Poetics. Aristotle. Thomas Twining (Translator). London, UK. 1789.
Sponsored by Perseus Project, Tufts University.
Poetics (Thomas Twining, 1789) (OCR draft) (English) (Thomas Twining's English translation of Aristotle's Poetics, published in 1789 and aligned to the Kassel reference passage sequence.)
Provisional text from uncorrected OCR; expect errors.
Poetics
5.
mvp-aristotle-comment-972
1460b15
αὐτῆς δὲ τῆς ποιητικῆς διττὴ ἁμαρτία.
The argument may be thus restated: There is always a twofold possibility of error in the poet's
μίμησις or description of things. (1) Starting with a correct idea of the object to be described, he may fail to express his own meaning; in which case his art as a poet (or
μιμητής) is at fault, and his faulty description is a sign of artistic or literary incapacity. (2) On the other hand the error may be simply due to his starting with an erroneous idea of the object; in which case it arises not from lack of descriptive power on his part, but from insufficient knowledge of something outside poetry, and it is thus in the accidents rather than the essentials of the poetic art.
Vahlen quotes
Soph. el. 33, 1826 33
ἀπορία δ᾽ ἐστὶ διττή, ἡ μὲν ἐν τοῖς συλλογισμοῖς ... ἡ δ᾽ ἐν τοῖς ἐριστικοῖς, to show that an article is not wanted before
ἁμαρτία.
6.
mvp-aristotle-comment-973
1460b17
ἀδυναμίαν:
comp.
16, 1454621
δι᾽ ἀπορίαν.
δι ἀδυναμίαν is practically equivalent to
δι' ἀτεχνίαν, through lack of artistic power- art being with
Aristotle a kind of.
δύναμις or power (v.
Bon. Ind. 207.b 6
).
1460b18
6.
mvp-aristotle-comment-974
εἰ δὲ τῷ προελέσθαι κτέ.
I have not been able to follow
Vahlen in his general view of this passage, which in his edition reads thus :-
εἰ δὲ τὸ προελέσθαι μὴ ὀρθῶς ἀλλὰ τὸν ἵππον ⟨ἀμ᾿⟩ ἄμφω τὰ δεξιὰ προβεβληκότα ἢ τὸ καθ'᾽ ἑκάστην τέχνην ἁμάρτημα οἷον τὸ κατ᾿ ἰατρικὴν ἢ ἄλλην τέχνην [ἢ ἀδύνατα πεποίηται] ὁποιανοῦν, οὐ καθ᾽ ἑαυτήν. This reading requires us to take
μὴ ὀρθῶς as standing for
μὴ ὀρθῶς εἶχεν, and
ἀλλὰ τὸν ἵππον κτέ. as a short way of saying
ἀλλὰ προείλετο μιμήσασθαι οἷον τὸν ἵππον κτἑ. It is, however, much simpler to suppose that
μὴ ὀρθῶς =
μὴ ὀρθῶς μιμήσασθαι, and to take
ἀλλὰ τὸν ἵππον κτέ. (
scil.
μιμήσασθαι) as a concrete instance of the opposite of
ὀρθῶς μιμήσασθαι. The insertion also of
ἅμα before
ἄμφω τὰ δεξιὰ προβεβληκότα is unnecessary; these words (as the tense of the participle is enough to show) suggest a picture; and the fault in the picture consists in the horse in motion being depicted with both right legs thrown forward, instead of only one of them. As regards the clause
ἀδύνατα πεποίηται, which
Vahlen (after
Düntzer) excises as a dittographia of the
ἀδύνατα πεποίηται in
623
, it seems to me that the words are wanted for two reasons, (1) to enable us to supply
πεποίηται after
τὸ καθ ἑκάστην τέχνην ἁμάρτημα, and (2) to give the statement the requisite breadth. The error in the poet's picture or description (
comp.
πεποίηται) may be in matters which come under the cogni- zance of some special art or science (
τὸ καθ ἑκάστην τέχνην ἁμάρ- τημα), but it may also be in matters of a less distinctly technical nature.
Aristotle adds
ἢ ἀδύνατα πεποίηται ὁποῖ᾽ ἂν οὖν in order to include this latter kind of error. The instance of it in the context (
b 26
) is the absurdity (
comp.
24, 1460a 15
), or rather the offence against common sense, in the Pursuit of Hector in the
Iliad. That given in
b31
of the other form of error is a mistake in natural history, i. e. in a matter of technical knowledge. The distinction, therefore, between the two kinds of error is a very real one, at any rate in controversy (v. on
25, 1461 b 24
).
6.
mvp-aristotle-comment-975
τὸν ἵππον ἄμφω τὰ δεξιὰ προβεβληκότα,
scil.
μιμήσασθαι. In
Aristotle's view this is a mistake in natural history, and inconsistent with the general law of the diagonal movement of the legs of quadrupeds walking as laid down in the
De incessu an.14, 712 a 24
:
κινεῖται δὲ τὰ ὀπίσθια πρὸς τὰ ἔμπροσθεν κατὰ διάμετρον μετὰ γὰρ τὸ δεξιὸν τῶν ἔμπροσθεν τὸ ἀριστερὸν τῶν ὄπισθεν κινοῦσιν, εἶτα τὸ ἀριστερὸν τῶν ἔμπροσθεν, μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο τὸ δεξιὸν τῶν ὄπισθεν... εἰ δὲ τοῖς δεξιοῖς ἀμφοτέροις πρώτοις [scil. ἐποιοῦντο τὴν κίνησιν], ἔξω Generated at Tufts University through HathiTrust on 2026-85-18 19:55 GMT [ 328 COMMENTARY 1460 b 18
ἂν ἐγίγνοντο τῶν ἐρεισμάτων καὶ ἔπιπτον ἄν. He was apparently unaware of the fact that the legs of the horse are actually in the position assumed to be impossible in certain stages of the amble and the rack. A horse with legs in this position is to be seen in modern art in
Meissonier's 'Cavaliers en marche' (Exposition
Meissonier, No. 114-Paris 1893). Illustrations from the life will be found in
E. Muybridge's 'Animal Locomotion '-Philadelphia 1872-93.
6.
mvp-aristotle-comment-976
1460b21
ὁποῖ᾽ ἂν οὖν,
scil.
ᾗ πεποιημένα ᾖ For the omission of the verb
comp.
Soph. el. 17, 175b27
ὁποτέρῳ γὰρ ἂν οὐδὲν διαφέρει. -
Eth. N. 3. 10. 1115b 19
ὡς ἂν ὁ λόγος. -
Pol. 6. 3, 1318b22
τι ἂν οἱ ὀλίγοι (also
Riddell,
Digest of Idioms § 255
). We should expect simply
ὁποιαοῦν, the formula ordinarily used by
Aristotle in passages like the present.
6.
mvp-aristotle-comment-977
οὐ καθ᾽ ἑαυτήν
(
scil.
ἡ ἁμαρτία τῆς ποιητικῆς) is the apodosis, and the opposite of that in the preceding clause (
b17
),
αὐτῆς ἡ ἁμαρτία. The general sense of the passage (with the reading
τῷ προελέσθαι) is briefly this: If it was through a mistake in his original concep- tion of the thing that either the technical error, or impossibilities of whatever kind they may be, have got into his description, the error in that case does not belong to the art of the poet
per se, but only
per accidens.
7.
mvp-aristotle-comment-978
ὥστε δεῖ τὰ ἐπιτιμήματα κτέ.
A Problem in
Aristotle's sense of the term is only a kind of question (v. on
b6
); but the mere fact of a question being raised in reference to the poet's work involves the possibility of an answer unfavourable to him, i. e. of an
ἐπιτίμημα, a censure or condemnation of what he has said. We have had
ἐπιτίμημα in this technical sense in
19, 1456 b 14
, and the verb
ἐπιτιμᾶν in
17, 1455b26
, in
19, 1456 b 16
, and in
22, 1458b6
. The criticisms to which a poem is exposed
Aristotle examines under the three heads indicated in the preceding state- ment (
b7-21
), but in reverse order: (1) the strictures passed on the poet's descriptions of things (
b 22-32
); (2) those relating to the kind of subject he has chosen to depict (
b32-1461a9
); and (3) the faults found in his language (
1461a9-31
). After that he shows in what way or ways each kind of criticism has to be answered.
7.
mvp-aristotle-comment-979
1460b23
τὰ πρὸς αὐτὴν τὴν τέχνην,
scil.
τοῦ ποιητοῦ ἐπιτιμήματα, the censures relating to the artistic execution in his imitations.
(εἰ)
ἀδύνατα πεποίηται.
Ueberweg suggests that the traditional
ἀδύνατα πεποίηται (without the insertion of εἰ) may be a rhetorical [ 25. 1460 18-28 329 1460b23 way of putting the supposition, such as might be used in an actual debate or discussion. In the course of this chapter
Aristotle more than once writes as if he were simply reporting a possible debate (v. on
33
ἀλλ᾽ ἴσως δεῖ, and on
1461a 1
ἀλλ᾽ οὖν φασι).
7.
mvp-aristotle-comment-980
ἡμάρτηται
is the natural opposite of the
ὀρθῶς ἔχει in the next line;
comp.
Eth. E. 2. 11, 1227 b 21
ἔστι δὲ τὸν μὲν σκοπὸν ἡμαρτῆσθαι, τὰ δὲ πρὸς ἐκεῖνον περαίνοντα ὀρθῶς ἔχειν. -
Eth. Ν. 8. 12, 1160b 30
αὕτη μὲν οὖν [scil. ἀρχή] ὀρθὴ φαίνεται, ἡ Περσικὴ δ᾽ ἡμαρτημένη. -
Eth. N. 6. 10, 1142b10
ἐπιστήμης μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν ὀρθότης, οὐδὲ γὰρ ἁμαρτία.-
2. 2, 1104 b32
περὶ πάντα ταῦτα ὁ ἀγαθὸς κατορθωτικός ἐστιν ὁ δὲ κακὸς ἁμαρτητικός.
8.
mvp-aristotle-comment-981
1460b24
τὸ γὰρ τέλος εἴρηται:
a reason for the statement that follows (see on
21, 1457 b 34
). For the use of
εἴρηται (which has been very unadvisedly questioned and altered into
εὕρηται,
αἱρεῖται,
εἴληπται, or
τηρεῖται) see on
11, 1452 b 11
.
8.
mvp-aristotle-comment-982
1460b25
εἰ οὕτως ἐκπληκτικώτερον κτέ.
is appositional to
εἰ τυγχάνει τοῦ τέλους τοῦ αὐτῆς.
Vahlen compares
Metaph. E 3, 1027 b 30
εἰ γὰρ μὴ τοῦτο, ἐξ ἀνάγκης πάντ᾿ ἔσται, εἰ τοῦ γιγνομένου καὶ φθειρομένου μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς αἴτιόν τι ἀνάγκη εἶναι.-
Plato
Gorg. 522 C
εἰ ἐκεῖνό γε ἐν αὐτῷ ὑπάρχοι, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ὃ σὺ πολλάκις ὡμολόγησας, εἰ βεβοηθηκὼς εἴη αὑτῷ κτἑ.; and
Hyperides
Euxen. 23, 24
,
Lysias 3, 38
. The clause only gives an illustration, not a complete account of the end of poetry. That surprise is one of the legitimate effects of poetry was definitely said, though the point is nowhere demonstrated, in
24, 1460a 11
; it has been assumed also in
9, 1452 a 4
, in
14, 1454 a 4
, and in
16, 1455 a 17
For the meaning of
ἐκπληκτικώτερον see on
14, 1454 a 4
.
9.
mvp-aristotle-comment-983
1460b27
ἢ μὴ ἧττον:
Metaph. K 5, 1062 b 25
δόξειε δὲ κἂν οὐχ ἵππον εἶναι φάσκων τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἢ μᾶλλον ἢ οὐχ ἧττον ἀληθεύειν ἢ οὐκ ἄνθρωπον.
1460b28
9.
mvp-aristotle-comment-984
ἡμαρτῆσθαι
here seems to be a dittographia of the
ἡμαρτῆσθαι in the next line (J. of Phil. 14, p. 52).
9.
mvp-aristotle-comment-985
δεῖ γὰρ κτἑ.:
comp. the parallel statement as to the avoidance of
ἄλογα in
24, 1460a 28
The general rule is that the descrip- tions in poetry should be in accordance with the technical standard of correctness; but at the same time there are cases in which some sacrifice of technical accuracy may be requisite to produce the poetic effect (
b24
;
comp.
1461 b11
πρὸς τὴν ποίησιν), and in these the end justifies the means. This is the only direct answer to an objection of this kind. But if such an answer is not possible, it may perhaps be urged, in mitigation of censure at [ [https://hdl.handle.net/2027/ucl](https://hdl.handle.net/2027/ucl) 31210000876426/ Generated at Tufts University through HathiTrust on 2026-05-18 19:55 GMT Public Domain in the United States, Gongle-digitized 330 COMMENTARY 1460b28 any rate, that the technical error is in a minor matter (
b31
), and as such, a venial fault in an imitative art.
10.
mvp-aristotle-comment-986
1460b29
ἔτι ποτέρων ἐστὶ τὸ ἁμάρτημα κτέ.
is not a
λύσις proper, but an attempt to minimize the offence. In a
λύσις proper the point to which the opponent has taken exception is shown to have another aspect, and to be right (
ὀρθῶς ἔχει
b 24
) when viewed in that other aspect.
10.
mvp-aristotle-comment-987
1460b30
τῶν κατὰ τὴν τέχνην:
in matters belonging to his art, i. e. the art of poetry, as distinct from matters outside poetry, and only acci- dentally (
κατὰ συμβεβηκός) connected with it.
Vahlen draws attention to the change of construction,
κατ' ἄλλο συμβεβηκός instead of
τῶν κατὰ συμβεβηκός. For the appositional clause after
ποτέρων
comp.
Eth. N. 9. 1, 1164 a 22
, and
Rhet. 3. 5, 1407 b 15
.
10.
mvp-aristotle-comment-988
1460b31
ἔλαφος θήλεια κέρατα οὐκ ἔχει:
Η. Α. 4. 11, 538 a 18
κέρατα ἔλαφος θήλεια οὐκ ἔχει.-
De part. an. 3. 1, 662 a 1
τῶν ἐλάφων οἱ μὲν ἄρρενες ἔχουσι κέρατα, αἱ δὲ θήλειαι οὐκ ἔχουσιν. The hind seems to have often been represented as having horns not only by poets (
v.
Nauck,
Aristophanis Byz. fr. p. 61
), but also by artists;
comp. the Scholiast on
Pindar
Ol. 3, 52
:
ἐπιμελῶς οἱ ποιηταὶ τὴν θήλειαν ἔλαφον κέρατα ἔχουσαν εἰσάγουσιν, καθάπερ καὶ τὴν θηλάζουσαν τὸν Τήλεφον γράφουσι καὶ πλάττουσιν.
10.
mvp-aristotle-comment-989
1460b32
ἀμιμήτως
is the opposite of
μιμητικῶς. In
Probl. 29. 10, 951 a 6
(the only Aristotelian passage in which it recurs)
ἀμίμητος is the opposite of
μιμητός; but it is not uncommon with negative words of this type to have two senses, an active as well as a passive;
ἀναίσθητος, for instance, is the opposite not only of
αἰσθητός but also of
αἰσθητικός. The negative idea in this and similar privative terms must not be pressed too far (see on
ἀήθεις
6, 1450a25
);
ἀμιμήτως ἔγραψεν only means that the picture did not adequately express the artist's meaning, i. e. did not express it in a way to be understood by others. A failure of this kind, which arises
δι' ἀδυναμίαν, through lack of artistic capacity (see above on
b 17
), is inexcusable in a
μιμητής, whose work must be intelligible, if it is to give us the pleasure of a
μίμημα (
v.
4, 1448 a 15
).
11.
mvp-aristotle-comment-990
πρὸς δὲ τούτοις κτέ.
Aristotle passes on to the
ἐπιτιμήματα which come under the first of the three heads in the survey in
b 8 sqq.
The objector is supposed to urge either that the poetic picture is not true to fact (
comp.
οἷα ἦν ἢ ἔστιν,
10
), or that it is not better than the reality (
comp.
οἷα εἶναι δεῖ,
b11
), or that it is not in harmony with tradition or opinion (
comp.
οἷά φασιν καὶ δοκεῖ
10
). The answers to these criticisms may take the follow- Digitized by Google Original from UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA States, Google-oigitized 25. 1460 28-1461 1 331 1460b 32 ing forms:-(1) If not true to fact, the picture is perhaps better than the reality; (2) if neither true to fact nor better than the reality, it is perhaps in accordance with opinion; (3) if not in accordance with opinion, it is perhaps true to fact. There are thus three
λύσεις for this class
ἐπιτιμήματα.
Aristotle omits to mention a fourth
λύσις, the plea of poetic necessity (
πρὸς τὴν ποίησιν,
1461 b 9
), which is, wherever possible, a valid answer to almost any criticism.
11.
mvp-aristotle-comment-991
1460b33
ἀλλ᾽ ἴσως δεῖ
=
ἀλλ᾽ ἴσως δεῖ εἶναι, just as in the next line
οἷους δεῖ =
οἷους δεῖ εἶναι (
comp.
Bon. Ind. 239b16
). The answer is vividly introduced by
ἀλλά, the word the defender himself might use in an actual discussion.
11.
mvp-aristotle-comment-992
οἷον καὶ Σοφοκλῆς:
see on
6, 1450a37
. A similar remark is attributed to the poet
Philoxenus,
Φιλόξενος ὁ ποιητὴς εἰπόντος τινός, διατί Σοφοκλῆς χρηστὰς παρεισάγει τὰς γυναῖκας αὐτὸς δὲ φαύλας, εἶπεν, Ὅτι Σοφοκλῆς μὲν οἷας δεῖ εἶναι τὰς γυναῖκας λέγει, ἐγὼ δὲ οἱαί εἰσιν (
S. Maximus Conf. 2 p. 632 Combef.
).
11.
mvp-aristotle-comment-993
1460b34
ταύτῃ λυτέον.
Having introduced an illustration (the saying of
Sophocles),
Aristotle adds
ταύτῃ λυτέον, repeating the sense of the words preceding the illustration. This is an instance of what
Riddell,
Digest of Idioms § 209, terms the Binary structure with comparisons, when 'the fact illustrated is stated (perhaps only in outline) before the illustration, and re-stated after it.' For other Aristotelian instances see
Vahlen,
Aristotelische Aufsätze p. 6
, and my
Textual Criticism of the Nic. Ethics p. 27.
12.
mvp-aristotle-comment-994
1461a1
ὅτι οὕτω φασίν =
λυτέον ὅτι οὕτω φασὶν εἶναι.
The construction
λύειν ὅτι ('to refute by saying that') is found in
Soph. el. 24, 179b 34
ἁμαρτάνουσι καὶ οἱ λύοντες ὅτι ἅpas ἀριθμὸς ὀλίγος.-
Rhet. 2. 25, 1402 a 34
οὔκουν ἱκανὸν ἂν λύσῃ ὅτι οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον, ἀλλὰ δεῖ λύειν ὅτι οὐκ εἰκός.-
Fr. 166 (Teubn.)
ἔστι δὲ λύειν ὅτι τοιαῦτα ἦν. ...
τὰ περὶ θεῶν: i, e. the poetic statements about Gods, though neither true nor better than the truth, may perhaps be said to be sanctioned by opinion, and to be what people are in the habit of repeating of the Gods.
13.
mvp-aristotle-comment-995
1461a
ὥσπερ Ξενοφάνει,
scil.
ἐστίν, 'as they are in the view of
Xenophanes' (
v.
Kühner, Gr. Gr. 2. 1, p. 421). Other Aristotelian instances of this use of the dative are
De caelo 3. 8, 307 a 16
Δημοκρίτῳ δὲ καὶ ἡ σφαῖρα ὡς γωνία τις οὖσα τέμνει ὡς εὐκίνητον.-
De gen. et corr. 1. 8, 325 a 15
Ἐμπεδοκλεῖ τίνα τρόπον ἔσται γένεσις καὶ φθορὰ καὶ ἀλλοίωσις, οὐ δῆλον.
Xenophanes, we must remember, [ 332 COMMENTARY 1461ª I was the first to lift up his voice against
Homer and
Hesiod, as the great exponents of a false and immoral conception of the Gods (see
fr. 10-12 Diels
).
13.
mvp-aristotle-comment-996
1461a2
ἀλλ᾽ οὖν =
'but at any rate' (
Kühner, Gr. Gr. 2. 2 p. 160;
comp.
Bon. Ind. 33b33
).
14.
mvp-aristotle-comment-997
ἔγχεα δέ σφιν κτέ.:
Ιλ. 10. 152
ἔγχεα δέ σφιν ὄρθ᾽ ἐπὶ σαυρωτῆρος ἐλήλατο. The difficulty here is thus stated in a fragment of the
Ἀπορήματα Ομηρικά (
fr. 160 Teubn.
=
Porphyr. in Il. 1. c. p. 145
Schrader), where the same solution is suggested:
φαύλη δοκεῖ εἶναι ἡ τῶν δοράτων ἐπὶ σαυρωτῆρας στάσις· καὶ δὴ πανταχοῦ θόρυβον ἤδη πεποίηκε νύκτωρ ἓν μόνον πεσόν. λύει δ᾽ Ἀριστοτέλης λέγων ὅτι τοιαῦτα ἀεὶ ποιεῖ Ὅμηρος οἷα ἦν τότε. ἦν δὲ τοιαῦτα τὰ παλαιὰ οἱάπερ καὶ νῦν ἐν τοῖς βαρβάροις· πολλοὶ δὲ οὕτω χρῶνται τῶν βαρβάρων. A similar justification of
Homer, by reference to a primitive custom still surviving among barbarians, is found in
fr. 166
(=
Porphyr. in Il. 24. 15, p. 267
Schr.):
διὰ τί ὁ Ἀχιλλεὺς τὸν Ἕκτορα εἶλκε περὶ τὸν τάφον τοῦ Πατρόκλου παρὰ τὰ νενομισμένα ποιῶν εἰς τὸν νεκρόν ; . . . ἔστι δὲ λύειν, φησὶν Ἀριστοτέλης, καὶ εἰς τὰς ὑπάρχοντα ἀνάγοντα ἔθη, ὅτι τοιαῦτα ἦν, ἐπεὶ καὶ νῦν ἐν Θετταλίᾳ περιέλκουσι περὶ τοὺς τάφους.
14.
mvp-aristotle-comment-998
1461a3
σαυρωτῆρος.
If the form in the quotation in the
Ἀπορήματα Ομηρικά is to be trusted,
Aristotle's text of
Homer would seem to have had
σαυρωτῆρας, the reading of
Aristophanes.
1461a4
καλῶς ἢ μὴ καλῶς =
πότερον καλῶς ἢ μὴ καλῶς (
v.
Kühner, Gr. Gr. 2. 2 p. 532). The objection
Aristotle is now considering is the moral objection, the criticism that something said or done by a personage in a poem was not morally right (
οἷον εἶναι δεῖ
1460b11
). His point is that, before admitting the validity of such an objection, it is proper to take the circumstances of the word or deed into account, e. g. (1) the person to whom it was said or done, (2) the moment, (3) the instrument used, and (4) the motive in the mind of the speaker or agent.
Eth. N. 3, 1, 1111 a 4
contains a fuller statement of the circumstances that may lead us to modify the severity of our moral judgements (
comp.
fr. 174 Teubn.
).
15.
mvp-aristotle-comment-999
1461a7
πρὸς ὃν κτἑ.:
i.e.
πρὸς ὃν ... ἔπραξεν ἢ ἔλεξεν ὁ πράττων ἢ λέγων.
15.
mvp-aristotle-comment-1000
1461a8
ὅτε.
Plutarch (
De aud. poet. 26 F) defends the four lines in
Il. 9. 458-61
, which
Aristarchus is said to have excised, as being
πρὸς τὸν καιρόν;
comp.
Porphyr. in Il.
9. 203
, p. 135
Schr.
οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀπὸ τῆς λέξεως λύουσι ... οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ καιροῦ, ὅτι νύξ.
15.
mvp-aristotle-comment-1001
1461a8
μείζονος ἀγαθοῦ:
An. pr. 2. 22, 68b35
αἱρετώτερον δὲ τὸ μεῖζον ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἔλαττον κακὸν ἢ τὸ ἔλαττον ἀγαθὸν καὶ μεῖζον κακόν (comp.
Rhet. 1. 10, 1369 b 25
). —Porphyr. in Od. 13. 119, p. 117 Schr.
πολλάκις γὰρ τῶν ἐν μιᾷ πράξει καὶ δυσχερὲς ὑπάρχει τι καὶ ἀγαθόν, καὶ μᾶλλόν ἐστιν αἱρετὸν τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἢ τὸ κακὸν φευκτόν· διόπερ οὐκ ἀποδοκιμάζομεν τὰς τοιαῦτας πράξεις.
1461a9
16.
mvp-aristotle-comment-1002
τὰ δὲ πρὸς τὴν λέξιν κτἑ.
Aristotle's examples show that the difficulties coming under this head are of every possible kind; the one point they have in common is that they turn on language, and may be met by the discovery or adoption of another interpretation of the language in the incriminated statement.
16.
mvp-aristotle-comment-1003
1461a10
διαλύειν
is simply a synonym for
λύειν (
Bon. Ind. 184b43
; HSt. s. v.).
16.
mvp-aristotle-comment-1004
1461a10_2
γλώττῃ:
i. e. by taking some word in the passage as a
γλώττα (see
21, 1457b4
). For the instrumental dative, of which there are so many other instances in the context, comp.
Soph. el. 24, 179b38
ἔνιοι δὲ καὶ τῷ διττῷ λύουσι τοὺς συλλογισμούς.
16.
mvp-aristotle-comment-1005
1461a11
οὐρῆας μὲν πρῶτον:
Il. 1. 50
οὐρῆας μὲν πρῶτον ἐπώχετο καὶ κύνας ἀργούς. The difficulty the ancients found here was to understand why the mules were made to suffer first (v. Porphyr. ad loc. p. 4 Schrader). Aristotle's interpretation of
οὐρῆας, which survives in Hesychius (s. v.
οὐρεῖς and
οὐρῆας), is condemned in Schol. Ven. A on Il. 1. c. (presumably from Aristonicus):
ὅτι οὐκ ὀρθῶς τινες οὐρῆας τοὺς φύλακας· ἀντιδιαστέλλει γὰρ διὰ τοῦ αὐτοῖσι, and again on Il. 10. 84:
ἀθετεῖται, ὅτι οὐρήων βούλεται λέγειν τῶν φυλάκων, καὶ οὐκ ἐκράτησεν τοῦ σχήματος· οὗρον γὰρ λέγει ὡς κοῦρον τὸν φύλακα, οὐρέα δὲ τὸν ἡμίονον.
16.
mvp-aristotle-comment-1006
1461a12
ὅς ῥ᾽ ἦ τοι εἶδος:
Il. 10. 316
ὃς δή τοι εἶδος μὲν ἔην κακός, ἀλλὰ ποδώκης. The question raised was apparently this: How could Dolon, if ill-shaped, have been swift of foot? The answer of Aristotle is that
εἶδος κακός may have meant in Homer not 'ill-shaped', but simply 'ugly' or 'ill-looking'; he suggests that
εἶδος may have been used not in its normal sense of 'shape', but in a strange sense (as a
γλώττα) corresponding to that of the derivative
εὐειδής in the Cretan dialect. His explanation of the word reappears in Schol. Bachm. on Il. 2. 58:
εἶδος ἐπὶ τοῦ προσώπου, and in Hesychius (s. ν.
εἴδη) :
εἶδος ... ὄψις, πρόσωπον.
16.
mvp-aristotle-comment-1007
1461a13
τὸ γὰρ εὐειδὲς κτέ.
The traditional reading
τὸ γὰρ εὐειδὲς οἱ Κρήτες εὐπρόσωπον καλοῦσι Public Domain in the United Generated at Tufts University through HathiTrust on 2026-05-18 19:55 GMT 334 COMMENTARY 1461a13 speciosum est', and Vahlen's 'vocabulo quod est
εὐειδές Cretes
εὐπρόσωπον appellant'. The difficulty however is in the absence of the article with the subject, which produces an intolerable ambiguity. I have accordingly ventured to restore (τὸ)
εὐπρόσωπον on the analogy of Aristotelian usage in the context (
τὸ ἄκρατον,
τὸ θᾶττον) and in
6, 1449b29
, as also elsewhere, e. g. in
Metaph. Δ 29, 1025b11
τὸ χωλαίνειν ... τὸ μιμεῖσθαι λέγων. Vahlen quotes a number of passages from other writers in defence of the vulgate, but as it seems to me, they are not all quite to the point; those from Plato (Theaet. 190 A and Crat. 410 c) at any rate may very well admit of another interpretation. The more important of his instances were discussed by W. Dindorf, Preface to Demosthenes p. lxii ed. Teubn. In two of them the anomaly may be removed at once by the same expedient, the insertion of a second article: Demosthenes 23, 33
τὰ γὰρ ἄποινα (τὰ) χρήματα ὠνόμαζον οἱ παλαιοί. —Xenophon Mem. 3. 14. 7 ἔλεγε δὲ καὶ ὡς
τὸ εὐωχεῖσθαι ἐν τῇ Ἀθηναίων γλώττῃ (τὸ) ἐσθίειν καλοῖτο.
1461a14
16.
mvp-aristotle-comment-1008
ζωρότερον κτέ.:
Il. 9. 202
μείζονα δὴ κρητῆρα, Μενοιτίου υἱέ, καθίστα, ζωρότερον δὲ κέραιε. Porphyry's note on this is:
ἀπρεπές· ὡς γὰρ ἐπὶ κῶμον ἤκουσιν ἀκρατότερον διδόναι παρακελεύεται. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀπὸ τῆς λέξεως λύουσι· τὸ γὰρ ζωρότερον εἶναι τάχιον κτέ. (p. 135 Schrader). Plutarch Qu. conv. 5. 4, 677 F tells us that this was one of the many Homeric statements to which Zoilus took exception.
16.
mvp-aristotle-comment-1009
1461a15
ἄκρατον.
The comparative
ἀκρατότερον is the usual equivalent for
ζωρότερον in the Homeric Scholia, and in the lexicographers: Apollonius Lex. p. 81 Bekk.
ζωρότερον ἀκρατότερον. —Hesychius
ζωρότερον· ἀκρατότερον. ἔνιοι δὲ τάχιον The reading
ἄκρατον, however, is sufficiently certified by Ath. 423 E
τινὲς δὲ καὶ τὸ παρ᾿ Ὁμήρῳ “ζωρότερον δὲ κέραιρε” οὐκ ἄκρατον σημαίνειν φασίν, ἀλλὰ θερμόν... ἄλλοι δὲ τὸ εὔκρατον, ὥσπερ τὸ δεξιτερὸν ἀντὶ τοῦ δεξιοῦ (comp. Plutarch Qu. conv. 5. 4, 677 D).
16.
mvp-aristotle-comment-1010
1461a15_2
ὡς οἰνόφλυξιν:
comp.
