶ τὴν Ἀντιόχου διάβασιν εἰς τὴν Εὐρώπην διασαφήσομεν πρῶτον μὲν τίνα τρόπον ἐκ τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἔφυγεν, δεύτερον δὲ πῶς ἡττηθεὶς τῆς ἐπὶ τάδε τοῦ Ταύρου πάσης ἐξεχώρησε,

[5] τὸ δὲ τρίτον τίνα τρόπον Ῥωμαῖοι καταλύσαντες τὴν Γαλατῶν ὕβριν ἀδήριτον μὲν σφίσι παρεσκεύασαν τὴν τῆς Ἀσίας ἀρχήν, ἀπέλυσαν δὲ τοὺς ἐπὶ τάδε τοῦ Ταύρου κατοικοῦντας βαρβαρικῶν φόβων καὶ τῆς Γαλατῶν παρανομίας.

[6] μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα θέντες ὑπὸ τὴν ὄψιν τὰς Αἰτωλῶν καὶ Κεφαλλήνων ἀτυχίας ἐπιβαλοῦμεν τοὺς Εὐμένει συστάντας πρός τε Προυσίαν καὶ Γαλάτας πολέμους, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸν μετʼ Ἀριαράθου πρὸς Φαρνάκην.

[7] οἷς ἑξῆς ἐπιμνησθέντες τῆς παρὰ Πελοποννησίων ὁμονοίας καὶ καταστάσεως, ἔτι δὲ τῆς αὐξήσεως τοῦ Ῥοδίων πολιτεύματος, συγκεφαλαιωσόμεθα τὴν ὅλην διήγησιν ἅμα καὶ τὰς πράξεις,

[8] ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ἐξηγησάμενοι τὴν Ἀντιόχου στρατείαν εἰς Αἴγυπτον τοῦ κληθέντος Ἐπιφανοῦς καὶ τὸν Περσικὸν πόλεμον καὶ τὴν κατάλυσιν τῆς ἐν Μακεδονίᾳ βασιλείας.

[9] διʼ ὧν ἅμα θεωρηθήσεται πῶς ἕκαστα χειρίσαντες Ῥωμαῖοι πᾶσαν ἐποιήσαντο τὴν οἰκουμένην ὑπήκοον αὑτοῖς.

[1] εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν κατορθωμάτων ἢ καὶ τῶν ἐλαττωμάτων ἱκανὴν ἐνεδέχετο ποιήσασθαι τὴν διάληψιν ὑπὲρ τῶν ψεκτῶν ἢ τοὐναντίον ἐπαινετῶν ἀνδρῶν καὶ πολιτευμάτων, ἐνθάδε που λήγειν ἂν ἡμᾶς ἔδει καὶ καταστρέφειν ἅμα τὴν διήγησιν καὶ τὴν πραγματείαν ἐπὶ τὰς τελευταίας ῥηθείσας πράξεις κατὰ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς πρόθεσιν.

[2] ὅ τε γὰρ χρόνος ὁ πεντηκοντακαιτριετὴς εἰς ταῦτʼ ἔληγεν, ἥ τʼ αὔξησις καὶ προκοπὴ τῆς Ῥωμαίων δυναστείας ἐτετελείωτο·

[3] πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ὁμολογούμενον ἐδόκει τοῦτʼ εἶναι καὶ κατηναγκασμένον ἅπασιν ὅτι λοιπόν ἐστι Ῥωμαίων ἀκούειν καὶ τούτοις πειθαρχεῖν ὑπὲρ τῶν παραγγελλομένων.

[4] ἐπεὶ δʼ οὐκ αὐτοτελεῖς εἰσιν οὔτε περὶ τῶν κρατησάντων οὔτε περὶ τῶν ἐλαττωθέντων αἱ ψιλῶς ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν ἀγωνισμάτων διαλήψεις,

[5] διὰ τὸ πολλοῖς μὲν τὰ μέγιστα δοκοῦντʼ εἶναι τῶν κατορθωμάτων, ὅταν μὴ δεόντως αὐτοῖς χρήσωνται, τὰς μεγίστας ἐπενηνοχέναι συμφοράς, οὐκ ὀλίγοις δὲ τὰς ἐκπληκτικωτάτας περιπετείας, ὅταν εὐγενῶς αὐτὰς ἀναδέξωνται, πολλάκις εἰς τὴν τοῦ συμφέροντος περιπεπτωκέναι μερίδα,

[6] προσθετέον ἂν εἴη ταῖς προειρημέναις πράξεσι τήν τε τῶν κρατούντων αἵρεσιν, ποία τις ἦν μετὰ ταῦτα καὶ πῶς προεστάτει τῶν ὅλων, τάς τε τῶν ἄλλων ἀποδοχὰς καὶ διαλήψεις, πόσαι καὶ τίνες ὑπῆρχον περὶ τῶν ἡγουμένων, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις τὰς ὁρμὰς καὶ τοὺς ζήλους ἐξηγητέον, τίνες παρʼ ἑκάστοις ἐπεκράτουν καὶ κατίσχυον περί τε τοὺς κατʼ ἰδίαν βίους καὶ τὰς κοινὰς πολιτείας.

[7] δῆλον γὰρ ὡς ἐκ τούτων φανερὸν ἔσται τοῖς μὲν νῦν οὖσιν πότερα φευκτὴν ἢ τοὐναντίον αἱρετὴν εἶναι συμβαίνει τὴν Ῥωμαίων δυναστείαν, τοῖς δʼ ἐπιγενομένοις πότερον ἐπαινετὴν καὶ ζηλωτὴν ἢ ψεκτὴν γεγονέναι νομιστέον τὴν ἀρχὴν αὐτῶν.

[8] τὸ γὰρ ὠφέλιμον τῆς ἡμετέρας ἱστορίας πρός τε τὸ παρὸν καὶ πρὸς τὸ μέλλον ἐν τούτῳ πλεῖστον κείσεται τῷ μέρει.

[9] οὐ γὰρ δὴ τοῦτʼ εἶναι τέλος ὑποληπτέον ἐν πράγμασιν οὔτε τοῖς ἡγουμένοις οὔτε τοῖς ἀποφαινομένοις ὑπὲρ τούτων, τὸ νικῆσαι καὶ ποιήσασθαι πάντας ὑφʼ ἑαυτούς.

[10] οὔτε γὰρ πολεμεῖ τοῖς πέλας οὐδεὶς νοῦν ἔχων ἕνεκεν αὐτοῦ τοῦ καταγωνίσασθαι τοὺς ἀντιταττομένους, οὔτε πλεῖ τὰ πελάγη χάριν τοῦ περαιωθῆναι μόνον, καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ τὰς ἐμπειρίας καὶ τέχνας αὐτῆς ἕνεκα τῆς ἐπιστήμης ἀναλαμβάνει·

[11] πάντες δὲ πράττουσι πάντα χάριν τῶν ἐπιγινομένων τοῖς ἔργοις ἡδέων ἢ καλῶν ἢ συμφερόντων.

[12] διὸ καὶ τῆς πραγματείας ταύτης τοῦτʼ ἔσται τελεσιούργημα, τὸ γνῶναι τὴν κατάστασιν παρʼ ἑκάστοις, ποία τις ἦν μετὰ τὸ καταγωνισθῆναι τὰ ὅλα καὶ πεσεῖν εἰς τὴν τῶν Ῥωμαίων ἐξουσίαν ἕως τῆς μετὰ ταῦτα πάλιν ἐπιγενομένης ταραχῆς καὶ κινήσεως.

[13] ὑπὲρ ἧς διὰ τὸ μέγεθος τῶν ἐν αὐτῇ πράξεων καὶ τὸ παράδοξον τῶν συμβαινόντων, τὸ δὲ μέγιστον, διὰ τὸ τῶν πλείστων μὴ μόνον αὐτόπτης, ἀλλʼ ὧν μὲν συνεργὸς ὧν δὲ καὶ χειριστὴς γεγονέναι, προήχθην οἷον ἀρ

[1] χὴν ποιησάμενος ἄλλην γράφειν. ἦν δʼ ἡ προειρημένη κίνησις, ἐν ᾗ Ῥωμαῖοι μὲν πρὸς Κελτίβηρας καὶ Οὐακκαίους ἐξήνεγκαν πόλεμον, Καρχηδόνιοι δὲ τὸν πρὸς Μασαννάσαν βασιλέα τῶν Λιβύων·

[2] περὶ δὲ τὴν Ἀσίαν Ἄτταλος μὲν καὶ Προυσίας πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἐπολέμησαν, ὁ δὲ τῶν Καππαδοκῶν βασιλεὺς Ἀριαράθης ἐκπεσὼν ἐκ τῆς ἀρχῆς ὑπʼ Ὀροφέρνους διὰ Δημητρίου τοῦ βασιλέως αὖθις ἀνεκτήσατο διʼ Ἀττάλου τὴν πατρῴαν ἀρχήν.

[3] ὁ δὲ Σελεύκου Δημήτριος κύριος γενόμενος ἔτη δώδεκα τῆς ἐν Συρίᾳ βασιλείας ἅμα τοῦ βίου καὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς ἐστερήθη, συστραφέντων ἐπʼ αὐτὸν τῶν ἄλλων βασιλέων.

[4] ἀποκατέστησαν δὲ καὶ Ῥωμαῖοι τοὺς Ἕλληνας εἰς τὴν οἰκείαν τοὺς ἐκ τοῦ Περσικοῦ πολέμου καταιτιαθέντας, ἀπολύσαντες τῆς ἐπενεχθείσης αὐτοῖς διαβολῆς.

[5] οἱ δʼ αὐτοὶ μετʼ οὐ πολὺ Καρχηδονίοις ἐπέβαλον τὰς χεῖρας, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον μεταναστῆσαι, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα πάλιν ἄρδην αὐτοὺς ἐξαναστῆσαι προθέμενοι διὰ τὰς ἐν τοῖς ἑξῆς ῥηθησομένας αἰτίας.

[6] οἷς κατάλληλα Μακεδόνων μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς Ῥωμαίων φιλίας, Λακεδαιμονίων δὲ τῆς τῶν Ἀχαιῶν συμπολιτείας ἀποστάντων, ἅμα τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ τὸ τέλος ἔσχε τὸ κοινὸν ἀτύχημα πάσης τῆς Ἑλλάδος.

τὰ μὲν οὖν τῆς ἐπιβολῆς ἡμῶν τοιαῦτα·

[7] προσδεῖ δʼ ἔτι τῆς τύχης, ἵνα συνδράμῃ τὰ τοῦ βίου πρὸς τὸ τὴν πρόθεσιν ἐπὶ τέλος ἀγαγεῖν.

[8] πέπεισμαι μὲν γάρ, κἄν τι συμβῇ περὶ ἡμᾶς ἀνθρώπινον, οὐκ ἀργήσειν τὴν ὑπόθεσιν οὐδʼ ἀπορήσειν ἀνδρῶν ἀξιόχρεων, διὰ δὲ τὸ κάλλος πολλοὺς κατεγγυηθήσεσθαι καὶ σπουδάσειν ἐπὶ τέλος ἀγαγεῖν αὐτήν.

[9] ἐπεὶ δὲ τὰς ἐπιφανεστάτας τῶν πράξεων ἐπὶ κεφαλαίου διεληλύθαμεν, βουλόμενοι καὶ καθόλου καὶ κατὰ μέρος εἰς ἔννοιαν ἀγαγεῖν τῆς ὅλης ἱστορίας τοὺς ἐντυγχάνοντας, ὥρα μνημονεύοντας τῆς προθέσεως ἐπαναγαγεῖν ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς αὑτῶν ὑποθέσεως.

[1] ἔνιοι δὲ τῶν συγγεγραφότων τὰς κατʼ Ἀννίβαν πράξεις βουλόμενοι τὰς αἰτίας ἡμῖν ὑποδεικνύναι, διʼ ἃς Ῥωμαίοις καὶ Καρχηδονίοις ὁ προειρημένος ἐνέστη πόλεμος, πρώτην μὲν ἀποφαίνουσι τὴν Ζακάνθης πολιορκίαν ὑπὸ Καρχηδονίων,

[2] δευτέραν δὲ τὴν διάβασιν αὐτῶν παρὰ τὰς συνθήκας τοῦ προσαγορευομένου παρὰ τοῖς ἐγχωρίοις Ἴβηρος ποταμοῦ·

[3] ἐγὼ δὲ ταύτας ἀρχὰς μὲν εἶναι τοῦ πολέμου φήσαιμʼ ἄν, αἰτίας γε μὴν οὐδαμῶς ἂν συγχωρήσαιμι. πολλοῦ γε δεῖν,

[4] εἰ μὴ καὶ τὴν Ἀλεξάνδρου διάβασιν εἰς τὴν Ἀσίαν αἰτίαν εἶναί τις φήσει τοῦ πρὸς τοὺς Πέρσας πολέμου καὶ τὸν Ἀντιόχου κατάπλουν εἰς Δημητριάδα τοῦ πρὸς Ῥωμαίους· ὧν οὔτʼ εἰκὸς οὔτʼ ἀληθές ἐστιν οὐδέτερον.

[5] τίς γὰρ ἂν νομίσειε ταύτας αἰτίας ὑπάρχειν, ὧν πολλὰ μὲν Ἀλέξανδρος πρότερον, οὐκ ὀλίγα δὲ Φίλιππος ἔτι ζῶν ἐνήργησε καὶ παρεσκευάσατο πρὸς τὸν κατὰ τῶν Περσῶν πόλεμον, ὁμοίως δὲ πάλιν Αἰτωλοὶ πρὸ τῆς Ἀντιόχου παρουσίας πρὸς τὸν κατὰ Ῥωμαίων;

[6] ἀλλʼ ἔστιν ἀνθρώπων τὰ τοιαῦτα μὴ διειληφότων ἀρχὴ τί διαφέρει καὶ πόσον διέστηκεν αἰτίας καὶ προφάσεως, καὶ διότι τὰ μέν ἐστι πρῶτα τῶν ἁπάντων, ἡ δʼ ἀρχὴ τελευταῖον τῶν εἰρημένων.

[7] ἐγὼ δὲ παντὸς ἀρχὰς μὲν εἶναί φημι τὰς πρώτας ἐπιβολὰς καὶ πράξεις τῶν ἤδη κεκριμένων, αἰτίας δὲ τὰς προκαθηγουμένας τῶν κρίσεων καὶ διαλήψεων· λέγω δʼ ἐπινοίας καὶ διαθέσεις καὶ τοὺς περὶ ταῦτα συλλογισμοὺς καὶ διʼ ὧν· ἐπὶ τὸ κρῖναί τι καὶ προθέσθαι παραγινόμεθα.

[8] δῆλον δʼ οἷον τὸ προειρημένον ἐκ τῶν ἐπιφερομένων.

[9] τίνες γὰρ ἀληθῶς ἦσαν αἰτίαι, καὶ πόθεν φῦναι συνέβη τὸν πρὸς τοὺς Πέρσας πόλεμον, εὐμαρὲς καὶ τῷ τυχόντι συνιδεῖν.

[10] ἦν δὲ πρώτη μὲν ἡ τῶν μετὰ Ξενοφῶντος Ἑλλήνων ἐκ τῶν ἄνω σατραπειῶν ἐπάνοδος, ἐν ᾗ πᾶσαν τὴν Ἀσίαν διαπορευομένων αὐτῶν πολεμίαν ὑπάρχουσαν οὐδεὶς ἐτόλμα μένειν κατὰ πρόσωπον τῶν βαρβάρων·

[11] δευτέρα δʼ ἡ τοῦ Λακεδαιμονίων βασιλέως Ἀγησιλάου διάβασις εἰς τὴν Ἀσίαν, ἐν ᾗ ʼκεῖνος οὐδὲν ἀξιόχρεων οὐδʼ ἀντίπαλον εὑρὼν ταῖς σφετέραις ἐπιβολαῖς ἄπρακτος ἠναγκάσθη μεταξὺ διὰ τὰς περὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα ταραχὰς ἐπανελθεῖν.

[12] ἐξ ὧν Φίλιππος κατανοήσας καὶ συλλογισάμενος τὴν Περσῶν ἀνανδρίαν καὶ ῥᾳθυμίαν καὶ τὴν αὑτοῦ καὶ Μακεδόνων εὐεξίαν ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς, ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὸ μέγεθος καὶ τὸ κάλλος τῶν ἐσομένων ἄθλων ἐκ τοῦ πολέμου πρὸ ὀφθαλμῶν θέμενος,

[13] ἅμα τῷ περιποιήσασθαι τὴν ἐκ τῶν Ἑλλήνων εὔνοιαν ὁμολογουμένην, εὐθέως προφάσει χρώμενος ὅτι σπεύδει μετελθεῖν τὴν Περσῶν παρανομίαν εἰς τοὺς Ἕλληνας, ὁρμὴν ἔσχε καὶ προέθετο πολεμεῖν καὶ πάντα πρὸς τοῦτο τὸ μέρος ἡτοίμαζε.

[14] διόπερ αἰτίας μὲν τὰς πρώτας ῥηθείσας ἡγητέον τοῦ πρὸς τοὺς Πέρσας πολέμου, πρόφασιν δὲ τὴν δευτέραν, ἀρχὴν δὲ τὴν

[1] Ἀλεξάνδρου διάβασιν εἰς τὴν Ἀσίαν. καὶ μὴν τοῦ κατʼ Ἀντίοχον καὶ Ῥωμαίους δῆλον ὡς αἰτίαν μὲν τὴν Αἰτωλῶν ὀργὴν θετέον.

[2] ἐκεῖνοι γὰρ δόξαντες ὑπὸ Ῥωμαίων ὠλιγωρῆσθαι κατὰ πολλὰ περὶ τὴν ἔκβασιν τὴν ἐκ τοῦ Φιλίππου πολέμου, καθάπερ ἐπάνω προεῖπον, οὐ μόνον Ἀντίοχον ἐπεσπάσαντο, πᾶν δὲ καὶ πρᾶξαι καὶ παθεῖν ὑπέστησαν διὰ τὴν ἐπιγενομένην ὀργὴν ἐκ τῶν προειρημένων καιρῶν.

[3] πρόφασιν δʼ ἡγητέον τὴν τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐλευθέρωσιν, ἣν ἐκεῖνοι περιπορευόμενοι μετʼ Ἀντιόχου τὰς πόλεις ἀλόγως καὶ ψευδῶς κατήγγελλον, ἀρχὴν δὲ τοῦ πολέμου τὸν Ἀντιόχου κατάπλουν εἰς Δημητριάδα.

[4] ἐγὼ δὲ τὴν ἐπὶ πλεῖον διαστολὴν πεποίημαι περὶ τούτων οὐχ ἕνεκα τῆς τῶν συγγραφέων ἐπιτιμήσεως, χάριν δὲ τῆς τῶν φιλομαθούντων ἐπανορθώσεως.

[5] τί γὰρ ὄφελος ἰατροῦ κάμνουσιν ἀγνοοῦντος τὰς αἰτίας τῶν περὶ τὰ σώματα διαθέσεων; τί δʼ ἀνδρὸς πραγματικοῦ μὴ δυναμένου συλλογίζεσθαι πῶς καὶ διὰ τί καὶ πόθεν ἕκαστα τῶν πραγμάτων τὰς ἀφορμὰς εἴληφεν;

[6] οὔτε γὰρ ἐκεῖνον εἰκὸς οὐδέποτε δεόντως συστήσασθαι τὰς τῶν σωμάτων θεραπείας, οὔτε τὸν πραγματικὸν οὐδὲν οἷόν τε κατὰ τρόπον χειρίσαι τῶν προσπιπτόντων ἄνευ τῆς τῶν προειρημένων ἐπιγνώσεως.

[7] διόπερ οὐδὲν οὕτω φυλακτέον καὶ ζητητέον ὡς τὰς αἰτίας ἑκάστου τῶν συμβαινόντων, ἐπειδὴ φύεται μὲν ἐκ τῶν τυχόντων πολλάκις τὰ μέγιστα τῶν πραγμάτων, ἰᾶσθαι δὲ ῥᾷστόν ἐστιν παντὸς τὰς πρώτας ἐπιβολὰς καὶ διαλήψεις.

[1] Φάβιος δέ φησιν ὁ Ῥωμαϊκὸς συγγραφεὺς ἅμα τῷ κατὰ Ζακανθαίους ἀδικήματι καὶ τὴν Ἀσδρούβου πλεονεξίαν καὶ φιλαρχίαν αἰτίαν γίνεσθαι τοῦ κατʼ Ἀννίβαν πολέμου.

[2] ἐκεῖνον γὰρ μεγάλην ἀνειληφότα τὴν δυναστείαν ἐν τοῖς κατʼ Ἰβηρίαν τόποις, μετὰ ταῦτα παραγενόμενον ἐπὶ Λιβύην ἐπιβαλέσθαι καταλύσαντα τοὺς νόμους εἰς μοναρχίαν περιστῆσαι τὸ πολίτευμα τῶν Καρχηδονίων·

[3] τοὺς δὲ πρώτους ἄνδρας ἐπὶ τοῦ πολιτεύματος προϊδομένους αὐτοῦ τὴν ἐπιβολὴν συμφρονῆσαι καὶ διαστῆναι πρὸς αὐτόν·

[4] τὸν δʼ Ἀσδρούβαν ὑπιδόμενον, ἀναχωρήσαντʼ ἐκ τῆς Λιβύης τὸ λοιπὸν ἤδη τὰ κατὰ τὴν Ἰβηρίαν χειρίζειν κατὰ τὴν αὑτοῦ προαίρεσιν, οὐ προσέχοντα τῷ συνεδρίῳ τῶν Καρχηδονίων.

[5] Ἀννίβαν δὲ κοινωνὸν καὶ ζηλωτὴν ἐκ μειρακίου γεγονότα τῆς ἐκείνου προαιρέσεως καὶ τότε διαδεξάμενον τὰ κατὰ τὴν Ἰβηρίαν τὴν αὐτὴν ἀγωγὴν Ἀσδρούβᾳ ποιεῖσθαι τῶν πραγμάτων.

[6] διὸ καὶ νῦν τὸν πόλεμον τοῦτον ἐξενηνοχέναι κατὰ τὴν αὑτοῦ προαίρεσιν Ῥωμαίοις παρὰ τὴν Καρχηδονίων γνώμην.

[7] οὐδένα γὰρ εὐδοκεῖν τῶν ἀξιολόγων ἀνδρῶν ἐν Καρχηδόνι τοῖς ὑπʼ Ἀννίβου περὶ τὴν Ζακανθαίων πόλιν πραχθεῖσιν.

[8] ταῦτα δʼ εἰπών φησιν μετὰ τὴν τῆς προειρημένης πόλεως ἅλωσιν παραγενέσθαι τοὺς Ῥωμαίους, οἰομένους δεῖν ἢ τὸν Ἀννίβαν ἐκδιδόναι σφίσι τοὺς Καρχηδονίους ἢ τὸν πόλεμον ἀναλαμβάνειν.

[9] εἰ δέ τις ἔροιτο τὸν συγγραφέα ποῖος ἦν καιρὸς οἰκειότερος τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις ἢ ποῖον πρᾶγμα τούτου δικαιότερον ἢ συμφορώτερον, ἐπείπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς δυσηρεστοῦντο, καθάπερ οὗτός φησιν, τοῖς ὑπʼ Ἀννίβου πραττομένοις,

[10] τοῦ πεισθέντας τότε τοῖς ὑπὸ Ῥωμαίων παρακαλουμένοις ἐκδοῦναι μὲν τὸν αἴτιον τῶν ἀδικημάτων, ἐπανελέσθαι δʼ εὐλόγως διʼ ἑτέρων τὸν κοινὸν ἐχθρὸν τῆς πόλεως, περιποιήσασθαι δὲ τῇ χώρᾳ τὴν ἀσφάλειαν, ἀποτριψαμένους τὸν ἐπιφερόμενον πόλεμον, δόγματι μόνον τὴν ἐκδίκησιν ποιησαμένους, τί ἂν εἰπεῖν ἔχοι πρὸς αὐτά; δῆλον γὰρ ὡς οὐδέν.

[11] οἵ γε τοσοῦτον ἀπέσχον τοῦ πρᾶξαί τι τῶν προειρημένων ὡς ἑπτακαίδεκʼ ἔτη συνεχῶς πολεμήσαντες κατὰ τὴν Ἀννίβου προαίρεσιν οὐ πρότερον κατελύσαντο τὸν πόλεμον, ἕως οὗ πάσας ἐξελέγξαντες τὰς ἐλπίδας τελευταῖον εἰς τὸν περὶ τῆς πατρίδος καὶ τῶν ἐν αὐτῇ σωμάτων παρεγένοντο κίνδυνον.

[1] τίνος δὴ χάριν ἐμνήσθην Φαβίου καὶ τῶν ὑπʼ ἐκείνου γεγραμμένων;

[2] οὐχ ἕνεκα τῆς πιθανότητος τῶν εἰρημένων, ἀγωνιῶν μὴ πιστευθῇ παρά τισιν — ἡ μὲν γὰρ [παρὰ] τούτων ἀλογία καὶ χωρὶς τῆς ἐμῆς ἐξηγήσεως αὐτὴ διʼ αὑτῆς δύναται θεωρεῖσθαι παρὰ τοῖς ἐντυγχάνουσιν —

[3] ἀλλὰ τῆς τῶν ἀναλαμβανόντων τὰς ἐκείνου βύβλους ὑπομνήσεως, ἵνα μὴ πρὸς τὴν ἐπιγραφὴν ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὰ πράγματα βλέπωσιν.

[4] ἔνιοι γὰρ οὐκ ἐπὶ τὰ λεγόμενα συνεπιστήσαντες ἀλλʼ ἐπʼ αὐτὸν τὸν λέγοντα καὶ λαβόντες ἐν νῷ διότι κατὰ τοὺς καιροὺς ὁ γράφων γέγονε καὶ τοῦ συνεδρίου μετεῖχε τῶν Ῥωμαίων, πᾶν εὐθέως ἡγοῦνται τὸ λεγόμενον ὑπὸ τούτου πιστόν.

[5] ἐγὼ δὲ φημὶ μὲν δεῖν οὐκ ἐν μικρῷ προσλαμβάνεσθαι τὴν τοῦ συγγραφέως πίστιν, οὐκ αὐτοτελῆ δὲ κρίνειν, τὸ δὲ πλεῖον ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν πραγμάτων ποιεῖσθαι τοὺς ἀναγινώσκοντας τὰς δοκιμασίας.

[6] οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦ γε Ῥωμαίων καὶ Καρχηδονίων πολέμου — τὴν γὰρ παρέκβασιν ἐντεῦθεν ἐποιησάμεθα — νομιστέον πρῶτον μὲν αἴτιον γεγονέναι τὸν Ἀμίλκου θυμὸν τοῦ Βάρκα μὲν ἐπικαλουμένου, πατρὸς δὲ κατὰ φύσιν Ἀννίβου γεγονότος.

[7] ἐκεῖνος γὰρ οὐχ ἡττηθεὶς τῷ περὶ Σικελίας πολέμῳ τῇ ψυχῇ τῷ δοκεῖν αὐτὸς μὲν ἀκέραια διατετηρηκέναι τὰ περὶ τὸν Ἔρυκα στρατόπεδα ταῖς ὁρμαῖς ἐφʼ ὧν αὐτὸς ἦν, διὰ δὲ τὴν ἐν τῇ ναυμαχίᾳ τῶν Καρχηδονίων ἧτταν τοῖς καιροῖς εἴκων πεποιῆσθαι τὰς συνθήκας, ἔμενεν ἐπὶ τῆς ὀργῆς, τηρῶν ἀεὶ πρὸς ἐπίθεσιν.

[8] εἰ μὲν οὖν μὴ τὸ περὶ τοὺς ξένους ἐγένετο κίνημα τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις, εὐθέως ἂν ἄλλην ἀρχὴν ἐποιεῖτο καὶ παρασκευὴν πραγμάτων, ὅσον ἐπʼ ἐκείνῳ.

[9] προκαταληφθεὶς δὲ ταῖς ἐμφυλίοις ταραχαῖς ἐν τούτοις

[1] καὶ περὶ ταύτας διέτριβε τὰς πράξεις. Ῥωμαίων δὲ μετὰ τὸ καταλύσασθαι Καρχηδονίους τὴν προειρημένην ταραχὴν ἀπαγγειλάντων αὐτοῖς πόλεμον, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον εἰς πᾶν συγκατέβαινον, ὑπολαμβάνοντες αὑτοὺς νικήσειν τοῖς δικαίοις, καθάπερ ἐν ταῖς πρὸ ταύτης βύβλοις περὶ τούτων δεδηλώκαμεν,

[2] ὧν χωρὶς οὐχ οἷόν τʼ ἦν συμπεριενεχθῆναι δεόντως οὔτε τοῖς νῦν λεγομένοις οὔτε τοῖς μετὰ ταῦτα ῥηθησομένοις ὑφʼ ἡμῶν.

[3] πλὴν οὐκ ἐντρεπομένων τῶν Ῥωμαίων, εἴξαντες τῇ περιστάσει καὶ βαρυνόμενοι μέν, οὐκ ἔχοντες δὲ ποιεῖν οὐδὲν ἐξεχώρησαν Σαρδόνος, συνεχώρησαν δʼ εἰσοίσειν ἄλλα χίλια καὶ διακόσια τάλαντα πρὸς τοῖς πρότερον ἐφʼ ᾧ μὴ τὸν πόλεμον ἐκείνοις ἀναδέξασθαι τοῖς καιροῖς.

[4] διὸ καὶ δευτέραν, μεγίστην δὲ ταύτην θετέον αἰτίαν τοῦ μετὰ ταῦτα συστάντος πολέμου.

[5] Ἀμίλκας γὰρ προσλαβὼν τοῖς ἰδίοις θυμοῖς τὴν ἐπὶ τούτοις ὀργὴν τῶν πολιτῶν, ὡς θᾶττον τοὺς ἀποστάντας τῶν μισθοφόρων καταπολεμήσας ἐβεβαίωσε τῇ πατρίδι τὴν ἀσφάλειαν, εὐθέως ἐποιεῖτο τὴν ὁρμὴν ἐπὶ τὰ κατὰ τὴν Ἰβηρίαν πράγματα, σπουδάζων ταύτῃ χρήσασθαι παρασκευῇ πρὸς τὸν κατὰ Ῥωμαίων πόλεμον. ἣν δὴ καὶ τρίτην αἰτίαν νομιστέον,

[6] λέγω δὲ τὴν εὔροιαν τῶν κατʼ Ἰβηρίαν πραγμάτων Καρχηδονίοις. ταύταις γὰρ ταῖς χερσὶ πιστεύσαντες εὐθαρσῶς ἐνέβησαν εἰς τὸν προειρημένον πόλεμον.

[7] ὅτι δʼ Ἀμίλκας πλεῖστα μὲν συνεβάλετο πρὸς τὴν σύστασιν τοῦ δευτέρου πολέμου, καίπερ τετελευτηκὼς ἔτεσι δέκα πρότερον τῆς καταρχῆς αὐτοῦ, πολλὰ μὲν ἂν εὕροι τις εἰς τοῦτο· σχεδὸν δὲ πρὸς

[1] πίστιν ἀρκοῦν ἔσται τὸ λέγεσθαι μέλλον. καθʼ οὓς γὰρ καιροὺς καταπολεμηθεὶς Ἀννίβας ὑπὸ Ῥωμαίων τέλος ἐκ τῆς πατρίδος ἐξεχώρησε καὶ παρʼ Ἀντιόχῳ διέτριβε, τότε Ῥωμαῖοι συνθεωροῦντες ἤδη τὴν Αἰτωλῶν ἐπιβολὴν ἐξαπέστειλαν πρεσβευτὰς πρὸς Ἀντίοχον, βουλόμενοι μὴ λανθάνειν σφᾶς τὴν τοῦ βασιλέως προαίρεσιν.

[2] οἱ δὲ πρέσβεις ὁρῶντες τὸν Ἀντίοχον προσέχοντα τοῖς Αἰτωλοῖς καὶ πρόθυμον ὄντα πολεμεῖν Ῥωμαίοις, ἐθεράπευον τὸν Ἀννίβαν, σπουδάζοντες εἰς ὑποψίαν ἐμβαλεῖν πρὸς τὸν Ἀντίοχον.

[3] ὃ καὶ συνέβη γενέσθαι. προβαίνοντος γὰρ τοῦ χρόνου, καὶ τοῦ βασιλέως ὑπόπτως ἔχοντος ἀεὶ καὶ μᾶλλον πρὸς τὸν Ἀννίβαν, ἐγένετό τις καιρὸς ὡς ἐπὶ λόγον ἀχθῆναι τὴν ὑποικουρουμένην ἀτοπίαν ἐν αὐτοῖς.

[4] ἐν ᾧ καὶ πλείους ἀπολογισμοὺς ποιησάμενος Ἀννίβας τέλος ἐπὶ τὸ τοιοῦτο κατήντησε, δυσχρηστούμενος τοῖς λόγοις.

[5] ἔφη γάρ, καθʼ ὃν καιρὸν ὁ πατὴρ αὐτοῦ τὴν εἰς Ἰβηρίαν ἔξοδον μέλλοι στρατεύεσθαι μετὰ τῶν δυνάμεων, ἔτη μὲν ἔχειν ἐννέα, θύοντος δʼ αὐτοῦ τῷ Διὶ παρεστάναι παρὰ τὸν βωμόν.

[6] ἐπεὶ δὲ καλλιερήσας κατασπείσαι τοῖς θεοῖς καὶ ποιήσαι τὰ νομιζόμενα, τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους τοὺς περὶ τὴν θυσίαν ἀποστῆναι κελεῦσαι μικρόν, αὐτὸν δὲ προσκαλεσάμενον ἐρέσθαι φιλοφρόνως εἰ βούλεται συνεξορμᾶν ἐπὶ τὴν στρατείαν.

[7] ἀσμένως δὲ κατανεύσαντος αὐτοῦ καί τι καὶ προσαξιώσαντος παιδικῶς, λαβόμενον τῆς δεξιᾶς προσαγαγεῖν αὐτὸν πρὸς τὸν βωμὸν καὶ κελεύειν ἁψάμενον τῶν ἱερῶν ὀμνύναι μηδέποτε Ῥωμαίοις εὐνοήσειν.

[8] ταῦτʼ οὖν εἰδότα σαφῶς ἠξίου τὸν Ἀντίοχον, ἕως μὲν ἄν τι δυσχερὲς βουλεύηται κατὰ Ῥωμαίων, θαρρεῖν καὶ πιστεύειν, αὐτὸν συνεργὸν ἕξειν νομίζοντʼ ἀληθινώτατον.

[9] ἐπὰν δὲ διαλύσεις ἢ φιλίαν συντίθηται πρὸς αὐτούς, τότε μὴ προσδεῖσθαι διαβολῆς, ἀλλʼ ἀπιστεῖν καὶ φυλάττεσθαι·

[1] πᾶν γάρ τι πρᾶξαι κατʼ αὐτῶν ὃ δυνατὸς εἴη. ὁ μὲν οὖν Ἀντίοχος ἀκούσας καὶ δόξας αὐτοπαθῶς ἅμα δʼ ἀληθινῶς εἰρῆσθαι, πάσης τῆς προϋπαρχούσης ὑποψίας ἀπέστη.

[2] τῆς μέντοι γε δυσμενείας τῆς Ἀμίλκου καὶ τῆς ὅλης προθέσεως ὁμολογούμενον θετέον εἶναι τοῦτο μαρτύριον, ὡς καὶ διʼ αὐτῶν φανερὸν ἐγένετο τῶν πραγμάτων.

[3] τοιούτους γὰρ ἐχθροὺς παρεσκεύασε Ῥωμαίοις Ἀσδρούβαν τε τὸν τῆς θυγατρὸς ἄνδρα καὶ τὸν αὑτοῦ κατὰ φύσιν υἱὸν Ἀννίβαν ὥστε μὴ καταλιπεῖν ὑπερβολὴν δυσμενείας.

[4] Ἀσδρούβας μὲν οὖν προαποθανὼν οὐ πᾶσιν ἔκδηλον ἐποίησε τὴν αὑτοῦ πρόθεσιν· Ἀννίβᾳ δὲ παρέδωκαν οἱ καιροὶ καὶ λίαν ἐναποδείξασθαι τὴν πατρῴαν ἔχθραν εἰς Ῥωμαίους.

[5] διὸ καὶ τοὺς ἐπὶ πραγμάτων ταττομένους χρὴ τῶν τοιούτων οὐδενὸς μᾶλλον φροντίζειν ὡς τοῦ μὴ λανθάνειν τὰς προαιρέσεις τῶν διαλυομένων τὰς ἔχθρας ἢ συντιθεμένων τὰς φιλίας, πότε τοῖς καιροῖς εἴκοντες καὶ πότε ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἡττώμενοι ποιοῦνται τὰς συνθήκας,

[6] ἵνα τοὺς μὲν ἐφέδρους νομίζοντες εἶναι τῶν καιρῶν ἀεὶ φυλάττωνται, τοῖς δὲ πιστεύοντες ὡς ὑπηκόοις ἢ φίλοις ἀληθινοῖς πᾶν τὸ παραπῖπτον ἐξ ἑτοίμου παραγγέλλωσιν.

αἰτίας μὲν

[7] οὖν τοῦ κατʼ Ἀννίβαν πολέμου τὰς προειρημένας ἡγητέον, ἀρχὰς δὲ τὰς μελλούσας λέ

[1] γεσθαι. Καρχηδόνιοι γὰρ βαρέως μὲν ἔφερον καὶ τὴν ὑπὲρ Σικελίας ἧτταν, συνεπέτεινε δʼ αὐτῶν τὴν ὀργήν, καθάπερ ἐπάνω προεῖπον, τὰ κατὰ Σαρδόνα καὶ τὸ τῶν τελευταῖον συντεθέντων χρημάτων πλῆθος.

[2] διόπερ ἅμα τῷ τὰ πλεῖστα κατʼ Ἰβηρίαν ὑφʼ αὑτοὺς ποιήσασθαι πρὸς πᾶν ἑτοίμως διέκειντο τὸ κατὰ Ῥωμαίων ὑποδεικνύμενον.

[3] προσπεσούσης οὖν τῆς Ἀσδρούβου τελευτῆς, ᾧ μετὰ τὸν Ἀμίλκου θάνατον ἐνεχείρισαν τὰ κατὰ τὴν Ἰβηρίαν, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἐκαραδόκουν τὰς τῶν δυνάμεων ὁρμάς·

[4] ἀφικομένης δὲ τῆς ἀγγελίας ἐκ τῶν στρατοπέδων ὅτι συμβαίνει τὰς δυνάμεις ὁμοθυμαδὸν ᾑρῆσθαι στρατηγὸν Ἀννίβαν, παραυτίκα συναθροίσαντες τὸν δῆμον μιᾷ γνώμῃ κυρίαν ἐποίησαν τὴν τῶν στρατοπέδων αἵρεσιν.

[5] Ἀννίβας δὲ παραλαβὼν τὴν ἀρχὴν εὐθέως ὥρμησεν ὡς καταστρεψόμενος τὸ τῶν Ὀλκάδων ἔθνος· ἀφικόμενος δὲ πρὸς Ἀλθαίαν τὴν βαρυτάτην αὐτῶν πόλιν κατεστρατοπέδευσεν.

[6] μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα χρησάμενος ἐνεργοῖς ἅμα καὶ καταπληκτικαῖς προσβολαῖς ταχέως ἐκράτησε τῆς πόλεως. οὗ συμβάντος οἱ λοιποὶ γενόμενοι καταπλαγεῖς ἐνέδωκαν αὑτοὺς τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις.

[7] ἀργυρολογήσας δὲ τὰς πόλεις καὶ κυριεύσας πολλῶν χρημάτων ἧκε παραχειμάσων εἰς Καινὴν πόλιν.

[8] μεγαλοψύχως δὲ χρησάμενος τοῖς ὑποταττομένοις καὶ τὰ μὲν δοὺς τῶν ὀψωνίων τοῖς συστρατευομένοις τὰ δʼ ὑπισχνούμενος πολλὴν εὔνοιαν καὶ μεγάλας ἐλπίδας ἐνειρ

[1] γάσατο ταῖς δυνάμεσι. τῷ δʼ ἐπιγινομένῳ θέρει πάλιν ὁρμήσας ἐπὶ τοὺς Οὐακκαίους Ἑλμαντικὴν μὲν ἐξ ἐφόδου ποιησάμενος προσβολὰς κατέσχεν, Ἀρβουκάλην δὲ διὰ τὸ μέγεθος τῆς πόλεως καὶ τὸ πλῆθος, ἔτι δὲ τὴν γενναιότητα τῶν οἰκητόρων μετὰ πολλῆς ταλαιπωρίας πολιορκήσας κατὰ κράτος εἷλε.

[2] μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα παραδόξως εἰς τοὺς μεγίστους ἦλθε κινδύνους ἐπανάγων, συνδραμόντων ἐπʼ αὐτὸν τῶν Καρπησίων, ὃ σχεδὸν ἰσχυρότατόν ἐστιν ἔθνος τῶν κατʼ ἐκείνους τοὺς τόπους,

[3] ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀστυγειτόνων ἁθροισθέντων ἅμα τούτοις, οὓς ἠρέθισαν μάλιστα μὲν οἱ τῶν Ὀλκάδων φυγάδες, συνεξέκαυσαν δὲ καὶ τῶν ἐκ τῆς Ἑλμαντικῆς οἱ διασωθέντες.

[4] πρὸς οὓς εἰ μὲν ἐκ παρατάξεως ἠναγκάσθησαν οἱ Καρχηδόνιοι διακινδυνεύειν, ὁμολογουμένως ἂν ἡττήθησαν.

[5] νῦν δὲ πραγματικῶς καὶ νουνεχῶς ἐξ ὑποστροφῆς ἀναχωρήσαντος Ἀννίβου καὶ πρόβλημα ποιησαμένου τὸν Τάγον καλούμενον ποταμὸν καὶ περὶ τὴν τοῦ ποταμοῦ διάβασιν συστησαμένου τὸν κίνδυνον, ἅμα δὲ συγχρησαμένου συναγωνιστῇ τῷ ποταμῷ καὶ τοῖς θηρίοις οἷς εἶχε περὶ τετταράκοντα τὸν ἀριθμόν, συνέβη τὰ ὅλα παραδόξως καὶ κατὰ λόγον αὐτῷ χωρῆσαι.

[6] τῶν γὰρ βαρβάρων ἐπιβαλομένων κατὰ πλείους τόπους βιάζεσθαι καὶ περαιοῦσθαι τὸν ποταμόν, τὸ μὲν πλεῖστον αὐτῶν μέρος διεφθάρη περὶ τὰς ἐκβάσεις, παραπορευομένων τῶν θηρίων παρὰ τὸ χεῖλος καὶ τοὺς ἐκβαίνοντας ἀεὶ προκαταλαμβανόντων·

[7] πολλοὶ δὲ κατʼ αὐτὸν τὸν ποταμὸν ὑπὸ τῶν ἱππέων ἀπώλοντο διὰ τὸ κρατεῖν μὲν μᾶλλον τοῦ ῥεύματος τοὺς ἵππους, ἐξ ὑπερδεξίου δὲ ποιεῖσθαι τὴν μάχην τοὺς ἱππέας πρὸς τοὺς πεζούς.

[8] τέλος δὲ τοὔμπαλιν ἐπιδιαβάντες οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἀννίβαν ἐπὶ τοὺς βαρβάρους ἐτρέψαντο πλείους ἢ δέκα μυριάδας ἀνθρώπων.

[9] ὧν ἡττηθέντων οὐδεὶς ἔτι τῶν ἐντὸς Ἴβηρος ποταμοῦ ῥᾳδίως πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἀντοφθαλμεῖν ἐτόλμα πλὴν Ζακανθαίων.

[10] ταύτης δὲ τῆς πόλεως ἐπειρᾶτο κατὰ δύναμιν ἀπέχεσθαι, βουλόμενος μηδεμίαν ἀφορμὴν ὁμολογουμένην δοῦναι τοῦ πολέμου Ῥωμαίοις, ἕως τἄλλα πάντα βεβαίως ὑφʼ αὑτὸν ποιήσαιτο κατὰ τὰς Ἀμίλκου τοῦ πατρὸς ὑποθήκας καὶ παραινέσεις.

[1] οἱ δὲ Ζακανθαῖοι συνεχῶς ἔπεμπον εἰς τὴν Ῥώμην, ἅμα μὲν ἀγωνιῶντες περὶ σφῶν καὶ προορώμενοι τὸ μέλλον, ἅμα δὲ βουλόμενοι μὴ λανθάνειν Ῥωμαίους τὴν γινομένην εὔροιαν Καρχηδονίοις τῶν κατʼ Ἰβηρίαν πραγμάτων.

[2] Ῥωμαῖοι δὲ πλεονάκις αὐτῶν παρακηκοότες τότε πρεσβευτὰς ἐξαπέστειλαν τοὺς ἐπισκεψομένους ὑπὲρ τῶν προσπιπτόντων.

[3] Ἀννίβας δὲ κατὰ τοὺς αὐτοὺς καιροὺς πεποιημένος ὑφʼ αὑτὸν οὓς προέθετο παρῆν αὖθις μετὰ τῶν δυνάμεων παραχειμάσων εἰς Καινὴν πόλιν, ἥτις ὡσανεὶ πρόσχημα καὶ βασίλειον ἦν Καρχηδονίων ἐν τοῖς κατὰ τὴν Ἰβηρίαν τόποις.

[4] καταλαβὼν δὲ τὴν παρὰ τῶν Ῥωμαίων πρεσβείαν καὶ δοὺς αὑτὸν εἰς ἔντευξιν διήκουε περὶ τῶν ἐνεστώτων.

[5] Ῥωμαῖοι μὲν οὖν διεμαρτύροντο Ζακανθαίων ἀπέχεσθαι — κεῖσθαι γὰρ αὐτοὺς ἐν τῇ σφετέρᾳ πίστει — καὶ τὸν Ἴβηρα ποταμὸν μὴ διαβαίνειν κατὰ τὰς ἐπʼ Ἀσδρούβου γενομένας ὁμολογίας.

[6] ὁ δʼ Ἀννίβας, ἅτε νέος μὲν ὤν, πλήρης δὲ πολεμικῆς ὁρμῆς, ἐπιτυχὴς δʼ ἐν ταῖς ἐπιβολαῖς, πάλαι δὲ παρωρμημένος πρὸς τὴν κατὰ Ῥωμαίων ἔχθραν,

[7] πρὸς μὲν ἐκείνους, ὡς κηδόμενος Ζακανθαίων, ἐνεκάλει Ῥωμαίοις διότι μικροῖς ἔμπροσθεν χρόνοις, στασιαζόντων αὐτῶν, λαβόντες τὴν ἐπιτροπὴν [εἰς τὸ διαλῦσαι] ἀδίκως ἐπανέλοιντό τινας τῶν προεστώτων· οὓς οὐ περιόψεσθαι παρεσπονδημένους· πάτριον γὰρ εἶναι Καρχηδονίοις τὸ μηδένα τῶν ἀδικουμένων περιορᾶν·

[8] πρὸς δὲ Καρχηδονίους διεπέμπετο, πυνθανόμενος τί δεῖ ποιεῖν, ὅτι Ζακανθαῖοι πιστεύοντες τῇ Ῥωμαίων συμμαχίᾳ τινὰς τῶν ὑφʼ αὑτοὺς ταττομένων ἀδικοῦσι.

[9] καθόλου δʼ ἦν πλήρης ἀλογίας καὶ θυμοῦ βιαίου· διὸ καὶ ταῖς μὲν ἀληθιναῖς αἰτίαις οὐκ ἐχρῆτο, κατέφευγε δʼ εἰς προφάσεις ἀλόγους· ἅπερ εἰώθασι ποιεῖν οἱ διὰ τὰς προεγκαθημένας αὐτοῖς ὁρμὰς ὀλιγωροῦντες τοῦ καθήκοντος.

[10] πόσῳ γὰρ ἦν ἄμεινον οἴεσθαι δεῖν Ῥωμαίους ἀποδοῦναι σφίσι Σαρδόνα καὶ τοὺς ἐπιταχθέντας ἅμα ταύτῃ φόρους, οὓς τοῖς καιροῖς συνεπιθέμενοι πρότερον ἀδίκως παρʼ αὐτῶν ἔλαβον· εἰ δὲ μή, φάναι πολεμήσειν;

[11] νῦν δὲ τὴν μὲν οὖσαν αἰτίαν ἀληθινὴν παρασιωπῶν, τὴν δʼ οὐχ ὑπάρχουσαν περὶ Ζακανθαίων πλάττων, οὐ μόνον ἀλόγως, ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον ἀδίκως κατάρχειν ἐδόκει τοῦ πολέμου.

[12] οἱ δὲ τῶν Ῥωμαίων πρέσβεις, ὅτι μὲν εἴη πολεμητέον σαφῶς εἰδότες, ἀπέπλευσαν εἰς Καρχηδόνα, τὰ παραπλήσια θέλοντες ἐπιμαρτύρασθαι κἀκείνους·

[13] οὐ μὴν ἐν Ἰταλίᾳ γε πολεμήσειν ἤλπισαν, ἀλλʼ ἐν Ἰβηρίᾳ, χρήσεσθαι δὲ πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον ὁρμητηρίῳ τῇ Ζακανθαίων πόλει.

[1] διὸ καὶ πρὸς ταύτην ἁρμοζόμενοι τὴν ὑπόθεσιν ἡ σύγκλητος ἔκρινεν ἀσφαλίσασθαι τὰ κατὰ τὴν Ἰλλυρίδα πράγματα, προορωμένη διότι μέγας ἔσται καὶ πολυχρόνιος καὶ μακρὰν ἀπὸ τῆς οἰκείας ὁ πόλεμος.

[2] συνέβαινε γὰρ κατʼ ἐκείνους τοὺς καιροὺς Δημήτριον τὸν Φάριον, ἐπιλελησμένον μὲν τῶν προγεγονότων εἰς αὐτὸν εὐεργετημάτων ὑπὸ Ῥωμαίων, καταπεφρονηκότα δὲ πρότερον μὲν διὰ τὸν ἀπὸ Γαλατῶν τότε δὲ διὰ τὸν ἀπὸ Καρχηδονίων φόβον περιεστῶτα Ῥωμαίους,

[3] πάσας δʼ ἔχοντα τὰς ἐλπίδας ἐν τῇ Μακεδόνων οἰκίᾳ διὰ τὸ συμπεπολεμηκέναι καὶ μετεσχηκέναι τῶν πρὸς Κλεομένη κινδύνων Ἀντιγόνῳ, πορθεῖν μὲν καὶ καταστρέφεσθαι τὰς κατὰ τὴν Ἰλλυρίδα πόλεις τὰς ὑπὸ Ῥωμαίους ταττομένας, πεπλευκέναι δʼ ἔξω τοῦ Λίσσου παρὰ τὰς συνθήκας πεντήκοντα λέμβοις καὶ πεπορθηκέναι πολλὰς τῶν Κυκλάδων νήσων.

[4] εἰς ἃ βλέποντες Ῥωμαῖοι καὶ θεωροῦντες ἀνθοῦσαν τὴν Μακεδόνων οἰκίαν ἔσπευδον ἀσφαλίσασθαι τὰ πρὸς ἕω τῆς Ἰταλίας πεπεισμένοι καταταχήσειν διορθωσάμενοι μὲν τὴν Ἰλλυριῶν ἄγνοιαν, ἐπιτιμήσαντες δὲ καὶ κολάσαντες τὴν ἀχαριστίαν καὶ προπέτειαν τὴν Δημητρίου.

[5] διεψεύσθησαν δὲ τοῖς λογισμοῖς· κατετάχησε γὰρ αὐτοὺς Ἀννίβας, ἐξελὼν τὴν Ζακανθαίων πόλιν.

[6] καὶ παρὰ τοῦτο συνέβη τὸν πόλεμον οὐκ ἐν Ἰβηρίᾳ, πρὸς αὐτῇ δὲ τῇ Ῥώμῃ καὶ κατὰ πᾶσαν γενέσθαι τὴν Ἰταλίαν.

[7] οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ τούτοις χρησάμενοι τοῖς διαλογισμοῖς Ῥωμαῖοι μὲν ὑπὸ τὴν ὡραίαν Λεύκιον τὸν Αἰμίλιον ἐξαπέστειλαν μετὰ δυνάμεως ἐπὶ τὰς κατὰ τὴν Ἰλλυρίδα πράξεις κατὰ τὸ πρῶτον ἔτος τῆς ἑκα

[1] τοστῆς καὶ τετταρακοστῆς ὀλυμπιάδος. Ἀννίβας δὲ μετὰ τῆς δυνάμεως ἀναζεύξας ἐκ τῆς Καινῆς πόλεως προῆγε, ποιούμενος τὴν πορείαν ἐπὶ τὴν Ζάκανθαν.

[2] ἡ δὲ πόλις αὕτη κεῖται μὲν ἐπὶ τῷ πρὸς θάλατταν καθήκοντι πρόποδι τῆς ὀρεινῆς τῆς συναπτούσης τὰ πέρατα τῆς Ἰβηρίας καὶ Κελτιβηρίας, ἀπέχει δὲ τῆς θαλάττης ὡς ἑπτὰ στάδια.

[3] νέμονται δὲ χώραν οἱ κατοικοῦντες αὐτὴν πάμφορον καὶ διαφέρουσαν ἀρετῇ πάσης τῆς Ἰβηρίας.

[4] ᾗ τότε παραστρατοπεδεύσας Ἀννίβας ἐνεργὸς ἐγίνετο περὶ τὴν πολιορκίαν, πολλὰ προορώμενος εὔχρηστα πρὸς τὸ μέλλον ἐκ τοῦ κατὰ κράτος ἑλεῖν αὐτήν.

[5] πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ ὑπέλαβε παρελέσθαι Ῥωμαίων τὴν ἐλπίδα τοῦ συστήσασθαι τὸν πόλεμον ἐν Ἰβηρίᾳ· δεύτερον δὲ καταπληξάμενος ἅπαντας εὐτακτοτέρους μὲν ἐπέπειστο παρασκευάσειν τοὺς ὑφʼ αὐτὸν ἤδη ταττομένους, εὐλαβεστέρους δὲ τοὺς ἀκμὴν αὐτοκράτορας ὄντας τῶν Ἰβήρων,

[6] τὸ δὲ μέγιστον, οὐδὲν ἀπολιπὼν ὄπισθεν πολέμιον ἀσφαλῶς ποιήσεσθαι τὴν εἰς τοὔμπροσθεν πορείαν.

[7] χωρίς τε τούτων εὐπορήσειν μὲν χορηγιῶν αὐτὸς ὑπελάμβανεν πρὸς τὰς ἐπιβολάς, προθυμίαν δʼ ἐνεργάσεσθαι ταῖς δυνάμεσιν ἐκ τῆς ἐσομένης ἑκάστοις ὠφελείας, προκαλέσεσθαι δὲ τὴν εὔνοιαν τῶν ἐν οἴκῳ Καρχηδονίων διὰ τῶν ἀποσταλησομένων αὐτοῖς λαφύρων.

[8] τοιούτοις δὲ χρώμενος διαλογισμοῖς ἐνεργῶς προσέκειτο τῇ πολιορκίᾳ, τοτὲ μὲν ὑπόδειγμα τῷ πλήθει ποιῶν αὑτὸν καὶ γινόμενος αὐτουργὸς τῆς ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις ταλαιπωρίας, ἔστι δʼ ὅτε παρακαλῶν τὰ πλήθη καὶ παραβόλως διδοὺς αὑτὸν εἰς τοὺς κινδύνους.

[9] πᾶσαν δὲ κακοπάθειαν καὶ μέριμναν ὑπομείνας τέλος ἐν ὀκτὼ μησὶ κατὰ κράτος εἷλε τὴν πόλιν.

[10] κύριος δὲ γενόμενος χρημάτων πολλῶν καὶ σωμάτων καὶ κατασκευῆς τὰ μὲν χρήματʼ εἰς τὰς ἰδίας ἐπιβολὰς παρέθετο κατὰ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς πρόθεσιν, τὰ δὲ σώματα διένειμε κατὰ τὴν ἀξίαν ἑκάστοις τῶν συστρατευομένων, τὴν δὲ κατασκευὴν παραχρῆμα πᾶσαν ἐξέπεμψε τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις.

[11] ταῦτα δὲ πράξας οὐ διεψεύσθη τοῖς λογισμοῖς οὐδʼ ἀπέτυχε τῆς ἐξ ἀρχῆς προθέσεως, ἀλλὰ τούς τε στρατιώτας προθυμοτέρους ἐποίησε πρὸς τὸ κινδυνεύειν, τούς τε Καρχηδονίους ἑτοίμους παρεσκεύασε πρὸς τὸ παραγγελλόμενον, αὐτός τε πολλὰ τῶν χρησίμων μετὰ ταῦτα κατειργάσατο διὰ τῆς τῶν χορηγιῶν παραθέσεως.

[1] κατὰ δὲ τοὺς αὐτοὺς καιροὺς Δημήτριος ἅμα τῷ συνεῖναι τὴν ἐπιβολὴν τῶν Ῥωμαίων παραυτίκα μὲν εἰς τὴν Διμάλην ἀξιόχρεων φρουρὰν εἰσέπεμψε καὶ τὰς ἁρμοζούσας ταύτης χορηγίας, ἐκ δὲ τῶν λοιπῶν πόλεων τοὺς μὲν ἀντιπολιτευομένους ἐπανείλετο, τοῖς δʼ αὑτοῦ φίλοις ἐνεχείρισε τὰς δυναστείας,

[2] αὐτὸς δʼ ἐκ τῶν ὑποτεταγμένων ἐπιλέξας τοὺς ἀνδρωδεστάτους ἑξακισχιλίους συνέστησε τούτους εἰς τὴν Φάρον.

[3] ὁ δὲ στρατηγὸς τῶν Ῥωμαίων ἀφικόμενος εἰς τὴν Ἰλλυρίδα μετὰ τῶν δυνάμεων καὶ θεωρῶν τοὺς ὑπεναντίους θαρροῦντας ἐπὶ τῇ τῆς Διμάλης ὀχυρότητι καὶ ταῖς παρασκευαῖς, ἔτι δὲ τῷ δοκεῖν αὐτὴν ἀνάλωτον ὑπάρχειν, ταύτῃ πρῶτον ἐγχειρεῖν ἔκρινε, βουλόμενος καταπλήξασθαι τοὺς πολεμίους.

[4] παρακαλέσας δὲ τοὺς κατὰ μέρος ἡγεμόνας καὶ προσαγαγὼν ἔργα κατὰ πλείους τόπους ἤρξατο πολιορκεῖν.

[5] λαβὼν δὲ κατὰ κράτος ἐν ἡμέραις ἑπτὰ παραχρῆμα πάντας ἥττησε ταῖς ψυχαῖς τοὺς ὑπεναντίους.

[6] διόπερ εὐθέως παρῆσαν ἐκ πασῶν τῶν πόλεων ἐπιτρέποντες καὶ διδόντες αὑτοὺς εἰς τὴν τῶν Ῥωμαίων πίστιν.

[7] ὁ δὲ προσδεξάμενος ἑκάστους ἐπὶ ταῖς ἁρμοζούσαις ὁμολογίαις ἐποιεῖτο τὸν πλοῦν εἰς τὴν Φάρον ἐπʼ αὐτὸν τὸν Δημήτριον.

[8] πυνθανόμενος δὲ τήν τε πόλιν ὀχυρὰν εἶναι καὶ πλῆθος ἀνθρώπων διαφερόντων εἰς αὐτὴν ἡθροῖσθαι, πρὸς δὲ καὶ ταῖς χορηγίαις ἐξηρτῦσθαι καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις παρασκευαῖς, ὑφεωρᾶτο μὴ δυσχερῆ καὶ πολυχρόνιον συμβῇ γενέσθαι τὴν πολιορκίαν.

[9] διὸ προορώμενος ἕκαστα τούτων ἐχρήσατο παρʼ αὐτὸν τὸν καιρὸν τοιῷδέ τινι γένει στρατηγήματος.

[10] ποιησάμενος γὰρ τὸν ἐπίπλουν νυκτὸς ἐπὶ τὴν νῆσον παντὶ τῷ στρατεύματι τὸ μὲν πλεῖον μέρος τῆς δυνάμεως ἀπεβίβασεν εἴς τινας ὑλώδεις καὶ κοίλους τόπους,

[11] εἴκοσι δὲ ναυσὶν ἐπιγενομένης ἡμέρας ἔπλει προδήλως ἐπὶ τὸν ἔγγιστα τῆς πόλεως λιμένα.

[12] συνορῶντες δὲ τὰς ναῦς οἱ περὶ τὸν Δημήτριον καὶ καταφρονοῦντες τοῦ πλήθους ὥρμησαν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἐπὶ τὸν λιμένα, κωλύσοντες τὴν ἀπό

[1] βασιν τῶν ὑπεναντίων. ἅμα δὲ τῷ συμμῖξαι γινομένης ἰσχυρᾶς τῆς συμπλοκῆς προσεβοήθουν ἀεὶ πλείους τῶν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως· τέλος δὲ πάντες ἐξεχύθησαν εἰς τὸν κίνδυνον.

[2] τῶν δὲ Ῥωμαίων οἱ τῆς νυκτὸς ἀποβάντες εἰς τὸν καιρὸν τοῦτον συνῆψαν, διὰ τόπων ἀδήλων ποιούμενοι τὴν πορείαν.

[3] καὶ καταλαβόμενοι μεταξὺ τῆς πόλεως καὶ τοῦ λιμένος λόφον ἐρυμνὸν διέκλεισαν ἀπὸ τῆς πόλεως τοὺς ἐκβεβοηθηκότας.

[4] οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Δημήτριον συννοήσαντες τὸ γεγονὸς τοῦ μὲν διακωλύειν τοὺς ἀποβαίνοντας ἀπέστησαν, συναθροίσαντες δὲ σφᾶς αὐτοὺς καὶ παρακαλέσαντες ὥρμησαν, κρίναντες ἐκ παρατάξεως διακινδυνεύειν πρὸς τοὺς ἐπὶ τὸν λόφον.

[5] οἱ δὲ Ῥωμαῖοι θεωροῦντες τὴν ἔφοδον τῶν Ἰλλυριῶν ἐνεργὸν καὶ συντεταγμένην ἀντέπεσαν ταῖς σπείραις καταπληκτικῶς.

[6] ἅμα δὲ τοῖς προειρημένοις οἱ πεποιημένοι τὴν ἀπόβασιν ἀπὸ τῶν πλοίων, συνορῶντες τὸ γινόμενον, προσέκειντο κατόπιν· καὶ πανταχόθεν προσπίπτοντες θόρυβον καὶ ταραχὴν οὐ μικρὰν ἐν τοῖς Ἰλλυριοῖς κατεσκεύαζον.

[7] ἐξ οὗ τῶν μὲν κατὰ πρόσωπον τῶν δὲ κατὰ νώτου πονούντων, τέλος οἱ περὶ τὸν Δημήτριον ἐτράπησαν· καὶ τινὲς μὲν αὐτῶν ἔφυγον ὡς πρὸς τὴν πόλιν, οἱ δὲ πλείους ἀνοδίᾳ κατὰ τῆς νήσου διεσπάρησαν.

[8] ὁ δὲ Δημήτριος ἔχων ἑτοίμους λέμβους πρὸς τὸ συμβαῖνον ἔν τισι τόποις ἐρήμοις ὑφορμοῦντας ἐπὶ τούτους ἐποιήσατο τὴν ἀποχώρησιν. εἰς οὓς ἐμβὰς ἐπιγενομένης τῆς νυκτὸς ἀπέπλευσε καὶ διεκομίσθη παραδόξως πρὸς τὸν βασιλέα Φίλιππον, παρʼ ᾧ τὸ λοιπὸν διέτριβε τοῦ βίου μέρος,

[9] ἀνὴρ θράσος μὲν καὶ τόλμαν κεκτημένος, ἀλόγιστον δὲ ταύτην καὶ τελέως ἄκριτον.

[10] διὸ καὶ τὴν καταστροφὴν παραπλησίαν αὐτῷ συνέβη γενέσθαι τῇ κατὰ τὸν ὅλον βίον προαιρέσει.

[11] καταλαβέσθαι γὰρ ἐγχειρήσας μετὰ τῆς Φιλίππου γνώμης τὴν τῶν Μεσσηνίων πόλιν εἰκῇ καὶ παραβόλως ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ τῆς πράξεως καιρῷ διεφθάρη· περὶ ὧν ἡμεῖς τὰ κατὰ μέρος, ὅταν ἐπὶ τοὺς καιροὺς ἔλθωμεν, διασαφήσομεν.

[12] ὁ δὲ στρατηγὸς τῶν Ῥωμαίων Αἰμίλιος τὴν μὲν Φάρον εὐθέως ἐξ ἐφόδου παραλαβὼν κατέσκαψε, τῆς δὲ λοιπῆς Ἰλλυρίδος ἐγκρατὴς γενόμενος καὶ πάντα διατάξας κατὰ τὴν αὑτοῦ προαίρεσιν μετὰ ταῦτα ληγούσης ἤδη τῆς θερείας εἰς τὴν Ῥώμην ἐπανῆλθεν καὶ τὴν εἴσοδον ἐποιήσατο μετὰ θριάμβου καὶ τῆς ἁπάσης εὐδοξίας.

[13] ἐδόκει γὰρ οὐ μόνον ἐπιδεξίως, ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον ἀνδρωδῶς κεχρῆσθαι τοῖς πράγμασιν.

[1] οἱ δὲ Ῥωμαῖοι, προσπεπτωκυίας αὐτοῖς ἤδη τῆς τῶν Ζακανθαίων ἁλώσεως, οὐ μὰ Δία περὶ τοῦ πολέμου τότε διαβούλιον ἦγον, καθάπερ ἔνιοι τῶν συγγραφέων φασί, προσκατατάττοντες ἔτι καὶ τοὺς εἰς ἑκάτερα ῥηθέντας λόγους, πάντων ἀτοπώτατον πρᾶγμα ποιοῦντες.

[2] πῶς γὰρ οἷόν τʼ ἦν Ῥωμαίους τοὺς ἐνιαυτῷ πρότερον ἐπηγγελκότας πόλεμον Καρχηδονίοις, ἐὰν ἐπιβαίνωσι τῆς Ζακανθαίων χώρας, τούτους κατὰ κράτος ἑαλωκυίας αὐτῆς τῆς πόλεως τότε βουλεύεσθαι συνελθόντας πότερα πολεμητέον ἢ τοὐναντίον;

[3] πῶς δὲ καὶ τίνα τρόπον ἅμα μὲν τὴν στυγνότητα τοῦ συνεδρίου παρεισάγουσι θαυμάσιον, ἅμα δὲ τοὺς υἱοὺς ἀπὸ δώδεκʼ ἐτῶν ἄγειν φασὶ τοὺς πατέρας εἰς τὸ συνέδριον, οὓς μετέχοντας τῶν διαβουλίων οὐδὲ τῶν ἀναγκαίων οὐδενὶ προΐεσθαι τῶν ἀπορρήτων οὐδέν;

[4] ὧν οὔτʼ εἰκὸς οὔτʼ ἀληθές ἐστι τὸ παράπαν οὐδέν, εἰ μὴ νὴ Δία πρὸς τοῖς ἄλλοις ἡ τύχη καὶ τοῦτο προσένειμε Ῥωμαίοις, τὸ φρονεῖν αὐτοὺς εὐθέως ἐκ γενετῆς.

[5] πρὸς μὲν οὖν τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν συγγραμμάτων οἷα γράφει Χαιρέας καὶ Σωσύλος οὐδὲν ἂν δέοι πλέον λέγειν· οὐ γὰρ ἱστορίας, ἀλλὰ κουρεακῆς καὶ πανδήμου λαλιᾶς ἔμοιγε δοκοῦσι τάξιν ἔχειν καὶ δύναμιν.

[6] Ῥωμαῖοι δέ, προσπεσόντος σφίσι τοῦ γεγονότος κατὰ τοὺς Ζακανθαίους ἀτυχήματος, παραχρῆμα πρεσβευτὰς ἑλόμενοι κατὰ σπουδὴν ἐξαπέστειλαν εἰς τὴν Καρχηδόνα,

[7] δύο προτείνοντες αὐτοῖς, ὧν τὸ μὲν αἰσχύνην ἅμα καὶ βλάβην ἐδόκει φέρειν δεξαμένοις τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις, τὸ δʼ ἕτερον πραγμάτων καὶ κινδύνων ἀρχὴν μεγάλων.

[8] ἢ γὰρ τὸν στρατηγὸν Ἀννίβαν καὶ τοὺς μετʼ αὐτοῦ συνέδρους ἐκδότους διδόναι Ῥωμαίοις ἐπέταττον, ἢ προήγγελλον τὸν πόλεμον.

[9] παραγενομένων δὲ τῶν Ῥωμαίων καὶ παρελθόντων εἰς τὸ συνέδριον καὶ διασαφούντων ταῦτα, δυσχερῶς ἤκουον οἱ Καρχηδόνιοι τὴν αἵρεσιν τῶν προτεινομένων.

[10] ὅμως δὲ προστησάμενοι τὸν ἐπιτηδειότατον ἐξ αὑτῶν ἤρξαντο περὶ σφῶν

[1] δικαιολογεῖσθαι. τὰς μὲν οὖν πρὸς Ἀσδρούβαν ὁμολογίας παρεσιώπων, ὡς οὔτε γεγενημένας, εἴ τε γεγόνασιν, οὐδὲν οὔσας πρὸς αὑτοὺς διὰ τὸ χωρὶς τῆς σφετέρας πεπρᾶχθαι γνώμης.

[2] ἐχρῶντο δʼ ἐξ αὐτῶν Ῥωμαίων εἰς τοῦτο παραδείγματι. τὰς γὰρ ἐπὶ Λυτατίου γενομένας συνθήκας ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ τῷ περὶ Σικελίας, ταύτας ἔφασαν ἤδη συνωμολογημένας ὑπὸ Λυτατίου μετὰ ταῦτα τὸν δῆμον τῶν Ῥωμαίων ἀκύρους ποιῆσαι διὰ τὸ χωρὶς τῆς αὑτοῦ γενέσθαι γνώμης.

[3] ἐπίεζον δὲ καὶ προσαπηρείδοντο παρʼ ὅλην τὴν δικαιολογίαν ἐπὶ τὰς τελευταίας συνθήκας τὰς γενομένας ἐν τῷ περὶ Σικελίας πολέμῳ.

[4] ἐν αἷς περὶ μὲν Ἰβηρίας οὐκ ἔφασαν ὑπάρχειν ἔγγραφον οὐδέν, περὶ δὲ τοῦ τοῖς ἑκατέρων συμμάχοις τὴν παρʼ ἀμφοῖν ἀσφάλειαν εἶναι ῥητῶς κατατετάχθαι.

[5] Ζακανθαίους δὲ παρεδείκνυον οὐκ ὄντας τότε Ῥωμαίων συμμάχους καὶ παρανεγίνωσκον πρὸς τοῦτο πλεονάκις τὰς συνθήκας.

[6] Ῥωμαῖοι δὲ τοῦ μὲν δικαιολογεῖσθαι καθάπαξ ἀπεγίνωσκον, φάσκοντες ἀκεραίου μὲν ἔτι διαμενούσης τῆς τῶν Ζακανθαίων πόλεως ἐπιδέχεσθαι τὰ πράγματα δικαιολογίαν καὶ δυνατὸν εἶναι λόγῳ περὶ τῶν ἀμφισβητουμένων διεξάγειν·

[7] ταύτης δὲ παρεσπονδημένης ἢ τοὺς αἰτίους ἐκδοτέον εἶναι σφίσι, διʼ οὗ φανερὸν ἔσται πᾶσιν ὡς οὐ μετεσχήκασι τῆς ἀδικίας, ἀλλʼ ἄνευ τῆς αὑτῶν γνώμης πεπρᾶχθαι τοῦτο τοὔργον,

[8] ἢ μὴ βουλομένους τοῦτο ποιεῖν, ὁμολογοῦντας δὲ κοινωνεῖν τῆς ἀδικίας καὶ συναναδέχεσθαι τὸν πόλεμον. οἱ μὲν οὖν καθολικώτερόν πως ἐχρήσαντο τοῖς λόγοις.

[9] ἡμῖν δʼ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι δοκεῖ τὸ μὴ παραλιπεῖν ἄσκεπτον τοῦτο τὸ μέρος, ἵνα μήθʼ οἷς καθήκει καὶ διαφέρει τὸ σαφῶς εἰδέναι τὴν ἐν τούτοις ἀκρίβειαν, παραπαίωσι τῆς ἀληθείας ἐν τοῖς ἀναγκαιοτάτοις διαβουλίοις,

[10] μήθʼ οἱ φιλομαθοῦντες περὶ τούτων ἀστοχῶσι, συμπλανώμενοι ταῖς ἀγνοίαις καὶ φιλοτιμίαις τῶν συγγραφέων, ἀλλʼ ᾖ τις ὁμολογουμένη θεωρία τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρχῆς ὑπαρξάντων δικαίων Ῥωμαίοις καὶ Καρχηδονίοις πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἕως εἰς τοὺς καθʼ ἡμᾶς καιρούς.

[1] γίνονται τοιγαροῦν συνθῆκαι Ῥωμαίοις καὶ Καρχηδονίοις πρῶται κατὰ Λεύκιον Ἰούνιον Βροῦτον καὶ Μάρκον Ὡράτιον, τοὺς πρώτους κατασταθέντας ὑπάτους μετὰ τὴν τῶν βασιλέων κατάλυσιν, ὑφʼ ὧν συνέβη καθιερωθῆναι καὶ τὸ τοῦ Διὸς ἱερὸν τοῦ Καπετωλίου.

[2] ταῦτα δʼ ἔστι πρότερα τῆς Ξέρξου διαβάσεως εἰς τὴν Ἑλλάδα τριάκοντʼ ἔτεσι λείπουσι δυεῖν.

[3] ἃς καθʼ ὅσον ἦν δυνατὸν ἀκριβέστατα διερμηνεύσαντες ἡμεῖς ὑπογεγράφαμεν. τηλικαύτη γὰρ ἡ διαφορὰ γέγονε τῆς διαλέκτου καὶ παρὰ Ῥωμαίοις τῆς νῦν πρὸς τὴν ἀρχαίαν ὥστε τοὺς συνετωτάτους ἔνια μόλις ἐξ ἐπιστάσεως διευκρινεῖν.

[4] εἰσὶ δʼ αἱ συνθῆκαι τοιαίδε τινές· ‘ἐπὶ τοῖσδε φιλίαν ‘εἶναι Ῥωμαίοις καὶ τοῖς Ῥωμαίων συμμάχοις καὶ ‘Καρχηδονίοις καὶ τοῖς Καρχηδονίων συμμάχοις· "

[5] 1μὴ πλεῖν Ῥωμαίους μηδὲ τοὺς Ῥωμαίων συμμάχους ‘ἐπέκεινα τοῦ Καλοῦ ἀκρωτηρίου, ἐὰν μὴ ὑπὸ χει"

[6] 1μῶνος ἢ πολεμίων ἀναγκασθῶσιν· ἐὰν δέ τις βίᾳ ‘κατενεχθῇ, μὴ ἐξέστω αὐτῷ μηδὲν ἀγοράζειν μηδὲ ‘λαμβάνειν πλὴν ὅσα πρὸς πλοίου ἐπισκευὴν ἢ πρὸς

[7] ἱερά, ἐν πέντε δʼ ἡμέραις ἀποτρεχέτω.

[8] τοῖς δὲ ‘κατʼ ἐμπορίαν παραγινομένοις μηδὲν ἔστω τέλος "

[9] 1πλὴν ἐπὶ κήρυκι ἢ γραμματεῖ. ὅσα δʼ ἂν τούτων ‘παρόντων πραθῇ, δημοσίᾳ πίστει ὀφειλέσθω τῷ ‘ἀποδομένῳ, ὅσα ἂν ἢ ἐν Λιβύῃ ἢ ἐν Σαρδόνι "

[10] 1πραθῇ. ἐὰν Ῥωμαίων τις εἰς Σικελίαν παρα‘γίνηται, ἧς Καρχηδόνιοι ἐπάρχουσιν, ἴσα ἔστω τὰ "

[11] 1Ῥωμαίων πάντα. Καρχηδόνιοι δὲ μὴ ἀδικείτωσαν ‘δῆμον Ἀρδεατῶν, Ἀντιατῶν, Λαρεντίνων, Κιρκαιι‘τῶν, Ταρρακινιτῶν, μηδʼ ἄλλον μηδένα Λατίνων, "

[12] 1ὅσοι ἂν ὑπήκοοι· ἐὰν δέ τινες μὴ ὦσιν ὑπήκοοι, ‘τῶν πόλεων ἀπεχέσθωσαν· ἂν δὲ λάβωσι, Ῥω"

[13] 1μαίοις ἀποδιδότωσαν ἀκέραιον. φρούριον μὴ ἐνοι‘κοδομείτωσαν ἐν τῇ Λατίνῃ. ἐὰν ὡς πολέμιοι εἰς ‘τὴν χώραν εἰσέλθωσιν, ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ μὴ ἐννυκτερευέτωσαν.’

[1] τὸ μὲν οὖν Καλὸν ἀκρωτήριόν ἐστι τὸ προκείμενον αὐτῆς τῆς Καρχηδόνος ὡς πρὸς τὰς ἄρκτους·

[2] οὗ καθάπαξ ἐπέκεινα πλεῖν ὡς πρὸς μεσημβρίαν οὐκ οἴονται δεῖν οἱ Καρχηδόνιοι τοὺς Ῥωμαίους μακραῖς ναυσὶ διὰ τὸ μὴ βούλεσθαι γινώσκειν αὐτούς, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, μήτε τοὺς κατὰ τὴν Βυσσάτιν μήτε τοὺς κατὰ τὴν μικρὰν Σύρτιν τόπους, ἃ δὴ καλοῦσιν Ἐμπόρια, διὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν τῆς χώρας.

[3] ἐὰν δέ τις ὑπὸ χειμῶνος ἢ πολεμίων βίᾳ κατενεχθεὶς δέηταί του τῶν ἀναγκαίων πρὸς ἱερὰ καὶ πρὸς ἐπισκευὴν πλοίου, ταῦτα, πάρεξ δὲ μηδὲν οἴονται δεῖν λαμβάνειν, καὶ κατʼ ἀνάγκην ἐν πένθʼ ἡμέραις ἀπαλλάττεσθαι τοὺς καθορμισθέντας.

[4] εἰς δὲ Καρχηδόνα καὶ πᾶσαν τὴν ἐπὶ τάδε τοῦ Καλοῦ ἀκρωτηρίου τῆς Λιβύης καὶ Σαρδόνα καὶ Σικελίαν, ἧς ἐπάρχουσι Καρχηδόνιοι, κατʼ ἐμπορίαν πλεῖν Ῥωμαίοις ἔξεστι, καὶ τὸ δίκαιον ὑπισχνοῦνται βεβαιώσειν οἱ Καρχηδόνιοι δημοσίᾳ πίστει.

[5] ἐκ δὲ τούτων τῶν συνθηκῶν περὶ μὲν Σαρδόνος καὶ Λιβύης ἐμφαίνουσιν ὡς περὶ ἰδίας ποιούμενοι τὸν λόγον· ὑπὲρ δὲ Σικελίας τἀναντία διαστέλλονται ῥητῶς, ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν τούτων ποιούμενοι τὰς συνθήκας, ὅσα τῆς Σικελίας ὑπὸ τὴν Καρχηδονίων πίπτει δυναστείαν.

[6] ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ Ῥωμαῖοι περὶ τῆς Λατίνης αὐτῆς χώρας ποιοῦνται τὰς συνθήκας, τῆς δὲ λοιπῆς Ἰταλίας οὐ μνημονεύουσι διὰ τὸ μὴ πίπτειν ὑπὸ τὴν αὐτῶν ἐξουσίαν.

[1] μετὰ δὲ ταύτας ἑτέρας ποιοῦνται συνθήκας, ἐν αἷς προσπεριειλήφασι Καρχηδόνιοι Τυρίους καὶ τὸν Ἰτυκαίων δῆμον.

[2] πρόσκειται δὲ καὶ τῷ Καλῷ ἀκρωτηρίῳ Μαστία Ταρσήιον· ὧν ἐκτὸς οἴονται δεῖν Ῥωμαίους μήτε λῄζεσθαι μήτε πόλιν κτίζειν.

[3] εἰσὶ δὲ τοιαίδε τινές· ‘ἐπὶ τοῖσδε φιλίαν εἶναι Ῥωμαίοις ‘καὶ τοῖς Ῥωμαίων συμμάχοις καὶ Καρχηδονίων ‘καὶ Τυρίων καὶ Ἰτυκαίων δήμῳ καὶ τοῖς τούτων "

[4] 1συμμάχοις. τοῦ Καλοῦ ἀκρωτηρίου, Μαστίας Ταρ‘σηίου, μὴ λῄζεσθαι ἐπέκεινα Ῥωμαίους μηδʼ ἐμ"

[5] 1πορεύεσθαι μηδὲ πόλιν κτίζειν. ἐὰν δὲ Καρχη‘δόνιοι λάβωσιν ἐν τῇ Λατίνῃ πόλιν τινὰ μὴ οὖσαν ‘ὑπήκοον Ῥωμαίοις, τὰ χρήματα καὶ τοὺς ἄνδρας "

[6] 1ἐχέτωσαν, τὴν δὲ πόλιν ἀποδιδότωσαν. ἐὰν δέ ‘τινες Καρχηδονίων λάβωσί τινας, πρὸς οὓς εἰρήνη ‘μέν ἐστιν ἔγγραπτος Ῥωμαίοις, μὴ ὑποτάττονται ‘δέ τι αὐτοῖς, μὴ καταγέτωσαν εἰς τοὺς Ῥωμαίων ‘λιμένας· ἐὰν δὲ καταχθέντος ἐπιλάβηται ὁ Ῥω"

[7] 1μαῖος, ἀφιέσθω. ὡσαύτως δὲ μηδʼ οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι "

[8] 1ποιείτωσαν. ἂν ἔκ τινος χώρας, ἧς Καρχηδόνιοι ‘ἐπάρχουσιν, ὕδωρ ἢ ἐφόδια λάβῃ ὁ Ῥωμαῖος, μετὰ ‘τούτων τῶν ἐφοδίων μὴ ἀδικείτω μηδένα πρὸς "

[9] 1οὓς εἰρήνη καὶ φιλία ἐστὶ Καρχηδονίοις. ὡσαύ"

[10] 1τως δὲ μηδʼ ὁ Καρχηδόνιος ποιείτω. εἰ δέ, μὴ ‘ἰδίᾳ μεταπορευέσθω· ἐὰν δέ τις τοῦτο ποιήσῃ, "

[11] 1δημόσιον γινέσθω τὸ ἀδίκημα. ἐν Σαρδόνι καὶ ‘Λιβύῃ μηδεὶς Ῥωμαίων μήτʼ ἐμπορευέσθω μήτε ‘πόλιν κτιζέτω, εἰ μὴ ἕως τοῦ ἐφόδια λαβεῖν ‘ἢ πλοῖον ἐπισκευάσαι. ἐὰν δὲ χειμὼν κατενέγκῃ, "

[12] 1ἐν πένθʼ ἡμέραις ἀποτρεχέτω. ἐν Σικελίᾳ ἧς ‘Καρχηδόνιοι ἐπάρχουσι καὶ ἐν Καρχηδόνι πάντα ‘καὶ ποιείτω καὶ πωλείτω ὅσα καὶ τῷ πολίτῃ ἔξ"

[13] 1εστιν. ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ὁ Καρχηδόνιος ποιείτω ἐν ‘Ῥώμῃ.’

[14] πάλιν ἐν ταύταις ταῖς συνθήκαις τὰ μὲν κατὰ Λιβύην καὶ Σαρδόνα προσεπιτείνουσιν ἐξιδιαζόμενοι καὶ πάσας ἀφαιρούμενοι τὰς ἐπιβάθρας Ῥωμαίων,

[15] περὶ δὲ Σικελίας τἀναντία προσδιασαφοῦσι, περὶ τῆς ὑπʼ αὐτοὺς ταττομένης.

[16] ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ Ῥωμαῖοι περὶ τῆς Λατίνης· οὐκ οἴονται δεῖν τοὺς Καρχηδονίους ἀδικεῖν Ἀρδεάτας, Ἀντιάτας, Κιρκαιίτας, Ταρρακινίτας. αὗται δʼ εἰσὶν αἱ πόλεις αἱ περιέχουσαι παρὰ θάλατταν τὴν Λατίνην χώραν, ὑπὲρ ἧς ποιοῦνται τὰς συνθήκας.

[1] ἔτι τοιγαροῦν τελευταίας συνθήκας ποιοῦνται Ῥωμαῖοι κατὰ τὴν Πύρρου διάβασιν πρὸ τοῦ συστήσασθαι τοὺς Καρχηδονίους τὸν περὶ Σικελίας πόλεμον·

[2] ἐν αἷς τὰ μὲν ἄλλα τηροῦσι πάντα κατὰ τὰς ὑπαρχούσας ὁμολογίας, πρόσκειται δὲ τούτοις τὰ ὑπογεγραμμένα.

[3] ‘ἐὰν συμμαχίαν ποιῶνται πρὸς ‘Πύρρον ἔγγραπτον, ποιείσθωσαν ἀμφότεροι, ἵνα ‘ἐξῇ βοηθεῖν ἀλλήλοις ἐν τῇ τῶν πολεμουμένων "

[4] 1χώρᾳ· ὁπότεροι δʼ ἂν χρείαν ἔχωσι τῆς βοηθείας, ‘τὰ πλοῖα παρεχέτωσαν Καρχηδόνιοι καὶ εἰς τὴν ‘ὁδὸν καὶ εἰς τὴν ἄφοδον, τὰ δὲ ὀψώνια τοῖς αὑ"

[5] 1τῶν ἑκάτεροι. Καρχηδόνιοι δὲ καὶ κατὰ θάλατταν ‘Ῥωμαίοις βοηθείτωσαν, ἂν χρεία ᾖ. τὰ δὲ πληρώ‘ματα μηδεὶς ἀναγκαζέτω ἐκβαίνειν ἀκουσίως.’

τὸν δʼ ὅρκον ὀμνύειν ἔδει τοιοῦτον,

[6] ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν πρώτων συνθηκῶν Καρχηδονίους μὲν τοὺς θεοὺς τοὺς πατρῴους, Ῥωμαίους δὲ Δία λίθον κατά τι παλαιὸν ἔθος, ἐπὶ δὲ τούτων τὸν Ἄρην καὶ τὸν Ἐνυάλιον.

[7] ἔστι δὲ τὸ Δία λίθον τοιοῦτον· λαβὼν εἰς τὴν χεῖρα λίθον ὁ ποιούμενος τὰ ὅρκια περὶ τῶν συνθηκῶν, ἐπειδὰν ὀμόσῃ δημοσίᾳ πίστει, λέγει τάδε· "

[8] 1εὐορκοῦντι μέν μοι εἴη τἀγαθά· εἰ δʼ ἄλλως διανοηθείην τι ἢ πράξαιμι, πάντων τῶν ἄλλων σῳζομένων ἐν ταῖς ἰδίαις πατρίσιν, ἐν τοῖς ἰδίοις νόμοις, ἐπὶ τῶν ἰδίων βίων, ἱερῶν, τάφων, ἐγὼ μόνος ἐκπέσοιμι οὕτως ὡς ὅδε λίθος νῦν.

[9] ’ καὶ ταῦτʼ εἰπὼν ῥίπτει τὸν λίθον ἐκ τῆς χειρός.

[1] τούτων δὴ τοιούτων ὑπαρχόντων, καὶ τηρουμένων τῶν συνθηκῶν ἔτι νῦν ἐν χαλκώμασι παρὰ τὸν Δία τὸν Καπετώλιον ἐν τῷ τῶν ἀγορανόμων ταμιείῳ,

[2] τίς οὐκ ἂν εἰκότως θαυμάσειεν Φιλίνου τοῦ συγγραφέως, οὐ διότι ταῦτʼ ἠγνόει — τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ οὐ θαυμαστόν, ἐπεὶ καθʼ ἡμᾶς ἔτι καὶ Ῥωμαίων καὶ Καρχηδονίων οἱ πρεσβύτατοι καὶ μάλιστα δοκοῦντες περὶ τὰ κοινὰ σπουδάζειν ἠγνόουν —

[3] ἀλλὰ πόθεν ἢ πῶς ἐθάρρησε γράψαι τἀναντία τούτοις, διότι Ῥωμαίοις καὶ Καρχηδονίοις ὑπάρχοιεν συνθῆκαι, καθʼ ἃς ἔδει Ῥωμαίους μὲν ἀπέχεσθαι Σικελίας ἁπάσης,

[4] Καρχηδονίους δʼ Ἰταλίας, καὶ διότι ὑπερέβαινον Ῥωμαῖοι τὰς συνθήκας καὶ τοὺς ὅρκους, ἐπεὶ ἐποιήσαντο τὴν πρώτην εἰς Σικελίαν διάβασιν, μήτε γεγονότος μήθʼ ὑπάρχοντος παράπαν ἐγγράφου τοιούτου μηδενός.

[5] ταῦτα γὰρ ἐν τῇ δευτέρᾳ λέγει βύβλῳ διαρρήδην. περὶ ὧν ἡμεῖς ἐν τῇ παρασκευῇ τῆς ἰδίας πραγματείας μνησθέντες εἰς τοῦτον ὑπερεθέμεθα τὸν καιρὸν κατὰ μέρος περὶ αὐτῶν ἐξεργάσασθαι διὰ τὸ καὶ πλείους διεψεῦσθαι τῆς ἀληθείας ἐν τούτοις, πιστεύσαντας τῇ Φιλίνου γραφῇ.

[6] οὐ μὴν ἀλλʼ εἰ κατὰ τοῦτό τις ἐπιλαμβάνεται Ῥωμαίων περὶ τῆς εἰς Σικελίαν διαβάσεως, ὅτι καθόλου Μαμερτίνους προσέλαβον εἰς τὴν φιλίαν καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα δεομένοις ἐβοήθησαν, οἵτινες οὐ μόνον τὴν Μεσσηνίων πόλιν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν Ῥηγίνων παρεσπόνδησαν, εἰκότως ἂν δόξειεν δυσαρεστεῖν.

[7] εἰ δὲ παρὰ τοὺς ὅρκους καὶ τὰς συνθήκας ὑπολαμβάνει τις αὐτοὺς πεποιῆσθαι τὴν διάβασιν, ἀγνοεῖ προφανῶς.

[1] συντελεσθέντος τοίνυν τοῦ περὶ Σικελίας πολέμου ποιοῦνται συνθήκας ἄλλας, ἐν αἷς τὰ συνέχοντα τῶν ἐγγράπτων ἦν ταῦτα· "

[2] 1ἐκχωρεῖν Καρχηδονίους ‘καὶ Σικελίας ἁπάσης καὶ τῶν νήσων ἁπασῶν τῶν "

[3] 1κειμένων Ἰταλίας μεταξὺ καὶ Σικελίας. τὴν ἀσφάλειαν ‘ὑπάρχειν παρʼ ἑκατέρων τοῖς ἑκατέρων συμμάχοις. "

[4] 1μηδετέρους ἐν ταῖς ἀλλήλων ἐπαρχίαις μηδὲν ἐπι‘τάττειν μηδʼ οἰκοδομεῖν δημοσίᾳ μηδὲ ξενολογεῖν ‘μηδὲ προσλαμβάνειν εἰς φιλίαν τοὺς ἀλλήλων συμ"

[5] 1μάχους. ἐξενεγκεῖν Καρχηδονίους ἐν ἔτεσιν δέκα ‘δισχίλια καὶ διακόσια τάλαντα, παραυτίκα δὲ δοῦ"

[6] 1ναι χίλια. τοὺς αἰχμαλώτους χωρὶς λύτρων ἀπο‘δοῦναι πάντας Καρχηδονίους τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις.’ μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα πάλιν,

[7] λήξαντος τοῦ Λιβυκοῦ πολέμου, Ῥωμαῖοι Καρχηδονίοις πόλεμον ἐξενέγκαντες ἕως δόγματος ἐπισυνθήκας ἐποιήσαντο τοιαύτας· "

[8] 1ἐκ‘χωρεῖν Καρχηδονίους Σαρδόνος καὶ προσεξενεγκεῖν ‘ἄλλα χίλια καὶ διακόσια τάλαντα,’ καθάπερ ἐπάνω προείπαμεν.

[9] ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς προειρημένοις τελευταῖαι πρὸς Ἀσδρούβαν ἐν Ἰβηρίᾳ γίνονται διομολογήσεις, ‘ἐφʼ ᾧ μὴ διαβαίνειν Καρχηδονίους ἐπὶ πολέμῳ "

[10] 1τὸν Ἴβηρα ποταμόν.’ ταῦθʼ ὑπῆρχε τὰ δίκαια Ῥωμαίοις καὶ Καρχηδονίοις ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρχῆς ἕως εἰς τοὺς κατʼ Ἀννίβαν καιρούς.

[1] ὥσπερ οὖν τὴν εἰς Σικελίαν διάβασιν Ῥωμαίων οὐ παρὰ τοὺς ὅρκους εὑρίσκομεν γεγενημένην, οὕτως ὑπὲρ τοῦ δευτέρου πολέμου, καθʼ ὃν ἐποιήσαντο τὰς περὶ Σαρδόνος συνθήκας, οὔτε πρόφασιν οὔτʼ αἰτίαν εὕροι τις ἂν εὔλογον,

[2] ἀλλʼ ὁμολογουμένως τοὺς Καρχηδονίους ἠναγκασμένους παρὰ πάντα τὰ δίκαια διὰ τὸν καιρὸν ἐκχωρῆσαι μὲν Σαρδόνος, ἐξενεγκεῖν δὲ τὸ προειρημένον πλῆθος τῶν χρημάτων.

[3] τὸ μὲν γὰρ ὑπὸ Ῥωμαίων περὶ τούτων λεγόμενον ἔγκλημα, διότι τοὺς παρὰ σφῶν πλοϊζομένους ἠδίκουν κατὰ τὸν Λιβυκὸν πόλεμον, ἐλύθη καθʼ οὓς καιροὺς κομισάμενοι παρὰ Καρχηδονίων ἅπαντας τοὺς κατηγμένους ἀντεδωρήσαντο χωρὶς λύτρων ἐν χάριτι τοὺς παρὰ σφίσιν ὑπάρχοντας αἰχμαλώτους.

[4] ὑπὲρ ὧν ἡμεῖς τὰ κατὰ μέρος ἐν τῇ πρὸ ταύτης βύβλῳ δεδηλώκαμεν.

[5] τούτων δὴ τοιούτων ὑπαρχόντων, λοιπὸν διευκρινῆσαι καὶ σκέψασθαι περὶ τοῦ κατʼ Ἀννίβαν πολέμου ποτέροις αὐτῶν τὴν αἰτίαν ἀναθετέον.

[1] τὰ μὲν οὖν ὑπὸ Καρχηδονίων τότε ῥηθέντα δεδηλώκαμεν, τὰ δʼ ὑπὸ Ῥωμαίων λεγόμενα νῦν ἐροῦμεν· οἷς τότε μὲν οὐκ ἐχρήσαντο διὰ τὸν ἐπὶ τῇ Ζακανθαίων ἀπωλείᾳ θυμόν· λέγεται δὲ πολλάκις καὶ ὑπὸ πολλῶν παρʼ αὐτοῖς.

[2] πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι τὰς πρὸς Ἀσδρούβαν γενομένας ὁμολογίας οὐκ ἀθετητέον, καθάπερ οἱ Καρχηδόνιοι λέγειν ἐθάρρουν· οὐ γὰρ προσέκειτο,

[3] καθάπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ Λυτατίου, ‘κυρίας εἶναι ταύτας, ἐὰν καὶ τῷ δήμῳ δόξῃ τῶν ‘Ῥωμαίων·’ ἀλλʼ αὐτοτελῶς ἐποιήσατο τὰς ὁμολογίας Ἀσδρούβας, ἐν αἷς ἦν, ‘τὸν Ἴβηρα ποταμὸν μὴ δια"

[4] 1βαίνειν ἐπὶ πολέμῳ Καρχηδονίους.’ καὶ μὴν ἐν ταῖς περὶ Σικελίαν συνθήκαις ἦν ἔγγραπτον, καθάπερ κἀκεῖνοί φασιν, ‘ὑπάρχειν τοῖς ἀμφοτέρων συμ‘μάχοις τὴν παρʼ ἑκατέρων ἀσφάλειαν,’ οὐκ αὐτοῖς μόνον τοῖς τότε συμμαχοῦσι, καθάπερ ἐποιοῦντο τὴν ἐκδοχὴν οἱ Καρχηδόνιοι·

[5] προσέκειτο γὰρ ἂν ἤτοι τὸ μὴ προσλαμβάνειν ἑτέρους συμμάχους παρὰ τοὺς ὑπάρχοντας ἢ τὸ μὴ παραλαμβάνεσθαι τοὺς ὕστερον προσληφθέντας τούτων τῶν συνθηκῶν.

[6] ὅτε δὲ τούτων οὐδέτερον ἐγράφη, προφανὲς ἦν ὅτι πᾶσι τοῖς ἑκατέρων συμμάχοις, καὶ τοῖς οὖσι τότε καὶ τοῖς μετὰ ταῦτα προσληφθησομένοις, τὴν παρʼ ἀμφοῖν ἀσφάλειαν ἀεὶ δέον ἦν ὑπάρχειν.

[7] ὃ δὴ καὶ πάντως ἂν εἰκὸς εἶναι δόξειεν. οὐ γὰρ δήπου τοιαύτας ἔμελλον ποιήσεσθαι συνθήκας διʼ ὧν ἀφελοῦνται τὴν ἐξουσίαν σφῶν αὐτῶν τοῦ προσλαμβάνειν κατὰ καιρούς, ἄν τινες ἐπιτήδειοι φανῶσιν αὐτοῖς φίλοι καὶ σύμμαχοι,

[8] οὐδὲ μὴν προσλαβόντες εἰς τὴν σφετέραν πίστιν περιόψεσθαι τούτους ὑπό τινων ἀδικουμένους·

[9] ἀλλʼ ἦν ἀμφοτέρων τὸ συνέχον τῆς ἐννοίας τῆς ἐν ταῖς συνθήκαις τῶν μὲν ὑπαρχόντων ἀμφοτέροις τότε συμμάχων ἀφέξεσθαι καὶ κατὰ μηδένα τρόπον τοὺς ἑτέρους παρὰ τῶν ἑτέρων ἐπιδέξεσθαί τινας τούτων εἰς συμμαχίαν,

[10] περὶ δὲ τῶν μετὰ ταῦτα προσληφθησομένων αὐτὸ τοῦτο, μήτε ξενολογεῖν μήτʼ ἐπιτάττειν μηδετέρους μηδὲν ἐν ταῖς ἀλλήλων ἐπαρχίαις καὶ συμμαχίαις, ὑπάρχειν τε τὴν ἀσφάλειαν πᾶσι τὴν παρʼ ἀμφοῖν.

[1] τούτων δὴ τοιούτων ὑπαρχόντων, ὁμολογούμενον ἦν κἀκεῖνο διότι Ζακανθαῖοι πλείοσιν ἔτεσιν ἤδη πρότερον τῶν κατʼ Ἀννίβαν καιρῶν ἐδεδώκεισαν αὑτοὺς εἰς τὴν τῶν Ῥωμαίων πίστιν.

[2] σημεῖον δὲ τοῦτο μέγιστον καὶ παρʼ αὐτοῖς τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις ὁμολογούμενον ὅτι στασιάσαντες Ζακανθαῖοι πρὸς σφᾶς οὐ Καρχηδονίοις ἐπέτρεψαν, καίπερ ἐγγὺς ὄντων αὐτῶν καὶ τὰ κατὰ τὴν Ἰβηρίαν ἤδη πραττόντων, ἀλλὰ Ῥωμαίοις καὶ διὰ τούτων ἐποιήσαντο τὴν κατόρθωσιν τῆς πολιτείας.

[3] διόπερ εἰ μέν τις τὴν Ζακάνθης ἀπώλειαν αἰτίαν τίθησι τοῦ πολέμου, συγχωρητέον ἀδίκως ἐξενηνοχέναι τὸν πόλεμον Καρχηδονίους κατά τε τὰς ἐπὶ τοῦ Λυτατίου συνθήκας, καθʼ ἃς ἔδει τοῖς ἑκατέρων συμμάχοις τὴν ὑφʼ ἑκατέρων ὑπάρχειν ἀσφάλειαν, κατά τε τὰς ἐπʼ Ἀσδρούβου, καθʼ ἃς οὐκ ἔδει διαβαίνειν τὸν Ἴβηρα ποταμὸν ἐπὶ πολέμῳ Καρχηδονίους·

[4] εἰ δὲ τὴν Σαρδόνος ἀφαίρεσιν καὶ τὰ σὺν ταύτῃ χρήματα, πάντως ὁμολογητέον εὐλόγως πεπολεμηκέναι τὸν κατʼ Ἀννίβαν πόλεμον τοὺς Καρχηδονίους· καιρῷ γὰρ πεισθέντες ἠμύνοντο σὺν καιρῷ τοὺς βλάψαντας.

[1] ἔνιοι δὲ τῶν ἀκρίτως τὰ τοιαῦτα θεωμένων τάχʼ ἂν φήσαιεν ἡμᾶς οὐκ ἀναγκαίως ἐπὶ πλεῖον ἐξακριβοῦν τοὺς ὑπὲρ τῶν τοιούτων λόγους.

[2] ἐγὼ δʼ, εἰ μέν τις ὑπείληφεν πρὸς πᾶσαν περίστασιν αὐτάρκης ὑπάρχειν, καλὴν μέν, οὐκ ἀναγκαίαν δʼ ἴσως φήσαιμʼ ἂν εἶναι τὴν τῶν προγεγονότων ἐπιστήμην·

[3] εἰ δὲ μηδεὶς ἂν μήτε περὶ τῶν κατʼ ἰδίαν μήτε περὶ τῶν κοινῶν τολμήσαι τοῦτʼ εἰπεῖν ἄνθρωπος ὢν διὰ τό, κἂν κατὰ τὸ παρὸν εὐτυχῇ, τήν γε περὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος ἐλπίδα μηδὲν ἂν ἐκ τῶν νῦν παρόντων εὐλόγως βεβαιώσασθαι μηδένα τῶν νοῦν ἐχόντων, οὐ μόνον καλήν,

[4] ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον ἀναγκαίαν εἶναί φημι διὰ ταῦτα τὴν τῶν παρεληλυθότων ἐπίγνωσιν.

[5] πῶς γὰρ ἂν εἴτʼ αὐτὸς ἀδικούμενός τις ἢ τῆς πατρίδος ἀδικουμένης βοηθοὺς εὕροι καὶ συμμάχους, εἴτε κτήσασθαί τι καὶ προκατάρξασθαι σπουδάζων τοὺς συνεργήσοντας αὐτῷ παρορμήσαι πρὸς τὰς ἐπιβολάς;

[6] πῶς δʼ ἂν εὐδοκούμενος τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις τοὺς βεβαιώσοντας τὴν αὐτοῦ προαίρεσιν καὶ διαφυλάξοντας τὴν κατάστασιν παροξύναι δικαίως, εἰ μηδὲν εἰδείη τῆς τῶν προγεγονότων περὶ ἑκάστους ὑπομνήσεως;

[7] πρὸς μὲν γὰρ τὸ παρὸν ἀεί πως ἁρμοζόμενοι καὶ συνυποκρινόμενοι τοιαῦτα καὶ λέγουσι καὶ πράττουσι πάντες ὥστε δυσθεώρητον εἶναι τὴν ἑκάστου προαίρεσιν καὶ λίαν ἐν πολλοῖς ἐπισκοτεῖσθαι τὴν ἀλήθειαν.

[8] τὰ δὲ παρεληλυθότα τῶν ἔργων, ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν πραγμάτων λαμβάνοντα τὴν δοκιμασίαν, ἀληθινῶς ἐμφαίνει τὰς ἑκάστων αἱρέσεις καὶ διαλήψεις καὶ δηλοῖ παρʼ οἷς μὲν χάριν, εὐεργεσίαν, βοήθειαν ἡμῖν ὑπάρχουσαν, παρʼ οἷς δὲ τἀναντία τούτων.

[9] ἐξ ὧν καὶ τὸν ἐλεήσοντα καὶ τὸν συνοργιούμενον, ἔτι δὲ τὸν δικαιώσοντα, πολλάκις καὶ ἐπὶ πολλῶν εὑρεῖν ἔστιν.

[10] ἅπερ ἔχει μεγίστας ἐπικουρίας καὶ κοινῇ καὶ κατʼ ἰδίαν πρὸς τὸν ἀνθρώπινον βίον.

[11] διόπερ οὐχ οὕτως ἐστὶ φροντιστέον τῆς αὐτῶν τῶν πράξεων ἐξηγήσεως οὔτε τοῖς γράφουσιν οὔτε τοῖς ἀναγινώσκουσιν τὰς ἱστορίας, ὡς τῶν πρότερον καὶ τῶν ἅμα καὶ τῶν ἐπιγινομένων τοῖς ἔργοις.

[12] ἱστορίας γὰρ ἐὰν ἀφέλῃ τις τὸ διὰ τί καὶ πῶς καὶ τίνος χάριν ἐπράχθη τὸ πραχθὲν καὶ πότερον εὔλογον ἔσχε τὸ τέλος, τὸ καταλειπόμενον αὐτῆς ἀγώνισμα μὲν μάθημα δʼ οὐ γίνεται,

[13] καὶ παραυτίκα μὲν τέρπει, πρὸς δὲ τὸ μέλλον οὐδὲν ὠφελεῖ τὸ παράπαν.

[1] ἧι καὶ τοὺς ὑπολαμβάνοντας δύσκτητον εἶναι καὶ δυσανάγνωστον τὴν ἡμετέραν πραγματείαν διὰ τὸ πλῆθος καὶ τὸ μέγεθος τῶν βύβλων ἀγνοεῖν νομιστέον.

[2] πόσῳ γὰρ ῥᾷόν ἐστι καὶ κτήσασθαι καὶ διαναγνῶναι βύβλους τετταράκοντα καθαπερανεὶ κατὰ μίτον ἐξυφασμένας καὶ παρακολουθῆσαι σαφῶς ταῖς μὲν κατὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν καὶ Σικελίαν καὶ Λιβύην πράξεσιν ἀπὸ τῶν κατὰ Πύρρον [καὶ Τίμαιον συγγραφέων καὶ καιρῶν ἐξηγήσεως] εἰς τὴν Καρχηδόνος ἅλωσιν,

[3] ταῖς δὲ κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην οἰκουμένην ἀπὸ τῆς Κλεομένους τοῦ Σπαρτιάτου φυγῆς κατὰ τὸ συνεχὲς μέχρι τῆς Ἀχαιῶν καὶ Ῥωμαίων περὶ τὸν Ἰσθμὸν παρατάξεως, ἢ τὰς τῶν κατὰ μέρος γραφόντων συντάξεις ἀναγινώσκειν ἢ κτᾶσθαι;

[4] χωρὶς γὰρ τοῦ πολλαπλασίους αὐτὰς ὑπάρχειν τῶν ἡμετέρων ὑπομνημάτων, οὐδὲ καταλαβεῖν ἐξ αὐτῶν βεβαίως οὐδὲν οἷόν τε τοὺς ἀναγινώσκοντας, πρῶτον μὲν διὰ τὸ τοὺς πλείστους μὴ ταὐτὰ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν γράφειν,

[5] εἶτα διὰ τὸ τὰς καταλλήλους τῶν πράξεων παραλείπειν, ὧν ἐκ παραθέσεως συνθεωρουμένων καὶ συγκρινομένων ἀλλοιοτέρας ἕκαστα τυγχάνει δοκιμασίας τῆς κατὰ μέρος διαλήψεως, τῶν δὲ κυριωτάτων μηδὲ ψαύειν αὐτοὺς δύνασθαι τὸ παράπαν.

[6] ἀκμὴν γάρ φαμεν ἀναγκαιότατα μέρη τῆς ἱστορίας εἶναι τά τʼ ἐπιγινόμενα τοῖς ἔργοις καὶ τὰ παρεπόμενα καὶ μάλιστα τὰ περὶ τὰς αἰτίας.

[7] θεωροῦμεν δὲ τὸν μὲν Ἀντιοχικὸν πόλεμον ἐκ τοῦ Φιλιππικοῦ τὰς ἀφορμὰς εἰληφότα, τὸν δὲ Φιλιππικὸν ἐκ τοῦ κατʼ Ἀννίβαν, τὸν δʼ Ἀννιβιακὸν ἐκ τοῦ περὶ Σικελίαν, τὰ δὲ μεταξὺ τούτων πολλὰς καὶ ποικίλας ἐσχηκότα διαθέσεις, πάσας δὲ συννευούσας πρὸς τὴν αὐτὴν ὑπόθεσιν.

[8] ταῦτα δὴ πάντα διὰ μὲν τῶν γραφόντων καθόλου δυνατὸν ἐπιγνῶναι καὶ μαθεῖν, διὰ δὲ τῶν τοὺς πολέμους αὐτούς, οἷον τὸν Περσικὸν ἢ τὸν Φιλιππικόν, ἀδύνατον,

[9] εἰ μὴ καὶ τὰς παρατάξεις τις ἀναγινώσκων αὐτὰς ἐξ ὧν ἐκεῖνοι γράφουσιν ὑπολαμβάνει σαφῶς ἐπεγνωκέναι καὶ τὴν τοῦ πολέμου τοῦ σύμπαντος οἰκονομίαν καὶ διάθεσιν.

[10] ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἔστι τούτων οὐδέν, ἀλλʼ ὅσῳ διαφέρει τὸ μαθεῖν τοῦ μόνον ἀκοῦσαι, τοσούτῳ καὶ τὴν ἡμετέραν ἱστορίαν ὑπολαμβάνω διαφέρειν τῶν ἐπὶ μέρους συντάξεων.

[1] οἱ δὲ παρὰ τῶν Ῥωμαίων πρέσβεις — τὴν γὰρ παρέκβασιν ἐντεῦθεν ἐποιησάμεθα — διακούσαντες τὰ παρὰ τῶν Καρχηδονίων ἄλλο μὲν οὐδὲν εἶπαν,

[2] ὁ δὲ πρεσβύτατος αὐτῶν δείξας τοῖς ἐν τῷ συνεδρίῳ τὸν κόλπον ἐνταῦθα καὶ τὸν πόλεμον αὐτοῖς ἔφη καὶ τὴν εἰρήνην φέρειν· ἐκβαλὼν οὖν, ὁπότερον ἂν κελεύσωσιν, ἀπολείψειν.

[3] ὁ δὲ βασιλεὺς τῶν Καρχηδονίων, ὁπότερον αὐτοῖς φαίνεται, τοῦτʼ ἐκβαλεῖν ἐκέλευσε.

[4] τοῦ δὲ Ῥωμαίου φήσαντος τὸν πόλεμον ἐκβαλεῖν, ἀνεφώνησαν ἅμα καὶ πλείους τῶν ἐκ τοῦ συνεδρίου, δέχεσθαι φάσκοντες. οἱ μὲν οὖν πρέσβεις καὶ τὸ συνέδριον ἐπὶ τούτοις ἐχωρίσθησαν.

[5] Ἀννίβας δὲ παραχειμάζων ἐν Καινῇ πόλει πρῶτον μὲν διαφῆκε τοὺς Ἴβηρας ἐπὶ τὰς ἑαυτῶν πόλεις, βουλόμενος ἑτοίμους καὶ προθύμους παρασκευάζειν πρὸς τὸ μέλλον.

[6] δεύτερον δʼ Ἀσδρούβᾳ τἀδελφῷ διέταξε πῶς δεήσει τῇ τε τῶν Ἰβήρων ἀρχῇ καὶ δυναστείᾳ χρῆσθαι ταῖς τε πρὸς Ῥωμαίους παρασκευαῖς, ἐὰν αὐτὸς χωρίζηταί που.

[7] τρίτον ὑπὲρ τῆς ἀσφαλείας τῶν ἐν Λιβύῃ προυνοεῖτο πραγμάτων.

[8] πάνυ δʼ ἐμπείρως καὶ φρονίμως ἐκλογιζόμενος ἐκ μὲν Λιβύης εἰς Ἰβηρίαν, ἐκ δʼ Ἰβηρίας εἰς Λιβύην διεβίβαζε στρατιώτας, ἐκδεσμεύων τὴν ἑκατέρων πίστιν εἰς ἀλλήλους διὰ τῆς τοιαύτης οἰκονομίας.

[9] ἦσαν δʼ οἱ διαβάντες εἰς τὴν Λιβύην Θερσῖται, Μαστιανοί,

[10] πρὸς δὲ τούτοις Ὀρῆτες Ἴβηρες, Ὀλκάδες, οἱ δὲ σύμπαντες ἀπὸ τούτων τῶν ἐθνῶν ἱππεῖς μὲν χίλιοι διακόσιοι, πεζοὶ δὲ μύριοι τρισχίλιοι ὀκτακόσιοι πεντήκοντα, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις Βαλιαρεῖς ὀκτακόσιοι ἑβδομήκοντα,

[11] οὓς κυρίως μὲν καλοῦσι σφενδονήτας, ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς χρείας ταύτης συνωνύμως καὶ τὸ ἔθνος αὐτῶν προσαγορεύουσι καὶ τὴν νῆσον.

[12] τῶν δὲ προειρημένων τοὺς μὲν πλείους εἰς τὰ Μεταγώνια τῆς Λιβύης, τινὰς δʼ εἰς αὐτὴν Καρχηδόνα κατέταξεν.

[13] ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν πόλεων τῶν Μεταγωνιτῶν καλουμένων ἀπέστειλεν ἄλλους εἰς Καρχηδόνα πεζοὺς τετρακισχιλίους, ὁμηρείας ἔχοντας καὶ βοηθείας ἅμα τάξιν.

[14] ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς Ἰβηρίας ἀπέλιπεν Ἀσδρούβᾳ τἀδελφῷ πεντήρεις μὲν πεντήκοντα, τετρήρεις δὲ δύο καὶ τριήρεις πέντε· τούτων ἐχούσας πληρώματα πεντήρεις μὲν τριάκοντα δύο, τριήρεις δὲ πέντε.

[15] καὶ μὴν ἱππεῖς Λιβυφοινίκων μὲν καὶ Λιβύων τετρακοσίους πεντήκοντα, Λεργητῶν δὲ τριακοσίους, Νομάδων δὲ Μασυλίων καὶ Μασαισυλίων καὶ Μακκοίων καὶ Μαυρουσίων τῶν παρὰ τὸν Ὠκεανὸν χιλίους ὀκτακοσίους,

[16] πεζοὺς δὲ Λιβύων μυρίους χιλίους ὀκτακοσίους πεντήκοντα, Λιγυστίνους τριακοσίους, Βαλιαρεῖς πεντακοσίους, ἐλέφαντας εἴκοσι καὶ ἕνα.

[17] οὐ χρὴ δὲ θαυμάζειν τὴν ἀκρίβειαν τῆς ἀναγραφῆς, εἰ τοιαύτῃ κεχρήμεθα περὶ τῶν ὑπʼ Ἀννίβου κατʼ Ἰβηρίαν πεπραγμένων οἵᾳ μόλις ἂν χρήσαιτό τις αὐτὸς κεχειρικὼς τὰς κατὰ μέρος πράξεις, οὐδὲ προκαταγινώσκειν, εἰ πεποιήκαμεν παραπλήσιον τοῖς ἀξιοπίστως ψευδομένοις τῶν συγγραφέων.

[18] ἡμεῖς γὰρ εὑρόντες ἐπὶ Λακινίῳ τὴν γραφὴν ταύτην ἐν χαλκώματι κατατεταγμένην ὑπʼ Ἀννίβου, καθʼ οὓς καιροὺς ἐν τοῖς κατὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν τόποις ἀνεστρέφετο, πάντως ἐνομίσαμεν αὐτὴν περί γε τῶν τοιούτων ἀξιόπιστον εἶναι· διὸ καὶ κατακολουθεῖν εἱλόμεθα τῇ γραφῇ ταύτῃ.

[1] Ἀννίβας δὲ πάντα προνοηθεὶς περὶ τῆς ἀσφαλείας τῶν τε κατὰ Λιβύην πραγμάτων καὶ τῶν ἐν Ἰβηρίᾳ λοιπὸν ἐκαραδόκει καὶ προσεδέχετο τοὺς παρὰ τῶν Κελτῶν πρὸς αὐτὸν ἀποστελλομένους·

[2] σαφῶς γὰρ ἐξητάκει καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν τῆς ὑπὸ τὰς Ἄλπεις καὶ περὶ τὸν Πάδον ποταμὸν χώρας καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν κατοικούντων αὐτήν, ἔτι δὲ τὴν πρὸς τοὺς πολέμους τῶν ἀνδρῶν τόλμαν,

[3] καὶ τὸ μέγιστον, τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν δυσμένειαν αὐτοῖς ἐκ τοῦ προγεγονότος πολέμου πρὸς Ῥωμαίους, ὑπὲρ οὗ διήλθομεν ἡμεῖς ἐν τῇ πρὸ ταύτης βύβλῳ χάριν τοῦ συμπεριφέρεσθαι τοὺς ἐντυγχάνοντας τοῖς νῦν μέλλουσι λέγεσθαι.

[4] διόπερ εἴχετο ταύτης τῆς ἐλπίδος καὶ πᾶν ὑπισχνεῖτο, διαπεμπόμενος ἐπιμελῶς πρὸς τοὺς δυνάστας τῶν Κελτῶν καὶ τοὺς ἐπὶ τάδε καὶ τοὺς ἐν αὐταῖς ταῖς Ἄλπεσιν ἐνοικοῦντας,

[5] μόνως ἂν ὑπολαμβάνων ἐν Ἰταλίᾳ συστήσασθαι τὸν πρὸς Ῥωμαίους πόλεμον, εἰ δυνηθείη διαπεράσας τὰς πρὸ τοῦ δυσχωρίας εἰς τοὺς προειρημένους ἀφικέσθαι τόπους καὶ συνεργοῖς καὶ συμμάχοις χρήσασθαι Κελτοῖς εἰς τὴν προκειμένην ἐπιβολήν.

[6] ἀφικομένων δὲ τῶν ἀγγέλων καὶ τήν τε τῶν Κελτῶν βούλησιν καὶ προσδοκίαν ἀπαγγειλάντων τήν τε τῶν Ἀλπεινῶν ὀρῶν ὑπερβολὴν ἐπίπονον μὲν καὶ δυσχερῆ λίαν, οὐ μὴν ἀδύνατον εἶναι φασκόντων, συνῆγε τὰς δυνάμεις ἐκ τῆς παραχειμασίας ὑπὸ τὴν ἐαρινὴν ὥραν.