Probl. 3. 5, 871b27
δια τί οἱ οἰνόφλυγες τρέμουσι, καὶ μᾶλλον ὅσῳ ἂν ἀκρατοποτῶσιν ;
17.
mvp-aristotle-comment-1011
1461a16
ἄλλοι μέν ῥα κτέ.:
Il. 10. 1
ἄλλοι μὲν παρὰ νηυσὶν ἀριστῆες Παναχαιῶν εἶδον παννύχιοι must be the passage Aristotle had in mind; but he seems to have mixed it up with that in
Il. 2. 1
ἄλροι μέν ῥα θεοί τε καὶ ἀνέρες ἱπποκορυσταὶ εἶδον παννύχιοι. The difficulty in the passage was its inconsistency with Il. 10. 11-13 (on the revelry and other signs of life among the Trojans),
ἤτοι ὅτ᾽ ἐς πεδίον τὸ Τρωικὸν ἀθρήσειε, θαύμαζεν πυρὰ πολλά, τὰ καίετο Ἰλιόθι Public Domain In the United States, Google digitized Generated at Tufts University through HathiTrust on 2026-05-18 19:55 GMT Digitized by Google Original from UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA 25. 1461a13-20 335 1461a16
πρό, αὐλῶν συρίγγων τ᾽ ἐνοπὴν ὅμαδόν τ᾿ ἀνθρώπων. Aristotle's solution, it will be observed, consists in saying that
πάντες may mean practically no more than 'many', and be an instance of the metaphorical substitution of a specific in lieu of a generic term (v.
21, 1457b8
). The word
πάντες, therefore, must have appeared somewhere or other in the text of the Aristotelian quotation (comp. Tyrwhitt ad loc.). Gräfenhan found a place for it by writing
πάντες instead of
ἄλροι, and Tyrwhitt by restoring
πάντες ὁμοῦ for
παννύχιοι. A simpler expedient would perhaps be to suppose the passage, as Aristotle remembered it, to have run thus:
ἄλροι μέν ῥα θεοί τε καὶ ἀνέρες εἶδον (ἅπαντες) | παννύχιοι.
17.
mvp-aristotle-comment-1012
1461a18
τοι ὅτ᾽ ἐς πεδίον κτέ.:
Il. 10. 11-13
(quoted above). The omission of the line
θαύμαζεν πυρὰ πολλά, τὰ καίετο Ιλιόθι πρό may very well be due to Aristotle himself; it is difficult, however, to hold him responsible for the form the next line has in the MS.,
αὐλῶν συρίγγων τε ὁμαδόν—which the editors (following Sylburg) have made into
αὐλῶν συρίγγων θ᾽ ὁμαδόν (or
ὅμαδον); he must have known that the meaning thus given to
ὅμαδος was not in accordance with Homeric usage. The accentuation too of the word in the manuscript
(ὁμαδόν) is difficult to account for. I think that it may perhaps represent
ὅμαδόν, i. e.
ὅμαδον with an enclitic after it; so that the reading in the MS. may be the wreckage of an older reading,
αὐλῶν συρίγγων τ᾽ ἐ(νοπὴν) ὅμαδόν (τ᾿ ἀνθρώπων), in other words, of the line as it appears in the ordinary text of Homer.
1461a19
17.
mvp-aristotle-comment-1013
τὸ γὰρ πάντες ἀντὶ τοῦ πολλοί.
Porphyry on
Od. 12. 374 (p. 113 Schrader)
records a similar interpretation of
πάντα in
Il. 3. 277
:
ἐναντίον τοῦτο [scil. Od. 12. 374] τῷ Ἠέλιός θ᾽ ὃς πάντ᾽ ἐφορᾶς καὶ πάντ᾽ ἐπακούεις· ἀφ᾿ ἑαυτοῦ γὰρ ἐχρῆν ἐγνωκέναι τὸν πάντα ἐφορῶντα. λύοιτο δ᾽ ἂν ἢ τῇ λέξει· τὸ γὰρ πάντα δηλοῖ τὰ πλεῖστα κτέ.
17.
mvp-aristotle-comment-1014
1461a20
οἴη δ᾽ ἄμμορος:
Il. 18. 489
(=
Od. 5. 275
)
οἴη δ᾽ ἄμμορός ἐστι λοετρῶν Ὠκεανοῖο (said of the Great Bear). The astronomical difficulty in the line, which even led some of the Homeric critics of antiquity to alter the text (v. Strabo p. 3 Cas. and Apollonius Lex. p. 29 Bekk.), is thus stated by Porphyry ad loc. (p. 225 Schrader):
ἀνιστόρητόν ἐστι τοῦτο· κατηγοροῦσι μὲν γὰρ κατὰ τὸν περὶ τῆς Ἀρκτου λόγον φάσκοντος οἴη δ᾽ ἄμμορός ἐστι λοετρῶν Ὠκεανοῖο· καθόλου γὰρ πάντα τὰ ἐν τῷ ἀρκτικῷ μὴ δύνειν. Aristotle's solution (which is not mentioned in the Scholia or elsewhere) is to take
οἴη as a generic in the place of a specific word, i. e. as an Public Generated at Tufts University through HathiTrust on 2026-05-16 19:55 GMT Domain in the United States, Google-digitized Digitized by Google Original from UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA 336 COMMENTARY 1461a20 instance of a kind of metaphor already recognized in
21, 1457b7
(ἀπὸ τοῦ γένους ἐπὶ εἶδος).
17.
mvp-aristotle-comment-1015
1461a21
τὸ γὰρ γνωριμώτατον μόνον.
Vahlen quotes
Eth. N. 7. 14, 1153b35
διὰ τὸ μόνας οὖν γνωρίμους εἶναι ταύτας [scil. τὰς ἡδονάς] μόνας οἴονται εἶναι. For the substitution of
μόνον, as a synonym for
πάντες, compare the use of
κωλυθῆναι in
26 to represent Homer's
ἔσχετο.
18.
mvp-aristotle-comment-1016
1461a22
κατὰ δὲ προσῳδίαν,
scil.
δεῖ λύειν (or
διαλύειν), understood from
9
τὰ δὲ πρὸς τὴν λέξιν ὁρῶντα δεῖ διαλύειν.
κατά means 'by reference to', as in
κατὰ τὸ ἔθος τῆς λέξεως in 27; it is the equivalent of the instrumental dative we find elsewhere in the context (see on 10) with
λύειν (or
διαλύειν).
Προσῳδία with Aristotle comprises accent, breathing, and quantity—all the elements in the spoken word which in the ancient mode of writing were left to be supplied by the reader. For accent as a form of
προσῳδία see
Soph. el. 4, 166b1
(v. infra on 23);
21, 177b
; and
23, 179a14
. Breathing is distinctly said to come under this head in
Soph. el. 20, 177b3
τὸ ὄρος καὶ ὅρος τῇ προσῳδίᾳ λεχθὲν σημαίνει ἕτερον. ἀλλ᾽ ἐν μὲν τοῖς γεγραμμένοις ταὐτὸν ὄνομα, ὅταν ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν στοιχείων γεγραμμένον ᾖ καὶ ὡσαύτως, κἀκεῖ δ᾽ ἤδη παράσημα ποιοῦνται, τὰ δὲ φθεγγόμενα οὐ ταὐτά. That quantity also was regarded by Aristotle as a part of
προσῳδία may be inferred from the position of
μήκει καὶ βραχύτητι in the enumeration in
20, 1456b32
(v. Schmidt, Beitr. zur Gesch. der Grammatik p. 188). His idea of
προσῳδία, therefore, agreed with that of Choeroboscus (Scholia in Dionys. Thracis art. gramm. p. 124 Hilgard),
ἰστέον δὲ ὅτι ἐν ταῖς προσῳδίαις τρία ἐστὶν εἴδη· ἔστι γὰρ τόνος, χρόνος, πνεῦμα (comp. Egger, Apollonius Dyscole p. 29, and Schmidt, l. c. p. 185).
18.
mvp-aristotle-comment-1017
1461a22_2
Ἱππίας.
The view of Sengebusch (Hom. Diss. prior p. 206) is that he lived in the second half of the fifth century, and may perhaps be identified with the Hippias of Thasos mentioned by Lysias (13. 54 and 61) as one of the victims of the Thirty Tyrants. Schrader (Porphyr. in Il. p. 413) doubts whether there is any sufficient evidence for this date.
18.
mvp-aristotle-comment-1018
1461a22_3
δίδομεν δέ οἱ.
The parallel in
Soph. el. 4, 166b1
(v. on 23) shows that
δίδομεν δέ οἱ εὖχος ἀρέσθαι was the reading in Aristotle's Homer in
Il. 2. 15
, where our existing vulgate has
Τρώεσσι δὲ κήδε᾽ ἐφῆπται; the reference too in the parenthesis,
ὥσπερ Ἱππίας ἔλυεν ὁ Θάσιος, shows that Hippias must have had the same reading before him. It is clear that we have in this instance at any rate 25. 1461a20-23 337 1461a22 a real variant, and not one of Aristotle's misquotations.
δίδομεν δέ τοι εὖχος ἀρέσθαι occurs in
Il. 21. 297
, but in a context very unlike that of Il. 2. 15. The deceptive dream of Agamemnon in
Il. 2. 8 sqq.
had been criticized by
Plato
Rep. 382 E
, as making Zeus a deceiver; and it was felt to be a difficulty by several of the grammarians (v. Porphyr. in Il. l. c. p. 23 Schr.). As the half-line
δίδομεν δὲ οἱ εὐχος ἀρέσθαι seems to credit Zeus with a direct lie, this was doubtless the difficulty which Aristotle and Hippias thought to remove by the artifice of reading ΔΙΔΟΜΕΝ not as
δίδομεν, but as
διδόμεν, i. e. as an infinitive in the sense of an imperative, so as to shift the actual falsehood from Zeus himself to the Dream-god (comp. Wolf, Prolegomena ad Hom. p. 128 ed. Peppmüller).
18.
mvp-aristotle-comment-1019
1461a23
τὸ μὲν οὐ καταπύθεται ὄμβρῳ:
Il. 23. 327
ἔστηκε ξύλον αὖον ὅσον τ᾿ ὄργυι ὑπὲρ αἴης, ἢ δρυὸς ἢ πεύκης· τὸ μὲν οὐ καταπύθεται ὄμβρῳ. Our text of Homer embodies the suggestion of Hippias,
οὐ for
οὗ. The objection to the older mode of reading the word was probably this, that the statement was against scientific truth, oak and pine being held to be among the woods least liable to rot through moisture (
Theophr. H. P. 5. 4, 3
). The view of Hippias is given with greater fullness in
Soph. el. 4, 166b1
:
παρὰ δὲ τὴν προσῳδίαν ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἄνευ γραφῆς διαλεκτικοῖς οὐ ῥᾳδιον ποιῆσαι λόγον, ἐν δὲ τοῖς γεγραμμένοις καὶ ποιήμασι μᾶλλον, οἷον καὶ τὸν Ὅμηρον ἔνιοι διορθοῦνται πρὸς τοὺς ἐλέγχοντας ὡς ἀτόπως εἰρηκότα “τὸ μὲν οὐ καταπύθεται ὄμβρῳ”. λύουσι γὰρ αὐτὸ τῇ προσῳδίαν λέγοντες τὸ ΟΥ ὀξύτερον. καὶ τὸ περὶ τὸ ἐνύπνιον τοῦ Ἀγαμέμνονος, ὅτι οὐκ αὐτὸς ὁ Ζεὺς εἶπεν “δίδομεν δέ οἱ εὐχος ἀρέσθαι”, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἐνυπνίῳ ἐνετέλλετο διδόναι. On this passage Alexander, or rather Michael Ephesius (p. 33 Wallies), has a comment which, besides serving to explain the passage in the Soph. el., is not without interest for the history of the early criticisms on Homer:
τινὲς οὖν ἐκάκιζον τὸν Ὅμηρον, περισπωμένως τὸ οὐ ἀναγινώσκοντες καὶ λέγοντες ἄτοπόν τι αὐτὸν εἰρηκέναι διὰ τοῦτο, ὡς λέγοντα δῆθεν ὅτι τοῦ ξύλου ἐκείνου ... τὶ μὲν κατασήπεται τὶ δὲ οὐ κατασήπεται· εἰ γὰρ μὴ καὶ τοῦτο ἐδήλωσεν ἐναργῶς, τὸ τὶ δὲ οὐ κατασήπεται λέγουσιν ἄντικρυς δηλοῦσθαι διὰ τοῦ εἰρημένου, τοῦ “οὗ τὸ μὲν καταπύθεται”.... ἐπιδιορθοῦται δὲ τούτους [εν τῷ περὶ Ποιητικῆς], ὡς αὐτὸς Ἀριστοτέλης ἐν τῇ Ρητορικῇ [read with Vahlen, ἐν τῷ περὶ Ποιητικῆς] φησιν, Ἱππίας ὁ Θάσιος μὴ περισπωμένως ἀναγινώσκων τὸ οὐ ἀλλ᾽ ἀποφατικῶς, ὅπερ αὐτὸς ὀξύτερον εἴρηκεν, ἵνα ᾖ τὸ λεγόμενον ὡς ἡ πεύκη τὸ δένδρον οὐ καταπύθεται ὄμβρῳ .... τὸ δ᾽ ἕτερον [scil. παράδειγμα] τὸ ἐπαγόμενον, τὸ περὶ τὸ ἐνύπνιον τοῦ Ἀγαμέμνονος, φησι τὸν Δία εἰπεῖν τὸ “ δίδομεν δὲ οἱ εὐχος ἀρέσθαι”, οὐδαμοῦ κεῖται ἐν τῇ Ἰλιάδι . εἰσὶν οὖν τὰ ῥήματα τοῦ Διὸς πρὸς τὸν ὄνειρον ὅτι βὰς ταῦτα εἶπε τῷ Ἀγαμέμνονι ὅτι δίδομεν αὐτῷ πάντες οἱ θεοὶ τὴν νίκην. φασὶν οὖν οἱ ταῦτα λέγοντες ὡς ἐνταῦθα ἁμαρτάνει ὁ ποιητὴς εἰσάγων τὸν Δία διαλεγόμενον ταῦτα τῷ ὀνείρῳ καὶ τρόπον τινὰ ψευδόμενον, ὅπερ οὐκ ἔστι θεοῦ. οἱ γοῦν ἐπιδιορθούμενοι τοῦτόν φασιν ὡς οὐ τῷ Ἀγαμέμνονι ὁ Ζεὺς ἔλεγε τὸ εὐχος δοθῆναι ἀλλὰ τῷ ὀνείρῳ κατὰ τοῦ Ἀγαμέμνονος· ἀναγινώσκουσι δὲ οὕτως, “δίδομεν δὲ οἱ”, ἀντὶ τοῦ σοί, τῷ ὀνείρῳ. ἔστι δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ψεῦδος· ὁ γὰρ αὐτὸς νοῦς ἐστι κἂν ὁ τόνος ἀναβιβασθείη κἂν περισπασθείη ἡ ἀντωνυμία ἡ οἱ. ποῦ γοῦν [ οὖν] ἐστιν ἡ ἁμαρτία; ἢ οὐκ εἰς τὸ “ δέ οἱ” ἀλλ᾽ εἰς τὸ “δίδομεν”. εἰ γοῦν [? μὲν οὖν] τὸ “ δίδομεν δέ οἱ εὐχος ἀρέσθαι” ἀναγνῷ τις τὸν τόνον θεὶς εἰς τὸ δι τὸν Δία ποιεῖ ψευδόμενον, ὡς ὑπισχνούμενον διδόναι τὴν νίκην καὶ μὴ εἰς ἔργον ἐξάγοντα τὴν ὑπόσχεσιν· εἰ δὲ εἰς τὸ δο τὸν τόνον θεὶς ἀναγνῷ τὸ ἑξῆς, καὶ τὸν Δία τοῦ ψεύδεσθαι ἀπολύσει, καὶ τῷ Ὁμήρῳ περιποιήσεται τὸ ἀνέγκλητον, ὡς τοῦ Διὸς λέγοντος τῷ ὀνείρῳ καὶ ἐπιτάττοντος διδόμεναι αὐτὸν τὸν ὄνειρον τὸ εὐχος τῷ Ἀγαμέμνονι καὶ μὴ αὐτοῦ τοῦ Διός. καὶ γοῦν ὁ ὄνειρος ὑπισχνεῖται τῷ Ἀγαμέμνονι τὸ εὐχος καὶ ψεύδεται, καὶ οὐχ ὁ Ζεὺς αὐτός.
It will be observed that in the explanation of
Il. 23. 328
in the
Soph. el. the negative
οὐ is said to be distinguished from the pronoun
οὗ by being pronounced
ὀξύτερον, i. e.
ὀξυτόνως. This takes us back to a time when
οὐ was oxytone wheresoever it occurs (
comp.
Kühner, Gr. Gr. 1. 1 p. 331
), as it was held to be by more than one of the grammarians:
Herodian p. 504 Lentz
τὰ εἰς οῦ περισπῶνται, πανταχοῦ, ἀγχοῦ, καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ πλὴν τοῦ [? τὸ] ἰδού τὸ δεικτικόν, ἰου τὸ σχετλιαστικόν, καὶ οὗ τὸ ἀρνητικόν· τοῦτο δὲ καὶ ἐν τῇ συνεπείᾳ ὀξύνεται.
1461a24
19.
mvp-aristotle-comment-1020
τὰ δὲ διαιρέσει,
scil.
λυτέον. Διαίρεσις—a wider term than our 'punctuation '—is the opposite of
σύνθεσις (
comp.
Soph. el. 4, 166
a23
), and includes every sort of break in reading, even one only just enough to keep words from being taken together in construction.
The kind of difficulty to which this solution is applicable, may be seen from the instances in the
Sophistici elenchi,
ἐγώ σ᾽ ἔθηκα δοῦλον ὄντ᾽ ἐλεύθερον (
4, 166
a36
), and
ἔστιν ἀγαθὸν ὄντα σκυτέα μοχθηρὸν εἶναι; 339 (20, 177
b14) —where the words are ambiguous and admit of being construed in two different ways. With this may be compared what
Aristotle says in the
Rhetoric (
3. 5, 1407 b 14
) on the ambiguities in
Heraclitus :
τὰ γὰρ Ἡρακλείτου διαστίξαι ἔργον διὰ τὸ ἄδηλον εἶναι ποτέρῳ πρόσκειται, τῷ ὕστερον ἢ τῷ πρότερον, οἷον ἐν τῇ ἀρχῇ αὐτοῦ τοῦ συγγράμματος· φησὶ γὰρ “τοῦ λόγου τοῦδ᾽ ἐόντος ἀεὶ ἀξύνετοι ἄνθρωποι γίγνονται”.
ἄδηλον γὰρ τὸ ἀεί πρὸς ὁποτέρῳ (δεῖ) διαστίξαι. On the beginnings of formal punctuation in Greece see
Schmidt,
Beiträge zur Gesch. der Grammatik p. 506
, and
Meisterhans,
Grammatik³ p. 11
.
19.
mvp-aristotle-comment-1021
Ἐμπεδοκλῆς.
The passage here quoted appears in the editions of
Empedocles in a somewhat different form,
αἶψα δὲ θνήτ᾽ ἐφύοντο, τὰ πρὶν μάθον ἀθάνατ᾿ εἶναι, ζωρά τε τὰ πρὶν ἄκρητα, διαλλάξαντα κελεύθους (
fr. 35, 14-15 Diels
); and it is known that
Theophrastus read it thus, as he adduced it to show that
ζωρότερον in
Homer meant
τὸ κεκραμένον:
Athenaeus 423 F
.
Θεόφραστος δ᾽ ἐν τῷ περὶ μέθης ζωρότερόν φησιν εἶναι τὸ κεκραμένον. This is not the place to consider either the reading recognized by
Theophrastus or his interpretation of
ζωρότερον and
ζωρά.
Aristotle has a different reading,
ζωρά τε πρὶν κέκρητο; and any difficulty that may have been found in it he meets by simply affirming the possibility of another
διαίρεσις, another way of construing the words. He does not dispute the meaning which was assigned to
ζωρά; his assumption presumably was that
ζωρά=
ἄκρατα (
v.
b15
). The positive
ζωρός no longer existed in Attic; but in Ionic the comparative
ζωρότερον was to be found in
Herodotus and
Hippocrates, in the sense of 'having but a small admixture of water':
Herod. 6, 84
Κλεομένεα δὲ λέγουσι ἡκόντων τῶν Σκυθῶν... μαθεῖν τὴν ἀκρητοποσίην παρ᾿ αὐτῶν... ἔκ τε τόσου, ὡς αὐτοὶ λέγουσι, ἐπεὰν ζωρότερον βούλωνται πιεῖν, “ ἐπισκύθισον” λέγουσι (where
ζωρότερον πίνειν =
ἀκρατοποτεῖν). —
Hippocrates 2, 654 Κ.
οἶνον, ἣν μή τι κωλύῃ, πίνειν ζωρότερον παλαιὸν ἐπὶ τέσσαρας ημέρας. There is one instance of it in Attic prose, in
Theophrastus
Char. 4, 9
δεινὸς φαγεῖν καὶ ζωρότερον πιεῖν ('ungemischten Wein zu trinken', R. Meister).
Aristotle does not say what the question was that had been raised by the critics; it may be supposed, however (
comp.
Hermann
ad loc.), to have turned on the
πρίν before
κέκρητο, which owing to its ambiguous position may be construed with either
ζωρά or
κέκρητο. If one construes it with
κέκρητο, the clause will mean 'things pure had been before that mixed'; but in that case an objector might very well urge the inconsistency between this and the statement in the preceding line, in which
Empedocles speaks of the 'mortal' forms as assumed by the elements only when mixed up together in the actual world (
comp.
Zeller, Ph. d. Gr. 340 COMMENTARY 22 p. 784
). On the other hand, if the
πρίν be taken with
ζωρά, the sense will be 'things before that pure were found mixed up together' (for the tense of
κέκρητο
v.
Kühner, Gr. Gr. 1. 1 p. 152
;
Goodwin, Synt. of Gk. Moods and Tenses § 52
); and the objection of the critic is answered. The integrity of the text of the present passage has been doubted in recent times by several scholars of distinction.
Bergk (
Kl. Schriften 2 p. 86) has suggested
ζωρά τε πρὶν τὰ κέκρητο;
Gomperz (
Hermes 31 p. 469)
ζωρά τε ἃ (i. e. θ' ἃ) πρὶν κέκρητο; and
Diels (
on Emped. l. c.)
ζωρά τε τὰ πρὶν ἔκρητο (on the analogy of
ἔπλητο).
19.
mvp-aristotle-comment-1022
1461a25
ἀθάνατα.
As
Aristotle is so apt to curtail his quotations, it is hardly necessary to restore
ἀθάνατ᾿ (εἶναι). For the omission of
εἶναι see on
24, 1459
b9
.
1461a26
20.
mvp-aristotle-comment-1023
τὰ δὲ ἀμφιβολίᾳ,
scil.
δεῖ διαλύειν.
Aristotle now passes on to another kind of ambiguous statement, one capable of two interpretations through the presence of an ambiguous term. Such a term is said to be
ἀμφίβολον (
a26;
comp.
Rhet. 3. 5, 1407 a 32
); and its effect is
ἀμφιβολία.
ἀμφιβολία is here the same thing as what
Aristotle often calls elsewhere
ὁμωνυμία. It may be noted, as an instance of his variations in the use of technical language, that in
Soph. el. 4, 165
b26
ἀμφιβολία is distinguished from
ὁμωνυμία, and used to describe the ambiguity arising from some ambiguous collocation of terms.
20.
mvp-aristotle-comment-1024
παρώχηκεν δὲ πλέω νύξ:
Il. 10. 251
ἀλλ᾽ ἴομεν μάλα γὰρ νὺξ ἄνεται, ἐγγύθι δ᾽ ἠώς, ἄστρα δὲ δὴ προβέβηκε, παρῴχωκεν δὲ πλέων νὺξ τῶν δύο μοιράων, τριτάτη δ᾽ ἔτι μοῖρα λέλειπται. The reading
πλέω, which still survives in some of the MSS. of
Homer, and was a recognized variant in antiquity, has a certain interest as showing the affinity of
Aristotle's
Homer with that of
Zenodotus, who is known to have admitted forms like
ἀμείνω for
ἀμείνων,
γλυκίω for
γλυκίων, and
κρείσσω for
κρείσσων (
La Roche, Hom. Textkr. p. 302
;
Lobeck, Path. Elem. 2 p. 281
).
The problem was to explain how, if more than two-thirds of the night had gone, a third could be still left. According to
Porphyry
ad loc. (p. 147 Schr.) this was one of the earliest difficulties found in
Homer :
τῶν παλαιῶν ζητημάτων ὡμολόγηται εἶναι τὸ τοιοῦτο, ἐν οἷς φησιν “ ἄστρα ... λέλειπται”. πῶς γάρ, εἰ αἱ δύο μοῖραι ἐξήκουσιν αὐταί τε καὶ ἔτι τούτων πλέον, ἡ τριτάτη μοῖρα λέλειπται, ἀλλ᾽ οὐχὶ τῆς τρίτης μόριον ; Among the many solutions he mentions is one from the Aristotelian
Ἀπορήματα Ομηρικά (
fr. 161 Teubn.
),
ἐπεὶ οὖν καὶ τῆς νυκτὸς αἱ δώδεκα μοῖραι εἰς δύο ἴσας μερίδας μερίζεσθαι δύνανται, 341 εἰς ἕξ, ηὐξήθη δὲ καὶ πλέον γεγονὸς θάτερον μέρος, ἄδηλον δὲ τὸ πόσαις ὥραις (καὶ γὰρ μιᾷ καὶ δύο καὶ τρισὶ καὶ πλείοσιν ἡ αὔξησις δύναται γίνεσθαι)· ἀφορίζων ὁ ποιητὴς τὸ ἀόριστον τοῦ πλείονος πόσον ἦν καὶ ὅτι β ὥραις ηὐξήθη, ἐπήγαγεν ὅτι τριτάτη μοῖρα λέλειπται, ὡς ὀκτὼ μὲν γενέσθαι τὰς παρωχηκυίας ὥρας, καταλείπεσθαι δὲ τέσσαρας, αἵπερ εἰσὶ τοῦ ὅλου τρίτον. This highly artificial interpretation, which makes
πλέω νὺξ τῶν δύο μοιράων mean 'the greater part of two-thirds of the night', can hardly be what
Aristotle has in mind, as he distinctly says that the solution of the difficulty may be found in recognizing
πλέω as an amphibolous word, i. e. in giving it not its usual sense of 'more', but some different sense. This other sense was probably that of 'full', which is mentioned by
Porphyry
ad loc. (p. 147) as the suggestion of a certain
Metrodorus :
Μητρόδωρος μὲν οὖν τὸ πλεῖον δύο σημαίνειν φησὶ παρ Ὁμήρῳ· καὶ γὰρ τὸ σύνηθες καὶ τὸ πλῆρες, ὡς ἐν τῷ σὸν δὲ πλεῖον δέπας αἰεὶ ἔστηκε, καὶ ἐν τῷ πλεῖαί τοι χαλκοῦ κλισίαι. νῦν οὖν τὸ πλέον ἀντὶ τοῦ πλῆρες εἰρῆσθαι· πλήρης γὰρ ἡ νὺξ τῶν δύο μοιρῶν γεγονυῖα παρώχηκε, τριτάτη δ᾽ ἔτι περιλέλειπται.
Aristonicus seems to have accepted this interpretation of
πλέω ἀντὶ τοῦ πλήρης (
Schol. Ven. A. Il. 9. 71
); and it survives also in the gloss of
Hesychius
πλέω· πλήρης.
1461a27
21.
mvp-aristotle-comment-1025
τὸ ἔθος τῆς λέξεως.
Vahlen quotes
Soph. el. 4, 166
a14
εἰσὶ δὲ τρεῖς τρόποι τῶν παρὰ τὴν ὁμωνυμίαν καὶ τὴν ἀμφιβολίαν, εἷς μὲν ὅταν ἢ ὁ λόγος ἢ τοὔνομα κυρίως σήμαινῃ πλείω, οἷον ἀετὸς καὶ κύων· εἷς δὲ ὅταν εἰωθότες ὦμεν οὕτω λέγειν.
21.
mvp-aristotle-comment-1026
τὸν κεκραμένον
is to my mind a much more probable correction here than the others that have been suggested,
τὸ κεκραμένον (
Madius),
πᾶν κεκραμένον (
Bursian),
(ὅσα) τῶν κεκραμένων (
Vahlen),
τῶν κεκραμένων (οἱονοῦν) (
Tucker).
τὸν κεκραμένον, with
οἶνον in close proximity in the context, means
τὸν κεκραμένον οἶνον. There is the same ellipse in
Aristoph.
Eq. 1187
πιεῖν κεκραμένον τρία καὶ δύο (
comp.
Gildersleeve, Syntax of Class. Gk. 32
); and it is certainly not uncommon with
ἄκρατος (
comp.
ἀκρατοπότης, etc.). The general sense then of the whole passage will be this: In common parlance a mixture of wine and water is said to be 'wine'; and on the same principle
Homer's 'tin' may be an amalgam of tin and another metal.
Aristotle is apparently replying to some critic who took exception to the idea of the greaves being made of so soft a metal as tin, a point which modern archaeologists also have some difficulty in explaining (
comp.
Helbig, Das homerische Epos¹ p. 196
). 342 COMMENTARY
21.
mvp-aristotle-comment-1027
οἶνον:
Plutarch
Coni. praec. 140 F
το κρᾶμα καίτοι ὕδατος μετέχον πλείονος οἶνον καλοῦμεν. The fact is recognized and explained in
De gen. et corr. 1. 5, 321b35
το ἐπικρατοῦν λέγεται ἐν τῇ μίξει, οἷον ὅτι οἶνος· ποιεῖ γὰρ τὸ τοῦ οἴνου ἔργον ἀλλ᾽ οὐ τὸ τοῦ ὕδατος τὸ σύνολον μίγμα.
21.
mvp-aristotle-comment-1028
1461a28
κνημὶς νεοτεύκτου κασσιτέροιο:
Il. 21. 592
.
21.
mvp-aristotle-comment-1029
1461a29
χαλκέας.
Aristotle adduces this use of
χαλκεύς, to justify the language in
Il. 20. 234
, on the assumption that by a similar extension of meaning
οἰνοχοεύειν may be used for the serving out of nectar as well as that of wine.
χαλκεύς and its cognates are often found in this more general sense in the literature after
Homer :
Schol. Ven. B. Il. 19. 283
παλαιὰ ἡ χρῆσις τοῦ χαλκὸν ὀνομάζειν τὸν σίδηρον. ἀμέλει καὶ χαλκέας λέγομεν τοὺς τὸν σίδηρον ἐργαζομένους. —
Pollux 7. 106
χαλκεύειν δὲ καὶ τὸ σιδηρεύειν ἔλεγον, καὶ χαλκέας τοὺς τὸν σίδηρον ἐργαζομένους. The language in these two passages may be a distant reminiscence of
Aristotle's words.
21.
mvp-aristotle-comment-1030
1461a30
οἰνοχοεύειν:
Il. 20. 234
τὸν καὶ ἀνηρείψαντο θεοὶ Διὶ οἰνοχοεύειν. On the other hand, we are told elsewhere (
Il. 5. 341
) that the gods do not drink wine,
οὐ πίνουσ᾽ αἴθοπα οἶνον. For the infinitive—actually found in the Homeric text—
comp.