[7] προσπεπτωκότων δὲ προσφάτως αὐτῷ καὶ τῶν ἐκ τῆς Καρχηδόνος, ἐπαρθεὶς τῷ θυμῷ καὶ πιστεύων τῇ τῶν πολιτῶν εὐνοίᾳ παρεκάλει τὰς δυνάμεις φανερῶς ἤδη πρὸς τὸν κατὰ Ῥωμαίων πόλεμον,

[8] ἐμφανίζων μὲν ὃν τρόπον ἔκδοτον αὐτὸν ἐγχειρήσαιεν αἰτεῖσθαι Ῥωμαῖοι καὶ πάντας τοὺς τοῦ στρατοπέδου προεστῶτας, ὑποδεικνύων δὲ τὴν τῆς χώρας ἀρετήν, εἰς ἣν ἀφίξονται, καὶ τὴν τῶν Κελτῶν εὔνοιαν καὶ συμμαχίαν.

[9] εὐθύμως δὲ τῶν ὄχλων αὐτῷ συνεξισταμένων, ἐπαινέσας καὶ παραγγείλας τακτὴν ἡμέραν, ἐν ᾗ ποιήσεται τὴν ἔξοδον, τότε μὲν διέλυσε τὴν ἐκκλησίαν.

[1] ἐπιτελέσας δὲ τὰ προειρημένα κατὰ τὴν παραχειμασίαν καὶ παρασκευάσας ἱκανὴν ἀσφάλειαν τοῖς τε κατὰ τὴν Λιβύην καὶ τοῖς ἐν Ἰβηρίᾳ πράγμασι, παραγενομένης τῆς ταχθείσης ἡμέρας, προῆγε, πεζῶν μὲν ἔχων εἰς ἐννέα μυριάδας, ἱππεῖς δὲ περὶ μυρίους καὶ δισχιλίους.

[2] καὶ διαβὰς τὸν Ἴβηρα ποταμὸν κατεστρέφετο τό τε τῶν Ἰλουργητῶν ἔθνος καὶ Βαργουσίων ἔτι δὲ τοὺς Αἰρηνοσίους καὶ τοὺς Ἀνδοσίνους μέχρι τῆς προσαγορευομένης Πυρήνης.

[3] ποιησάμενος δὲ πάντας ὑφʼ ἑαυτὸν καί τινας πόλεις κατὰ κράτος ἑλών, ταχέως μὲν καὶ παρʼ ἐλπίδα, μετὰ πολλῶν δὲ καὶ μεγάλων ἀγώνων ἔτι δὲ πολλῆς καταφθορᾶς ἀνδρῶν,

[4] ἡγεμόνα μὲν ἐπὶ πάσης κατέλιπε τῆς ἐπὶ τάδε τοῦ ποταμοῦ χώρας Ἄννωνα, τῶν δὲ Βαργουσίων καὶ δεσπότην· μάλιστα γὰρ τούτοις ἠπίστει διὰ τὴν πρὸς Ῥωμαίους εὔνοιαν.

[5] ἀπεμέρισε δὲ καὶ τῆς δυνάμεως ἧς εἶχε τῷ μὲν Ἄννωνι πεζοὺς μυρίους ἱππεῖς δὲ χιλίους καὶ τὰς ἀποσκευὰς ἀπέλιπε τούτῳ τῶν αὐτῷ συνεξορμώντων.

[6] εἰς δὲ τὴν οἰκείαν ἀπέλυσε τοὺς ἴσους τοῖς προειρημένοις, βουλόμενος αὐτούς τε τούτους εὔνους ἀπολιπεῖν, τοῖς τε λοιποῖς ὑποδεικνύων ἐλπίδα τῆς εἰς οἶκον ἐπανόδου καὶ τοῖς μεθʼ ἑαυτοῦ μὲν στρατευομένοις, οὐχ ἧττον δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἐν οἴκῳ μένουσι τῶν Ἰβήρων, ἵνα προθύμως ἐξορμῶσι πάντες, ἄν ποτέ τις ἐπικουρίας χρεία γένηται παρʼ αὐτῶν.

[7] τὴν δὲ λοιπὴν στρατιὰν ἀναλαβὼν εὔζωνον πεζοὺς μὲν πεντακισμυρίους ἱππεῖς δὲ πρὸς ἐννακισχιλίους ἦγεν διὰ τῶν Πυρηναίων λεγομένων ὀρῶν ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ Ῥοδανοῦ καλουμένου ποταμοῦ διάβασιν,

[8] ἔχων οὐχ οὕτως πολλὴν δύναμιν ὡς χρησίμην καὶ γεγυμνασμένην διαφερόντως ἐκ τῆς συνεχείας τῶν κατὰ τὴν Ἰβηρίαν ἀγώνων.

[1] ἵνα δὲ μὴ τῶν τόπων ἀγνοουμένων παντάπασιν ἀσαφῆ γίνεσθαι συμβαίνῃ τὴν διήγησιν, ῥητέον ἂν εἴη πόθεν ὁρμήσας Ἀννίβας καὶ τίνας καὶ πόσους διελθὼν τόπους εἰς ποῖα μέρη κατῆρε τῆς Ἰταλίας.

[2] ῥητέον δʼ οὐκ αὐτὰς τὰς ὀνομασίας τῶν τόπων καὶ ποταμῶν καὶ πόλεων, ὅπερ ἔνιοι ποιοῦσι τῶν συγγραφέων, ὑπολαμβάνοντες ἐν παντὶ πρὸς γνῶσιν καὶ σαφήνειαν αὐτοτελὲς εἶναι τοῦτο τὸ μέρος.

[3] οἶμαι δʼ, ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν γνωριζομένων τόπων οὐ μικρὰ μεγάλα δὲ συμβάλλεσθαι πεποίηκε πρὸς ἀνάμνησιν ἡ τῶν ὀνομάτων παράθεσις· ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἀγνοουμένων εἰς τέλος ὁμοίαν ἔχει τὴν δύναμιν ἡ τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐξήγησις ταῖς ἀδιανοήτοις καὶ κρουσματικαῖς λέξεσι.

[4] τῆς γὰρ διανοίας ἐπʼ οὐδὲν ἀπερειδομένης οὐδὲ δυναμένης ἐφαρμόττειν τὸ λεγόμενον ἐπʼ οὐδὲν γνώριμον, ἀνυπότακτος καὶ κωφὴ γίνεθʼ ἡ διήγησις.

[5] διόπερ ὑποδεικτέος ἂν εἴη τρόπος, διʼ οὗ δυνατὸν ἔσται περὶ τῶν ἀγνοουμένων λέγοντας κατὰ ποσὸν εἰς ἀληθινὰς καὶ γνωρίμους ἐννοίας ἄγειν τοὺς ἀκούοντας.

πρώτη μὲν οὖν καὶ μεγίστη γνῶσις,

[6] ἔτι δὲ κοινὴ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις ἐστὶν ἡ τοῦ περιέχοντος ἡμᾶς διαίρεσις καὶ τάξις, καθʼ ἣν πάντες, ὧν καὶ μικρὸν ὄφελος, ἀνατολάς, δύσεις, μεσημβρίαν, ἄρκτον γνωρίζομεν·

[7] δευτέρα δέ, καθʼ ἣν ἑκάστῃ διαφορᾷ τῶν προειρημένων τοὺς ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς τόπους ὑποτάττοντες καὶ φέροντες ἀεὶ τῇ διανοίᾳ τὸ λεγόμενον ἐπί τι τῶν προειρημένων εἰς γνωρίμους καὶ συνήθεις ἐπινοίας ἐμπίπτομεν ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀγνώστων καὶ

[1] ἀοράτων τόπων. τούτων δὲ περὶ τῆς ὅλης γῆς ὑποκειμένων, ἀκόλουθον ἂν εἴη τὸ καὶ περὶ τῆς καθʼ ἡμᾶς οἰκουμένης ἀνὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον διελομένους εἰς ἐπίστασιν ἀγαγεῖν τοὺς ἀκούοντας.

[2] ταύτης διῃρημένης εἰς τρία μέρη καὶ τρεῖς ὀνομασίας, τὸ μὲν ἓν μέρος αὐτῆς Ἀσίαν, τὸ δʼ ἕτερον Λιβύην, τὸ δὲ τρίτον Εὐρώπην προσαγορεύουσι.

[3] τὰς δὲ διαφορὰς ταύτας ὁρίζουσιν ὅ τε Τάναϊς ποταμὸς καὶ Νεῖλος καὶ τὸ καθʼ Ἡρακλέους στήλας στόμα.

[4] Νείλου μὲν οὖν καὶ Τανάιδος μεταξὺ τὴν Ἀσίαν κεῖσθαι συμβέβηκε, πίπτειν δὲ τοῦ περιέχοντος ὑπὸ τὸ μεταξὺ διάστημα θερινῶν ἀνατολῶν καὶ μεσημβρίας.

[5] ἡ δὲ Λιβύη κεῖται μὲν μεταξὺ Νείλου καὶ στηλῶν Ἡρακλείων, τοῦ δὲ περιέχοντος πέπτωκεν ὑπό τε τὴν μεσημβρίαν καὶ κατὰ τὸ συνεχὲς ὑπὸ τὰς χειμερινὰς δύσεις ἕως τῆς ἰσημερινῆς καταφορᾶς, ἣ πίπτει καθʼ Ἡρακλείους στήλας.

[6] αὗται μὲν οὖν αἱ χῶραι καθολικώτερον θεωρούμεναι τὸν πρὸς τὴν μεσημβρίαν τόπον ἐπέχουσι τῆς καθʼ ἡμᾶς θαλάττης ἀπὸ τῶν ἀνατολῶν ὡς πρὸς τὰς δύσεις.

[7] ἡ δʼ Εὐρώπη ταύταις ἀμφοτέραις ὡς πρὸς τὰς ἄρκτους ἀντιπαράκειται, κατὰ τὸ συνεχὲς ἀπὸ τῶν ἀνατολῶν παρήκουσα μὲν ἄχρι πρὸς τὰς δύσεις,

[8] κεῖται δʼ αὐτῆς τὸ μὲν ὁλοσχερέστερον καὶ βαθύτερον μέρος ὑπʼ αὐτὰς τὰς ἄρκτους μεταξὺ τοῦ τε Τανάιδος ποταμοῦ καὶ τοῦ Νάρβωνος, ὃς οὐ πολὺν ἀπέχει τόπον ὡς πρὸς δύσεις ἀπὸ Μασσαλίας καὶ τῶν τοῦ Ῥοδανοῦ στομάτων, διʼ ὧν εἰς τὸ Σαρδόνιον πέλαγος ἐξίησιν ὁ προειρημένος ποταμός.

[9] ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ Νάρβωνος καὶ τὰ περὶ τοῦτον Κελτοὶ νέμονται μέχρι τῶν προσαγορευομένων Πυρηναίων ὀρῶν, ἃ διατείνει κατὰ τὸ συνεχὲς ἀπὸ τῆς καθʼ ἡμᾶς θαλάττης ἕως εἰς τὴν ἐκτός.

[10] τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν μέρος τῆς Εὐρώπης ἀπὸ τῶν προειρημένων ὀρῶν τὸ συνάπτον πρός τε τὰς δύσεις καὶ πρὸς Ἡρακλείους στήλας περιέχεται μὲν ὑπό τε τῆς καθʼ ἡμᾶς καὶ τῆς ἔξω θαλάττης, καλεῖται δὲ τὸ μὲν παρὰ τὴν καθʼ ἡμᾶς παρῆκον ἕως Ἡρακλείων στηλῶν Ἰβηρία,

[11] τὸ δὲ παρὰ τὴν ἔξω καὶ μεγάλην προσαγορευομένην κοινὴν μὲν ὀνομασίαν οὐκ ἔχει διὰ τὸ προσφάτως κατωπτεῦσθαι, κατοικεῖται δὲ πᾶν ὑπὸ βαρβάρων ἐθνῶν καὶ πολυανθρώπων, ὑπὲρ ὧν ἡμεῖς μετὰ ταῦτα τὸν

[1] κατὰ μέρος λόγον ἀποδώσομεν. καθάπερ δὲ καὶ τῆς Ἀσίας καὶ τῆς Λιβύης, καθὸ συνάπτουσιν ἀλλήλαις περὶ τὴν Αἰθιοπίαν, οὐδεὶς ἔχει λέγειν ἀτρεκῶς ἕως τῶν καθʼ ἡμᾶς καιρῶν πότερον ἤπειρός ἐστι κατὰ τὸ συνεχὲς τὰ πρὸς τὴν μεσημβρίαν ἢ θαλάττῃ περιέχεται,

[2] τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον τὸ μεταξὺ Τανάιδος καὶ Νάρβωνος εἰς τὰς ἄρκτους ἀνῆκον ἄγνωστον ἡμῖν ἕως τοῦ νῦν ἐστιν, ἐὰν μή τι μετὰ ταῦτα πολυπραγμονοῦντες ἱστορήσωμεν.

[3] τοὺς δὲ λέγοντάς τι περὶ τούτων ἄλλως ἢ γράφοντας ἀγνοεῖν καὶ μύθους διατιθέναι νομιστέον.

[4] ταῦτα μὲν οὖν εἰρήσθω μοι χάριν τοῦ μὴ τελέως ἀνυπότακτον εἶναι τοῖς ἀπείροις τῶν τόπων τὴν διήγησιν, ἀλλὰ κατά γε τὰς ὁλοσχερεῖς διαφορὰς συνεπιβάλλειν καὶ φέρειν ἐπί τι τῇ διανοίᾳ τὸ λεγόμενον, τεκμαιρομένους ἐκ τοῦ περιέχοντος.

[5] καθάπερ γὰρ ἐπὶ τῆς ὁράσεως εἰθίσμεθα συνεπιστρέφειν ἀεὶ τὰ πρόσωπα πρὸς τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἔνδειξιν ὑποδεικνύμενον, οὕτως καὶ τῇ διανοίᾳ χρὴ συνδιανεύειν καὶ συρρέπειν ἐπὶ τοὺς τόπους ἀεὶ τοὺς

[1] διὰ τοῦ λόγου συνεπιδεικνυμένους. ἀφέμενοι δὲ τούτων τρεψόμεθα πρὸς τὸ συνεχὲς τῆς προκειμένης ἡμῖν διηγήσεως.

[2] Καρχηδόνιοι γὰρ ἐν τούτοις τοῖς καιροῖς τῆς μὲν Λιβύης ἐκυρίευον πάντων τῶν ἐπὶ τὴν ἔσω θάλατταν νευόντων μερῶν ἀπὸ τῶν Φιλαίνου βωμῶν, οἳ κεῖνται κατὰ τὴν μεγάλην Σύρτιν, ἕως ἐφʼ Ἡρακλέους στήλας.

[3] τοῦτο δὲ τὸ μῆκός ἐστι τῆς παραλίας ὑπὲρ τοὺς ἑξακισχιλίους καὶ μυρίους σταδίους.

[4] διαβάντες δὲ τὸν καθʼ Ἡρακλείους στήλας πόρον ὁμοίως ἐκεκρατήκεισαν καὶ τῆς Ἰβηρίας ἁπάσης ἕως τῆς ῥαχίας, ὃ πέρας ἐστὶ πρὸς τῇ καθʼ ἡμᾶς θαλάττῃ τῶν Πυρηναίων ὀρῶν, ἃ διορίζει τοὺς Ἴβηρας καὶ Κελτούς.

[5] ἀπέχει δὲ τοῦ καθʼ Ἡρακλείους στήλας στόματος οὗτος ὁ τόπος περὶ ὀκτακισχιλίους σταδίους.

[6] ἐπὶ μὲν γὰρ Καινὴν πόλιν ἀπὸ στηλῶν εἶναι συμβαίνει τρισχιλίους, ὅθεν ἐποιεῖτο τὴν ὁρμὴν Ἀννίβας τὴν εἰς Ἰταλίαν· [τὴν δὲ Καινὴν πόλιν ἔνιοι Νέαν Καρχηδόνα καλοῦσιν]· ἀπὸ δὲ ταύτης εἰσὶν ἐπὶ μὲν τὸν Ἴβηρα ποταμὸν ἑξακόσιοι στάδιοι πρὸς δισχιλίοις,

[7] ἀπὸ δὲ τούτου πάλιν εἰς Ἐμπόριον χίλιοι σὺν ἑξακοσίοις, ἀπὸ δʼ Ἐμπορίου πόλεως εἰς περὶ ἑξακοσίους,

[8] καὶ μὴν ἐντεῦθεν ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ Ῥοδανοῦ διάβασιν περὶ χιλίους ἑξακοσίους· [ταῦτα γὰρ νῦν βεβημάτισται καὶ σεσημείωται κατὰ σταδίους ὀκτὼ διὰ Ῥωμαίων ἐπιμελῶς·

[9] ] ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς διαβάσεως τοῦ Ῥοδανοῦ πορευομένοις παρʼ αὐτὸν τὸν ποταμὸν ὡς ἐπὶ τὰς πηγὰς ἕως πρὸς τὴν ἀναβολὴν τῶν Ἄλπεων τὴν εἰς Ἰταλίαν χίλιοι τετρακόσιοι.

[10] λοιπαὶ δʼ αἱ τῶν Ἄλπεων ὑπερβολαί, περὶ χιλίους διακοσίους· ἃς ὑπερβαλὼν ἔμελλεν ἥξειν εἰς τὰ περὶ τὸν Πάδον πεδία τῆς Ἰταλίας.

[11] ὥστʼ εἶναι τοὺς πάντας ἐκ Καινῆς πόλεως σταδίους περὶ ἐννακισχιλίους, οὓς ἔδει διελθεῖν αὐτόν.

[12] τούτων δὴ τῶν τόπων κατὰ μὲν τὸ μῆκος ἤδη σχεδὸν τοὺς ἡμίσεις διεληλύθει, κατὰ δὲ τὴν δυσχέρειαν τὸ πλέον αὐτῷ μέρος ἀπελείπετο τῆς πορείας.

[1] Ἀννίβας μὲν οὖν ἐνεχείρει ταῖς διεκβολαῖς τῶν Πυρηναίων ὀρῶν, κατάφοβος ὢν τοὺς Κελτοὺς διὰ τὰς ὀχυρότητας τῶν τόπων.

[2] Ῥωμαῖοι δὲ κατὰ τοὺς αὐτοὺς καιροὺς διακούσαντες μὲν τῶν ἐξαποσταλέντων εἰς Καρχηδόνα πρεσβευτῶν τὰ δεδογμένα καὶ τοὺς ῥηθέντας λόγους, προσπεσόντος δὲ θᾶττον ἢ προσεδόκων Ἀννίβαν διαβεβηκέναι τὸν Ἴβηρα ποταμὸν μετὰ τῆς δυνάμεως, προεχειρίσαντο πέμπειν μετὰ στρατοπέδων Πόπλιον μὲν Κορνήλιον εἰς Ἰβηρίαν, Τεβέριον δὲ Σεμπρώνιον εἰς Λιβύην.

[3] ἐν ὅσῳ δʼ οὗτοι περὶ τὰς καταγραφὰς ἐγίνοντο τῶν στρατοπέδων καὶ τὴν ἄλλην παρασκευήν, ἔσπευσαν ἐπὶ τέλος ἀγαγεῖν τὰ κατὰ τὰς ἀποικίας, οἳ δὴ πρότερον ἦσαν εἰς Γαλατίαν ἀποστέλλειν προκεχειρισμένοι.

[4] τὰς μὲν οὖν πόλεις ἐνεργῶς ἐτείχιζον, τοὺς δʼ οἰκήτορας ἐν ἡμέραις τριάκοντα παρήγγειλαν ἐπιτόπους γίνεσθαι, τὸν ἀριθμὸν ὄντας εἰς ἑκατέραν τὴν πόλιν εἰς ἑξακισχιλίους·

[5] ὧν τὴν μὲν μίαν ἔκτιζον ἐπὶ τάδε τοῦ Πάδου ποταμοῦ, προσαγορεύσαντες Πλακεντίαν, τὴν δʼ ἄλλην ἐπὶ θάτερα, κατονομάσαντες Κρεμώνην.

[6] ἤδη δὲ τούτων συνῳκισμένων, οἱ Βοῖοι καλούμενοι Γαλάται, πάλαι μὲν οἷον λοχῶντες τὴν πρὸς Ῥωμαίους φιλίαν, οὐκ ἔχοντες δὲ τότε καιρόν,

[7] μετεωριζόμενοι καὶ πιστεύοντες ἐκ τῶν διαπεμπομένων τῇ παρουσίᾳ τῶν Καρχηδονίων ἀπέστησαν ἀπὸ Ῥωμαίων, ἐγκαταλιπόντες τοὺς ὁμήρους, οὓς ἔδοσαν ἐκβαίνοντες ἐκ τοῦ πολέμου τοῦ προγεγονότος, ὑπὲρ οὗ τὴν ἐξήγησιν ἡμεῖς ἐν τῇ προτέρᾳ βύβλῳ ταύτης ἐποιησάμεθα.

[8] παρακαλέσαντες δὲ τοὺς Ἴνσομβρας καὶ συμφρονήσαντες κατὰ τὴν προγεγενημένην ὀργὴν κατέσυραν τὴν κατακεκληρουχημένην χώραν ὑπὸ Ῥωμαίων καὶ τοὺς φεύγοντας συνδιώξαντες εἰς Μοτίνην, ἀποικίαν ὑπάρχουσαν Ῥωμαίων, ἐπολιόρκουν.

[9] ἐν οἷς καὶ τρεῖς ἄνδρας τῶν ἐπιφανῶν συνέκλεισαν τοὺς ἐπὶ τὴν διαίρεσιν τῆς χώρας ἀπεσταλμένους· ὧν εἷς μὲν ἦν Γάιος Λυτάτιος ὁ τὴν ὕπατον ἀρχὴν εἰληφώς, οἱ δὲ δύο τὴν ἑξαπέλεκυν.

[10] οἰομένων δὲ δεῖν τούτων εἰς λόγους σφίσι συνελθεῖν, ὑπήκουσαν οἱ Βοῖοι. τῶν δʼ ἀνδρῶν ἐξελθόντων, παρασπονδήσαντες συνέλαβον αὐτούς, ἐλπίσαντες διὰ τούτων κομιεῖσθαι τοὺς αὑτῶν ὁμήρους.

[11] Λεύκιος δὲ Μάλιος ἑξαπέλεκυς ὑπάρχων καὶ προκαθήμενος ἐπὶ τῶν τόπων μετὰ δυνάμεως, ἀκούσας τὸ γεγονός, ἐβοήθει κατὰ σπουδήν.

[12] οἱ δὲ Βοῖοι συνέντες αὐτοῦ τὴν παρουσίαν, ἔν τισι δρυμοῖς ἑτοιμάσαντες ἐνέδρας ἅμα τῷ παρελθεῖν εἰς τοὺς ὑλώδεις τόπους πανταχόθεν ἅμα προσπεσόντες πολλοὺς ἀπέκτειναν τῶν Ῥωμαίων.

[13] οἱ δὲ λοιποὶ τὰς μὲν ἀρχὰς ὥρμησαν πρὸς φυγήν· ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν ψιλῶν ἥψαντο χωρίων, ἐπὶ ποσὸν συνέστησαν οὕτως ὥστε μόλις εὐσχήμονα ποιήσασθαι τὴν ἀποχώρησιν. οἱ δὲ Βοῖοι κατακολουθήσαντες συνέκλεισαν καὶ τούτους εἰς τὴν Τάννητος καλουμένην κώμην.

[14] τοῖς δʼ ἐν τῇ Ῥώμῃ προσπεσόντος ὅτι τὸ τέταρτον στρατόπεδον περιειλημμένον ὑπὸ τῶν Βοίων πολιορκεῖται κατὰ κράτος, τὰ μὲν τῷ Ποπλίῳ προκεχειρισμένα στρατόπεδα κατὰ σπουδὴν ἐξαπέστελλον ἐπὶ τὴν τούτων βοήθειαν, ἡγεμόνα συστήσαντες ἑξαπέλεκυν, ἄλλα δὲ συνάγειν καὶ καταγράφειν ἐκ τῶν συμμάχων αὐτῷ παρήγγειλαν.

[1] τὰ μὲν οὖν κατὰ Κελτοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρχῆς ἕως εἰς τὴν Ἀννίβου παρουσίαν ἐν τούτοις ἦν καὶ τοιαύτην εἰλήφει διέξοδον, οἵαν ἔν τε τοῖς πρὸ τοῦ καὶ νῦν διεληλύθαμεν.

[2] οἱ δὲ στρατηγοὶ τῶν Ῥωμαίων ἑτοιμασάμενοι τὰ πρὸς τὰς ἰδίας ἐπιβολάς, ἐξέπλεον ἐπὶ τὴν ὡραίαν ἐπὶ τὰς προκειμένας πράξεις, Πόπλιος μὲν οὖν εἰς Ἰβηρίαν ἑξήκοντα ναυσί, Τεβέριος δὲ Σεμπρώνιος εἰς Λιβύην ἑκατὸν ἑξήκοντα σκάφεσι πεντηρικοῖς.

[3] οἷς οὕτως καταπληκτικῶς ἐπεβάλετο πολεμεῖν καὶ τοιαύτας ἐποιεῖτο παρασκευὰς ἐν τῷ Λιλυβαίῳ, πάντας καὶ πανταχόθεν ἁθροίζων, ὡς εὐθέως ἐκ κατάπλου πολιορκήσων αὐτὴν τὴν Καρχηδόνα.

[4] Πόπλιος δὲ κομισθεὶς παρὰ τὴν Λιγυστίνην ἧκε πεμπταῖος ἀπὸ Πισῶν εἰς τοὺς κατὰ Μασσαλίαν τόπους,

[5] καὶ καθορμισθεὶς πρὸς τὸ πρῶτον στόμα τοῦ Ῥοδανοῦ, τὸ Μασσαλιωτικὸν προσαγορευόμενον,

[6] ἀπεβίβαζε τὰς δυνάμεις, ἀκούων μὲν ὑπερβάλλειν ἤδη τὰ Πυρηναῖα τὸν Ἀννίβαν ὄρη, πεπεισμένος δʼ ἔτι μακρὰν ἀπέχειν αὐτὸν διά τε τὰς δυσχωρίας τῶν τόπων καὶ διὰ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν μεταξὺ κειμένων Κελτῶν.

[7] Ἀννίβας δὲ παραδόξως τοὺς μὲν χρήμασι πείσας τῶν Κελτῶν τοὺς δὲ βιασάμενος ἧκε μετὰ τῶν δυνάμεων, δεξιὸν ἔχων τὸ Σαρδόνιον πέλαγος, ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ Ῥοδανοῦ διάβασιν.

[8] ὁ δὲ Πόπλιος, διασαφηθέντος αὐτῷ παρεῖναι τοὺς ὑπεναντίους, τὰ μὲν ἀπιστῶν διὰ τὸ τάχος τῆς παρουσίας, τὰ δὲ βουλόμενος εἰδέναι τὴν ἀκρίβειαν, αὐτὸς μὲν ἀνελάμβανε τὰς δυνάμεις ἐκ τοῦ πλοῦ καὶ διενοεῖτο μετὰ τῶν χιλιάρχων ποίοις χρηστέον τῶν τόπων καὶ συμμικτέον τοῖς ὑπεναντίοις·

[9] τριακοσίους δὲ τῶν ἱππέων ἐξαπέστειλε τοὺς ἀνδρωδεστάτους, συστήσας μετʼ αὐτῶν καθηγεμόνας ἅμα καὶ συναγωνιστὰς Κελτούς, οἳ παρὰ τοῖς Μασσαλιώταις ἐτύγχανον μισθοφοροῦντες.

[1] Ἀννίβας δὲ προσμίξας τοῖς περὶ τὸν ποταμὸν τόποις εὐθέως ἐνεχείρει ποιεῖσθαι τὴν διάβασιν κατὰ τὴν ἁπλῆν ῥύσιν, σχεδὸν ἡμερῶν τεττάρων ὁδὸν ἀπέχων στρατοπέδῳ τῆς θαλάττης.

[2] καὶ φιλοποιησάμενος παντὶ τρόπῳ τοὺς παροικοῦντας τὸν ποταμὸν ἐξηγόρασε παρʼ αὐτῶν τά τε μονόξυλα πλοῖα πάντα καὶ τοὺς λέμβους, ὄντας ἱκανοὺς τῷ πλήθει διὰ τὸ ταῖς ἐκ τῆς θαλάττης ἐμπορίαις πολλοὺς χρῆσθαι τῶν παροικούντων τὸν Ῥοδανόν.

[3] ἔτι δὲ τὴν ἁρμόζουσαν ξυλείαν ἐξέλαβε πρὸς τὴν κατασκευὴν τῶν μονοξύλων· ἐξ ὧν ἐν δυσὶν ἡμέραις πλῆθος ἀναρίθμητον ἐγένετο πορθμείων, ἑκάστου σπεύδοντος μὴ προσδεῖσθαι τοῦ πέλας, ἐν αὑτῷ δʼ ἔχειν τὰς τῆς διαβάσεως ἐλπίδας.

[4] κατὰ δὲ τὸν καιρὸν τοῦτον ἐν τῷ πέραν πλῆθος ἡθροίσθη βαρβάρων χάριν τοῦ κωλύειν τὴν τῶν Καρχηδονίων διάβασιν.

[5] εἰς οὓς ἀποβλέπων Ἀννίβας καὶ συλλογιζόμενος ἐκ τῶν παρόντων ὡς οὔτε διαβαίνειν μετὰ βίας δυνατὸν εἴη τοσούτων πολεμίων ἐφεστώτων, οὔτʼ ἐπιμένειν, μὴ πανταχόθεν προσδέξηται τοὺς ὑπεναντίους,

[6] ἐπιγενομένης τῆς τρίτης νυκτὸς ἐξαποστέλλει μέρος τι τῆς δυνάμεως, συστήσας καθηγεμόνας ἐγχωρίους, ἐπὶ δὲ πάντων Ἄννωνα τὸν Βοαμίλκου τοῦ βασιλέως.

[7] οἳ ποιησάμενοι τὴν πορείαν ἀντίοι τῷ ῥεύματι παρὰ τὸν ποταμὸν ἐπὶ διακόσια στάδια, παραγενόμενοι πρός τινα τόπον, ἐν ᾧ συνέβαινε περί τι χωρίον νησίζον περισχίζεσθαι τὸν ποταμόν, ἐνταῦθα κατέμειναν.

[8] ἐκ δὲ τῆς παρακειμένης ὕλης τὰ μὲν συμπηγνύντες τῶν ξύλων τὰ δὲ συνδεσμεύοντες ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ πολλὰς ἥρμοσαν σχεδίας, ἀρκούσας τῇ χρείᾳ πρὸς τὸ παρόν· ἐφʼ αἷς διεκομίσθησαν ἀσφαλῶς οὐδενὸς κωλύοντος.

[9] καταλαβόμενοι δὲ τόπον ἐχυρὸν ἐκείνην μὲν τὴν ἡμέραν ἔμειναν ἀναπαύοντες σφᾶς ἐκ τῆς προγεγενημένης κακοπαθείας, ἅμα δὲ παρασκευαζόμενοι πρὸς τὴν ἐπιοῦσαν χρείαν κατὰ τὸ συντεταγμένον.

[10] καὶ μὴν Ἀννίβας τὸ παραπλήσιον ἐποίει περὶ τὰς μεθʼ ἑαυτοῦ καταλειφθείσας δυνάμεις.

[11] μάλιστα δʼ αὐτῷ παρεῖχε δυσχρηστίαν ἡ τῶν ἐλεφάντων διάβασις· οὗτοι δʼ ἦσαν ἑπτὰ καὶ τριάκοντα τὸν ἀριθμόν.

[1] οὐ μὴν ἀλλʼ ἐπιγενομένης τῆς πέμπτης νυκτὸς οἱ μὲν προδιαβάντες ἐκ τοῦ πέραν ὑπὸ τὴν ἑωθινὴν προῆγον παρʼ αὐτὸν τὸν ποταμὸν ἐπὶ τοὺς ἀντίπερα βαρβάρους,

[2] ὁ δʼ Ἀννίβας ἑτοίμους ἔχων τοὺς στρατιώτας ἐπεῖχε τῇ διαβάσει, τοὺς μὲν λέμβους πεπληρωκὼς τῶν πελτοφόρων ἱππέων, τὰ δὲ μονόξυλα τῶν εὐκινητοτάτων πεζῶν.

[3] εἶχον δὲ τὴν μὲν ἐξ ὑπερδεξίου καὶ παρὰ τὸ ῥεῦμα τάξιν οἱ λέμβοι, τὴν δʼ ὑπὸ τούτους τὰ λεπτὰ τῶν πορθμείων, ἵνα τὸ πολὺ τῆς τοῦ ῥεύματος βίας ἀποδεχομένων τῶν λέμβων ἀσφαλεστέρα γίνοιτο τοῖς μονοξύλοις ἡ παρακομιδὴ διὰ τοῦ πόρου.

[4] κατὰ δὲ τὰς πρύμνας τῶν λέμβων ἐφέλκειν διενοοῦντο τοὺς ἵππους νέοντας, τρεῖς ἅμα καὶ τέτταρας τοῖς ἀγωγεῦσιν ἑνὸς ἀνδρὸς ἐξ ἑκατέρου τοῦ μέρους τῆς πρύμνης οἰακίζοντος, ὥστε πλῆθος ἱκανὸν ἵππων συνδιακομίζεσθαι κατὰ τὴν πρώτην εὐθέως διάβασιν.

[5] οἱ δὲ βάρβαροι θεωροῦντες τὴν ἐπιβολὴν τῶν ὑπεναντίων ἀτάκτως ἐκ τοῦ χάρακος ἐξεχέοντο καὶ σποράδην, πεπεισμένοι κωλύειν εὐχερῶς τὴν ἀπόβασιν τῶν Καρχηδονίων.

[6] Ἀννίβας δʼ ἅμα τῷ συνιδεῖν ἐν τῷ πέραν ἐγγίζοντας ἤδη τοὺς παρʼ αὑτοῦ στρατιώτας, σημηνάντων ἐκείνων τὴν παρουσίαν τῷ καπνῷ κατὰ τὸ συντεταγμένον, ἐμβαίνειν ἅπασιν ἅμα παρήγγελλε καὶ βιάζεσθαι πρὸς τὸ ῥεῦμα τοῖς ἐπὶ τῶν πορθμείων τεταγμένοις.

[7] ταχὺ δὲ τούτου γενομένου, καὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς πλοίοις ἁμιλλωμένων μὲν πρὸς ἀλλήλους μετὰ κραυγῆς, διαγωνιζομένων δὲ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ποταμοῦ βίαν,

[8] τῶν δὲ στρατοπέδων ἀμφοτέρων ἐξ ἑκατέρου τοῦ μέρους παρὰ τὰ χείλη τοῦ ποταμοῦ παρεστώτων, καὶ τῶν μὲν ἰδίων συναγωνιώντων καὶ παρακολουθούντων μετὰ κραυγῆς, τῶν δὲ κατὰ πρόσωπον βαρβάρων παιανιζόντων καὶ προκαλουμένων τὸν κίνδυνον, ἦν τὸ γινόμενον ἐκπληκτικὸν καὶ παραστατικὸν ἀγωνίας.

[9] ἐν ᾧ καιρῷ τῶν βαρβάρων ἀπολελοιπότων τὰς σκηνὰς ἐπιπεσόντες ἄφνω καὶ παραδόξως οἱ πέραν Καρχηδόνιοι, τινὲς μὲν αὐτῶν ἐνεπίμπρασαν τὴν στρατοπεδείαν, οἱ δὲ πλείους ὥρμησαν ἐπὶ τοὺς τὴν διάβασιν τηροῦντας.

[10] οἱ δὲ βάρβαροι, παραλόγου τοῦ πράγματος φανέντος αὐτοῖς, οἱ μὲν ἐπὶ τὰς σκηνὰς ἐφέροντο βοηθήσοντες, οἱ δʼ ἠμύνοντο καὶ διεμάχοντο πρὸς τοὺς ἐπιτιθεμένους.

[11] Ἀννίβας δέ, κατὰ τὴν πρόθεσιν αὐτῷ συντρεχόντων τῶν πραγμάτων, εὐθέως τοὺς πρώτους ἀποβαίνοντας συνίστα καὶ παρεκάλει καὶ συνεπλέκετο τοῖς βαρβάροις.

[12] οἱ δὲ Κελτοὶ καὶ διὰ τὴν ἀταξίαν καὶ διὰ τὸ παράδοξον τοῦ συμβαίνοντος ταχέως τραπέντες ὥρμησαν πρὸς φυγήν.

[1] ὁ δὲ στρατηγὸς τῶν Καρχηδονίων ἅμα τῆς τε διαβάσεως καὶ τῶν ὑπεναντίων κεκρατηκὼς παραυτίκα μὲν ἐγίνετο πρὸς τῇ παρακομιδῇ τῶν πέραν ἀπολειπομένων ἀνδρῶν,

[2] πάσας δʼ ἐν βραχεῖ χρόνῳ διαπεραιώσας τὰς δυνάμεις ἐκείνην μὲν τὴν νύκτα παρʼ αὐτὸν τὸν ποταμὸν κατεστρατοπέδευσεν,

[3] τῇ δʼ ἐπαύριον ἀκούων τὸν τῶν Ῥωμαίων στόλον περὶ τὰ στόματα τοῦ ποταμοῦ καθωρμίσθαι, προχειρισάμενος πεντακοσίους τῶν Νομαδικῶν ἱππέων ἐξαπέστειλε κατασκεψομένους ποῦ καὶ πόσοι τυγχάνουσιν ὄντες καὶ τί πράττουσιν οἱ πολέμιοι.

[4] κατὰ δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν καιρὸν καὶ πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἐλεφάντων διάβασιν προεχειρίσατο τοὺς ἐπιτηδείους.

[5] αὐτὸς δὲ συναγαγὼν τὰς δυνάμεις εἰσήγαγε τοὺς βασιλίσκους τοὺς περὶ Μάγιλον — οὗτοι γὰρ ἧκον πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐκ τῶν περὶ τὸν Πάδον πεδίων — καὶ διʼ ἑρμηνέως τὰ δεδογμένα παρʼ αὐτῶν διεσάφει τοῖς ὄχλοις.

[6] ἦν δὲ τῶν λεγομένων ἰσχυρότατα πρὸς θάρσος τῶν πολλῶν πρῶτον μὲν ἡ τῆς παρουσίας ἐνάργεια τῶν ἐπισπωμένων καὶ κοινωνήσειν ἐπαγγελλομένων τοῦ πρὸς Ῥωμαίους πολέμου,

[7] δεύτερον δὲ τὸ τῆς ἐπαγγελίας αὐτῶν ἀξιόπιστον, ὅτι καθηγήσονται διὰ τόπων τοιούτων διʼ ὧν οὐδενὸς ἐπιδεόμενοι τῶν ἀναγκαίων συντόμως ἅμα καὶ μετʼ ἀσφαλείας ποιήσονται τὴν εἰς Ἰταλίαν πορείαν,

[8] πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἡ τῆς χώρας γενναιότης, εἰς ἣν ἀφίξονται, καὶ τὸ μέγεθος, ἔτι δὲ τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἡ προθυμία, μεθʼ ὧν μέλλουσι ποιεῖσθαι τοὺς ἀγῶνας πρὸς τὰς τῶν Ῥωμαίων δυνάμεις.

[9] οἱ μὲν οὖν Κελτοὶ τοιαῦτα διαλεχθέντες ἀνεχώρησαν.

[10] μετὰ δὲ τούτους εἰσελθὼν αὐτὸς πρῶτον μὲν τῶν προγεγενημένων πράξεων ἀνέμνησε τοὺς ὄχλους· ἐν αἷς ἔφη πολλοῖς αὐτοὺς καὶ παραβόλοις ἔργοις καὶ κινδύνοις ἐπικεχειρηκότας ἐν οὐδενὶ διεσφάλθαι, κατακολουθήσαντας τῇ ʼκείνου γνώμῃ καὶ συμβουλίᾳ.

[11] τούτοις δʼ ἑξῆς εὐθαρσεῖς εἶναι παρεκάλει, θεωροῦντας διότι τὸ μέγιστον ἤνυσται τῶν ἔργων, ἐπειδὴ τῆς τε τοῦ ποταμοῦ διαβάσεως κεκρατήκασι τῆς τε τῶν συμμάχων εὐνοίας καὶ προθυμίας αὐτόπται γεγόνασι.

[12] διόπερ ᾤετο δεῖν περὶ μὲν τῶν κατὰ μέρος ῥᾳθυμεῖν, ὡς αὐτῷ μελόντων, πειθαρχοῦντας δὲ τοῖς παραγγέλμασιν ἄνδρας ἀγαθοὺς γίνεσθαι καὶ τῶν προγεγονότων ἔργων ἀξίους.

[13] τοῦ δὲ πλήθους ἐπισημαινομένου καὶ μεγάλην ὁρμὴν καὶ προθυμίαν ἐμφαίνοντος, ἐπαινέσας αὐτοὺς καὶ τοῖς θεοῖς ὑπὲρ ἁπάντων εὐξάμενος διαφῆκε, παραγγείλας θεραπεύειν σφᾶς καὶ παρασκευάζεσθαι μετὰ σπουδῆς, ὡς εἰς τὴν αὔριον ἀναζυγῆς ἐσομένης.

[1] λυθείσης δὲ τῆς ἐκκλησίας ἧκον τῶν Νομάδων οἱ προαποσταλέντες ἐπὶ τὴν κατασκοπήν, τοὺς μὲν πλείστους αὑτῶν ἀπολωλεκότες, οἱ δὲ λοιποὶ προτροπάδην πεφευγότες.

[2] συμπεσόντες γὰρ οὐ μακρὰν ἀπὸ τῆς ἰδίας στρατοπεδείας τοῖς τῶν Ῥωμαίων ἱππεῦσι τοῖς ἐπὶ τὴν αὐτὴν χρείαν ἐξαπεσταλμένοις ὑπὸ τοῦ Ποπλίου τοιαύτην ἐποιήσαντο φιλοτιμίαν ἀμφότεροι κατὰ τὴν συμπλοκὴν ὥστε τῶν Ῥωμαίων καὶ Κελτῶν εἰς ἑκατὸν ἱππεῖς καὶ τετταράκοντα διαφθαρῆναι, τῶν δὲ Νομάδων ὑπὲρ τοὺς διακοσίους.

[3] γενομένων δὲ τούτων οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι συνεγγίσαντες κατὰ τὸ δίωγμα τῷ τῶν Καρχηδονίων χάρακι καὶ κατοπτεύσαντες αὖθις ἐξ ὑποστροφῆς ἠπείγοντο, διασαφήσοντες τῷ στρατηγῷ τὴν παρουσίαν τῶν πολεμίων· ἀφικόμενοι δʼ εἰς τὴν παρεμβολὴν ἀνήγγειλαν.

[4] Πόπλιος δὲ παραυτίκα τὴν ἀποσκευὴν ἀναθέμενος ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς ἀνέζευξε παντὶ τῷ στρατεύματι καὶ προῆγε παρὰ τὸν ποταμόν, σπεύδων συμμῖξαι τοῖς ὑπεναντίοις.

[5] Ἀννίβας δὲ τῇ κατὰ πόδας ἡμέρᾳ τῆς ἐκκλησίας ἅμα τῷ φωτὶ τοὺς μὲν ἱππεῖς προέθετο πάντας ὡς πρὸς θάλατταν, ἐφεδρείας ἔχοντας τάξιν, τὴν δὲ τῶν πεζῶν ἐκίνει δύναμιν ἐκ τοῦ χάρακος εἰς πορείαν.

[6] αὐτὸς δὲ τοὺς ἐλέφαντας ἐξεδέχετο καὶ τοὺς ἅμα τούτοις ἀπολελειμμένους ἄνδρας. ἐγένετο δʼ

[1] ἡ διακομιδὴ τῶν θηρίων τοιαύτη τις. πήξαντες σχεδίας καὶ πλείους ἀραρότως, τούτων δύο πρὸς ἀλλήλας ζεύξαντες βιαίως ἤρεισαν ἀμφοτέρας εἰς τὴν γῆν κατὰ τὴν ἔμβασιν τοῦ ποταμοῦ, πλάτος ἐχούσας τὸ συναμφότερον ὡς πεντήκοντα πόδας.

[2] ταύταις δὲ συζευγνύντες ἄλλας ἐκ τῶν ἐκτὸς προσήρμοζον, προτείνοντες τὴν κατασκευὴν τοῦ ζεύγματος εἰς τὸν πόρον.

[3] τὴν δʼ ἀπὸ τοῦ ῥεύματος πλευρὰν ἠσφαλίζοντο τοῖς ἐκ τῆς γῆς ἐπιγύοις, εἰς τὰ περὶ τὸ χεῖλος πεφυκότα τῶν δένδρων ἐνάπτοντες, πρὸς τὸ συμμένειν καὶ μὴ παρωθεῖσθαι τὸ ὅλον ἔργον κατὰ τοῦ ποταμοῦ.

[4] ποιήσαντες δὲ πρὸς δύο πλέθρα τῷ μήκει τὸ πᾶν ζεῦγμα τῆς προβολῆς, μετὰ ταῦτα δύο πεπηγυίας σχεδίας διαφερόντως [τὰς μεγίστας] προσέβαλον ταῖς ἐσχάταις, πρὸς αὑτὰς μὲν βιαίως δεδεμένας, πρὸς δὲ τὰς ἄλλας οὕτως ὥστʼ εὐδιακόπους αὐτῶν εἶναι τοὺς δεσμούς. ῥύματα δὲ καὶ πλείω ταύταις ἐνῆψαν,

[5] οἷς ἔμελλον οἱ λέμβοι ῥυμουλκοῦντες οὐκ ἐάσειν φέρεσθαι κατὰ ποταμοῦ, βίᾳ δὲ πρὸς τὸν ῥοῦν κατέχοντες παρακομιεῖν καὶ περαιώσειν ἐπὶ τούτων τὰ θηρία.

[6] μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα χοῦν ἔφερον ἐπὶ πάσας πολύν, ἕως ἐπιβάλλοντες ἐξωμοίωσαν, ὁμαλὴν καὶ σύγχρουν ποιοῦντες τῇ διὰ τῆς χέρσου φερούσῃ πρὸς τὴν διάβασιν ὁδῷ.

[7] τῶν δὲ θηρίων εἰθισμένων τοῖς Ἰνδοῖς μέχρι μὲν πρὸς τὸ ὑγρὸν ἀεὶ πειθαρχεῖν, εἰς δὲ τὸ ὕδωρ ἐμβαίνειν οὐδαμῶς ἔτι τολμώντων, ἦγον διὰ τοῦ χώματος δύο προθέμενοι θηλείας, πειθαρχούντων αὐταῖς τῶν θηρίων.

[8] ἐπεὶ δʼ ἐπὶ τὰς τελευταίας ἐπέστησαν σχεδίας, διακόψαντες τοὺς δεσμούς, οἷς προσήρτηντο πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας, καὶ τοῖς λέμβοις ἐπισπασάμενοι τὰ ῥύματα ταχέως ἀπέσπασαν ἀπὸ τοῦ χώματος τά τε θηρία καὶ τὰς ὑπʼ αὐτοῖς σχεδίας.

[9] οὗ γενομένου διαταραχθέντα τὰ ζῷα κατὰ μὲν τὰς ἀρχὰς ἐστρέφετο καὶ κατὰ πάντα τόπον ὥρμα· περιεχόμενα δὲ πανταχόθεν ὑπὸ τοῦ ῥεύματος ἀπεδειλία καὶ μένειν ἠναγκάζετο κατὰ χώραν.

[10] καὶ τοιούτῳ δὴ τρόπῳ προσαρμοζομένων ἀεὶ σχεδιῶν δυεῖν, τὰ πλεῖστα τῶν θηρίων ἐπὶ τούτων διεκομίσθη,

[11] τινὰ δὲ κατὰ μέσον τὸν πόρον ἀπέρριψεν εἰς τὸν ποταμὸν αὑτὰ διὰ τὸν φόβον· ὧν τοὺς μὲν Ἰνδοὺς ἀπολέσθαι συνέβη πάντας, τοὺς δʼ ἐλέφαντας διασωθῆναι.

[12] διὰ γὰρ τὴν δύναμιν καὶ τὸ μέγεθος τῶν προβοσκίδων ἐξαίροντες ταύτας ὑπὲρ τὸ ὑγρὸν καὶ διαπνέοντες, ἅμα δʼ ἐκφυσῶντες πᾶν τὸ παρεμπῖπτον ἀντέσχον, τὸ πολὺ καθʼ ὕδατος ὀρθοὶ ποιούμενοι τὴν πορείαν.

[1] περαιωθέντων δὲ τῶν θηρίων, ἀναλαβὼν Ἀννίβας τοὺς ἐλέφαντας καὶ τοὺς ἱππεῖς προῆγε τούτοις ἀπουραγῶν παρὰ τὸν ποταμὸν ἀπὸ θαλάττης ὡς ἐπὶ τὴν ἕω, ποιούμενος τὴν πορείαν ὡς εἰς τὴν μεσόγαιον τῆς Εὐρώπης.

[2] ὁ δὲ Ῥοδανὸς ἔχει τὰς μὲν πηγὰς ὑπὲρ τὸν Ἀδριατικὸν μυχὸν πρὸς τὴν ἑσπέραν νευούσας, ἐν τοῖς ἀποκλίνουσι μέρεσι τῶν Ἄλπεων ὡς πρὸς τὰς ἄρκτους, ῥεῖ δὲ πρὸς [τὰς] δύσεις χειμερινάς, ἐκβάλλει δʼ εἰς τὸ Σαρδῷον πέλαγος.

[3] φέρεται δʼ ἐπὶ πολὺ διʼ αὐλῶνος, οὗ πρὸς μὲν τὰς ἄρκτους Ἄρδυες Κελτοὶ κατοικοῦσι, τὴν δʼ ἀπὸ μεσημβρίας αὐτοῦ πλευρὰν ὁρίζουσι πᾶσαν αἱ πρὸς ἄρκτον κεκλιμέναι τῶν Ἄλπεων παρώρειαι. τὰ δὲ πεδία τὰ περὶ τὸν Πάδον,

[4] ὑπὲρ ὧν ἡμῖν εἴρηται διὰ πλειόνων, ἀπὸ τοῦ κατὰ τὸν Ῥοδανὸν αὐλῶνος διαζευγνύουσιν αἱ τῶν προειρημένων ὀρῶν ἀκρώρειαι, λαμβάνουσαι τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀπὸ Μασσαλίας ἕως ἐπὶ τὸν τοῦ παντὸς Ἀδρίου μυχόν·

[5] ἃς τόθʼ ὑπεράρας Ἀννίβας ἀπὸ τῶν κατὰ τὸν Ῥοδανὸν τόπων ἐνέβαλεν εἰς Ἰταλίαν.

[6] ἔνιοι δὲ τῶν γεγραφότων περὶ τῆς ὑπερβολῆς ταύτης, βουλόμενοι τοὺς ἀναγινώσκοντας ἐκπλήττειν τῇ περὶ τῶν προειρημένων τόπων παραδοξολογίᾳ, λανθάνουσιν ἐμπίπτοντες εἰς δύο τὰ πάσης ἱστορίας ἀλλοτριώτατα· καὶ γὰρ ψευδολογεῖν καὶ μαχόμενα γράφειν αὑτοῖς ἀναγκάζονται.

[7] ἅμα μὲν γὰρ τὸν Ἀννίβαν ἀμίμητόν τινα παρεισάγοντες στρατηγὸν καὶ τόλμῃ καὶ προνοίᾳ τοῦτον ὁμολογουμένως ἀποδεικνύουσιν ἡμῖν ἀλογιστότατον,

[8] ἅμα δὲ καταστροφὴν οὐ δυνάμενοι λαμβάνειν οὐδʼ ἔξοδον τοῦ ψεύδους θεοὺς καὶ θεῶν παῖδας εἰς πραγματικὴν ἱστορίαν παρεισάγουσιν.

[9] ὑποθέμενοι γὰρ τὰς ἐρυμνότητας καὶ τραχύτητας τῶν Ἀλπεινῶν ὀρῶν τοιαύτας ὥστε μὴ οἷον ἵππους καὶ στρατόπεδα, σὺν δὲ τούτοις ἐλέφαντας, ἀλλὰ μηδὲ πεζοὺς εὐζώνους εὐχερῶς ἂν διελθεῖν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὴν ἔρημον τοιαύτην τινὰ περὶ τοὺς τόπους ὑπογράψαντες ἡμῖν ὥστʼ, εἰ μὴ θεὸς ἤ τις ἥρως ἀπαντήσας τοῖς περὶ τὸν Ἀννίβαν ὑπέδειξε τὰς ὁδούς, ἐξαπορήσαντας ἂν καταφθαρῆναι πάντας, ὁμολογουμένως ἐκ τούτων εἰς ἑκάτερον τῶν προειρημένων

[1] ἁμαρτημάτων ἐμπίπτουσι. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ ἂν τίς φανείη στρατηγὸς ἀλογιστότερος Ἀννίβου, τίς καὶ σκαιότερος ἡγεμών,

[2] ὃς τοσούτων ἡγούμενος δυνάμεων καὶ τὰς μεγίστας ἐλπίδας ἔχων ἐν τούτοις τοῦ κατορθώσειν τοῖς ὅλοις, οὔτε τὰς ὁδοὺς οὔτε τόπους, ὡς οὗτοί φασιν, οὔτε ποῦ πορεύεται τὸ παράπαν οὔτε πρὸς τίνας ἐγίνωσκε,

[3] τὸ δὲ πέρας, οὐδʼ εἰ καθόλου [τοὐναντίον] δυνατοῖς ἐπιβάλλεται πράγμασιν;

[4] ἀλλʼ ὅπερ οἱ τοῖς ὅλοις ἐπταικότες καὶ κατὰ πάντα τρόπον ἐξαποροῦντες οὐχ ὑπομένουσιν, ὥστʼ εἰς ἀπρονοήτους καθιέναι τόπους μετὰ δυνάμεως, τοῦτο περιτιθέασιν οἱ συγγραφεῖς Ἀννίβᾳ τῷ τὰς μεγίστας ἐλπίδας ἀκεραίους ἔχοντι περὶ τῶν καθʼ αὑτὸν πραγμάτων.

[5] ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ περὶ τῆς ἐρημίας, ἔτι δʼ ἐρυμνότητος καὶ δυσχωρίας τῶν τόπων ἔκδηλον ποιεῖ τὸ ψεῦδος αὐτῶν.

[6] οὐχ ἱστορήσαντες γὰρ ὅτι συμβαίνει τοὺς Κελτοὺς τοὺς παρὰ τὸν Ῥοδανὸν ποταμὸν οἰκοῦντας οὐχ ἅπαξ οὐδὲ δὶς πρὸ τῆς Ἀννίβου παρουσίας, οὐδὲ μὴν πάλαι προσφάτως δέ, μεγάλοις στρατοπέδοις ὑπερβάντας τὰς Ἄλπεις παρατετάχθαι μὲν Ῥωμαίοις, συνηγωνίσθαι δὲ Κελτοῖς τοῖς τὰ περὶ τὸν Πάδον πεδία κατοικοῦσι, καθάπερ ἡμεῖς ἐν τοῖς πρὸ τούτων ἐδηλώσαμεν,

[7] πρὸς δὲ τούτοις οὐκ εἰδότες ὅτι πλεῖστον ἀνθρώπων φῦλον κατʼ αὐτὰς οἰκεῖν συμβαίνει τὰς Ἄλπεις, ἀλλʼ ἀγνοοῦντες ἕκαστα τῶν εἰρημένων ἥρω τινά φασιν ἐπιφανέντα συνυποδεῖξαι τὰς ὁδοὺς αὐτοῖς.

[8] ἐξ ὧν εἰκότως ἐμπίπτουσιν εἰς τὸ παραπλήσιον τοῖς τραγῳδιογράφοις. καὶ γὰρ ἐκείνοις πᾶσιν αἱ καταστροφαὶ τῶν δραμάτων προσδέονται θεοῦ καὶ μηχανῆς διὰ τὸ τὰς πρώτας ὑποθέσεις ψευδεῖς καὶ παραλόγους λαμβάνειν,

[9] τούς τε συγγραφέας ἀνάγκη τὸ παραπλήσιον πάσχειν καὶ ποιεῖν ἥρωάς τε καὶ θεοὺς ἐπιφαινομένους, ἐπειδὰν τὰς ἀρχὰς ἀπιθάνους καὶ ψευδεῖς ὑποστήσωνται. πῶς γὰρ οἷόν τε παραλόγοις ἀρχαῖς εὔλογον ἐπιθεῖναι τέλος;

[10] Ἀννίβας γε μὴν οὐχ ὡς οὗτοι γράφουσιν, λίαν δὲ περὶ ταῦτα πραγματικῶς ἐχρῆτο ταῖς ἐπιβολαῖς.

[11] καὶ γὰρ τὴν τῆς χώρας ἀρετήν, εἰς ἣν ἐπεβάλετο καθιέναι, καὶ τὴν τῶν ὄχλων ἀλλοτριότητα πρὸς Ῥωμαίους ἐξητάκει σαφῶς, εἴς τε τὰς μεταξὺ δυσχωρίας ὁδηγοῖς καὶ καθηγεμόσιν ἐγχωρίοις ἐχρῆτο τοῖς τῶν αὐτῶν ἐλπίδων μέλλουσι κοινωνεῖν.

[12] ἡμεῖς δὲ περὶ τούτων εὐθαρσῶς ἀποφαινόμεθα διὰ τὸ περὶ τῶν πράξεων παρʼ αὐτῶν ἱστορηκέναι τῶν παρατετευχότων τοῖς καιροῖς, τοὺς δὲ τόπους κατωπτευκέναι καὶ τῇ διὰ τῶν Ἄλπεων αὐτοὶ κεχρῆσθαι πορείᾳ γνώσεως ἕνεκα καὶ θέας.

[1] οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ Πόπλιος μὲν ὁ τῶν Ῥωμαίων στρατηγὸς ἡμέραις ὕστερον τρισὶ τῆς ἀναζυγῆς τῆς τῶν Καρχηδονίων παραγενόμενος ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ ποταμοῦ διάβασιν καὶ καταλαβὼν ὡρμηκότας τοὺς ὑπεναντίους ἐξενίσθη μὲν ὡς ἐνδέχεται μάλιστα,

[2] πεπεισμένος οὐδέποτʼ ἂν αὐτοὺς τολμῆσαι τῇδε ποιήσασθαι τὴν εἰς Ἰταλίαν πορείαν διὰ τὸ πλῆθος καὶ τὴν ἀθεσίαν τῶν κατοικούντων τοὺς τόπους βαρβάρων.

[3] θεωρῶν δὲ τετολμηκότας αὖθις ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς ἠπείγετο καὶ παραγενόμενος ἐνεβίβαζε τὰς δυνάμεις.

[4] καὶ τὸν μὲν ἀδελφὸν ἐξέπεμπεν ἐπὶ τὰς ἐν Ἰβηρίᾳ πράξεις, αὐτὸς δὲ πάλιν ὑποστρέψας εἰς Ἰταλίαν ἐποιεῖτο τὸν πλοῦν, σπεύδων καταταχῆσαι τοὺς ὑπεναντίους διὰ Τυρρηνίας πρὸς τὴν τῶν Ἄλπεων ὑπερβολήν.