An. post. 2. 30, 97 b 6
τοῦτο δ᾽ εἴρηται μὴ διαφέρειν. —
Top. 2. 3. 110b3
οὔτ᾽ εἰ παντὶ οὔτ᾽ εἰ μηδενὶ ὑπάρχειν εἴρηται.
21.
mvp-aristotle-comment-1031
1461a31
εἴη δ᾽ ἂν τοῦτό γε κατὰ μεταφοράν.
Aristotle apparently prefers to explain
Homer's use of
οἰνοχοεύειν as a metaphor; referring, it would seem, to the
μεταφορὰ κατὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον considered in
21, 1457 b 16 sqq.
22.
mvp-aristotle-comment-1032
δεῖ δὲ κτέ.
This is a general word of caution very like that in
a4. Just as we have to consider all the attendant circumstances before condemning an act as wrong or immoral, so too, when the question turns on a word, we should consider its context and its possible meanings in the context before pronouncing it to be improper; we must be quite sure of our interpretation before passing an adverse judgement on the poet.
1461a33
οἷον
τῷ =
οἷον ἐν τῷ, the preposition being understood from the preceding ἐν τῷ εἰρημένῳ (see on
2, 1448a10
).
22.
mvp-aristotle-comment-1033
τῇ ῥ᾽ ἔσχετο χάλκεον ἔγχος:
Il. 20. 267
οὐδὲ τότ᾿ Αἰνείαο δαίφρονος ὄβριμον ἔγχος ῥῆξε σάκος· χρυσὸς γὰρ ἐρύκακε, δώρα θεοῖο ἀλλὰ δύω μὲν ἔλασσε διὰ πτύχας, αἱ δ᾽ ἄρ᾽ ἔτι τρεῖς ἦσαν, ἐπεὶ πέντε πτύχας ἤλασε κυλλοποδίων, τὰς δύο χαλκείας, δύο δ᾽ ἔνδοθι κασσιτέροιο, τὴν δὲ μίαν χρυσέην· τῇ ῥ᾽ ἔσχετο μείλινον ἔγχος. The difficulty found here may be seen from the note of
Porphyry (p. 244 343 Digitized by Google Original from UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA Schr.):
τῆς γὰρ χρυσῆς πτυχὸς δοκούσης πρώτης εἶναι, εἴ γε κόσμου ἕνεκα τὴν χρυσῆν εἰς τὸ ἔξω καὶ ὁρώμενον πρώτην ἐνέθηκεν, ὑπ᾿ αὐτὴν δὲ στερεότητος ἕνεκα τὰς δύο χαλκᾶς, μαλάγματος χάριν καὶ τελευταίας τὰς κασσιτερίνας, πῶς δύο τε διέκοψε πτύχας, καὶ ἐν τῇ χρυσῇ πτυχὶ ἔξω οὖσῃ καὶ διατμηθείσῃ ἐνεσχέθη τὸ δόρυ; The answer of
Aristotle was perhaps this, that the plate of gold sufficed to stop the course of the spear, though the spear-point actually pierced it and indented the underlying plates of brass. This is practically the same as the solution quoted from
Autochthon in
Schol. Ven. B
and
Eustathius
ad loc.
Aristarchus also is said to have acknowledged its plausibility:
Schol. Ven. A Il. 20. 269
ἵνα δὲ μὴ δοκῇ λύσεως ἠπορηκέναι καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἠθετηκέναι, φησὶν ὅτι τῆς χρυσῆς πτυχῆς πρώτης κατὰ τὴν ἐπιφάνειαν κειμένης νοητέον τὸ δόρυ τῆς πλείονος ὁρμῆς ἐγκοπὴν εἰληφέναι [=Aristotle's κωλυθῆναι], διακεκόφθαι μέντοι τὸ σάκος ἕως τῆς τρίτης πτυχῆς, ὃν τρόπον ἐπὶ τῆς πτυχῆς Μενελάου λέγει “ ἡ οἱ πλεῖστον ἔρυτο, διὰ πρὸ δὲ εἶσατο καὶ τῆς ”.
22.
mvp-aristotle-comment-1034
1461a34
κωλυθῆναι:
Metaph. A 23, 1023a17
ἔτι τὸ κωλύον κατὰ τὴν αὑτοῦ ὁρμήν τι κινεῖσθαι ἢ πράττειν ἔχειν λέγεται τοῦτο αὐτό, οἷον καὶ οἱ κίονες τὰ ἐπικείμενα βάρη, καὶ ὡς οἱ ποιηταὶ τὸν ᾿Ἄτλαντα ποιοῦσι τὸν οὐρανὸν ἔχειν ὡς συμπεσόντ᾽ ἂν ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν.
22.
mvp-aristotle-comment-1035
ἐνδέχεται,
scil.
σημαίνειν (see on
24, 1460b34
).
ὡδὶ ἢ ὡδί =
πότερον
ὡδὶ ἢ ὡδί (see on
a4). The clause, with the punctuation given in the text, is appositional to
ποσαχῶς ἂν σημαίνοι (see on
25, 1460b25
). For
ὡδὶ ἢ ὡδί
comp.
An. pr. 1. 31, 46a28
ἀγνοεῖται τὸ πότερον ὧδε ἢ ὧδε ἔχει. —
Soph. el. 18, 177a5
ἀναιροῦντες ἢ ὧδε ἢ ὧδε. —
Rhet. 3. 1, 1404a10
διαφέρει γάρ τι πρὸς τὸ δηλῶσαι ὡδὶ ἢ ὡδὶ εἰπεῖν.
23.
mvp-aristotle-comment-1036
1461a35
μάλιστ᾽ ἄν τις ὑπολάβοι.
The comma (or colon) which recent editors place after this I have removed in order that
μάλιστα may be taken with
κατὰ τὴν καταντικρύ;
comp.
Metaph. A 8, 989a30
μάλιστ ἂν ὑπολάβοι κατὰ λόγον ὃν ἐκεῖνος μὲν οὐ διήρθρωσεν κτέ. (also
Phys. 7. 3, 245b6
;
Metaph. Z 16, 1040b10
).
23.
mvp-aristotle-comment-1037
κατὰ τὴν καταντικρύ =
ἐξ ἐναντίας or
ἐναντίως. The
ἢ ὡς which follows
Vahlen illustrates from
22, 1458b3
ἄλλως ἔχειν ἢ ὡς τὸ κύριον. —
An. post. 1. 17, 80b35
ληπτέαι ἐναντίως ἢ ὡς ἔχουσιν αἱ προτάσεις. —
De caelo 2. 2, 285b25
ἐναντίως ἢ ὡς οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι λέγουσιν. —
Meteor. 1. 12, 348b12
τουναντίον ἢ ὡς Ἀναξαγόρας λέγει. A similar construction is found after a comparative adverb in
Eth. N. 3. 13, 1118b23
μᾶλλον ἢ ὡς οἱ πολλοί. The clause
ὅτι ἔνια κτέ. is explanatory of
ὡς Γλαύκων λέγει, 'the way described by Glaucon', and apparently a quotation.
24.
mvp-aristotle-comment-1038
1461b2
1461a31
Γλαύκων.
Aristotle is probably referring to the Glaucon mentioned as an authority in Homeric matters in
Plato's
Ion 530 D
, where the rhapsodist says of himself:
καὶ οἶμαι κάλλιστ᾽ ἀνθρώπων λέγειν περὶ Ὁμήρου, ὡς οὔτε Μητρόδωρος ὁ Λαμψακηνὸς οὔτε Στησίμβροτος ὁ Θάσιος οὔτε Γλαύκων οὔτε ἄλλος οὐδεὶς τῶν πώποτε γενομένων ἔσχεν εἰπεῖν οὕτω πολλὰς καὶ καλὰς διανοίας περὶ Ὁμήρου ὅσας ἐγώ. The absence of a local appellative here seems to imply that the Glaucon in question was an Athenian. If this inference is right, we cannot identify him with the
Γλαύκων ὁ Τήιος of
Rhet. 3. 1, 1403 b 26
or with Glaucus of Rhegium (
comp.
Hiller, Rh. Mus. 41 p. 398
); he may perhaps be the same as the Glaucus or Glaucon (
v.
Düntzer, Rettung der aristot. Poetik p. 227
) mentioned by
Porphyry on
Il. 11. 636 (p. 168 Schr.)
along with other early interpreters of
Homer.
24.
mvp-aristotle-comment-1039
1461b
αὐτοὶ καταψηφισάμενοι
resumes the idea of
ἔνια ἀλόγως προυπολαμβάνουσιν, and anticipates that in
τῇ αὐτῶν οἰήσει. The common rendering, 'postquam ipsi condemnationis sententiam tulerint' (
Tyrwhitt), gives
καταψηφισάμενοι a sense too near to that of the
ἐπιτιμῶσιν in the following line. The probability is, as
Vahlen has seen (
comp.
Bon. Ind. 376 a 56
), that it means in the present instance 'to decide', or to 'affirm' or 'accept' something. As a term of politics
καταψηφίζεσθαι is the opposite of
ἀποψηφίζεσθαι (to reject a proposal):
Pol. 4. 14, 1298 a 36
ἀποψηφιζόμενον μὲν γὰρ κύριον δεῖ ποιεῖν τὸ πλῆθος, καταψηφιζόμενον δὲ μὴ κύριον, ἀλλ' ἐπαναγέσθω πάλιν ἐπὶ τοὺς ἄρχοντας· ἐν γὰρ ταῖς πολιτείαις ἀντεστραμμένως ποιοῦσιν· οἱ γὰρ ὀλίγοι ἀποψηφισάμενοι μὲν κύριοι, καταψηφισάμενοι δὲ οὐ κύριοι, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπανάγεται εἰς τοὺς πλείστους αἰεί.
24.
mvp-aristotle-comment-1040
εἰρηκότος,
scil.
τοῦ ποιητοῦ (see on
6, 1449 b 26
).
25.
mvp-aristotle-comment-1041
1461b3
τοῦτο δὲ πέπονθε:
De anima 1. 5, 410 b 27
τοῦτο δὲ πέπονθε καὶ ὁ ἐν τοῖς Ὀρφικοῖς ἔπεσι καλουμένοις λόγος.
25.
mvp-aristotle-comment-1042
1461b4
τὰ περὶ Ἰκάριον.
The question which
Aristotle regards as based on a mere assumption, survives in
Porphyry on
Od. 4. 1 (p. 40 Schr.)
διὰ τί ὁ Τηλέμαχος εἰς Λακεδαίμονα ἐλθὼν οὐκ ἐνέτυχε τῷ Ἰκαρίῳ ; καίτοι ἄλογον ἐλθόντα τῷ πατρὶ τῆς μητρὸς μὴ ἐντυχεῖν, and in
Schol. Od. 1. 285
(
comp.
Schol. Od. 2. 52
)
πῶς εἰς Σπάρτην ἐλθὼν οὐ συντυγχάνει Ἰκαρίῳ ; The assumption of the critics, that the father of Penelope (called in
Homer Icarius) was a Lacedaemonian,
Aristotle meets by quoting on the other side the Cephallenian tradition which made him a Cephallenian. This same solution of the difficulty reappears incidentally in
Schol. Od. 15. 16
ὅτι Ιθακήσιος ὁ Ἰκάριος, οὐ Σπαρτιάτης, ἀδελφὸς Τυνδάρεω ... ὁ δὲ Ἰκάριος ἐκ Μεσσήνης ἦν τῆς Κεφαλληνιακῆς, ἐπεὶ οὐχ ὁρᾶται ἐν Ἰθάκῃ ἀναστρεφόμενος· ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ Λάκων· ὅθεν οὐδὲ ἐνέτυχεν αὐτῷ Τηλέμαχος ἐν τῇ εἰς Λακεδαίμονα ἀποδημίᾳ (
comp.
E. Meyer, Hermes 30 p. 265
).
25.
mvp-aristotle-comment-1043
τὸ δ᾽ ἴσως:
comp.
An. post. 1. 9, 76 a 29
;
Soph. el. 1, 165 a 10
.
25.
mvp-aristotle-comment-1044
1461b6
Κεφαλλῆνες.
Though the form
Κεφαληνία is found in the text of
H. A. 8. 28, 605 b 27
, there is little doubt that
Aristotle must have written the word with a double
λ. This is the normal spelling in Attic Inscriptions (
Meisterhans, Gr. p. 96
), and also in literature, according to
Eustathius on
Dion. Perieg. 431
,
τοὺς δὲ Κεφαλλῆνας καὶ τὴν Κεφαλληνίαν ἐν δυσὶ
λ ἡ παλαιὰ χρῆσις ἅπασα ἔχει.
25.
mvp-aristotle-comment-1045
παρ᾿ αὐτῶν γὰρ γῆμαι.
For the preposition
comp.
Plato
Polit. 310 D
γαμοῦσί τε παρὰ τούτων. —
Isocrates 386 c
ἔγημεν ἐκ Σερίφου παρ᾿ ἀνθρώπων πολὺ πλείονος ἀξίων ἢ κατὰ τὴν αὑτῶν πόλιν, ἐξ ἧς ἐγένετο Σώπαλις.
25.
mvp-aristotle-comment-1046
1461b8
Ἰκάδιον.
The name is presumably the same as
Εἰκάδιος, on which see
Fick, Gr. Personennamen p. 296
.
1461b9
25.
mvp-aristotle-comment-1047
εἰκός ἐστιν,
scil.
εἶναι (see on
24, 1459 b 9
). The alternative is to take the clause (with
Madius) as meaning 'it is through an error that the question (i. e. the objection), seems probable and reasonable'.
26.
mvp-aristotle-comment-1048
ὅλως δὲ κτέ.
This concluding paragraph, in intention at any rate, puts the main points in the preceding discussion into a more general form. The language in b 23 is to be noticed;
ἀδύνατα is clearly used as the opposite of the
οἷα ἦν ἢ ἔστιν,
ἄλογα of the
οἷά φασιν καὶ δοκεῖ, and
βλαβερά of the
οἷα εἶναι δεῖ in
25, 1460 b 10
. Some of the points in the previous statement are either passed over or only just hinted at.
On the other hand two new points are introduced: the plea of poetical necessity, instead of being limited to 'impossibilities' (
comp.
25, 1460 b 23
), is indirectly said to be an excuse for the 'improbable' and the 'morally offensive' also (
comp.
b 19
ἀλογίᾳ καὶ μοχθηρίᾳ); and besides this we have the dialectical rule of caution in b 15, which might very well have found a place in the main discussion, as a pendant to that in 31. The whole chapter in fact, however excellent in substance, is hardly a model of logical arrangement.
26.
mvp-aristotle-comment-1049
τὸ ἀδύνατον μὲν πρὸς τὴν ποίησιν.
Vahlen takes these words together in the sense of 'the impossible in poetry', and supposes only two solutions to be recognized, those denoted by
πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον ἢ πρὸς τὴν δόξαν. The chief objection to this view is that it seems to exclude the solution given in
25, 1460 b 24
, where poetical necessity is said to justify even 'impossibilities'. The reason that follows,
πρός τε γὰρ τὴν ποίησιν κτέ., adds a very necessary qualification, viz. that the impossibility has to be disguised and made credible (
πιθανόν) by arts of expression;
comp.
24, 1460 a 27
ἀδύνατα εἰκότα, and
24, 1460 b 2
ἀφανίζει ἡδύνων τὸ ἄτοπον. A second solution is by reference
πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον—a point which
Aristotle illustrates here from painting, and not as in
25, 1460 b 33
from poetry. A third is by reference
πρὸς τὴν δόξαν i. e. by showing that the impossibility has been accepted and sanctioned by opinion (
comp.
25, 1460 b 10
οἷά φασιν καὶ δοκεῖ, and
1460 b 35
οὕτω φασίν).
26.
mvp-aristotle-comment-1050
1461b10
πρὸς τὴν ποίησιν:
Meteor. 2. 3, 357 a 26
πρὸς ποίησιν μὲν γὰρ οὕτως εἰπὼν [scil.
Empedocles] ἴσως εἴρηκεν ἱκανῶς (ἡ γὰρ μεταφορὰ ποιητικόν), πρὸς δὲ τὸ γνῶναι τὴν φύσιν οὐχ ἱκανῶς. —
Fr. 147 (Teubn.)
οὐδὲ γὰρ πρὸς τὴν ποίησιν πρὸ ἔργου ἦν ἡ τούτων μνήμη.
26.
mvp-aristotle-comment-1051
ἀνάγειν,
to explain by reference to something (
comp.
Bon. Ind. 42 a 37
).
27.
mvp-aristotle-comment-1052
1461b11
αἱρετώτερον πιθανὸν ἀδύνατον:
24, 1460 a 26
προαιρεῖσθαί τε δεῖ ἀδύνατα εἰκότα μᾶλλον ἢ δυνατὰ ἀπίθανα.
28.
mvp-aristotle-comment-1053
1461b12
οἵους Ζεύξις ἔγραφεν.
In
25, 1460 b 18
also the allusion is apparently to a picture. We have been told in an earlier chapter (
6, 1450 a 27
) that the personages of
Zeuxis lacked character, i. e. that he sacrificed expression to beauty. The criticism implied in the present passage is that they are 'impossibilities', in other words, of an impossible beauty, not like real men and women (i. e. not
οἷα ἦν ἢ ἔστιν,
25, 1460 b 10
).
The answer to this is that they are, like the characters in
Sophocles (
25, 1460 b 33
), better than the reality, what men and women ought to be. This justification of
Zeuxis, which recalls what has been said elsewhere of
Polygnotus (
2, 1448 a 5
), and of
Homer (
15, 1454 b 14
), may very well represent
Aristotle's own view of him and his work. It was certainly a common view of him in antiquity (
comp.
Maximus Tyrius
Diss. 32. 5
).
28.
mvp-aristotle-comment-1054
1461b13
ἀλλὰ βέλτιον
(
scil.
τοιούτους εἶναι) is a vivid way of putting the respondent's answer to the objection (see on
25, 1460 b 33
).
28.
mvp-aristotle-comment-1055
τὸ γὰρ παράδειγμα δεῖ ὑπερέχειν.
As
Aristotle says in
15, 1454 b 9
, a true artist, instead of keeping too closely to his model, will make his portrait more beautiful than the real man.
1461b14
29.
mvp-aristotle-comment-1056
πρὸς ἅ φασιν τἄλογα,
scil.
δεῖ ἀνάγειν. It will be seen that a
δέ is wanting, and also that the next clause (
οὕτω τε καὶ ὅτι ποτὲ οὐκ ἄλογόν ἐστιν) comes in without a conjunction. This may perhaps be taken as another sign of the
Poetics being in places only the rough draft of a book (see on
22, 1458 b 30
). It would have been easy on revision to make the text read thus:
πρὸς δὲ ἅ φασι τἄλογα ἀνάγοντας οὕτω τε λυτέον καὶ ὅτι ποτὲ οὐκ ἄλογόν ἐστιν. For the ellipse
comp.
25, 1460 b 35
ὅτι οὕτω φασίν,
scil.
λυτέον.
29.
mvp-aristotle-comment-1057
τἄλογα.
The first appearance of the word in this chapter, though it has been used more than once in chap. 24.
τὸ ἄλογον, said of a fact or statement, means that which we cannot account for, and thus find a difficulty in accepting as either true or possible (see on
15, 1454 b 6
). There is an obvious distinction between it and
τὸ ἀδύνατον, that which is not and cannot be true, the one being only 'improbable', and the other 'impossible'. The charge of improbability according to
Aristotle may be met in two ways: one may urge (1) that the statement criticized has the sanction of opinion (
φασιν), or (2) that the incident was not so improbable, if one remembers the time (
ποτέ) when it is supposed to have occurred. These two solutions have already appeared in the main discussion in
1460 b 35 — 1461 a 4
, but in answer to a somewhat different allegation, that of untruth (
ὅτι οὐκ ἀληθῆ
1460 b 33
). A third answer, the plea of poetical necessity, is indirectly suggested in b 19.
29.
mvp-aristotle-comment-1058
ὅτι ποτὲ οὐκ ἄλογον:
comp.
fr. 164 (Teubn.)
λύων οὖν ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης τὸ τάλαντον οὔτε ἴσον φησὶ τότε καὶ νῦν οὔτε ἀφωρισμένῳ χρῆσθαι σταθμῷ, and the passages quoted above on
25, 1461 a 2
. For the emphatic
ποτέ
comp.
Top. 3. 2, 117 a 36
αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀεὶ ἡ δὲ ποτὲ χρησίμη (also
Top. 5. 1, 128 b 20
).
29.
mvp-aristotle-comment-1059
εἰκὸς γὰρ κτέ.
See on
18, 1456 a 23
(
ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο εἰκὸς).
1461b15
The maxim being Agathon's, it might be quoted for controversial purposes when better arguments were not to be had. The text details context for controversial usage.
30.
mvp-aristotle-comment-1060
τὰ δ᾽ ὑπεναντίως εἰρημένα
covers the ground of the group of difficulties considered in
1461 a 9–31
. The common point in these is that they turn primarily on the language rather than the matter of the poem, and may be met by finding another interpretation for the word or phrase to which the critic has taken exception. The difficulties themselves are very far from being all of one kind.
In the second (
εἶδος κακός
a 12
), fourth (
ἄλλοι μὲν
a 16
), eighth (
αἶψα δὲ
a 34
), and eleventh (
οἰνοχοεύειν
a 30
) the supposed fault is clearly some inconsistency or self-contradiction; in the third (
ζωρότερον
a 14
) and sixth (
δίδομεν
a 22
), however, it is an offence against morals; in the fifth (
οἴη
a 20
), seventh (
οὗ
a 23
), and ninth (
πλέω
a 26
) one against scientific or other truth; and in the first (
οὐρῆας
a 10
) and tenth (
κασσιτέροιο
a 28
) one against general probability.
The formula, therefore,
ὑπεναντίως εἰρημένα, instead of being restricted to logical incompatibilities, seems to include words and phrases which in the view of the critic are at variance with other standards of judgement. That it was meant to bear this wider sense is shown by the fuller formula in the context, ὥστε καὶ αὐτὸν [scil.
ἐναντίως εἰρηκέναι] ἢ πρὸς ἃ αὐτὸς λέγει ἢ ὃ ἂν φρόνιμος ὑποθῆται (b 18).
30.
mvp-aristotle-comment-1061
1461b16
ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἔλεγχοι.
The sense shows that a passive verb (σκεπτέοι?) has to be understood. The same sort of ellipse may be the explanation of the nominative
ὥσπερ σφαῖρα in
De anima 3. 11, 434 a 13
, where
κινεῖται is probably to be supplied from the text which precedes the comparison (see
J. of Phil. 17 p. 67
). The converse of this, an active understood from a passive, is found in
Metaph. I 2, 1053 b 14
πῶς δεῖ γνωριμωτέρως λεχθῆναι καὶ μᾶλλον ὥσπερ οἱ περὶ φύσεως (
scil.
λέγουσιν).
The statement in the text is a word of caution not unlike those we have already had in 4 and 31.
Aristotle reminds us that the difficulties of language pointed out by the critics are not always real ones, and that, before they are admitted to be real, they should be scrutinized and tested in just the same way as in a dialectical discussion one tests the contradiction or confutation of one's opponent which is sometimes a genuine confutation (
ἔλεγχοs ἀληθινός), and sometimes only the semblance of one (
ἔλεγχος φαινόμενος:
v.
Bon. Ind. 235 b 42
). The main points to be considered are briefly indicated in the context,
εἰ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ὡσαύτως. A fuller enumeration of the marks of a genuine
ἔλεγχος is found in
Soph. el. 5, 167 a 23
ἔλεγχος μὲν γὰρ ἀντίφασις τοῦ αὐτοῦ καὶ ἑνός, μὴ ὀνόματος ἀλλὰ πράγματος, καὶ ὀνόματος μὴ συνωνύμου ἀλλὰ τοῦ αὐτοῦ, ἐκ τῶν δοθέντων, ἐξ ἀνάγκης, μὴ συναριθμουμένου τοῦ ἐν ἀρχῇ, κατὰ ταὐτὸ καὶ πρὸς ταὐτὸ καὶ ὡσαύτως καὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ χρόνῳ.
26, 181 a 1
τοῖς δὲ παρὰ τὸν ὁρισμὸν γινομένοις τοῦ ἐλέγχου ἀπαντητέον σκοποῦσι τὸ συμπέρασμα πρὸς τὴν ἀντίφασιν, ὅπως ἔσται τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ὡσαύτως καὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ χρόνῳ.
30.
mvp-aristotle-comment-1062
1461b18
ὥστε καὶ αὐτὸν κτὲ.
ὥστε καὶ τὸν ποιητὴν ὑπεναντίως εἰρηκέναι ἢ πρὸς ἃ αὐτὸς λέγει ἢ πρὸς ὃ ἂν φρόνιμος ὑποθῆται (
comp.
Vahlen, Beitr. 4 p. 384
). The sense is: The word or phrase in question must be first ascertained to be really inconsistent either with some actual statement in the poem itself, in the context or elsewhere, or with what may be reasonably assumed as true or probable. In saying
ὃ ἂν φρόνιμος ὑποθῆται,
Aristotle sets aside the hasty or arbitrary assumptions which underlay a good deal of the current poetical criticism (see b 3 sqq.).
The statement in the text may be compared with the rule laid down for dialectic in
Soph. el. 15, 174 b 19
ἔτι καθάπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ῥητορικοῖς καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐλεγκτικοῖς ὁμοίως τὰ ἐναντιώματα θεωρητέον ἢ πρὸς τὰ ὑφ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ λεγόμενα ἢ πρὸς οὓς ὁμολογεῖ καλῶς λέγειν ἢ πράττειν. In the note on this passage in his edition
Vahlen supposes the clause to mean
ὥστε καὶ αὐτόν,
scil.
σκοπεῖν δεῖ τὸν ποιητήν—as though
Aristotle were now offering a word of advice to the poets. It seems to me that he is still thinking of the critics and apologists of poetry, and that he is merely telling them to examine the supposed
ὑπεναντία and make quite sure they are real ones. These, to be real, must be like the
εναντιώματα in a genuine confutation, and capable of standing the same logical tests. The whole point in fact is that the incongruities found in the language of a poem may turn out on examination to be imaginary, just as a confutation in argument may be only a sham confutation.
1461b19
31.
mvp-aristotle-comment-1063
ἀλογίᾳ καὶ μοχθηρίᾳ.
For the datives see
Bon. Ind. 166 c 61
,
281 b 24
, and
875 a 53
.
31.
mvp-aristotle-comment-1064
μὴ ἀνάγκης οὔσης:
15, 1454 a 28
παράδειγμα πονηρίας μὲν ἤθους μὴ ἀναγκαίου οἷον ὁ Μενέλαος ὁ ἐν τῷ Ὀρέστῃ. The plea of poetic necessity was indirectly recognized as a valid answer to certain criticisms in
25, 1460 b 24
, and before that in
15, 1454 a 28
;
comp. also
24, 1460 a 12
.
31.
mvp-aristotle-comment-1065
1461b21
Αἰγεῖ:
The appearance of Aegeus is in
Aristotle's view (1)
ἄλογον, because no sufficient reason can be given for it, and (2) unnecessary, because no use is made of it in the after-part of the play. The explanations of certain of the editors of
Euripides are hardly an adequate answer to
Aristotle's criticism.
31.
mvp-aristotle-comment-1066
ἐν Ὀρέστῃ:
see on
15, 1454 a 29
(
μὴ ἀναγκαίου).
1461b22
32.
mvp-aristotle-comment-1067
ἐκ πέντε εἰδῶν φέρουσιν.
The various heads under which the faults in poetry have been classified are termed
εἴδη, because they represent distinct 'kinds' of faults. It is one thing to say of something that it is
ἀδύνατον, another that it is
ἄλογον, and another that it is
βλαβερόν (etc.). For this use of
φέρειν
comp.
19, 1456 b 14
ἐπιτίμημα φέρεται. —
An. pr. 2. 26, 69 b 1
φέρεται ἡ ἔνστασις. —
An. post. 1. 14, 79 a 19
φέρουσι τὰς ἀποδείξεις. —
Rhet. 2. 18, 1391 b 24
δόξαι καὶ προτάσεις εἰσίν, ἐξ ὧν τὰς πίστεις φέρουσιν.
32.
mvp-aristotle-comment-1068
1461b23
ὡς ἀδύνατα,
scil.
ὄντα τὰ εἰρημένα.
32.
mvp-aristotle-comment-1069
1461b23_2
βλαβερά:
the opposite of the
οἷα εἶναι δεῖ in
25, 1460b 11
. The word may be a reminiscence of
Plato's condemnation of certain legends in
Rep. 391 D
οὔθ᾽ ὅσια ταῦτα οὔτ᾽ ἀληθῆ . . . καὶ μὴν τοῖς γε ἀκούουσι βλαβερά· πᾶς γὰρ ἑαυτῷ ξυγγνώμην ἕξει κακῷ ὄντι, πεισθεὶς ὡς ἄρα τοιαῦτα πράττουσί τε καὶ ἔπραττον καὶ “ οἱ θεῶν ἀγχίσποροι ”.
32.
mvp-aristotle-comment-1070
1461b23_3
ὑπεναντία:
the
ὑπεναντίως εἰρημένα of
b15.
32.
mvp-aristotle-comment-1071
1461b24
παρὰ τὴν ὀρθότητα τὴν κατὰ τέχνην
must refer, as
Twining has seen, to the technical inaccuracies of description considered in
25, 1460b 16 sqq.
It is to be observed that the present statement clearly recognizes two kinds of error, only incidentally distinguished in the early part of the chapter (
25, 1460b 20
), the fault of impossibility and the fault of technical inaccuracy. The distinction is a very real one in controversy; to say of a picture, for instance, that it is not scientifically or historically correct is not quite the same thing as saying that it represents an impossibility.
κατὰ τέχνην is apparently used as an equivalent for the
καθ᾽ ἑκάστην τέχνην in
25, 1460b 19
. The older interpreters understand the passage differently.
Goulston makes it mean 'tanquam ea quae a poeticae vel alterius artis norma ac veritate discedunt', thus giving
κατὰ τέχνην a sense wide enough to include poetry as well as
ἰατρική,
πολιτική, etc.
Heinsius (after
Victorius) renders it by 'ut quae cum ipsa artis poeticae pugnant natura'—just as though the text had either
κατὰ τὴν τέχνην (which
Hermann wished to restore) or
κατ᾿ αὐτὴν τὴν τέχνην. The objection to such interpretations is sufficiently obvious. The criticism that something is poetically wrong is not one of the
ἐπιτιμήματα considered in this chapter; and it cannot be met by any of the counter-arguments which
Aristotle has suggested for the use of the apologist.
32.
mvp-aristotle-comment-1072
1461b24_2
ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ἀριθμῶν.
The precise meaning of this is far from clear.