[5] Ἀννίβας δὲ ποιησάμενος ἑξῆς ἐπὶ τέτταρας ἡμέρας τὴν πορείαν ἀπὸ τῆς διαβάσεως ἧκε πρὸς τὴν καλουμένην Νῆσον, χώραν πολύοχλον καὶ σιτοφόρον, ἔχουσαν δὲ τὴν προσηγορίαν ἀπʼ αὐτοῦ τοῦ συμπτώματος.

[6] ᾗ μὲν γὰρ ὁ Ῥοδανός, ᾗ δʼ Ἰσάρας προσαγορευόμενος, ῥέοντες παρʼ ἑκατέραν τὴν πλευράν, ἀποκορυφοῦσιν αὐτῆς τὸ σχῆμα κατὰ τὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλους σύμπτωσιν.

[7] ἔστι δὲ παραπλησία τῷ μεγέθει καὶ τῷ σχήματι τῷ κατʼ Αἴγυπτον καλουμένῳ Δέλτα, πλὴν ἐκείνου μὲν θάλαττα τὴν μίαν πλευρὰν καὶ τὰς τῶν ποταμῶν ῥύσεις ἐπιζεύγνυσι, ταύτης δʼ ὄρη δυσπρόσοδα καὶ δυσέμβολα καὶ σχεδὸν ὡς εἰπεῖν ἀπρόσιτα.

[8] πρὸς ἣν ἀφικόμενος καὶ καταλαβὼν ἐν αὐτῇ δύʼ ἀδελφοὺς ὑπὲρ τῆς βασιλείας στασιάζοντας καὶ μετὰ στρατοπέδων ἀντικαθημένους ἀλλήλοις,

[9] ἐπισπωμένου τοῦ πρεσβυτέρου καὶ παρακαλοῦντος εἰς τὸ συμπρᾶξαι καὶ συμπεριποιῆσαι τὴν ἀρχὴν αὐτῷ, ὑπήκουσε, προδήλου σχεδὸν ὑπαρχούσης τῆς πρὸς τὸ παρὸν ἐσομένης αὐτῷ χρείας.

[10] διὸ καὶ συνεπιθέμενος καὶ συνεκβαλὼν τὸν ἕτερον πολλῆς ἐπικουρίας ἔτυχε παρὰ τοῦ κρατήσαντος·

[11] οὐ γὰρ μόνον σίτῳ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐπιτηδείοις ἀφθόνως ἐχορήγησε τὸ στρατόπεδον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ὅπλων τὰ παλαιὰ καὶ τὰ πεπονηκότα πάντα διαλλάξας ἐκαινοποίησε πᾶσαν τὴν δύναμιν εὐκαίρως,

[12] ἔτι δὲ τοὺς πλείστους ἐσθῆτι καὶ πρὸς τούτοις ὑποδέσει κοσμήσας μεγάλην εὐχρηστίαν παρέσχετο πρὸς τὰς τῶν ὀρῶν ὑπερβολάς.

[13] τὸ δὲ μέγιστον, εὐλαβῶς διακειμένοις πρὸς τὴν διὰ τῶν Ἀλλοβρίγων καλουμένων Γαλατῶν πορείαν ἀπουραγήσας μετὰ τῆς σφετέρας δυνάμεως ἀσφαλῆ παρεσκεύασε τὴν δίοδον αὐτοῖς, ἕως ἤγγισαν τῇ τῶν Ἄλπεων ὑπερβολῇ.

[1] Ἀννίβας δʼ ἐν ἡμέραις δέκα πορευθεὶς παρὰ τὸν ποταμὸν εἰς ὀκτακοσίους σταδίους ἤρξατο τῆς πρὸς τὰς Ἄλπεις ἀναβολῆς, καὶ συνέβη μεγίστοις αὐτὸν περιπεσεῖν κινδύνοις.

[2] ἕως μὲν γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἐπιπέδοις ἦσαν, ἀπείχοντο πάντες αὐτῶν οἱ κατὰ μέρος ἡγεμόνες τῶν Ἀλλοβρίγων, τὰ μὲν τοὺς ἱππεῖς δεδιότες, τὰ δὲ τοὺς παραπέμποντας βαρβάρους· ἐπειδὴ δʼ ἐκεῖνοι μὲν εἰς τὴν οἰκείαν ἀπηλλάγησαν,

[3] οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Ἀννίβαν ἤρξαντο προάγειν εἰς τὰς δυσχωρίας, τότε συναθροίσαντες οἱ τῶν Ἀλλοβρίγων ἡγεμόνες ἱκανόν τι πλῆθος προκατελάβοντο τοὺς εὐκαίρους τόπους, διʼ ὧν ἔδει τοὺς περὶ τὸν Ἀννίβαν κατʼ ἀνάγκην ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἀναβολήν.

[4] εἰ μὲν οὖν ἔκρυψαν τὴν ἐπίνοιαν, ὁλοσχερῶς ἂν διέφθειραν τὸ στράτευμα τῶν Καρχηδονίων· νῦν δὲ καταφανεῖς γενόμενοι μεγάλα μὲν καὶ τοὺς περὶ Ἀννίβαν ἔβλαψαν, οὐκ ἐλάττω δʼ ἑαυτούς.

[5] γνοὺς γὰρ ὁ στρατηγὸς τῶν Καρχηδονίων ὅτι προκατέχουσιν οἱ βάρβαροι τοὺς εὐκαίρους τόπους, αὐτὸς μὲν καταστρατοπεδεύσας πρὸς ταῖς ὑπερβολαῖς ἐπέμενε,

[6] προέπεμψε δέ τινας τῶν καθηγουμένων αὐτοῖς Γαλατῶν χάριν τοῦ κατασκέψασθαι τὴν τῶν ὑπεναντίων ἐπίνοιαν καὶ τὴν ὅλην ὑπόθεσιν.

[7] ὧν πραξάντων τὸ συνταχθέν, ἐπιγνοὺς ὁ στρατηγὸς ὅτι τὰς μὲν ἡμέρας ἐπιμελῶς παρευτακτοῦσι καὶ τηροῦσι τοὺς τόπους οἱ πολέμιοι, τὰς δὲ νύκτας εἴς τινα παρακειμένην πόλιν ἀπαλλάττονται, πρὸς ταύτην τὴν ὑπόθεσιν ἁρμοζόμενος συνεστήσατο πρᾶξιν τοιαύτην.

[8] ἀναλαβὼν τὴν δύναμιν προῆγεν ἐμφανῶς καὶ συνεγγίσας ταῖς δυσχωρίαις οὐ μακρὰν τῶν πολεμίων κατεστρατοπέδευσε. τῆς δὲ νυκτὸς ἐπιγενομένης, συντάξας τὰ πυρὰ καίειν, τὸ μὲν πλεῖον μέρος τῆς δυνάμεως αὐτοῦ κατέλιπε, τοὺς δʼ ἐπιτηδειοτάτους εὐζώνους ποιήσας διῆλθε τὰ στενὰ τὴν νύκτα καὶ κατέσχε τοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν πολεμίων προκαταληφθέντας τόπους, ἀποκεχωρηκότων τῶν βαρβάρων κατὰ τὴν συνήθειαν εἰς τὴν πόλιν.

[1] οὗ συμβάντος καὶ τῆς ἡμέρας ἐπιγενομένης, οἱ βάρβαροι συνθεασάμενοι τὸ γεγονὸς τὰς μὲν ἀρχὰς ἀπέστησαν τῆς ἐπιβολῆς·

[2] μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα θεωροῦντες τὸ τῶν ὑποζυγίων πλῆθος καὶ τοὺς ἱππεῖς δυσχερῶς ἐκμηρυομένους καὶ μακρῶς τὰς δυσχωρίας, ἐξεκλήθησαν ὑπὸ τοῦ συμβαίνοντος ἐξάπτεσθαι τῆς πορείας.

[3] τούτου δὲ γενομένου, καὶ κατὰ πλείω μέρη προσπεσόντων τῶν βαρβάρων, οὐχ οὕτως ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνδρῶν ὡς ὑπὸ τῶν τόπων πολὺς ἐγίνετο φθόρος τῶν Καρχηδονίων, καὶ μάλιστα τῶν ἵππων καὶ τῶν ὑποζυγίων.

[4] οὔσης γὰρ οὐ μόνον στενῆς καὶ τραχείας τῆς προσβολῆς ἀλλὰ καὶ κρημνώδους, ἀπὸ παντὸς κινήματος καὶ πάσης ταραχῆς ἐφέρετο κατὰ τῶν κρημνῶν ὁμόσε τοῖς φορτίοις πολλὰ τῶν ὑποζυγίων.

[5] καὶ μάλιστα τὴν τοιαύτην ταραχὴν ἐποίουν οἱ τραυματιζόμενοι τῶν ἵππων· τούτων γὰρ οἱ μὲν ἀντίοι συμπίπτοντες τοῖς ὑποζυγίοις, ὁπότε διαπτοηθεῖεν ἐκ τῆς πληγῆς, οἱ δὲ κατὰ τὴν εἰς τοὔμπροσθεν ὁρμὴν ἐξωθοῦντες πᾶν τὸ παραπῖπτον ἐν ταῖς δυσχωρίαις, μεγάλην ἀπειργάζοντο ταραχήν.

[6] εἰς ἃ βλέπων Ἀννίβας καὶ συλλογιζόμενος ὡς οὐδὲ τοῖς διαφυγοῦσι τὸν κίνδυνον ἔστι σωτηρία τοῦ σκευοφόρου διαφθαρέντος, ἀναλαβὼν τοὺς προκατασχόντας τὴν νύκτα τὰς ὑπερβολὰς ὥρμησε παραβοηθήσων τοῖς τῇ πορείᾳ προλαβοῦσιν.

[7] οὗ γενομένου πολλοὶ μὲν τῶν πολεμίων ἀπώλλυντο διὰ τὸ ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἔφοδον ἐξ ὑπερδεξίων τὸν Ἀννίβαν, οὐκ ἐλάττους δὲ καὶ τῶν ἰδίων·

[8] ὁ γὰρ κατὰ τὴν πορείαν θόρυβος ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ηὔξετο διὰ τὴν τῶν προειρημένων κραυγὴν καὶ συμπλοκήν.

[9] ἐπεὶ δὲ τοὺς μὲν πλείστους τῶν Ἀλλοβρίγων ἀπέκτεινε, τοὺς δὲ λοιποὺς τρεψάμενος ἠνάγκασε φυγεῖν εἰς τὴν οἰκείαν, τότε δὴ τὸ μὲν ἔτι περιλειπόμενον πλῆθος τῶν ὑποζυγίων καὶ τῶν ἵππων μόλις καὶ ταλαιπώρως διήνυε τὰς δυσχωρίας,

[10] αὐτὸς δὲ συναθροίσας ὅσους ἠδύνατο πλείστους ἐκ τοῦ κινδύνου προσέβαλε πρὸς τὴν πόλιν, ἐξ ἧς ἐποιήσαντο τὴν ὁρμὴν οἱ πολέμιοι.

[11] καταλαβὼν δὲ σχεδὸν ἔρημον διὰ τὸ πάντας ἐκκληθῆναι πρὸς τὰς ὠφελείας ἐγκρατὴς ἐγένετο τῆς πόλεως. ἐκ δὲ τούτου πολλὰ συνέβη τῶν χρησίμων αὐτῷ πρός τε τὸ παρὸν καὶ πρὸς τὸ μέλλον.

[12] παραυτίκα μὲν γὰρ ἐκομίσατο πλῆθος ἵππων καὶ ὑποζυγίων καὶ τῶν ἅμα τούτοις ἑαλωκότων ἀνδρῶν, εἰς δὲ τὸ μέλλον ἔσχε μὲν καὶ σίτου καὶ θρεμμάτων ἐπὶ δυεῖν καὶ τρισὶν ἡμέραις εὐπορίαν,

[13] τὸ δὲ συνέχον, φόβον ἐνειργάσατο τοῖς ἑξῆς πρὸς τὸ μὴ τολμᾶν αὐτῷ ῥᾳδίως ἐγχειρεῖν μηδένα τῶν παρακειμένων ταῖς ἀναβολαῖς.

[1] τότε μὲν οὖν αὐτοῦ ποιησάμενος τὴν παρεμβολὴν καὶ μίαν ἐπιμείνας ἡμέραν αὖθις ὥρμα.

[2] ταῖς δʼ ἑξῆς μέχρι μέν τινος ἀσφαλῶς διῆγε τὴν στρατιάν· ἤδη δὲ τεταρταῖος ὢν αὖθις εἰς κινδύνους παρεγένετο μεγάλους.

[3] οἱ γὰρ περὶ τὴν δίοδον οἰκοῦντες συμφρονήσαντες ἐπὶ δόλῳ συνήντων αὐτῷ, θαλλοὺς ἔχοντες καὶ στεφάνους· τοῦτο γὰρ σχεδὸν πᾶσι τοῖς βαρβάροις ἐστὶ σύνθημα φιλίας, καθάπερ τὸ κηρύκειον τοῖς Ἕλλησιν.

[4] εὐλαβῶς δὲ διακείμενος πρὸς τὴν τοιαύτην πίστιν Ἀννίβας ἐξήτασε φιλοτίμως τὴν ἐπίνοιαν αὐτῶν καὶ τὴν ὅλην ἐπιβολήν.

[5] τῶν δὲ φασκόντων καλῶς εἰδέναι καὶ τὴν τῆς πόλεως ἅλωσιν καὶ τὴν τῶν ἐγχειρησάντων αὐτὸν ἀδικεῖν ἀπώλειαν, καὶ διασαφούντων ὅτι πάρεισι διὰ ταῦτα, βουλόμενοι μήτε ποιῆσαι μήτε παθεῖν μηδὲν δυσχερές, ὑπισχνουμένων δὲ καὶ δώσειν ἐξ αὑτῶν ὅμηρα,

[6] πολὺν μὲν χρόνον ηὐλαβεῖτο καὶ διηπίστει τοῖς λεγομένοις, συλλογιζόμενος δʼ Ἀννίβας ὡς δεξάμενος μὲν τὰ προτεινόμενα, τάχʼ ἂν ἴσως εὐλαβεστέρους καὶ πρᾳοτέρους ποιήσαι τοὺς παραγεγονότας, μὴ προσδεξάμενος δὲ προδήλους ἕξει πολεμίους αὐτούς, συγκατένευσε τοῖς λεγομένοις καὶ συνυπεκρίθη τίθεσθαι φιλίαν πρὸς αὐτούς.

[7] τῶν δὲ βαρβάρων τὰ ὅμηρα παραδόντων καὶ θρέμμασι χορηγούντων ἀφθόνως καὶ καθόλου διδόντων σφᾶς αὐτοὺς εἰς τὰς χεῖρας ἀπαρατηρήτως, ἐπὶ ποσὸν ἐπίστευσαν οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἀννίβαν, ὥστε καὶ καθηγεμόσιν αὐτοῖς χρῆσθαι πρὸς τὰς ἑξῆς δυσχωρίας. προπορευομένων δʼ αὐτῶν ἐπὶ δύʼ ἡμέραις,

[8] συναθροισθέντες οἱ προειρημένοι καὶ συνακολουθήσαντες ἐπιτίθενται, φάραγγά τινα δύσβατον καὶ κρημνώδη

[1] περαιουμένων αὐτῶν. ἐν ᾧ καιρῷ πάντας ἄρδην ἀπολέσθαι συνέβη τοὺς περὶ τὸν Ἀννίβαν, εἰ μὴ δεδιότες ἀκμὴν ἐπὶ ποσὸν καὶ προορώμενοι τὸ μέλλον τὰ μὲν σκευοφόρα καὶ τοὺς ἱππεῖς εἶχον ἐν τῇ πρωτοπορείᾳ, τοὺς δʼ ὁπλίτας ἐπὶ τῆς οὐραγίας.

[2] τούτων δʼ ἐφεδρευόντων ἔλαττον συνέβη γενέσθαι τὸ πάθος· οὗτοι γὰρ ἔστεξαν τὴν ἐπιφορὰν τῶν βαρβάρων.

[3] οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ τούτου συγκυρήσαντος πολύ τι πλῆθος καὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν καὶ τῶν ὑποζυγίων καὶ τῶν ἵππων διεφθάρη.

[4] τῶν γὰρ τόπων ὑπερδεξίων ὄντων τοῖς πολεμίοις, ἀντιπαράγοντες οἱ βάρβαροι ταῖς παρωρείαις καὶ τοῖς μὲν τὰς πέτρας ἐπικυλίοντες τοὺς δʼ ἐκ χειρὸς τοῖς λίθοις τύπτοντες εἰς ὁλοσχερῆ διατροπὴν καὶ κίνδυνον ἦγον,

[5] οὕτως ὥστʼ ἀναγκασθῆναι τὸν Ἀννίβαν μετὰ τῆς ἡμισείας δυνάμεως νυκτερεῦσαι περί τι λευκόπετρον ὀχυρὸν χωρὶς τῶν ἵππων καὶ τῶν ὑποζυγίων, ἐφεδρεύοντα τούτοις, ἕως ἐν ὅλῃ τῇ νυκτὶ ταῦτα μόλις ἐξεμηρύσατο τῆς χαράδρας.

[6] τῇ δʼ ἐπαύριον τῶν πολεμίων χωρισθέντων, συνάψας τοῖς ἱππεῦσι καὶ τοῖς ὑποζυγίοις προῆγε πρὸς τὰς ὑπερβολὰς τὰς ἀνωτάτω τῶν Ἄλπεων, ὁλοσχερεῖ μὲν οὐδενὶ περιπίπτων ἔτι συστήματι τῶν βαρβάρων, κατὰ μέρη δὲ καὶ κατὰ τόπους παρενοχλούμενος ὑπʼ αὐτῶν·

[7] ὧν οἱ μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς οὐραγίας, οἱ δʼ ἀπὸ τῆς πρωτοπορείας ἀπέσπων τῶν σκευοφόρων ἔνια, προσπίπτοντες εὐκαίρως. μεγίστην δʼ αὐτῷ παρείχετο χρείαν τὰ θηρία·

[8] καθʼ ὃν γὰρ ἂν τόπον ὑπάρχοι τῆς πορείας ταῦτα, πρὸς τοῦτο τὸ μέρος οὐκ ἐτόλμων οἱ πολέμιοι προσιέναι, τὸ παράδοξον ἐκπληττόμενοι τῆς τῶν ζῴων φαντασίας.

[9] ἐναταῖος δὲ διανύσας εἰς τὰς ὑπερβολὰς αὐτοῦ κατεστρατοπέδευσε καὶ δύʼ ἡμέρας προσέμεινε, βουλόμενος ἅμα μὲν ἀναπαῦσαι τοὺς διασῳζομένους, ἅμα δὲ προσδέξασθαι τοὺς ἀπολειπομένους.

[10] ἐν ᾧ καιρῷ συνέβη πολλοὺς μὲν ἵππους τῶν ἀπεπτοημένων, πολλὰ δʼ ὑποζύγια τῶν ἀπερριφότων τὰ φορτία παραδόξως ἀναδραμεῖν τοῖς στίβοις ἑπόμενα

[1] καὶ συνάψαι πρὸς τὴν παρεμβολήν. τῆς δὲ χιόνος ἤδη περὶ τοὺς ἄκρους ἁθροιζομένης διὰ τὸ συνάπτειν τὴν τῆς Πλειάδος δύσιν, θεωρῶν τὰ πλήθη δυσθύμως διακείμενα καὶ διὰ τὴν προγεγενημένην ταλαιπωρίαν καὶ διὰ τὴν ἔτι προσδοκωμένην,

[2] ἐπειρᾶτο συναθροίσας παρακαλεῖν, μίαν ἔχων ἀφορμὴν εἰς τοῦτο τὴν τῆς Ἰταλίας ἐνάργειαν· οὕτως γὰρ ὑποπεπτώκει τοῖς προειρημένοις ὄρεσιν ὥστε συνθεωρουμένων ἀμφοῖν ἀκροπόλεως φαίνεσθαι διάθεσιν ἔχειν τὰς Ἄλπεις τῆς ὅλης Ἰταλίας.

[3] διόπερ ἐνδεικνύμενος αὐτοῖς τὰ περὶ τὸν Πάδον πεδία καὶ καθόλου τῆς εὐνοίας ὑπομιμνήσκων τῆς τῶν κατοικούντων αὐτὰ Γαλατῶν, ἅμα δὲ καὶ τὸν τῆς Ῥώμης αὐτῆς τόπον ὑποδεικνύων ἐπὶ ποσὸν εὐθαρσεῖς ἐποίησε τοὺς ἀνθρώπους.

[4] τῇ δʼ ἐπαύριον ἀναζεύξας ἐνήρχετο τῆς καταβάσεως. ἐν ᾗ πολεμίοις μὲν οὐκέτι περιέτυχε πλὴν τῶν λάθρᾳ κακοποιούντων, ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν τόπων καὶ τῆς χιόνος οὐ πολλῷ λείποντας ἀπέβαλε τῶν κατὰ τὴν ἀνάβασιν φθαρέντων.

[5] οὔσης γὰρ στενῆς καὶ κατωφεροῦς τῆς καταβάσεως, τῆς δὲ χιόνος ἄδηλον ποιούσης ἑκάστοις τὴν ἐπίβασιν, πᾶν τὸ παραπεσὸν τῆς ὁδοῦ καὶ σφαλὲν ἐφέρετο κατὰ τῶν κρημνῶν.

[6] οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ ταύτην μὲν ὑπέφερον τὴν ταλαιπωρίαν, ἅτε συνήθεις ὄντες ἤδη τοῖς τοιούτοις κακοῖς·

[7] ἅμα δὲ τῷ παραγενέσθαι πρὸς τοιοῦτον τόπον, ὃν οὔτε τοῖς θηρίοις οὔτε τοῖς ὑποζυγίοις δυνατὸν ἦν παρελθεῖν διὰ τὴν στενότητα, σχεδὸν ἐπὶ τρίʼ ἡμιστάδια τῆς ἀπορρῶγος καὶ πρὸ τοῦ μὲν οὔσης, τότε δὲ καὶ μᾶλλον ἔτι προσφάτως ἀπερρωγυίας, ἐνταῦθα πάλιν ἀθυμῆσαι καὶ διατραπῆναι συνέβη τὸ πλῆθος.

[8] τὸ μὲν οὖν πρῶτον ἐπεβάλετο περιελθεῖν τὰς δυσχωρίας ὁ τῶν Καρχηδονίων στρατηγός· ἐπιγενομένης δὲ χιόνος καὶ ταύτην ἀδύνατον ποιούσης τὴν πορείαν,

[1] ἀπέστη τῆς ἐπιβολῆς. τὸ γὰρ συμβαῖνον ἴδιον ἦν καὶ παρηλλαγμένον. ἐπὶ γὰρ τὴν προϋπάρχουσαν χιόνα καὶ διαμεμενηκυῖαν ἐκ τοῦ πρότερον χειμῶνος ἄρτι τῆς ἐπʼ ἔτους πεπτωκυίας, ταύτην μὲν εὐδιάκοπτον εἶναι συνέβαινε καὶ διὰ τὸ πρόσφατον οὖσαν ἁπαλὴν ὑπάρχειν καὶ διὰ τὸ μηδέπω βάθος ἔχειν.

[2] ὁπότε δὲ ταύτην διαπατήσαντες ἐπὶ τὴν ὑποκάτω καὶ συνεστηκυῖαν ἐπιβαῖεν, οὐκέτι διέκοπτον, ἀλλʼ ἐπέπλεον ὀλισθάνοντες ἀμφοτέροις ἅμα τοῖς ποσί, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῇ γῇ συμβαίνει τοῖς διὰ τῶν ἀκροπήλων πορευομένοις.

[3] τὸ δὲ συνεξακολουθοῦν τούτοις ἔτι δυσχερέστερον ὑπῆρχεν.

[4] οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἄνδρες οὐ δυνάμενοι τὴν κάτω χιόνα διακόπτειν, ὁπότε πεσόντες βουληθεῖεν ἢ τοῖς γόνασιν ἢ ταῖς χερσὶ προσεξερείσασθαι πρὸς τὴν ἐξανάστασιν, τότε καὶ μᾶλλον ἐπέπλεον ἅμα πᾶσι τοῖς ἐρείσμασιν, ἐπὶ πολὺ καταφερῶν ὄντων τῶν χωρίων·

[5] τὰ δʼ ὑποζύγια διέκοπτεν, ὅτε πέσοι, τὴν κάτω χιόνα κατὰ τὴν διανάστασιν, διακόψαντα δʼ ἔμενε μετὰ τῶν φορτίων οἷον καταπεπηγότα διά τε τὸ βάρος καὶ διὰ τὸ πῆγμα τῆς προϋπαρχούσης χιόνος.

[6] ὅθεν ἀποστὰς τῆς τοιαύτης ἐλπίδος ἐστρατοπέδευσε περὶ τὴν ῥάχιν, διαμησάμενος τὴν ἐπʼ αὐτῇ χιόνα, καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα παραστήσας τὰ πλήθη τὸν κρημνὸν ἐξῳκοδόμει μετὰ πολλῆς ταλαιπωρίας.

[7] τοῖς μὲν οὖν ὑποζυγίοις καὶ τοῖς ἵπποις ἱκανὴν ἐποίησε πάροδον ἐν ἡμέρᾳ μιᾷ. διὸ καὶ ταῦτα μὲν εὐθέως διαγαγὼν καὶ καταστρατοπεδεύσας περὶ τοὺς ἐκφεύγοντας ἤδη τὴν χιόνα τόπους διαφῆκε πρὸς τὰς νομάς,

[8] τοὺς δὲ Νομάδας ἀνὰ μέρος προῆγε πρὸς τὴν οἰκοδομίαν καὶ μόλις ἐν ἡμέραις τρισὶ κακοπαθήσας διήγαγε τὰ θηρία. καὶ τάδε συνέβαινε κακῶς ὑπὸ τοῦ λιμοῦ διατεθεῖσθαι·

[9] τῶν γὰρ Ἄλπεων τὰ μὲν ἄκρα καὶ τὰ πρὸς τὰς ὑπερβολὰς ἀνήκοντα τελέως ἄδενδρα καὶ ψιλὰ πάντʼ ἔστι διὰ τὸ συνεχῶς ἐπιμένειν τὴν χιόνα καὶ θέρους καὶ χειμῶνος, τὰ δʼ ὑπὸ μέσην τὴν παρώρειαν ἐξ ἀμφοῖν τοῖν μεροῖν ὑλοφόρα καὶ δενδροφόρα καὶ τὸ ὅλον οἰκήσιμʼ ἔστιν.

[1] Ἀννίβας δὲ συναθροίσας ὁμοῦ πᾶσαν τὴν δύναμιν κατέβαινε καὶ τριταῖος ἀπὸ τῶν προειρημένων κρημνῶν διανύσας ἥψατο τῶν ἐπιπέδων,

[2] πολλοὺς μὲν ἀπολωλεκὼς τῶν στρατιωτῶν ὑπό τε τῶν πολεμίων καὶ τῶν ποταμῶν ἐν τῇ καθόλου πορείᾳ, πολλοὺς δʼ ὑπὸ τῶν κρημνῶν καὶ τῶν δυσχωριῶν κατὰ τὰς Ἄλπεις, οὐ μόνον ἄνδρας, ἔτι δὲ πλείους ἵππους καὶ ὑποζύγια.

[3] τέλος δὲ τὴν μὲν πᾶσαν πορείαν ἐκ Καινῆς πόλεως ἐν πέντε μησὶ ποιησάμενος τὴν δὲ τῶν Ἄλπεων ὑπερβολὴν ἡμέραις δεκαπέντε κατῆρε τολμηρῶς εἰς τὰ περὶ τὸν Πάδον πεδία καὶ τὸ τῶν Ἰνσόμβρων ἔθνος,

[4] ἔχων τὸ διασῳζόμενον μέρος τῆς μὲν τῶν Λιβύων δυνάμεως πεζοὺς μυρίους καὶ δισχιλίους, τῆς δὲ τῶν Ἰβήρων εἰς ὀκτακισχιλίους, ἱππεῖς δὲ τοὺς πάντας οὐ πλείους ἑξακισχιλίων, ὡς αὐτὸς ἐν τῇ στήλῃ τῇ περὶ τοῦ πλήθους ἐχούσῃ τὴν ἐπιγραφὴν ἐπὶ Λακινίῳ διασαφεῖ.

[5] κατὰ δὲ τοὺς αὐτοὺς καιρούς, ὡς ἐπάνω προεῖπα, Πόπλιος ἀπολελοιπὼς τὰς δυνάμεις Γναΐῳ τἀδελφῷ καὶ παρακεκληκὼς αὐτὸν ἔχεσθαι τῶν ἐν Ἰβηρίᾳ πραγμάτων καὶ πολεμεῖν ἐρρωμένως Ἀσδρούβᾳ, κατέπλευσε μετʼ ὀλίγων αὐτὸς εἰς Πίσας.

[6] ποιησάμενος δὲ τὴν πορείαν διὰ Τυρρηνίας καὶ παραλαβὼν τὰ παρὰ τῶν ἑξαπελέκεων στρατόπεδα τὰ προκαθήμενα καὶ προσπολεμοῦντα τοῖς Βοίοις ἧκε πρὸς τὰ περὶ τὸν Πάδον πεδία καὶ καταστρατοπεδεύσας ἐπεῖχε τοῖς πολεμίοις, σπεύδων συμβαλεῖν εἰς μάχην.

[1] ἡμεῖς δʼ ἐπειδὴ καὶ τὴν διήγησιν καὶ τοὺς ἡγεμόνας ἀμφοτέρων καὶ τὸν πόλεμον εἰς Ἰταλίαν ἠγάγομεν, πρὸ τοῦ τῶν ἀγώνων ἄρξασθαι βραχέα βουλόμεθα περὶ τῶν ἁρμοζόντων τῇ πραγματείᾳ διελθεῖν.

[2] ἴσως γὰρ δή τινες ἐπιζητήσουσι πῶς πεποιημένοι τὸν πλεῖστον λόγον ὑπὲρ τῶν κατὰ Λιβύην καὶ κατʼ Ἰβηρίαν τόπων οὔτε περὶ τοῦ καθʼ Ἡρακλέους στήλας στόματος οὐδὲν ἐπὶ πλεῖον εἰρήκαμεν οὔτε περὶ τῆς ἔξω θαλάττης καὶ τῶν ἐν ταύτῃ συμβαινόντων ἰδιωμάτων,

[3] οὐδὲ μὴν περὶ τῶν Βρεττανικῶν νήσων καὶ τῆς τοῦ καττιτέρου κατασκευῆς, ἔτι δὲ τῶν ἀργυρείων καὶ χρυσείων τῶν κατʼ αὐτὴν Ἰβηρίαν, ὑπὲρ ὧν οἱ συγγραφεῖς ἀμφισβητοῦντες πρὸς ἀλλήλους τὸν πλεῖστον διατίθενται λόγον.

[4] ἡμεῖς δʼ οὐχὶ νομίζοντες ἀλλότριον εἶναι τοῦτο τὸ μέρος τῆς ἱστορίας, διὰ τοῦτο παρελείπομεν, ἀλλὰ πρῶτον μὲν οὐ βουλόμενοι παρʼ ἕκαστα διασπᾶν τὴν διήγησιν οὐδʼ ἀποπλανᾶν ἀπὸ τῆς πραγματικῆς ὑποθέσεως τοὺς φιληκοοῦντας,

[5] δεύτερον δὲ κρίνοντες οὐ διερριμμένην οὐδʼ ἐν παρέργῳ ποιήσασθαι τὴν περὶ αὐτῶν μνήμην, ἀλλὰ κατʼ ἰδίαν καὶ τόπον καὶ καιρὸν ἀπονείμαντες τῷ μέρει τούτῳ, καθʼ ὅσον οἷοί τʼ ἐσμέν, τὴν ἀλήθειαν περὶ αὐτῶν ἐξηγήσασθαι.

[6] διόπερ οὐ χρὴ θαυμάζειν οὐδʼ ἐν τοῖς ἑξῆς, ἐὰν ἐπί τινας τόπους ἐρχόμενοι τοιούτους παραλείπωμεν τοῦτο τὸ μέρος διὰ τὰς προειρημένας αἰτίας.

[7] εἰ δέ τινες πάντως ἐπιζητοῦσι κατὰ τόπον καὶ κατὰ μέρος τῶν τοιούτων ἀκούειν, ἴσως ἀγνοοῦσι παραπλήσιόν τι πάσχοντες τοῖς λίχνοις τῶν δειπνητῶν.

[8] καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι πάντων ἀπογευόμενοι τῶν παρακειμένων οὔτε κατὰ τὸ παρὸν οὐδενὸς ἀληθινῶς ἀπολαύουσι τῶν βρωμάτων οὔτʼ εἰς τὸ μέλλον ὠφέλιμον ἐξ αὐτῶν τὴν ἀνάδοσιν καὶ τροφὴν κομίζονται, πᾶν δὲ τοὐναντίον·

[9] οἵ τε περὶ τὴν ἀνάγνωσιν τὸ παραπλήσιον ποιοῦντες οὔτε τῆς παραυτίκα διαγωγῆς ἀληθινῶς οὔτε τῆς εἰς τὸ μέλλον ὠφελείας στοχάζονται δεόντως.

[1] διότι μὲν οὖν, εἰ καί τι τῶν τῆς ἱστορίας μερῶν ἄλλο, καὶ τοῦτο προσδεῖ λόγου καὶ διορθώσεως ἀληθινωτέρας, προφανὲς ἐκ πολλῶν μάλιστα δʼ ἐκ τούτων.

[2] σχεδὸν γὰρ πάντων, εἰ δὲ μή γε, τῶν πλείστων συγγραφέων πεπειραμένων μὲν ἐξηγεῖσθαι τὰς ἰδιότητας καὶ θέσεις τῶν περὶ τὰς ἐσχατιὰς τόπων τῆς καθʼ ἡμᾶς οἰκουμένης, ἐν πολλοῖς δὲ τῶν πλείστων διημαρτηκότων,

[3] παραλείπειν μὲν οὐδαμῶς καθήκει, ῥητέον δέ τι πρὸς αὐτοὺς οὐκ ἐκ παρέργου καὶ διερριμμένως ἀλλʼ ἐξ ἐπιστάσεως, καὶ ῥητέον οὐκ ἐπιτιμῶντας οὐδʼ ἐπιπλήττοντας,

[4] ἐπαινοῦντας δὲ μᾶλλον καὶ διορθουμένους τὴν ἄγνοιαν αὐτῶν, γινώσκοντας ὅτι κἀκεῖνοι τῶν νῦν καιρῶν ἐπιλαβόμενοι πολλὰ τῶν αὐτοῖς εἰρημένων εἰς διόρθωσιν ἂν καὶ μετάθεσιν ἤγαγον.

[5] ἐν μὲν γὰρ τῷ προγεγονότι χρόνῳ σπανίους ἂν εὕροι τις τῶν Ἑλλήνων τοὺς ἐπιβεβλημένους πολυπραγμονεῖν τὰ κατὰ τὰς ἐσχατιὰς διὰ τὸ τῆς ἐπιβολῆς ἀδύνατον.

[6] πολλοὶ μὲν γὰρ ἦσαν οἱ κατὰ θάλατταν τότε κίνδυνοι καὶ δυσεξαρίθμητοι, πολλαπλάσιοι δὲ τούτων οἱ κατὰ γῆν.

[7] ἀλλʼ εἰ καί τις ἢ κατʼ ἀνάγκην ἢ κατὰ προαίρεσιν ἐξίκοιτο πρὸς τὰ πέρατα τῆς οἰκουμένης, οὐδʼ οὕτως ἤνυεν τὸ προκείμενον.

[8] δυσχερὲς μὲν γὰρ ἐπὶ πλέον τινῶν αὐτόπτην γενέσθαι διὰ τὸ τοὺς μὲν ἐκβεβαρβαρῶσθαι τοὺς δʼ ἐρήμους εἶναι τόπους, ἔτι δὲ χαλεπώτερον τὸ περὶ τῶν ὁραθέντων διὰ λόγου τι γνῶναι καὶ μαθεῖν διὰ τὸ τῆς φωνῆς ἐξηλλαγμένον.

[9] ἐὰν δὲ καὶ γνῷ τις, ἔτι τῶν πρὸ τοῦ δυσχερέστερον τὸ τῶν ἑωρακότων τινὰ μετρίῳ χρῆσθαι τρόπῳ καὶ καταφρονήσαντα τῆς παραδοξολογίας καὶ τερατείας ἑαυτοῦ χάριν προτιμῆσαι τὴν ἀλήθειαν καὶ μηδὲν τῶν πάρεξ ὄντων ἡμῖν

[1] ἀναγγεῖλαι. διόπερ οὐ δυσχεροῦς ἀλλʼ ἀδυνάτου σχεδὸν ὑπαρχούσης κατά γε τοὺς προγεγονότας καιροὺς τῆς ἀληθοῦς ἱστορίας ὑπὲρ τῶν προειρημένων, οὐκ εἴ τι παρέλιπον οἱ συγγραφεῖς ἢ διήμαρτον, ἐπιτιμᾶν αὐτοῖς ἄξιον,

[2] ἀλλʼ ἐφʼ ὅσον ἔγνωσάν τι καὶ προεβίβασαν τὴν ἐμπειρίαν τὴν περὶ τούτων ἐν τοιούτοις καιροῖς, ἐπαινεῖν καὶ θαυμάζειν αὐτοὺς δίκαιον.

[3] ἐν δὲ τοῖς καθʼ ἡμᾶς τῶν μὲν κατὰ τὴν Ἀσίαν διὰ τὴν Ἀλεξάνδρου δυναστείαν τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν τόπων διὰ τὴν Ῥωμαίων ὑπεροχὴν σχεδὸν ἁπάντων πλωτῶν καὶ πορευτῶν γεγονότων,

[4] ἀπολελυμένων δὲ καὶ τῶν πρακτικῶν ἀνδρῶν τῆς περὶ τὰς πολεμικὰς καὶ πολιτικὰς πράξεις φιλοτιμίας, ἐκ δὲ τούτων πολλὰς καὶ μεγάλας ἀφορμὰς εἰληφότων εἰς τὸ πολυπραγμονεῖν καὶ φιλομαθεῖν περὶ τῶν προειρημένων,

[5] δέον ἂν εἴη καὶ βέλτιον γινώσκειν καὶ ἀληθινώτερον ὑπὲρ τῶν πρότερον ἀγνοουμένων. ὅπερ ἡμεῖς αὐτοί τε πειρασόμεθα ποιεῖν,

[6] λαβόντες ἁρμόζοντα τόπον ἐν τῇ πραγματείᾳ τῷ μέρει τούτῳ, τούς τε φιλοπευστοῦντας ὁλοσχερέστερον βουλησόμεθα συνεπιστῆσαι περὶ τῶν προειρημένων,

[7] ἐπειδὴ καὶ τὸ πλεῖον τούτου χάριν ὑπεδεξάμεθα τοὺς κινδύνους [καὶ τὰς κακοπαθείας] τοὺς συμβάντας ἡμῖν ἐν πλάνῃ τῇ κατὰ Λιβύην καὶ κατʼ Ἰβηρίαν, ἔτι δὲ Γαλατίαν καὶ τὴν ἔξωθεν ταύταις ταῖς χώραις συγκυροῦσαν θάλατταν,

[8] ἵνα διορθωσάμενοι τὴν τῶν προγεγονότων ἄγνοιαν ἐν τούτοις γνώριμα ποιήσωμεν τοῖς Ἕλλησι καὶ ταῦτα τὰ μέρη τῆς οἰκουμένης.

[9] νῦν δʼ ἀναδραμόντες ἐπὶ τὴν παρέκβασιν τῆς διηγήσεως πειρασόμεθα δηλοῦν τοὺς γενομένους ἐκ παρατάξεως ἐν Ἰταλίᾳ Ῥωμαίοις καὶ Καρχηδονίοις ἀγῶνας.

[1] τὸ μὲν οὖν πλῆθος τῆς δυνάμεως, ὅπερ ἔχων Ἀννίβας ἐνέβαλεν εἰς Ἰταλίαν, ἤδη δεδηλώκαμεν.

[2] μετὰ δὲ τὴν εἰσβολὴν καταστρατοπεδεύσας ὑπʼ αὐτὴν τὴν παρώρειαν τῶν Ἄλπεων τὰς μὲν ἀρχὰς ἀνελάμβανε τὰς δυνάμεις.

[3] οὐ γὰρ μόνον ὑπὸ τῶν ἀναβάσεων καὶ καταβάσεων, ἔτι δὲ τραχυτήτων τῶν κατὰ τὰς ὑπερβολάς, δεινῶς τεταλαιπωρήκει τὸ σύμπαν αὐτῷ στρατόπεδον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῇ τῶν ἐπιτηδείων σπάνει καὶ ταῖς τῶν σωμάτων ἀθεραπευσίαις κακῶς ἀπήλλαττε.

[4] πολλοὶ δὲ καὶ καθυφεῖνθʼ ἑαυτοὺς ὁλοσχερῶς διὰ τὴν ἔνδειαν καὶ συνέχειαν τῶν πόνων. οὔτε γὰρ διακομίζειν εἰς τοσαύτας μυριάδας διὰ τοιούτων τόπων δαψιλῆ τὰ πρὸς τὴν τροφὴν οἷοί τʼ ἦσαν, ἅ τε καὶ παρεκόμιζον, ἅμα τῇ τῶν ὑποζυγίων καταφθορᾷ καὶ τούτων τὰ πλεῖστα συναπώλλυτο.

[5] διόπερ ὁρμήσας ἀπὸ τῆς τοῦ Ῥοδανοῦ διαβάσεως, πεζοὺς μὲν εἰς ὀκτακισχιλίους καὶ τρισμυρίους ἔχων ἱππεῖς δὲ πλείους ὀκτακισχιλίων, σχεδόν που τὴν ἡμίσειαν τῆς δυνάμεως, καθάπερ ἐπάνω προεῖπον, ἐν ταῖς ὑπερβολαῖς διέφθειρεν.

[6] οἵ γε μὴν σωθέντες καὶ ταῖς ἐπιφανείαις καὶ τῇ λοιπῇ διαθέσει διὰ τὴν συνέχειαν τῶν προειρημένων πόνων οἷον ἀποτεθηριωμένοι πάντες ἦσαν.

[7] πολλὴν οὖν ποιούμενος πρόνοιαν Ἀννίβας τῆς ἐπιμελείας αὐτῶν ἀνεκτᾶτο καὶ τὰς ψυχὰς ἅμα καὶ τὰ σώματα τῶν ἀνδρῶν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἵππων.

[8] μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα, προσανειληφυίας ἤδη τῆς δυνάμεως, τῶν Ταυρίνων, οἳ τυγχάνουσι πρὸς τῇ παρωρείᾳ κατοικοῦντες, στασιαζόντων μὲν πρὸς τοὺς Ἴνσομβρας ἀπιστούντων δὲ τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις,

[9] τὸ μὲν πρῶτον αὐτοὺς εἰς φιλίαν προυκαλεῖτο καὶ συμμαχίαν· οὐχ ὑπακουόντων δὲ περιστρατοπεδεύσας τὴν βαρυτάτην πόλιν ἐν τρισὶν ἡμέραις ἐξεπολιόρκησεν.

[10] κατασφάξας δὲ τοὺς ἐναντιωθέντας αὐτῷ τοιοῦτον ἐνειργάσατο φόβον τοῖς σύνεγγυς κατοικοῦσιν τῶν βαρβάρων ὥστε πάντας ἐκ χειρὸς παραγίνεσθαι, διδόντας αὑτοὺς εἰς τὴν πίστιν.

[11] τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν πλῆθος τῶν τὰ πεδία κατοικούντων Κελτῶν ἐσπούδαζε μὲν κοινωνεῖν τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις τῶν πραγμάτων κατὰ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐπιβολήν·

[12] παρηλλαχότων δὲ τῶν Ῥωμαϊκῶν στρατοπέδων ἤδη τοὺς πλείστους αὐτῶν καὶ διακεκλεικότων, ἡσυχίαν ἦγον· τινὲς δὲ καὶ συστρατεύειν ἠναγκάζοντο τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις.

[13] εἰς ἃ βλέπων Ἀννίβας ἔκρινε μὴ μέλλειν ἀλλὰ προάγειν εἰς τοὔμπροσθεν καὶ πράττειν τι πρὸς τὸ θαρρῆσαι τοὺς βουλομένους μετέχειν σφίσι τῶν αὐτῶν ἐλπίδων.

[1] προθέμενος δὲ ταῦτα καὶ τὸν Πόπλιον ἀκούων ἤδη διαβεβηκέναι τὸν Πάδον μετὰ τῶν δυνάμεων καὶ σύνεγγυς εἶναι, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἠπίστει τοῖς προσαγγελλομένοις,

[2] ἐνθυμούμενος μὲν ὅτι πρότερον ἡμέραις ὀλίγαις αὐτὸν ἀπέλιπε περὶ τὴν τοῦ Ῥοδανοῦ διάβασιν, καὶ συλλογιζόμενος τόν τε πλοῦν τὸν ἀπὸ Μασσαλίας εἰς Τυρρηνίαν ὡς μακρὸς καὶ δυσπαρακόμιστος εἴη,

[3] πρὸς δὲ τούτοις τὴν πορείαν ἱστορῶν τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ Τυρρηνικοῦ πελάγους διὰ τῆς Ἰταλίας μέχρι πρὸς τὰς Ἄλπεις ὡς πολλὴ καὶ δυσδίοδος ὑπάρχει στρατοπέδοις.

[4] πλειόνων δὲ καὶ σαφεστέρως ἀεὶ προσαγγελλόντων, ἐθαύμαζε καὶ κατεπέπληκτο τὴν ὅλην ἐπιβολὴν καὶ τὴν πρᾶξιν τοῦ στρατηγοῦ.

[5] τὸ δὲ παραπλήσιον συνέβαινε πάσχειν καὶ τὸν Πόπλιον· τὰς μὲν γὰρ ἀρχὰς οὐδʼ ἐπιβάλλεσθαι τῇ διὰ τῶν Ἄλπεων ἤλπισε πορείᾳ τὸν Ἀννίβαν δυνάμεσιν ἀλλοφύλοις· εἰ δὲ καὶ τολμήσαι, καταφθαρήσεσθαι προδήλως αὐτὸν ὑπελάμβανεν. διόπερ ἐν τοιούτοις ὢν διαλογισμοῖς,

[6] ὡς ἐπυνθάνετο καὶ σεσῶσθαι καὶ πολιορκεῖν αὐτὸν ἤδη τινὰς πόλεις ἐν Ἰταλίᾳ, κατεπέπληκτο τὴν τόλμαν καὶ τὸ παράβολον τἀνδρός.

[7] τὸ δʼ αὐτὸ συνέβαινεν καὶ τοῖς ἐν τῇ Ῥώμῃ πεπονθέναι περὶ τῶν προσπιπτόντων.

[8] ἄρτι γὰρ τῆς τελευταίας φήμης καταληγούσης ὑπὲρ τῶν Καρχηδονίων ὅτι Ζάκανθαν εἰλήφασιν, καὶ πρὸς ταύτην βεβουλευμένων τὴν ἔννοιαν, καὶ τὸν μὲν ἕνα τῶν στρατηγῶν ἐξαπεσταλκότων εἰς τὴν Λιβύην, ὡς αὐτὴν τὴν Καρχηδόνα πολιορκήσοντα, τὸν ἕτερον δʼ εἰς Ἰβηρίαν, ὡς πρὸς Ἀννίβαν ἐκεῖ διαπολεμήσοντα, παρῆν ἀγγελία διότι πάρεστιν Ἀννίβας μετὰ δυνάμεως καὶ πολιορκεῖ τινας ἤδη πόλεις ἐν Ἰταλίᾳ.

[9] διότι παραδόξου φανέντος αὐτοῖς τοῦ γινομένου, διαταραχθέντες παραχρῆμα πρὸς τὸν Τεβέριον εἰς τὸ Λιλύβαιον ἐξαπέστελλον, δηλοῦντες μὲν τὴν παρουσίαν τῶν πολεμίων, οἰόμενοι δὲ δεῖν ἀφέμενον τῶν προκειμένων κατὰ σπουδὴν βοηθεῖν τοῖς ἰδίοις πράγμασιν.

[10] ὁ δὲ Τεβέριος τοὺς μὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ στόλου παραυτίκα συναθροίσας ἐξέπεμψε, παραγγείλας ποιεῖσθαι τὸν πλοῦν ὡς ἐπʼ οἴκου· τὰς δὲ πεζικὰς δυνάμεις ἐξώρκισε διὰ τῶν χιλιάρχων, τάξας ἡμέραν ἐν ᾗ δεήσει πάντας ἐν Ἀριμίνῳ γενέσθαι κοιταίους.

[11] αὕτη δʼ ἔστι πόλις παρὰ τὸν Ἀδρίαν ἐπὶ τῷ πέρατι κειμένη τῶν περὶ τὸν Πάδον πεδίων ὡς ἀπὸ μεσημβρίας.

[12] πανταχόθεν δὲ τοῦ κινήματος ἅμα γινομένου, καὶ τῶν συμβαινόντων πᾶσι παρὰ δόξαν προσπιπτόντων, ἦν παρʼ ἑκάστοις ἐπίστασις ὑπὲρ τοῦ μέλλοντος οὐκ εὐκαταφρόνητος.

[1] κατὰ δὲ τὸν καιρὸν τοῦτον ἤδη συνεγγίζοντες ἀλλήλοις Ἀννίβας καὶ Πόπλιος ἐπεβάλοντο παρακαλεῖν τὰς ἑαυτῶν δυνάμεις, ἑκάτερος προθέμενος τὰ πρέποντα τοῖς παροῦσι καιροῖς.

[2] Ἀννίβας μὲν οὖν διὰ τοιοῦδέ τινος ἐνεχείρει τρόπου ποιεῖσθαι τὴν παραίνεσιν.

[3] συναγαγὼν γὰρ τὰ πλήθη παρήγαγεν νεανίσκους τῶν αἰχμαλώτων, οὓς εἰλήφει κακοποιοῦντας τὴν πορείαν ἐν ταῖς περὶ τὰς Ἄλπεις δυσχωρίαις.

[4] τούτους δὲ κακῶς διετίθετο, παρασκευαζόμενος πρὸς τὸ μέλλον· καὶ γὰρ δεσμοὺς εἶχον βαρεῖς καὶ τῷ λιμῷ συνέσχηντο, καὶ ταῖς πληγαῖς αὐτῶν τὰ σώματα διέφθαρτο.

[5] καθίσας οὖν τούτους εἰς τὸ μέσον προέθηκε πανοπλίας Γαλατικάς, οἵαις εἰώθασιν οἱ βασιλεῖς αὐτῶν, ὅταν μονομαχεῖν μέλλωσιν, κατακοσμεῖσθαι· πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἵππους παρέστησε καὶ σάγους εἰσήνεγκε πολυτελεῖς.

[6] κἄπειτα τῶν νεανίσκων ἤρετο τίνες αὐτῶν βούλονται διαγωνίσασθαι πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἐφʼ ᾧ τὸν μὲν νικήσαντα τὰ προκείμενα λαμβάνειν ἆθλα, τὸν δʼ ἡττηθέντα τῶν παρόντων ἀπηλλάχθαι κακῶν, τελευτήσαντα τὸν βίον.

[7] πάντων δʼ ἀναβοησάντων ἅμα καὶ δηλούντων ὅτι βούλονται μονομαχεῖν, κληρώσασθαι προσέταξε καὶ δύο τοὺς λαχόντας καθοπλισαμένους ἐκέλευσε μάχεσθαι πρὸς ἀλλήλους.

[8] παραυτίκα μὲν οὖν ἀκούσαντες οἱ νεανίσκοι ταῦτα καὶ τὰς χεῖρας ἐξαίροντες εὔχοντο τοῖς θεοῖς, σπεύδων ἕκαστος αὐτὸς γενέσθαι τῶν λαχόντων.

[9] ἐπεὶ δʼ ἐδηλώθη τὰ κατὰ τὸν κλῆρον, ἦσαν οἱ μὲν εἰληχότες περιχαρεῖς, οἱ δʼ ἄλλοι τοὐναντίον.

[10] γενομένης δὲ τῆς μάχης οὐχ ἧττον ἐμακάριζον οἱ περιλειπόμενοι τῶν αἰχμαλώτων τὸν τεθνεῶτα τοῦ νενικηκότος, ὡς πολλῶν καὶ μεγάλων κακῶν ἐκείνου μὲν ἀπολελυμένου, σφᾶς δʼ αὐτοὺς ἀκμὴν ὑπομένοντας.

[11] ἦν δὲ παραπλησία καὶ περὶ τοὺς πολλοὺς τῶν Καρχηδονίων ἡ διάληψις· ἐκ παραθέσεως γὰρ θεωρουμένης τῆς τῶν ἀγομένων καὶ ζώντων ταλαιπωρίας, τούτους μὲν ἠλέουν, τὸν δὲ τεθνεῶτα πάν

[1] τες ἐμακάριζον. Ἀννίβας δὲ διὰ τῶν προειρημένων τὴν προκειμένην διάθεσιν ἐνεργασάμενος ταῖς τῶν δυνάμεων ψυχαῖς,

[2] μετὰ ταῦτα προελθὼν αὐτὸς τούτου χάριν ἔφη παρεισάγειν τοὺς αἰχμαλώτους, ἵνʼ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων συμπτωμάτων ἐναργῶς θεασάμενοι τὸ συμβαῖνον βέλτιον ὑπὲρ τῶν σφίσι παρόντων βουλεύωνται πραγμάτων.

[3] εἰς παραπλήσιον γὰρ αὐτοὺς ἀγῶνα καὶ καιρὸν τὴν τύχην συγκεκλεικέναι καὶ παραπλήσια τοῖς νῦν ἆθλα προτεθεικέναι.

[4] δεῖν γὰρ ἢ νικᾶν ἢ θνήσκειν ἢ τοῖς ἐχθροῖς ὑποχειρίους γενέσθαι ζῶντας. εἶναι δʼ ἐκ μὲν τοῦ νικᾶν ἆθλον οὐχ ἵππους καὶ σάγους, ἀλλὰ τὸ πάντων ἀνθρώπων γενέσθαι μακαριωτάτους, κρατήσαντας τῆς Ῥωμαίων εὐδαιμονίας,

[5] ἐκ δὲ τοῦ μαχομένους τι παθεῖν, διαγωνιζομένους ἕως τῆς ἐσχάτης ἀναπνοῆς ὑπὲρ τῆς καλλίστης ἐλπίδος μεταλλάξαι τὸν βίον ἐν χειρῶν νόμῳ, μηδενὸς κακοῦ λαβόντας πεῖραν,

[6] τοῖς δʼ ἡττωμένοις καὶ διὰ τὴν πρὸς τὸ ζῆν ἐπιθυμίαν ὑπομένουσι φεύγειν ἢ κατʼ ἄλλον τινὰ τρόπον ἑλομένοις τὸ ζῆν παντὸς κακοῦ καὶ πάσης ἀτυχίας μετασχεῖν.

[7] οὐδένα γὰρ οὕτως ἀλόγιστον οὐδὲ νωθρὸν αὐτῶν ὑπάρχειν, ὃς μνημονεύων μὲν τοῦ μήκους τῆς ὁδοῦ τῆς διηνυσμένης ἐκ τῶν πατρίδων, μνημονεύων δὲ τοῦ πλήθους τῶν μεταξὺ πολεμίων, εἰδὼς δὲ τὰ μεγέθη τῶν ποταμῶν ὧν διεπέρασεν, ἐλπίσαι ποτʼ ἂν ὅτι φεύγων εἰς τὴν οἰκείαν ἀφίξεται.

[8] διόπερ ᾤετο δεῖν αὐτούς, ἀποκεκομμένης καθόλου τῆς τοιαύτης ἐλπίδος, τὴν αὐτὴν διάληψιν ποιεῖσθαι περὶ τῶν καθʼ αὑτοὺς πραγμάτων ἥνπερ ἀρτίως ἐποιοῦντο περὶ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων συμπτωμάτων.

[9] καθάπερ γὰρ ἐπʼ ἐκείνων τὸν μὲν νικήσαντα καὶ τεθνεῶτα πάντες ἐμακάριζον τοὺς δὲ ζῶντας ἠλέουν, οὕτως ᾤετο δεῖν καὶ περὶ τῶν καθʼ αὑτοὺς διαλαμβάνειν καὶ πάντας ἰέναι πρὸς τοὺς ἀγῶνας, μάλιστα μὲν νικήσοντας, ἂν δὲ μὴ τοῦτʼ ᾖ δυνατόν, ἀποθανουμένους.

[10] τὴν δὲ τοῦ ζῆν ἡττημένους ἐλπίδα κατὰ μηδένα τρόπον ἠξίου λαμβάνειν ἐν νῷ.

[11] τούτῳ γὰρ χρησαμένων αὐτῶν τῷ λογισμῷ καὶ τῇ προθέσει ταύτῃ, καὶ τὸ νικᾶν ἅμα καὶ τὸ σῴζεσθαι προδήλως σφίσι συνεξακολουθήσειν.

[12] πάντας γὰρ τοὺς ἢ κατὰ προαίρεσιν ἢ κατʼ ἀνάγκην τοιαύτῃ προθέσει κεχρημένους οὐδέποτε διεψεῦσθαι τοῦ κρατεῖν τῶν ἀντιταξαμένων.

[13] ὅταν δὲ δὴ καὶ τοῖς πολεμίοις συμβαίνῃ τὴν ἐναντίαν ἐλπίδα ταύτης ὑπάρχειν, ὃ νῦν ἐστι περὶ Ῥωμαίους, ὥστε φεύγουσι πρόδηλον εἶναι τοῖς πλείστοις τὴν σωτηρίαν, παρακειμένης αὐτοῖς τῆς οἰκείας, δῆλον ὡς ἀνυπόστατος γίνοιτʼ ἂν ἡ τῶν ἀπηλπικότων τόλμα.

[14] τῶν δὲ πολλῶν ἀποδεχομένων τό τε παράδειγμα καὶ τοὺς λόγους καὶ λαμβανόντων ὁρμὴν καὶ παράστασιν οἵαν ὁ παρακαλῶν ἐσπούδασε, τότε μὲν ἐπαινέσας αὐτοὺς διαφῆκε, τῇ δʼ ἐπαύριον ἀναζυγὴν ἅμα τῷ φωτὶ παρήγγειλε.

[1] Πόπλιος δὲ περὶ τὰς αὐτὰς ἡμέρας τὸν Πάδον ποταμὸν ἤδη πεπεραιωμένος, τὸν δὲ Τίκινον κρίνων εἰς τοὔμπροσθεν διαβαίνειν, τοῖς μὲν ἐπιτηδείοις γεφυροποιεῖν παρήγγειλε, τὰς δὲ λοιπὰς δυνάμεις συναγαγὼν παρεκάλει.

[2] τὰ μὲν οὖν πολλὰ τῶν λεγομένων ἦν περί τε τοῦ τῆς πατρίδος ἀξιώματος καὶ τῶν προγονικῶν πράξεων, τὰ δὲ τοῦ παρεστῶτος καιροῦ τοιάδε.

[3] ἔφη γὰρ δεῖν καὶ μηδεμίαν μὲν εἰληφότας πεῖραν ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος τῶν ὑπεναντίων, αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο γινώσκοντας ὅτι μέλλουσι πρὸς Καρχηδονίους κινδυνεύειν, ἀναμφισβήτητον ἔχειν τὴν τοῦ νικᾶν ἐλπίδα,

[4] καὶ καθόλου δεινὸν ἡγεῖσθαι καὶ παράλογον, εἰ τολμῶσι Καρχηδόνιοι Ῥωμαίοις ἀντοφθαλμεῖν, πολλάκις μὲν ὑπʼ αὐτῶν ἡττημένοι, πολλοὺς δʼ ἐξενηνοχότες φόρους, μόνον δʼ οὐχὶ δουλεύοντες αὐτοῖς ἤδη τοσούτους χρόνους.

[5] ὅταν δέ, χωρὶς τῶν προειρημένων, καὶ τῶν νῦν παρόντων ἀνδρῶν ἔχωμεν ἐπὶ ποσὸν πεῖραν ὅτι μόνον οὐ τολμῶσι κατὰ πρόσωπον ἰδεῖν ἡμᾶς, τίνα χρὴ διάληψιν ποιεῖσθαι περὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος τοὺς ὀρθῶς λογιζομένους;

[6] καὶ μὴν οὔτε τοὺς ἱππεῖς συμπεσόντας τοῖς παρʼ αὑτῶν ἱππεῦσι περὶ τὸν Ῥοδανὸν ποταμὸν ἀπαλλάξαι καλῶς, ἀλλὰ πολλοὺς ἀποβαλόντας αὑτῶν φυγεῖν αἰσχρῶς μέχρι τῆς ἰδίας παρεμβολῆς,

[7] τόν τε στρατηγὸν αὐτῶν καὶ τὴν σύμπασαν δύναμιν ἐπιγνόντας τὴν παρουσίαν τῶν ἡμετέρων στρατιωτῶν φυγῇ παραπλησίαν ποιήσασθαι τὴν ἀποχώρησιν καὶ παρὰ τὴν αὑτῶν προαίρεσιν διὰ τὸν φόβον κεχρῆσθαι τῇ διὰ τῶν Ἄλπεων πορείᾳ.

[8] παρεῖναι δὲ καὶ νῦν ἔφη τὸν Ἀννίβαν, κατεφθαρκότα μὲν τὸ πλεῖστον μέρος τῆς δυνάμεως, τὸ δὲ περιλειπόμενον ἀδύνατον καὶ δύσχρηστον ἔχοντα διὰ τὴν κακουχίαν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἵππων τοὺς μὲν πλείστους ἀπολωλεκότα, τοὺς δὲ λοιποὺς ἠχρειωκότα διὰ τὸ μῆκος καὶ τὴν δυσχέρειαν τῆς ὁδοῦ.

[9] διʼ ὧν ἐπιδεικνύειν ἐπειρᾶτο διότι μόνον ἐπιφανῆναι δεῖ τοῖς πολεμίοις.

[10] μάλιστα δʼ ἠξίου θαρρεῖν αὐτοὺς βλέποντας εἰς τὴν αὑτοῦ παρουσίαν· οὐδέποτε γὰρ ἂν ἀπολιπὼν τὸν στόλον καὶ τὰς ἐν Ἰβηρίᾳ πράξεις, ἐφʼ ἃς ἀπεστάλη, δεῦρο μετὰ τοιαύτης ἐλθεῖν σπουδῆς, εἰ μὴ καὶ λίαν ἐκ τῶν κατὰ λόγον ἑώρα τὴν πρᾶξιν ταύτην ἀναγκαίαν μὲν οὖσαν τῇ πατρίδι, πρόδηλον δʼ ἐν αὐτῇ τὴν νίκην ὑπάρχουσαν.

[11] πάντων δὲ καὶ διὰ τὴν τοῦ λέγοντος πίστιν καὶ διὰ τὴν τῶν λεγομένων ἀλήθειαν ἐκθύμως ἐχόντων πρὸς τὸ κινδυνεύειν, ἀποδεξάμενος αὐτῶν τὴν ὁρμὴν διαφῆκε, προσπαρακαλέσας ἑτοίμους εἶναι πρὸς τὸ παραγγελλόμενον.

[1] τῇ δὲ κατὰ πόδας ἡμέρᾳ προῆγον ἀμφότεροι παρὰ τὸν ποταμὸν ἐκ τοῦ πρὸς τὰς Ἄλπεις μέρους, ἔχοντες εὐώνυμον μὲν οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι, δεξιὸν δὲ τὸν ῥοῦν οἱ Καρχηδόνιοι.

[2] γνόντες δὲ τῇ δευτέρᾳ διὰ τῶν προνομευόντων ὅτι σύνεγγύς εἰσιν ἀλλήλων, τότε μὲν αὐτοῦ καταστρατοπεδεύσαντες ἔμειναν.

[3] τῇ δʼ ἐπαύριον πᾶσαν τὴν ἵππον ἀναλαβόντες ἀμφότεροι, Πόπλιος δὲ καὶ τῶν πεζῶν τοὺς ἀκοντιστάς, προῆγον διὰ τοῦ πεδίου, σπεύδοντες κατοπτεῦσαι τὰς ἀλλήλων δυνάμεις.

[4] ἅμα δὲ τῷ πλησιάζειν αὑτοῖς καὶ συνιδεῖν τὸν κονιορτὸν ἐξαιρόμενον εὐθέως συνετάττοντο πρὸς μάχην.

[5] ὁ μὲν οὖν Πόπλιος προθέμενος τοὺς ἀκοντιστὰς καὶ τοὺς ἅμα τούτοις Γαλατικοὺς ἱππεῖς, τοὺς δὲ λοιποὺς ἐν μετώπῳ καταστήσας προῄει βάδην.

[6] ὁ δʼ Ἀννίβας τὴν μὲν κεχαλινωμένην ἵππον καὶ πᾶν τὸ στάσιμον αὐτῆς κατὰ πρόσωπον τάξας ἀπήντα τοῖς πολεμίοις, τοὺς δὲ Νομαδικοὺς ἱππεῖς ἀφʼ ἑκατέρου τοῦ κέρατος ἡτοιμάκει πρὸς κύκλωσιν.

[7] ἀμφοτέρων δὲ καὶ τῶν ἡγεμόνων καὶ τῶν ἱππέων φιλοτίμως διακειμένων πρὸς τὸν κίνδυνον, τοιαύτην συνέβη γενέσθαι τὴν πρώτην σύμπτωσιν ὥστε τοὺς ἀκοντιστὰς μὴ φθάσαι τὸ πρῶτον ἐκβαλόντας βέλος, φεύγειν δʼ ἐγκλίναντας εὐθέως διὰ τῶν διαστημάτων ὑπὸ τὰς παρʼ αὑτῶν ἴλας, καταπλαγέντας τὴν ἐπιφορὰν καὶ περιδεεῖς γενομένους μὴ συμπατηθῶσιν ὑπὸ τῶν ἐπιφερομένων ἱππέων.

[8] οἱ μὲν οὖν κατὰ πρόσωπον ἀλλήλοις συμπεσόντες ἐπὶ πολὺν χρόνον ἐποίουν ἰσόρροπον τὸν κίνδυνον·

[9] ὁμοῦ γὰρ ἦν ἱππομαχία καὶ πεζομαχία διὰ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν παρακαταβαινόντων ἀνδρῶν ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ μάχῃ.

[10] τῶν δὲ Νομάδων κυκλωσάντων καὶ κατόπιν ἐπιπεσόντων, οἱ μὲν πεζακοντισταὶ τὸ πρῶτον διαφυγόντες τὴν σύμπτωσιν τῶν ἱππέων τότε συνεπατήθησαν ὑπὸ τοῦ πλήθους καὶ τῆς ἐπιφορᾶς τῶν Νομάδων·

[11] οἱ δὲ κατὰ πρόσωπον ἐξ ἀρχῆς διαμαχόμενοι πρὸς τοὺς Καρχηδονίους, πολλοὺς μὲν αὑτῶν ἀπολωλεκότες, ἔτι δὲ πλείους τῶν Καρχηδονίων διεφθαρκότες, συνεπιθεμένων ἀπʼ οὐρᾶς τῶν Νομάδων, ἐτράπησαν, οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ σποράδες, τινὲς δὲ περὶ τὸν ἡγεμόνα συστραφέντες.

[1] Πόπλιος μὲν οὖν ἀναζεύξας προσῆγε διὰ τῶν πεδίων ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ Πάδου γέφυραν, σπεύδων φθάσαι διαβιβάσας τὰ στρατόπεδα.

[2] θεωρῶν γὰρ τοὺς μὲν τόπους ἐπιπέδους ὄντας, τοὺς δʼ ὑπεναντίους ἱπποκρατοῦντας, αὑτὸν δὲ βαρυνόμενον ὑπὸ τοῦ τραύματος, εἰς ἀσφαλὲς ἔκρινε δεῖν ἀποκαταστῆσαι τὰς δυνάμεις.

[3] Ἀννίβας δὲ μέχρι μέν τινος ὑπέλαβε τοῖς πεζικοῖς στρατοπέδοις αὐτοὺς διακινδυνεύειν· συνιδὼν δὲ κεκινηκότας ἐκ τῆς παρεμβολῆς, ἕως μὲν τοῦ πρώτου ποταμοῦ καὶ τῆς ἐπὶ τούτῳ γεφύρας ἠκολούθει,

[4] καταλαβὼν δὲ τὰς μὲν πλείστας τῶν σανίδων ἀνεσπασμένας, τοὺς δὲ φυλάττοντας τὴν γέφυραν ἔτι περὶ τὸν ποταμὸν ὑπολειπομένους, τούτων μὲν ἐγκρατὴς ἐγένετο, σχεδὸν ἑξακοσίων ὄντων τὸν ἀριθμόν·

[5] τοὺς δὲ λοιποὺς ἀκούων ἤδη πολὺ προειληφέναι, μεταβαλόμενος αὖθις εἰς τἀναντία παρὰ τὸν ποταμὸν ἐποιεῖτο τὴν πορείαν, σπεύδων ἐπὶ τόπον εὐγεφύρωτον ἀφικέσθαι τοῦ Πάδου.

[6] καταλύσας δὲ δευτεραῖος καὶ γεφυρώσας τοῖς ποταμίοις πλοίοις τὴν διάβασιν Ἀσδρούβᾳ μὲν ἐπέταξεν διακομίζειν τὸ πλῆθος, αὐτὸς δὲ διαβὰς εὐθέως ἐχρημάτιζε τοῖς παραγεγονόσι πρεσβευταῖς ἀπὸ τῶν σύνεγγυς τόπων.

[7] ἅμα γὰρ τῷ γενέσθαι τὸ προτέρημα πάντες ἔσπευδον οἱ παρακείμενοι Κελτοὶ κατὰ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς πρόθεσιν καὶ φίλοι γίνεσθαι καὶ χορηγεῖν καὶ συστρατεύειν τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις.

[8] ἀποδεξάμενος δὲ τοὺς παρόντας φιλανθρώπως καὶ κομισάμενος τὰς δυνάμεις ἐκ τοῦ πέραν προῆγεν παρὰ τὸν ποταμόν, τὴν ἐναντίαν ποιούμενος τῇ πρόσθεν παρόδῳ· κατὰ ῥοῦν γὰρ ἐποιεῖτο τὴν πορείαν, σπεύδων συνάψαι τοῖς ὑπεναντίοις.

[9] ὁ δὲ Πόπλιος περαιωθεὶς τὸν Πάδον καὶ στρατοπεδεύσας περὶ πόλιν Πλακεντίαν, ἥτις ἦν ἀποικία Ῥωμαίων, ἅμα μὲν αὑτὸν ἐθεράπευε καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τραυματίας, ἅμα δὲ τὰς δυνάμεις εἰς ἀσφαλὲς ἀπηρεῖσθαι νομίζων ἦγε τὴν ἡσυχίαν.

[10] Ἀννίβας δὲ παραγενόμενος δευτεραῖος ἀπὸ τῆς διαβάσεως ἐγγὺς τῶν πολεμίων τῇ τρίτῃ παρέταξε τὴν δύναμιν ἐν συνόψει τοῖς ὑπεναντίοις.

[11] οὐδενὸς δὲ σφίσιν ἀντεξάγοντος, κατεστρατοπέδευσε, λαβὼν περὶ πεντήκοντα στάδια τὸ μεταξὺ διάστημα τῶν στρατοπέδων.

[1] οἱ δὲ συστρατευόμενοι Κελτοὶ τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις θεωροῦντες ἐπικυδεστέρας τὰς τῶν Καρχηδονίων ἐλπίδας, συνταξάμενοι πρὸς ἀλλήλους καιρὸν ἐπετήρουν πρὸς ἐπίθεσιν, μένοντες ἐν ταῖς ἑαυτῶν ἕκαστοι σκηναῖς.

[2] δειπνοποιησαμένων δὲ καὶ κατακοιμισθέντων τῶν ἐν τῷ χάρακι, παρελθεῖν ἐάσαντες τὸ πλεῖον μέρος τῆς νυκτὸς καθωπλισμένοι περὶ τὴν ἑωθινὴν φυλακὴν ἐπιτίθενται τοῖς σύνεγγυς τῶν Ῥωμαίων παραστρατοπεδεύουσι.

[3] καὶ πολλοὺς μὲν αὐτῶν ἀπέκτειναν, οὐκ ὀλίγους δὲ κατετραυμάτισαν· τέλος δὲ τὰς κεφαλὰς ἀποτεμόντες τῶν τεθνεώτων ἀπεχώρουν πρὸς τοὺς Καρχηδονίους, ὄντες πεζοὶ μὲν εἰς δισχιλίους, ἱππεῖς δὲ μικρῷ λείποντες διακοσίων.

[4] Ἀννίβας δὲ φιλοφρόνως ἀποδεξάμενος αὐτῶν τὴν παρουσίαν, τούτους μὲν εὐθέως παρακαλέσας καὶ δωρεὰς ἑκάστοις τὰς ἁρμοζούσας ἐπαγγειλάμενος ἐξέπεμψεν εἰς τὰς αὑτῶν πόλεις, δηλώσοντας μὲν τὰ πεπραγμένα τοῖς πολίταις, παρακαλέσοντας δὲ πρὸς τὴν αὑτοῦ συμμαχίαν.

[5] ᾔδει γὰρ ὅτι πάντες κατʼ ἀνάγκην αὐτῷ κοινωνήσουσι τῶν πραγμάτων, ἐπιγνόντες τὸ γεγονὸς ἐκ τῶν σφετέρων πολιτῶν παρασπόνδημα κατὰ τῶν Ῥωμαίων.

[6] ἅμα δὲ τούτοις καὶ τῶν Βοίων παραγεγονότων καὶ τοὺς τρεῖς ἄνδρας ἐγχειριζόντων αὐτῷ τοὺς ἐπὶ τὴν διάδοσιν τῆς χώρας ὑπὸ Ῥωμαίων ἐξαπεσταλμένους, ὧν κατʼ ἀρχὰς ἐκυρίευσαν τοῦ πολέμου παρασπονδήσαντες, καθάπερ ἐπάνω προεῖπον,

[7] ἀποδεξάμενος Ἀννίβας τὴν εὔνοιαν αὐτῶν ὑπὲρ μὲν τῆς φιλίας καὶ συμμαχίας ἔθετο πρὸς τοὺς παρόντας πίστεις· τούς γε μὴν ἄνδρας αὐτοῖς ἀπέδωκε, παραγγείλας τηρεῖν, ἵνα παρὰ τούτων κομίσωνται τοὺς αὑτῶν ὁμήρους κατὰ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς πρόθεσιν.

[8] Πόπλιος δὲ σχετλιάζων ἐπὶ τῷ γεγονότι παρασπονδήματι καὶ συλλογισάμενος ὅτι πάλαι τῶν Κελτῶν πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἀλλοτρίως διακειμένων, τούτων ἐπιγεγονότων πάντας τοὺς πέριξ Γαλάτας συμβήσεται πρὸς τοὺς Καρχηδονίους ἀπονεύειν, ἔγνω δεῖν εὐλαβηθῆναι τὸ μέλλον.

[9] διόπερ ἐπιγενομένης τῆς νυκτὸς ὑπὸ τὴν ἑωθινὴν ἀναζεύξας ἐποιεῖτο τὴν πορείαν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸν Τρεβίαν ποταμὸν καὶ τοὺς τούτῳ συνάπτοντας γεωλόφους, πιστεύων τῇ τε τῶν τόπων

[1] ὀχυρότητι καὶ τοῖς παροικοῦσι τῶν συμμάχων. Ἀννίβας δὲ τὴν ἀναζυγὴν αὐτῶν ἐπιγνοὺς παραυτίκα μὲν τοὺς Νομαδικοὺς ἱππεῖς ἐξαπέστελλε, μετʼ οὐ πολὺ δὲ τοὺς ἄλλους· τούτοις δʼ ἐκ ποδὸς τὴν δύναμιν ἔχων αὐτὸς εἵπετο κατόπιν.

[2] οἱ μὲν οὖν Νομάδες εἰς ἔρημον τὴν στρατοπεδείαν ἐμπεσόντες ταύτην ἐνεπίμπρασαν.

[3] ὃ δὴ καὶ σφόδρα συνήνεγκε τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις, ὡς εἴπερ οὗτοι κατὰ πόδας ἀκολουθήσαντες συνῆψαν ταῖς ἀποσκευαῖς, πολλοὺς ἂν αὐτῶν ὑπὸ τῶν ἱππέων ἐν τοῖς ἐπιπέδοις συνέβη διαφθαρῆναι.

[4] νῦν δʼ οἱ πλείους ἔφθασαν διαβάντες τὸν Τρεβίαν ποταμόν· τῶν δὲ καταλειφθέντων ἐπὶ τῆς οὐραγίας οἱ μὲν διεφθάρησαν, οἱ δὲ ζῶντες ἑάλωσαν ὑπὸ τῶν Καρχηδονίων.

[5] Πόπλιος μὲν οὖν διαβὰς τὸν προειρημένον ποταμὸν ἐστρατοπέδευσε περὶ τοὺς πρώτους λόφους

[6] καὶ περιλαβὼν τάφρῳ καὶ χάρακι τὴν παρεμβολὴν ἀνεδέχετο μὲν τὸν Τεβέριον καὶ τὰς μετʼ ἐκείνου δυνάμεις, ἐθεράπευε δʼ αὑτὸν ἐπιμελῶς, σπουδάζων εἰ δύναιτο κοινωνῆσαι τοῦ μέλλοντος κινδύνου.

[7] Ἀννίβας δὲ περὶ τετταράκοντα σταδίους ἀποσχὼν τῶν πολεμίων αὐτοῦ κατεστρατοπέδευσε.

[8] τὸ δὲ τῶν Κελτῶν πλῆθος τὸ τὰ πεδία κατοικοῦν, συνεξεστηκὸς ταῖς τῶν Καρχηδονίων ἐλπίσι, δαψιλῶς μὲν ἐχορήγει τὸ στρατόπεδον τοῖς ἐπιτηδείοις, ἕτοιμον δʼ ἦν παντὸς κοινωνεῖν ἔργου καὶ κινδύνου τοῖς περὶ τὸν Ἀννίβαν.

[9] οἱ δʼ ἐν τῇ Ῥώμῃ, προσπεπτωκότων τῶν κατὰ τὴν ἱππομαχίαν, ἐξενίζοντο μὲν τῷ τὸ συμβεβηκὸς εἶναι παρὰ τὴν προσδοκίαν, οὐ μὴν ἠπόρουν γε σκήψεων πρὸς τὸ μὴ δοκεῖν αὐτοῖς ἧτταν εἶναι τὸ γεγονός,

[10] ἀλλʼ οἱ μὲν ᾐτιῶντο τὴν τοῦ στρατηγοῦ προπέτειαν, οἱ δὲ τὴν τῶν Κελτῶν ἐθελοκάκησιν, στοχαζόμενοι διὰ τῆς τελευταίας ἀποστάσεως.

[11] καθόλου δὲ τῶν πεζικῶν στρατοπέδων ἀκεραίων ὄντων ἀκεραίους εἶναι διελάμβανον τὰς ὑπὲρ τῶν ὅλων ἐλπίδας.

[12] ὅθεν καὶ συνάψαντος τοῦ Τεβερίου καὶ τῶν μετʼ ἐκείνου στρατοπέδων καὶ διαπορευομένων διὰ τῆς Ῥώμης, ἐξ ἐπιφανείας ἐδόξαζον κριθήσεσθαι τὴν μάχην.

[13] ἁθροισθέντων δὲ τῶν στρατιωτῶν κατὰ τὸν ὅρκον εἰς Ἀρίμινον, ἀναλαβὼν αὐτοὺς ὁ στρατηγὸς προῆγε, σπεύδων συνάψαι τοῖς περὶ τὸν Πόπλιον.

[14] συμμίξας δὲ καὶ καταστρατοπεδεύσας παρʼ αὐτοῖς ταῖς οἰκείαις δυνάμεσι τὸ μὲν πλῆθος ἀνελάμβανε τῶν ἀνδρῶν, ὡς ἂν ἐκ Λιλυβαίου τετταράκοντα συνεχῶς ἡμέρας πεπεζοπορηκότων εἰς Ἀρίμινον, τὰς δὲ παρασκευὰς ἐποιεῖτο πάσας ὡς πρὸς μάχην,

[15] αὐτὸς δʼ ἐπιμελῶς συνήδρευε τῷ Ποπλίῳ, τὰ μὲν ἤδη γεγονότα πυνθανόμενος, περὶ δὲ τῶν παρόντων συνδιανοούμενος.

[1] κατὰ δὲ τοὺς αὐτοὺς καιροὺς Ἀννίβας πραξικοπήσας πόλιν Κλαστίδιον, ἐνδόντος αὐτῷ τοῦ πεπιστευμένου παρὰ Ῥωμαίων, ἀνδρὸς Βρεντεσίνου, κατέσχε.

[2] γενόμενος δὲ κύριος τῆς φρουρᾶς καὶ τῆς τοῦ σίτου παραθέσεως τούτῳ μὲν πρὸς τὸ παρὸν ἐχρήσατο, τοὺς δὲ παραληφθέντας ἄνδρας ἀβλαβεῖς μεθʼ ἑαυτοῦ προῆγε,

[3] δεῖγμα βουλόμενος ἐκφέρειν τῆς σφετέρας προαιρέσεως πρὸς τὸ μὴ δεδιότας ἀπελπίζειν τὴν παρʼ αὐτοῦ σωτηρίαν τοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν καιρῶν καταλαμβανομένους.

[4] τὸν δὲ προδότην ἐτίμησε μεγαλείως, ἐκκαλέσασθαι σπουδάζων τοὺς ἐπὶ πραγμάτων ταττομένους πρὸς τὰς Καρχηδονίων ἐλπίδας.

[5] μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα συνθεωρήσας τινὰς τῶν Κελτῶν, οἳ κατῴκουν μεταξὺ τοῦ Πάδου καὶ τοῦ Τρεβία ποταμοῦ, πεποιημένους μὲν καὶ πρὸς αὑτὸν φιλίαν, διαπεμπομένους δὲ καὶ πρὸς Ῥωμαίους καὶ πεπεισμένους τῷ τοιούτῳ τρόπῳ τὴν παρʼ ἀμφοῖν ἀσφάλειαν αὑτοῖς ὑπάρξειν,

[6] ἐξαποστέλλει πεζοὺς μὲν δισχιλίους, ἱππεῖς δὲ Κελτοὺς καὶ Νομάδας εἰς χιλίους, προστάξας ἐπιδραμεῖν αὐτῶν τὴν χώραν.

[7] τῶν δὲ πραξάντων τὸ προσταχθὲν καὶ πολλὴν περιβαλομένων λείαν, εὐθέως οἱ Κελτοὶ παρῆσαν ἐπὶ τὸν χάρακα τῶν Ῥωμαίων, δεόμενοι σφίσι βοηθεῖν.

[8] Τεβέριος δὲ καὶ πάλαι ζητῶν ἀφορμὴν τοῦ πράττειν τότε λαβὼν πρόφασιν ἐξαπέστειλε τῶν μὲν ἱππέων τὸ πλεῖστον μέρος, πεζοὺς δὲ σὺν τούτοις ἀκοντιστὰς εἰς χιλίους.

[9] σπουδῇ δὲ τούτων προσμιξάντων πέραν τοῦ Τρεβία καὶ διαμαχομένων τοῖς πολεμίοις ὑπὲρ τῆς λείας, ἐτράπησαν οἱ Κελτοὶ σὺν τοῖς Νομάσι καὶ τὴν ἀποχώρησιν ἐπὶ τὸν ἑαυτῶν ἐποιοῦντο χάρακα.

[10] ταχὺ δὲ συννοήσαντες τὸ γινόμενον οἱ προκαθήμενοι τῆς τῶν Καρχηδονίων παρεμβολῆς ἐντεῦθεν ταῖς ἐφεδρείαις ἐβοήθουν τοῖς πιεζομένοις· οὗ γενομένου τραπέντες οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι πάλιν ἐποιοῦντο τὴν ἀπόλυσιν εἰς τὴν ἑαυτῶν παρεμβολήν.

[11] Τεβέριος δὲ συνορῶν τὸ γινόμενον πάντας ἐπαφῆκε τοὺς ἵππους καὶ τοὺς ἀκοντιστάς. τούτου δὲ συμπεσόντος αὖθις ἐγκλίναντες οἱ Κελτοὶ πρὸς τὴν ἑαυτῶν ἀσφάλειαν ἀπεχώρουν.

[12] ὁ δὲ στρατηγὸς τῶν Καρχηδονίων ἀπαράσκευος ὢν πρὸς τὸ κρίνειν τὰ ὅλα καὶ νομίζων δεῖν μηδέποτε χωρὶς προθέσεως μηδʼ ἐκ πάσης ἀφορμῆς ποιεῖσθαι τοὺς ὁλοσχερεῖς κινδύνους, ὅπερ εἶναι φατέον ἡγεμόνος ἔργον ἀγαθοῦ,

[13] τότε μὲν ἐπέσχε τοὺς παρʼ αὑτοῦ συνεγγίσαντας τῷ χάρακι καὶ στῆναι μὲν ἐκ μεταβολῆς ἠνάγκασε, διώκειν δὲ καὶ συμπλέκεσθαι τοῖς πολεμίοις ἐκώλυσε, διὰ τῶν ὑπηρετῶν καὶ σαλπιγκτῶν ἀνακαλούμενος. οἱ δὲ Ῥωμαῖοι βραχὺν ἐπισχόντες χρόνον ἀνέλυσαν,

[14] ὀλίγους μὲν αὑτῶν ἀποβαλόντες, πλείους δὲ τῶν Καρχηδονίων διεφθαρκότες.

[1] ὁ δὲ Τεβέριος μετεωρισθεὶς καὶ περιχαρὴς γενόμενος ἐπὶ τῷ προτερήματι φιλοτίμως εἶχε πρὸς τὸ τὴν ταχίστην κρῖναι τὰ ὅλα.

[2] προέκειτο μὲν οὖν αὐτῷ κατὰ τὴν ἰδίαν γνώμην χρῆσθαι τοῖς παροῦσι διὰ τὸ τὸν Πόπλιον ἀρρωστεῖν· ὅμως δὲ βουλόμενος προσλαβέσθαι καὶ τὴν τοῦ συνάρχοντος γνώμην ἐποιεῖτο λόγους περὶ τούτων πρὸς αὐτόν.

[3] ὁ δὲ Πόπλιος τὴν ἐναντίαν εἶχε διάληψιν περὶ τῶν ἐνεστώτων·

[4] τὰ γὰρ στρατόπεδα χειμασκήσαντα βελτίω τὰ παρʼ αὑτῶν ὑπελάμβανε γενήσεσθαι, τήν τε τῶν Κελτῶν ἀθεσίαν οὐκ ἐμμενεῖν ἐν τῇ πίστει, τῶν Καρχηδονίων ἀπραγούντων καὶ τὴν ἡσυχίαν ἀναγκαζομένων ἄγειν, ἀλλὰ καινοτομήσειν τι πάλιν κατʼ ἐκείνων.

[5] πρὸς δὲ τούτοις αὐτὸς ὑγιασθεὶς ἐκ τοῦ τραύματος ἀληθινὴν παρέξεσθαι χρείαν ἤλπιζε τοῖς κοινοῖς πράγμασιν.

[6] διὸ καὶ τοιούτοις χρώμενος λογισμοῖς μένειν ἠξίου τὸν Τεβέριον ἐπὶ τῶν ὑποκειμένων.

[7] ὁ δὲ προειρημένος ᾔδει μὲν ἕκαστα τούτων ἀληθινῶς λεγόμενα καὶ δεόντως, ὑπὸ δὲ τῆς φιλοδοξίας ἐλαυνόμενος καὶ καταπιστεύων τοῖς πράγμασι παραλόγως ἔσπευδεν κρῖναι διʼ αὑτοῦ τὰ ὅλα καὶ μήτε τὸν Πόπλιον δύνασθαι παρατυχεῖν τῇ μάχῃ μήτε τοὺς ἐπικαθισταμένους στρατηγοὺς φθάσαι παραλαβόντας τὴν ἀρχήν· οὗτος γὰρ ἦν ὁ χρόνος.

[8] διόπερ οὐ τὸν τῶν πραγμάτων καιρὸν ἐκλεγόμενος ἀλλὰ τὸν ἴδιον ἔμελλε τοῦ δέοντος σφαλήσεσθαι προφανῶς.

[9] ὁ δʼ Ἀννίβας παραπλησίους ἔχων ἐπινοίας Ποπλίῳ περὶ τῶν ἐνεστώτων κατὰ τοὐναντίον ἔσπευδε συμβαλεῖν τοῖς πολεμίοις, θέλων μὲν πρῶτον ἀκεραίοις ἀποχρήσασθαι ταῖς τῶν Κελτῶν ὁρμαῖς,

[10] δεύτερον ἀνασκήτοις καὶ νεοσυλλόγοις συμβαλεῖν τοῖς τῶν Ῥωμαίων στρατοπέδοις, τρίτον ἀδυνατοῦντος ἔτι τοῦ Ποπλίου ποιήσασθαι τὸν κίνδυνον, τὸ δὲ μέγιστον, πράττειν τι καὶ μὴ προΐεσθαι διὰ κενῆς τὸν χρόνον.

[11] τῷ γὰρ εἰς ἀλλοτρίαν καθέντι χώραν στρατόπεδα καὶ παραδόξοις ἐγχειροῦντι πράγμασιν εἷς τρόπος ἐστὶν οὗτος σωτηρίας, τὸ συνεχῶς καινοποιεῖν ἀεὶ τὰς τῶν συμμάχων ἐλπίδας.

[12] Ἀννίβας μὲν οὖν εἰδὼς τὴν ἐσομένην ὁρμὴν

[1] τοῦ Τεβερίου πρὸς τούτοις ἦν. πάλαι δὲ συνεωρακὼς μεταξὺ τῶν στρατοπέδων τόπον ἐπίπεδον μὲν καὶ ψιλόν, εὐφυῆ δὲ πρὸς ἐνέδραν διά τι ῥεῖθρον ἔχον ὀφρῦν, ἐπὶ δὲ ταύτης ἀκάνθας καὶ βάτους συνεχεῖς ἐπιπεφυκότας, ἐγίνετο πρὸς τῷ στρατηγεῖν τοὺς ὑπεναντίους.

[2] ἔμελλεν δʼ εὐχερῶς λήσειν· οἱ γὰρ Ῥωμαῖοι πρὸς μὲν τοὺς ὑλώδεις τόπους ὑπόπτως εἶχον διὰ τὸ τοὺς Κελτοὺς ἀεὶ τιθέναι τὰς ἐνέδρας ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις χωρίοις, τοῖς δʼ ἐπιπέδοις καὶ ψιλοῖς ἀπεπίστευον,

[3] οὐκ εἰδότες ὅτι καὶ πρὸς τὸ λαθεῖν καὶ πρὸς τὸ μηδὲν παθεῖν τοὺς ἐνεδρεύσαντας εὐφυέστεροι τυγχάνουσιν ὄντες τῶν ὑλωδῶν διὰ τὸ δύνασθαι μὲν ἐκ πολλοῦ προορᾶν πάντα τοὺς ἐνεδρεύοντας, εἶναι δʼ ἐπιπροσθήσεις ἱκανὰς ἐν τοῖς πλείστοις τόποις.

[4] τὸ γὰρ τυχὸν ῥεῖθρον μετὰ βραχείας ὀφρύος, ποτὲ δὲ κάλαμοι καὶ πτέρεις καί τι γένος ἀκανθῶν, οὐ μόνον πεζοὺς ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἱππεῖς ἐνίοτε δύναται κρύπτειν, ἐὰν βραχέα τις προνοηθῇ τοῦ τὰ μὲν ἐπίσημα τῶν ὅπλων ὕπτια τιθέναι πρὸς τὴν γῆν, τὰς δὲ περικεφαλαίας ὑποτιθέναι τοῖς ὅπλοις.

[5] πλὴν ὅ γε τῶν Καρχηδονίων στρατηγὸς κοινολογηθεὶς Μάγωνι τἀδελφῷ καὶ τοῖς συνέδροις περὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος ἀγῶνος, συγκατατιθεμένων αὐτῷ πάντων ταῖς ἐπιβολαῖς,

[6] ἅμα τῷ δειπνοποιήσασθαι τὸ στρατόπεδον ἀνακαλεσάμενος Μάγωνα τὸν ἀδελφόν, ὄντα νέον μὲν ὁρμῆς δὲ πλήρη καὶ παιδομαθῆ περὶ τὰ πολεμικά, συνέστησε τῶν ἱππέων ἄνδρας ἑκατὸν καὶ πεζοὺς τοὺς ἴσους.

[7] ἔτι δὲ τῆς ἡμέρας οὔσης ἐξ ὅλου τοῦ στρατοπέδου σημηνάμενος τοὺς εὐρωστοτάτους παρηγγέλκει δειπνοποιησαμένους ἥκειν ἐπὶ τὴν αὑτοῦ σκηνήν.

[8] παρακαλέσας δὲ καὶ παραστήσας τούτοις τὴν πρέπουσαν ὁρμὴν τῷ καιρῷ παρήγγελλε δέκα τοὺς ἀνδρωδεστάτους ἕκαστον ἐπιλεξάμενον ἐκ τῶν ἰδίων τάξεων ἥκειν εἴς τινα τόπον τακτὸν ἤδη τῆς στρατοπεδείας.

[9] τῶν δὲ πραξάντων τὸ συνταχθέν, τούτους μὲν ὄντας ἱππεῖς χιλίους καὶ πεζοὺς ἄλλους τοσούτους ἐξαπέστειλε νυκτὸς εἰς τὴν ἐνέδραν, συστήσας ὁδηγοὺς καὶ τἀδελφῷ διαταξάμενος περὶ τοῦ καιροῦ τῆς ἐπιθέσεως·

[10] αὐτὸς δʼ ἅμα τῷ φωτὶ τοὺς Νομαδικοὺς ἱππεῖς συναγαγών, ὄντας φερεκάκους διαφερόντως, παρεκάλεσε καί τινας δωρεὰς ἐπαγγειλάμενος τοῖς ἀνδραγαθήσασι προσέταξε πελάσαντας τῷ τῶν ἐναντίων χάρακι κατὰ σπουδὴν ἐπιδιαβαίνειν τὸν ποταμὸν καὶ προσακροβολιζομένους κινεῖν τοὺς πολεμίους, βουλόμενος ἀναρίστους καὶ πρὸς τὸ μέλλον ἀπαρασκεύους λαβεῖν τοὺς ὑπεναντίους.

[11] τοὺς δὲ λοιποὺς ἡγεμόνας ἁθροίσας ὁμοίως παρεκάλεσε πρὸς τὸν κίνδυνον καὶ πᾶσιν ἀριστοποιεῖσθαι παρήγγειλε καὶ περὶ τὴν τῶν ὅπλων καὶ τῶν ἵππων γίνεσθαι θεραπείαν.

[1] ὁ δὲ Τεβέριος ἅμα τῷ συνιδεῖν ἐγγίζοντας τοὺς Νομαδικοὺς ἱππεῖς παραυτίκα μὲν αὐτὴν τὴν ἵππον ἐξαπέστελλε, προστάξας ἔχεσθαι καὶ συμπλέκεσθαι τοῖς πολεμίοις.

[2] ἑξῆς δὲ τούτοις ἐξέπεμπε τοὺς πεζακοντιστὰς εἰς ἑξακισχιλίους· ἐκίνει δὲ καὶ τὴν λοιπὴν δύναμιν ἐκ τοῦ χάρακος, ὡς ἐξ ἐπιφανείας κριθησομένων τῶν ὅλων, ἐπαιρόμενος τῷ τε πλήθει τῶν ἀνδρῶν καὶ τῷ γεγονότι τῇ προτεραίᾳ περὶ τοὺς ἱππεῖς εὐημερήματι.

[3] οὔσης δὲ τῆς ὥρας περὶ χειμερινὰς τροπὰς καὶ τῆς ἡμέρας νιφετώδους καὶ ψυχρᾶς διαφερόντως, τῶν δʼ ἀνδρῶν καὶ τῶν ἵππων σχεδὸν ὡς εἰπεῖν ἁπάντων ἀναρίστων ἐκπεπορευμένων, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ὁρμῇ καὶ προθυμίᾳ περιῆν τὸ πλῆθος·

[4] ἐπιγενομένης δὲ τῆς τοῦ Τρεβία ποταμοῦ διαβάσεως, καὶ προσαναβεβηκότος τῷ ῥεύματι διὰ τὸν ἐν τῇ νυκτὶ γενόμενον ἐν τοῖς ὑπὲρ τὰ στρατόπεδα τόποις ὄμβρον, μόλις ἕως τῶν μασθῶν οἱ πεζοὶ βαπτιζόμενοι διέβαινον·

[5] ἐξ ὧν ἐκακοπάθει τὸ στρατόπεδον ὑπό τε τοῦ ψύχους καὶ τῆς ἐνδείας, ὡς ἂν ἤδη καὶ τῆς ἡμέρας προβαινούσης.

[6] οἱ δὲ Καρχηδόνιοι κατὰ σκηνὰς βεβρωκότες καὶ πεπωκότες καὶ τοὺς ἵππους ἡτοιμακότες ἠλείφοντο καὶ καθωπλίζοντο περὶ τὰ πυρὰ πάντες.

[7] Ἀννίβας δὲ τὸν καιρὸν ἐπιτηρῶν ἅμα τῷ συνιδεῖν διαβεβηκότας τοὺς Ῥωμαίους τὸν ποταμὸν προβαλόμενος ἐφεδρείαν τοὺς λογχοφόρους καὶ Βαλιαρεῖς, ὄντας εἰς ὀκτακισχιλίους, ἐξῆγε τὴν δύναμιν.

[8] καὶ προαγαγὼν ὡς ὀκτὼ στάδια πρὸ τῆς στρατοπεδείας τοὺς μὲν πεζοὺς ἐπὶ μίαν εὐθεῖαν παρενέβαλε, περὶ δισμυρίους ὄντας τὸν ἀριθμόν, Ἴβηρας καὶ Κελτοὺς καὶ Λίβυας,

[9] τοὺς δʼ ἱππεῖς διελὼν ἐφʼ ἑκάτερον παρέστησε τὸ κέρας, πλείους ὄντας μυρίων σὺν τοῖς παρὰ τῶν Κελτῶν συμμάχοις, τὰ δὲ θηρία μερίσας πρὸ τῶν κεράτων διʼ ἀμφοτέρων προεβάλετο.

[10] Τεβέριος δὲ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν καιρὸν τοὺς μὲν ἱππεῖς ἀνεκαλεῖτο, θεωρῶν οὐκ ἔχοντας ὅ,τι χρήσονται τοῖς ὑπεναντίοις διὰ τὸ τοὺς Νομάδας ἀποχωρεῖν μὲν εὐχερῶς καὶ σποράδην, ἐπικεῖσθαι δὲ πάλιν ἐκ μεταβολῆς τολμηρῶς καὶ θρασέως· τὸ γὰρ τῆς Νομαδικῆς μάχης ἴδιόν ἐστι τοῦτο·

[11] τοὺς δὲ πεζοὺς παρενέβαλε κατὰ τὰς εἰθισμένας παρʼ αὐτοῖς τάξεις, ὄντας τοὺς μὲν Ῥωμαίους εἰς μυρίους ἑξακισχιλίους, τοὺς δὲ συμμάχους εἰς δισμυρίους.

[12] τὸ γὰρ τέλειον στρατόπεδον παρʼ αὐτοῖς πρὸς τὰς ὁλοσχερεῖς ἐπιβολὰς ἐκ τοσούτων ἀνδρῶν ἐστιν, ὅταν ὁμοῦ τοὺς ὑπάτους ἑκατέρους οἱ καιροὶ συνάγωσιν.

[13] μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τοὺς ἱππεῖς ἐφʼ ἑκάτερον θεὶς τὸ κέρας, ὄντας εἰς τετρακισχιλίους, ἐπῄει τοῖς ὑπεναντίοις σοβαρῶς, ἐν τάξει

[1] καὶ βάδην ποιούμενος τὴν ἔφοδον. ἤδη δὲ σύνεγγυς ὄντων ἀλλήλοις, συνεπλέκησαν οἱ προκείμενοι τῶν δυνάμεων εὔζωνοι.

[2] τούτου δὲ συμβάντος οἱ μὲν Ῥωμαῖοι κατὰ πολλοὺς τρόπους ἠλαττοῦντο, τοῖς δὲ Καρχηδονίοις ὑπερδέξιον γίνεσθαι συνέβαινε τὴν χρείαν,

[3] ἅτε δὴ τῶν μὲν Ῥωμαίων πεζακοντιστῶν κακοπαθούντων ἐξ ὄρθρου καὶ προεμένων τὰ πλεῖστα βέλη κατὰ τὴν πρὸς τοὺς Νομάδας συμπλοκήν, τῶν δὲ καταλειπομένων βελῶν ἠχρειωμένων αὐτοῖς διὰ τὴν συνέχειαν τῆς νοτίδος.

[4] παραπλήσια δὲ τούτοις συνέβαινε καὶ περὶ τοὺς ἱππεῖς γίνεσθαι καὶ περὶ τὸ σύμπαν αὐτοῖς στρατόπεδον.

[5] περί γε μὴν τοὺς Καρχηδονίους ὑπῆρχε τἀναντία τούτων· ἀκμαῖοι γὰρ παρατεταγμένοι καὶ νεαλεῖς ἀεὶ πρὸς τὸ δέον εὐχρήστως καὶ προθύμως εἶχον.

[6] διόπερ ἅμα τῷ δέξασθαι διὰ τῶν διαστημάτων τοὺς προκινδυνεύοντας καὶ συμπεσεῖν τὰ βαρέα τῶν ὅπλων ἀλλήλοις, οἱ μὲν ἱππεῖς οἱ τῶν Καρχηδονίων εὐθέως ἀπʼ ἀμφοῖν τοῖν κεράτοιν ἐπίεζον τοὺς ὑπεναντίους, ὡς ἂν τῷ πλήθει πολὺ διαφέροντες καὶ ταῖς ἀκμαῖς αὐτῶν τε καὶ τῶν ἵππων διὰ τὴν προειρημένην ἀκεραιότητα περὶ τὴν ἔξοδον·

[7] τοῖς δὲ Ῥωμαίοις τῶν ἱππέων ὑποχωρησάντων καὶ ψιλωθέντων τῶν τῆς φάλαγγος κεράτων, οἵ τε λογχοφόροι τῶν Καρχηδονίων καὶ τὸ τῶν Νομάδων πλῆθος ὑπεραίροντες τοὺς προτεταγμένους τῶν ἰδίων καὶ πρὸς τὰ κέρατα προσπίπτοντες τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις πολλὰ καὶ κακὰ διειργάζοντο καὶ μάχεσθαι τοῖς κατὰ πρόσωπον οὐκ εἴων.

[8] οἱ δʼ ἐν τοῖς βαρέσιν ὅπλοις παρʼ ἀμφοῖν τὰς πρώτας ἔχοντες καὶ μέσας τῆς ὅλης παρεμβολῆς τάξεις ἐπὶ πολὺν χρόνον ἐμάχοντο συστάδην, ἐφάμιλλον ποιούμενοι

[1] τὸν κίνδυνον. ἐν ᾧ καιρῷ διαναστάντων τῶν ἐκ τῆς ἐνέδρας Νομάδων καὶ προσπεσόντων ἄφνω κατὰ νώτου τοῖς ἀγωνιζομένοις περὶ τὰ μέσα, μεγάλην ταραχὴν καὶ δυσχρηστίαν συνέβαινε γίνεσθαι περὶ τὰς τῶν Ῥωμαίων δυνάμεις.

[2] τέλος δʼ ἀμφότερα τὰ κέρατα τῶν περὶ τὸν Τεβέριον πιεζούμενα κατὰ πρόσωπον μὲν ὑπὸ τῶν θηρίων, πέριξ δὲ καὶ κατὰ τὰς ἐκ τῶν πλαγίων ἐπιφανείας ὑπὸ τῶν εὐζώνων, ἐτράπησαν καὶ συνωθοῦντο κατὰ τὸν διωγμὸν πρὸς τὸν ὑποκείμενον ποταμόν.

[3] τούτου δὲ συμβάντος οἱ κατὰ μέσον τὸν κίνδυνον ταχθέντες τῶν Ῥωμαίων οἱ μὲν κατόπιν ἐφεστῶτες ὑπὸ τῶν ἐκ τῆς ἐνέδρας προσπεσόντων ἀπώλλυντο καὶ κακῶς ἔπασχον,

[4] οἱ δὲ περὶ τὰς πρώτας χώρας ἐπαναγκασθέντες ἐκράτησαν τῶν Κελτῶν καὶ μέρους τινὸς τῶν Λιβύων καὶ πολλοὺς αὐτῶν ἀποκτείναντες διέκοψαν τὴν τῶν Καρχηδονίων τάξιν.

[5] θεωροῦντες δὲ τοὺς ἀπὸ τῶν ἰδίων κεράτων ἐκπεπιεσμένους, τὸ μὲν ἐπιβοηθεῖν τούτοις ἢ πάλιν εἰς τὴν ἑαυτῶν ἀπιέναι παρεμβολὴν ἀπέγνωσαν, ὑφορώμενοι μὲν τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ἱππέων, κωλυόμενοι δὲ διὰ τὸν ποταμὸν καὶ τὴν ἐπιφορὰν καὶ συστροφὴν τοῦ κατὰ κεφαλὴν ὄμβρου.

[6] τηροῦντες δὲ τὰς τάξεις ἁθρόοι μετʼ ἀσφαλείας ἀπεχώρησαν εἰς Πλακεντίαν, ὄντες οὐκ ἐλάττους μυρίων.

[7] τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν οἱ μὲν πλεῖστοι περὶ τὸν ποταμὸν ἐφθάρησαν ὑπό τε τῶν θηρίων καὶ τῶν ἱππέων,

[8] οἱ δὲ διαφυγόντες τῶν πεζῶν καὶ τὸ πλεῖστον μέρος τῶν ἱππέων πρὸς τὸ προειρημένον σύστημα ποιούμενοι τὴν ἀποχώρησιν ἀνεκομίσθησαν ἅμα τούτοις εἰς Πλακεντίαν.

[9] τὸ δὲ τῶν Καρχηδονίων στρατόπεδον ἕως τοῦ ποταμοῦ καταδιῶξαν τοὺς πολεμίους, ὑπὸ δὲ τοῦ χειμῶνος οὐκέτι δυνάμενον πορρωτέρω προβαίνειν ἐπανῆλθε πάλιν εἰς τὴν παρεμβολήν.

[10] καὶ πάντες ἐπὶ μὲν τῇ μάχῃ περιχαρεῖς ἦσαν, ὡς κατωρθωκότες· συνέβαινε γὰρ ὀλίγους μὲν τῶν Ἰβήρων καὶ Λιβύων, τοὺς δὲ πλείους ἀπολωλέναι τῶν Κελτῶν·

[11] ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν ὄμβρων καὶ τῆς ἐπιγινομένης χιόνος οὕτως διετίθεντο δεινῶς ὥστε τὰ μὲν θηρία διαφθαρῆναι πλὴν ἑνός, πολλοὺς δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἀπόλλυσθαι καὶ τῶν ἵππων διὰ τὸ ψῦχος.

[1] ὁ δὲ Τεβέριος εἰδὼς μὲν τὰ συμβεβηκότα, βουλόμενος δὲ κατὰ δύναμιν ἐπικρύπτεσθαι τοὺς ἐν τῇ Ῥώμῃ τὸ γεγονὸς ἔπεμψε τοὺς ἀπαγγελοῦντας ὅτι μάχης γενομένης τὴν νίκην αὐτῶν ὁ χειμὼν ἀφείλετο.

[2] οἱ δὲ Ῥωμαῖοι παραυτίκα μὲν ἐπίστευον τοῖς προσπίπτουσιν· μετʼ οὐ πολὺ δὲ πυνθανόμενοι τοὺς μὲν Καρχηδονίους καὶ τὴν παρεμβολὴν τὴν αὑτῶν τηρεῖν καὶ τοὺς Κελτοὺς πάντας ἀπονενευκέναι πρὸς τὴν ἐκείνων φιλίαν,

[3] τοὺς δὲ παρʼ αὑτῶν ἀπολελοιπότας τὴν παρεμβολὴν ἐκ τῆς μάχης ἀνακεχωρηκέναι καὶ συνηθροῖσθαι πάντας εἰς τὰς πόλεις καὶ χορηγεῖσθαι δὲ τοῖς ἀναγκαίοις ἐκ θαλάττης ἀνὰ τὸν Πάδον ποταμόν, καὶ λίαν σαφῶς ἔγνωσαν τὰ γεγονότα περὶ τὸν κίνδυνον.

[4] διὸ καὶ παραδόξου φανέντος αὐτοῖς τοῦ πράγματος, περὶ τὰς λοιπὰς παρασκευὰς διαφερόντως ἐγίνοντο καὶ περὶ φυλακὴν τῶν προκειμένων τόπων, πέμποντες εἰς Σαρδόνα καὶ Σικελίαν στρατόπεδα, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις εἰς Τάραντα προφυλακὰς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τόπων εἰς τοὺς εὐκαίρους· παρεσκεύασαν δὲ καὶ ναῦς ἑξήκοντα πεντήρεις. Γνάιος δὲ Σερουίλιος καὶ Γάιος Φλαμίνιος,

[5] οἵπερ ἔτυχον ὕπατοι τότε καθεσταμένοι, συνῆγον τοὺς συμμάχους καὶ κατέγραφον τὰ παρʼ αὑτοῖς στρατόπεδα.

[6] παρῆγον δὲ καὶ τὰς ἀγορὰς τὰς μὲν εἰς Ἀρίμινον τὰς δʼ εἰς Τυρρηνίαν, ὡς ἐπὶ τούτοις ποιησόμενοι τοῖς τόποις τὴν ἔξοδον.

[7] ἔπεμψαν δὲ καὶ πρὸς Ἱέρωνα περὶ βοηθείας, ὃς καὶ πεντακοσίους αὐτοῖς ἐξαπέστειλε Κρῆτας καὶ χιλίους πελτοφόρους· πάντα δὲ καὶ πανταχόθεν ἐνεργῶς ἡτοίμαζον.

[8] τότε γάρ εἰσι φοβερώτατοι Ῥωμαῖοι καὶ κοινῇ καὶ κατʼ ἰδίαν, ὅταν αὐτοὺς περιστῇ φόβος ἀληθινός.

[1] κατὰ δὲ τοὺς αὐτοὺς καιροὺς Γνάιος Κορνήλιος ὁ καταλειφθεὶς ὑπὸ τἀδελφοῦ Ποπλίου στρατηγὸς ἐπὶ τῆς ναυτικῆς δυνάμεως, καθάπερ ἐπάνω προεῖπον, ἀναχθεὶς ἀπὸ τῶν τοῦ Ῥοδανοῦ στομάτων παντὶ τῷ στόλῳ προσέσχε τῆς Ἰβηρίας πρὸς τοὺς κατὰ τὸ καλούμενον Ἐμπόριον τόπους.

[2] ἀρξάμενος δʼ ἐντεῦθεν ἀποβάσεις ἐποιεῖτο καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἀπειθοῦντας ἐπολιόρκει τῶν τὴν παραλίαν κατοικούντων ἕως Ἴβηρος ποταμοῦ, τοὺς δὲ προσδεχομένους ἐφιλανθρώπει, τὴν ἐνδεχομένην ποιούμενος περὶ αὐτῶν προμήθειαν.

[3] ἀσφαλισάμενος δὲ τοὺς προσκεχωρηκότας τῶν παραθαλαττίων προῆγε παντὶ τῷ στρατεύματι, ποιούμενος τὴν πορείαν εἰς τὴν μεσόγαιον·

[4] πολὺ γὰρ ἤδη καὶ τὸ συμμαχικὸν ἡθροίκει τῶν Ἰβήρων. ἅμα δὲ προϊὼν ἃς μὲν προσήγετο τὰς δὲ κατεστρέφετο τῶν πόλεων.

[5] τῶν δὲ Καρχηδονίων, οὓς ἔχων ἐπὶ τούτων ἀπελείφθη τῶν τόπων Ἄννων, ἀντιστρατοπεδευσάντων αὐτοῖς περὶ πόλιν προσαγορευομένην Κίσσαν, συμβαλὼν ὁ Γνάιος ἐκ παρατάξεως καὶ νικήσας τῇ μάχῃ πολλῶν μὲν χρημάτων ἐγένετʼ ἐγκρατής, ὡς ἂν ἁπάσης τῆς ἀποσκευῆς τῶν εἰς Ἰταλίαν ὁρμησάντων παρὰ τούτοις ἀπολελειμμένης,

[6] πάντας δὲ τοὺς ἐντὸς Ἴβηρος ποταμοῦ συμμάχους ἐποιήσατο καὶ φίλους, ζωγρίᾳ δὲ τόν τε τῶν Καρχηδονίων στρατηγὸν Ἄννωνα καὶ τὸν τῶν Ἰβήρων Ἀνδοβάλην ἔλαβε.

[7] τοῦτον δὲ συνέβαινε τύραννον μὲν εἶναι τῶν κατὰ τὴν μεσόγαιον τόπων, εὔνουν δὲ διαφερόντως ἀεί ποτε Καρχηδονίοις.

[8] ταχὺ δὲ συνεὶς τὸ γεγονὸς Ἀσδρούβας ἧκε παραβοηθῶν διαβὰς τὸν Ἴβηρα ποταμόν.

[9] καὶ καταμαθὼν ἀπολελειμμένους τοὺς ἀπὸ τοῦ στόλου τῶν Ῥωμαίων, ῥᾳθύμως καὶ κατατεθαρρηκότως ἀναστρεφομένους διὰ τὸ προτέρημα τῶν πεζικῶν στρατοπέδων,

[10] παραλαβὼν ἀπὸ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ δυνάμεως πεζοὺς μὲν εἰς ὀκτακισχιλίους ἱππεῖς δὲ περὶ χιλίους, καὶ καταλαβὼν ἐσκεδασμένους κατὰ τῆς χώρας τοὺς ἀπὸ τῶν πλοίων, πολλοὺς μὲν αὐτῶν ἀπέκτεινεν, τοὺς δὲ λοιποὺς ἠνάγκασε φυγεῖν ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς.

[11] οὗτος μὲν οὖν ἀναχωρήσας καὶ διαβὰς αὖθις τὸν Ἴβηρα ποταμὸν ἐγίνετο περὶ παρασκευὴν καὶ φυλακὴν τῶν ἐντὸς τοῦ ποταμοῦ τόπων, ποιούμενος τὴν παραχειμασίαν ἐν Καινῇ πόλει.

[12] ὁ δὲ Γνάιος συνάψας τῷ στόλῳ καὶ τοὺς αἰτίους τῶν συμβεβηκότων κατὰ τοὺς παρʼ αὐτοῖς ἐθισμοὺς κολάσας, τὸ λοιπὸν ἤδη συναγαγὼν ἐπὶ ταὐτὸ τήν τε πεζὴν καὶ τὴν ναυτικὴν στρατιὰν ἐν Ταρράκωνι τὴν παραχειμασίαν ἐποιεῖτο.

[13] διαδοὺς δὲ τὴν λείαν ἴσως τοῖς στρατιώταις μεγάλην εὔνοιαν καὶ προθυμίαν ἐνειργάσατο πρὸς τὸ μέλλον.

[1] καὶ τὰ μὲν κατὰ τὴν Ἰβηρίαν ἐν τούτοις ἦν. ἐνισταμένης δὲ τῆς ἐαρινῆς ὥρας, Γάιος μὲν Φλαμίνιος ἀναλαβὼν τὰς αὑτοῦ δυνάμεις προῆγε διὰ Τυρρηνίας καὶ κατεστρατοπέδευσε πρὸ τῆς τῶν Ἀρρητίνων πόλεως,

[2] Γνάιος δὲ Σερουίλιος τοὔμπαλιν ὡς ἐπʼ Ἀριμίνου, ταύτῃ παρατηρήσων τὴν εἰσβολὴν τῶν ὑπεναντίων.

[3] Ἀννίβας δὲ παραχειμάζων ἐν τῇ Κελτικῇ τοὺς μὲν Ῥωμαίους τῶν ἐκ τῆς μάχης αἰχμαλώτων ἐν φυλακῇ συνεῖχεν, τὰ μέτρια τῶν ἐπιτηδείων διδούς,

[4] τοὺς δὲ συμμάχους αὐτῶν τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἐν τῇ πάσῃ φιλανθρωπίᾳ διεξῆγεν, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα συναγαγὼν παρεκάλει, φάσκων οὐκ ἐκείνοις ἥκειν πολεμήσων, ἀλλὰ Ῥωμαίοις ὑπὲρ ἐκείνων. διόπερ ἔφη δεῖν αὐτούς,

[5] ἐὰν ὀρθῶς φρονῶσιν, ἀντέχεσθαι τῆς πρὸς αὑτὸν φιλίας.

[6] παρεῖναι γὰρ πρῶτον μὲν τὴν ἐλευθερίαν ἀνακτησόμενος Ἰταλιώταις, ὁμοίως δὲ τὰς πόλεις καὶ τὴν χώραν, ἣν ὑπὸ Ῥωμαίων ἀπολωλεκότες ἕκαστοι τυγχάνουσι, συνανασώσων.

[7] ταῦτα δʼ εἰπὼν ἀφῆκε πάντας χωρὶς λύτρων εἰς τὴν οἰκείαν, βουλόμενος ἅμα μὲν προκαλεῖσθαι διὰ τοιούτου τρόπου πρὸς αὑτὸν τοὺς κατοικοῦντας τὴν Ἰταλίαν, ἅμα δʼ ἀπαλλοτριοῦν τῆς πρὸς Ῥωμαίους εὐνοίας, ἐρεθίζειν δὲ τοὺς δοκοῦντας πόλεσιν ἢ λιμέσιν ἠλαττῶσθαί τι διὰ τῆς Ῥωμαίων ἀρχῆς.

[1] ἐχρήσατο δέ τινι καὶ Φοινικικῷ στρατηγήματι τοιούτῳ κατὰ τὴν παραχειμασίαν.

[2] ἀγωνιῶν γὰρ τὴν ἀθεσίαν τῶν Κελτῶν καὶ τὰς ἐπιβουλὰς τὰς περὶ τὸ σῶμα διὰ τὸ πρόσφατον τῆς πρὸς αὐτοὺς συστάσεως κατεσκευάσατο περιθετὰς τρίχας, ἁρμοζούσας ταῖς κατὰ τὰς ὁλοσχερεῖς διαφορὰς τῶν ἡλικιῶν ἐπιπρεπείαις,

[3] καὶ ταύταις ἐχρῆτο συνεχῶς μετατιθέμενος· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰς ἐσθῆτας μετελάμβανε τὰς καθηκούσας ἀεὶ ταῖς περιθεταῖς.