Goulston's paraphrase
1 is 'ex antedictis formarum numeris, seu specialibus differentiis'; and
Vahlen's 'aus den genannten Zahlen oder Stücken' (
Beitr. 4, 389
). To illustrate the sense of
ἀριθμῶν
Tyrwhitt quotes
Isocrates 224 c
ἅπαντας τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς περιλαβὼν ἐξ ὧν ἄριστ᾽ ἄν τις τὰ κοινὰ διοικήσειεν;
Plutarch
De aud. 45 B
τὸ μὲν καλὸν ἐκ πολλῶν οἷον ἀριθμῶν εἰς ἕνα καιρὸν ἡκόντων ὑπὸ συμμετρίας τινὸς καὶ ἁρμονίας ἐπιτελεῖται; comparing also the similar use of numeri in Latin. Another of
Tyrwhitt's quotations is perhaps more directly to the purpose,
Eurip.
Ion 1014
ὁ δεύτερος δ᾽ ἀριθμὸς ὃν [ὧν
L. Dindorf] λέγεις τί δρᾷ;—to which may be added
Eurip.
Heracl. 997
εἰδὼς μὲν οὐκ ἀριθμὸν ἀλλ᾽ ἐτητύμως ἄνδρ᾽ ὄντα τὸν σὸν παῖδα, and the passage in
Aristotle (cited by
Teichmüller) in
De gen. an. 3. 10, 760
a33
αὐτοὶ μὲν γὰρ γίγνονται, ἄλλο δ᾽ οὐδὲν γεννῶσιν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν τῷ τρίτῳ ἀριθμῷ πέρας ἔσχεν ἡ γένεσις. It would seem from these instances that
ἀριθμός may sometimes have the sense of an item or term in a series, and that
ἀριθμῶν in the present passage may thus stand for 'points enumerated'
1. If this interpretation is possible, the reference in
ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ἀριθμῶν is to the list of assumptions in the opening of this chapter.
Twining draws attention to the parallelism between the language in the text,
αἱ λύσεις ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ἀριθμῶν σκεπτέαι, and that in
1460b 21
ὥστε δεῖ τὰ ἐπιτιμήματα ἐκ τούτων ἐπισκοποῦντα λύειν. The advantage of this view of the reference in
ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ἀριθμῶν is that it simplifies the explanation of the next clause,
εἰσὶ δὲ δώδεκα (
scil.
οἱ ἀριθμοί). It is usual to explain the number by adding up the various
λύσεις actually found and described in the preceding discussion (
1460b 21—1461b 21
), and counting in statements like those in
1460b 29
and
1461a 4
31 (
v. ad loc.), though they are hardly
λύσεις in the present sense of the term (see on
1460b 29
). If we look back, however, to the opening paragraph in the chapter, it will be seen that
Aristotle begins by laying down a series of postulates concerning poetry. The first is that, as the poet is an imitator, the poetic picture may represent either
οἷα ἦν ἢ ἔστιν or
οἷά φασι καὶ δοκεῖ or
οἷα εἶναι δεῖ. There are thus, if we separate the alternatives (as
Aristotle himself has done in the course of the discussion), five possibilities,
οἷα ἦν,
οἷά ἐστιν,
οἷά φασιν (εἶναι),
οἷα δοκεῖ (εἶναι),
οἷα εἶναι δεῖ; and they are each of them available in reply to criticism; if the critic, for instance, says that the picture is not of things
οἷα εἶναι δεῖ, it is a valid answer to reply that it represents
οἷα ἦν (
v. 1461a 2
) or
οἷά ἐστιν, etc. The second postulate is that, as poetic language is not quite the same as ordinary speech, it may have to be explained by certain arts of interpretation. This point is merely indicated in
1460b11-13
; the statement there has to be supplemented from that in
1461a9-31
where we are told that six modes of interpretation of the written letter of poetry (
γλώττῃ,
κατὰ μεταφοράν,
κατὰ προσῳδίαν,
διαιρέσει,
ἀμφιβολίᾳ,
κατὰ τὸ ἔθος τῆς λέξεως) are available, and may be legitimately assumed, whenever a
λύσις of difficulties arising from the poet's language is wanted. The third postulate is that poetry, as a distinct art, has a correctness of its own, apart from that of every other art or science—which implies, as the next section (
1460b 23-29
) explains, that a description may be poetically right, even though it involves some impossibility, or offends against some technical standard of correctness. The various assumptions, therefore, in this series of postulates may serve as major premisses for the apologist; and as a matter of fact every one of them appears in some form or other in the specimen
λύσεις in this chapter. It will be seen, too, that they are just 12 (5+6+1) in number.
1
Goulston may possibly have remembered the expression
τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς ἑκάστου τῶν νοσημάτων in
Hippocrates 3 p. 27 K. as interpreted by
Foes,
Oec. Hippocr. p. 92.
1 The word seems to bear the same sense in [
Dion. Hal.]
Ars Rhet. p. 414 R.
γίνεται δὲ τοῦτο ἐν τοῖς ἀριθμοῖς οἷς εἴπομεν, τοῖς ἑπτά—where
ἀριθμοῖς represents the
τόποι of p. 400.
6.
mvp-aristotle-comment-601
25.5
6. Quand elle choisit des ſujets au deſſus de fes forces & de ſa portée, voilà celuy qui vient d'elle.]
1
7.
mvp-aristotle-comment-602
25.6
7. Et quand elle choisit des ſujets qui ne font pas au deſſus de ses forces, mais qui font vicieux, voilà celuy que j'appelle par accident, elle represente, par exemple, un cheval qui remue en même temps les deux pieds droits.]
2
8.
mvp-aristotle-comment-603
25.6
8. Elle peut pecher de mème contre les regles de tous les autres arts, comme contre la Medecine.]
3
9.
mvp-aristotle-comment-604
10.
mvp-aristotle-comment-605
25.7
10. Il faut donc tirer de ces lieux-là les réponſes qu'on doit oppoſer aux reproches qu'on fait aux Poëtes.]
5
11.
mvp-aristotle-comment-606
25.8
11. Premierement fi le Poëte avance des choses impoſſibles dans les regles mêmes de fon art, il commet une faute ſans con-tredit; mais elle ceffe d'être faute, lorſque par ce moyen il arri-ve à la fin qu'il s'eſt proposée.]
6
12.
mvp-aristotle-comment-607
25.8
12. Si par là il rend cet endroit, ou quelqu'autre partie de fon Poëme, plus étonnant & plus admirable.]
7
13.
mvp-aristotle-comment-608
25.9
13. Que fi le Poëte a pů parvenir à la même fin, & faire à peu prés le même effet ſans violer les regles de fon art, alors fa faute n'est plas pardonnable, car il faut, s'il eſt poſſible, s'em-pêcher de tomber dans aucun défaut.]
8
14.
mvp-aristotle-comment-609
25.10
14. Il faut encore bien examiner ſi la faute, dont il eſt queftion, est faite contre l'art du Poëte, ou ſic'est une faute par quelqu'autre accident que ce foit. ]
9
15.
mvp-aristotle-comment-610
25.10
15. Et on excufera bien plus volontiers un Poëte qui aura igno-ré que les biches n'ont point de cornes, que celuy qui aura fait une méchante imitation.]
10
16.
mvp-aristotle-comment-611
25.11
16. De plus on reproche ſouvent aux Poëtes qu'ils ne ſui-vent pas la verité dans les caractères qu'ils forment. Mais on fait voir qu'ils les forment tels qu'ils devoient étre, ou tels qu'ils ſont.]
11
17.
mvp-aristotle-comment-612
25.11
17. Et c'est ainsi que Sophocle & Euripide répondirent à leurs Cenſeurs; Sophocle, en diſant qu'il faiſoit ſes Heros, comme ils devoient être: Et Euripide qu'il les faisoit comme ils étoient.]
12
18.
mvp-aristotle-comment-613
25.12
18. Que si on ne peut se fervir d'aucune de ces deux manieres pour les réfuter, il faut avoir recours à la Renommée, & faire voir qu'on l'a dit ainſi.]
13
19.
mvp-aristotle-comment-614
25.12
19. C'eſt par là qu'on ſauve ce qu' Homere a dit des Dieux, car il peut bien être, que ce qu'il en dit, n'est ny vray, ny meilleur de cette manière ; mais il a ſuivi ce qu'on en a publié.]
14
20.
mvp-aristotle-comment-615
25.13
20. Car il peut bien ètre que ce qu'il en dit n'eſt, ny vray, ny meilleur de cette maniére ; mais il a fuivi ce que l'on en a publié.]
15
21.
mvp-aristotle-comment-616
25.13
21. Et d'ailleurs, comme Xenophanes l'a fort bien dit, qui eſt aſſeuré de connoitre ſur cela la verité?]
16
22.
mvp-aristotle-comment-617
25.14
22. Il arrive quelquefois que la chose n'est pas mieux, comme le Poëte la dit; mais il la raporte comme elle eft, & c'est ainsi qu'on répond à la Critique qu'on fait à Homere ſur cet endroit, où il dit que les Troupes de Diomede dormoient prés de leurs piques toutes droites.]
17
22a.
mvp-aristotle-comment-618
25.15
22a. Pour bien connoître ſi une choſe eſt bien ou mal dite, bien ou mal faite, il ne faut pas se contenter d'examiner la choſe même, & de voir ſi elle est bonne ou mauvaiſe, il faut avoir égard à celuy qui parle ou qui agit.]
18
23.
mvp-aristotle-comment-619
25.15
23. Il faut encore avoir égard à celuy qui parle ou qui agit, & à celuy à qui il s'adreſſe.]
19
24.
mvp-aristotle-comment-620
25.
mvp-aristotle-comment-621
26.
mvp-aristotle-comment-622
27.
mvp-aristotle-comment-623
25.16
27. On peut encore rendre bien des Critiques inutiles par le moyen de l'expreſſion, en faiſant voir, par exemple, que ce qu'on prend pour un mot propre peut être un mot étranger qui a une fignification toute differente.]
23
28.
mvp-aristotle-comment-624
25.16
28. Ainſi quand on reproche à Homere d'avoir dit mal à pro-pos que la peste s'attacha premierement aux mulets, on peut répondre que dans ce paſſage, &c.]
24
29.
mvp-aristotle-comment-625
25.16
29. Quand il a dit de Dolon, qu'il étoit mal fait, il a voulu parler du visage, & non pas du corps.]
25
30.
mvp-aristotle-comment-626
25.16
30. Quand on accuſe le même Poëte d'avoir fait donner du vin pur aux Ambaſſadeurs qu' Agamemnon envoyoit à Achille, on le justifie en faiſant voir que le mot Grec ne ſignifie pas du vin pur, comme on en donne aux yurognes, mais qu'il fignifie promptement.]
26
31.
mvp-aristotle-comment-627
25.17
31. On les juftifie encore tres ſouvent, en faiſant voir qu'ils parlent par metaphore, & c'est ainsi qu'on ſauve tous ces en-droit d' Homere, quand il dit, que tous les Dieux & tous les hommes dormoient hors Jupiter.]
27
32.
mvp-aristotle-comment-628
25.17
32. Quand il dit d' Agamemnon enfermé la nuit dans ſa tente au milieu de fon camp, qu'il jettoit les yeux fur le camp des Troyens.]
28
33.
mvp-aristotle-comment-629
25.17
33. Enfin quand il dit en parlant de l'Ourse, qu'elle est la seule constellation qui ne ſe baigne pas dans l'Ocean, la seule, c'est-à-dire, la principale, la plus connue.]
29
34.
mvp-aristotle-comment-630
25.18
34. Il arrive auſſi quelquefois qu'on répond ſolidement aux Cenſures des Critiques par un ſeul changement de ton ou d'ac-cent; & c'est ainsi qu Hippias de Thasos a fauve Homere ſur cet endroit, où Jupiter envoye un Songe à Agamemnon; car on l'accuſoit d'avoir fait dire un mensonge par Jupiter.]
30
35.
mvp-aristotle-comment-631
25.19
35. Le même Hippias défend auſſi par le même moyen ce Poëte dans ce paſſage, où aprés avoir parlé d'un bois bien sec, on l'accuſe de dire ensuite, qu'une partie de ce bois eft corrompue par la pluye.]
31
36.
mvp-aristotle-comment-632
25.20
36. On fauve auſſi beaucoup d'endroits par une differente ponctuation, & c'est ce qui a juſtifié Empedocle qu'on avoit accuſe de s'être contredit dans les vers où il expliquoit les principes des choſes.]
32
37.
mvp-aristotle-comment-633
25.21
37. Quelquefois on a recours à l'ambiguité, comme dans ce paſſage, où Homere dit que la nuit eſt plus des deux tiers paſſée, & qu'il en reste encore le tiers.]
33
38.
mvp-aristotle-comment-634
25.22
38. Pour défendre les Poëtes on employe ſouvent auſſi l'autorité de l'usage qui fait, par exemple, qu'on appelle du vin, un vin qui eſt mélé d'eau.]
34
39.
mvp-aristotle-comment-635
25.23
39. Toutes les fois qu'un mot ſemble ſignifier quelque chose de contraire au deſſein du Poëte, il faut examiner toutes les differentes fignifications que ce mot peut avoir dans le paſſage en que-stion.]
35
40.
mvp-aristotle-comment-636
25.23
40. Et le plus court moyen de ſe tirer de ces endroits, c'est de prendre le mot dans un ſens tout contraire à celuy qu'on luy donne ordinairement.]
36
41.
mvp-aristotle-comment-637
25.24
41. Il arrive auſſi tres ſouvent, comme Glaucon l'a fort bien dit, que les Critiques se préoccupent & s'entètent ſans raiſon de certaines chofes avant que de lire les Poëtes, & perfuadez que leur fentiment est le ſeul raisonnable, ils condamnent fans autre examen tout ce qui se trouve contraire à leur opinion.]
37
42.
mvp-aristotle-comment-638
43.
mvp-aristotle-comment-639
25.25
43. C'eſt de ce faux préjugé qu'est née la Critique qu'on a faite à Homere ſur le ſujet d'Icarius pere de Penelope; car ces Cenfeurs prévenus que cet Icarius étoit Lacedemonien. ]
39
44.
mvp-aristotle-comment-640
25.26
44. En general, quand on accuſe les Poëtes d'avoir dit quelque chose d'impoſſible, il faut examiner cette impoſibilité par raport à la Poësie, par raport à ce qui est mieux, ou par raport à la Renommée.]
40
45.
mvp-aristotle-comment-641
25.27
45. Par raport à la Poësie, car on montre que l'impoſſible vray-femblable doit être preferé au poſſible qui n'a aucune vray-ſemblance, & qui ne seroit pas crû.]
41
46.
mvp-aristotle-comment-642
47.
mvp-aristotle-comment-643
48.
mvp-aristotle-comment-644
25.28
48. Enfin par raport à la Renommée, car on prouve qu'on ne fait que ſuivre l'opinion commune.)
44
49.
mvp-aristotle-comment-645
25.29
49. Tout ce qui paroit abfurde se peut justifier par ces trois moyens, & par cette maxime qu'on a déja raportée, &c.]
45
50.
mvp-aristotle-comment-646
25.30
50. Pour les choses qui ſemblent contraires, à ce que l'on a dėja dit, il faut les examiner comme on examine les objections dans la Dialectique.]
46
51.
mvp-aristotle-comment-647
25.31
51. Les Critiques juſtes & auſquelles on ne peut répondre, font celles où l'on fait voir qu'un endroit est déraisonnable & abfurde, & qu'un autre est méchant.]
47
52.
mvp-aristotle-comment-648
25.31
52. Un Poëte tombe dans le premier vice, lorſque ſsans aucune neceſſité il a recours à une choſe qui eſt ſans raiſon, & telle est la faute d' Euripide dans le rolle d' Egée.]
48
53.
mvp-aristotle-comment-649
25.31
53. Et il tombe dans le ſecond, quand il introduit, par exem-ple, un méchant caractère ſsans neceſſité, & tel est le caractére de Menelas dans l'Oreste d'Euripide.]
49
54.
mvp-aristotle-comment-650
55.
mvp-aristotle-comment-651
25.32
55. Et les réponſes qu'on y peut faire ſe tirent des lieux que nous avons marquez, & qui ſont douze en tout.]
51
231.
mvp-aristotle-comment-231
NOTE 231.
25.5
P. 123. THE FAULTS OF POETRY, &C.
The original is—
ΑΥΤΗΣ δὲ τῆς ποιητικῆς διττὴ ἡ ἁμαρτία. The word
αὐτῆς appears to me to make strange confusion. For Aristotle is here distinguishing two sorts of faults in Poetry, essential and incidental; and his expression, presently after, for the former, is
ΑΥΤΗΣ ἡ ἁμαρτία—
"a fault of the Poetry itself." As the text stands, therefore, it is just as if he had said—
"There are two faults of the Poetry itself: one, of the Poetry itself, and the other, incidental." — Accordingly Dacier, Batteux, and almost all the translators, neglect the word
αὐτῆς. Possibly it might, originally, have stood thus : —
οὐδὲ ἄλλης τέχνης, καὶ ποιητικῆς ἀυτῆς. Τῆς ΔΕ ποιητικῆς, &c.
232.
mvp-aristotle-comment-232
NOTE 232.
25.6
P. 123. IF THE POET HAS UNDERTAKEN TO IMITATE WITHOUT TALENTS FOR IMITATION--.
Εἰ μὲν γὰρ προείλετο μιμήσασθαι ἀδυναμίαν. —So, the MSS. But
ἀδυναμία never, I believe, means
impossibility, but
want of power, incapacity. This was, long ago, sufficiently proved by Victorius. If the word be right, some preposition must be wanting. Heinsius supplies—
ΚΑΤ’ ἀδυναμίαν. The credit of the conjecture is due to Castelvetro. Still the phrase,
μιμήσασθαι κατ’ ἀδυναμίαν, for
imitating without ability, or talents, for imitation, is harsh, and, as far as I know, unsupported by any other example. It seems not improbable, that Aristotle might have written it—
ΠΑΡΑ ΔΥΝΑΜΙΝ. Supposing the three first letters of the preposition to have been destroyed, the passage would stand thus—
μιμήσασθαι * * ΑΔΥΝΑΜΙΝ: which it was obvious enough for the transcriber to miscorrect into
ἀδυναμίαν. The phrase,
προείλετο μιμήσασθαι παρὰ δύναμιν, would be clear and unexceptionable. So,
cap. ix.
—
παρὰ τὴν δύναμιν παρατείναντες μῦθον.
Victorius remarks, and, I think, justly, that Horace probably had his eye upon this passage, in the lines—
Sumite materiam vestris, qui scribitis, æquam Viribus; et versate diu, quid ferre recusent, Quid valeant, humeri. ... Cui lecta potenter erit res, &c. —
Epist. ad Pis. v. 38, &c.
—where Aristotle's
προαιρεῖσθαι, he thinks, is expressed by
"sumite materiam," and,
"lecta res:" and
κατ’ ἀδυναμίαν glanced at in the other expressions, but, particularly, in the adverb—
"potenter."
1
233.
mvp-aristotle-comment-233
NOTE 233.
25.7
P. 123. TO HAVE REPRESENTED THINGS IMPOSSIBLE WITH RESPECT TO SOME OTHER ART, &c.
No interpretation that I have seen, or been able to devise, of this whole ambiguous, perplexed, and, probably, mangled passage, is without its difficulties. All I could do was, to choose that, which, after the closest attention to the original, and to the best comments, appeared to me
"minimis urgeri." I will not attempt to drag the reader after me, through the detail of my own doubts and embarrassments. But lest my version, from that degree of closeness, to which, in all passages where the meaning is doubtful, I have thought it right to confine myself, should retain, in some degree, the ambiguity, or obscurity, of the original, some explanation may be necessary.
By the various expressions,
μιμήσασθαι κατ’ ἀδυναμίαν — ἁμαρτία ἡ καθ’ αὑτὴν — αὐτῆς — καθ’ ἑαυτὴν, and, above all, by
ΚΑΚΟΜΙΜΗΤΩΣ ἔγραψε, which seems to fix clearly the sense of the rest, Aristotle means, I think, to indicate all such faults as are incompatible with good imitation—that is, in his view, with good Poetry. All other faults he denominates,
κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς—
incidental. Faults he allows them to be; but smaller, and more pardonable, faults:
ΕΛΑΤΤΟΝ γὰρ, εἰ μὴ ᾔδει, &c. In this class he reckons,
τὰ ἀδύνατα—
things impossible. The expression is unhappily ambiguous : for we may understand either
ἀδύνατα in general, or,
ἀδύνατα κατ’ ἰατρικὴν ἢ ἄλλην τέχνην. The commentators are divided. I cannot be of their party, who adopt the first of these senses. I see not how impossibilities, or absurdities,
2
in general, could, consist- ently with Aristotle's principles, be admitted by him into the number of merely incidental faults—
κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς—such as affected not the Poetry itself. We must, I think, understand—
ἁμαρτήματα ἢ ἀδύνατα—
things inaccurate, or, what is worse, impossible,
καθ’ ἑκάστην τέχνην—
upon the principles of some other art.
3
Aristotle then goes on, and applies his solution, founded on the foregoing distinction, to the worst species of such incidental faults—to things
ἀδύνατα. Take, he says, the worst: suppose the Poet to have represented something impossible, with respect to some particular art, as that of medicine, geography, &c. This, strictly speaking, is a fault; but it is a fault that may even be justified, (
ὀρθῶς ἔχοι,) if, by means of it, the Poet has answered, better than he could have done without it, the end of his own art, &c. Still, he continues, supposing this not to be the case, we are to consider, whether the fault, admitting it to be a fault, be
τῶν κατὰ τὴν τέχνην, ἢ κατ’ ἄλλο συμβεβηκὸς, &c. If the pursuit of Hector cannot be absolutely justified by the
θαυμαστὸν, the
ἔκπληξις which is produced by it, still it is not
κακομιμήτως γεγραμμένον; the Poetry is good, and the end of Poetry, the pleasure arising from the wonderful and the striking, is actually attained, though it be true, that it might have been attained without the fault in question.
By the expression,
τὰ πρὸς ἀυτὴν τὴν τέχνην ἀδύνατα, I understand—with respect to the art of which the Poet speaks; not, with respect to the art of Poetry itself: though I confess the latter sense to be that, which the words,
ἀυτὴν τὴν τέχνην,
the art itself, most naturally present. But this sense of the expression seems to me to be utterly irreconcilable with the sense of the whole passage. In rejecting it I have the concurrence of Victorius, Piccolomini, and M. Batteux. Besides, that the expression itself seems to be jargon.
4
For, what are
"things impossible to, (or, with respect to,) the art of Poetry itself?" —The only reasonable meaning of the phrase is—things, which it is beyond the power of the art to represent or imitate; as it is beyond the power of painting to imitate sounds.
5
But how can the phrase be applied, as Dacier applies it, to the
ἄλογον,
"deraisonnable tout ce qui est absurde?" Is it not just as possible for Poetry to represent a horse flying, as a ship sailing? — The sense, which I have given, seems also supported by the antithetic expression that follows—
τέλος τὸ ΑΥΤΗΣ—
" its own purpose;" and still more by the clearer phrase which he presently after uses —
τὴν ΠΕΡΙ ΤΟΥΤΩΝ τέχνην —
" the art to which these things belong."
I must, however, repeat my confession, that no passage of this treatise appears to me to be of more desperate perplexity than this; nor is there any of the numerous and stubborn difficulties I have had to encounter, of which I wish to be understood to offer my solution with less confidence. Here, as in many other places, had I waited for perfect satisfaction, I might have stood still for ever:—
—ἐικέλοι ἀνδρὶ Κείνῳ, ὃς ἐν τριοδοῖσι πολυτρίπτοισι κυρήσας Ἕστη ἐφορμαίνων· κραδίη δέ οἱ ἄλλοτε λαιὴν, Ἄλλοτε δεξιτερὴν ἐπιβάλλεται ἐις ὁδὸν ἐλθεῖν. Παπταίνει δ’ ἑκατέρθε· νόος δέ οἱ ἠΰτε κῦμα Εἰλεῖται, μάλα δ’ ὄψε μιῆς ὠρέξατο βουλῆς.
6
234.
mvp-aristotle-comment-234
NOTE 234.
25.8
P. 123. ACCORDING TO WHAT HAS BEEN ALREADY SAID OF THAT END.
Τὸ γὰρ τέλος ΕΙΡΗΤΑΙ. This reading has been questioned; but, I think, without sufficient reason. It may very well be understood to refer to all that Aristotle had said, or, at least,
hinted, about the end of the art—the
θαυμαστόν,
ch. xxiv.
—
ἔκπληξις,
cap. xiv.
and
xvi.
&c. This is not the only instance in this treatise, of reference to something implied, as if it had been expressly said. See
NOTE 150, p. 396, and note (g.)
Victorius illustrates
ἐκπληκτικώτερον by an apt quotation from Aristotle himself:
Δοκεῖ δὲ ἡ ΕΚΠΛΗΞΙΣ ΘΑΥΜΑΣΙΟΤΗΣ εἶναι ΥΠΕΡΒΑΛΛΟΥΣΑ.
Top. lib. iv.
Strabo says—
Μύθου ΤΕΛΟΣ, ἡδονὴν καὶ ΕΚΠΛΗΞΙΝ.
p. 25. ed. Caf.
235.
mvp-aristotle-comment-235
NOTE 235.
25.10
P. 124. WHETHER A FAULT BE, &C.
Ποτέρων ἐστὶ τὸ ἁμάρτημα τῶν κατὰ τὴν τέχνην, ἢ κατ’ ἄλλο συμβεβηκός. —I cannot perceive, that this wants any emendation; much less, that it is, as
Mr. Winstanley
says,
"nullo sensu." He contends for the certainty of
ΑΤΟΠΩΤΕΡΟΝ—a reading, which Robortelli says he found in all the manuscripts he consulted. I would only ask, whether Aristotle can be conceived to have written such a sentence as this?
"A fault in the Poetry itself is a more absurd thing than a fault in some other incidental matter; FOR it is a less fault," &c. Yet this, I think, is the plain English of the Greek—
Ἔτι, ἀτοπώτερόν ἐστι τὸ ἁμάρτημα τῶν κατὰ τὴν τέχνην, ἢ κατ’ ἄλλο συμβεβηκός· ἔλαττον ΓΑΡ κ. τ. λ.
Victorius contends strongly, and, I think, with much better reason, for
ποτέρων. He says well—
"Nam quæ adjunguntur videntur significare ita prorsus legi debere: duo enim genera peccatorum contraria inter se indicant. Utrorum igitur peccatorum id, cujus arguitur poeta, videndum esse præcipit: alterum enim eorum genus faciliorem excusationem habet."
p. 274.
236.
mvp-aristotle-comment-236
NOTE 236.
25.11
P. 124. HAS NOT REPRESENTED THINGS CONFORMABLY TO TRUTH-.
Οὐκ ἀληθῆ. — An
ἐπιτίμησις very frequent in the mouth of PLATO, to whom, undoubtedly, Aristotle here alludes.
"The Poets ought not," says Plato, speaking of the representations of Hesiod and Homer,
" to be permitted to tell us—ὡς θεοὶ θεοῖς πολεμοῦσί τε, καὶ ἐπιβουλεύουσι καὶ μάχονται· ΟΥΔΕ γὰρ ΑΛΗΘΗ." —They ought not,
λοιδορεῖν ἁπλῶς οὕτω τὰ ἐν ᾅδου, ἀλλὰ, μᾶλλον, ἐπαινεῖν ὡς ΟΥΤ’ ΑΛΗΘΗ λέγοντας, οὔτ’ ὠφέλιμα τοῖς μέλλουσι μαχίμοις ἔσεσθαι. So again, of Homer's account of the cruel treatment of the body of Hector by Achilles, and of his sacrificing twelve Trojan captives to the manes of Patroclus [
Il. Ψ. 175.
]:
ξύμπαντα ταῦτα ΟΥ φήσομεν ΑΛΗΘΗ εἰρῆσθαι. — And again, presently after—
οὐθ’ ὅσια ταῦτα, ΟΥΤ’ ΑΛΗΘΗ.
237.
mvp-aristotle-comment-237
NOTE 237.
25.11
P. 124. SOPHOCLES—DREW MEN, SUCH AS THEY SHOULD BE; EURIPIDES, SUCH AS THEY ARE.
The difference here intended, between the two great Tragic Poets, seems to me to be rightly explained by
Dacier
in few words:
"Sophocle tâchoit de rendre ses imitations parfaites, en suivant toujours bien plus ce qu' une belle nature etoit capable de faire, que ce qu'elle faisoit. Au lieu qu' Euripide ne travailoit qu' à les rendre semblables, en consultant davantage ce que cette même nature faisoit, que ce qu'elle etoit capable de faire."
p. 458.
It is thus indeed, that, by comparing different passages, we shall find Aristotle clearly explain himself. What he here means by
ἀληθῆ, is sufficiently clear from the synonymous expressions,
οἷοἰ εἰσι—
οἷα ἦν, ἢ ἔστιν, in this chapter, and
ὁμοἰους καθ' ἡμᾶς—and,
οἱ νῦν, in
chapter ii.
where he explains the different objects of poetic imitation.
10
To these expressions are opposed another set of expressions, which I take to be synonymous with each other—
οἷα εἶναι δεῖ—
οἵους δεῖ, here;
τὸ βέλτιον, and the
παράδειγμα ὑπερέχον, presently after;
11
καλλίους,
cap. xv.
12
βελτίονας καθ' ἡμᾶς — βελτίονας τῶν νῦν,
cap. ii.
All these expressions correspond to the various expressions of,
improved nature—la belle nature—ideal beauty, &c. in modern writers.
The objection then, to which Aristotle here points out the best answer, I understand to be this—
"Your imitation is not true; it is not an exact copy of such nature as we see about us." The answer is—
"No: but it is an improved copy. If I have not represented things as they are, I have represented them as they ought to be."
A very different explanation of this passage has been given by an eminent critic;
13
but, I confess, it appears to me to be irreconcilable with Aristotle's expressions, clearly interpreted, as I think they are, by comparison with each other. According to that explanation, the answer of Sophocles to the objection—
οὐκ ἀληθῆ, and indeed the sense of the objection itself, are very different from what Dacier, and, I believe, all the commentators, have represented them to be. —The explanation is this:
"And this will further explain an essential difference, as we are told, between the two great rivals of the Greek stage. Sophocles, in return to such as objected a want of truth in his characters, used to plead, that he drew men such as they ought to be, Euripides such as they were.
—Again—after an illustration of this meaning, by a comparative examination of the
Electra of Sophocles with that of Euripides, the conclusion is—
Σοφοκλῆς ἔφη, αὐτὸς μὲν οἵους δεῖ ποιεῖν, Εὐριπίδης δὲ, οἷοἰ εἰσι. The meaning of which is, Sophocles, from his more extended commerce with mankind, had enlarged and widened the narrow, partial conception, arising from the contemplation of particular characters, into a complete comprehension of the kind. Whereas the philosophic Euripides, having been mostly conversant in the academy, when he came to look into life, keeping his eye too intent on single, really existing personages, sunk the kind in the individual; and so painted his characters naturally indeed, and truly, with regard to the objects in view, but sometimes without that general and universally striking likeness, which is demanded to the full exhibition of poetical truth.""Whether this representation of Sophocles be not more agreeable to truth, as collected from wide observation, i. e. from human nature at large, than that of Euripides, the capable reader will judge. If it be, the reason I suppose to have been, that Sophocles painted his characters,
such as, from attending to numerous instances of the same kind, he would conclude they ought to be; Euripides, such, as a narrower sphere of observation had persuaded him
they were."