[4] διʼ ὧν οὐ μόνον τοῖς αἰφνιδίως ἰδοῦσι δύσγνωστος ἦν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ἐν συνηθείᾳ γεγονόσιν.

[5] θεωρῶν δὲ τοὺς Κελτοὺς δυσχεραίνοντας ἐπὶ τῷ τὸν πόλεμον ἐν τῇ παρʼ αὑτῶν χώρᾳ λαμβάνειν τὴν τριβήν, σπεύδοντας δὲ καὶ μετεώρους ὄντας εἰς τὴν πολεμίαν, προφάσει μὲν διὰ τὴν πρὸς Ῥωμαίους ὀργήν, τὸ δὲ πλεῖον διὰ τὰς ὠφελείας, ἔκρινε τὴν ταχίστην ἀναζευγνύειν καὶ συνεκπληροῦν τὰς τῶν δυνάμεων ὁρμάς.

[6] διόπερ ἅμα τῷ τὴν ὥραν μεταβάλλειν πυνθανόμενος τῶν μάλιστα τῆς χώρας δοκούντων ἐμπειρεῖν τὰς μὲν ἄλλας ἐμβολὰς τὰς εἰς τὴν πολεμίαν μακρὰς εὕρισκε καὶ προδήλους τοῖς ὑπεναντίοις, τὴν δὲ διὰ τῶν ἑλῶν εἰς Τυρρηνίαν φέρουσαν δυσχερῆ μὲν σύντομον δὲ καὶ παράδοξον φανησομένην τοῖς περὶ τὸν Φλαμίνιον.

[7] ἀεὶ δέ πως οἰκεῖος ὢν τῇ φύσει τούτου τοῦ μέρους ταύτῃ προέθετο ποιεῖσθαι τὴν πορείαν.

[8] διαδοθείσης δὲ τῆς φήμης ἐν τῷ στρατοπέδῳ διότι μέλλει διά τινων ἑλῶν ἄγειν αὐτοὺς ὁ στρατηγός, πᾶς τις εὐλαβῶς εἶχε πρὸς τὴν πορείαν, ὑφορώμενος βάραθρα καὶ

[1] τοὺς λιμνώδεις τῶν τόπων. Ἀννίβας δʼ ἐπιμελῶς ἐξητακὼς τεναγώδεις καὶ στερεοὺς ὑπάρχοντας τοὺς κατὰ τὴν δίοδον τόπους, ἀναζεύξας εἰς μὲν τὴν πρωτοπορείαν ἔθηκε τοὺς Λίβυας καὶ Ἴβηρας καὶ πᾶν τὸ χρησιμώτερον μέρος τῆς σφετέρας δυνάμεως, συγκαταμίξας αὐτοῖς τὴν ἀποσκευήν, ἵνα πρὸς τὸ παρὸν εὐπορῶσι τῶν ἐπιτηδείων·

[2] πρὸς γὰρ τὸ μέλλον εἰς τέλος ἀφροντίστως εἶχε περὶ παντὸς τοῦ σκευοφόρου, λογιζόμενος ὡς ἐὰν ἅψηται τῆς πολεμίας, ἡττηθεὶς μὲν οὐ προσδεήσεται τῶν ἀναγκαίων, κρατῶν δὲ τῶν ὑπαίθρων οὐκ ἀπορήσει τῶν ἐπιτηδείων.

[3] ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς προειρημένοις ἐπέβαλε τοὺς Κελτούς, ἐπὶ δὲ πᾶσι τοὺς ἱππεῖς.

[4] ἐπιμελητὴν δὲ τῆς οὐραγίας τὸν ἀδελφὸν ἀπέλιπε Μάγωνα τῶν τε λοιπῶν χάριν καὶ μάλιστα τῆς τῶν Κελτῶν μαλακίας καὶ φυγοπονίας, ἵνʼ ἐὰν κακοπαθοῦντες τρέπωνται πάλιν εἰς τοὐπίσω, κωλύῃ διὰ τῶν ἱππέων καὶ προσφέρῃ τὰς χεῖρας αὐτοῖς.

[5] οἱ μὲν οὖν Ἴβηρες καὶ Λίβυες διʼ ἀκεραίων τῶν ἑλῶν ποιούμενοι τὴν πορείαν μετρίως κακοπαθοῦντες ἤνυον, ἅτε καὶ φερέκακοι πάντες ὄντες καὶ συνήθεις ταῖς τοιαύταις ταλαιπωρίαις.

[6] οἱ δὲ Κελτοὶ δυσχερῶς μὲν εἰς τοὔμπροσθεν προύβαινον, τεταραγμένων καὶ διαπεπατημένων εἰς βάθος τῶν ἑλῶν, ἐπιπόνως δὲ καὶ ταλαιπώρως ὑπέμενον τὴν κακοπάθειαν, ἄπειροι πάσης τῆς τοιαύτης ὄντες κακουχίας.

[7] ἐκωλύοντο δὲ πάλιν ἀπονεύειν εἰς τοὐπίσω διὰ τοὺς ἐφεστῶτας αὐτοῖς ἱππεῖς.

[8] πάντες μὲν οὖν ἐκακοπάθουν καὶ μάλιστα διὰ τὴν ἀγρυπνίαν, ὡς ἂν ἑξῆς ἡμέρας τέτταρας καὶ τρεῖς νύκτας συνεχῶς διʼ ὕδατος ποιούμενοι τὴν πορείαν· διαφερόντως γε μὴν ἐπόνουν καὶ κατεφθείρονθʼ ὑπὲρ τοὺς ἄλλους οἱ Κελτοί.

[9] τῶν δʼ ὑποζυγίων αὐτοῦ τὰ πλεῖστα πίπτοντα διὰ τοὺς πηλοὺς ἀπώλλυντο, μίαν παρεχόμενα χρείαν ἐν τῷ πεσεῖν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις·

[10] καθεζόμενοι γὰρ ἐπʼ αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν σκευῶν σωρηδὸν ὑπὲρ τὸ ὑγρὸν ὑπερεῖχον καὶ τῷ τοιούτῳ τρόπῳ βραχὺ μέρος τῆς νυκτὸς ἀπεκοιμῶντο.

[11] οὐκ ὀλίγοι δὲ καὶ τῶν ἵππων τὰς ὁπλὰς ἀπέβαλον διὰ τὴν συνέχειαν τῆς διὰ τῶν πηλῶν πορείας.

[12] Ἀννίβας δὲ μόλις ἐπὶ τοῦ περιλειφθέντος θηρίου διεσώθη μετὰ πολλῆς ταλαιπωρίας, ὑπεραλγὴς ὢν διὰ τὴν βαρύτητα τῆς ἐπενεχθείσης ὀφθαλμίας αὐτῷ, διʼ ἣν καὶ τέλος ἐστερήθη τῆς μιᾶς ὄψεως, οὐκ ἐπιδεχομένου τοῦ καιροῦ καταμονὴν οὐδὲ θεραπείαν διὰ τὸ τῆς περιστάσεως ἀδύνατον.

[1] διαπεράσας δὲ παραδόξως τοὺς ἑλώδεις τόπους καὶ καταλαβὼν ἐν Τυρρηνίᾳ τὸν Φλαμίνιον στρατοπεδεύοντα πρὸ τῆς τῶν Ἀρρητίνων πόλεως, τότε μὲν αὐτοῦ πρὸς τοῖς ἕλεσι κατεστρατοπέδευσε,

[2] βουλόμενος τήν τε δύναμιν ἀναλαβεῖν καὶ πολυπραγμονῆσαι τὰ περὶ τοὺς ὑπεναντίους καὶ τοὺς προκειμένους τῶν τόπων.

[3] πυνθανόμενος δὲ τὴν μὲν χώραν τὴν πρόσθεν πολλῆς γέμειν ὠφελείας, τὸν δὲ Φλαμίνιον ὀχλοκόπον μὲν καὶ δημαγωγὸν εἶναι τέλειον, πρὸς ἀληθινῶν δὲ καὶ πολεμικῶν πραγμάτων χειρισμὸν οὐκ εὐφυῆ, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις καταπεπιστευκέναι τοῖς σφετέροις πράγμασιν,

[4] συνελογίζετο διότι παραλλάξαντος αὐτοῦ τὴν ἐκείνων στρατοπεδείαν καὶ καθέντος εἰς τοὺς ἔμπροσθεν τόπους τὰ μὲν ἀγωνιῶν τὸν ἐπιτωθασμὸν τῶν ὄχλων οὐ δυνήσεται περιορᾶν δῃουμένην τὴν χώραν, τὰ δὲ κατηλγηκὼς παρέσται προχείρως εἰς πάντα τόπον ἑπόμενος, σπουδάζων διʼ αὑτοῦ ποιήσασθαι τὸ προτέρημα καὶ μὴ προσδέξασθαι τὴν παρουσίαν τοῦ τὴν ἴσην ἀρχὴν ἔχοντος.

[5] ἐξ ὧν πολλοὺς αὐτὸν ὑπελάμβανε παραδώσειν καιροὺς πρὸς ἐπίθεσιν. πάντα δʼ

[1] ἐμφρόνως ἐλογίζετο ταῦτα καὶ πραγματικῶς· οὐ γὰρ εἰκὸς ἄλλως εἰπεῖν, ὡς εἴ τις οἴεται κυριώτερόν τι μέρος εἶναι στρατηγίας τοῦ γνῶναι τὴν προαίρεσιν καὶ φύσιν τοῦ τῶν ἐναντίων ἡγεμόνος, ἀγνοεῖ καὶ τετύφωται.

[2] καθάπερ γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν κατʼ ἄνδρα καὶ ζυγὸν ἀγωνισμάτων δεῖ τὸν μέλλοντα νικᾶν συνθεωρεῖν πῶς δυνατὸν ἐφικέσθαι τοῦ σκοποῦ καὶ τί γυμνὸν ἢ ποῖον ἔξοπλον μέρος φαίνεται τῶν ἀνταγωνιστῶν,

[3] οὕτως χρὴ καὶ τοὺς ὑπὲρ τῶν ὅλων προεστῶτας σκοπεῖν οὐχ ὅπου τι τοῦ σώματος γυμνόν, ἀλλὰ ποῦ τῆς ψυχῆς εὐχείρωτόν τι παραφαίνεται τοῦ τῶν ἐναντίων ἡγεμόνος,

[4] ἐπειδὴ πολλοὶ μὲν διὰ ῥᾳθυμίαν καὶ τὴν σύμπασαν ἀργίαν οὐ μόνον τὰς κοινὰς πράξεις, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἰδίους καταπροΐενται βίους ἄρδην,

[5] πολλοὶ δὲ διὰ τὴν πρὸς τὸν οἶνον ἐπιθυμίαν οὐδʼ ὑπνῶσαι δύνανται χωρὶς ἀλλοιώσεως καὶ μέθης,

[6] ἔνιοι δὲ διὰ τὰς τῶν ἀφροδισίων ὁρμὰς καὶ τὴν ἐν τούτοις ἔκπληξιν οὐ μόνον πόλεις καὶ βίους ἀναστάτους πεποιήκασιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ζῆν αὑτῶν ἀφῄρηνται μετʼ αἰσχύνης.

[7] καὶ μὴν δειλία καὶ βλακεία κατʼ ἰδίαν μὲν αὐτοῖς ὄνειδος ἐπιφέρει τοῖς ἔχουσι, περὶ δὲ τὸν τῶν ὅλων ἡγεμόνα γενομένη κοινόν ἐστι καὶ μέγιστον συμπτωμάτων.

[8] οὐ γὰρ μόνον ἀπράκτους ποιεῖ τοὺς ὑποταττομένους, πολλάκις δὲ καὶ κινδύνους ἐπιφέρει τοὺς μεγίστους τοῖς πεπιστευκόσι.

[9] προπέτειά γε μὴν καὶ θρασύτης καὶ θυμὸς ἄλογος, ἔτι δὲ κενοδοξία καὶ τῦφος εὐχείρωτα μὲν τοῖς ἐχθροῖς, ἐπισφαλέστατα δὲ τοῖς φίλοις. πρὸς γὰρ πᾶσαν ἐπιβουλήν, ἐνέδραν, ἀπάτην ἕτοιμος ὅ γε τοιοῦτος.

[10] διόπερ εἴ τις δύναιτο συννοεῖν τὰ περὶ τοὺς πέλας ἁμαρτήματα καὶ τῇδέ που προσιέναι τοῖς ὑπεναντίοις, ᾗ μάλιστα καὶ διʼ ὧν εὐχείρωτος ἔσθʼ ὁ προεστὼς τῶν πολεμίων, τάχιστʼ ἂν τῶν ὅλων κατακρατοίη. καθάπερ γὰρ νεὼς ἐὰν ἀφέλῃ τις τὸν κυβερνήτην,

[11] τὸ ὅλον αὐτανδρὶ σκάφος ὑποχείριον γίνεται τοῖς ἐχθροῖς, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἐὰν τὸν προεστῶτα [πόλεμον] δυνάμεως χειρώσηταί τις κατὰ τὰς ἐπιβολὰς καὶ συλλογισμούς, αὐτανδρὶ γίνεται πολλάκις κρατεῖν τῶν ἀντιταττομένων.

[12] ἃ δὴ καὶ τότε προϊδόμενος καὶ συλλογισάμενος Ἀννίβας περὶ τοῦ τῶν ἐναντίων ἡγεμόνος οὐ διεσφάλη τῆς ἐπιβολῆς.

[1] ὡς γὰρ θᾶττον ποιησάμενος ἀναζυγὴν ἀπὸ τῶν κατὰ τὴν Φαισόλαν τόπων καὶ μικρὸν ὑπεράρας τὴν τῶν Ῥωμαίων στρατοπεδείαν ἐνέβαλεν εἰς τὴν προκειμένην χώραν,

[2] εὐθέως μετέωρος ἦν ὁ Φλαμίνιος καὶ θυμοῦ πλήρης, δοξάζων ἑαυτὸν ὑπὸ τῶν ἐναντίων καταφρονεῖσθαι.

[3] μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα πορθουμένης τῆς χώρας, καὶ πανταχόθεν τοῦ καπνοῦ σημαίνοντος τὴν καταφθορὰν αὐτῆς, ἐσχετλίαζε, δεινὸν ἡγούμενος τὸ γινόμενον.

[4] διὸ καὶ τινῶν οἰομένων δεῖν μὴ προχείρως ἐπακολουθεῖν μηδὲ συμπλέκεσθαι τοῖς πολεμίοις, φυλάττεσθαι δὲ καὶ προσέχειν τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ἱππέων, μάλιστα δὲ καὶ τὸν ἕτερον ὕπατον προσλαβεῖν καὶ πᾶσιν ἐπὶ ταὐτὸ τοῖς στρατοπέδοις ὁμοῦ ποιήσασθαι τὸν κίνδυνον,

[5] οὐχ οἷον προσεῖχε τοῖς λεγομένοις, ἀλλʼ οὐδʼ ἀνείχετο τῶν ἀποφαινομένων ταῦτα,

[6] παρεκάλει δʼ αὐτοὺς ἐν νῷ λαμβάνειν τί λέγειν εἰκὸς τοὺς ἐν τῇ πατρίδι τῆς μὲν χώρας καταφθειρομένης σχεδὸν ἕως πρὸς αὐτὴν τὴν Ῥώμην, αὐτῶν δὲ κατόπιν τῶν πολεμίων ἐν Τυρρηνίᾳ στρατοπεδευόντων.

[7] τέλος δέ, ταῦτʼ εἰπών, ἀναζεύξας προῆγε μετὰ τῆς δυνάμεως, οὐ καιρόν, οὐ τόπον προορώμενος, μόνον δὲ σπεύδων συμπεσεῖν τοῖς πολεμίοις, ὡς προδήλου τῆς νίκης αὐτοῖς ὑπαρχούσης·

[8] τηλικοῦτον γὰρ προενεβεβλήκει κατελπισμὸν τοῖς ὄχλοις ὥστε πλείους εἶναι τῶν τὰ ὅπλα φερόντων τοὺς ἐκτὸς παρεπομένους τῆς ὠφελείας χάριν, κομίζοντας ἁλύσεις καὶ πέδας καὶ πᾶσαν τὴν τοιαύτην παρασκευήν.

[9] ὅ γε μὴν Ἀννίβας ἅμα μὲν εἰς τοὔμπροσθεν ὡς πρὸς τὴν Ῥώμην προῄει διὰ τῆς Τυρρηνίας, εὐώνυμον μὲν πόλιν ἔχων τὴν προσαγορευομένην Κυρτώνιον καὶ τὰ ταύτης ὄρη, δεξιὰν δὲ τὴν Ταρσιμέννην καλουμένην λίμνην·

[10] ἅμα δὲ προάγων ἐπυρπόλει καὶ κατέφθειρε τὴν χώραν, βουλόμενος ἐκκαλέσασθαι τὸν θυμὸν τῶν ὑπεναντίων. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸν Φλαμίνιον ἤδη συνάπτοντα καθεώρα,

[11] τόπους δʼ εὐφυεῖς συνεθεώρησε πρὸς τὴν χρείαν,

[1] ἐγίνετο πρὸς τὸ διακινδυνεύειν. ὄντος δὲ κατὰ τὴν δίοδον αὐλῶνος ἐπιπέδου, τούτου δὲ παρὰ μὲν τὰς εἰς μῆκος πλευρὰς ἑκατέρας βουνοὺς ἔχοντος ὑψηλοὺς καὶ συνεχεῖς, παρὰ δὲ τὰς εἰς πλάτος κατὰ μὲν τὴν ἀντικρὺ λόφον ἐπικείμενον ἐρυμνὸν καὶ δύσβατον, κατὰ δὲ τὴν ἀπʼ οὐρᾶς λίμνην τελείως στενὴν ἀπολείπουσαν πάροδον ὡς εἰς τὸν αὐλῶνα παρὰ τὴν παρώρειαν,

[2] διελθὼν τὸν αὐλῶνα παρὰ τὴν λίμνην τὸν μὲν κατὰ πρόσωπον τῆς πορείας λόφον αὐτὸς κατελάβετο καὶ τοὺς Ἴβηρας καὶ τοὺς Λίβυας ἔχων ἐπʼ αὐτοῦ κατεστρατοπέδευσε,

[3] τοὺς δὲ Βαλιαρεῖς καὶ λογχοφόρους κατὰ τὴν πρωτοπορείαν ἐκπεριάγων ὑπὸ τοὺς ἐν δεξιᾷ βουνοὺς τῶν παρὰ τὸν αὐλῶνα κειμένων, ἐπὶ πολὺ παρατείνας, ὑπέστειλε,

[4] τοὺς δʼ ἱππεῖς καὶ τοὺς Κελτοὺς ὁμοίως τῶν εὐωνύμων βουνῶν κύκλῳ περιαγαγὼν παρεξέτεινε συνεχεῖς, ὥστε τοὺς ἐσχάτους εἶναι κατʼ αὐτὴν τὴν εἴσοδον τὴν παρά τε τὴν λίμνην καὶ τὰς παρωρείας φέρουσαν εἰς τὸν προειρημένον τόπον.

[5] ὁ μὲν οὖν Ἀννίβας ταῦτα προκατασκευασάμενος τῆς νυκτὸς καὶ περιειληφὼς τὸν αὐλῶνα ταῖς ἐνέδραις τὴν ἡσυχίαν εἶχεν.

[6] ὁ δὲ Φλαμίνιος εἵπετο κατόπιν, σπεύδων συνάψαι [τῶν πολεμίων]·

[7] κατεστρατοπεδευκὼς δὲ τῇ προτεραίᾳ πρὸς αὐτῇ τῇ λίμνῃ τελέως ὀψὲ τῆς ὥρας, μετὰ ταῦτα τῆς ἡμέρας ἐπιγενομένης εὐθέως ἐπὶ τὴν ἑωθινὴν ἦγε τὴν πρωτοπορείαν παρὰ τὴν λίμνην εἰς τὸν ὑποκείμενον αὐλῶνα, βουλόμενος ἐξάπτεσθαι τῶν πολεμίων.

[1] οὔσης δὲ τῆς ἡμέρας ὀμιχλώδους διαφερόντως, Ἀννίβας ἅμα τῷ τὸ πλεῖστον μέρος τῆς πορείας εἰς τὸν αὐλῶνα προσδέξασθαι καὶ συνάπτειν πρὸς αὐτὸν ἤδη τὴν τῶν ἐναντίων πρωτοπορείαν ἀποδοὺς τὰ συνθήματα καὶ διαπεμψάμενος πρὸς τοὺς ἐν ταῖς ἐνέδραις συνεπεχείρει πανταχόθεν ἅμα τοῖς πολεμίοις.

[2] οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Φλαμίνιον, παραδόξου γενομένης αὐτοῖς τῆς ἐπιφανείας, ἔτι δὲ δυσσυνόπτου τῆς κατὰ τὸν ἀέρα περιστάσεως ὑπαρχούσης, καὶ τῶν πολεμίων κατὰ πολλοὺς τόπους ἐξ ὑπερδεξίου καταφερομένων καὶ προσπιπτόντων, οὐχ οἷον παραβοηθεῖν ἐδύναντο πρός τι τῶν δεομένων οἱ ταξίαρχοι καὶ χιλίαρχοι τῶν Ῥωμαίων, ἀλλʼ οὐδὲ συννοῆσαι τὸ γινόμενον.

[3] ἅμα γὰρ οἱ μὲν κατὰ πρόσωπον, οἱ δʼ ἀπʼ οὐρᾶς, οἱ δʼ ἐκ τῶν πλαγίων αὐτοῖς προσέπιπτον.

[4] διὸ καὶ συνέβη τοὺς πλείστους ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ τῆς πορείας σχήματι κατακοπῆναι, μὴ δυναμένους αὑτοῖς βοηθεῖν, ἀλλʼ ὡσανεὶ προδεδομένους ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ προεστῶτος ἀκρισίας.

[5] ἔτι γὰρ διαβουλευόμενοι τί δεῖ πράττειν ἀπώλλυντο παραδόξως.

[6] ἐν ᾧ καιρῷ καὶ τὸν Φλαμίνιον αὐτὸν δυσχρηστούμενον καὶ περικακοῦντα τοῖς ὅλοις προσπεσόντες τινὲς τῶν Κελτῶν ἀπέκτειναν.

[7] ἔπεσον οὖν τῶν Ῥωμαίων κατὰ τὸν αὐλῶνα σχεδὸν εἰς μυρίους καὶ πεντακισχιλίους, οὔτʼ εἴκειν τοῖς παροῦσιν οὔτε πράττειν οὐδὲν δυνάμενοι, τοῦτο δʼ ἐκ τῶν ἐθισμῶν αὐτὸ περὶ πλείστου ποιούμενοι, τὸ μὴ φεύγειν μηδὲ λείπειν τὰς τάξεις.

[8] οἱ δὲ κατὰ πορείαν μεταξὺ τῆς λίμνης καὶ τῆς παρωρείας ἐν τοῖς στενοῖς συγκλεισθέντες αἰσχρῶς, ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον ταλαιπώρως διεφθείροντο.

[9] συνωθούμενοι [μὲν] γὰρ εἰς τὴν λίμνην οἱ μὲν διὰ τὴν παράστασιν τῆς διανοίας ὁρμῶντες ἐπὶ τὸ νήχεσθαι σὺν τοῖς ὅπλοις ἀπεπνίγοντο, τὸ δὲ πολὺ πλῆθος μέχρι μὲν τοῦ δυνατοῦ προβαῖνον εἰς τὴν λίμνην ἔμενε τὰς κεφαλὰς αὐτὰς ὑπὲρ τὸ ὑγρὸν ὑπερίσχον·

[10] ἐπιγενομένων δὲ τῶν ἱππέων, καὶ προδήλου γενομένης ἀπωλείας ἐξαίροντες τὰς χεῖρας καὶ δεόμενοι ζωγρεῖν καὶ πᾶσαν προϊέμενοι φωνὴν τὸ τελευταῖον οἱ μὲν ὑπὸ τῶν πολεμίων, τινὲς δὲ παρακαλέσαντες αὑτοὺς διεφθάρησαν.

[11] ἑξακισχίλιοι δʼ ἴσως τῶν κατὰ τὸν αὐλῶνα τοὺς κατὰ πρόσωπον νικήσαντες παραβοηθεῖν μὲν τοῖς ἰδίοις καὶ περιίστασθαι τοὺς ὑπεναντίους ἠδυνάτουν διὰ τὸ μηδὲν συνορᾶν τῶν γινομένων, καίπερ μεγάλην δυνάμενοι πρὸς τὰ ὅλα παρέχεσθαι χρείαν·

[12] ἀεὶ δὲ τοῦ πρόσθεν ὀρεγόμενοι προῆγον, πεπεισμένοι συμπεσεῖσθαί τισιν, ἕως ἔλαθον ἐκπεσόντες πρὸς τοὺς ὑπερδεξίους τόπους. γενόμενοι δʼ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄκρων,

[13] καὶ τῆς ὀμίχλης ἤδη πεπτωκυίας συνέντες τὸ γεγονὸς ἀτύχημα καὶ ποιεῖν οὐδὲν ὄντες ἔτι δυνατοὶ διὰ τὸ τοῖς ὅλοις ἐπικρατεῖν καὶ πάντα προκατέχειν ἤδη τοὺς πολεμίους, συστραφέντες ἀπεχώρησαν εἴς τινα κώμην Τυρρηνίδα.

[14] μετὰ δὲ τὴν μάχην ἀποσταλέντος ὑπὸ τοῦ στρατηγοῦ μετὰ τῶν Ἰβήρων καὶ λογχοφόρων Μαάρβα καὶ περιστρατοπεδεύσαντος τὴν κώμην, ποικίλης αὐτοῖς ἀπορίας περιεστώσης, ἀποθέμενοι τὰ ὅπλα παρέδοσαν αὑτοὺς ὑποσπόνδους, ὡς τευξόμενοι τῆς σωτηρίας.

[15] τὰ μὲν οὖν περὶ τὸν ὅλον κίνδυνον τὸν γενόμενον ἐν Τυρρηνίᾳ Ῥωμαίοις καὶ Καρχηδονίοις

[1] τοῦτον ἐπετελέσθη τὸν τρόπον. Ἀννίβας δέ, πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐπαναχθέντων τῶν ὑποσπόνδων, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἰχμαλώτων, συναγαγὼν πάντας, ὄντας πλείους τῶν μυρίων καὶ πεντακισχιλίων,

[2] πρῶτον μὲν διεσάφησεν ὅτι Μαάρβας οὐκ εἴη κύριος ἄνευ τῆς αὑτοῦ γνώμης διδοὺς τὴν ἀσφάλειαν τοῖς ὑποσπόνδοις, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα κατηγορίαν ἐποιήσατο Ῥωμαίων.

[3] λήξας δὲ τούτων, ὅσοι μὲν ἦσαν Ῥωμαῖοι τῶν ἑαλωκότων, διέδωκεν εἰς φυλακὴν ἐπὶ τὰ τάγματα, τοὺς δὲ συμμάχους ἀπέλυσε χωρὶς λύτρων ἅπαντας εἰς τὴν οἰκείαν,

[4] ἐπιφθεγξάμενος τὸν αὐτὸν ὃν καὶ πρόσθεν λόγον ὅτι πάρεστι πολεμήσων οὐκ Ἰταλιώταις, ἀλλὰ Ῥωμαίοις ὑπὲρ τῆς Ἰταλιωτῶν ἐλευθερίας.

[5] τὴν δʼ ἑαυτοῦ δύναμιν ἀνελάμβανε καὶ τῶν νεκρῶν τῶν ἐκ τῆς σφετέρας δυνάμεως τοὺς ἐπιφανεστάτους ἔθαψεν, ὄντας εἰς τριάκοντα τὸν ἀριθμόν· οἱ μὲν γὰρ πάντες εἰς χιλίους καὶ πεντακοσίους ἔπεσον, ὧν ἦσαν οἱ πλείους Κελτοί.

[6] ταῦτα δὲ πράξας διενοεῖτο μετὰ τἀδελφοῦ καὶ τῶν φίλων ποῦ καὶ πῶς δεῖ ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ὁρμήν, εὐθαρσὴς ὢν ἤδη περὶ τῶν ὅλων.

[7] εἰς δὲ τὴν Ῥώμην προσπεσόντος ἤδη τοῦ γεγονότος ἀτυχήματος, στέλλεσθαι μὲν ἢ ταπεινοῦν τὸ συμβεβηκὸς οἱ προεστῶτες τοῦ πολιτεύματος ἠδυνάτουν διὰ τὸ μέγεθος τῆς συμφορᾶς, λέγειν δὲ τοῖς πολλοῖς ἠναγκάζοντο τὰ γεγονότα, συναθροίσαντες τὸν δῆμον εἰς ἐκκλησίαν.

[8] διόπερ ἅμα τῷ τὸν στρατηγὸν εἰπεῖν τοῖς ὄχλοις ἀπὸ τῶν ἐμβόλων ὅτι ‘Λειπόμεθα μάχῃ μεγάλῃ’, τηλικαύτην συνέβη γενέσθαι διατροπὴν ὥστε τοῖς παραγενομένοις ἐφʼ ἑκατέρων τῶν καιρῶν πολλῷ μεῖζον τότε φανῆναι τὸ γεγονὸς ἢ παρʼ αὐτὸν τὸν τῆς μάχης καιρόν.

[9] καὶ τοῦτʼ εἰκότως συνέβη. πολλῶν γὰρ χρόνων ἄπειροι καὶ τοῦ ῥήματος καὶ τοῦ πράγματος ὑπάρχοντες τῆς ὁμολογουμένης ἥττης οὐ μετρίως οὐδὲ κατὰ σχῆμα τὴν περιπέτειαν ἔφερον.

[10] οὐ μὴν ἥ γε σύγκλητος, ἀλλʼ ἐπὶ τοῦ καθήκοντος ἔμενε λογισμοῦ καὶ διενοεῖτο περὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος πῶς καὶ τί πρακτέον ἑκάστοις εἴη.

[1] κατὰ δὲ τοὺς τῆς μάχης καιροὺς Γνάιος Σερουίλιος ὁ προκαθήμενος ὕπατος ἐπὶ τῶν κατʼ Ἀρίμινον τόπων —

[2] οὗτοι δʼ εἰσὶν ἐπὶ τῆς παρὰ τὸν Ἀδρίαν πλευρᾶς, οὗ συνάπτει τὰ Γαλατικὰ πεδία πρὸς τὴν ἄλλην Ἰταλίαν, οὐ μακρὰν τῆς εἰς θάλατταν ἐκβολῆς τῶν τοῦ Πάδου στομάτων —

[3] ἀκούσας εἰσβεβληκότα τὸν Ἀννίβαν εἰς Τυρρηνίαν ἀντιστρατοπεδεύειν τῷ Φλαμινίῳ, πᾶσι μὲν ἐπεβάλετο τοῖς στρατοπέδοις αὐτὸς συνάπτειν, ἀδυνατῶν δὲ διὰ τὸ τῆς στρατιᾶς βάρος Γάιον Κεντήνιον κατὰ σπουδὴν δοὺς τετρακισχιλίους ἱππεῖς προεξαπέστειλε, βουλόμενος, εἰ δέοινθʼ οἱ καιροί, πρὸ τῆς αὑτοῦ παρουσίας τούτους καταταχεῖν.

[4] Ἀννίβας δέ, μετὰ τὴν μάχην προσαγγελθείσης αὐτῷ τῆς τῶν ὑπεναντίων βοηθείας, ἐξαποστέλλει Μαάρβαν ἔχοντα τοὺς λογχοφόρους καί τι μέρος τῶν ἱππέων.

[5] οἳ καὶ συμπεσόντες τοῖς περὶ τὸν Γάιον ἐν αὐτῇ μὲν τῇ πρώτῃ συμπλοκῇ σχεδὸν τοὺς ἡμίσεις αὐτῶν διέφθειραν, τοὺς δὲ λοιποὺς εἴς τινα λόφον συνδιώξαντες τῇ κατὰ πόδας ἡμέρᾳ πάντας ἔλαβον ὑποχειρίους.

[6] ἐν δὲ τῇ Ῥώμῃ, τριταίας οὔσης τῆς κατὰ τὴν μάχην προσαγγελίας, καὶ μάλιστα τότε τοῦ πάθους κατὰ τὴν πόλιν ὡσανεὶ φλεγμαίνοντος, ἐπιγενομένης καὶ ταύτης τῆς περιπετείας οὐ μόνον τὸ πλῆθος, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν σύγκλητον αὐτὴν συνέβη διατραπῆναι.

[7] διὸ καὶ παρέντες τὴν κατʼ ἐνιαυτὸν ἀγωγὴν τῶν πραγμάτων καὶ τὴν αἵρεσιν τῶν ἀρχόντων μειζόνως ἐπεβάλοντο βουλεύεσθαι περὶ τῶν ἐνεστώτων, νομίζοντες αὐτοκράτορος δεῖσθαι στρατηγοῦ τὰ πράγματα καὶ τοὺς περιεστῶτας καιρούς.

[8] Ἀννίβας δὲ κατατεθαρρηκὼς τοῖς ὅλοις ἤδη τὸ μὲν συνεγγίζειν τῇ Ῥώμῃ κατὰ τὸ παρὸν ἀπεδοκίμασεν, τὴν δὲ χώραν ἐπιπορευόμενος ἀδεῶς ἐπόρθει, ποιούμενος τὴν πορείαν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸν Ἀδρίαν.

[9] διανύσας τε τήν τε τῶν Ὄμβρων καλουμένην χώραν καὶ τὴν τῶν Πικέντων ἧκεν δεκαταῖος πρὸς τοὺς κατὰ τὸν Ἀδρίαν τόπους,

[10] πολλῆς μὲν λείας γεγονὼς ἐγκρατής, ὥστε μήτʼ ἄγειν μήτε φέρειν δύνασθαι τὸ στρατόπεδον τὰς ὠφελείας, πολὺ δὲ πλῆθος ἀνθρώπων ἀπεκταγκὼς κατὰ τὴν δίοδον·

[11] καθάπερ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς τῶν πόλεων καταλήψεσι, καὶ τότε παράγγελμά τι δεδομένον ἦν φονεύειν τοὺς ὑποπίπτοντας τῶν ἐν ταῖς ἡλικίαις. ταῦτα δʼ ἐποίει διὰ τὸ προ

[1] ϋπάρχον αὐτῷ μῖσος ἔμφυτον πρὸς Ῥωμαίους. ἐν ᾧ καιρῷ καταστρατοπεδεύσας παρὰ τὸν Ἀδρίαν ἐν χώρᾳ πρὸς πάντα τὰ γεννήματα διαφερούσῃ μεγάλην ἐποιεῖτο σπουδὴν ὑπὲρ τῆς ἀναλήψεως καὶ θεραπείας τῶν ἀνδρῶν, οὐχ ἧττον δὲ καὶ τῶν ἵππων.

[2] ὡς ἂν γὰρ ὑπαίθρου τῆς παραχειμασίας γεγενημένης ἐν τοῖς κατὰ Γαλατίαν τόποις, ὑπό τε τοῦ ψύχους καὶ τῆς ἀνηλειψίας, ἔτι δὲ τῆς μετὰ ταῦτα διὰ τῶν ἑλῶν πορείας καὶ ταλαιπωρίας ἐπεγεγόνει σχεδὸν ἅπασι τοῖς ἵπποις, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἀνδράσιν ὁ λεγόμενος λιμόψωρος καὶ τοιαύτη καχεξία.

[3] διὸ γενόμενος ἐγκρατὴς χώρας εὐδαίμονος ἐσωματοποίησε μὲν τοὺς ἵππους, ἀνεκτήσατο δὲ τά τε σώματα καὶ τὰς ψυχὰς τῶν στρατιωτῶν· μετακαθώπλισε δὲ τοὺς Λίβυας εἰς τὸν Ῥωμαϊκὸν τρόπον ἐκλεκτοῖς ὅπλοις, ὡς ἂν γεγονὼς κύριος τοσούτων σκύλων.

[4] ἐξαπέστειλε δὲ κατὰ θάλατταν ἐν τῷ καιρῷ τούτῳ καὶ τοὺς διασαφήσοντας εἰς τὴν Καρχηδόνα περὶ τῶν γεγονότων· τότε γὰρ πρῶτον ἥψατο θαλάττης, ἀφʼ οὗ τὴν εἰσβολὴν ἐποιήσατο τὴν εἰς Ἰταλίαν.

[5] ἐφʼ οἷς ἀκούσαντες μεγαλείως ἐχάρησαν οἱ Καρχηδόνιοι καὶ πολλὴν ἐποιοῦντο σπουδὴν καὶ πρόνοιαν ὑπὲρ τοῦ κατὰ πάντα τρόπον ἐπικουρεῖν καὶ τοῖς ἐν Ἰταλίᾳ καὶ τοῖς ἐν Ἰβηρίᾳ πράγμασι.

[6] Ῥωμαῖοι δὲ δικτάτορα μὲν κατέστησαν Κόιντον Φάβιον, ἄνδρα καὶ φρονήσει διαφέροντα καὶ πεφυκότα καλῶς. ἔτι γοῦν ἐπεκαλοῦντο καὶ καθʼ ἡμᾶς οἱ ταύτης τῆς οἰκίας Μάξιμοι, τοῦτο δʼ ἔστι μέγιστοι, διὰ τὰς ἐκείνου τἀνδρὸς ἐπιτυχίας καὶ πράξεις.

[7] ὁ δὲ δικτάτωρ ταύτην ἔχει τὴν διαφορὰν τῶν ὑπάτων· τῶν μὲν γὰρ ὑπάτων ἑκατέρῳ δώδεκα πελέκεις ἀκολουθοῦσι,

[8] τούτῳ δʼ εἴκοσι καὶ τέτταρες, κἀκεῖνοι μὲν ἐν πολλοῖς προσδέονται τῆς συγκλήτου πρὸς τὸ συντελεῖν τὰς ἐπιβολάς, οὗτος δʼ ἔστιν αὐτοκράτωρ στρατηγός, οὗ κατασταθέντος παραχρῆμα διαλύεσθαι συμβαίνει πάσας τὰς ἀρχὰς ἐν τῇ Ῥώμῃ πλὴν τῶν δημάρχων.

[9] οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἐν ἄλλοις ἀκριβεστέραν ποιησόμεθα τὴν διαστολήν. ἅμα δὲ τῷ δικτάτορι κατέστησαν ἱππάρχην Μάρκον Μινύκιον. οὗτος δὲ τέτακται μὲν ὑπὸ τὸν αὐτοκράτορα, γίνεται δʼ οἱονεὶ διάδοχος τῆς ἀρχῆς ἐν τοῖς ἐκείνου περισπασμοῖς.

[1] Ἀννίβας δὲ κατὰ βραχὺ μεταθεὶς τὴν παρεμβολὴν ἐνδιέτριβε τῇ παρὰ τὸν Ἀδρίαν χώρᾳ καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἵππους ἐκλούων τοῖς παλαιοῖς οἴνοις διὰ τὸ πλῆθος ἐξεθεράπευσε τὴν καχεξίαν αὐτῶν καὶ τὴν ψώραν,

[2] παραπλησίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν τοὺς μὲν τραυματίας ἐξυγίασε, τοὺς δὲ λοιποὺς εὐέκτας παρεσκεύασε καὶ προθύμους εἰς τὰς ἐπιφερομένας χρείας.

[3] διελθὼν δὲ καὶ καταφθείρας τήν τε Πραιτεττιανὴν καὶ τὴν Ἀδριανὴν ἔτι δὲ τὴν Μαρρουκίνην καὶ Φρεντανὴν χώραν ὥρμησε ποιούμενος τὴν πορείαν εἰς τὴν Ἰαπυγίαν.

[4] ἧς διῃρημένης εἰς τρεῖς ὀνομασίας, καὶ τῶν μὲν προσαγορευομένων Δαυνίων, τῶν δὲ Πευκετίων, τῶν δὲ Μεσσαπίων, εἰς πρώτην ἐνέβαλε τὴν Δαυνίαν.

[5] ἀρξάμενος δὲ ταύτης ἀπὸ Λουκαρίας, οὔσης ἀποικίας Ῥωμαίων, ἐπόρθει τὴν χώραν.

[6] μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα καταστρατοπεδεύσας περὶ τὸ καλούμενον Οἰβώνιον ἐπέτρεχε τὴν Ἀργυριππανὴν καὶ πᾶσαν ἀδεῶς ἐλεηλάτει τὴν Δαυνίαν.

[7] ἐν ᾧ καιρῷ καὶ Φάβιος μετὰ τὴν κατάστασιν θύσας τοῖς θεοῖς ἐξώρμησε μετὰ τοῦ συνάρχοντος καὶ τῶν ἐκ τοῦ καιροῦ καταγραφέντων τεττάρων στρατοπέδων.

[8] συμμίξας δὲ ταῖς ἀπʼ Ἀριμίνου βοηθούσαις δυνάμεσι περὶ τὴν Ναρνίαν, Γνάιον μὲν τὸν ὑπάρχοντα στρατηγὸν ἀπολύσας τῆς κατὰ γῆν στρατείας ἐξαπέστειλε μετὰ παραπομπῆς εἰς τὴν Ῥώμην, ἐντειλάμενος, ἐάν τι κατὰ θάλατταν κινῶνται Καρχηδόνιοι, βοηθεῖν ἀεὶ τοῖς ὑποπίπτουσι καιροῖς,

[9] αὐτὸς δὲ μετὰ τοῦ συνάρχοντος παραλαβὼν τὰς δυνάμεις ἀντεστρατοπέδευσε τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις περὶ τὰς Αἴκας καλουμένας, ἀπέχων τῶν πολεμίων περὶ πεντήκοντα στα

[1] δίους. Ἀννίβας δὲ συνεὶς τὴν παρουσίαν τοῦ Φαβίου καὶ βουλόμενος ἐξ ἐφόδου καταπλήξασθαι τοὺς ὑπεναντίους, ἐξαγαγὼν τὴν δύναμιν καὶ συνεγγίσας τῷ τῶν Ῥωμαίων χάρακι παρετάξατο. χρόνον δέ τινα μείνας, οὐδενὸς ἐπεξιόντος αὖθις ἀνεχώρησεν εἰς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ παρεμβολήν.

[2] ὁ γὰρ Φάβιος διεγνωκὼς μήτε παραβάλλεσθαι μήτε διακινδυνεύειν, στοχάζεσθαι δὲ πρῶτον καὶ μάλιστα τῆς ἀσφαλείας τῶν ὑποταττομένων, ἔμενε βεβαίως ἐπὶ τῆς διαλήψεως ταύτης.

[3] τὰς μὲν οὖν ἀρχὰς κατεφρονεῖτο καὶ παρεῖχε λόγον ὡς ἀποδεδειλιακὼς καὶ καταπεπληγμένος τὸν κίνδυνον, τῷ δὲ χρόνῳ πάντας ἠνάγκασε παρομολογῆσαι καὶ συγχωρεῖν ὡς οὔτε νουνεχέστερον οὔτε φρονιμώτερον οὐδένα δυνατὸν ἦν χρῆσθαι τοῖς τότε περιεστῶσι καιροῖς.

[4] ταχὺ δὲ καὶ τὰ πράγματα προσεμαρτύρησε τοῖς λογισμοῖς αὐτοῦ. καὶ τοῦτʼ εἰκότως ἐγένετο.

[5] τὰς μὲν γὰρ τῶν ὑπεναντίων δυνάμεις συνέβαινε γεγυμνάσθαι μὲν ἐκ τῆς πρώτης ἡλικίας συνεχῶς ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς, ἡγεμόνι δὲ χρῆσθαι συντεθραμμένῳ σφίσι καὶ παιδομαθεῖ περὶ τὰς ἐν τοῖς ὑπαίθροις χρείας,

[6] νενικηκέναι δὲ πολλὰς μὲν ἐν Ἰβηρίᾳ μάχας, δὶς δὲ Ῥωμαίους ἑξῆς καὶ τοὺς συμμάχους αὐτῶν, τὸ δὲ μέγιστον, ἀπεγνωκότας πάντα μίαν ἔχειν ἐλπίδα τῆς σωτηρίας τὴν ἐν τῷ νικᾶν·

[7] περὶ δὲ τὴν τῶν Ῥωμαίων στρατιὰν τἀναντία τούτοις ὑπῆρχε.

[8] διόπερ εἰς μὲν τὸν ὑπὲρ τῶν ὅλων κίνδυνον οὐχ οἷός τʼ ἦν συγκαταβαίνειν, προδήλου τῆς ἐλαττώσεως ὑπαρχούσης· εἰς δὲ τὰ σφέτερα προτερήματα τοῖς λογισμοῖς ἀναχωρήσας ἐν τούτοις διέτριβε καὶ διὰ τούτων ἐχείριζε τὸν πόλεμον.

[9] ἦν δὲ τὰ προτερήματα Ῥωμαίων ἀκατάτριπτα χορήγια

[1] καὶ χειρῶν πλῆθος. διόπερ κατὰ τοὺς ἑξῆς χρόνους ἀντιπαρῆγεν τοῖς πολεμίοις ἀεὶ καὶ τοὺς εὐκαίρους προκατελάμβανε τόπους κατὰ τὴν ἐμπειρίαν.

[2] ἔχων δὲ κατὰ νώτου τὰς χορηγίας ἀφθόνους οὐδέποτε τοὺς στρατιώτας ἠφίει προνομεύειν οὐδὲ χωρίζεσθαι καθάπαξ ἐκ τοῦ χάρακος, ἅθρους δʼ ἀεὶ καὶ συνεστραμμένους τηρῶν ἐφήδρευε τοῖς τόποις καὶ καιροῖς.

[3] καὶ πολλοὺς τῶν πολεμίων ἀποσπωμένους ἀπὸ τῆς ἰδίας παρεμβολῆς ἐπὶ τὰς προνομὰς διὰ τὸ καταφρονεῖν ὑποχειρίους ἐλάμβανε καὶ κατέφθειρε τῷ τοιούτῳ τρόπῳ.

[4] ταῦτα δʼ ἐποίει, βουλόμενος ἅμα μὲν ἀφʼ ὡρισμένου πλήθους ἐλαττοῦν ἀεὶ τοὺς ὑπεναντίους, ἅμα δὲ τὰς τῶν ἰδίων δυνάμεων ψυχὰς προηττημένας τοῖς ὅλοις διὰ τῶν κατὰ μέρος προτερημάτων κατὰ βραχὺ σωματοποιεῖν καὶ προσαναλαμβάνειν.

[5] εἰς ὁλοσχερῆ δὲ κρίσιν ἐξ ὁμολόγου συγκαταβαίνειν οὐδαμῶς οἷός τʼ ἦν.

[6] οὐ μὴν Μάρκῳ γε τῷ συνάρχοντι τούτων οὐδὲν ἤρεσκεν. σύμψηφον δὲ τοῖς ὄχλοις ποιῶν αὑτὸν τὸν μὲν Φάβιον κατελάλει πρὸς πάντας, ὡς ἀγεννῶς χρώμενον τοῖς πράγμασιν καὶ νωθρῶς, αὐτὸς δὲ πρόθυμος ἦν παραβάλλεσθαι καὶ διακινδυνεύειν.

[7] οἱ δὲ Καρχηδόνιοι καταφθείραντες τοὺς προειρημένους τόπους ὑπερέβαλον τὸν Ἀπεννῖνον καὶ κατάραντες εἰς τὴν Σαυνῖτιν χώραν, οὖσαν εὐδαίμονα καὶ πολλῶν χρόνων ἀπολέμητον, ἐν τοιαύτῃ περιουσίᾳ τῶν ἐπιτηδείων ἦσαν ὥστε μήτε χρωμένους μήτε καταφθείροντας ἀνύειν δύνασθαι τὰς λείας. κατέδραμον δὲ καὶ τὴν Οὐενοαντανήν,

[8] Ῥωμαίων ἀποικίαν ὑπάρχουσαν· εἷλον δὲ καὶ πόλιν Οὐενουσίαν, ἀτείχιστον οὖσαν καὶ πολλῆς καὶ παντοδαπῆς ἀποσκευῆς γέμουσαν.

[9] οἱ δὲ Ῥωμαῖοι κατόπιν μὲν εἵποντο συνεχῶς, μιᾶς καὶ δυεῖν ἡμερῶν ὁδὸν ἀπέχοντες, ἐγγίζειν γε μὴν καὶ συμπλέκεσθαι τοῖς πολεμίοις οὐχ οἷοί τʼ ἦσαν.

[10] διόπερ Ἀννίβας ὁρῶν τὸν Φάβιον φυγομαχοῦντα μὲν προδήλως τοῖς δʼ ὅλοις οὐκ ἐκχωροῦντα τῶν ὑπαίθρων, ὥρμησε τολμηρῶς εἰς τὰ περὶ Καπύην πεδία, καὶ τούτων εἰς τὸν προσαγορευόμενον Φάλερνον τόπον,

[11] πεπεισμένος δυεῖν θάτερον, ἢ μάχεσθαι τοὺς πολεμίους ἀναγκάσειν ἢ πᾶσι δῆλον ποιήσειν ὅτι κρατεῖ τῶν ὅλων καὶ παραχωροῦσι Ῥωμαῖοι τῶν ὑπαίθρων αὐτοῖς.

[12] οὗ γενομένου καταπλαγείσας ἤλπιζε τὰς πόλεις ὁρμήσειν πρὸς τὴν ἀπὸ Ῥωμαίων ἀπόστασιν.

[13] ἕως γὰρ τότε δυσὶ μάχαις ἤδη λελειμμένων αὐτῶν οὐδεμία πόλις ἀπέστη τῶν κατὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν πρὸς Καρχηδονίους, ἀλλὰ διετήρουν τὴν πίστιν, καίπερ ἔνιαι πάσχουσαι κακῶς.

[14] ἐξ ὧν καὶ παρασημήναιτʼ ἄν τις τὴν κατάπληξιν καὶ καταξίωσιν παρὰ τοῖς συμμάχοις τοῦ Ῥωμαίων πολιτεύματος.

[1] οὐ μὴν ἀλλʼ ὅ γʼ Ἀννίβας εἰκότως ἐπὶ τούτους κατήντα τοὺς λογισμούς.

[2] τὰ γὰρ πεδία τὰ κατὰ Καπύην ἐπιφανέστατα μέν ἐστι τῶν κατὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν καὶ διὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν καὶ διὰ τὸ κάλλος καὶ διὰ τὸ πρὸς αὐτῇ κεῖσθαι τῇ θαλάττῃ καὶ τούτοις χρῆσθαι τοῖς ἐμπορίοις, εἰς ἃ σχεδὸν ἐκ πάσης τῆς οἰκουμένης κατατρέχουσιν οἱ πλέοντες εἰς Ἰταλίαν.

[3] περιέχουσι δὲ καὶ τὰς ἐπιφανεστάτας καὶ καλλίστας πόλεις τῆς Ἰταλίας ἐν αὑτοῖς.

[4] τὴν μὲν γὰρ παραλίαν αὐτῶν Σενοεσανοὶ καὶ Κυμαῖοι καὶ Δικαιαρχῖται νέμονται, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις Νεαπολῖται, τελευταῖον δὲ τὸ τῶν Νουκερίνων ἔθνος.

[5] τῆς δὲ μεσογαίου τὰ μὲν πρὸς τὰς ἄρκτους Καληνοὶ καὶ Τιανῖται κατοικοῦσι, τὰ δὲ πρὸς ἕω καὶ μεσημβρίαν Δαύνιοι

[6] καὶ Νωλανοί. κατὰ μέσα δὲ τὰ πεδία κεῖσθαι συμβαίνει τὴν πασῶν ποτε μακαριωτάτην γεγονυῖαν πόλιν Καπύην.

[7] ἐπιεικέστατος δὲ καὶ παρὰ τοῖς μυθογράφοις ὁ περὶ τούτων τῶν πεδίων λέγεται λόγος· προσαγορεύεται δὲ καὶ ταῦτα Φλεγραῖα, καθάπερ καὶ ἕτερα τῶν ἐπιφανῶν πεδίων· θεούς γε μὴν μάλιστα περὶ τούτων εἰκὸς ἠρικέναι διὰ τὸ κάλλος καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν αὐτῶν.

[8] ἅμα δὲ τοῖς προειρημένοις ὀχυρὰ δοκεῖ καὶ δυσέμβολα τελέως εἶναι τὰ πεδία· τὰ μὲν γὰρ θαλάττῃ τὸ δὲ πλεῖον ὄρεσι μεγάλοις πάντῃ καὶ συνεχέσι περιέχεται, διʼ ὧν εἰσβολαὶ τρεῖς ὑπάρχουσι μόνον ἐκ τῆς μεσογαίου στεναὶ καὶ δύσβατοι,

[9] μία μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς Σαυνίτιδος, δευτέρα δʼ ἀπὸ τῆς Λατίνης, ἡ δὲ κατάλοιπος ἀπὸ τῶν κατὰ τοὺς Ἱρπίνους τόπων.

[10] διόπερ ἔμελλον εἰς ταῦτα καταστρατοπεδεύσαντες ὥσπερ εἰς θέατρον οἱ Καρχηδόνιοι καταπλήξεσθαι μὲν τῷ παραλόγῳ πάντας, ἐκθεατριεῖν δὲ τοὺς πολεμίους φυγομαχοῦντας, αὐτοὶ δʼ ἐξ ὁμολόγου φανήσεσθαι τῶν ὑπαίθρων κρατοῦντες.

[1] Ἀννίβας μὲν οὖν τοιούτοις χρησάμενος λογισμοῖς καὶ διελθὼν ἐκ τῆς Σαυνίτιδος τὰ στενὰ κατὰ τὸν Ἐριβιανὸν καλούμενον λόφον κατεστρατοπέδευσε παρὰ τὸν Ἄθυρνον ποταμόν, ὃς σχεδὸν δίχα διαιρεῖ τὰ προειρημένα πεδία.

[2] καὶ τὴν μὲν παρεμβολὴν ἐκ τοῦ πρὸς Ῥώμην μέρους εἶχε, ταῖς δὲ προνομαῖς πᾶν ἐπιτρέχων ἐπόρθει τὸ πεδίον ἀδεῶς.

[3] Φάβιος δὲ κατεπέπληκτο μὲν τὴν ἐπιβολὴν καὶ τόλμαν τῶν ὑπεναντίων, τοσούτῳ δὲ μᾶλλον ἐπὶ τῶν κεκριμένων ἔμενεν.

[4] ὁ δὲ συνάρχων αὐτοῦ Μάρκος καὶ πάντες οἱ κατὰ τὸ στρατόπεδον χιλίαρχοι καὶ ταξίαρχοι νομίζοντες ἐν καλῷ τοὺς πολεμίους ἀπειληφέναι, σπεύδειν ᾤοντο δεῖν καὶ συνάπτειν εἰς τὰ πεδία καὶ μὴ περιορᾶν τὴν ἐπιφανεστάτην χώραν δῃουμένην.

[5] Φάβιος δὲ μέχρι μὲν τοῦ συνάψαι τοῖς τόποις ἔσπευδε καὶ συνυπεκρίνετο τοῖς προθύμως καὶ φιλοκινδύνως διακειμένοις,

[6] ἐγγίσας δὲ τῷ Φαλέρνῳ ταῖς μὲν παρωρείαις ἐπιφαινόμενος ἀντιπαρῆγε τοῖς πολεμίοις, ὥστε μὴ δοκεῖν τοῖς αὑτῶν συμμάχοις ἐκχωρεῖν τῶν ὑπαίθρων,

[7] εἰς δὲ τὸ πεδίον οὐ καθίει τὴν δύναμιν, εὐλαβούμενος τοὺς ὁλοσχερεῖς κινδύνους διά τε τὰς προειρημένας αἰτίας καὶ διὰ τὸ προφανῶς ἱπποκρατεῖν παρὰ πολὺ τοὺς ὑπεναντίους.

[8] Ἀννίβας δʼ ἐπειδὴ καταπειράσας τῶν πολεμίων καὶ καταφθείρας πᾶν τὸ πεδίον ἥθροισε λείας ἄπλετον πλῆθος,

[9] ἐγίνετο πρὸς ἀναζυγήν, βουλόμενος μὴ καταφθεῖραι τὴν λείαν, ἀλλʼ εἰς τοιοῦτον ἀπερείσασθαι τόπον, ἐν ᾧ δυνήσεται ποιήσασθαι καὶ τὴν παραχειμασίαν, ἵνα μὴ μόνον κατὰ τὸ παρὸν εὐωχίαν ἀλλὰ συνεχῶς δαψίλειαν ἔχῃ τῶν ἐπιτηδείων τὸ στρατόπεδον.

[10] Φάβιος δὲ καὶ κατανοῶν αὐτοῦ τὴν ἐπιβολήν, ὅτι προχειρίζεται ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἐπάνοδον ᾗπερ ἐποιήσατο καὶ τὴν εἴσοδον, καὶ θεωρῶν τοὺς τόπους στενοὺς ὄντας καὶ καθʼ ὑπερβολὴν εὐφυεῖς πρὸς ἐπίθεσιν,

[11] ἐπʼ αὐτῆς μὲν τῆς διεκβολῆς περὶ τετρακισχιλίους ἐπέστησε, παρακαλέσας χρήσασθαι τῇ προθυμίᾳ σὺν καιρῷ μετὰ τῆς τῶν τόπων εὐφυΐας, αὐτὸς δὲ τὸ πολὺ μέρος ἔχων τῆς δυνάμεως ἐπί τινα λόφον ὑπερδέξιον πρὸ τῶν στε

[1] νῶν κατεστρατοπέδευσε. παραγενομένων δὲ τῶν Καρχηδονίων καὶ ποιησαμένων τὴν παρεμβολὴν ἐν τοῖς ἐπιπέδοις ὑπʼ αὐτὴν τὴν παρώρειαν, τὴν μὲν λείαν αὐτῶν ἤλπισεν ἀδηρίτως περισυρεῖν, ὡς δὲ τὸ πολὺ καὶ τοῖς ὅλοις πέρας ἐπιθήσειν διὰ τὴν τῶν τόπων εὐκαιρίαν.

[2] καὶ δὴ περὶ ταῦτα καὶ πρὸς τούτοις ἐγίνετο τοῖς διαβουλίοις, διανοούμενος πῇ καὶ πῶς χρήσεται τοῖς τόποις καὶ τίνες καὶ πόθεν πρῶτον ἐγχειρήσουσι τοῖς ὑπεναντίοις.

[3] Ἀννίβας δέ, ταῦτα πρὸς τὴν ἐπιοῦσαν ἡμέραν παρασκευαζομένων τῶν πολεμίων, συλλογιζόμενος ἐκ τῶν εἰκότων οὐκ ἔδωκε χρόνον οὐδʼ ἀναστροφὴν ταῖς ἐπιβολαῖς αὐτῶν,

[4] ἀνακαλεσάμενος δὲ τὸν ἐπὶ τῶν λειτουργιῶν τεταγμένον Ἀσδρούβαν παρήγγειλε λαμπάδας δεσμεύειν ἐκ τῆς ξηρᾶς καὶ παντοδαπῆς ὕλης κατὰ τάχος ὡς πλείστας καὶ τῶν ἐργατῶν βοῶν ἐκλέξαντʼ ἐκ πάσης τῆς λείας τοὺς εὐρωστοτάτους εἰς δισχιλίους ἁθροῖσαι πρὸ τῆς παρεμβολῆς.