14
From these two passages compared, it appears, I think, that by
οἷα δεῖ εἶναι—
such as they ought to be—the learned commentator understands,
such as they ought to be in order to possess "that general and universally striking likeness, which is demanded to the full exhibition of poetical truth." But a comparison of Aristotle with himself, in the several passages above referred to, seems to fix the sense clearly to that ideal perfection, that poetic elevation and improvement of nature, which may be said, rather, to exclude such
"general and universally striking likeness" of
"human nature at large:" and this, I think, was the very objection made to Sophocles by the patrons of his rival.
According to the interpretation which I am taking the liberty to examine, Sophocles is made to answer the charge by denying its truth: for the answer, as here stated, will be this—
You say, my representations are not true, and those of Euripides are true. I deny this. You use the term improperly. My representations are "agreeable to truth," because they are "collected from wide observation, i. e. from human nature at large;" those of Euripides are not agreeable to truth, because they are representations, not of the kind, but of individuals. The answer, as I understand Aristotle, is very different. The charge is not denied, or explained away, but admitted and justified.
15
Sophocles says,
"If you would have men represented as they are—
Euripides does not appear to have been charged, by those objectors, with what may be termed
individual improbability of imitation, but with too close and portrait-like delineation of
general nature. οἷοἰ εἰσι—you must, indeed, go to Euripides. I have not drawn them so—I never intended to draw them so. I have done better—I have delineated mankind, not such as they really are, but such as they ought to be."
In short, the difference, which I understand to be here intended, between the two Poets, cannot be more exactly expressed, than it is by the ingenious commentator himself, in the beginning of the note to which I refer; where it is observed, [
p. 253
] that
"truth may be followed too closely in works of imitation, as is evident in two respects. For, 1. the artist, when he would give a copy of nature, may confine himself too scrupulously to the exhibition of particulars, and so fail of representing the general idea of the kind. Or, 2. in applying himself to give the general idea, he may collect it from an enlarged view of real life, whereas it were still better taken from the nobler conception of it as subsisting only in the mind." Now, if we apply the latter of these differences to the two Poets in question—if we say,
"In applying himself to give the general idea, Euripides collected it from an enlarged view of real life; whereas Sophocles took it from the nobler conception of it, as subsisting only in the mind"—this will express exactly what I take to be the sense of Aristotle.
To the support, which the common interpretation of this passage receives from Aristotle himself, may be added that which it receives, and, I believe, is generally acknowledged to receive, from the Tragedies themselves, which are extant, of the two Poets in question. That Euripides is, in general, liable to the censure of particular imitation—of
"sinking the kind in the individual," I cannot say I have observed. But who can read this Poet without observing the examples, with which he every where abounds, of that very
"general and universally striking likeness, which is demanded to the full exhibition of poetical truth?" In Sophocles, we find more elevation, more dignity, more of that improved likeness, and ideal perfection, which the philosopher expresses by his
οἷα δεῖ — πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον, &c. In Euripides, we find more of the
ἀληθὲς, the
ὅμοιον, &c. — we are oftener reminded of the common nature and common life, which we all see around us. And if this, in conjunction with other causes, be sometimes found to lower the imitations of this Poet, beneath the proper level of Tragic dignity, and to produce something of the
κωμῳδία τις ἠθολογουμένη, which
Longinus
attributes to the
Odyssey,
16
the fault is amply redeemed, perhaps in those very parts, by the pleasure which results from the closeness and obviousness of the imitation; certainly, in many others, by those precious touches of nature, which must, at once, strike every individual of every audience;
17
such, if I mistake not, as are much more rarely to be found in Sophocles, and such, perhaps, as, after all that we have heard about the
beau ideal and improved nature, can only be produced by an exact transcript of nature, as it is—of what the Poet has actually felt himself, and actually seen in others.
The truth seems to be, that both in Poetry, and in Painting, if the sublime be aimed at, the Poet, and the Artist, must look up to the
οἷα ΔΕΙ εἶναι: their eyes may
"glance from earth to heaven," and they may
"body forth the form of things unknown." But, if emotion and the pathetic be their object, they will, neither of them, attain their end, unless they submit to descend a little towards earth, and to copy with some closeness that nature which is before their eyes. We are told of Michael Angelo, that
"his people are a superior order of beings;" that
"there is nothing about them, nothing in the air of their actions, or their attitudes, or the style and cast of their very limbs or features, that puts one in mind of their belonging to our own species."
18
If this be the character of that painter's works, I must confess, for my own part, that I should be disposed to turn from them to those of the charming artist, whose words I quote, where we see human nature improved, but not forgotten. I am very well content to be reminded of my own species, as he reminds me of them. But this, at least, is certain, that such a character, applied to a Tragic Poet, would be the severest censure that criticism could pronounce.
19
238.
mvp-aristotle-comment-238
NOTE 238.
25.13
P. 124. BUT, AS XENOPHANES SAYS, &C.
Ἀλλ’ ἔτυχεν, ὥσπερ Ξενοφάνης· ἀλλ’ ΦΑΣΙ τάδε. Thus all the MSS. and editions. Victorius proposed—
ἀλλ’ ΣΑΦΗ τάδε: and supported his conjecture by the following fragment of Xenophanes, preserved in
Sext. Empiricus
, to which he supposes Aristotle to allude:
Καὶ τὸ μὲν οὖν ΣΑΦΕΣ οὔτις ἀνὴρ ἴδεν, οὐδέ τις ἔσται Εἰδὼς, ἀμφὶ θεῶν τε, καὶ ὅσσα λέγω περὶ πάντων. Εἰ γὰρ καὶ τὰ μάλιστα ΤΥΧΟΙ τετελεσμένον εἰπὼν, Αὐτὸς ὅμως οὐκ οἶδε, δόκος δ’ ἐπὶ πᾶσι τέτυκται.
20
Few conjectural emendations invite assent by a more remarkable union of ingenuity and probability: and, as it appears to me, that, without some emendation, nothing consistent or satisfactory can be made of the passage, we need, I think, have little scruple in admitting the reading of Victorius as true, till manuscript authority produces something better.
Xenophanes is here introduced, probably, because he had written against the theology of HOMER and HESIOD.
21
The following lines are quoted from him by Sextus Empiricus:
Πάντα θεοῖς ἀνέθηκαν Ὅμηρός θ’ Ἡσίοδός τε, Ὅσσα παρ’ ἀνθρώποισιν ὀνείδεα καὶ ψόγος ἐστὶ, ΚΛΕΠΤΕΙΝ, ΜΟΙΧΕΥΕΙΝ τε, καὶ ΑΛΛΗΛΟΥΣ ΑΠΑΤΕΥΕΙΝ.
By alluding to those other verses, where he descants on the uncertainty and obscurity of all inquiries relative to the nature of the Gods, and asserts, that all, on that subject, is mere conjecture and opinion, Aristotle seems, slily enough, to have intended to make Xenophanes answer himself; and to excuse Homer's theology, even by the testimony of one who had been most forward to condemn it.
"These may be opinions taken up at random, as Xenophanes says; and his representation of the Gods may be the true:—but, as he himself owns, these are matters not clearly known.
Ἀλλ’ οὐ σαφῆ τάδε. —Homer was therefore right, as a Poet, in following popular tradition and belief."
Aristotle also alludes here, without doubt, to the objections of PLATO,
De Repub. II. p. 150, &c. ed. Massey.
I cannot forbear to mention one curious maxim of Xenophanes about drinking, which we find in some pleasant elegiac lines preserved in Athenæus.
22
It was his opinion, it seems, that no man had drunk too much, provided he was able to walk home without a guide.
Οὐχ ὕβρις πίνειν δ’ ὁπόσον μεν ἔχων ἀφίκοιο Οἴκαδ’ ΑΝΕΥ ΠΡΟΠΟΛΟΥ. —
23
And what says the severe and moral PLATO on this subject?—He forbids young men this indulgence, but allows it to old:—
μέθης δὲ, καὶ πολυοινίας τὸ παράπαν ΤΟΝ ΝΕΟΝ ἀπέχεσθαι. Till the age of 18, he allows no wine; for, to drink it at that time of life, he says, is
"adding fire to fire, both in body and mind." —
πῦρ ἐπὶ πῦρ ὀχετεύειν, ἐις τε τὸ σῶμα, καὶ τὴν ψυχήν. From 18 to 30, a moderate use of wine might be allowed:—
οἴνου γεύεσθαί τε ΜΕΤΡΙΟΥ. At 40, and after, it might be used in a jolly kind of way—
ἐις παιδιάν—ὥστε ἀνηβᾶν ἡμᾶς, καὶ δυσθυμίας ΛΗΘΗΝ γίγνεσθαι, μαλακώτερον ἐκ σκληροτέρου τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἦθος, καθάπερ ἐις πῦρ σίδηρον ἐντεθέντα, γιγνόμενον καὶ οὕτως εὐπλαστότερον εἶναι. For wine, says he, was given to man, as—
φάρμακον — ἐπίκουρον τῆς τοῦ ΓΗΡΩΣ αὐστηρότητος. —
De Leg. II. p. 666. ed. Serr.
239.
mvp-aristotle-comment-239
NOTE 239.
25.14
P. 125. WHETHER WHAT IS SAID, OR DONE, &c.
I believe Victorius is right in referring this to the accusation, or
ἐπιτίμησις, which Aristotle, at the end of the chapter, expresses by
ὡς βλαβερά.
"Arbitror autem rationem hanc pertinere ad formam eam, quam vocavit, ὡς βλαβερά. Docet enim nunc, si poeta arguitur, quod personam aliquam induxerit, quæ quippiam dixerit aut fecerit, quod meritò reprehendi possit, aut speciem habeat nocendi, quomodo illud defendi purgarique debeat."
p. 278.
It is true, the word
βλαβερόν does not here occur: but Aristotle uses other words, as synonymous, at the conclusion of the chapter;
ἀλογία, μοχθηρία, πονηρία: and here, the same thing is sufficiently indicated by the moral expressions,
μὴ καλῶς, and
φαῦλον. And though this solution cannot, that I see, be considered as arising from the application of any of the three principles laid down at the beginning of the chapter, yet it seems plainly connected, as I have observed in the notes on the translation, with what precedes.
240.
mvp-aristotle-comment-240
NOTE 240.
25.16
P. 125. FOR THE SOLUTION OF SOME OBJECTIONS, WE MUST HAVE RECOURSE TO THE DICTION.
Τὰ δὲ, πρὸς τὴν λέξιν ὁρῶντα δεῖ διαλύειν. So, undoubtedly, the passage should be punctuated; not, as in some editions, very absurdly,
τὰ δὲ πρὸς τὴν λέξιν, ὁρῶντα δεῖ διαλύειν: of which the fair, and only fair, translation would be—
"Those objections, which relate to the diction, we must solve by looking at them!"
24
Goulston, who adopts this perverse construction, is forced to supply:
"his modis intuentem:" and Heinsius has inserted
οὕτως in his text; on what authority, I know not. But the true construction certainly is,
ὁρῶντα πρὸς τὴν λέξιν—i. e.
"by having an eye to, or, considering, the diction." And so the passage was, long ago, well explained by Victorius; who was followed by Castelvetro, Piccolomini, and Beni. Dacier, though he translates rightly, mistakes the sense with those, whose translation is wrong. He supposes Aristotle here to be suggesting answers to objections against the diction.
25
But the instances might have set him right; none of them appearing to be criticisms on the diction, but, all of them, objections to the sense, though the answers are drawn from the diction. Indeed Dacier seems to have seen this, and is therefore forced to make the diction,
Λέξις, include the thoughts,
διάνοιαν; thus confounding Aristotle's clear distinction.
In this whole chapter, words are considered no farther, than as they afford the means of obviating objections against the sense.
241.
mvp-aristotle-comment-241
NOTE 241.
25.16
P. 126. WHEN ON THE TROJAN PLAIN HIS ANXIOUS EYE, &C.
The censure, here, is generally supposed to have fallen on the word
ἀθρήσειε, and the absurdity of making Agamemnon see the Trojan camp, and the Grecian fleet, by night, and when he was shut up in his tent. To this, Aristotle is understood to reply, that the word is metaphorical; he saw with his mind's eye. For my part, I would much rather confess, that I do not understand the instance at all, than suppose the philosopher capable of thus explaining away one of the finest descriptive touches in the whole
Iliad. The entire passage is this:
Ἦτοι ὅτ’ ἐς πεδίον τὸ Τρωϊκὸν ἀθρήσειε, Θαύμαζεν πυρὰ πολλὰ, τὰ καίετο Ἰλιόθι πρὸ, Αὐλῶν συρίγγων τ’ ἐνοπὴν, ὅμαδόν τ’ ἀνθρώπων.
Il. Χ. [Κ.] v. 11-13.
I can hardly think it possible for any man, of the least taste, to read these lines, and understand them to express merely the thoughts of Agamemnon. Mr. Pope, who has shewn so much taste in making the most of all Homer's picturesque descriptions,
26
has, in his translation, done ample justice to this.
27
Yet, in the note, this cruel metaphorical sponge is applied, without compunction, upon the supposed authority of Aristotle; though, after all, the evident corruption and deficiency of this whole passage leaves it dubious, whether this, or, indeed, any other meaning, assigned, or assignable, be the true one.
All, in this description, seems clearly literal. The verb,
ἀθρῆσαι, is no where in Homer, I believe, applied to mental vision. Still less is
θαύμαζεν applicable to mere thought, or recollection. And what, after all, is Agamemnon made to see? Only what he might easily see, even as he lay on his couch—the fires of the Trojan camp. Add to this, the sense still more evidently literal of what follows of his hearing the military music,
28
and
"the busy hum of men."
There are few descriptions in Homer, that, to me, appear more beautiful than this little military night-scene. Whatever may be supposed with respect to Agamemnon, we, who read, are made to see, and hear. But, take away the literal sense, and you take away, with it, the whole beauty of the passage. And, after all, what is the difficulty? Agamemnon, though retired to his tent, was kept awake by his anxiety. The enemy was not far off; and he apprehended the design of some nocturnal incursion.
29
In this situation, is it difficult to imagine, that he might frequently rise, and look with an anxious eye towards the Trojan camp, and towards the ships?—for this is all which the expressions,
ΕΣ πεδίον ἀθρήσειε—ΕΣ νῆας ἴδοι—here imply. Nor is it at all improbable, that he might have these views as he lay upon his bed, through windows, or apertures, made perhaps for that very purpose. The commentators seem to have thought only of a modern officer, snugly shut up in a close and comfortable tent, and disturbed by no fear, but that of a sore throat, or the rheumatism. The tents of the antients were mere huts, or hovels.
30
The marquee of Achilles himself, as it is minutely described by Homer,
31
seems to have been little better than a cow-house.
As I have given the passage from Homer, the reader may not be displeased to compare that sketch with a far more finished and exquisite night-piece, but of the same kind, by our own great Poet.
From camp to camp, through the foul womb of night, The hum of either army stilly sounds, That the fix'd centinels almost receive The secret whispers of each other's watch: Fire answers fire; and through their paly flames Each battle sees the other's umber'd face: Steed threatens steed, in high and boastful neighs, Piercing the night's dull ear; and from the tents, The armourers, accomplishing the knights, With busy hammers closing rivets up, Give dreadful note of preparation.
Henry V. Act iv. [Prologue]
242.
mvp-aristotle-comment-242
NOTE 242.
25.17
Αὐλῶν συρίγγωνθ’ ὅμαδον. —
Il. Χ. [Κ.] v. 13.
—So Aristotle. In our editions of Homer, the whole line is—
Αὐλῶν συρίγγων τ’ ἐνοπὴν, ὅμαδόν τ’ ἀνθρώπων.
I cannot agree with those commentators who take the objection here to fall upon the word
ἐνοπὴν, which means, voice,
"& ne se dit proprement," says
Dacier
,
"que des hommes." This would be a mere verbal objection; for the meaning is plain enough. But Aristotle, as I have already observed, is not here considering criticisms on the diction, but, such criticisms on the
διάνοια, or thoughts, as may be obviated by means of the diction.
Farther; he is here shewing, how objections may be removed by having recourse to metaphor—by saying,
"the expression is not to be taken in its proper, but, in its metaphorical sense." But Dacier's explanation makes the objection to be, not the impropriety of the literal sense, (for that was out of the question here), but only the impropriety, or harshness, of the metaphor; and the answer, according to him, is no other, than a denial of the charge, and a justification of the metaphor. And this will be equally the case, whether we take Aristotle's quotation as it stands—
συρίγγων θ’ ὅμαδον—or suppose him to mean,
συρίγγων τ’ ἐνοπὴν, as we read it in our editions: except, that the former would be much the bolder and harsher metaphor of the two.
So much then for, what the criticism was not. What it was, must always, I fear, in the present condition of the text, remain a problem. One conjecture only occurs to me, and that, such as I cannot take upon me to offer with any degree of confidence. Perhaps Aristotle had, originally, quoted, or meant, at least, to refer to, the whole verse, as we read it; and the censure might be pointed at the expression—
ὍΜΑΔΟΝ τ’ ἀνθρώπων. The proper and derivative sense of
ὅμαδος seems to be that of
a crowd, a multitude, a heap;
32
its secondary sense, by a common metonymy of cause for effect,
the murmur, or tumult, occasioned by a multitude. So Hesychius:
Ὅμαδος· (1.) ΑΘΡΟΙΣΙΣ, (2.) ΘΟΡΥΒΟΣ. (1.) ΟΧΛΟΣ, (2.) ΤΑΡΑΧΟΣ. ΣΤΡΑΤΟΣ, ἀπὸ τοῦ, ὁμοῦ. — Perhaps, then, some hypercritic might take, or chuse to take, the word here in its primary sense, of multitude, and ask, how Agamemnon could, by night, perceive, and
"wonder at," the multitude of men?
θαύμαζεν—ὅμαδον ἀνθρώπων. To this it would be a proper answer, to say—you mistake the meaning of the word
ὅμαδον: it is not used here in its proper sense, of a multitude, but, in its metaphorical sense, for the effect produced by the voices and the bustle of a multitude. The criticism, I confess, would be frivolous enough; yet not more so than many others, to which Aristotle has condescended to furnish answers. It will perhaps be thought a more solid objection to my conjecture, that the word,
ὅμαδος, seems to be constantly used by Homer in the secondary sense. So,
Il. Μ. 471.
—
Β. 96.
Od. Κ. 556
:
Κινυμένων δ’ ἑτάρων ΟΜΑΔΟΝ ΚΑΙ ΔΟΥΠΟΝ ΑΚΟΥΣΑΣ. Nor can I say, that I have found any instance in Homer, of this word used in its primary sense. The other sense may, therefore, appear too common and established to have admitted of any difficulty. But to this circumstance, a critic, disposed to cavil, and furnished with sufficient authorities for the primary sense from other authors, may easily be imagined to have paid no regard.
243.
mvp-aristotle-comment-243
NOTE 243.
25.17
P. 127. ALL, IS PUT FOR MANY—.
Τὸ γὰρ ΠΑΝΤΕΣ, ἀντὶ τοῦ ΠΟΛΛΟΥ, κατὰ μεταφορὰν εἴρηται. The word,
πάντες, does not occur in any of the preceding examples. But, says
M. Batteux
, it is virtually contained in the first example—
ἌΛΛΟΙ μέν ῥα θεοἰ τε καὶ ἀνέρες, &c. —for
ἄλλοι means
ΠΑΝΤΕΣ ἄλλοι.
"Aristote traduit l'idée, & non le mot."
Dacier
understands the passage in the same manner. This explanation appears to me forced and improbable. Aristotle says plainly,
Τὸ πάντες εἴρηται i. e.
"the word
and I believe, with Victorius, Piccolomini, and Heinsius, that some corresponding example is lost, as the explanations of the other examples appear to be likewise. πάντες;"
244.
mvp-aristotle-comment-244
NOTE 244. P. 127.
25.18
ΔΙΔΟΜΕΝ δέ οἱ εὖχος ἀρέσθαι.
Καὶ τὸ περὶ τὸ ἐνύπνιον τὸ Ἀγαμέμνονθ’, ὅτι ΟΥΚ ΑΥΤΟΣ ὁ Ζεὺς εἶπεν, "δίδομεν δέ οἱ εὖχος ἀρέσθαι," ἀλλὰ ΤΩΙ ΕΝΥΠΝΙΩΙ ΕΝΕΤΕΛΛΕΤΟ διδόναι. —
De Soph. Elench. p. 284, ed. Duval.
— This clearly confirms the common explanation, which makes Hippias substitute
διδόμεν, the infinitive, (for
διδόμεναι,) used imperatively, instead of
δίδομεν, the first person plural of the present tense. A very curious solution this. Jupiter tells no lie. He only orders the dream to lie for him:
"Ce qui est très different," says
Dacier
;
"car alors le mensonge ne vient pas de Jupiter, il vient du songe." — Dacier tells us also, that this hemistich, which does not appear in our copies of Homer, was altered,
"par une fraude pieuse."
33
I cannot see any great piety in the fraud; because nothing appears to be added to the impiety of the passage by the words objected to, or to be taken from it, by the suppression of them. If the words were in Aristotle's Homer, they were probably in Plato's also. Yet, in the passage at the end of the second book of his Republic, where he alludes to this part of Homer, he, very properly, takes no notice of these words, but censures the whole circumstance, of Jupiter's being represented as sending such a deceitful dream: —
τὴν τοῦ ἐνυπνίου ΠΟΜΠΗΝ ὑπὸ Διὸς τῷ Ἀγαμέμνονι.
34
The theology, indeed, of this charming writer, was of a very different complexion from that of Hippias, or of Dacier. —
Κομιδῇ ἄρα ὁ ΘΕΟΣ ἁπλοῦν καὶ ἀληθὲς, ἔν τε ἔργῳ, καὶ ἐν λόγῳ· καὶ οὔτε αὐτὸς μεθίσταται, οὔτε ἄλλους ἐξαπατᾷ, οὔτε κατὰ φαντασίας, οὔτε κατὰ λόγους, οὔτε κατὰ σημείων πομπὰς, οὔθ’ ὕπαρ, οὐδ’ ὄναρ.
35
245.
mvp-aristotle-comment-245
NOTE 245. P. 127.
25.18
Τὸ μὲν ΟΥ καταπύθεται ὄμβρῳ.
This correction, also, of Hippias, is somewhat more explicitly mentioned,
De Soph. Elench. p. 284.
The passage was censured as absurd, (
ὡς ἀτόπως εἰρηκότα) by those critics who read
οὗ.
36
But what the absurdity was, we are not told by Aristotle. His com- mentators tell us, that it consisted in first calling the post
"dry,"
αὖον, and then saying
"where it was rotted by rain." I cannot say I comprehend this. Are rottenness and dryness, as
Beni
very well asks, incompatible? — Nor is it clear, what construction, or what sense, was given to the passage, by those who read
οὗ, instead of
οὐ. — But the reader will hardly thank me for detaining him with a dissertation upon a rotten post.
246.
mvp-aristotle-comment-246
NOTE 246.
25.19
P. 128. AND MIX'D BEFORE UNMIX'D.
Ζωρά τε τὰ πρὶν ΑΚΡΗΤΑ, [
διαλλάττοντα κελεύθους: for so the verse is completed, in Simplicius and Athenæus.] This seems the best and most authentic reading, and Dacier's the most reasonable explanation. The meaning of the words,
ζωρόν, ζωρότερον, was matter of great dispute among the antients themselves. See
Plutarch's Sympos. Prob. V. 4.
— M. Batteux, taking it to mean
pure, unmixed, reads, consistently with that idea, for
ἄκρητα, ΚΕΚΡΑΤΟ. But, that this word, whatever it was, meant unmixed, seems plain from the passage of
Athenæus, p. 423, 424
, about
Theophrastus
; who, it seems, in a treatise on drunkenness, adduced these very lines of Empedocles to prove, that the meaning of
ζωρότερον was, not pure wine, but wine mixed with water.
The expression,
διαλλάττοντα κελεύθους, seems to prove, as Dacier has explained it, that the second verse was not intended merely as explanatory repetition, in other terms, of the change described in the first, but as descriptive of a contrary change; an interpretation which is somewhat supported by the two following lines of the same Poet, on the same subject: —
Ἄλλοτε μὲν, φιλότητι συνερχόμεν’ εἰς ἓν ἅπαντα, Ἄλλοτε δ’ αὖ, δίχ’ ἕκαστα φορεύμενα νείκεος ἔχθει.
37
—and, perhaps, still better, by the lines quoted by Aristotle,
Phys. Auscult. VIII. p. 408.
The expression —
ΜΑΘΟΝ ἀθάνατ’ εἶναι — is well explained by
Casaubon, upon Athenæus, p. 718,
μαθον,
pro εἰώθεισαν, aut ἐπεφύκεισαν: —
"didicerant esse, pro erant, vel solebant, esse," &c. See also the verses just referred to, in the
Phys. Auscult. where the same expression occurs —
ΜΕΜΑΘΗΚΕ φύεσθαι.
Of
διαίρεσις and
σύνθεσις, and the ambiguity of punctuation, as a source of sophistical argumentation, more may be seen, if it be thought worth seeing,
Rhet. II. 24, p. 580.
De Soph. Elench. p. 284, 288, 303, ed. Duval.
247.
mvp-aristotle-comment-247
NOTE 247.
25.20
P. 128. TO AMBIGUITY—.
Ἀμφιβολία. i. e. such ambiguity, as does not depend on the different senses of single words, (which Aristotle calls
ὁμωνυμία,) but on the different senses, of which two or more words are capable, independently of their punctuation. See,
De Soph. Elench. I. cap. iv.
which clears up his distinctions, between
διαίρεσις, ἀμφιβολία, ὁμωνυμία, &c.
248.
mvp-aristotle-comment-248
NOTE 248.
25.21
P. 128. WHATEVER IS POURED OUT TO DRINK AS WINE.
Upon
v. 363 of Od. Ω. [v. 364]
(
—κερώντας αἴθοπα οἶνον—)
Eustathius
says —
τουτέστιν, ἐμβάλλοντας εἰς κρατῆρας: and
Gataker
remarks, on occasion of the same passage —
"τὸ κεραν, sive κερασαι, licet miscere proprie significet, usurpatur tamen simpliciter ἀντὶ τοῦ, ἐγχεῖν, καὶ διδόναι πιεῖν pro infundere, in calicem scil. sive cyathum, et bibendum porrigere."
38
As a proof that the verb was so used, without the idea of mixing, we meet with it applied to nectar:
—ΚΕΡΑΣΣΕ δὲ νέκταρ ἐρυθρόν.
Od. Ε. 93.
The Gods hardly drank nectar and water. But it is even applied to pure water itself:
Θυμῆρες ΚΕΡΑΣΑΣΑ κατὰ κρατός τε καὶ ὤμων. i. e. pouring it over my head and shoulders.
Od. Κ. 362.
249.
mvp-aristotle-comment-249
NOTE 249.
25.21
P. 128. HENCE GANYMEDE, &C.
I have adhered, without scruple, to the transposition mentioned in
Mr. Winstanley's note
;
39
which had been proposed, I know not by whom, before Victorius published his commentary. Victorius opposes it; but, I think, without sufficient reason. Piccolomini saw, and has well defended, the necessity of it, which appears to me to be obvious. I would read the whole passage thus:
Τὰ δὲ, κατὰ τὸ ἔθος τῆς λέξεως· οἷον, τὸν [forte, ΤΟ] κεκραμμένον, οἶνόν φασιν εἶναι· ὅθεν εἴρηται ὁ Γανυμήδης, "Διῒ οἰνοχοεύειν," πινόντων οἶνον. Εἴη δ’ ἂν τοῦτό γε καὶ κατὰ μεταφοράν. Καὶ, Χαλκέας, τοὺς τὸν σίδηρον ἐργαζομένους· ὅθεν πεποἰηται, "Κνημὶς νεότευκτος κασσιτέροιο."
This differs from Mr. Winstanley's arrangement, only with respect to the words —
εἴη δ’ ἂν τοῦτό γε, &c. which appear to me to be- long to the single example immediately preceding them in the editions. The commentators agree, I think, in making them refer to all the examples. But I cannot be persuaded, that Aristotle, after formally proposing the
ἔθος λέξεως, as a distinct solution, would immediately say, that all the instances he gives might as well be defended
κατὰ μεταφοράν. I understand him to say —
"though this example, indeed, may also be defended by metaphor." The expression confirms this : —
εἴη δ’ ἂν ΤΟΥΤΟ ΓΕ καὶ κατὰ μεταφοράν.
Besides, there seems to be a pretty plain reason, why this instance might be considered as a metaphor, and the others not so. Nectar was the wine of the Gods; and the resemblance was sufficiently obvious, to make the substitution of the one for the other an easy metaphor. With the other examples the case is different. Brass and iron are indeed, each of them, species of metals. But the common genus is too general to constitute that obvious resemblance which is requisite to a metaphor. Their likeness, to use the philosopher's own language, is not perceived by the genus. Oil and vinegar are both liquids; yet the substitution of the one for the other would make a very strange sort of metaphor; because they have no other resemblance to each other, but as liquids. Hence, Aristotle denominates such substitutions not metaphors, but customary modes of speech; both because the resemblance is not obvious enough for metaphor, and because, as the name implies, they are common and established expressions, (
κύρια,) however, in themselves, improper.
40
250.
mvp-aristotle-comment-250
NOTE 250.
25.22
P. 129. THE MEANING IS, WAS STOPPED ONLY, OR REPELLED.
Dacier
supposes the critics to have objected to the improba- bility of a long spear's remaining fixed in a shield, like an arrow, or light dart. I cannot so conceive it. The lines themselves are the best comment here.
Οὐδὲ τότ’ Αἰνείαο δαΐφρονος ὄβριμον ἔγχος Ῥῆξε σάκος· χρυσὸς γὰρ ἐρύκακε, δῶρα θεοῖο· Ἀλλὰ δύω μὲν ἔλασσε διὰ πτύχας, αἱ δ’ ἄρ’ ἔτι τρεῖς Ἦσαν· ἐπεὶ πέντε πτύχας ἤλασε Κυλλοποδίων, Τὰς δύο, χαλκείας, δύο δ’ ἔνδοθι, κασσιτέροιο, Τὴν δὲ μίαν, χρυσῆν· τῇ ῥ’ ἔσχετο χάλκεον ἔγχος.
Il. Υ. 267, &c.
The shield was composed of five plates; the two first, of brass; the two innermost, next the body, (for that seems to be the sense of
ἔνδοθι
41
,) of tin,
κασσιτέροιο
42
; and one in the middle, of gold; and there the spear was stopped:
ΤΗΙ ῥ’ ἔσχετο. Now this might mean,
stuck, or, was fastened, in it. But this, it was objected, would have been a manifest contradiction; for Homer had said, not only that the gold stopped it—
χρυσὸς γὰρ ἐρύκακε—but, still more expressly, that the spear penetrated two of the plates, and that the three others remained unpierced. But the spear could not well be fixed, or fastened, in the plate of gold, which was the third, without piercing it. And thus the objection appears to have been rightly understood by Victorius and Goulston.
251.
mvp-aristotle-comment-251
NOTE 251.