[5] γενομένου δὲ τούτου συναγαγὼν ὑπέδειξε τοῖς λειτουργοῖς ὑπερβολήν τινα μεταξὺ κειμένην τῆς αὑτοῦ στρατοπεδείας καὶ τῶν στενῶν, διʼ ὧν ἔμελλε ποιεῖσθαι τὴν πορείαν, πρὸς ἣν ἐκέλευε προσελαύνειν τοὺς βοῦς ἐνεργῶς καὶ μετὰ βίας, ὅταν δοθῇ τὸ παράγγελμα, μέχρι συνάψωσι τοῖς ἄκροις.

[6] μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο δειπνοποιησαμένοις ἀναπαύεσθαι καθʼ ὥραν παρήγγειλε πᾶσιν.

[7] ἅμα δὲ τῷ κλῖναι τὸ τρίτον μέρος τῆς νυκτὸς εὐθέως ἐξῆγε τοὺς λειτουργοὺς καὶ προσδεῖν ἐκέλευσε πρὸς τὰ κέρατα τοῖς βουσὶ τὰς λαμπάδας.

[8] ταχὺ δὲ τούτου γενομένου διὰ τὸ πλῆθος, ἀνάψαι παρήγγειλε πάσας καὶ τοὺς μὲν βοῦς ἐλαύνειν καὶ προσβάλλειν πρὸς τὰς ἀκρωρείας ἐπέταξε,

[9] τοὺς δὲ λογχοφόρους κατόπιν ἐπιστήσας τούτοις ἕως μέν τινος συνεργεῖν παρεκελεύετο τοῖς ἐλαύνουσιν, ὅταν δὲ τὴν πρώτην ἅπαξ ὁρμὴν λάβῃ τὰ ζῷα, παρατρέχοντας παρὰ τὰ πλάγια καὶ συγκρούοντας ἅμα τῶν ὑπερδεξίων ἀντέχεσθαι τόπων καὶ προκαταλαμβάνειν τὰς ἀκρωρείας, ἵνα παραβοηθῶσι καὶ συμπλέκωνται τοῖς πολεμίοις, ἐάν που συναντῶσι πρὸς τὰς ὑπερβολάς.

[10] κατὰ δὲ τὸν καιρὸν τοῦτον αὐτὸς ἀναλαβὼν πρῶτα μὲν τὰ βαρέα τῶν ὅπλων, ἐπὶ δὲ τούτοις τοὺς ἱππεῖς, ἑξῆς δὲ τὴν λείαν, ἐπὶ δὲ πᾶσι τοὺς Ἴβηρας καὶ Κελτοὺς

[1] ἧκε πρὸς τὰ στενὰ καὶ τὰς διεκβολάς. τῶν δὲ Ῥωμαίων οἱ μὲν ἐπὶ τοῖς στενοῖς φυλάττοντες ἅμα τῷ συνιδεῖν τὰ φῶτα προσβάλλοντα πρὸς τὰς ὑπερβολάς, νομίσαντες ταύτῃ ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ὁρμὴν τὸν Ἀννίβαν, ἀπολιπόντες τὰς δυσχωρίας παρεβοήθουν τοῖς ἄκροις.

[2] ἐγγίζοντες δὲ τοῖς βουσὶν ἠποροῦντο διὰ τὰ φῶτα, μεῖζόν τι τοῦ συμβαίνοντος καὶ δεινότερον ἀναπλάττοντες καὶ προσδοκῶντες. ἐπιγενομένων δὲ τῶν λογχοφόρων,

[3] οὗτοι μὲν βραχέα πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἀκροβολισάμενοι, τῶν βοῶν αὐτοῖς ἐμπιπτόντων ἔμειναν διαστάντες ἐπὶ τῶν ἄκρων ἀμφότεροι καὶ προσανεῖχον καραδοκοῦντες τὴν ἐπιφάνειαν τῆς ἡμέρας διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι γνῶναι τὸ γινόμενον.

[4] Φάβιος δὲ τὰ μὲν ἀπορούμενος ἐπὶ τῷ συμβαίνοντι καὶ κατὰ τὸν ποιητὴν ὀισσάμενος δόλον εἶναι, τὰ δὲ κατὰ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὑπόθεσιν οὐδαμῶς κρίνων ἐκκυβεύειν οὐδὲ παραβάλλεσθαι τοῖς ὅλοις, ἦγε τὴν ἡσυχίαν ἐπὶ τῷ χάρακι καὶ προσεδέχετο τὴν ἡμέραν.

[5] κατὰ δὲ τὸν καιρὸν τοῦτον Ἀννίβας, προχωρούντων αὐτῷ τῶν πραγμάτων κατὰ τὴν ἐπιβολήν, τήν τε δύναμιν διεκόμισε διὰ τῶν στενῶν μετʼ ἀσφαλείας καὶ τὴν λείαν, λελοιπότων τοὺς τόπους τῶν παραφυλαττόντων τὰς δυσχωρίας.

[6] ἅμα δὲ τῷ φωτὶ συνιδὼν τοὺς ἐν τοῖς ἄκροις ἀντικαθημένους τοῖς λογχοφόροις ἐπαπέστειλέ τινας τῶν Ἰβήρων, οἳ καὶ συμμίξαντες κατέβαλον μὲν τῶν Ῥωμαίων εἰς χιλίους, ῥᾳδίως δὲ τοὺς παρὰ σφῶν εὐζώνους ἐκδεξάμενοι κατεβίβασαν.

[7] Ἀννίβας μὲν οὖν τοιαύτην ἐκ τοῦ Φαλέρνου ποιησάμενος τὴν ἔξοδον, λοιπὸν ἤδη στρατοπεδεύων ἀσφαλῶς κατεσκέπτετο καὶ προυνοεῖτο περὶ τῆς χειμασίας ποῦ καὶ πῶς ποιήσεται, μέγαν φόβον καὶ πολλὴν ἀπορίαν παρεστακὼς ταῖς πόλεσι καὶ τοῖς κατὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν ἀνθρώποις.

[8] Φάβιος δὲ κακῶς μὲν ἤκουε παρὰ τοῖς πολλοῖς, ὡς ἀνάνδρως ἐκ τοιούτων τόπων προέμενος τοὺς ὑπεναντίους, οὐ μὴν ἀφίστατό γε τῆς προθέσεως.

[9] καὶ ἀναγκασθεὶς δὲ μετʼ ὀλίγας ἡμέρας ἐπί τινας ἀπελθεῖν θυσίας εἰς τὴν Ῥώμην παρέδωκεν τῷ συνάρχοντι τὰ στρατόπεδα καὶ πολλὰ χωριζόμενος ἐνετείλατο μὴ τοσαύτην ποιεῖσθαι σπουδὴν ὑπὲρ τοῦ βλάψαι τοὺς πολεμίους ἡλίκην ὑπὲρ τοῦ μηδὲν αὐτοὺς παθεῖν δεινόν.

[10] ὧν οὐδὲ μικρὸν ἐν νῷ τιθέμενος Μάρκος ἔτι λέγοντος αὐτοῦ ταῦτα πρὸς τῷ παραβάλλεσθαι καὶ τῷ διακινδυνεύειν ὅλος καὶ πᾶς ἦν.

[1] τὰ μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν τοιαύτην εἶχε τὴν διάθεσιν.

[2] κατὰ δὲ τοὺς αὐτοὺς καιροὺς ταῖς προειρημέναις πράξεσιν Ἀσδρούβας ὁ τεταγμένος ἐπὶ τῆς Ἰβηρίας στρατηγὸς κατηρτικὼς ἐν τῇ παραχειμασίᾳ τὰς ὑπὸ τἀδελφοῦ καταλειφθείσας τριάκοντα ναῦς καὶ δέκα προσπεπληρωκὼς ἄλλας, ἀρχομένης τῆς θερείας ἀνήχθη τετταράκοντα ναυσὶ καταφράκτοις ἐκ Καινῆς πόλεως, προχειρισάμενος Ἀμίλκαν τοῦ στόλου ναύαρχον.

[3] ἅμα δὲ καὶ τὴν πεζὴν ἐκ τῆς παραχειμασίας ἡθροικὼς δύναμιν ἀνέζευξε· καὶ ταῖς μὲν ναυσὶ παρὰ τὴν χέρσον ἐποιεῖτο τὸν πλοῦν, τοῖς δὲ πεζοῖς τὴν πορείαν παρὰ τὸν αἰγιαλόν, σπεύδων ἀμφοτέραις ἅμα ταῖς δυνάμεσι καταζεῦξαι πρὸς τὸν Ἴβηρα ποταμόν.

[4] Γνάιος δὲ τὰς ἐπιβολὰς συλλογιζόμενος τῶν Καρχηδονίων τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἐπεβάλετο κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλατταν ἐκ τῆς παραχειμασίας ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἀπάντησιν.

[5] ἀκούων δὲ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν δυνάμεων καὶ τὸ μέγεθος τῆς παρασκευῆς τὸ μὲν κατὰ γῆν ἀπαντᾶν ἀπεδοκίμασε, συμπληρώσας δὲ πέντε καὶ τριάκοντα ναῦς καὶ λαβὼν ἐκ τοῦ πεζικοῦ στρατεύματος τοὺς ἐπιτηδειοτάτους ἄνδρας πρὸς τὴν ἐπιβατικὴν χρείαν ἀνήχθη καὶ κατῆρε δευτεραῖος ἐκ Ταρράκωνος εἰς τοὺς περὶ τὸν Ἴβηρα ποταμὸν τόπους.

[6] καθορμισθεὶς δὲ τῶν πολεμίων ἐν ἀποστήματι περὶ τοὺς ὀγδοήκοντα σταδίους προαπέστειλε κατασκεψομένας δύο ναῦς ταχυπλοούσας Μασσαλιητικάς· καὶ γὰρ προκαθηγοῦντο καὶ προεκινδύνευον οὗτοι καὶ πᾶσαν ἀποτόμως σφίσι παρείχοντο τὴν χρείαν.

[7] εὐγενῶς γάρ, εἰ καί τινες ἕτεροι, κεκοινωνήκασι Ῥωμαίοις πραγμάτων καὶ Μασσαλιῶται, πολλάκις μὲν καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα, μάλιστα δὲ κατὰ τὸν Ἀννιβιακὸν πόλεμον.

[8] διασαφούντων δὲ τῶν ἐπὶ τὴν κατασκοπὴν ἐκπεμφθέντων ὅτι περὶ τὸ στόμα τοῦ ποταμοῦ συμβαίνει τὸν τῶν ὑπεναντίων ὁρμεῖν στόλον, ἀνήγετο κατὰ σπουδήν, βουλόμενος ἄφνω προσπεσεῖν τοῖς

[1] πολεμίοις. οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Ἀσδρούβαν, σημηνάντων αὐτοῖς τῶν σκοπῶν ἐκ πολλοῦ τὸν ἐπίπλουν τῶν ὑπεναντίων, ἅμα τὰς πεζικὰς ἐξέταττον δυνάμεις παρὰ τὸν αἰγιαλὸν καὶ τοῖς πληρώμασι παρήγγελλον ἐμβαίνειν εἰς τὰς ναῦς.

[2] ἤδη δὲ καὶ τῶν Ῥωμαίων σύνεγγυς ὄντων, σημήναντες πολεμικὸν ἀνήγοντο, κρίναντες ναυμαχεῖν. συμβαλόντες δὲ τοῖς πολεμίοις βραχὺν μέν τινα χρόνον ἀντεποιήσαντο τῆς νίκης, μετʼ οὐ πολὺ δὲ πρὸς τὸ κλίνειν ὥρμησαν.

[3] ἡ γὰρ ἐφεδρεία τῶν πεζῶν ἡ περὶ τὸν αἰγιαλὸν οὐχ οὕτως αὐτοὺς ὤνησε, θάρσος παριστάνουσα πρὸς τὸν κίνδυνον, ὡς ἔβλαψε τὴν ἐλπίδα τῆς σωτηρίας ἑτοίμην παρασκευάζουσα.

[4] πλὴν δύο μὲν αὐτάνδρους νῆας ἀποβαλόντες, τεττάρων δὲ τοὺς ταρσοὺς καὶ τοὺς ἐπιβάτας ἔφευγον ἐκκλίναντες εἰς γῆν.

[5] ἐπικειμένων δὲ τῶν Ῥωμαίων αὐτοῖς ἐκθύμως, τὰς μὲν ναῦς ἐξέβαλον εἰς τὸν αἰγιαλόν, αὐτοὶ δʼ ἀποπηδήσαντες ἐκ τῶν πλοίων ἐσῴζοντο πρὸς τοὺς παρατεταγμένους.

[6] οἱ δὲ Ῥωμαῖοι τολμηρῶς συνεγγίσαντες τῇ γῇ καὶ τὰ δυνάμενα κινεῖσθαι τῶν πλοίων ἀναδησάμενοι μετὰ χαρᾶς ὑπερβαλλούσης ἀπέπλεον, νενικηκότες μὲν ἐξ ἐφόδου τοὺς ὑπεναντίους, κρατοῦντες δὲ τῆς θαλάττης, εἴκοσι δὲ καὶ πέντε ναῦς ἔχοντες τῶν πολεμίων.

[7] τὰ μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὴν Ἰβηρίαν ἀπὸ τούτων ἐπικυδεστέρας εἰλήφει τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις τὰς ἐλπίδας διὰ τὸ προειρημένον κατόρθωμα.

[8] οἱ δὲ Καρχηδόνιοι, προσπεσόντος αὐτοῖς τοῦ γεγονότος ἐλαττώματος, παραχρῆμα πληρώσαντες ἑβδομήκοντα νῆας ἐξαπέστειλαν, κρίναντες ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πρὸς πάσας τὰς ἐπιβολὰς ἀντέχεσθαι τῆς θαλάττης.

[9] αἳ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον εἰς Σαρδόνʼ, ἐκεῖθεν δὲ πρὸς τοὺς περὶ Πίσας τόπους τῆς Ἰταλίας προσέβαλον, πεπεισμένων τῶν ἐπιπλεόντων συμμίξειν ἐνθάδε τοῖς περὶ τὸν Ἀννίβαν.

[10] ταχὺ δὲ τῶν Ῥωμαίων ἀναχθέντων ἐπʼ αὐτοὺς ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς Ῥώμης ἑκατὸν εἴκοσι σκάφεσι πεντηρικοῖς, πυθόμενοι τὸν ἀνάπλουν οὗτοι μὲν αὖθις ἀπέπλευσαν εἰς τὴν Σαρδόνα, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα πάλιν εἰς Καρχηδόνα.

[11] Γνάιος δὲ Σερουίλιος ἔχων τὸν προειρημένον στόλον ἕως μέν τινος ἐπηκολούθει τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις, συνάψειν πεπεισμένος, πολὺ δὲ καθυστερῶν ἀπέγνω.

[12] καὶ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον τῆς Σικελίας Λιλυβαίῳ προσέσχε· μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα καταπλεύσας τῆς Λιβύης ὡς ἐπὶ τὴν τῶν Κερκινητῶν νῆσον καὶ λαβὼν παρʼ αὐτῶν χρήματα τοῦ μὴ πορθῆσαι τὴν χώραν ἀπηλλάγη.

[13] κατὰ δὲ τὸν ἀνάπλουν γενόμενος κύριος νήσου Κοσσύρου καὶ φρουρὰν εἰς τὸ πολισμάτιον εἰσαγαγὼν αὖθις εἰς τὸ Λιλύβαιον κατῆρε.

[14] καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν οὗτος μὲν αὐτοῦ συνορμίσας τὸν στόλον μετʼ οὐ πολὺν χρόνον

[1] αὐτὸς ἀνεκομίσθη πρὸς τὰς πεζικὰς δυνάμεις· οἱ δʼ ἐκ τῆς συγκλήτου πυθόμενοι τὸ γεγονὸς προτέρημα διὰ τοῦ Γναΐου περὶ τὴν ναυμαχίαν καὶ νομίσαντες χρήσιμον εἶναι, μᾶλλον δʼ ἀναγκαῖον τὸ μὴ προΐεσθαι τὰ κατὰ τὴν Ἰβηρίαν, ἀλλʼ ἐνίστασθαι τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις καὶ τὸν πόλεμον αὔξειν,

[2] προχειρισάμενοι ναῦς εἴκοσι καὶ στρατηγὸν ἐπιστήσαντες Πόπλιον Σκιπίωνα κατὰ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς πρόθεσιν, ἐξαπέστελλον μετὰ σπουδῆς πρὸς τὸν ἀδελφὸν Γνάιον, κοινῇ πράξοντα μετʼ ἐκείνου τὰ κατὰ τὴν Ἰβηρίαν.

[3] πάνυ γὰρ ἠγωνίων μὴ κρατήσαντες Καρχηδόνιοι τῶν τόπων ἐκείνων καὶ περιποιησάμενοι χορηγίας ἀφθόνους καὶ χεῖρας ἀντιποιήσωνται μὲν τῆς θαλάττης ὁλοσχερέστερον, συνεπιθῶνται δὲ τοῖς κατὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν, στρατόπεδα πέμποντες καὶ χρήματα τοῖς περὶ τὸν Ἀννίβαν.

[4] διόπερ ἐν μεγάλῳ τιθέμενοι καὶ τοῦτον τὸν πόλεμον ἐξαπέστειλαν τάς τε ναῦς καὶ τὸν Πόπλιον. ὃς καὶ παραγενόμενος εἰς Ἰβηρίαν καὶ συμμίξας τἀδελφῷ μεγάλην παρεῖχε χρείαν τοῖς κοινοῖς πράγμασιν.

[5] οὐδέποτε γὰρ πρότερον θαρρήσαντες διαβῆναι τὸν Ἴβηρα ποταμόν, ἀλλʼ ἀσμενίζοντες τῇ τῶν ἐπὶ τάδε φιλίᾳ καὶ συμμαχίᾳ τότε διέβησαν καὶ τότε πρῶτον ἐθάρρησαν ἀντιποιεῖσθαι τῶν πέραν πραγμάτων, μεγάλα καὶ ταὐτομάτου συνεργήσαντος σφίσι πρὸς τοὺς περιεστῶτας καιρούς.

[6] ἐπειδὴ γὰρ καταπληξάμενοι τοὺς περὶ τὴν διάβασιν οἰκοῦντας τῶν Ἰβήρων ἧκον πρὸς τὴν τῶν Ζακανθαίων πόλιν, ἀποσχόντες σταδίους ὡς τετταράκοντα περὶ τὸ τῆς Ἀφροδίτης ἱερὸν κατεστρατοπέδευσαν,

[7] λαβόντες τόπον εὐφυῶς κείμενον πρός τε τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν πολεμίων ἀσφάλειαν καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἐκ θαλάττης χορηγίαν·

[8] ὁμοῦ γὰρ αὐτοῖς συνέβαινε καὶ τὸν στόλον ποιεῖσθαι τὸν παράπλουν. ἔνθα δὴ

[1] γίνεταί τις πραγμάτων περιπέτεια τοιάδε. καθʼ οὓς καιροὺς Ἀννίβας ἐποιεῖτο τὴν πορείαν εἰς Ἰταλίαν, ὅσαις πόλεσιν ἠπίστησε τῶν κατὰ τὴν Ἰβηρίαν, ἔλαβε παρὰ τούτων ὅμηρα τοὺς υἱεῖς τῶν ἐπιφανεστάτων ἀνδρῶν· οὓς πάντας εἰς τὴν Ζακανθαίων ἀπέθετο πόλιν διά τε τὴν ὀχυρότητα καὶ διὰ τὴν τῶν ἀπολειπομένων ἐπʼ αὐτῆς ἀνδρῶν πίστιν. ἦν δέ τις ἀνὴρ Ἴβηρ,

[2] Ἀβίλυξ ὄνομα, κατὰ μὲν τὴν δόξαν καὶ τὴν τοῦ βίου περίστασιν οὐδενὸς δεύτερος Ἰβήρων, κατὰ δὲ τὴν πρὸς Καρχηδονίους εὔνοιαν καὶ πίστιν πολύ τι διαφέρειν δοκῶν τῶν ἄλλων.

[3] οὗτος θεωρῶν τὰ πράγματα καὶ νομίσας ἐπικυδεστέρας εἶναι τὰς τῶν Ῥωμαίων ἐλπίδας, συνελογίσατο παρʼ ἑαυτῷ περὶ τῆς τῶν ὁμήρων προδοσίας συλλογισμὸν Ἰβηρικὸν καὶ βαρβαρικόν.

[4] πεισθεὶς γὰρ διότι δύναται μέγας γενέσθαι παρὰ Ῥωμαίοις προσενεγκάμενος ἐν καιρῷ πίστιν ἅμα καὶ χρείαν, ἐγίνετο πρὸς τῷ παρασπονδήσας τοὺς Καρχηδονίους ἐγχειρίσαι τοὺς ὁμήρους τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις.

[5] θεωρῶν δὲ τὸν Βώστορα τὸν τῶν Καρχηδονίων στρατηγόν, ὃς ἀπεστάλη μὲν ὑπʼ Ἀσδρούβου κωλύσων τοὺς Ῥωμαίους διαβαίνειν τὸν ποταμόν, οὐ θαρρήσας δὲ τοῦτο ποιεῖν ἀνακεχωρηκὼς ἐστρατοπέδευε τῆς Ζακάνθης ἐν τοῖς πρὸς θάλατταν μέρεσιν, τοῦτον μὲν ἄκακον ὄντα τὸν ἄνδρα καὶ πρᾷον τῇ φύσει,

[6] πιστῶς δὲ τὰ πρὸς αὐτὸν διακείμενον, ποιεῖται λόγους ὑπὲρ τῶν ὁμήρων πρὸς τὸν Βώστορα φάσκων, ἐπειδὴ διαβεβήκασι Ῥωμαῖοι τὸν ποταμόν, οὐκέτι δύνασθαι Καρχηδονίους φόβῳ συνέχειν τὰ κατὰ τὴν Ἰβηρίαν, προσδεῖσθαι δὲ τοὺς καιροὺς τῆς τῶν ὑποταττομένων εὐνοίας·

[7] νῦν οὖν ἠγγικότων Ῥωμαίων καὶ προσκαθεζομένων τῇ Ζακάνθῃ, καὶ κινδυνευούσης τῆς πόλεως, ἐὰν ἐξαγαγὼν τοὺς ὁμήρους ἀποκαταστήσῃ τοῖς γονεῦσι καὶ ταῖς πόλεσιν, ἐκλύσειν μὲν αὐτὸν τῶν Ῥωμαίων τὴν φιλοτιμίαν· τοῦτο γὰρ αὐτὸ καὶ μάλιστα σπουδάζειν ἐκείνους πρᾶξαι, κυριεύοντας τῶν ὁμήρων·

[8] ἐκκαλέσεσθαι δὲ τὴν τῶν Ἰβήρων πάντων πρὸς Καρχηδονίους εὔνοιαν, προϊδόμενον τὸ μέλλον καὶ προνοηθέντα τῆς τῶν ὁμήρων ἀσφαλείας. τὴν δὲ χάριν αὐξήσειν ἔφη πολλαπλασίαν, αὐτὸς γενόμενος χειριστὴς τοῦ πράγματος.

[9] ἀποκαθιστάνων γὰρ εἰς τὰς πόλεις τοὺς παῖδας οὐ μόνον τὴν παρʼ αὐτῶν εὔνοιαν ἐπισπάσεσθαι τῶν γεννησάντων ἀλλὰ καὶ παρὰ τῶν πολλῶν, ὑπὸ τὴν ὄψιν τιθεὶς διὰ τοῦ συμβαίνοντος τὴν Καρχηδονίων πρὸς τοὺς συμμάχους αἵρεσιν καὶ μεγαλοψυχίαν.

[10] προσδοκᾶν δʼ αὐτὸν ἐκέλευσε καὶ δώρων πλῆθος ἰδίᾳ παρὰ τῶν τὰ τέκνα κομιζομένων· παραδόξως γὰρ ἑκάστους ἐγκρατεῖς γινομένους τῶν ἀναγκαιοτάτων ἅμιλλαν ποιήσεσθαι τῆς εἰς τὸν κύριον τῶν πραγμάτων εὐεργεσίας.

[11] παραπλήσια δὲ τούτοις ἕτερα καὶ πλείω πρὸς τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον διαλεχθεὶς ἔπεισε τὸν Βώστορα συγκαταθέσθαι τοῖς

[1] λεγομένοις. καὶ τότε μὲν ἐπανῆλθε, ταξάμενος ἡμέραν, ᾗ παρέσται μετὰ τῶν ἐπιτηδείων πρὸς τὴν ἀνακομιδὴν τῶν παίδων.

[2] παραγενηθεὶς δὲ νυκτὸς ἐπὶ τὸ τῶν Ῥωμαίων στρατόπεδον καὶ συμμίξας τισὶ τῶν συστρατευομένων ἐκείνοις Ἰβήρων διὰ τούτων εἰσῆλθε πρὸς τοὺς στρατηγούς.

[3] ἐκλογιζόμενος δὲ διὰ πλειόνων τὴν ἐσομένην ὁρμὴν καὶ μετάπτωσιν πρὸς αὐτοὺς τῶν Ἰβήρων, ἐὰν ἐγκρατεῖς γένωνται τῶν ὁμήρων, ἐπηγγείλατο παραδώσειν αὐτοῖς τοὺς παῖδας.

[4] τῶν δὲ περὶ τὸν Πόπλιον ὑπερβολῇ προθύμως δεξαμένων τὴν ἐλπίδα καὶ μεγάλας ὑπισχνουμένων δωρεάς, τότε μὲν εἰς τὴν ἰδίαν ἀπηλλάγη, συνθέμενος ἡμέραν καὶ καιρὸν καὶ τόπον, ἐν ᾧ δεήσει τοὺς ἐκδεξομένους αὐτὸν ὑπομένειν.

[5] μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα παραλαβὼν τοὺς ἐπιτηδείους τῶν φίλων ἧκε πρὸς τὸν Βώστορα καί, παραδοθέντων αὐτῷ τῶν παίδων ἐκ τῆς Ζακάνθης, νυκτὸς ποιησάμενος τὴν ἔξοδον, ὡς θέλων λαθεῖν, παραπορευθεὶς τὸν χάρακα τῶν πολεμίων ἧκε πρὸς τὸν τεταγμένον καιρὸν καὶ τόπον καὶ πάντας ἐνεχείρισε τοὺς ὁμήρους τοῖς ἡγεμόσι τῶν Ῥωμαίων.

[6] οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Πόπλιον ἐτίμησάν τε διαφερόντως τὸν Ἀβίλυγα καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀποκατάστασιν τῶν ὁμήρων εἰς τὰς πατρίδας ἐχρήσαντο τούτῳ, συμπέμψαντες τοὺς ἐπιτηδείους.

[7] ὃς ἐπιπορευόμενος τὰς πόλεις καὶ διὰ τῆς τῶν παίδων ἀποκαταστάσεως τιθεὶς ὑπὸ τὴν ὄψιν τὴν τῶν Ῥωμαίων πρᾳότητα καὶ μεγαλοψυχίαν παρὰ τὴν Καρχηδονίων ἀπιστίαν καὶ βαρύτητα καὶ προσπαρατιθεὶς τὴν αὑτοῦ μετάθεσιν πολλοὺς Ἰβήρων παρώρμησε πρὸς τὴν τῶν Ῥωμαίων φιλίαν.

[8] Βώστωρ δὲ παιδικώτερον ἢ κατὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν δόξας ἐγκεχειρικέναι τοὺς ὁμήρους τοῖς πολεμίοις οὐκ εἰς τοὺς τυχόντας ἐπεπτώκει κινδύνους.

[9] καὶ τότε μέν, ἤδη τῆς ὥρας κατεπειγούσης, διέλυον εἰς παραχειμασίαν ἀμφότεροι τὰς δυνάμεις, ἱκανοῦ τινος ἐκ τῆς τύχης γεγονότος συνεργήματος τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις τοῦ περὶ τοὺς παῖδας πρὸς τὰς ἐπικειμένας ἐπιβολάς. καὶ τὰ μὲν κατὰ τὴν Ἰβηρίαν ἐν τούτοις ἦν.

[1] ὁ δὲ στρατηγὸς Ἀννίβας, ὅθεν ἀπελίπομεν, πυνθανόμενος παρὰ τῶν κατασκόπων πλεῖστον ὑπάρχειν σῖτον ἐν τῇ περὶ τὴν Λουκαρίαν καὶ τὸ καλούμενον Γερούνιον χώρᾳ, πρὸς δὲ τὴν συναγωγὴν εὐφυῶς ἔχειν τὸ Γερούνιον,

[2] κρίνας ἐκεῖ ποιεῖσθαι τὴν παραχειμασίαν, προῆγε ποιούμενος τὴν πορείαν παρὰ τὸ Λίβυρνον ὄρος ἐπὶ τοὺς προειρημένους τόπους. ἀφικόμενος δὲ πρὸς τὸ Γερούνιον,

[3] ὃ τῆς Λουκαρίας ἀπέχει διακόσια στάδια, τὰς μὲν ἀρχὰς διὰ λόγων τοὺς ἐνοικοῦντας εἰς φιλίαν προυκαλεῖτο καὶ πίστεις ἐδίδου τῶν ἐπαγγελιῶν, οὐδενὸς δὲ προσέχοντος, πολιορκεῖν ἐπεβάλετο.

[4] ταχὺ δὲ γενόμενος κύριος τοὺς μὲν οἰκήτορας κατέφθειρε, τὰς δὲ πλείστας οἰκίας ἀκεραίους διεφύλαξε καὶ τὰ τείχη, βουλόμενος σιτοβολίοις χρήσασθαι πρὸς τὴν παραχειμασίαν.

[5] τὴν δὲ δύναμιν πρὸ τῆς πόλεως παρεμβαλὼν ὠχυρώσατο τάφρῳ καὶ χάρακι τὴν στρατοπεδείαν.

[6] γενόμενος δʼ ἀπὸ τούτων τὰ μὲν δύο μέρη τῆς δυνάμεως ἐπὶ τὴν σιτολογίαν ἐξέπεμπε, προστάξας καθʼ ἑκάστην ἡμέραν τακτὸν ἀναφέρειν μέτρον ἕκαστον τοῖς ἰδίοις, ἐπιβολὴν τοῦ τάγματος τοῖς προκεχειρισμένοις ἐπὶ τὴν οἰκονομίαν ταύτην,

[7] τῷ δὲ τρίτῳ μέρει τήν τε στρατοπεδείαν ἐτήρει καὶ τοῖς σιτολογοῦσι παρεφήδρευε κατὰ τόπους.

[8] οὔσης δὲ τῆς μὲν χώρας τῆς πλείστης εὐεφόδου καὶ πεδιάδος, τῶν δὲ συναγόντων ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ἀναριθμήτων, ἔτι δὲ τῆς ὥρας ἀκμαζούσης πρὸς τὴν συγκομιδήν, ἄπλετον συνέβαινε καθʼ ἑκάστην ἡμέραν ἁθροίζεσθαι τοῦ σίτου τὸ πλῆθος.

[1] Μάρκος δὲ παρειληφὼς τὰς δυνάμεις παρὰ Φαβίου τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἀντιπαρῆγε ταῖς ἀκρωρείαις, πεπεισμένος ἀεὶ περὶ τὰς ὑπερβολὰς συμπεσεῖσθαί ποτε τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις.

[2] ἀκούσας δὲ τὸ μὲν Γερούνιον τοὺς περὶ τὸν Ἀννίβαν ἤδη κατέχειν, τὴν δὲ χώραν σιτολογεῖν, πρὸ δὲ τῆς πόλεως χάρακα βεβλημένους στρατοπεδεύειν, ἐπιστρέψας ἐκ τῶν ἀκρωρειῶν κατέβαινε κατὰ τὴν ἐπὶ τὰ πεδία κατατείνουσαν ῥάχιν.

[3] ἀφικόμενος δʼ ἐπὶ τὴν ἄκραν, ἣ κεῖται μὲν ἐπὶ τῆς Λαρινάτιδος χώρας προσαγορεύεται δὲ Καλήνη, κατεστρατοπέδευσε περὶ ταύτην, πρόχειρος ὢν ἐκ παντὸς τρόπου συμπλέκεσθαι τοῖς πολεμίοις.

[4] Ἀννίβας δὲ θεωρῶν ἐγγίζοντας τοὺς πολεμίους τὸ μὲν τρίτον μέρος τῆς δυνάμεως εἴασε σιτολογεῖν, τὰ δὲ δύο μέρη λαβὼν καὶ προελθὼν ἀπὸ τῆς πόλεως ἑκκαίδεκα σταδίους πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους ἐπί τινος βουνοῦ κατεστρατοπέδευσε, βουλόμενος ἅμα μὲν καταπλήξασθαι τοὺς ὑπεναντίους, ἅμα δὲ τοῖς σιτολογοῦσι τὴν ἀσφάλειαν παρασκευάζειν.

[5] μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα, γεωλόφου τινὸς ὑπάρχοντος μεταξὺ τῶν στρατοπέδων, ὃς εὐκαίρως καὶ σύνεγγυς ἐπέκειτο τῇ τῶν πολεμίων παρεμβολῇ, τοῦτον ἔτι νυκτὸς ἐξαποστείλας περὶ δισχιλίους τῶν λογχοφόρων κατελάβετο.

[6] οὓς ἐπιγενομένης τῆς ἡμέρας συνιδὼν Μάρκος ἐξῆγε τοὺς εὐζώνους καὶ προσέβαλε τῷ λόφῳ.

[7] γενομένου δʼ ἀκροβολισμοῦ νεανικοῦ, τέλος ἐπεκράτησαν οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα τὴν ὅλην στρατοπεδείαν μετεβίβασαν εἰς τοῦτον τὸν τόπον.

[8] ὁ δʼ Ἀννίβας ἕως μέν τινος διὰ τὴν ἀντιστρατοπεδείαν συνεῖχεν τὸ πλεῖστον μέρος τῆς δυνάμεως ἐφʼ αὑτόν.

[9] πλειόνων δὲ γενομένων ἡμερῶν, ἠναγκάζετο τοὺς μὲν ἐπὶ τὴν νομὴν τῶν θρεμμάτων ἀπομερίζειν τοὺς δʼ ἐπὶ τὴν σιτολογίαν,

[10] σπουδάζων κατὰ τὴν ἐν ἀρχῇ πρόθεσιν μήτε τὴν λείαν καταφθεῖραι τόν τε σῖτον ὡς πλεῖστον συναγαγεῖν, ἵνα πάντων ᾖ κατὰ τὴν παραχειμασίαν δαψίλεια τοῖς ἀνδράσιν, μὴ χεῖρον δὲ τοῖς ὑποζυγίοις καὶ τοῖς ἵπποις·

[11] εἶχε γὰρ τὰς πλείστας ἐλπίδας τῆς αὑτοῦ δυνάμεως ἐν τῷ τῶν ἱππέων τάγματι.

[1] καθʼ ὃν δὴ καιρὸν Μάρκος συνθεωρήσας τὸ πολὺ μέρος τῶν ὑπεναντίων ἐπὶ τὰς προειρημένας χρείας κατὰ τῆς χώρας σκεδαννύμενον, λαβὼν τὸν ἀκμαιότατον καιρὸν τῆς ἡμέρας ἐξῆγε τὴν δύναμιν

[2] καὶ συνεγγίσας τῇ παρεμβολῇ τῶν Καρχηδονίων τὰ μὲν βαρέα τῶν ὅπλων ἐξέταξε, τοὺς δʼ ἱππεῖς καὶ τοὺς εὐζώνους κατὰ μέρη διελὼν ἐπαφῆκε τοῖς προνομεύουσι, παραγγείλας μηδένα ζωγρεῖν.

[3] Ἀννίβας δὲ τούτου συμβάντος εἰς ἀπορίαν ἐνεπεπτώκει μεγάλην· οὔτε γὰρ ἀντεξάγειν τοῖς παρατεταγμένοις ἀξιόχρεως ἦν οὔτε παραβοηθεῖν τοῖς ἐπὶ τῆς χώρας διεσπαρμένοις.

[4] τῶν δὲ Ῥωμαίων οἱ μὲν ἐπὶ τοὺς προνομεύοντας ἐξαποσταλέντες πολλοὺς τῶν ἐσκεδασμένων ἀπέκτειναν· οἱ δὲ παρατεταγμένοι τέλος εἰς τοῦτʼ ἦλθον καταφρονήσεως ὥστε καὶ διασπᾶν τὸν χάρακα καὶ μόνον οὐ πολιορκεῖν τοὺς Καρχηδονίους.

[5] ὁ δʼ Ἀννίβας ἦν μὲν ἐν κακοῖς, ὅμως δὲ χειμαζόμενος ἔμενε, τοὺς πελάζοντας ἀποτριβόμενος καὶ μόλις διαφυλάττων τὴν παρεμβολήν,

[6] ἕως Ἀσδρούβας ἀναλαβὼν τοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς χώρας συμπεφευγότας εἰς τὸν χάρακα τὸν περὶ τὸ Γερούνιον, ὄντας εἰς τετρακισχιλίους, ἧκε παραβοηθῶν.

[7] τότε δὲ μικρὸν ἀναθαρρήσας ἐπεξῆλθε καὶ βραχὺ πρὸ τῆς στρατοπεδείας παρεμβαλὼν μόλις ἀπεστρέψατο τὸν ἐνεστῶτα κίνδυνον.

[8] Μάρκος δὲ πολλοὺς μὲν ἐν τῇ περὶ τὸν χάρακα συμπλοκῇ τῶν πολεμίων ἀποκτείνας, ἔτι δὲ πλείους ἐπὶ τῆς χώρας διεφθαρκώς, τότε μὲν ἐπανῆλθεν, μεγάλας ἐλπίδας ἔχων ὑπὲρ τοῦ μέλλοντος.

[9] τῇ δʼ ἐπαύριον ἐκλιπόντων τὸν χάρακα τῶν Καρχηδονίων, ἐπέβη καὶ κατελάβετο τὴν ἐκείνων παρεμβολήν.

[10] ὁ γὰρ Ἀννίβας διαγωνιάσας τοὺς Ῥωμαίους μὴ καταλαβόμενοι νυκτὸς ἔρημον ὄντα τὸν ἐπὶ τῷ Γερουνίῳ χάρακα κύριοι γένωνται τῆς ἀποσκευῆς καὶ τῶν παραθέσεων, ἔκρινεν αὐτὸς ἀναχωρεῖν καὶ πάλιν ἐκεῖ ποιεῖσθαι τὴν στρατοπεδείαν.

[11] ἀπὸ δὲ τούτων τῶν καιρῶν οἱ μὲν Καρχηδόνιοι ταῖς προνομαῖς εὐλαβέστερον ἐχρῶντο καὶ φυλακτικώτερον, οἱ δὲ Ῥωμαῖοι τἀναντία θαρραλεώτερον καὶ προπετέστερον.

[1] οἱ δʼ ἐν τῇ Ῥώμῃ, προσπεσόντος σφίσι τοῦ γεγονότος μειζόνως ἢ κατὰ τὴν ἀλήθειαν, περιχαρεῖς ἦσαν διὰ τὸ πρῶτον μὲν ἐκ τῆς προϋπαρχούσης ὑπὲρ τῶν ὅλων δυσελπιστίας οἱονεὶ μεταβολήν τινα πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον αὐτοῖς προφαίνεσθαι,

[2] δεύτερον δὲ καὶ διὰ τὸ δοκεῖν τὸν πρὸ τούτου χρόνον τὴν ἀπραγίαν καὶ κατάπληξιν τῶν στρατοπέδων μὴ παρὰ τὴν τῶν δυνάμεων ἀποδειλίασιν, ἀλλὰ παρὰ τὴν τοῦ προεστῶτος εὐλάβειαν γεγονέναι.

[3] διὸ καὶ τὸν μὲν Φάβιον ᾐτιῶντο καὶ κατεμέμφοντο πάντες ὡς ἀτόλμως χρώμενον τοῖς καιροῖς, τὸν δὲ Μάρκον ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ηὖξον διὰ τὸ συμβεβηκὸς ὥστε τότε γενέσθαι τὸ μηδέποτε γεγονός·

[4] αὐτοκράτορα γὰρ κἀκεῖνον κατέστησαν, πεπεισμένοι ταχέως αὐτὸν τέλος ἐπιθήσειν τοῖς πράγμασι· καὶ δὴ δύο δικτάτορες ἐγεγόνεισαν ἐπὶ τὰς αὐτὰς πράξεις, ὃ πρότερον οὐδέποτε συνεβεβήκει παρὰ Ῥωμαίοις.

[5] τῷ δὲ Μάρκῳ διασαφηθείσης τῆς τε τοῦ πλήθους εὐνοίας καὶ τῆς παρὰ τοῦ δήμου δεδομένης ἀρχῆς αὐτῷ, διπλασίως παρωρμήθη πρὸς τὸ παραβάλλεσθαι καὶ κατατολμᾶν τῶν πολεμίων.

[6] ἧκε δὲ καὶ Φάβιος ἐπὶ τὰς δυνάμεις οὐδὲν ἠλλοιωμένος ὑπὸ τῶν συμβεβηκότων, ἔτι δὲ βεβαιότερον μένων ἐπὶ τῆς ἐξ ἀρχῆς διαλήψεως.

[7] θεωρῶν δὲ τὸν Μάρκον ἐκπεφυσημένον καὶ πρὸς πάντʼ ἀντιφιλονικοῦντα καὶ καθόλου πολὺν ὄντα πρὸς τῷ διακινδυνεύειν, αἵρεσιν αὐτῷ προύτεινε τοιαύτην, ἢ κατὰ μέρος ἄρχειν ἢ διελόμενον τὰς δυνάμεις χρῆσθαι τοῖς σφετέροις στρατοπέδοις κατὰ τὴν αὑτοῦ προαίρεσιν.

[8] τοῦ δὲ καὶ λίαν ἀσμένως δεξαμένου τὸν μερισμόν, διελόμενοι τὸ πλῆθος χωρὶς ἐστρατοπέδευσαν ἀλλήλων, ἀπέχοντες ὡς δώδεκα

[1] σταδίους. Ἀννίβας δὲ τὰ μὲν ἀκούων τῶν ἁλισκομένων αἰχμαλώτων, τὰ δὲ θεωρῶν ἐκ τῶν πραττομένων ᾔδει τήν τε τῶν ἡγεμόνων πρὸς ἀλλήλους φιλοτιμίαν καὶ τὴν ὁρμὴν καὶ τὴν φιλοδοξίαν τοῦ Μάρκου.

[2] διόπερ οὐ καθʼ αὑτοῦ, πρὸς αὑτοῦ δὲ νομίσας εἶναι τὰ συμβαίνοντα περὶ τοὺς ἐναντίους, ἐγίνετο περὶ τὸν Μάρκον, σπουδάζων τὴν τόλμαν ἀφελέσθαι καὶ προκαταλαβεῖν αὐτοῦ τὴν ὁρμήν.

[3] οὔσης δέ τινος ὑπεροχῆς μεταξὺ τῆς αὐτοῦ καὶ τῆς τοῦ Μάρκου στρατοπεδείας δυναμένης ἑκατέρους βλάπτειν, ἐπεβάλετο καταλαβεῖν ταύτην. σαφῶς δὲ γινώσκων ἐκ τοῦ προγεγονότος κατορθώματος ὅτι παρέσται βοηθῶν ἐκ χειρὸς πρὸς ταύτην τὴν ἐπιβολήν, ἐπινοεῖ τι τοιοῦτον.

[4] τῶν γὰρ τόπων τῶν περὶ τὸν λόφον ὑπαρχόντων ψιλῶν μέν, πολλὰς δὲ καὶ παντοδαπὰς ἐχόντων περικλάσεις κοιλότητας, ἐξέπεμψε τῆς νυκτὸς εἰς τὰς ἐπιτηδειοτάτας ὑποβολὰς ἀνὰ διακοσίους καὶ τριακοσίους, πεντακοσίους μὲν ἱππεῖς, ψιλοὺς δὲ καὶ πεζοὺς τοὺς πάντας εἰς πεντακισχιλίους.

[5] ἵνα δὲ μὴ πρῲ κατοπτευθῶσιν ὑπὸ τῶν εἰς τὰς προνομὰς ἐκπορευομένων, ἅμα τῷ διαυγάζειν κατελάμβανε τοῖς εὐζώνοις τὸν λόφον.

[6] ὁ δὲ Μάρκος θεωρῶν τὸ γινόμενον καὶ νομίσας ἑρμαῖον εἶναι παραυτίκα μὲν ἐξαπέστειλε τοὺς ψιλούς, κελεύσας ἀγωνίζεσθαι καὶ διαμάχεσθαι περὶ τοῦ τόπου, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τοὺς ἱππεῖς·

[7] ἑξῆς δὲ τούτοις κατόπιν αὐτὸς ἦγε συνεχῆ τὰ βαρέα τῶν ὅπλων, καθάπερ καὶ πρότερον, ἑκάστων ποιούμενος

[1] παραπλήσιον τὸν χειρισμόν. ἄρτι δὲ τῆς ἡμέρας διαφαινούσης, καὶ πάντων ταῖς τε διανοίαις καὶ τοῖς ὄμμασι περιεσπασμένων περὶ τοὺς ἐν τῷ γεωλόφῳ κινδυνεύοντας, ἀνύποπτος ἦν ἡ τῶν ἐνεδρευόντων ὑποβολή.

[2] τοῦ δʼ Ἀννίβου συνεχῶς μὲν ἐπαποστέλλοντος τοῖς ἐν τῷ λόφῳ τοὺς βοηθήσοντας, ἑπομένου δὲ κατὰ πόδας αὐτοῦ μετὰ τῶν ἱππέων καὶ τῆς δυνάμεως, ταχέως συνέβη καὶ τοὺς ἱππεῖς συμπεσεῖν ἀλλήλοις.

[3] οὗ γενομένου, καὶ πιεζομένων τῶν Ῥωμαίων εὐζώνων ὑπὸ τοῦ πλήθους τῶν ἱππέων, ἅμα μὲν οὗτοι καταφεύγοντες εἰς τὰ βαρέα τῶν ὅπλων θόρυβον ἐποίουν,

[4] ἅμα δὲ τοῦ συνθήματος ἀποδοθέντος τοῖς ἐν ταῖς ἐνέδραις, πανταχόθεν ἐπιφαινομένων καὶ προσπιπτόντων τούτων, οὐκέτι περὶ τοὺς εὐζώνους μόνον, ἀλλὰ περὶ πᾶν τὸ στράτευμα μέγας κίνδυνος συνειστήκει τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις.

[5] κατὰ δὲ τὸν καιρὸν τοῦτον Φάβιος θεωρῶν τὸ γινόμενον καὶ διαγωνιάσας μὴ σφαλῶσι τοῖς ὅλοις, ἐξῆγε τὰς δυνάμεις καὶ κατὰ σπουδὴν ἐβοήθει τοῖς κινδυνεύουσι.

[6] ταχὺ δὲ συνεγγίσαντος αὐτοῦ, πάλιν ἀναθαρρήσαντες οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι, καίπερ λελυκότες ἤδη τὴν ὅλην τάξιν, αὖθις ἁθροιζόμενοι περὶ τὰς σημείας ἀνεχώρουν καὶ κατέφευγον ὑπὸ τὴν τούτων ἀσφάλειαν, πολλοὺς μὲν ἀπολελωκότες τῶν εὐζώνων, ἔτι δὲ πλείους ἐκ τῶν ταγμάτων καὶ τοὺς ἀρίστους ἄνδρας.

[7] οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Ἀννίβαν καταπλαγέντες τὴν ἀκεραιότητα καὶ σύνταξιν τῶν παραβεβοηθηκότων στρατοπέδων ἀπέστησαν τοῦ διωγμοῦ καὶ τῆς μάχης.

[8] τοῖς μὲν οὖν παρʼ αὐτὸν γενομένοις τὸν κίνδυνον ἦν ἐναργὲς ὅτι διὰ μὲν τὴν Μάρκου τόλμαν ἀπόλωλε τὰ ὅλα, διὰ δὲ τὴν εὐλάβειαν τοῦ Φαβίου σέσωσται καὶ πρὸ τοῦ καὶ νῦν·

[9] τοῖς δʼ ἐν τῇ Ῥώμῃ τότʼ ἐγένετο φανερὸν ὁμολογουμένως τί διαφέρει στρατιωτικῆς προπετείας καὶ κενοδοξίας στρατηγικὴ πρόνοια καὶ λογισμὸς ἑστὼς καὶ νουνεχής.

[10] οὐ μὴν ἀλλʼ οἱ μὲν Ῥωμαῖοι διδαχθέντες ὑπὸ τῶν πραγμάτων καὶ βαλόμενοι χάρακα πάλιν ἕνα πάντες ἐστρατοπέδευσαν ὁμόσε καὶ λοιπὸν ἤδη Φαβίῳ προσεῖχον τὸν νοῦν καὶ τοῖς ὑπὸ τούτου παραγγελλομένοις.

[11] οἱ δὲ Καρχηδόνιοι τὸν μὲν μεταξὺ τόπον τοῦ βουνοῦ καὶ τῆς σφετέρας παρεμβολῆς διετάφρευσαν, περὶ δὲ τὴν κορυφὴν τοῦ καταληφθέντος λόφου χάρακα περιβαλόντες καὶ φυλακὴν ἐπιστήσαντες λοιπὸν ἤδη πρὸς τὴν χειμασίαν ἀσφαλῶς ἡτοιμάζοντο.

[1] τῆς δὲ τῶν ἀρχαιρεσίων ὥρας συνεγγιζούσης, εἵλοντο στρατηγοὺς οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι Λεύκιον Αἰμίλιον καὶ Γάιον Τερέντιον. ὧν κατασταθέντων οἱ μὲν δικτάτορες ἀπέθεντο τὴν ἀρχήν,

[2] οἱ δὲ προϋπάρχοντες ὕπατοι, Γνάιος Σερουίλιος καὶ Μάρκος Ῥήγουλος ὁ μετὰ τὴν Φλαμινίου τελευτὴν ἐπικατασταθείς, τότε προχειρισθέντες ὑπὸ τῶν περὶ τὸν Αἰμίλιον ἀντιστράτηγοι καὶ παραλαβόντες τὴν ἐν τοῖς ὑπαίθροις ἐξουσίαν ἐχείριζον κατὰ τὴν ἑαυτῶν γνώμην τὰ κατὰ τὰς δυνάμεις.

[3] οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Αἰμίλιον βουλευσάμενοι μετὰ τῆς συγκλήτου τὸ μὲν ἐλλεῖπον πλῆθος ἔτι τῶν στρατιωτῶν πρὸς τὴν ὅλην ἐπιβολὴν παραχρῆμα καταγράψαντες ἐξαπέστειλαν,

[4] τοῖς δὲ περὶ τὸν Γνάιον διεσάφησαν ὁλοσχερῆ μὲν κίνδυνον κατὰ μηδένα τρόπον συνίστασθαι, τοὺς δὲ κατὰ μέρος ἀκροβολισμοὺς ὡς ἐνεργοτάτους ποιεῖσθαι καὶ συνεχεστάτους χάριν τοῦ γυμνάζειν καὶ παρασκευάζειν εὐθαρσεῖς τοὺς νέους πρὸς τοὺς ὁλοσχερεῖς ἀγῶνας,

[5] τῷ καὶ τὰ πρότερον αὐτοῖς συμπτώματα δοκεῖν οὐχ ἥκιστα γεγονέναι διὰ τὸ νεοσυλλόγοις καὶ τελέως ἀνασκήτοις κεχρῆσθαι τοῖς στρατοπέδοις.

[6] αὐτοὶ δὲ Λεύκιον μὲν Ποστόμιον, ἑξαπέλεκυν ὄντα στρατηγόν, στρατόπεδον δόντες εἰς Γαλατίαν ἐξαπέστειλαν, βουλόμενοι ποιεῖν ἀντιπερίσπασμα τοῖς Κελτοῖς τοῖς μετʼ Ἀννίβου στρατευομένοις.

[7] πρόνοιαν δʼ ἐποιήσαντο καὶ τῆς ἀνακομιδῆς τοῦ παραχειμάζοντος ἐν τῷ Λιλυβαίῳ στόλου, διεπέμψαντο δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἐν Ἰβηρίᾳ στρατηγοῖς πάντα τὰ κατεπείγοντα πρὸς τὴν χρείαν.

[8] οὗτοι μὲν οὖν περὶ ταῦτα καὶ περὶ τὰς λοιπὰς ἐγίνοντο παρασκευὰς ἐπιμελῶς.

[9] οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Γνάιον κομισάμενοι τὰς παρὰ τῶν ὑπάτων ἐντολὰς πάντα τὰ κατὰ μέρος ἐχείριζον κατὰ τὴν ἐκείνων γνώμην·

[10] διὸ καὶ τὸ πλείω γράφειν ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν παρήσομεν. ὁλοσχερὲς μὲν γὰρ ἢ μνήμης ἄξιον ἁπλῶς οὐδὲν ἐπράχθη διὰ τὴν ἐντολὴν καὶ διὰ τὴν τοῦ καιροῦ περίστασιν,

[11] ἀκροβολισμοὶ δὲ μόνον καὶ συμπλοκαὶ κατὰ μέρος ἐγίνοντο πλείους, ἐν αἷς εὐδοκίμουν οἱ προεστῶτες τῶν Ῥωμαίων· καὶ γὰρ ἀνδρωδῶς καὶ νουνεχῶς ἐδόκουν ἕκαστα χειρίζειν.

[1] τὸν μὲν οὖν χειμῶνα καὶ τὴν ἐαρινὴν ὥραν διέμειναν ἀντιστρατοπεδεύοντες ἀλλήλοις· ἤδη δὲ παραδιδόντος τοῦ καιροῦ τὴν ἐκ τῶν ἐπετείων καρπῶν χορηγίαν, ἐκίνει τὴν δύναμιν ἐκ τοῦ περὶ τὸ Γερούνιον χάρακος Ἀννίβας.

[2] κρίνων δὲ συμφέρειν τὸ κατὰ πάντα τρόπον ἀναγκάσαι μάχεσθαι τοὺς πολεμίους, καταλαμβάνει τὴν τῆς Κάννης προσαγορευομένης πόλεως ἄκραν.

[3] εἰς γὰρ ταύτην συνέβαινε τόν τε σῖτον καὶ τὰς λοιπὰς χορηγίας ἁθροίζεσθαι τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις ἐκ τῶν περὶ Κανύσιον τόπων· ἐκ δὲ ταύτης ἀεὶ πρὸς τὴν χρείαν ἐπὶ τὸ στρατόπεδον παρακομίζεσθαι.

[4] τὴν μὲν οὖν πόλιν ἔτι πρότερον συνέβαινε κατεσκάφθαι, τῆς παρασκευῆς δὲ καὶ τῆς ἄκρας τότε καταληφθείσης, οὐ μικρὰν συνέπεσε ταραχὴν γενέσθαι περὶ τὰς τῶν Ῥωμαίων δυνάμεις·

[5] οὐ γὰρ μόνον διὰ τὰς χορηγίας ἐδυσχρηστοῦντʼ ἐπὶ τῷ κατειλῆφθαι τὸν προειρημένον τόπον, ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τὸ κατὰ τὴν πέριξ εὐφυῶς κεῖσθαι χώραν.

[6] πέμποντες οὖν εἰς τὴν Ῥώμην συνεχῶς ἐπυνθάνοντο τί δεῖ ποιεῖν, ὡς ἐὰν ἐγγίσωσι τοῖς πολεμίοις, οὐ δυνησόμενοι φυγομαχεῖν, τῆς μὲν χώρας καταφθειρομένης, τῶν δὲ συμμάχων πάντων μετεώρων ὄντων ταῖς διανοίαις,

[7] οἱ δʼ ἐβουλεύσαντο μάχεσθαι καὶ συμβάλλειν τοῖς πολεμίοις. τοῖς μὲν οὖν περὶ τὸν Γνάιον ἐπισχεῖν ἔτι διεσάφησαν, αὐτοὶ δὲ τοὺς ὑπάτους ἐξαπέστελλον.

[8] συνέβαινε δὲ πάντας εἰς τὸν Αἰμίλιον ἀποβλέπειν καὶ πρὸς τοῦτον ἀπερείδεσθαι τὰς πλείστας ἐλπίδας διά τε τὴν ἐκ τοῦ λοιποῦ βίου καλοκἀγαθίαν καὶ διὰ τὸ μικροῖς πρότερον χρόνοις ἀνδρωδῶς ἅμα καὶ συμφερόντως δοκεῖν κεχειρικέναι τὸν πρὸς Ἰλλυριοὺς πόλεμον.

[9] προέθεντο δὲ στρατοπέδοις ὀκτὼ διακινδυνεύειν, ὃ πρότερον οὐδέποτʼ ἐγεγόνει παρὰ Ῥωμαίοις, ἑκάστου τῶν στρατοπέδων ἔχοντος ἄνδρας εἰς πεντακισχιλίους χωρὶς τῶν συμμάχων.

[10] Ῥωμαῖοι γάρ, καθά που καὶ πρότερον εἰρήκαμεν, ἀεί ποτε τέτταρα στρατόπεδα προχειρίζονται. τὸ δὲ στρατόπεδον πεζοὺς μὲν λαμβάνει περὶ τετρακισχιλίους, ἱππεῖς δὲ διακοσίους.

[11] ἐπὰν δέ τις ὁλοσχερεστέρα προφαίνηται χρεία, τοὺς μὲν πεζοὺς ἐν ἑκάστῳ στρατοπέδῳ ποιοῦσι περὶ πεντακισχιλίους, τοὺς δʼ ἱππεῖς τριακοσίους.

[12] τῶν δὲ συμμάχων τὸ μὲν τῶν πεζῶν πλῆθος πάρισον ποιοῦσι τοῖς Ῥωμαϊκοῖς στρατοπέδοις, τὸ δὲ τῶν ἱππέων ὡς ἐπίπαν τριπλάσιον.

[13] τούτων δὲ τοὺς ἡμίσεις τῶν συμμάχων καὶ τὰ δύο στρατόπεδα δόντες ἑκατέρῳ τῶν ὑπάτων ἐξαποστέλλουσιν ἐπὶ τὰς πράξεις.

[14] καὶ τοὺς μὲν πλείστους ἀγῶνας διʼ ἑνὸς ὑπάτου καὶ δύο στρατοπέδων καὶ τοῦ προειρημένου πλήθους τῶν συμμάχων κρίνουσι, σπανίως δὲ πᾶσι πρὸς ἕνα καιρὸν καὶ πρὸς ἕνα χρῶνται κίνδυνον.

[15] τότε γε μὴν οὕτως ἐκπλαγεῖς ἦσαν καὶ κατάφοβοι τὸ μέλλον ὡς οὐ μόνον τέτταρσιν, ἀλλʼ ὀκτὼ στρατοπέδοις Ῥωμαϊκοῖς ὁμοῦ προῄρηντο διακινδυνεύειν.

[1] διὸ καὶ παρακαλέσαντες τοὺς περὶ τὸν Αἰμίλιον καὶ πρὸ ὀφθαλμῶν θέντες τὸ μέγεθος τῶν εἰς ἑκάτερον τὸ μέρος ἀποβησομένων ἐκ τῆς μάχης ἐξαπέστειλαν, ἐντειλάμενοι σὺν καιρῷ κρίνειν τὰ ὅλα γενναίως καὶ τῆς πατρίδος ἀξίως.

[2] οἳ καὶ παραγενόμενοι πρὸς τὰς δυνάμεις καὶ συναθροίσαντες τὰ πλήθη τήν τε τῆς συγκλήτου γνώμην διεσάφησαν τοῖς πολλοῖς καὶ παρεκάλουν τὰ πρέποντα τοῖς παρεστῶσι καιροῖς, ἐξ αὐτοπαθείας τοῦ Λευκίου διατιθεμένου τοὺς λόγους.