25.23
P. 129. OF HOW MANY DIFFERENT SENSES, &c.
I may say with Victorius,
"hic locus valde me torsit." The words are these: —
τὸ δὲ, ποσαχῶς ἐνδέχεται, ὧδί πως μάλιστ’ ἄν τις ὑπολάβοι κατὰ τὴν κατ’ ἀντικρύ. — In this passage, as in many others, there is just glimpse enough of some meaning, to mock a commentator with the hopes of discovery, and to deprive him of the comfort of doing at once, what, after all his efforts, he will probably find himself obliged to do at last — of abandoning the passage as unintelligible. For my own part, I do not see one clear and satisfactory sense, that can be made of the words, without conjectural emendation; and if we open that door, we shall be, again, confounded by the number of different senses which ingenuity may propose, with equal pretensions to our acceptance.
Dacier
translates thus:
"Et le plus court moyen de se tirer de ces endroits, c'est de prendre le mot dans un sens tout contraire à celui qu'on lui donne ordinairement."
Piccolomini
and
Beni
understand it thus:
"How many senses a word admits of, may best be known by considering the significations opposed to it:" a sense preferable, I think, at least, to any other that has been offered, because it certainly does receive some support from the
15th chapter of Aristotle's first book of Topics
; where he treats of Homonymy, or equivocation, and points out different means, by which we may discover, what, and how many, different senses a word will admit of;
43
and among these is the rule here supposed to be alluded to; i. e. that any single word must admit of as many different significations as are opposed to it. As, for example, to the word
acute, we oppose, sometimes
grave, sometimes
blunt, sometimes
dull, or
stupid.
Acute therefore has, of course, three different senses, corresponding to those three opposite senses.
But though this explanation of the passage must be allowed to give an Aristotelic meaning, yet I cannot think it a meaning that arises, fairly and clearly, from the text. In particular, the expression,
ΚΑΤΑ τὴν [scil. σημασίαν for so it is supplied—] KAT’ ANTIKPY, has, to me, a very suspicious appearance. I much doubt, whether Aristotle would have used the word
ἀντικρύ to denote contrariety of meaning, or any thing but local opposition. I believe he would have used
ἐναντίον, or
ἀντικείμενον; as he does constantly in those parts of his logical works, where he treats of contrariety, and of the opposite senses of words;
44
and where I have not found the phrase,
κατ’ ἀντικρύ, once made use of in that sense. — However, as this interpretation seems to be the least exceptionable of any, and I see nothing better to propose, I have admitted it in my version: but I should certainly not accuse any reader of being very fastidious, if he preferred a blank to this, or any other meaning, that has been given to this dark saying. Emendatory conjectures, indeed, have occurred to me, as to others; but none of them plausible enough even to impose upon myself.
252.
mvp-aristotle-comment-252
NOTE 252.
25.24
P. 129. ARGUE FROM THESE PREVIOUS DECISIONS OF THEIR OWN.
Αὐτοὶ ΚΑΤΑΨΗΦΙΣΑΜΕΝΟΙ. — I cannot think this word so free from all difficulty as
Mr. Winstanley
does. He says,
"Egregie dictum καταψηφισάμενοι, ut sensus sit: hi perinde ac judices quidam decernentes ratiocinantur," &c. But the question is, whether the word will admit that sense, or any other, than that of condemning, passing sentence against, &c. which is not to Aristotle's purpose in this place. The fair sense of
καταψηφισάμενοι συλλογίζονται, is, if I mistake not,
"they argue, or form their conclusion, after, or, in consequence of, having condemned" what? — We must necessarily understand them to have condemned, either the passage in question, or, the opinion of others about the sense of it. But Aristotle, in what follows, says plainly, that they condemned the passage, or the opinions of others relative to it, in consequence of their own preconceived and erroneous notions; and the idea of condemnation, or censure, here, would be only an awkward, tautological anticipation of the
ἘΠΙΤΙΜΩΣΙΝ, ἂν ὑπεναντίον ᾖ τῇ αὑτῶν οἰήσει, which follows. I think, therefore, that the proposed correction of
Heinsius
καταΣΟφισάμενοι, must be allowed the praise, both of ingenuity and probability. In my version, however, I have contented myself with making the best I could of that reading which has the authority of all the manuscripts, and all the commentators, except Heinsius, on its side. —
Victorius
thinks the word will bear the sense of
"cum sententiam tulerint;" but he adds —
"quamvis in præpositione, quæ verbo adjuncta est, vis insit contra alios id faciendi."
253.
mvp-aristotle-comment-253
NOTE 253.
25.25
P. 130. THE OBJECTION ITSELF, THEREFORE, IS PROBABLY FOUNDED ON A MISTAKE.
Δι’ ἁμάρτημα δὲ τὸ πρόβλημα εἰκός ἐστι.
"Metuo ne hic locus corruptus mancusve sit."
Victor.
— To give these words any meaning that may not easily be controverted, is, I believe, impossible. I have made them say, what it seems to me most probable that the author meant to say:
"So far is this criticism from proving Homer to be wrong, that it is, itself, probably, founded on a mistake."
254.
mvp-aristotle-comment-254
NOTE 254.
25.28
P. 130. THE IMITATIONS OF POETRY SHOULD RESEMBLE THE PAINTINGS OF ZEUXIS-.
Τοιούτους δ’ εἶναι, οἵους Ζεῦξις ἔγραφεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον· τὸ γὰρ παράδειγμα δεῖ ὑπερέχειν.
M. Batteux proposes this arrangement:—
Ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον· τὸ γὰρ παράδειγμα δεῖ ὑπερέχειν, τοιούτους δ’ εἶναι, οἵους Ζεῦξις ἔγραφεν.
45
That the words,
τοιούτους δ’ εἶναι, οἵους Ζεῦξις ἔγραφεν, belong to the second way of defending the impossible, by referring it to the
βέλτιον — οἷα δεῖ εἶναι, &c. seems clear. Nor is it any objection to this, as some have thought it,
46
that Aristotle had before mentioned the paintings of Zeuxis, as deficient in the expression of the manners.
47
For it by no means follows, from this deficiency of Zeuxis as to manners, that he did not represent
πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον, with respect to beauty, grace, dignity of form, &c.: and it seems to be this kind of improvement, in painting, by which Aristotle, here and elsewhere, illustrates the
μίμησις βελτίον of poetry.
48
Compare, particularly,
cap. xv.
Ἐπεὶ δὲ μίμησίς ἐστιν ἡ Τραγῳδία βελτιόνων δεῖ...
49
The story of the manner, in which Zeuxis is said to have collected the
βέλτιον for his famous picture of Helen, is well known. See
Cic. de Invent. II. 1.
Plin. Nat. Hist. XXXV. 9.
Bayle, art. ZEUXIS.
I agree, therefore, perfectly with Mr. Winstanley, that the words,
τοιούτους δ’ εἶναι οἵους Ζ. ἔγρ. should be transposed: but I do not see, that any alteration, farther than the mere transposition, is necessary. I would read —
Ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον· [scil. δεῖ ἀνάγειν] τοιούτους δ’ εἶναι [scil. δεῖ] οἵους Ζεῦξις ἔγραφεν· τὸ γὰρ παράδειγμα δεῖ ὑπερέχειν.
255.
mvp-aristotle-comment-255
NOTE 255.
25.29
P. 130. TO OPINION, OR WHAT IS SAID TO BE, MAY BE REFERRED, &c.
Πρὸς ἃ φασί, τὰ ἄλογα: [scil.
δεῖ ἀνάγειν: for so, I think, with Mr. Winstanley, the passage is to be understood; and so it is explained and translated by Castelvetro. The expression,
ἃ φασί, or
οἷα φασί, is used by Aristotle as synonymous with
δόξα, and
οἷα δοκεῖ. Thus, —
οἷα ΦΑΣΙ καὶ ΔΟΚΕΙ, at the beginning of this chapter: and afterwards —
οὕτω φασιν.
But it will not, I think, be found possible to give this passage a consistent sense, unless we understand him to mean, what, as the text stands, he does not expressly say, i. e.
"By general opinion we may excuse, not only the
As if he had written,
πιθανὸν ἀδύνατον, but even such things as are manifestly improbable, or absurd."πρὸς ἃ φασί, ΚΑΙ τὰ ἄλογα. And thus Goulston has supplied: —
"Ad ea quæ aiunt, [rediguntur hæc quæ dixi; et] illa, quæ sine ratione sunt."
256.
mvp-aristotle-comment-256
NOTE 256.
25.30
P. 131. WHEN THINGS, WHICH APPEAR TO BE CONTRADICTORY—.
Τὰ δ’ ὑπεναντία ὡς εἰρημένα—. The words,
ὡς εἰρημένα, have distressed all the commentators; and no sense, which they have laboured to force upon the expression, is, to my apprehension, satisfactory. Heinsius corrected by transposition —
Τὰ δ’ ὡς ὑπεναντία εἰρημένα:
"Ea, quæ tanquam subcontraria dicta videntur." — An easier and more probable emendation, I think, would be —
Τὰ δ’ ΥΠΕΝΑΝΤΙΩΣ εἰρημένα.
257.
mvp-aristotle-comment-257
NOTE 257.
25.30
P. 131. AND IN THE SAME SENSE—.
The word is,
ὡσαύτως:
"simili modo," as all the commentators render it. I cannot say I have been able thoroughly to satisfy myself, as to the precise meaning of the expression, from any thing I have found in Aristotle's logical works.
50
If,
"in the same manner," does not mean,
"in the same sense," I confess I do not know what it means. I understand Aristotle to say, that, if the subject of the propositions, charged with being contradictory, be the same, and spoken of in the same respect, we must still examine, farther, whether the two propositions admit of a sense really and accurately opposite to each other; which cannot be the case, unless the same words, in each proposition, have exactly the same sense.
And this meaning seems to be supported by the following passage from the treatise
Περὶ Ἑρμηνείας
: —
Καὶ ἔστω τοῦτο ΑΝΤΙΦΑΣΙΣ, (nempe) κατάφασις καὶ ἀπόφασις αἱ ἀντικείμεναι. Λέγω δὲ ἀντικεῖσθαι, τὴν ΤΟΥ ΑΥΤΟΥ κατὰ ΤΟΥ ΑΥΤΟΥ, μὴ ὉΜΩΝΥΜΩΣ δέ.
51
That is, as it is well explained in the analytical Synopsis prefixed to Duval's edition:—
"Affirmatio & negatio oppositæ, contradictionem faciunt. Oppositio est ejusdem, de eodem, non homonymè; nam accipi debent termini in oppositione, EODEM MODO AC SENSU."
All that follows—viz.
ὥστε καὶ αὐτὸν, ἢ πρὸς ἃ αὐτὸς λέγει, ἢ ὃ ἂν φρόνιμος ὑποθῆται is either so corrupt, or so darkly expressed, that I have only to confess myself unable even to guess what Aristotle meant to say.
52
Commentators indeed have explained, and translators have translated; but I have seen no explanation that approaches to satisfaction, nor any translation, but what is either unintelligible, or unwarrantable, or both. I do not mean to except myself; for I had translated thus:—
"We must also consider the person who speaks, and whether the contradiction be to what he himself said, or to what any reasonable man would understand him to have said." But, to wave other objections, which, no doubt, the learned reader will easily make for me, the verb,
ὑποθέσθαι, will, I believe, by no means bear this sense, of
supposing, understanding—
ὑπολαβεῖν. At least, Aristotle seems always to use it in that of
advising, suggesting, &c. So
Rhet. I. 9, p. 533
.
ὅταν ἐπαινεῖν βούλῃ, ὅρα τί ἂν ΥΠΟΘΟΙΟ· καὶ ὅταν ΥΠΟΘΕΣΘΑΙ, ὅρα τί ἂν ἐπαινέσειας. Accordingly, Goulston has given the word this sense in his version: —
"videndumque, an eâ in re, quod prudens præceperit, secutus sit." But, of what force this circumstance is, or how it is to be applied to obviate the charge of contradiction, I do not see.
Being therefore obliged to reject the only version, which seemed to me to offer any tolerable meaning, I have left a blank in my translation.
258.
mvp-aristotle-comment-258
NOTE 258.
25.31
P. 131. WHEN EXCUSED BY NO NECESSITY, &c.
—
Ὅταν μὴ ἀνάγκης οὔσης, μηθὲν χρήσηται τῷ ἀλόγῳ, ὥσπερ Εὐριπίδης τῷ Αἰγειἤτε πονηρίᾳ, ὥσπερ ἐν Ὀρέστῃ τοῦ Μενελάου. — Such was the confused state in which
Robortelli
found the text, which he, very ingeniously and solidly, rectified thus:
—
Ὅταν μὴ ἀνάγκης οὔσης μηθὲν, χρήσηται τῷ ἀλόγῳ, ὥσπερ Εὐριπίδης ΕΝ τῷ ΑΙΓΕΙ, ΤΗι πονηρίᾳ, ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ Ὀρέστῃ τοῦ Μενελάου.
Some MSS. for
Αἰγειἤτε, give
Αἰγεητη, which, as Goulston has observed, suggests the true reading—
ἐν τῷ ΑΙΓΕΙ, ΤΗι πονηρίᾳ... &c.
By the
Aegeus, Robortelli understood the character of that name, in the
Medea of Euripides
. To this
Victorius
very reasonably objected, that the mode of expression,
ἐν τῷ Αἰγεῖ, seems plainly to indicate a Tragedy so named; not a character only in a Tragedy of a different name. But this is no objection to Robortelli's reading, though it is to his explanation of it. See the fragments at the end of the Oxford Euripides, where several passages of the
Aegeus are quoted from
Stobæus
, &c.
259.
mvp-aristotle-comment-259
NOTE 259.
25.32
P. 131. THUS THE SOURCES OF OBJECTIONS ARE FIVE, &C.
This enumeration may seem, at the first view, to be deficient; for one of the objections was —
Οὐκ ἀληθῆ: —
"the representation is not conformable to truth." But this, perhaps, may be considered as falling under the charge of
ἄλογον. For he, who accuses a Poet of departing from nature, experience, and the
οἷα ἦν, ἢ ἔστι, says, in other words, it is improbable, incredible, absurd, &c. Or, when this objection was relative to truth of another sort—to theological truth, as violated by the poetic representations of the Gods, it then came, properly, under the
βλαβερόν; it was of immoral and pernicious tendency. And thus we find Plato objecting continually to the theology of Homer; sometimes, as not true—
ΟΥΚ ΑΛΗΘΗ
53
; sometimes, as hurtful—
τοῖς ἀκούουσι ΒΛΑΒΕΡΑ
54
.
The objections answered by considerations drawn from the diction, (Sect. 5.) appear to be all reducible to one or other of these five sources.
260.
mvp-aristotle-comment-260
NOTE 260.
25.32
P. 131. OR, OF IMMORAL TENDENCY.
Βλαβερά: i. e. hurtful on account of their immoral tendency. So the word is used by
Plato
; to whose objections, and to the very language in which he expresses them, Aristotle so frequently alludes. Censuring the immoral tendency of some of Homer's representations of his hero Achilles, Plato says—
Οὔθ’ ὅσια ταῦτα, οὔτ’ ἀληθῆ· καὶ μὴν τοῖς γε ἀκούουσι ΒΛΑΒΕΡΑ. The reason follows:
πᾶς γὰρ ἑαυτῷ συγγνώμην ἕξει, κακῷ ὄντι, πεισθεὶς, ὡς ἄρα τοιαῦτα πράττουσί ΤΕ καὶ ἔπραττον "Οἱ θεῶν ἀγχίσποροι." Ὧν ἕνεκα, παυστέον τοὺς τοιούτους μύθους, μὴ ἡμῖν πολλὴν εὐχέρειαν ἐντίκτωσι τοῖς νέοις, πονηρίας.
De Rep. III. p. 176, ed. Mass.
Compare the precept,
cap. xv.
about making the character as morally good as possible
55
; and see
NOTE 108
. It is obvious however to observe, that when the
μοχθηρία, the villainy of a character, is overcharged, it brings with it its own antidote. Such characters as
Iago
56
, or Glenalvon, can be
βλαβερά to no reader or spectator. They excite only pure and unmitigated disgust. Not all the art of the Poet, or the charms of Poetry, can cheat us into any degree of sympathy with them, even for the moment in which they are speaking. We feel, there, no such struggle between immoral approbation and moral indignation, as
Dr. Johnson
has described, in his observations upon the different effects produced on the spectator, by the villainy of Rowe's
Lothario, and that of Richardson's
Lovelace. The passage is so much to the purpose of this note, so justly thought, and so well expressed, that I am persuaded I shall gratify the reader by transcribing it.
"The character of Lothario seems to have been expanded by Richardson into Lovelace; but he has excelled his original in the moral effect of the fiction. Lothario, with gaiety which cannot be hated, and bravery which cannot be despised, retains too much of the spectator's kindness. It was in the power of Richardson alone to teach us at once esteem and detestation, to make virtuous resentment overpower all the benevolence which wit, and elegance, and courage, naturally excite, and to lose at last the hero in the villain."
57
261.
mvp-aristotle-comment-261
NOTE 261.
25.32
P. 131. OR AS CONTRARY TO TECHNICAL ACCURACY.
—
Παρὰ τὴν ὀρθότητα, τὴν κατὰ τέχνην. Most of the commentators understand the art of Poetry itself. But, if I am right in the explanation I have given,
NOTE 233
, of the expression,
πρὸς αὐτὴν τὴν τέχνην, the sense of the expression here must be the same.
58
I understand Aristotle to mean, the rightness, not of Poetry itself, but of other arts, which may be incidentally the subject of the Poetry; and the words, I think, express the source, or
εἶδος, as he terms it, of objections relative to all faults
κατὰ συμβεβηκός, as opposed to those, which he distinguishes by the various expressions of,
ἁμαρτίαι καθ’ ἑαυτὴν, &c.
The other interpretation of the words is fairly liable, I think, to the following objections.
1. If we understand the poetic art itself to be meant, then the objection to faults
κατὰ συμβεβηκός — to impossibilities and inaccuracies with respect to other arts and sciences — will be entirely omitted in this enumeration. This is very improbable, considering how common a source of critical censure this was. For while, on the one hand, the extravagant admirers of Homer made no scruple to assert, that his Poems contained the principles of all arts and sciences; on the other, we know how eagerly the Zoilists caught at every apparent inaccuracy of this kind; and, particularly, with respect to his geography. One instance, at least, of this sort of cavil, we have in this chapter: the censure of the passage,
Οἴη δ’ ἄμμορος,
Il. Σ. 489
, fell on Homer's ignorance of astronomy.
59
2. By the manner in which Aristotle here mentions, first, the five sources of critical censures, and then, immediately, the twelve sources of
λύσεις or answers, it is plain, I think, that he means answers to those censures, and to all of them. But this cannot be the case, if we understand essential faults in the Poetry itself, or bad imitation: for this admits of no answer, but a direct denial of the fact. Whereas, if we understand incidental errors in other arts, all will be consistent; and every fault enumerated will find its answer in some of the
λύσεις, which had been pointed out in the preceding part of the chapter, and are referred to in this enumeration.
3. If the art here mentioned be the art of Poetry itself, and the faults against that art be, as I understand them to be, essential faults, faults which constitute bad Poetry, i. e. in Aristotle's view, bad imitation, this plainly implies, that the four other faults enumerated are not essential, but accidental faults;
κατὰ συμβεβηκός. But, that such faults as improbability, and immorality, (
ἄλογα, βλαβερά,) which had just before been singled out from the rest, as
ὀρθαὶ ἐπιτιμήσεις—as the most solid objections, and such as admitted of no excuse—that these should be considered by Aristotle as faults merely incidental, not to be objected to the Poetry itself, not affecting the merit of the imitation,
καθ’ ΕΑΥΤΗΝ ἁμαρτίαι, is what, as I have before said, I cannot easily conceive.
60
The expression itself—
παρὰ τὴν ὀρθότητα τὴν κατὰ τέχνην, is indeed ambiguous; and they, who prefer the sense which I have rejected, will perhaps think it favoured by the similar expression, clearly applied to faults against the art of Poetry itself, in the passage, —
ποτέρων ἐστὶ τὸ ἁμάρτημα, τῶν ΚΑΤΑ ΤΗΝ ΤΕΧΝΗΝ, ἢ κατ’ ἄλλο συμβεβηκός. The expressions, however, are not exactly the same. There, it is,
κατὰ ΤΗΝ τέχνην—
"against the art:" here, —
κατὰ τέχνην—
"contrary to the rectitude of art." — But Aristotle had before used an expression, that seemed still more strongly to point at the art of Poetry:
τὰ πρὸς ΑΥΤΗΝ ΤΗΝ ΤΕΧΝΗΝ ἀδύνατα: which, however, it seems necessary, for the reasons given in NOTE 233, to understand in the same sense, which I have here given to
κατὰ τέχνην. But that passage, and indeed this whole chapter, is, in its present state, so full of obscurity and ambiguity, that every interpretation which can be given must necessarily be, in a great measure, conjectural and disputable. All I can venture to be confident of is, that my explanation of this passage is consistent with my explanation of the other; and that either both are right, or both are wrong.
262.
mvp-aristotle-comment-262
NOTE 262.
25.32
P. 131. THE ANSWERS, WHICH ARE TWELVE, &C.
How the different
Λύσεις or solutions proposed throughout the chapter are reducible to 12, and which are the 12 that Aristotle meant, are questions, which the defective state of the original renders it very difficult, if not impossible, to answer, with any certainty. And indeed the matter is of so little importance, that it is by no means worth while to enter into any examination of the various modes of reckoning, by which different expositors have endeavoured to solve the problem.
Victorius
, indeed, is so wise, as to give up the attempt. It will be very easy however, and therefore, I hope, not very foolish, just to enumerate all the
λύσεις, which actually have been mentioned in the chapter, in the order in which they occur, and then to examine, by way of experiment, whether they are any way reducible to twelve.
1.
τυγχάνει τοῦ τέλους, τοῦ αὑτῆς. — i. e. The end of Poetry is better answered, &c.
2.
κατὰ συμβεβηκός — The fault is incidental.
3. —
οἷα δεῖ, (or,
βέλτιον) — It is what is best, or what should be.
4. —
οἷα φασὶ, (or,
οἷα δοκεῖ) — It is according to general opinion.
5. —
οἷα ἦν, ἢ ἔστιν (or,
οὕτως εἶχεν, or,
ἀληθῆ) — to truth.
[6.
σκεπτέον εἰς τὸν πράττοντα, πρὸς ὅν, ὅτε, &c.] — [Consider circumstances.]
7.
Γλώττῃ — Defend, by the foreign sense of the word.
8. —
Μεταφορᾷ — by Metaphor.
9.
κατὰ Προσῳδίαν — by Accent.
10. —
Διαιρέσει — by Punctuation.
11. —
Ἀμφιβολίᾳ — by Ambiguity.
12.
κατὰ τὸ ἔθος τῆς λέξεως — by Customary speech.
13. —
Ποσαχῶς ἂν σημήνειε or,
καθ’ ὁμωνυμίαν — by the different senses of a word.
[14. —
Γλαύκωνος λύσις] — [Glauco's answer.]
[15.
εἰκὸς, καὶ παρὰ τὸ εἰκὸς γίνεσθαι] — [Probable, that many things should happen improbably.]
[16. —
Οὐ τὸ αὐτὸ, ἢ οὐ πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ, &c.] [The same thing is not spoken of, or, not in the same respect, &c.]
Here are, then, 16 different answers. Of these, it seems, upon the whole, most probable, that the 12 not enclosed in brackets, are the 12 which Aristotle means. My reason is, that in the beginning of the chapter, after laying down the three distinct considerations, of the different objects of imitation, the privileges of poetical language, and the distinction of essential and incidental faults, he immediately, and explicitly, refers to those three principles, as sources of all the answers.
Ὥστε δεῖ τὰ ἐπιτιμήματα — ΕΚ ΤΟΥΤΩΝ ἐπισκοποῦντα ΛΥΕΙΝ. Now it will be found, I believe, that the 12 answers above mentioned are drawn from those sources, and that the four remaining answers are not.
But why these four, which evidently are proposed as answers, and seem to be distinct answers, were not admitted in the concluding enumeration, it may not be easy to shew. Perhaps, Aristotle reckoned only as one solution, the two which he assigns to the same objection, with an
ἢ, or
οὕτως τε καὶ, &c. This would throw out Nos 14, and 15, which seem, indeed, to be mentioned only as a sort of secondary or subsidiary answers. As to Nos 6, and 16, he might consider them as one; both of them, in fact, saying the same thing, and nearly in the same words—i. e.
"circumstances must be considered." Still however, taking these together as one answer, that answer will be supernumerary; and how it is fairly to be got rid of, it is difficult to see: the more difficult, because it is the only
λύσις furnished by the whole chapter to the objection of immoral tendency, (
βλαβερά,) upon which so great stress is laid.
All that seems tolerably clear is, that the 12 answers intended in the recapitulation are those 12, which are deducible from the three principles laid down at the opening of the chapter. In this idea, which I had formed before I consulted any commentator, I was glad to find myself supported by
Goulston
, in his accurate analysis; where he makes the 12 answers to be those here assigned, and draws them from the three sources at the beginning of the chapter: viz. three from the first source, (Nos 3, 4, 5,) — seven from the second — the diction, (Nos 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13,) and two from the third source, (Nos 1 and 2.)
25.2.
mvp-aristotle-comment-110
25.6
LIKE SOPHOCLES WHO SAID HE DREW HIS CHARACTERS AS THEY OUGHT TO BE, AND EURIPIDES AS THEY REALLY WERE.
BISHOP HURD, in a note on verse 317 of Horace's Epistle to the Pifos, has given a sense to this passage different from its usual acceptation, and which I had inferted in the first edition of my tranflation. But I think Mr. Twining has clearly confuted this opinion as to the particular [c] application of it here. But of this I shall leave the reader to judge for himself, by laying the reasoning of both before him. The bishop of Worcester, after citing this sentence of Ariftotle proceeds. ، ، ، The meaning of this is, Sophocles from his more extended commerce with mankind had enlarged and widened the narrow partial conception arifing from the contemplation of particular characters, into a complete comprehenfion of the kind. Whereas the philofophic Euripides, having been mostly conversant in the academy, when he came to look into life, keeping his eye too intent on single really exifting perfonages, funk the kind in the individual, and so painted his [c] For the particular purpose of the bishop's note, which is to discriminate between general and particular characters, as objects of the drama, and especially of comedy, nothing can be more accurate and conclufive than the reasoning. characters,
، characters, naturally indeed and truly with regard to the objects in ⚫ view, but fometimes without that general and universally striking like- * ness which is demanded to the full exhibition of poetical truth. 66. • According to this interpretation, To this Mr. Twining answers. • which I am taking the liberty to examine, Sophocles is made to an- • swer the charge [D] by denying its truth: for the answer as here stated agreeable to truth" because they are • will be this. You say my representations are not true, and those of Euripides are true. I deny this. You use the term improperly. My • representations are " If you would have men " from wide observation, from human nature at large;" those of Euripides are not agreeable to truth because they are representations not of • the kind but of individuals. The answer, as I understand Ariftotle, • is very different. The charge is not denied, or explained away, but • admitted and justified. Sophocles says, “ " "collected represented as they are, διοι ἔισι, you must go to Euripides. I have not drawn them so. I never intended to draw them fo; I have done " better. I have delineated mankind not fuch as they really are, but " such as they ought to be." Euripides does not appear to have been charged by those objectors with what may be termed, individual impropriety of imitation, but with too close and portrait-like delineation • of general nature. In short, the difference which I understand to be here intended between the two poets cannot be better expressed than by the ingenious commentator himself in the beginning of the note to which I refer, where it is observed, (page 253) that “ truth may followed too closely in works of imitation, as is evident in two ، ، ، " ... it is respects. For, 1. the artist, when he would give a copy of nature, [D] For not defcribing things according to truth.. " may
POETIC OF ARISTOTLE. may confine himself too fcrupulously to the exhibition of particulars, " and so fail of representing the idea of the kind. Or, 2. in applying " himself to give the general idea, he may collect it from an enlarged "view of real life, whereas it were still better taken from the nobler " conception of it as subsisting only in the mind." Now if we apply • the latter of these differences to the two poets in question, if we fay " In applying himself to give the general idea, Euripides collected it " from an enlarged view of real life, whereas Sophocles took it from " the nobler conception of it as subsisting only in the mind;" this • will express exactly what I take to be the sense of Aristotle. To the support which the common interpretation of this passage receives from • Aristotle himself, may be added that which it receives, and I believe • is generally acknowledged to receive, from the tragedies themselves, • which are extant of the two poets in question. That Euripides is in ، general liable to the censure of particular imitation of “ sinking the "kind in the individual," I cannot say I have observed. But who can • read this poet without observing the examples with which he every • where abounds of that very general and universally striking like- " ness which is demanded to the full exhibition of poetical truth." In Sophocles we find more elevation, more dignity, more of that improved likeness and ideal perfection which the philosopher expresses by his ὁία δεῖ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον. In Euripides we find more of the ἀληθὲς, the ὅμοιον. We are oftener reminded of the common nature and common life, which we fee all around us. And if this with other ⚫ causes be sometimes found to lower the imitations of this poet beneath • the proper level of tragic dignity, and to produce something of the κωμωδία τίς ἠθολογεμένη, which Longinus attributes to the Odyssey, the * fault is amply redeemed, perhaps in those very parts by the pleasure * which results from the closeness and obviousness of the imitation. 3 T certainly
، certainly in many others by those precious touches of nature which • must at once strike every individual of every audience; such as if I ⚫ mistake not are much more rarely to be found in Sophocles, and ' such perhaps, after all we have heard about the BEAU IDEAL and ، improved nature, can only be produced by an exact transcript of nature as it is, of what the poet has actually felt himself, and actually seen in others.' This reasoning appears to me unanswerable. That for the purposes of the drama at least, if not for every species of poetry which professes to imitate human actions; a comprehenfive view of real character is much superior to this image of perfection in the mind, is to me evident beyond a doubt, and seems founded on the superiority of truth, to unnatural fiction, exemplified in such characters as Tom Jones and Amelia, when contrasted with Grandison and Clarifsa. It must be remembered also, though it does not seem to have occurred to the bishop, that Aristotle is not drawing a parallel between the two tragic poets here, neither does he here or elsewhere give any shew of preferring Sophocles to Euripides, but rather the contrary; for he has in another place allowed Euripides the merit of attaining the end of tragedy more effectually than [E] any other poet. A compliment of no common magnitude, as it is on the same principle that in the next chapter he finally determines the superiority of tragedy over the epopee. Besides in this chapter, Aristotle is not pointing out beauties, but thewing how faults may be palliated. [E] Chap. XIII. Τραγικώτατος τῶν ποιητῶν. It
POETIC OF ARISTOTLE. It is impossible for the English reader to go through Mr. Twining's note without seeing how applicable the parallel between the two Greek tragic poets is to the father of the British drama and our other best tragic writers, as also the French dramatic poets. Substitute Shakespear for Euripides, and Thomson or Voltaire for Sophocles, and the criticifm will be equally just.
25.3.
mvp-aristotle-comment-111
25.7
IF IT DOES NOT COME UNDER EITHER OF HESE DESCRIPTIONS HE MAY SAY IT IS ACCORDING TO RECEIVED OPINION, AS IN WHAT RELATES TO THE GODS.
IF the objection to the poet is, that he has not drawn his characters conformable with truth, and he can neither shew that they are according to truth, or that the deviation from truth is occafioned by a defire to represent characters above the level of human nature, he may yet excuse himself by saying, that he has followed models, which, though they may neither have an archetype in nature, or be better than perhaps they really are, nevertheless have the sanction of popular opinion for their credibility. This seems to have been exactly the cafe with Homer's gods; and the popularity of Shakespear's supernatural beings rests on the fame ground even at this day, when the belief of them is nearly annihilated. How entirely has Shakespear availed himself of a vulgar fuperstition in his Ghost of Hamlet which first appears, ' the bell then beating one,' and which vanishes at the crowing of the cock. And with what propriety, according to the fabulous creed of his age, and which is still orthodox in the regions of fiction, has he distinguished the 3 T2 fairies
fairies from the more gloomy tenants of the invisible world in these beautiful lines. Night's swift dragons cut the clouds full fast, • And yonder shines Aurora's harbinger, At whose approach ghosts wandering here and there Troop home to church yards. -Damned spirits all • That in cross ways and floods have burial, ، Already to their wormy beds are gone.'
• But we are spirits of another fort:
• I with the morning's love have oft made sport, • And like a forefter the groves may tread • Even till the eastern gate all fiery red, ، Opening on Neptune with fair blessed beams, • Turns into yellow gold his falt green streams.'
25.4.
mvp-aristotle-comment-112
25.8
OR PERHAPS IT MAY BE SAID THAT THE FACT WAS ACTUALLY SO AT THAT TIME.
IF the poet has so managed as to represent the customs of the time in which the action of his poem is supposed to have passed, however contrary they may be to those of his own age, so far from needing an excuse it will itself be strong proof of merit. In this the excellence of Homer, as a just imitator of the manners of the age he wrote on, is Thewn by a particular instance. (F) In his own time the art of horfe- [F] See Pope's Essay on Homer's battles. manship
POETIC OF ARISTOTLE. manship was arrived at a pitch of perfection capable of rivalling the exploits of Hughes and Astley. But though in his fifteenth Iliad, ν. 679, (ν. 822 of Pope's tranflation) when he speaks in his own person he does not fcruple to compare Ajax leaping from deck to deck of the Grecian vessels to a skilful horfeman, who manages [G] four horses at a time, leaping occafionally from the back of one to the other; yet in defcribing the different evolutions of the field he never puts his warriors on horfeback, but always represents them as fighting from chariots. But the excuse which Ariftotle means to make is from the poet's representing things as they were at the time while he was writing, which, as far as they differ only from the time of the criticism, is allowable; but if they differ from the practice of the time concerning which the poet is writing, they are excusable only on the fame principle with the objections mentioned in the first note on this chapter. Virgil has been guilty of this fault in the very circumstance just mentioned of the horfemanship of Homer's heroes. For Afcanius is represented as an expert horseman soon after he is at Carthage. Our Shakespear is too often guilty of this fault, and is apt to make the customs of all ages and countries congenial with those of his own. [G] Pope has entirely destroyed the difficulty of this manœuvre by saying they were Four fair coursers practised to obey." Here is an instance, it is true, of the sense and spirit of the original facrificed to rhyme; but could not Pope have done better when a very inferior rhymist might have written, • So when some man, the courser skill'd to rein, • Four steeds selecting from a num'rous train, • To the full city from th' extended mead, • Impels their flight, and urges on their speed.' When
When however he only incurs the censure made by hypercriticism, and to which the candor of Aristotle here furnishes an answer, he affords fometimes entertainment and sometimes difficulty to the antiquarian. We learn that in the days of Queen Elizabeth rooms of state were strewed with rushes, and we hear with furprize, that the [H] dagger was used for breaking heads, as we now speak of a cudgel. How abfurd will the equestrian expedition of Sophia and her maid appear to future readers, who shall not know that in the year 1745 poft chaises, which became very foon after so universal, were hardly if at all used. I do not exactly know when two-wheeled chaises (now entirely laid afide) were partially introduced from France, but I very well remember the first four-wheel chaise that run post, introduced by March of Maidenhead-bridge, at least eight years fince the era of Tom Jones. There is a passage in the Spectator that may probably puzzle our pofterity, who will hear fo much of the exclusive merit of English gardening and its comparative excellence and diftinguishing character when opposed to the fame art among our neighbours, from the writers of the present day. • We have before observed, that there is generally in nature something more grand and august than what we meet with in the curiofities of art. When therefore we see this imitated in any measure it gives us a [H] The old English dagger must have something resembled a stick with a tuck at the end of it, as in Grofe's account of ancient armour, one of the uses ascribed to it in miliof faftening tary service is to be stuck in the ground for the purpose a horse to it.
• nobler
POETIC OF ARISTOTLE. ⚫ nobler and more exalted kind of pleasure than what we receive from • the nicer and more accurate productions of art: on this account our • English gardens are not so entertaining to the fancy as those in France • and Italy, where we fee a large extent of ground covered over with an ، . agreeable mixture of garden and foreft, which represent every where an artificial rudeness, much more charming than that neatness and elegancy which we meet with in those of our own country. - • Our British gardeners instead of humouring nature love to deviate • from it as much as possible. Our trees rise in cones, globes and pyra- ، mids. We see the marks of the scissars upon every plant and bush.' SPECTATOR, No. 414, by ADDISON. Pope's Epistle to Lord Burlington will appear equally furprizing.
25.5.
mvp-aristotle-comment-113
25.9
IN EXAMINING WHETHER A THING IS EITHER SAID OR DONE PROPERLY OR IMPROPERLY, WE ARE NOT ONLY TO REGARD WHETHER THE THING ITSELF IS GOOD OR BAD; BUT WE MUST CONSIDER THE CHARACTER OF THE ACTOR OR SPEAKER.
IF it is neceffary for the poet to introduce vicious persons, it is also necessary for him to make them speak and act in character, and no blame can be incurred from this if the character is so marked, and the expressions so introduced, as to shew they are not the real opinion of the poet [1]. [1] See Note IV. Chap. XII. Dr..
، Dr. Beattie, who censures a fault of this kind in Cowley, and another in Dryden's tranflation of Virgil, makes this judicious distinction. 'But ، if instruction may be drawn from the speeches and behaviour of Milton's devils, of Shakespeare's Macbeth, and of Virgil's Mezentius, Why is Cowley blamed for a phrase which at worst implies only a • flight fally of momentary pride (K)? I answer, that to speak serioufly the language of intemperate paffion is one thing, to imitate or defcribe it another. By the former, one can never merit praise or esteem; by the latter, one may merit much praise and do much good. In the one • cafe we recommend intemperate passions by our example, in the other we may render them odious by displaying their absurdity and consequences. To the greater part of his readers an author cannot convey • either pleasure or instruction by delivering sentiments as his own, which contradict the general confcience of mankind.' ESSAY ON POETRY AND MUSIC, Part 1. Chap. 1. If impious and immoral sentiments are put into the mouth of a virtuous character, the same fault is incurred perhaps rather in a higher degree. Since what a man says or even writes himself may be supposed to proceed from paffion; but sentiments that he makes a good man pronounce he will be imagined to approve from principle. In the Tatler, No. 122, by Addison, the circumstance is mentioned of Socrates quitting the theatre when a tragedy of Euripides was performing, on account of the following line being spoken by Hippolytus, [K] The following are the exceptionable lines of Cowley that are alluded to. • What shall I do to be for ever known, ، And make the age to come my own? ، I shall like beafts or common people die, • Unless you write my elegy." • My
POETIC OF ARISTOTLE. [L] 'My tongue has sworn indeed, but not my heart.' On which the following remark is made: 'Had a person of a vicious * character made such a speech, it might have been allowed as a proper representation of the baseness of his thoughts; but such an expression ، out of the mouth of the virtuous Hippolytus was giving a fanction to • falshood, and establishing perjury by a maxim. But a sentence grossly impious, by whomsoever spoken, will so far affect the feelings of an audience in any country, where religion is at all held in veneration, that they will instantly be shocked. Plutarch mentions a circumftance of this kind in his Dialogue on Love. • You have • certainly heard with what tumult [M] Euripides was received when he * opened his tragedy of (N) Menalippe in this manner: [0] " I know not Jove, or know him for my foe." And other daring expressions. On which account, when he wrote • out and corrected the piece, he changed the verse in the manner it now stands. [1.] Η γλῶσσ᾽ ὀμώμοχ᾽, ἡ δὲ φρὴν ἀνώμοτος. [M] An anecdote something fimilar is told of Æschylus. See Note IV. Chap. XII. [N] The speech of this lady is in Chap. xv. mentioned by Ariftotle as an instance of impropriety of manners. The story of the drama is very fingular: she has children by Neptune, whom her father taking for the unnatural produce of his cows is going to destroy. On which Menalippe makes a long speech to shew him that, on the principles of philosophy, they may be their natural offspring, and which Dionyfius of Halycarnassus says Euripides introduced on purpose to shew his knowledge in the philofophical tenets of Anaxagoras. [o] This verse is strangely mutilated in the original. I have followed the reading proposed by Xylander in his note on the passage. 3 U "What's
[P] "What's truly faid of Jove, and who he is, " I only know from fame." In the Alzire of Voltaire, Zamor fays to Alzire: • Perissent tes fermens & le Dieu qui J'abhorre." The shocking blafphemy of this verse, when we confider of whom it is spoken, whatever may be the situation of the speaker no English audience would tolerate; Hill in his tranflation has accordingly omitted it [].
25.6.
mvp-aristotle-comment-114
25.10
THE WORD MAY BE FOREIGN.
WE have already taken notice of the impoffibility of giving modern examples in serious compofition of this property of language, which confifted in transferring a word from one Grecian dialect to another. We may however illustrate in some degree this objection and its answer from what might happen in common difcourse. We will suppose a perfon to say, ، I would rather want my dinner than have it.' This is objected to as a contradiction. But the objector is answered, The • speaker is a Scotsiman, and to want, in the Scottish dialect, signifies simply to be without, and conveys no idea of wishing to possess, as it does in • English.' [P] This is fomething like the doctrine of Xenophanes, mentioned in this chapter. [2] For farther observations on this subject, see Note xvI. on this chapter. The
POETIC OF ARISTOTLE. The examples in the text are fufficiently clear; especially that of Dolon. Had he been deformed in body he could not have poffibly been so active as he is represented. The same objection may be made to the deformity of Richard 111. as he is described by Shakespear and the historians friendly to the house of Tudor; and goes far to justify the historic doubts of Walpole and (R) Buck. A modern general may command an army, however deficient in bodily strength and activity, provided he has good health. And an adımiral may command a fleet in an armed chair on the quarter deck; but a warrior with a withered arm and a distorted body, was ill calculated to turn the tide of battle in the wars between the houses of York and Lancaster; or to make the personal exertions Richard is said to have made in Bosworth-field.
25.7.
mvp-aristotle-comment-115
25.11
THE EXPRESSIONS MAY BE CONSIDERED AS METAPHORICAL.
HER E also the examples in the original are exactly equivalent with what we continually meet in our own language. We say, 'a thousand,' * a million,' for any indeterminate large number. The same of time: • all day,' ' a year,'' an age.' [R] An historian who wrote in the reign of James 1. and who strongly combats the opinion of Richard's deformity. 3 U2 NOTE
25.8.
mvp-aristotle-comment-116
25.12
SOMETIMES THE OBJECTION MAY BE ANSWERED BY ATTENDING TO THE ACCENT.
THE sense of a word is seldom materially changed by the accent in English [s]. Substantives and verbs are sometimes so diftinguished, as ' cónverse,' and ' to converse;' ' convert,' and ' to convért.' Yet some words are entirely changed in fignification by the accent, as 'gállant, and 'gallant;'' piquet,' the game, and the ' píquet,' of an encamped battalion. [s] Ariftotle, in his Treatise De Sophisticis Elenchis, L. 1. Chap. Iv. where he treats of this effect of accent as to creating doubts, and illustrates it by the fame examples, makes this very curious remark. Παρὰ δὲ τὴν προσωδίαν ἐν μὲν τοις ἄνευ γραφῆς διαλεκλικοις ἐ ῥάδιον ποῖησαι λέγον· ἐν δὲ τοῖς γεγραμμέναις κὶ ποιήμασι μάλλον. • It is not easy to make a • fallacy by the accent in arguments not written, but rather in written language and poetry." From this it is obvious, that in the time of Ariftotle Greek was spoken by accent, and that the accents were not marked in writing, nor apparent in the recitation of verse; that is, I imagine, in the recitation of Greek verse, accent was lost in the superior momentum given to quantity, as in Latin verse, and even in Greek verse as we now read it, quantity is lost
in the superior momentum we give to Latin accentuation. NOTE
25.9.
mvp-aristotle-comment-117
25.13
OBJECTIONS MAY BE CONFUTED BY THE DIVISION OF THE SENTENCE.
THAT is the punctuation. Shakespear has strongly exemplified this in his prologue to the clown's play in Midsummer Night's Dream. [T] Mr. Sheridan has pointed out many instances of this breach of propriety in his Treatise on Elocution, which are frequently made by the clergy in the usual mode of reading the Liturgy. One is very common, even among good readers, which, befides offending greatly against euphony, makes nonsense of the passage. I mean in the prayer for the King. • Our most gracious sovereign lord King George.' This is commonly read with a stop after sovereign, making it a substantive, and giving his majesty a ridiculous title, something like that of a duke's younger fon. The stop should be obviously after lord, making sovereign an adjective. Our sovereign lord, the King, is the general legal defignation of his majesty. Turn to a common prayer book of Queen Anne, and the abfurdity will be still more striking. I have heard fome careless readers in the prayer for the Prince read, ‘George Prince of Wales, exactly as if they were speaking of a private inhabitant of the principality. The following line of Pope, • And make immortal verse as mean as mine,' [T] See Note IV. Chap. xIx. will
will have opposite meanings, according to the position of the stop, after ' immortal,' or construction. ، verse,' which last by the way is the most natural
25.10.
mvp-aristotle-comment-118
25.14
OR BY AMBIGUOUS EXPRESSIONS.
ARISTOTLE explains his meaning fully as to this, in his Treatise DE SOPHISTICIS ELENCHIS, L. 1. Chap. Iv. He clearly there shews, as Mr. Twining fays, that by ambiguity ([υ] ἀμφιβολία) he designs such different senses, as two or more words are capable of independently of their punctuation. As juxta-position is the principal sign of connexion in English, it is difficult to give instances of this, independent [x] of the punctuation. The example given by the philosopher in the place above cited, τὸ βέλεσθαι λαβεῖν με τοὺς πολεμίους. ' Velle capere me hoftes,' it is impossible to tranflate into English, and preserve the ambiguity, which confifts in its being doubtful whether it expresses a wish that I should take, or be taken by the enemy [Y]. Perhaps the best instance that can be given of this kind of ambiguity in English, is the promiscuous use [z] of 'he,' ' him,' ' she,' ' her,' [U] The French have naturalized the Greek word, AMPHIBOLOGIE. [x] See Note v1. Chap. xxII. [Y] In Home's Elements of Criticism, Chap. XVIII. Sect. II. many instances of ambiguity are cited from English writers, but most of them may be made clear by the punctuation [z] See Encyclopedie, Article AMPHIBOLOGIE. Such an expression as, he fights him- › self,' comes under this class exactly. when
5.19 POETIC OF ARISTOTLE. when a number of persons are spoken of, and which occafion the frequent, though necessary repetition of he the said A. B.' in our deeds and law proceedings. Sometimes however in our verse an alteration of the usual arrangement of the words, will create an ambiguity that punctuation cannot elucidate. An instance occurs in a translation I have feen of two lines of the fifth book of Ovid's Metamorphoses. ، Now Actor's fon, whose hands a pole-ax wield, Without a fword the gallant Perfeus kill'd.' Taking these verses by themselves it would appear that the fon of Actor had killed Perfeus, both from the position of the words, and the circumstance of the pole-axe. From the advantage the Latin has of diftinguishing the governing and governed cafe by the termination, no such ambiguity appears in the original. • At non Actoriden Erithen, cui lata bipennis • Telum erat, admoto petit enfe.' There is a striking instance in Thomson's tragedy of Tancred and Sigifmunda, where the construction of the sentence and the sense are in opposition to each other. Sigifmunda says, • Retire! for tho' th' emotions of my HEART Can ne'er alarm my VIRTUE; yet, alas! • They tear IT so, they pierce IT with such anguish, Oh, 'tis too much! I cannot bear the conflict!' Here the conftruction points to VIRTUE, but the sense obviously to HEART as the antecedent of IT. NOTE
25.11.
mvp-aristotle-comment-119
25.15
OR BY THE ESTABLISHED CUSTOM OF SPEECH, AS-ARTIFICERS IN STEEL ARE CALLED BRAZIERS.
ON the fame principle we call actors of comedy and tragedy equally [A] comedians. And we also use gold for money in general. May not we infer our fuperior wealth from the circumstance of this being peculiar to ourselves. All the other nations of Europe, with whose language I am at all acquainted, using silver in the same sense. • I have no filver,' would be a very unfaithful translation of ' Je n'ai point d'argent.' In Latin, æs, (brass) is equivalent with money.
25.12.
mvp-aristotle-comment-120
25.16
IT IS RIGHT ALSO, WHEN A WORD SEEMS TO BE CAPABLE OF GIVING CONTRARY SENSES, TO EXAMINE HOW MANY SIGNI- FICATIONS IT MAY HAVE IN THE PASSAGE BEFORE US.
THE reader who has honored me with his attention thus far, will be at no loss for examples of this fort of solution. The various commentators on Shakespear afford numerous instances. I will select one from Hamlet. • Let the devil wear black for I'll have a suit of fables.' Now the word sables may have two contradictory senses here. It may mean mourning as in the passage from Maffinger, quoted by Farmer; or it may mean a [A] See Note [c] Chap. III. on the tranflation. rich
POETIC OF ARISTOTLE. rich dress, as in Malone's quotation from Ben Jonfon. The word is capable of either sense in the passage before us. The very contradiction it appears to convey in the first sense, is not unlikely to be the intent of a man who is counterfeiting madness: and on the other hand, a dress made of the skins of the animal, would be a very proper habit for the climate of Denmark, especially at a season of the year when Hamlet, Horatio and the soldiers complain much of the severity of the cold. As to which meaning is the most probable here, • Who shall decide when doctors disagree?' But I am inclined to think with Mr. Farmer, that it is meant to be equivocal. [B] Hamlet though he affected to be mad was not really fo. Therefore he might with to speak sense, and at the fame time give it the appearance of nonsense. [B] It must be confefsed Shakespear has not been very careful in keeping up this distinction throughout the play. See Note v. Chap. xv. Since I wrote the above I have met with another passage in this play, which, if the word is not equivocal, appears to confirm the first sense. Hamlet enquiring of Horatio about the ghost; afks impatiently • His beard was grizzled? No?' Horatio answers, It was, as I have seen it in his life, 'A SABLE filver'd.' 3 X NOTE
25.13.
mvp-aristotle-comment-121
25.17
SOME MEN TAKING UP AN OPINION HASTILY, AND THEN REA- SONING FROM PREJUDICE IN FAVOUR OF THAT OPINION, WILL BLAME ANY THING THAT IS CONTRARY TO WHAT THEY HAVE PRE-SUPPOSED.
THIS position of Glauco is compleatly illustrated by the example in the text. Most of the erroneous opinions of the commentators on the work before us arise from the fame cause; especially many of the French dramatic rules, which are said to be taken from Aristotle, when in fact they are not. The depreciating the valor of Achilles, as if Homer had made him invulnerable, comes under this predicament [c].
25.14.
mvp-aristotle-comment-122
25.19
THE IMPOSSIBLE SHOULD BE CONSIDERED AS CONDUCING ON THE WHOLE EITHER TO THE END, WHICH IT IS THE AIM OF POETRY TO ATTAIN, OR TO EXCELLENCE OF CHARACTER, OR AS BEING AGREEABLE TO RECEIVED OPΙΝΙΟΝ.
I IMAGINE Aristotle alludes here to the pursuit of Hector in the Iliad, which he has twice mentioned as incurring this blame, and that he is now shewing us on what principles it may be vindicated. [C] Note VII. Chap. xv. First,
POETIC OF ARISTOTLE. First, It conduces to the main end of poetry, the production of interest, [D] for we must be more interested for the event of a single combat than the destruction of one person by superior numbers; and such a circumstance will afford greater variety and produce greater effect in the detail. Secondly, The character of Achilles, in point of courage at least, if not [E] of conduct, will be raised; and the valor and address of both combatants will be shewn in a more confpicuous light. It is impoffible for contempt of inevitable death to be more strongly expressed than in the two lines uttered by Achilles after the dying prophecy of Hector. • Die thou the first-when Jove and heav'n ordain, • I follow thee.' [F] And thirdly, As to its being agreeable to received opinion, it is very possible it might be fo; and we may safely give it credit on the authority of the Stagirite. Our modern novel writers are sometimes apt to carry the second excuse a little too far, and favor us with perfect monsters. Sir Charles Grandifon is a much more improbable character than Caliban. The. [D] 'Even in comic composition expreffions, though sometimes falling into the improbable, ← become probable from exciting laughter, as this, "he possessed an estate no bigger than a. " Lacedæmonian's letter;" laughter being a paffion though a pleasing one... LONGINUS,, Sect. XXXVIII.. [E] Note v. Chap. xxiv.. [F] Τέθναθι,-Κῆρα δ᾽ ἐγὼ τότε δέξομαι ὑππότε κεν δὴ Ζεὺς ἐθέλη τελέσαι, ἠδ'᾽ ἀθάναλοι θεὸι ἄλλοι. 3 X 2 manners
manners of Caliban, for what we know, may be very natural for a being composed of a witch and a fiend; but we immediately know the manners of Sir Charles Grandison are perfectly unnatural in a mere man. Perfection of character, befides the objection [G] formerly made to it, will always be infipid and uninteresting. I am inclined to think the Helen of Zeuxis, if it were composed, as we are told it was, from a selection of the best features of the most beautiful women of Greece, could not be a very interesting piece. The Abbe Terrasson, who seems to push the idea of perfection as far as it can reasonably go, speaking of the Telemachus, which he praises above all other epopees for drawing so excellent a character of a young hero, adds, 'The epic hero being proposed as a model for imitation, it is not allowable to elevate him above human nature. We may leave him flight failings which may even sometimes draw him into misfortunes, • if we chuse it, in the course of the poem. I have not therefore faid, ' that the hero of the epopee should be perfectly virtuous. I have only • said that he ought to be essentially virtuous.' [G] Note III. Chap. XIII. NOTE
25.15.
mvp-aristotle-comment-123
25.21
AS TO THE WAY IN WHICH CONTRADICTIONS MAY BE AN- SWERED, THEY SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN THE SAME LIGHT AS CONFUTATIONS IN AN ARGUMENT. WE SHOULD OBSERVE IF THE SAME THINGS ARE SPOKEN OF, OR TO THE SAME PERSON, OR IN THE SAME MANNER.
THIS seems to be extending the same principle to account for and excuse contradictions, that is employed before (see note v. on this chapter) to excuse sentiments that seem immoral. As there the immorality is no fault unless carried to a great excess, if it proceeds from an immoral character apparently shewn so, who will not interest us in his favor; fo here contradictions in opinion will be proper or improper according to the manners and sentiments of the speaker. In real life people see things in different lights according to their different habits, mode of education, or profession. A painter will not speak of a wood like a timber-merchant, or a mathematician deliver his opinion on Homer or Milton in the fame terms with a poet. This the composer of fictitious fable is to imitate; and indeed from the nice discrimination of this arises the variety of ferious, and the humour of comic poetry. Romeo and the Friar fhould not be affected in the fame manner at the appearance of Juliet. Prince Henry will not address his father, Percy, and Falstaff, in the same terms. Sincerity will not be expected from Iago, or wisdom from the mouth of Malvolio. Horace exemplifies this difference of sentiment arifing from difference of character in the epistle to the Pifos. ' Much
• Much boots the speaker's character to mark : . God, hero, grave old man, or hot young spark, • Matron, or busy nurse, who's used to roam • Trading abroad, or plows his field at home: • If Colchian or Affyrian fill the scene, • Theban or Argian note the shades between [H].' COLMAN.
25.16.
mvp-aristotle-comment-124
25.22
THE REPREHENSIONS OF IMPIETY AND ABSURDITY WILL IN- DEED BE JUST WHEN THEY ARE INTRODUCED WITHOUT NE- CESSITY.
ARISTOTLE gives examples of each. Of unnecessary absurdity from the Egeus of Euripides a few fragments only of which remain; and of impiety from the character of Menelaus in the Orestes of the fame poet, which he has already mentioned in the fifteenth chapter as an example of the fame. Dryden, in his tragedy of Tyrannic Love, has saved us the trouble of seeking for two instances, as the character of Maximin furnishes at the same time an example of both. We should be shocked at the blafphemies he utters, if their complete absurdity did not rather incline us to laugh. I hardly know a more ridiculous circumstance even [H] Intererit multum divusne loquatur an heros: Maturusne senex an adhuc florente juventâ Fervidus; an matrona potens an sedula nutrix, Mercatorne vagus cultorne virentis agelli, Colchus an Affyrius; Thebis nutritus an Argis. in
POETIC OF ARISTOTLE. in Tom Thumb, than occurs in one line. He has declared war with the gods, and being from custom betrayed into an oath immediately corrects himself. • Now by the gods!-By Maximin I mean.' The author of the Letters of Literature mentions [1] a new figure of rhetoric which he calls ἄνοια, or UTTER ABSURDITY, a figure which he shews by examples, many writers of high reputation have made a very free use of. (K) To the instances he gives may be added the conduct of Virgil in regard to Ascanius. In the second book of the Æneid he is a little boy accompanying his father. • Haud paffibus æquis.' • And with unequal paces tripp'd along.' DRYDEN. And in the third book Andromache, speaking of her own son, says to him, < O mihi fola mei super Astyanactis imago, Sic oculos, fic ille manus, fic ora ferebat • Et nunc æquali tecum pubefceret ævo.' • In thee my loft Astyanax I trace, • Such were his eyes, his form, his blooming face; } • Such now, had fate decreed, his manhood's ripening grace.' Again, Virgil in one part of his fourth book makes him a child in lap, and in another an active youth following the chace on a fiery courser, and wishing to encounter a wild boar or a lion. [1] Letter XXII. [K] See Curiosities of Literature, Article Virgil, printed for J. Murray, 1791. There
There is a striking instance of this figure in Tancred and Sigismunda. Sigifmunda is in despair at Tancred's supposed infidelity in forsaking her and offering his hand to Constantia, after having given her the strongest afsurances of unaltered attachment. At this juncture Siffredi comes in and presses his daughter to give her hand to Ofmond: and to overcome her reluctance at taking this step he tries to rouse her pride, and induce her to shew the king that her heart
• Disdains to wear • A chain that his has greatly thrown aside.' A very natural argument, and which prevails afterwards in the mouth of Laura, and from whence the novel in Gil Blas from which the fable and part of the language of the tragedy are taken, receives its name [L]. But how does Siffredi conduct his argument? ، • But above all you must root out for ever From the king's breast the least remain of hope, • And henceforth make his mention'd love dishonor. Was not this effectually done by Tancred's match with Conftantia? In fact this (to use a vulgar proverb) is letting the cat out of the bag; and acquainting his daughter with the reluctance of Tancred to obey the late king's will; and defiring her to act the very part in regard to her lover, for which she herself is so enraged against him as to run into another man's arms, merely from a principle of revenge. [L] La Marriage du Vengeance.' Which Smollet (with an eye I presume to the figure in question) has rendered The Baleful Marriage.' In
POETIC OF ARISTOTLE. In these lines of Shenstone, otherwise beautiful, there is a manifest absurdity. Pleasing when youth is long expired to trace • The forms our pencil or our pen design'd; " Such was our youthful air, and shape, and face, Such the foft image of our youthful mind." This is comparing the sister arts in a circumstance where they have not the leaft refemblance: the early productions of a young poet, if written from the heart, may shew the • Soft image of his youthful mind.' But I cannot possibly see how • His youthful air, and shape, and face,' can be traced in the juvenile designs of the painter. I shall conclude these examples with one from Shakespear. In the Merchant of Venice, Portia quotes the Lord's Prayer to perfuade a Jew (calling him fo only three lines before.) • We do pray for mercy; And that same prayer doth teach us all to render • The deeds of mercy.'- 3 Y NOTE
25.17.
mvp-aristotle-comment-125
25.24
THE ANSWERS TO THESE OBJECTIONS MAY BE COLLECTED FROM WHAT WE HAVE SAID, AND THEY ARE TWELVE IN NUMBER.
THOUGH in the note on the translation I have given what appeared to me the most probable arrangement of these solutions; yet I must avow my indecision on a subject which has occafioned so many various opinions among the different commentators. CHAP.
3.
mvp-aristotle-comment-186
Ritter, cap. 25 § 3
πρὸς δὲ τούτοις - καὶ ποιητικῆς : quaesitum est varieque disputatum cur, dum scribit non eandem esse recti normam politicae artis atque poeticae, politicam prae ceteris huc adsciverit, qua de re equidem ita existimo : politica propria est oratorum et ab his prae ceteris perscrutanda. facultatis autem dicendi cum sit
τέχνη, cumque item sit
τέχνη ποιητική, tamen utriusque diversam esse rationem, ut quod in una reprehendatur non semper in altera reprehensione dignum sit, hoc technicus obscure monuit. idem (non Aristoteles) c. 6, 16. scripsit
τρίτον δὲ ἡ διάνοια.
τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐστὶ τὸ λέγειν δύνασθαι τὰ ἐνόντα καὶ τὰ ἁρμότ τοντα,
ὅπερ ἐπὶ τῶν λόγων (in orationibus)
τῆς πολιτικῆς καὶ ῥητορικῆς ἔργον ἐστίν. post
τῆς πο λιτικῆς καὶ τῆς ποιητικῆς tarde succedunt illa
οὐδὲ ἄλλης τέχνης καὶ ποιητικῆς, et continuo tertium subsequitur
αὐτῆς δὲ τῆς ποιητικῆς, cetera. summa et in his et in ceteris infantia deprehenditur.
ἡ μὲν γὰρ καθ' αυτήν,
ἡ δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκός: peccatorum quibus poesis obnoxia est unum genus ad ipsam pertinet, alterum ad accidens. ecce interpolator quaedam inaudivit de notionibus illis Aristoteliis, quae
τὸ συμβεβηκὸς et
τὸ ὡς ἀληθῶς ὂν appellantur: sed eas dum ad suam disputationem accommodare studet, non proficit hilum, ut mox videbimus.
4.
mvp-aristotle-comment-187
Ritter, cap. 25 § 4
εἰ μὲν γὰρ - οὐ καθ' ἑαυτήν: mira et falsadisputatio: si quis imitandum suscipit quod fieri nequit, leges artis poeticae egreditur, sin imitatur quae sunt peccata in alia arte quae admisit
ἀδύνατα, hoc vitium ad poeticam non pertinet. sed si quis alius artis
ἀδύνατα admittentis peccata imitatur, nonne et ipse imitatur quae fieri non possunt? cetera considera.