[3] ἦν δὲ τὰ πλεῖστα τῶν λεγομένων πρὸς τοῦτον τείνοντα τὸν νοῦν, τὸν ὑπὲρ τῶν νεωστὶ γεγονότων συμπτωμάτων· ὧδε γὰρ καὶ τῇδέ που συνέβαινε διατετράφθαι καὶ προσδεῖσθαι παραινέσεως τοὺς πολλούς.

[4] διόπερ ἐπειρᾶτο συνιστάνειν ὅτι τῶν μὲν ἐν ταῖς προγεγενημέναις μάχαις ἐλαττωμάτων οὐχ ἓν οὐδὲ δεύτερον, καὶ πλείω δʼ ἂν εὕροι τις αἴτια, διʼ ἃ τοιοῦτον αὐτῶν ἐξέβη τὸ τέλος,

[5] ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν νῦν καιρῶν οὐδεμία λείπεται πρόφασις, ἐὰν ἄνδρες ὦσι, τοῦ μὴ νικᾶν τοὺς ἐχθρούς.

[6] τότε μὲν γὰρ οὔτε τοὺς ἡγεμόνας ἀμφοτέρους οὐδέποτε συνηγωνίσθαι τοῖς στρατοπέδοις οὔτε ταῖς δυνάμεσι κεχρῆσθαι γεγυμνασμέναις, ἀλλὰ νεοσυλλόγοις καὶ ἀοράτοις παντὸς δεινοῦ·

[7] τό τε μέγιστον, ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἀγνοεῖσθαι παρʼ αὐτοῖς πρότερον τὰ κατὰ τοὺς ὑπεναντίους ὥστε σχεδὸν μηδʼ ἑωρακότας τοὺς ἀνταγωνιστὰς παρατάττεσθαι καὶ συγκαταβαίνειν εἰς τοὺς ὁλοσχερεῖς κινδύνους.

[8] ‘οἱ μὲν γὰρ περὶ τὸν Τρεβίαν ποταμὸν σφαλέντες, ἐκ Σικελίας τῇ προτεραίᾳ παραγενηθέντες, ἅμα τῷ φωτὶ τῇ κατὰ πόδας ἡμέρᾳ παρετάξαντο·

[9] τοῖς δὲ κατὰ Τυρρηνίαν ἀγωνισαμένοις οὐχ οἷον πρότερον, ἀλλʼ οὐδʼ ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ μάχῃ συνιδεῖν ἐξεγένετο τοὺς πολεμίους διὰ τὸ περὶ τὸν ἀέρα γενόμενον σύμπτωμα.

[10] νῦν γε μὴν πάντα τἀναντία τοῖς προειρημένοις ὑπάρχει.

[1] πρῶτον γὰρ ἡμεῖς ἀμφότεροι πάρεσμεν, οὐ μόνον αὐτοὶ κοινωνήσοντες ὑμῖν τῶν κινδύνων, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἐκ τοῦ πρότερον ἔτους ἄρχοντας ἑτοίμους παρεσκευάκαμεν πρὸς τὸ μένειν καὶ μετέχειν τῶν αὐτῶν ἀγώνων.

[2] ὑμεῖς γε μὴν οὐ μόνον ἑωράκατε τοὺς καθοπλισμούς, τὰς τάξεις, τὰ πλήθη τῶν πολεμίων, ἀλλὰ καὶ διαμαχόμενοι μόνον οὐ καθʼ ἑκάστην ἡμέραν δεύτερον ἐνιαυτὸν ἤδη διατελεῖτε.

[3] πάντων οὖν τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἐναντίως ἐχόντων ταῖς προγεγενημέναις μάχαις, εἰκὸς καὶ τὸ τέλος ἐναντίον ἐκβήσεσθαι τοῦ νῦν ἀγῶνος.

[4] καὶ γὰρ ἄτοπον, μᾶλλον δʼ ὡς εἰπεῖν ἀδύνατον, ἐν μὲν τοῖς κατὰ μέρος ἀκροβολισμοῖς ἴσους πρὸς ἴσους συμπίπτοντας τὸ πλεῖον ἐπικρατεῖν, ὁμοῦ δὲ πάντας παραταξαμένους πλείους ὄντας ἢ διπλασίους τῶν ὑπεναντίων ἐλαττωθῆναι.

[5] διόπερ, ὦ ἄνδρες, πάντων ὑμῖν παρεσκευασμένων πρὸς τὸ νικᾶν, ἑνὸς προσδεῖται τὰ πράγματα, τῆς ὑμετέρας βουλήσεως καὶ προθυμίας, ὑπὲρ ἧς οὐδὲ παρακαλεῖσθαι πλείω πρέπειν ὑμῖν ὑπολαμβάνω.

[6] τοῖς μέν γε μισθοῦ παρά τισι στρατευομένοις ἢ τοῖς κατὰ συμμαχίαν ὑπὲρ τῶν πέλας μέλλουσι κινδυνεύειν, οἷς κατʼ αὐτὸν τὸν ἀγῶνα καιρός ἐστι δεινότατος, τὰ δʼ ἐκ τῶν ἀποβαινόντων βραχεῖαν ἔχει διαφοράν, ἀναγκαῖος ὁ τῆς παρακλήσεως γίνεται τρόπος·

[7] οἷς δέ, καθάπερ ὑμῖν νῦν, οὐχ ὑπὲρ ἑτέρων ἀλλʼ ὑπὲρ σφῶν αὐτῶν καὶ πατρίδος καὶ γυναικῶν καὶ τέκνων ὁ κίνδυνος συνέστηκεν, καὶ πολλαπλασίαν τὰ μετὰ ταῦτα συμβαίνοντα τὴν διαφορὰν ἔχει τῶν ἐνεστώτων ἀεὶ κινδύνων, ὑπομνήσεως μόνον, παρακλήσεως δʼ οὐ προσδεῖ.

[8] τίς γὰρ οὐκ ἂν βούλοιτο μάλιστα μὲν νικᾶν ἀγωνιζόμενος, εἰ δὲ μὴ τοῦτʼ εἴη δυνατόν, τεθνάναι πρόσθεν μαχόμενος ἢ ζῶν ἐπιδεῖν τὴν τῶν προειρημένων ὕβριν καὶ καταφθοράν;

[9] διόπερ, ὦ ἄνδρες, χωρὶς τῶν ὑπʼ ἐμοῦ λεγομένων, αὐτοὶ λαμβάνοντες πρὸ ὀφθαλμῶν τὴν ἐκ τοῦ λείπεσθαι καὶ τοῦ νικᾶν διαφορὰν καὶ τὰ συνεξακολουθοῦντα τούτοις, οὕτως ἑαυτοὺς παραστήσεσθε πρὸς τὴν μάχην ὡς τῆς πατρίδος οὐ κινδυνευούσης νῦν αὐτοῖς τοῖς στρατοπέδοις, ἀλλὰ τοῖς ὅλοις.

[10] τί γὰρ ἔτι προσθεῖσα τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις, ἐὰν ἄλλως πως τὰ παρόντα κριθῇ, περιγενήσεται τῶν ἐχθρῶν, οὐκ ἔχει.

[11] πᾶσαν γὰρ τὴν αὑτῆς προθυμίαν καὶ δύναμιν εἰς ὑμᾶς ἀπήρεισται, καὶ πάσας τὰς ἐλπίδας ἔχει τῆς σωτηρίας ἐν ὑμῖν. ὧν ὑμεῖς αὐτὴν μὴ διαψεύσητε νῦν,

[12] ἀλλʼ ἀπόδοτε μὲν τῇ πατρίδι τὰς ἁρμοζούσας χάριτας, φανερὸν δὲ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις ποιήσατε διότι καὶ τὰ πρότερον ἐλαττώματα γέγονεν οὐ διὰ τὸ Ῥωμαίους χείρους ἄνδρας εἶναι Καρχηδονίων, ἀλλὰ διʼ ἀπειρίαν τῶν τότε μαχομένων καὶ διὰ τὰς ἐκ τῶν καιρῶν περιστάσεις.

[13] ’ τότε μὲν οὖν ταῦτα καὶ τοιαῦτα παρακαλέσας ὁ Λεύκιος διαφῆκε τοὺς πολλούς.

[1] τῇ δʼ ἐπαύριον ἀναζεύξαντες ἦγον τὴν δύναμιν οὗ τοὺς πολεμίους ἤκουον στρατοπεδεύειν. δευτεραῖοι δʼ ἐπιβαλόντες παρενέβαλον, περὶ πεντήκοντα σταδίους ἀποσχόντες τῶν πολεμίων.

[2] ὁ μὲν οὖν Λεύκιος συνθεασάμενος ἐπιπέδους καὶ ψιλοὺς ὄντας τοὺς πέριξ τόπους οὐκ ἔφη δεῖν συμβάλλειν ἱπποκρατούντων τῶν πολεμίων, ἀλλʼ ἐπισπᾶσθαι καὶ προάγειν μᾶλλον εἰς τόπους τοιούτους ἐν οἷς τὸ πλέον ἔσται διὰ τῶν πεζικῶν στρατοπέδων ἡ μάχη.

[3] τοῦ δὲ Γαΐου διὰ τὴν ἀπειρίαν ὑπὲρ τῆς ἐναντίας ὑπάρχοντος γνώμης, ἦν ἀμφισβήτησις καὶ δυσχρηστία περὶ τοὺς ἡγεμόνας, ὃ πάντων ἐστὶ σφαλερώτατον.

[4] τῆς δʼ ἡγεμονίας τῷ Γαΐῳ καθηκούσης εἰς τὴν ἐπιοῦσαν ἡμέραν διὰ τὸ παρὰ μίαν ἐκ τῶν ἐθισμῶν μεταλαμβάνειν τὴν ἀρχὴν τοὺς ὑπάτους, ἀναστρατοπεδεύσας προῆγε, βουλόμενος ἐγγίσαι τοῖς πολεμίοις, πολλὰ διαμαρτυρομένου καὶ κωλύοντος τοῦ Λευκίου.

[5] ὁ δʼ Ἀννίβας ἀναλαβὼν τοὺς εὐζώνους καὶ τοὺς ἱππεῖς ἀπήντα καὶ προσπεσὼν ἔτι κατὰ πορείαν οὖσι παραδόξως συνεπλέκετο καὶ πολὺν ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐποιεῖτο θόρυβον.

[6] οἱ δὲ Ῥωμαῖοι τὴν μὲν πρώτην ἐπιφορὰν ἐδέξαντο, προθέμενοί τινας τῶν ἐν τοῖς βαρέσι καθοπλισμοῖς· μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τοὺς ἀκοντιστὰς καὶ τοὺς ἱππεῖς ἐπαφέντες ἐπροτέρουν κατὰ τὴν ὅλην συμπλοκὴν διὰ τὸ τοῖς μὲν Καρχηδονίοις μηδὲν ἐφεδρεύειν ἀξιόλογον, τοῖς δὲ Ῥωμαίοις ἀναμεμιγμένας τοῖς εὐζώνοις ὁμόσε κινδυνεύειν τινὰς σπείρας.

[7] τότε μὲν οὖν ἐπιγενομένης νυκτὸς ἐχωρίσθησαν ἀπʼ ἀλλήλων, οὐ κατὰ τὴν ἐλπίδα τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις ἐκβάσης τῆς ἐπιθέσεως·

[8] εἰς δὲ τὴν ἐπαύριον ὁ Λεύκιος οὔτε μάχεσθαι κρίνων οὔτε μὴν ἀπάγειν ἀσφαλῶς τὴν στρατιὰν ἔτι δυνάμενος τοῖς μὲν δυσὶ μέρεσι κατεστρατοπέδευσε παρὰ τὸν Αὔφιδον καλούμενον ποταμόν, ὃς μόνος διαρρεῖ τὸν Ἀπεννῖνον —

[9] τοῦτο δʼ ἔστιν ὄρος συνεχές, ὃ διείργει πάσας τὰς κατὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν ῥύσεις, τὰς μὲν εἰς τὸ Τυρρηνικὸν πέλαγος, τὰς δʼ εἰς τὸν Ἀδρίαν· διʼ οὗ ῥέοντα συμβαίνει τὸν Αὔφιδον τὰς μὲν πηγὰς ἔχειν ἐν τοῖς πρὸς τὸ Τυρρηνικὸν κλίμασι τῆς Ἰταλίας, ποιεῖσθαι δὲ τὴν ἐκβολὴν εἰς τὸν Ἀδρίαν — τῷ δὲ τρίτῳ πέραν,

[10] ἀπὸ διαβάσεως πρὸς τὰς ἀνατολάς, ἐβάλετο χάρακα, τῆς μὲν ἰδίας παρεμβολῆς περὶ δέκα σταδίους ἀποσχών, τῆς δὲ τῶν ὑπεναντίων μικρῷ πλεῖον,

[11] βουλόμενος διὰ τούτων προκαθῆσθαι μὲν τῶν ἐκ τῆς πέραν παρεμβολῆς προνομευόντων, ἐπικεῖσθαι δὲ τοῖς παρὰ τῶν Καρχηδονίων.

[1] Ἀννίβας δὲ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν καιρὸν θεωρῶν ὅτι καλεῖ τὰ πράγματα μάχεσθαι καὶ συμβάλλειν τοῖς πολεμίοις, εὐλαβούμενος δὲ μὴ διατέτραπται τὸ πλῆθος ἐκ τοῦ προγεγονότος ἐλαττώματος, κρίνας προσδεῖσθαι παρακλήσεως τὸν καιρὸν συνῆγε τοὺς πολλούς.

[2] ἁθροισθέντων δέ, περιβλέψαι κελεύσας πάντας εἰς τοὺς πέριξ τόπους, ἤρετο τί μεῖζον εὔξασθαι τοῖς θεοῖς κατὰ τοὺς παρόντας ἐδύναντο καιρούς, δοθείσης αὐτοῖς ἐξουσίας, τοῦ παρὰ πολὺ τῶν πολεμίων ἱπποκρατοῦντας ἐν τοιούτοις τόποις διακριθῆναι περὶ τῶν ὅλων.

[3] πάντων δὲ τὸ ῥηθὲν ἐπισημηναμένων διὰ τὴν ἐνάργειαν ‘τούτου τοιγαροῦν’ ἔφη ‘πρῶτον μὲν τοῖς θεοῖς ἔχετε χάριν· ἐκεῖνοι γὰρ ἡμῖν συγκατασκευάζοντες τὴν νίκην εἰς τοιούτους τόπους ἤχασι τοὺς ἐχθρούς·

[4] δεύτερον δʼ ἡμῖν, ὅτι καὶ μάχεσθαι τοὺς πολεμίους συνηναγκάσαμεν· οὐ γὰρ ἔτι δύνανται τοῦτο διαφυγεῖν· καὶ μάχεσθαι προφανῶς ἐν τοῖς ἡμετέροις προτερήμασι.

[5] τὸ δὲ παρακαλεῖν ὑμᾶς νῦν διὰ πλειόνων εὐθαρσεῖς καὶ προθύμους εἶναι πρὸς τὸν κίνδυνον οὐδαμῶς μοι δοκεῖ καθήκειν.

[6] ὅτε μὲν γὰρ ἀπείρως διέκεισθε τῆς πρὸς Ῥωμαίους μάχης, ἔδει τοῦτο ποιεῖν, καὶ μεθʼ ὑποδειγμάτων ἐγὼ πρὸς ὑμᾶς πολλοὺς διεθέμην λόγους·

[7] ὅτε δὲ κατὰ τὸ συνεχὲς τρισὶ μάχαις τηλικαύταις ἐξ ὁμολογουμένου νενικήκατε Ῥωμαίους, ποῖος ἂν ἔτι λόγος ὑμῖν ἰσχυρότερον παραστήσαι θάρσος αὐτῶν τῶν ἔργων;

[8] διὰ μὲν οὖν τῶν πρὸ τοῦ κινδύνων κεκρατήκατε τῆς χώρας καὶ τῶν ἐκ ταύτης ἀγαθῶν κατὰ τὰς ἡμετέρας ἐπαγγελίας, ἀψευστούντων ἡμῶν ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς πρὸς ὑμᾶς εἰρημένοις· ὁ δὲ νῦν ἀγὼν ἐνέστηκεν περὶ τῶν πόλεων καὶ τῶν ἐν αὐταῖς ἀγαθῶν.

[9] οὗ κρατήσαντες κύριοι μὲν ἔσεσθε παραχρῆμα πάσης Ἰταλίας, ἀπαλλαγέντες δὲ τῶν νῦν πόνων, γενόμενοι συμπάσης ἐγκρατεῖς τῆς Ῥωμαίων εὐδαιμονίας, ἡγεμόνες ἅμα καὶ δεσπόται πάντων γενήσεσθε διὰ ταύτης τῆς μάχης.

[10] διόπερ οὐκέτι λόγων ἀλλʼ ἔργων ἐστὶν ἡ χρεία· θεῶν γὰρ βουλομένων ὅσον οὔπω βεβαιώσειν ὑμῖν πέπεισμαι τὰς ἐπαγγελίας.

[11] ’ ταῦτα δὲ καὶ τούτοις παραπλήσια διαλεχθείς, προθύμως αὐτὸν ἐπισημαινομένου τοῦ πλήθους, ἐπαινέσας καὶ δεξάμενος αὐτῶν τὴν ὁρμὴν ἀφῆκε καὶ παραχρῆμα κατεστρατοπέδευσε, ποιούμενος τὸν χάρακα παρὰ τὴν αὐτὴν πλευρὰν τοῦ ποταμοῦ τῇ μείζονι στρατοπεδείᾳ τῶν ὑπεναντίων.

[1] τῇ δʼ ἐχομένῃ περὶ παρασκευὴν καὶ θεραπείαν παρήγγειλε γίνεσθαι πᾶσι. τῇ δʼ ἑξῆς παρὰ τὸν ποταμὸν ἐξέταττε τὰ στρατόπεδα καὶ δῆλος ἦν μάχεσθαι σπεύδων τοῖς ὑπεναντίοις.

[2] ὁ δὲ Λεύκιος δυσαρεστούμενος μὲν τοῖς τόποις, ὁρῶν δʼ ὅτι ταχέως ἀναγκασθήσονται μεταστρατοπεδεύειν οἱ Καρχηδόνιοι διὰ τὸν πορισμὸν τῶν ἐπιτηδείων, εἶχε τὴν ἡσυχίαν, ἀσφαλισάμενος ταῖς ἐφεδρείαις τὰς παρεμβολάς.

[3] Ἀννίβας δὲ χρόνον ἱκανὸν μείνας, οὐδενὸς ἀντεξιόντος, τὴν μὲν λοιπὴν δύναμιν αὖθις εἰς χάρακα κατέστησεν, τοὺς δὲ Νομάδας ἐπαφῆκε τοῖς ὑδρευομένοις ἀπὸ τῆς ἐλάττονος παρεμβολῆς.

[4] τῶν δὲ Νομάδων ἕως πρὸς αὐτὸν τὸν χάρακα προσπιπτόντων καὶ διακωλυόντων τὴν ὑδρείαν, ὅ τε Γάιος ἔτι μᾶλλον ἐπὶ τούτοις παρωξύνετο, τά τε πλήθη πρὸς τὸν κίνδυνον ὁρμὴν εἶχεν καὶ δυσχερῶς ἔφερε τὰς ὑπερθέσεις.

[5] βαρύτατος γὰρ δὴ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις ὁ τοῦ μέλλειν γίνεται χρόνος· ὅταν δʼ ἅπαξ κριθῇ, ὅ,τι ἂν ᾖ πάσχειν πάντων τῶν δοκούντων εἶναι δεινῶν ὑπομενετέον.

[6] εἰς δὲ τὴν Ῥώμην προσπεπτωκότος ὅτι παραστρατοπεδεύουσιν ἀλλήλοις καὶ συμπλοκαὶ γίνονται τῶν προκινδυνευόντων ἀνʼ ἑκάστην ἡμέραν, ὀρθὴ καὶ περίφοβος ἦν ἡ πόλις,

[7] δεδιότων μὲν τῶν πολλῶν τὸ μέλλον διὰ τὸ πολλάκις ἤδη προηττῆσθαι, προορωμένων δὲ καὶ προλαμβανόντων τὰ συμβησόμενα ταῖς ἐννοίαις, ἐὰν σφάλλωνται τοῖς ὅλοις.

[8] πάντα δʼ ἦν τὰ παρʼ αὐτοῖς λόγια πᾶσι τότε διὰ στόματος, σημείων δὲ καὶ τεράτων πᾶν μὲν ἱερόν, πᾶσα δʼ ἦν οἰκία πλήρης, ἐξ ὧν εὐχαὶ καὶ θυσίαι καὶ θεῶν ἱκετηρίαι καὶ δεήσεις ἐπεῖχον τὴν πόλιν.

[9] δεινοὶ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς περιστάσεσι Ῥωμαῖοι καὶ θεοὺς ἐξιλάσασθαι καὶ ἀνθρώπους καὶ μηδὲν ἀπρεπὲς μηδʼ ἀγεννὲς ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις καιροῖς ἡγεῖσθαι τῶν περὶ ταῦτα συντελουμένων.

[1] ὁ δὲ Γάιος ἅμα τῷ παραλαβεῖν τῇ κατὰ πόδας ἡμέρᾳ τὴν ἀρχήν, ἄρτι τῆς κατὰ τὸν ἥλιον ἀνατολῆς ἐπιφαινομένης, ἐκίνει τὴν δύναμιν ἐξ ἑκατέρας ἅμα

[2] τῆς παρεμβολῆς καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἐκ τοῦ μείζονος χάρακος διαβιβάζων τὸν ποταμὸν εὐθέως παρενέβαλε, τοὺς δʼ ἐκ θατέρου συνάπτων τούτοις ἐπὶ τὴν αὐτὴν εὐθεῖαν ἐξέταττε, λαμβάνων πᾶσι τὴν ἐπιφάνειαν τὴν πρὸς μεσημβρίαν.

[3] τοὺς μὲν οὖν τῶν Ῥωμαίων ἱππεῖς παρʼ αὐτὸν τὸν ποταμὸν ἐπὶ τοῦ δεξιοῦ κέρατος κατέστησε, τοὺς δὲ πεζοὺς συνεχεῖς τούτοις ἐπὶ τῆς αὐτῆς εὐθείας ἐξέτεινε, πυκνοτέρας ἢ πρόσθεν τὰς σημείας καθιστάνων, καὶ ποιῶν πολλαπλάσιον τὸ βάθος ἐν ταῖς σπείραις τοῦ μετώπου·

[4] τοὺς δὲ τῶν συμμάχων ἱππεῖς εἰς τὸ λαιὸν κέρας παρενέβαλε· πάσης δὲ τῆς δυνάμεως προέστησε τοὺς εὐζώνους ἐν ἀποστάσει.

[5] ἦσαν δὲ σὺν τοῖς συμμάχοις πεζῶν μὲν εἰς ὀκτὼ μυριάδας, ἱππεῖς δὲ μικρῷ πλείους τῶν ἑξακισχιλίων.

[6] Ἀννίβας δὲ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν καιρὸν τοὺς μὲν Βαλιαρεῖς καὶ λογχοφόρους διαβιβάσας τὸν ποταμὸν προεβάλετο τῆς δυνάμεως, τοὺς δὲ λοιποὺς ἐξαγαγὼν ἐκ τοῦ χάρακος καὶ περαιώσας κατὰ διττοὺς τόπους τὸ ῥεῖθρον ἀντετάττετο τοῖς πολεμίοις.

[7] ἐτίθει δʼ ἐπʼ αὐτὸν μὲν τὸν ποταμόν, ἐπὶ τῶν εὐωνύμων, τοὺς Ἴβηρας καὶ Κελτοὺς ἱππεῖς ἀντίους τοῖς τῶν Ῥωμαίων ἱππεῦσι, συνεχεῖς δὲ τούτοις πεζοὺς τοὺς ἡμίσεις τῶν ἐν τοῖς βαρέσι καθοπλισμοῖς Λιβύων, ἑξῆς δὲ τοῖς εἰρημένοις Ἴβηρας καὶ Κελτούς. παρὰ δὲ τούτοις τὸ λοιπὸν μέρος ἔθηκε τῶν Λιβύων, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ δεξιοῦ κέρως ἐπέταξε τοὺς Νομαδικοὺς ἱππεῖς.

[8] ἐπεὶ δὲ πάντʼ ἐπὶ μίαν εὐθεῖαν ἐξέτεινε, μετὰ ταῦτα λαβὼν τὰ μέσα τῶν Ἰβήρων καὶ Κελτῶν τάγματα προῆγε καὶ τἄλλα τούτοις ἐκ τοῦ κατὰ λόγον παρίστανε ζυγοῦντα, μηνοειδὲς ποιῶν τὸ κύρτωμα καὶ λεπτύνων τὸ τούτων αὐτῶν σχῆμα,

[9] βουλόμενος ἐφεδρείας μὲν τάξιν ἐν τῇ μάχῃ τοὺς Λίβυας αὐτῶν ἔχειν, προκινδυνεῦσαι δὲ τοῖς Ἴβηρσι καὶ Κελτοῖς.

[1] ἦν δʼ ὁ καθοπλισμὸς τῶν μὲν Λιβύων Ῥωμαϊκός, οὓς πάντας Ἀννίβας τοῖς ἐκ τῆς προγεγενημένης μάχης σκύλοις ἐκλέξας κατακεκοσμήκει·

[2] τῶν δʼ Ἰβήρων καὶ Κελτῶν ὁ μὲν θυρεὸς ἦν παραπλήσιος, τὰ δὲ ξίφη τὴν ἐναντίαν εἶχε διάθεσιν·

[3] τῆς μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔλαττον τὸ κέντημα τῆς καταφορᾶς ἴσχυε πρὸς τὸ βλάπτειν, ἡ δὲ Γαλατικὴ μάχαιρα μίαν εἶχε χρείαν τὴν ἐκ καταφορᾶς, καὶ ταύτην ἐξ ἀποστάσεως.

[4] ἐναλλὰξ δὲ ταῖς σπείραις αὐτῶν παρατεταγμένων, καὶ τῶν μὲν Κελτῶν γυμνῶν, τῶν δʼ Ἰβήρων λινοῖς περιπορφύροις χιτωνίσκοις κεκοσμημένων κατὰ τὰ πάτρια, ξενίζουσαν ἅμα καὶ καταπληκτικὴν συνέβαινε γίνεσθαι τὴν πρόσοψιν.

[5] ἦν δὲ τὸ μὲν τῶν ἱππικῶν πλῆθος τὸ σύμπαν τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις εἰς μυρίους, τὸ δὲ τῶν πεζῶν οὐ πολὺ πλείους τετρακισμυρίων σὺν τοῖς Κελτοῖς. εἶχε δὲ τὸ μὲν δεξιὸν τῶν Ῥωμαίων Αἰμίλιος,

[6] τὸ δʼ εὐώνυμον Γάιος, τὰ δὲ μέσα Μάρκος καὶ Γνάιος οἱ τῷ πρότερον ἔτει στρατηγοῦντες.

[7] τῶν δὲ Καρχηδονίων τὸ μὲν εὐώνυμον Ἀσδρούβας εἶχε, τὸ δὲ δεξιὸν Ἄννων· ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς μέσοις αὐτὸς ἦν Ἀννίβας, ἔχων μεθʼ ἑαυτοῦ Μάγωνα τὸν ἀδελφόν.

[8] βλεπούσης δὲ τῆς μὲν τῶν Ῥωμαίων τάξεως πρὸς μεσημβρίαν, ὡς ἐπάνω προεῖπα, τῆς δὲ τῶν Καρχηδονίων πρὸς τὰς ἄρκτους, ἑκατέροις ἀβλαβῆ συνέβαινε γίνεσθαι τὴν κατὰ τὸν ἥλιον ἀνατολήν.

[1] γενομένης δὲ τῆς συμπλοκῆς τῆς πρώτης ἐκ τῶν προτεταγμένων, τὰς μὲν ἀρχὰς αὐτῶν τῶν εὐζώνων ἔπισος ἦν ὁ κίνδυνος,

[2] ἅμα δὲ τῷ τοὺς Ἴβηρας καὶ Κελτοὺς ἱππεῖς ἀπὸ τῶν εὐωνύμων πελάσαι τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις ἐποίουν οὗτοι μάχην ἀληθινὴν καὶ βαρβαρικήν·

[3] οὐ γὰρ ἦν κατὰ νόμους ἐξ ἀναστροφῆς καὶ μεταβολῆς ὁ κίνδυνος, ἀλλʼ εἰσάπαξ συμπεσόντες ἐμάχοντο συμπλεκόμενοι κατʼ ἄνδρα, παρακαταβαίνοντες ἀπὸ τῶν ἵππων.

[4] ἐπειδὴ δʼ ἐκράτησαν οἱ παρὰ τῶν Καρχηδονίων καὶ τοὺς μὲν πλείστους ἀπέκτειναν ἐν τῇ συμπλοκῇ, πάντων ἐκθύμως καὶ γενναίως διαγωνιζομένων τῶν Ῥωμαίων, τοὺς δὲ λοιποὺς ἤλαυνον παρὰ τὸν ποταμὸν φονεύοντες καὶ προσφέροντες τὰς χεῖρας ἀπαραιτήτως, τότε δὴ τὰ πεζικὰ στρατόπεδα διαδεξάμενα τοὺς εὐζώνους συνέπεσεν ἀλλήλοις.

[5] ἐπὶ βραχὺ μὲν οὖν τῶν Ἰβήρων καὶ τῶν Κελτῶν ἔμενον αἱ τάξεις καὶ διεμάχοντο τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις γενναίως· μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τῷ βάρει θλιβόμενοι κλίνοντες ὑπεχώρουν εἰς τοὐπίσω, λύσαντες τὸν μηνίσκον.

[6] αἱ δὲ τῶν Ῥωμαίων σπεῖραι κατὰ τὴν ἐκθυμίαν ἑπόμεναι τούτοις διέκοψαν ῥᾳδίως τὴν τῶν ὑπεναντίων τάξιν, ἅτε δὴ τῶν μὲν Κελτῶν ἐπὶ λεπτὸν ἐκτεταγμένων, αὐτοὶ δὲ πεπυκνωκότες ἀπὸ τῶν κεράτων ἐπὶ τὰ μέσα καὶ τὸν κινδυνεύοντα τόπον·

[7] οὐ γὰρ ἅμα συνέβαινε τὰ κέρατα καὶ τὰ μέσα συμπίπτειν, ἀλλὰ πρῶτα τὰ μέσα διὰ τὸ τοὺς Κελτοὺς ἐν μηνοειδεῖ σχήματι τεταγμένους πολὺ προπεπτωκέναι τῶν κεράτων, ἅτε τοῦ μηνίσκου τὸ κύρτωμα πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους ἔχοντος.

[8] πλὴν ἑπόμενοί γε τούτοις οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι καὶ συντρέχοντες ἐπὶ τὰ μέσα καὶ τὸν εἴκοντα τόπον τῶν πολεμίων οὕτως ἐπὶ πολὺ προέπεσον ὥστʼ ἐξ ἑκατέρου τοῦ μέρους κατὰ τὰς ἐκ τῶν πλαγίων ἐπιφανείας τοὺς Λίβυας αὐτῶν γενέσθαι τοὺς ἐν τοῖς βαρέσι καθοπλισμοῖς·

[9] ὧν οἱ μὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ δεξιοῦ κέρατος κλίναντες ἐπʼ ἀσπίδα καὶ τὴν ἐμβολὴν ἐκ δόρατος ποιούμενοι παρίσταντο παρὰ πλευρὰν τοῖς πολεμίοις,

[10] οἱ δʼ ἀπὸ τῶν εὐωνύμων ἐπὶ δόρυ ποιούμενοι τὴν κλίσιν ἐξ ἀσπίδος ἐπιπαρενέβαλλον, αὐτοῦ τοῦ πράγματος ὃ δέον ἦν ποιεῖν ὑποδεικνύντος.

[11] ἐξ οὗ συνέβη κατὰ τὴν Ἀννίβου πρόνοιαν μέσους ἀποληφθῆναι τοὺς Ῥωμαίους ὑπὸ τῶν Λιβύων κατὰ τὴν ἐπὶ τοὺς Κελτοὺς παράπτωσιν.

[12] οὗτοι μὲν οὖν οὐκέτι φαλαγγηδόν, ἀλλὰ κατʼ ἄνδρα καὶ κατὰ σπείρας στρεφόμενοι πρὸς τοὺς ἐκ τῶν πλαγίων προς

[1] πεπτωκότας ἐποιοῦντο τὴν μάχην· Λεύκιος δὲ καίπερ ὢν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐπὶ τοῦ δεξιοῦ κέρατος καὶ μετασχὼν ἐπί τι τοῦ τῶν ἱππέων ἀγῶνος ὅμως ἔτι τότε διεσῴζετο.

[2] βουλόμενος δὲ τοῖς κατὰ τὴν παράκλησιν λόγοις ἀκολούθως ἐπʼ αὐτῶν γίνεσθαι τῶν ἔργων καὶ θεωρῶν τὸ συνέχον τῆς κατὰ τὸν ἀγῶνα κρίσεως ἐν τοῖς πεζικοῖς στρατοπέδοις κείμενον,

[3] παριππεύων ἐπὶ τὰ μέσα τῆς ὅλης παρατάξεως ἅμα μὲν αὐτὸς συνεπλέκετο καὶ προσέφερε τὰς χεῖρας τοῖς ὑπεναντίοις, ἅμα δὲ παρεκάλει καὶ παρώξυνε τοὺς παρʼ αὑτοῦ στρατιώτας.

[4] τὸ δὲ παραπλήσιον Ἀννίβας ἐποίει· καὶ γὰρ οὗτος ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐπὶ τούτοις τοῖς μέρεσιν ἐπέστη τῆς δυνάμεως.

[5] οἱ δὲ Νομάδες ἀπὸ τοῦ δεξιοῦ κέρατος προσπίπτοντες τοῖς ὑπεναντίοις ἱππεῦσι τοῖς ἐπὶ τῶν εὐωνύμων τεταγμένοις μέγα μὲν οὔτʼ ἐποίουν οὐδὲν οὔτʼ ἔπασχον διὰ τὴν ἰδιότητα τῆς μάχης, ἀπράκτους γε μὴν τοὺς πολεμίους παρεσκεύαζον, περισπῶντες καὶ πανταχόθεν προσπίπτοντες.

[6] ἐπεὶ δʼ οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἀσδρούβαν ἀποκτείναντες τοὺς περὶ τὸν ποταμὸν ἱππεῖς πλὴν παντελῶς ὀλίγων παρεβοήθησαν ἀπὸ τῶν εὐωνύμων τοῖς Νομάσιν, τότε προϊδόμενοι τὴν ἔφοδον αὐτῶν οἱ σύμμαχοι τῶν Ῥωμαίων ἱππεῖς ἐκκλίναντες ἀπεχώρουν.

[7] ἐν ᾧ καιρῷ πραγματικὸν δοκεῖ ποιῆσαι καὶ φρόνιμον ἔργον Ἀσδρούβας· θεωρῶν γὰρ τοὺς Νομάδας τῷ τε πλήθει πολλοὺς ὄντας καὶ πρακτικωτάτους καὶ φοβερωτάτους τοῖς ἅπαξ ἐγκλίνασιν, τοὺς μὲν φεύγοντας παρέδωκε τοῖς Νομάσιν, πρὸς δὲ τὴν τῶν πεζῶν μάχην ἡγεῖτο, σπεύδων παραβοηθῆσαι τοῖς Λίβυσι.

[8] προσπεσὼν δὲ τοῖς Ῥωμαϊκοῖς στρατοπέδοις κατὰ νώτου καὶ ποιούμενος ἐκ διαδοχῆς ταῖς ἴλαις ἐμβολὰς ἅμα κατὰ πολλοὺς τόπους ἐπέρρωσε μὲν τοὺς Λίβυας, ἐταπείνωσε δὲ καὶ κατέπληξε ταῖς ψυχαῖς τοὺς Ῥωμαίους.

[9] ἐν ᾧ καιρῷ καὶ Λεύκιος Αἰμίλιος περιπεσὼν βιαίοις πληγαῖς ἐν χειρῶν νόμῳ μετήλλαξε τὸν βίον, ἀνὴρ πάντα τὰ δίκαια τῇ πατρίδι κατὰ τὸν λοιπὸν βίον καὶ κατὰ τὸν ἔσχατον καιρόν, εἰ καί τις ἕτερος, ποιήσας.

[10] οἱ δὲ Ῥωμαῖοι μέχρι μὲν ἐμάχοντο κατὰ τὰς ἐπιφανείας στρεφόμενοι πρὸς τοὺς κεκυκλωκότας, ἀντεῖχον·

[11] ἀεὶ δὲ τῶν πέριξ ἀπολλυμένων, καὶ κατὰ βραχὺ συγκλειόμενοι, τέλος αὐτοῦ πάντες, ἐν οἷς καὶ Μάρκος καὶ Γνάιος, ἔπεσον, οἱ τὸ πρότερον ἔτος ὕπατοι γεγονότες, ἄνδρες ἀγαθοὶ καὶ τῆς Ῥώμης ἄξιοι γενόμενοι κατὰ τὸν κίνδυνον.

[12] κατὰ δὲ τὸν τούτων φόνον καὶ τὴν συμπλοκὴν οἱ Νομάδες ἑπόμενοι τοῖς φεύγουσι τῶν ἱππέων τοὺς μὲν πλείστους ἀπέκτειναν, τοὺς δὲ κατεκρήμνισαν ἀπὸ τῶν ἵππων.

[13] ὀλίγοι δέ τινες εἰς Οὐενουσίαν διέφυγον, ἐν οἷς ἦν καὶ Γάιος Τερέντιος ὁ τῶν Ῥωμαίων στρατηγός, ἀνὴρ αἰσχρὰν μὲν τὴν ψυχὴν ἀλυσιτελῆ δὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν τὴν αὑτοῦ τῇ πατρίδι πεποιημένος.

[1] ἡ μὲν οὖν περὶ Κάνναν γενομένη μάχη Ῥωμαίων καὶ Καρχηδονίων ἐπετελέσθη τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον, μάχη γενναιοτάτους ἄνδρας ἔχουσα καὶ τοὺς νικήσαντας καὶ τοὺς ἡττηθέντας.

[2] δῆλον δὲ τοῦτʼ ἐγένετʼ ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν πραγμάτων. τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἑξακισχιλίων ἱππέων ἑβδομήκοντα μὲν εἰς Οὐενουσίαν μετὰ Γαΐου διέφυγον, περὶ τριακοσίους δὲ τῶν συμμάχων σποράδες εἰς τὰς πόλεις ἐσώθησαν·

[3] ἐκ δὲ τῶν πεζῶν μαχόμενοι μὲν ἑάλωσαν εἰς μυρίους — οἱ δʼ ἐκτὸς ὄντες τῆς μάχης — ἐξ αὐτοῦ δὲ τοῦ κινδύνου τρισχίλιοι μόνον ἴσως εἰς τὰς παρακειμένας πόλεις διέφυγον.

[4] οἱ δὲ λοιποὶ πάντες, ὄντες εἰς ἑπτὰ μυριάδας, ἀπέθανον εὐγενῶς, τὴν μεγίστην χρείαν παρεσχημένου τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις εἰς τὸ νικᾶν καὶ τότε καὶ πρὸ τοῦ τοῦ τῶν ἱππέων ὄχλου.

[5] καὶ δῆλον ἐγένετο τοῖς ἐπιγενομένοις ὅτι κρεῖττόν ἐστι πρὸς τοὺς τῶν πολέμων καιροὺς ἡμίσεις ἔχειν πεζούς, ἱπποκρατεῖν δὲ τοῖς ὅλοις, μᾶλλον ἢ πάντα πάρισα τοῖς πολεμίοις ἔχοντα διακινδυνεύειν.

[6] τῶν δὲ μετʼ Ἀννίβου Κελτοὶ μὲν ἔπεσον εἰς τετρακισχιλίους, Ἴβηρες δὲ καὶ Λίβυες εἰς χιλίους καὶ πεντακοσίους, ἱππεῖς δὲ περὶ διακοσίους.

[7] οἱ δὲ ζωγρηθέντες τῶν Ῥωμαίων ἐκτὸς ἐγένοντο τοῦ κινδύνου, καὶ διὰ τοιαύτην αἰτίαν.

[8] Λεύκιος ἀπέλιπε μυρίους πεζοὺς ἐπὶ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ παρεμβολῆς, ἵνʼ ἐὰν μὲν Ἀννίβας ὀλιγωρήσας τοῦ χάρακος ἐκτάξῃ πᾶσι, παραπεσόντες οὗτοι κατὰ τὸν τῆς μάχης καιρὸν ἐγκρατεῖς γένωνται τῆς τῶν πολεμίων ἀποσκευῆς,

[9] ἐὰν δὲ προϊδόμενος τὸ μέλλον ἀπολίπῃ φυλακὴν ἀξιόχρεων, πρὸς ἐλάττους αὐτοῖς ὁ περὶ τῶν ὅλων γένηται κίνδυνος.

[10] ἑάλωσαν δὲ τοιούτῳ τινὶ τρόπῳ. καταλιπόντος Ἀννίβου φυλακὴν ἀρκοῦσαν ἐπὶ τοῦ χάρακος, ἅμα τῷ κατάρξασθαι τὴν μάχην κατὰ τὸ συνταχθὲν ἐπολιόρκουν οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι, προσβάλλοντες τοὺς ἀπολελειμμένους ἐν τῷ τῶν Καρχηδονίων χάρακι. τὸ μὲν οὖν πρῶτον ἀντεῖχον·

[11] ἤδη δʼ αὐτῶν πιεζομένων, ἐπειδὴ κατὰ πάντα τὰ μέρη τὴν μάχην Ἀννίβας ἔκρινε, καὶ τότε παραβοηθήσας καὶ τρεψάμενος συνέκλεισε τοὺς Ῥωμαίους εἰς τὴν ἰδίαν παρεμβολὴν καὶ δισχιλίους μὲν αὐτῶν ἀπέκτεινε, τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν ἐγκρατὴς ἐγένετο ζωγρίᾳ πάντων.

[12] ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἐπὶ τὰ κατὰ τὴν χώραν ἐρύματα συμπεφευγότας ἐκπολιορκήσαντες οἱ Νομάδες ἐπανῆγον, ὄντας εἰς δισχιλίους τῶν εἰς φυγὴν τραπέντων ἱππέων.

[1] Βραβευθείσης δὲ τῆς μάχης τὸν προειρημένον τρόπον, ἀκόλουθον εἰλήφει τὰ ὅλα κρίσιν τοῖς ὑπʼ ἀμφοτέρων προσδοκωμένοις.

[2] Καρχηδόνιοι μὲν γὰρ διὰ τῆς πράξεως ταύτης παραχρῆμα τῆς μὲν λοιπῆς παραλίας σχεδὸν πάσης ἦσαν ἐγκρατεῖς·

[3] Ταραντῖνοί τε γὰρ εὐθέως ἐνεχείριζον αὑτούς, Ἀργυριππανοὶ δὲ καὶ Καπυανῶν τινες ἐκάλουν τὸν Ἀννίβαν, οἱ δὲ λοιποὶ πάντες ἀπέβλεπον ἤδη τότε πρὸς Καρχηδονίους·

[4] μεγάλας δʼ εἶχον ἐλπίδας ἐξ ἐφόδου καὶ τῆς Ῥώμης αὐτῆς ἔσεσθαι κύριοι·

[5] Ῥωμαῖοί γε μὴν τὴν Ἰταλιωτῶν δυναστείαν παραχρῆμα διὰ τὴν ἧτταν ἀπεγνώκεισαν, ἐν μεγάλοις δὲ φόβοις καὶ κινδύνοις ἦσαν περί τε σφῶν αὐτῶν καὶ περὶ τοῦ τῆς πατρίδος ἐδάφους, ὅσον οὔπω προσδοκῶντες ἥξειν αὐτὸν τὸν Ἀννίβαν.

[6] καὶ γὰρ ὥσπερ ἐπιμετρούσης καὶ συνεπαγωνιζομένης τοῖς γεγονόσι τῆς τύχης, συνέβη μετʼ ὀλίγας ἡμέρας, τοῦ φόβου κατέχοντος τὴν πόλιν, καὶ τὸν εἰς τὴν Γαλατίαν στρατηγὸν ἀποσταλέντʼ εἰς ἐνέδραν ἐμπεσόντα παραδόξως ἄρδην ὑπὸ τῶν Κελτῶν διαφθαρῆναι μετὰ τῆς δυνάμεως.

[7] οὐ μὴν ἥ γε σύγκλητος οὐδὲν ἀπέλειπε τῶν ἐνδεχομένων, ἀλλὰ παρεκάλει μὲν τοὺς πολλούς, ἠσφαλίζετο δὲ τὰ κατὰ τὴν πόλιν, ἐβουλεύετο δὲ περὶ τῶν ἐνεστώτων ἀνδρωδῶς. τοῦτο δʼ ἐγένετο φανερὸν ἐκ τῶν μετὰ ταῦτα συμβάντων·

[8] ὁμολογουμένως γὰρ Ῥωμαίων ἡττηθέντων τότε καὶ παραχωρησάντων τῆς ἐν τοῖς ὅπλοις ἀρετῆς,

[9] τῇ τοῦ πολιτεύματος ἰδιότητι καὶ τῷ βουλεύεσθαι καλῶς οὐ μόνον ἀνεκτήσαντο τὴν τῆς Ἰταλίας δυναστείαν, νικήσαντες μετὰ ταῦτα Καρχηδονίους, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς οἰκουμένης ἁπάσης ἐγκρατεῖς ἐγένοντο μετʼ ὀλίγους χρόνους.

[10] διόπερ ἡμεῖς ταύτην μὲν τὴν βύβλον ἐπὶ τούτων τῶν ἔργων καταστρέψομεν, ἃ περιέλαβεν Ἰβηρικῶν καὶ τῶν Ἰταλικῶν ἡ τετταρακοστὴ πρὸς ταῖς ἑκατὸν ὀλυμπιάσι δηλώσαντες·

[11] ὅταν δὲ τὰς Ἑλληνικὰς πράξεις τὰς κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν ὀλυμπιάδα γενομένας διεξιόντες ἐπιστῶμεν τοῖς καιροῖς τούτοις, τότʼ ἤδη προθέμενοι ψιλῶς τὸν ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς τῆς Ῥωμαίων πολιτείας ποιησόμεθα λόγον,

[12] νομίζοντες οὐ μόνον πρὸς τὴν τῆς ἱστορίας σύνταξιν οἰκείαν εἶναι τὴν περὶ αὐτῆς ἐξήγησιν. ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τὰς τῶν πολιτευμάτων διορθώσεις καὶ κατασκευὰς μεγάλα συμβάλλεσθαι τοῖς φιλομαθοῦσι καὶ πραγματικοῖς τῶν ἀνδρῶν.

Notes on the current edition

Histories

1. A summary of the work from B. C. 220 to B. C. 168.

2. B. C. 220- 216.

3. 1. The cause and course of the Hannibalian war.

4. 2. Macedonian treaty with Carthage , B. C. 216.

5. 3. Syrian war, B. C. 218.

6. 4. Byzantine war. B. C. 220.

7. First digression on the Roman Constitution.

8. Second on Hiero of Syracuse .

9. 5. The attempted partition of the dominions of Ptolemy Epiphanes, B. C. 204.

10. 6. War with Philip, B. C. 201-197.

11. 7. Asiatic war, B. C. 192-191.

12. 8. Gallic wars of Eumenes and Prusias.

13. 9. Union of the Peloponnese . Antiochus Epiphanes in Egypt . Fall of the Macedonian monarchy, B. C. 188- 168.

14. The plan extended to embrace the period from B. C. 168-146.

15. A new departure the breaking-up of the arrangement made after the fall of Macedonia . Wars of Carthage against Massinissa; and of Rome against the Celtiberians, B. C. 155-150; and against Carthage (3d Punic war, B. C. 149-146).

16. The origin of the 2d Punic war;

17. B. C. 334.

18. B. C. 192,

19. B. C. 401-400,

20. B. C. 396-394

21. and of the war with Antiochus.

22. The Hannibalian or Second Punic war. First cause.

23. B.C. 238. . Second cause.

24. Third cause.

25. B. C. 195

26. B. C. 238.

27. Death of Hamilcar, B. C. 229.

28. Death of Hasdrubal, B. C. 221.

29. B. C. 220 Hannibal attacks the Vaccaei.

30. Saguntum appeals to Rome . Winter of B. C. 220- 219.

31. Hannibal’s defiance.

32. Illyrian war, B. C. 219.

33. B. C. 219. Coss. M. Livius Salinator L. Aemilius Paullus.

34. Hannibal besieges Saguntum .

35. Fall of Saguntum .

36. Illyrian war, B. C. 219.

37. Capture of Pharos.

38. Indignation at Rome at the fall of Saguntum .

39. Of Chaereas nothing seems known; a few fragments of an historian of his name are given in Müller, vol. iii. Of Sosilus, Diodorus (26, fr. 6) says that he was of Ilium and wrote a history of Hannibal in seven books. Nepos ( Hann. 13 ) calls him a Lacedaemonian, and says that he lived in Hannibal’s camp and taught him Greek.

40. Envoys sent to Carthage to demand surrender of Hannibal.

41. The first treaty, B. C. 509-508.

42. i.e. in Latium .

43. Second treaty. B. C. 306 (?).

44. ἐπιλάβηται injecerit manum, the legal form of claiming a slave.

45. Third treaty, B.C. 279.

46. Misstatement of Philinus.

47. Fourth treaty, B. C. 241.

48. Fifth treaty, B. C. 238.

49. Sixth treaty, B. C. 228.

50. No excuse for the Roman claim on Sardinia .

51. 1, 83.

52. The Roman case.

53. Mutual provocation.

54. Saguntum of course is south of the Iber, but the attack on it by Hannibal was a breach of the former of the two treaties. Livy ( 21, 2 ) seems to assert that it was specially exempted from attack in the treaty with Hasdrubal.

55. Answer of Fabius. See Livy, 21, 18 .

56. From .

57. βασιλεύς. The two Suffetes represented the original Kings of Carthage (6, 51). The title apparently remained for sacrificial purposes, like the ἄρχων βασιλεύς, and the rex sacrificulus. Polybius, like other Greek writers, calls them βασιλεῖς. Infra, 42. Herod. 7, 165 . Aristot. Pol. 2, 8 .

58. Winter of 219- 218 B. C. Hannibal’s arrangements for the coming campaign.

59. The inscription recording these facts.

60. A promontory in Bruttium , Capo delle Colonne.

61. B.C. 218. Hannibal breaks up his winter quarters and starts for Italy .

62. General view of the geography of the world.

63. This division of the world into three parts was an advance upon the ancient geographers, who divided it into two, combining Egypt with Asia , and Africa with Europe . See Sall. Jug. 17 ; Lucan, Phars. 9, 411 ; Varro de L. L. 5, § 31 . And note on .

64. The extreme north and south unknown.

65. The length of the march from Carthagena to the Po, 1125 Roman miles.

66. The arae Philaenorum were apparently set up as boundary stones to mark the territory of the Pentapolis or Cyrene from Egypt : and the place retained the name long after the disappearance of the altars ( Strabo, 3.5.5-6 ).

67. For Polybius’s calculation as to the length of the stade, see note on 34, 12.

68. Coss. P. Cornelius Scipio and Tib. Sempronius Longus. B. C. 218. The Consuls are sent, one to Spain , and the other to Africa .

69. Placentia and Cremona .

70. Outrage by Boii and Insubres.

71. Livy, 21, 25 , calls it Tannetum, and describes it only as vicus Pado propinquus. It was a few miles from Parma .

72. Tiberius Sempronius prepares to attack Carthage .

73. Publius Scipio lands near Marseilles .

74.

Pluribus enim divisus amnis in mare decurrit

(Livy, 21, 26) .

75. Hannibal reaches the Rhone .

76. See on , note 2.

77. A detachment crosses higher up the river.

78. The crossing begun.

79. The crossing completed.

80. Message from friendly Gauls.

81. The passage of the elephants.

82. This statement has done much to ruin Polybius’s credit as a geographer. It indicates indeed a strangely defective conception of distance; as his idea, of the Rhone flowing always west, does of the general lie of the country.

83. Scipio finds that Hannibal has escaped him.

84. Hannibal’s march to the foot of the Alps .

85. The ascent.

86. I have no intention of rediscussing the famous question of the pass by which Hannibal crossed the Alps . The reader will find an admirably clear statement of the various views entertained, and the latest arguments advanced in favour of each, in the notes to Mr. W. T. Arnold’s edition of Dr. Arnold’s History of the Second Punic War, pp. 362-373.

87. The Gauls harass the army.

88. Severe losses.

89. περί τι λευκόπετρον, which, however, perhaps only means bare rock, cf. . But see Law’s Alps of Hannibal, vol. i. p. 201 sq.

90. Arrives at the summit.

91. 9th November.

92. The descent.

93. A break in the road.

94. Digression on the limits of history.

95. Rest and recovery.

96. Taking of Turin .

97. Tiberius Sempronius recalled.

98. Excitement at Rome

99. Hannibal’s speech.

100. Skirmish of cavalry near the Ticinus , Nov. B. C. 219.

101. Scipio retires to Placentia on the right bank of the Po.

102. His life, according to one story, was saved by his son, the famous Scipio Africanus ( ); according to another, by a Ligurian slave ( Livy, 21, 46 ).

103. Hannibal crosses the Po higher up and follows Scipio to Placentia .

104. Livy says to Mago, Hannibal’s younger brother ( 21, 47 ). This Hasdrubal is called in captain of pioneers.

105. Treachery of the Gauls serving in the army of Scipio.

106. Scipio changes his position at Placentia to one on the Trebia.

107. Hannibal follows him.

108. Scipio’s position on the slopes of Apennines , near the source of the Trebia.

109. Tiberius Sempronius joins Scipio.

110. Fall of Clastidium . Hannibal’s policy towards the Italians.

111. A skirmish favourable to the Romans.

112. Sempronius resolves to give battle.

113. Hannibal prepares an ambuscade.

114. Battle of the Trebia, December B.C. 218.

115. Hannibal’s forces.

116. The Roman forces.

117. That is, four legions and their regular contingent of socii. See sqq.

118. The Roman cavalry retreat.

119. Both Roman wings defeated.

120. fights its way to Placentia .

121. Winter of B.C. 218- 217. Great exertions at Rome to meet the danger.

122. B. C. 217.

123. Hannibal conciliates the Italians.

124. He crossed the Apennines , not by the ordinary road to Lucca , descending the valley of the Macra, but, as it appears, by a straighter line down the valley of the Auser or Serchio .—ARNOLD.

125. Hannibal starts for Etruria. Spring of B. C. 217.

126. The marshes between the Arno and the Apennines south of Florence .

127. ἀπεκοιμῶντο Schw. translates simply dormiebant. But the compound means more than that; it conveys the idea of an interval of sleep snatched from other employments. See Herod. 8, 76 ; Aristoph. Vesp. 211 .

128. Hannibal in the valley of the Arno .

129. Hannibal correctly judges the character of Flaminius.

130. Flaminius is drawn out of camp.

131. The ambuscade at Lake Thrasymene.

132. Livy, 22, 4-6 . For a discussion of the modern views as to the scene of the battle, see W. T. Arnold’s edition of Dr. Arnold’s History of the Second Punic War, pp. 384-393. The radical difference between the account of Livy and that of Polybius seems to be that the former conceives the fighting to have been on the north shore of the lake between Tucro and Passignano ; Polybius conceives the rear to have been caught in the defile of Passignano , the main fighting to have been more to the east, where the road turns up at right angles to the lake by La Torricella. Mr. Capes, however, in his note on the passage of Livy, seems to think that both accounts agree in representing the fighting on the vanguard as being opposite Tucro.

133. The battle, 22d June.

134. Hannibal’s treatment of prisoners.

135. Dismay at Rome .

136. Servilius’s advanced guard cut to pieces.

137. Hannibal’s advance after the battle.

138. This treatment of non-combatants was contrary to the usages of civilised warfare even in those days, and seems to have been the true ground for the charge of crudelitas always attributed to Hannibal by Roman writers, as opposed to the behaviour of such an enemy as Pyrrhus ( Cic. de Am. 28 ). It may be compared to the order of the Convention to give no quarter to English soldiers, which the French officers nobly refused to execute.

139. Polybius expresses the fact accurately, for, in the absence of a Consul to nominate a Dictator, Fabius was created by a plebiscitum; but the scruples of the lawyers were quieted by his having the title of prodictator only ( Livy, 22, 8 ).

140. Q. Fabius Maximus Dictator.

141. Ramsay ( Roman Antiquities, p. 148) denies this exception, quoting Livy, 6, 16 . But Polybius could hardly have been mistaken on such a point; and there are indications ( Plutarch, Anton. 9 ) that the Tribunes did not occupy the same position as the other magistrates towards the Dictator.

142. The ager Praetutianus was the southern district of Picenum ( Livy, 22, 9 ; 27, 43 ). The chief town was Interamna .

143. Fabius takes the command.

144. On the Appian Way between Equus Tuticus and Herdonia , mod. Troja.

145. Cunctator.

146. Minucius discontented.

147. Hannibal in Samnium and Apulia .

148. Holsten for the Δαύνιοι of the old text; others suggest Calatia.

149. Added by conjecture of Schw. One MS. has δευτέρα ἡ ἀπὸ τοῦ Ἐριβανοῦ.

150. Hannibal descends into the Falernian plain.

151. Near Cales .

152. Fabius lies in wait.

153. Hannibal eludes him.

154. Hannibal gets through the pass. Autumn, B. C. 217.

155. Homer, Odyss. 10, 230 .

156. Fabius goes to Rome , leaving the command to M. Minucius.

157. Spain , B. C. 217.

158. Roman success at sea.

159. Publius Scipio, whose imperium is prolonged after his Consulship of the previous year, with Spain assigned as his province, is sent to join his brother there with 20 ships: early in B.C. 217.

160. Treason of Abilyx.

161. Hannibal takes Geronium.

162. Minucius obtains a slight success. Autumn B. C. 217.

163. Carthaginian foragers cut off.

164. Minucius invested with co-equal powers with Fabius.

165. Hannibal draws on Minucius.

166. Fabius comes to the rescue.

167. B.C. 216. Coss. C. Terentius Varro and L. Aemilius Paulus.

168. Autumn, B. C. 216.

169. The Senate order a battle.

170. See .

171. The Consuls Aemilius Paulus, and Terentius Varro go to the seat of war.

172. Speech of Aemilius.

173. The Roman army approaches Cannae.

174. Terentius Varro orders an advance.

175. The Romans are successful.

176. Hannibal harangues his troops.

177. Hannibal irritates the enemy.

178. Anxiety at Rome .

179. Dispositions for the battle of Cannae .

180. The battle, 2d August, B. C. 216.

181. The Romans outflanked by the cavalry.

182. ἐξ ἀσπίδος ἐπιπαρενέβαλλον. The ordinary word for forming line or taking dressing is παρεμβάλλειν. In the other two passages where ἐπιπαρενβάλλειν is used, ἐπί has a distinct (though different) force. I think here it must mean against, so as to attack. And this seems to be Casaubon’s interpretation.

183. Fall of Aemilius Paulus.

184. There is nothing here absolutely to contradict the picturesque story of the death of Paulus given by Livy ( 22, 49 ), but the words certainly suggest that Polybius had never heard it.

185. Losses of the Romans.

186. The results of the battle. Defection of the allies.

187. Fall of Lucius Postumius in Gaul . See supra, .

188. B.C. 216.