ἀδυναμία et ceteris Graecis scriptoribus et vero Aristoteli est virium defectus 4): sed hic nove eam posuit pro
αδύνατόν τι, ut apparet ex §. 5., ubi hanc divisionem respiciens scribit
πρῶτον μὲν,
ἂν τὰ πρὸς αὐτὴν τὴν τέχνην ἀδύνατα πεποίηται,
ἡμάρτηται. corruptum csse nomen
ἀδυναμίαν unde probari possit ego non video.
εἰ δὲ - προβεβληκότα: ex his verbis sanam sententiam et Graecam structuram nondum elicere quisquam potuit: multi editores ad coniecturas confugerunt, sed quae dedere non sufficiunt, sive sententiam respicis sive Graeci sermonis leges et naturam. ego dedi eum loci habitum quem Bekkerus ex codicum auctoritate restituit, sed ne sic quidem tolerabilis sententia neque iusta structura verborum oritur, nisi verba uncis a me circumdata tollentur. sed haec ipsa quo casu nata sunt? hoce: adversus haec verba
εἰ δὲ (intellige
προείλετο μιμήσασθαι)
τὸν ἵππον ἄμφω τὰ δεξιὰ προβεβληκύτα in margine antiqui cuiusdam libri aliquis adnotavit
τὸ προελέσθαι μὴ ὀρθῶς, ut lector inde disceret quid sit illud quode in proximis disputaretur. quae verba cum per errorem contextui illata essent, corrector quidam addita voce
ἀλλὰ loci hiatum sarcire se posse putavit.
εἰ δὲ τὸ προελέσθαι μὴ ὀρθῶς certe dici non potest pro
εἰ δὲ τὸ προελέσθαι μὴ ὀρθῶς ἔχει, ac praeterea sic accusativus qui sequitur (
τὸν ἵππον) unde pendeat non habet: utraque difficultas ratione a nobis inita vanescit. disputatio autem quae iam prodit hoc homine satis digna est: si poetica quod fieri nequit imitandum sive describendum suscipit, ipsa peccat, sin Vide Metaphysicorum 4. 12. p. 1019 b 15. conf.
Θ. 2. p. 1040 a 29. 1. 10. p. 1058 b 27... quoddam artis statuariae peccatum (equum illum utroque pede dextro proiecto) vel aliarum artium peccata, ipsa non peccavit. per
τὸν ἵππον ἄμφω τὰ δεξιὰ προβεβληκότα designari coniicio nobile cuiusdam statuarii opus insigni vitio in pedibus effingendis commisso illustratum, quemadmodum in horto Schwezingensi prope Mannhemium Apollo visitur qui lyram dextra manu tenet. inde patet primum cur
ΤΟΝ ἵππον scripserit, deinde cur post
τὸν ἵππον προβεβληκότα continuo adiecerit
ἢ τὸ καθ' ἑκάστην τέχνην ἁμάρἢ ἀδύνατα πέποιηται: quae impossibilia
τημα. admisit sive quae impossibilia excidere sibi passa est. quamquam forma media sic quodammodo potest excusari 5), tamen aut locus non sanus, aut interpolator in culpa esse videatur quod
πεποίηται posuit pro
πεποίηκε, praesertim cum statim
πεποίηται passivo intellectu subsequatur. qui
εἰ ἀδύνατα πεποίηται ὁποιαοῦν dederunt, eos sequi nolui, propterea quod a codicibus longius desciscunt.
5.
mvp-aristotle-comment-188
Ritter, cap. 25 § 5
ὥστε δεῖ- λύειν: si reprehenduntur nonnulla in quodam artis poeticae opere a quaestionum subtilium captatoribus, ad diluendas reprehensiones quaerere convenit, utrum ars (poetica) ipsa peccaverit an peccatum ab alia arte acceptum propagaverit. quid excusationis et quando proferendum sit, ubi ars ipsa
ἀδύνατα commiserit, continuo docet verbis
πρῶτον μέν -Ἕκτορος δίωξις.
τὸ γὰρ τέλος –
ποιεῖ μέρος: respicit quae paulo ante (c. 24, 8) apud verum Aristotelem legit, unde perperam colligit epicae poesis finem esse ut admirationem faciat (
τὸ ἐκπλήττειν), id quod Aristoteles nusquam dixit neque dicere potuit. idem falsus auctor ex loco indicato exemplum illud suum sumpsit, sed tam obscure breviterque, ut hominem decet in exemplis unice versantem et nihil ultra exempla sapientem. —
εἰ μέντοι τὸ τέλος - περὶ τούτων τέχνην: in his primum friget 5) Noli defendere falsum auctorem eiusmodi locis, qualis est in Topicis VI, 4 init.
πρῶτον μὲν εἰ μὴ διὰ προτέρων καὶ γνωριμωτέρων πεποίηται τὸν ὁρισμόν.additum
ἢ μᾶλλον ἢ ἧττον, tum subobscurum est quid sibi velint illa
καὶ κατὰ τὴν περὶ τούτων τέχνην, quibus idem significari videtur quod modo monitum est,
εἰ οὕτως ἐκπληκτικώτερον ἢ αὐτὸ ἢ ἄλλο ποιεῖ μέρος, h. e. si ne id quidem excusationis gratia dici potest,
οὕτω ἐκπληκτικώτερον γίγνεσθαι ἢ αὐτὸ ἢ ἄλλο μέρος. nimirum technicus hic noster ubique artes loquitur. cf. Commentar. ad c. 20, 4.
ἔτι ποτέρων - κακομιμήτως ἔγραψεν: alteram illam levioremque peccandi rationem interrogando et lectorem quasi excitando proponit, postquam priorem absolvit. si poeta
κατὰ συμβεβηκός peccavit, illum peccasse quidem sed levius esse peccatum excusantes dicemus. illa
ἔλαττον γὰρ –
κακομιμήτως ἔγραψεν exempli gratia afferuntur. si quis cervae cornua tribuit (id quod et alii poetae fecerunt et Pindarus Ol. III, 29. vid. Boeckhii Explicationes ad h. 1.), is eam non
κακομιμήτως γράφει, interpolatore quippe iudice: non enim quae sunt male describit (
κακομιμήτως γράφει), sed quae non sunt, eorum unum aliquid admisit, ut magis peccaverit in
ἱστορίαν τῶν ζῴων quam in ipsam artem poeticam. hem astutias. similiter, ut poetae cornutas cervas producentes, Aristophanes peccavit, dum scribit in Nubibus 151.
ἐνέβαψεν εἰς τὸν κηρὸν αὐτῆς (pulicis)
τώ πόδε, ubi scholiasta:
δυϊκὸν τὼ πόδε ἐπὶ τῆς ψύλλης κακῶς·
λέγεται γὰρ ἓξ ἔχειν πόδας.
6.
mvp-aristotle-comment-189
Ritter, cap. 25 § 6
πρὸς δὲ τούτοις - ταύτῃ λυτέον: non id homini levissimo curae est ut appareat quid re vera peccatum sit, quid non sit, sed ut multae variaeque excusandi viae suppetant, quibus vituperantium dictis occurratur.
ἀλλ' οἷα δεῖ: ola ab Aldo accepi.
ἴσως quod codices offerunt ex versu 8. huc delatum videtur. sed respice quam moleste hic noster scribat o
ἷα οἷον οἷους οἷοι, quae brevissimo intervallo sese excipiunt.
οἷον καὶ Σοφοκλῆς ἔφη κτλ. nihil est cur ex hisce verbis colligamus Sophoclem hoc de suis tragoediis iudicium in libro quodam, velut in illa de choro tragico scriptione (conf. Commentar. p. 134), pronuntiasse: eodem enim iure Euripidi similemlibrum tribuere licet, quod nemo facere sustinebit. ego hac de re sic sentio, non verum Sophoclem haec dixisse, sed dixisse Sophoclem a comico quodam in scena cum Euripide compositum 6), ut in Ranis Aeschylum et Euripidem composuit Aristophanes. -
Εὐριπίδης δὲ οἷοι εἰσί: sequor codices, non coniecturam D. Heinsii (
Εὐριπίδην), quamvis ea probabilis videatur. ad nomen
Εὐριπίδης δὲ ex prioribus trahendum
ἔφη αὐτὸς ποιεῖν. nimirum si ullo alio testimonio constaret Sophoclem unquam hoc de se atque Euripide iudicium protulisse, statim Heinsii coniecturam ego adoptarem: ut nunc res est, scriptura codicum adquiescamus, et quod unus testis offert, id illibatum exploremus atque, ubi longius progredi non datur, probabiliter explicemus.
7.
mvp-aristotle-comment-190
Ritter, cap. 25 § 7
εἰ δὲ μηδετέρως,
ὅτι οὕτω φασίν : si neque ea excusatio fieri potest, contra accidens peccatum esse, neque altera, id quod oporteat poetam fingere, dicatur sic ferri hominum fama. inepta excusatio, quae quid valeat perbene intellexit verus Aristoteles c. 24, 10.
ὥστε τὸ λέ γειν ὅτι ἀνήρητο ἂν ὁ μῦθος γελοῖον, cet. cf, c. 14, 5. 15,8. 17,3.
ἀλλ᾽ ἔτυχεν ὡς παρά Ξενοφάνει: sed acciderunt ut est apud Xenophanem. haec pertinent ad Xenophanis de dis deorumque natura iudicium, quod multum distabat a ceteris poetis vulgarem opinionem et fabulas popularium sectantibus, partim in opere
περὶ Φύσεως partim in Sillis sive Iambis pronuntiatum. vid. Sext. Empiricus adv. Mathem. VII, 49 et IX, 193. sententia igitur haec est: fortasse mala sunt et falsa quae de dis feruntur, et potius sic se habuere 6) Fortasse hoc ipsum ex Aristophanis fabula quadam, v. c. ex Gerytade vel alia, profectum est. quae in Ranis Aeschylus de sua poesi et Euripides de sua gloriatur v. 907 - 1073., alter alterum irridens, haec eo recurrunt ut Aeschylus dicat se ostendisse homines quales esse oporteat, Euripides contra dicat se fecisse quales sint.ut est apud Xenophanem, sed haec non dicunt. relicuum est ut de loci scriptura dispiciamus. codices fere (cf. not. crit.) praebent
Ξενοφάνει vel
Ξενοφάνη vel
Ξενοφάνῃ, quarum formarum altera et tertia leviter a prima aberrant. hanc igitur ex pluribus et fidelioribus codicibus sumptam recipio, et leve ac vulgare vitium
ὥσπερ in
ὡς παρὰ corrigendum existimo. hoc ipsum vitium quartam illius nominis formam
Ξενοφάνης videtur procreasse, quae apud Aldum et in libro Bc (si fides est silentio) reperitur: sed
ἔτυχεν ὥσπερ Ξενοφάνης quid sit nemo explicare poterit. Victorius in sequentibus
ἀλλ' οὐ φασι τάδε vitium latere suspicatus scribendum coniecit
ἀλλ' οὐ σαφῆ τάδε, quo recepto nonnulli legunt
ἀλλ' ἔτυχεν ὥσπερ Ξενοφάνει οὐ σαφῆ τάδε : sed haec quo pertineant neque satis liquet et illa
ἀλλ' οὐ φασι τάδε certe ab omni dubitatione tuta sunt.
ἴσως οὐ βέλτιον μέν:
δὲ ab Aldo post
ἴσως additum conducere videatur ad iuvandam iustam orationis iuncturam, sed ea ipsa apud hunc hominem saepius desideratur.
οἷον τὰ περὶ τῶν ὅπλων κτλ. intelligit verba Homeri Il. K. 152.
ἔγχεα δέ σφιν ὄρθ᾽ ἐπὶ σαυρωτῆρος ἐνήλατο. quid vitii in his invenerint critici illi ad controversias nimium proclives ex Porphyrii ad versum illum adnotatione (vid. Schol. in Homeri Il. ed. Bekker. pag. 279 b 42) discimus:
φαύλη δοκεῖ ἡ τῶν δοράτων ἐπὶ σαυρωτῆρας στάσις·
καὶ δὴ πολλαχοῦ θόρυβον ἤδη πεποίηκε νύκτωρ ἓν μόνον πεσόν.
λύει δ' ᾿Αριστοτέλης (respicit Problemata Homerica, non hunc Poeticae locum)
λέγων ὅτι τοιαῦ τα ἀεὶ ποιεῖ Ὅμηρος οἷα ἦν τότε. quid sit
σαυρωτήρ explicat scholiasta anonymus in eadem illa farragine 1. c. in hunc modum :
σαυρωτήρ δέ ἐστι τὸ ἀπολῆγον μέρος τοῦ δόρατος,
ὅπερ ἀντίκειται τῇ αἰχμῇ,
ὃν καὶ οὐρίαχον καλοῦσιν.
οὕτω γὰρ τότ᾽ ἐνόμιζον,
ὥσπερ καὶ νῦν Ἰλλυριοί: similia his Porphyrius 1. c.
ἦν δὲ τοιαῦτα τὰ·
παλαιὰ οἷάπερ καὶ νῦν ἐν τοῖς βαρβάροις·
πολλοὶ δὲ οὕτω χρῶνται τῶν βαρβάρων.
8.
mvp-aristotle-comment-191
Ritter, cap. 25 § 8
περὶ δὲ τοῦ καλῶς –
ἵνα ἀπογένηται: haecAristotele non indigna conserentur, si alio loco legerentur. quamquam ad morum doctrinam potius pertinent quam ad poesis explicationem. –
πρὸς ὃν ἢ ὅτε: pertinent ad
λέγοντα, sequentia
ὅτῳ ἢ οὗ ἕνεκα ad
πράττοντα. notabis chiasmum.
9.
mvp-aristotle-comment-192
Ritter, cap. 25 § 9
-14. haec admodum mira sunt et in his potissimum hominem ineptum deprehendimus. at vero dicunt iocari Aristotelem provocantes ad ea quae ipse monuit Elench. sophist. c. 17. p. 175 a 31.
πρῶτον μὲν οὖν,
ὥσπερ συλλογίζεσθαί φαμεν ἐνδόξως ποτὲ μᾶλλον ἢ ἀληθῶς προαιρεῖσθαι δεῖν,
οὕτω καὶ λυτέον ποτὲ μᾶλλον ἐνδόξως ἢ κατὰ τἀληθές.
ὅλως γὰρ πρὸς τοὺς ἐριστικοὺς μαχητέον οὐχ ὡς ἐλέγχοντας ἀλλ᾿ ὡς φαινομένους. est hoc aliquid, tametsi non est satis: fac enim Aristotelem risum captasse, unde alioqui quam maxime abhorret, hic sane non erat iocandi locus. idem, si loco non apto animo indulgere voluisset, hoc significare non omissurus erat. sed maius illud est, quod qui haec scripsit tantum abest ut ridere lectores voluerit, ut doctrina sua mirum quantum gaudeat et magnum quoddam et reconditum afferre se existimet. oratio negligenter conformata ubique grammaticum prodit. plures accusativi sublimes quasi pendent. exempla breviter et obscure significantur: nimirum hic homo in Homericis bene versatus et ultra vix quidquam sapiens lectores suos omnia quae ipsi nota sunt aeque memores tenere stulte credidit. §. 9. nonnulla quae poetis vitio vertuntur ita diluenda sunt, ut vocem quandam insolito intellectu positam esse dicamus. pro exemplis tres loci ex Homeri Iliade promuntur. primus est A. 50.
οὐρῆας μὲν πρῶτον ἐπώχετο καὶ κύνας ἀργούς. scilicet dubitandi cupidi anquirebant cur bestiae ante quam homines peste ab Apolline immissa correptae fuerint. vid. Schol. ad h. 1. pag. 7 a 25. Zoilus nimirum dei crudelitatem incusavit, qui ne bestiis quidem pepercerit. vid. Heraclid. Allegor. Hom. c. 14. eam difficultatem hic ita se tollere posse opinatur, ut Homerus
οὐρῆας non mulos sed custodes intellexisse dicatur. sed haec solutio tam absonaest et stulta, ut tunc demum, si custodes intelligerentur 7), vera et inextricabilis difficultas oreretur. scilicet hanc
λύσιν cogitando invenerunt ii qui aliquid dixisse contenti totius loci sententiam parum curarent. id apte monet scholiasta anonymus 1. c. pag. 7b 9.
ὅτι οὐκ ὀρθῶς τινὲς οὐρῆας τοὺς φύλακας·
ἀντιδιαστέλλει (Homerus)
γὰρ διὰ τοῦ αὐτοῖσι (v. 51).
καὶ τὸν Δόλωνα “
ὃς δή τοι εἶδος μὲν ἔην και κός - αἰσχρόν: haec admodum obscure pronuntiata sunt, et verborum iunctura turpiter hiscit. in versu Iliad. K. 316.
ὃς δή τοι εἶδος μὲν ἔην κακὸς ἀλλὰ ποδώκης, illud offensioni esse simulat quod idem homo specie deformis et tamen pedibus velox dicatur, tamquam utrumque in eodem homine iunctum esse non possit. ad eam difficultatem tollendam sapiens hic praeceptor docet
εἶδος non esse totius corporis formam, sed unam faciem vultumve esse. sed id quomodo probat? nempe Cretenses
εὐπρόσωπον appellant quod ab aliis
εὐειδὲς vocatur: sed exspectamus potius a Cretensibus
εὐειδὲς appellari quod a ceteris Graecis
εὐπρόσωπον. num igitur permutabimus sedes utriusque vocabuli codicibus quamvis repugnantibus? equidem hoc non faciam, sed librorum scripturam nova explicatione vindicandam existimo. magister ille hanc fere analogiam animo suo informavit:
εὐειδὲς se habet ad
εὐπρόσωπον ut
εἶδος ad
πρόσωπον (
εὐειδὲς :
εὐπρόσωπον =
εἶδος :
πρόσωπον). iam ille circumspiciens (ipse se Graece quasi non scientem simulat) invenit a Cretensibus
εὐπρόσωπον dici quod ab aliis
ευειδές. inde concludit
εὐειδὲς et
εὐπρόσωπον idem esse, atque inde rursus colligit
εἶδος et
πρόσωπον idem esse, adeoque
εἶδος in illo Homeri versu non esse figuram sed vultum. vide mi lector, tanto molimine obscurus hic magistellus rem falsam adprobare nititur. 7) Ea potestate nomen
οὐρῆες nonnisi in versu subditicio Il. K. 84. fungitur.
καὶ τὸ “
ζωρότερον δὲ κέραιε- τὸ θᾶττον: 10- quitur de versibus Homeri Il. I. 202 et 203., ubi Achilles carissimos amicos ad se venisse intelligens Patroclum cohortatur
μείζονα δὴ κρητῆρα,
Μενοιτίου υἱέ,
καθίστα,
ζωρότερον δὲ κέραιε,
δέπας δ᾽ ἔντυνον ἑκάστῳ. hunc locum Zoilus Amphipolitanus, Isocratis discipulus et Aristotelem non multum aetate antecedens, vituperavit: quippe fortissimos Achivorum viros tamquam bibaces et mero indulgentes induci. vid. Plutarchi Quaestion. conviv. V, 4. p. 677 F. quam
ἀπορίαν quomodo tollere grammatici Alexandrini tentaverint ex Scholiis in hunc Iliadis locum videre licet:
ζωρότερον ἀκρατότερον,
παρὰ τὸ ζῆν.
οἱ δὲ ταχύτερον....
ἀπρεπὲς δὲ τὸ ὡς ἐπὶ κῶμον ἥκουσιν ἀκρατότερον διδόναι παρακελεύεσθαι.
καὶ οἱ μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς λέξεως (in his erat Pseudo - Aristoteles)
λύουσι·
τὸ γὰρ ζωρότερον τάχιον·
οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ καιροῦ,
ὅτι νύξ·
οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἔθους·
τοὺς γὰρ ἥρωας,
ἄλλως καταπονουμένους,
δαψιλεστέροις τοῖς πρὸς τὴν δίαιταν χρῆσθαι εἰκός. Plutarchus 1. c. refert,
ὅτι τῷ ζωρότερον τὸ θερμὸν ἔνιοι σημαίνεσθαι λέγουσι,
τῷ δὲ θερμοτέρῳ τὸ τάχιον. Plutarchus solutionem istam sibi bene cognitam ad
ἐνίους rettulit; neque ipse neque Homeri scholiasta de Aristotele illius auctore quidquam inaudiverat.
10.
mvp-aristotle-comment-193
Ritter, cap. 25 § 10
τὸ δὲ κατὰ μεταφορὰν εἴρηται - τὸ γὰρ πᾶν πολύ τι: alias
ἀπορίας ita solvere licet, ut metaphorice poetam locutum esse statuamus. ceterum insignem hunc locum ab interpretibus nondum illustratum paulo copiosius explicare opus est. nimirum interpolator exemplo a se allato lectores suos decipere conatus est: nam cum Iliadis rhapsodia B sic incipiat
ἄλλοι μέν ῥα θεοί τε καὶ ἀνέρες ἱπποκορυσταὶ εἶδον παννύχιοι, cumque rhapsodia K hoc exordio inchoetur
ἄλλοι μὲν παρὰ νηυσὶν ἀριστῆες Παναχαιῶν εἶδον παννύχιοι, ille praeproperus et legentium sive imprudentia sive tarditateingenii confisus, translato secundi libri principio ad decimum, tamquam hoc initium
ἄλλοι μέν ῥα θεοί τε καὶ ἀνέρες ἱπποκορυσταὶ εἶδον παννύχιοι,
μαλακῷ δεδμημένοι ὕπνῳ, libro decimo Homerus posuisset, hoc igitur falsi admittens et ex
παννύχιοι nomen
πάντες sibi extorquens, tandem insigni libidine hoc iste sibi videbatur assecutus esse, ut eiusdem libri (K) versus 11-13., ubi de Agamemnone hoc refertur
ἤτοι ὅτ᾽ ἐς πεδίον τὸ Τρωϊκὸν ἀθρήσειεν,
θαύμαζεν πυρὰ πολλά,
τὰ καίετο Ἰλιόθι πρό,
αὐλῶν συρίγγων τ' ἐνοπὴν ὁμαδόν τ' ἀνθρώπων, illi principio quod finxerat repugnare imperitos et incautos lectores docere posset. scilicet si excepto Agamemnone ceteri et di et homines dormitabant, quî fieri poterat, ut ille tibiarum fistularumque in castris Troianis vocem atque clamorem hominum audiret? iam aderat
ἀπορία miro artificio procreata, quam ita solvit ut nomen
πάντες in versu illo (K. 2) ab ipso ex nav-
νύχιοι factum et fictum non fungi solito suo munere sed idem esse quod
πολλοί statueret. totum igitur quo ille usus est artificium eo recurrit, ut in exordio libri decimi poneret ça
θεοί τε καὶ ἀνέρες ἱπποκορυσταὶ sumptum ex B. 1., ubi debuit
παρὰ νηυσὶν ἀριστῆες Παναχαιῶν. sed si cui haec grammaticorum sive astutia sive impudentia nimis mira videatur, is magis etiam mirabitur, si resciverit quae illi in Homeri carminibus ausi sint, ut
ἀπορίας suas et
λύσεις possent expromere. nam unus aliquis eorum adeo versus Iliadis T. 269-272. inseruit, ut tradit Aristonicus in Scholiis ad h. 1.
ἀθετοῦνται στίχοι δ',
ὅτι διεσκευασμένοι εἰσὶν ὑπό τινος τῶν βουλομένων πρόβλημα ποιεῖν. sed plane ad hanc nostram causam accedit quod idem Aristonicus narrat ad Il. K. 372.
ἡ διπλῆ,
ὅτι θέλοντες ζήτημα ποιεῖν μεταγράφουσι τὸ ἡμιστίχιον οὕτως “
καὶ βάλεν οὐδ' ἀφάμαρτεν,
ἑκὼν δ᾽ ἡμάρτανε φωτός.” apud Homerum est
ἢ ῥα,
καὶ ἔγχος ἀφῆκεν,
ἑκὼν δ᾽ ἡμάρτανε φωτός. conf. Lehrsius de Aristarchi studiis Homericis p. 210 sq. ut vero omnis de explicationis meae veritate dubitatio removeatur, tertium afferam exemplumquo illustrius produci vix poterit. Mercurius Priamum ob Hectoris corpus non humatum et ab Achille contumeliose tractatum graviter maerentem apud Homerum (I
Ι.
Ω. 418-421) ita consolatur, ut ab Achille quamvis cupiente Hectoris cadaver non deformatum iri hisce verbis spondeat
οὐδέ μιν αἰσχύνει·
θηοῖό κεν αὐτὸς ἐπελθών,
οἷον ἐερσήεις κεῖται,
περὶ δ' αἷμα νένιπται,
οὐδέ ποθι μιαρός·
σὺν δ᾽ ἕλκεα πάντα μέμυκεν,
ὅσσ᾽ ἐτύπη. grammaticus aliquis magni Aristotelis nomen mentitus (idem ille qui Problemata Homerica composuit) hic haerebat,
ἀδύνατον esse dicens, quod mortui hominis vulnera concrevisse dicantur. eius rei memoriam conservavit scholiasta Victorianus in Scholiis in Homeri Il. p. 642 a 30 ed. Bekk.
ἀδύ νατον νεκρῶν θραύματα μύειν·
ὥς φησιν ᾿Αριστοτέλης εἰρηκέναι 8)
Ὅμηρον “
μῦσεν δὲ περιβροτόεσσα ωτειλή.”
τοῦτο δὲ τὸ ἡμιστίχιον οὐδὲ φέρεται. nimirum personatus Aristoteles in istis Problematis Homericis suo ingenio versum 420. in hunc modum immutavit pro
οὐδέ ποθι μῦσεν δὲ περιβροτόεσσ᾽ ὦτειλή οὐδέ ποθι μιαρός·
σὺν δ᾽ ἕλκεα πάντα μέμυκεν. iam iste pro
ἀδυνάτῳ concinnavit
δυνατόν. nunc enim habemus non concrevit vulnus sanguine circumfusum pro eo quod erat omnia vulnera concreverunt. hem argutias. nune demum vera difficultas in locum Homericum illata est. i puer, et haec adscribe recensioni illi operum Homericorum, quam Aristoteli liberalius quam verius vulgo tribuunt. vid. Wolfii Prolegomena ad Hom. p. CLXXXIII sqq. quartum illarum nugarum exemplum ad §. 11. indicabimus.
καὶ τὸ οἴη δ᾽ ἄμμορος”
κατὰ μεταφοράν: intelligit Iliadis locum
Σ. 489. ubi Vulcanus effingere dicitur in Achillis scuto Pleiades et Hyades, postremo Arcton de 8) Hoc est
ὡς φησιν ᾿Αριστοτέλης,
εἴρηκεν Ὅμηρος.qua ibidem praedicatur
οἴη δ' ἄμμορός ἐστὶ λοετρῶν ᾿Ὠκεα- vo
ῖο. conf. Odyss. E. 275. in his verbis haerere se simulabant quaestionum captatores, tamquam Homerum in astronomicis non satis peritum deprehendissent, ut in excogitandis solutionibus ingenii acumen ostentare possent. nonnulli igitur nomen
οἴη nonnisi ad stellarum nomina ante posita, non ad omnes stellas, referri putabant. conf. Schol. ad h. 1.
οἴη,
ὡς πρὸς τὰ προειρημένα ἄστρα,
ἐπεὶ καὶ ἄλλα ἐστὶ μὴ δύνοντα. falsus Aristoteles
οἴην pro insigni dictam esse statuit, solutionem
κατά μεταφορὰν (
ἀπὸ γένους ἐπὶ εἶδος c. 21, 5) probando.
11.
mvp-aristotle-comment-194
Ritter, cap. 25 § 11
κατὰ δὲ προσῳδίαν (
δεῖ λύειν),
ὥσπερ Ἱππίας ἔλυεν ὁ Θάσιος τὸ “
δίδομεν δέ οἱ”
καὶ “
ιὸ μὲν οὐ καταπύθεται ὄμβρῳ”: vir iste tanta lectionis copia doctrinaque tumet, ut nonnisi fastigia rerum leviter attingat; et hoc quidem loco ita se contraxit, ut quae voluit dicere vix perciperemus, nisi auxilio veniret verus Aristoteles qui in Elenchis sophisticis c. 4. p. 166 b 3. haec scripsit:
οἷον καὶ τὸν Ὅμηρον ἔνιοι διορθοῦνται πρὸς τοὺς ἐλέγχοντας ὡς ἀτόπως εἰρηκότα “
τὸ μὲν οὐ 9)
καταπύθεται ὄμβρῳ.”
λύουσι γὰρ αὐτὸ τῇ προσῳδίᾳ,
λέγοντες τὸ “
οὗ”
ὀξύτερον,
καὶ τὸ περὶ τὸ ἐνύπνιον τοῦ ᾿Αγαμέμνονος,
ὅτι οὐκ 9) Bekkerus pro
οὐ dedit o
ὗ et paulo post o
ὔ pro o
ὗ, a libris suis praeter consuetudinem bis deficiens ad coniecturas, nisi quod secundo loco ou inesse codici C (Coisliniano 330) ex silentio eius colligere licet. sed illi scripturae et sententia repugnat et locus Poeticae quem tractamus, ut omittam neutiquam hoc verisimile videri, turpe illud vitium (
τὸ μὲν οὖ) ante Hippiam Thasium in vulgatis Homeri exemplis resedisse, eundemque hominem priore loco ineptissimas quidem argutias agitasse, alterum autem emendavisse sapientissime. quod o
ὗ prae
οὐ ὀξύτερον vocatur, id mirum videri non debet: nam o
ὗ accentu acuto gravique simul feritur (
δύ),
οὐ sine accentu profertur. Bekkerum alioqui satis cautum deceptum esse puto iis quae Alexander Aphrodisiensis et falso et perturbate ad h. 1. conseribillavit. vid. Scholia in Aristot. tom. I. p. 299 b 33 ed. Brandis.
αὐτὸς ὁ Ζεὺς εἶπεν “
δίδομεν δὲ οἱ εὖχος ἀρέσθαι,”
ἀλλὰ τῷ ἐνυπνίῳ ἐνετέλλετο διδόναι. his adiuti possumus explicare quid Hippias Thasius (non ille Eleus) in Homeri verbis tentaverit, id quod adhuc non satis perspexerunt neque interpretes neque Wolfius in Prolegomenis ad Hom. p. CLXVII sq. Iuppiter igitur Somnio mandavit ut Agamemnoni diceret
δίδομεν δὲ οἱ εὖχος ἀρέσθαι. sed hic hexametri exitus nusquam in Iliade locum habere potuit nisi in Iovis ad Somnium mandato B. 8-15, neque tamen illic usquam comparet. quid igitur statuemus? utrum versum aliquem excidisse dicemus. ex nostris exemplaribus, an in vetere quadam Iliadis recensione, quam Aristoteles versaverit, hoc hemistichium in versu 15. inventum fuisse, ubi iam illud
Τρώεσσι δὲ κήδε᾽ ἐφῆπται substitutum legimus? hoc alterum cum alii crediderunt, tum Wolfius 1. c. qui hoc indicio erectus (p. CLXVIII) exclamat adeo mutatus est textus noster. ego neutrum admittam, sed eandem explicandi viam ingrediar qua paulo ante (§. 10) verum repperi. Hippias igitur
ἀποριῶν et
λύσεων acute excogitandarum cupidus id fraudis commisit ut versum Iliadis B. 15.
Ἥρη λισσομένη·
Τρώεσσι δὲ κήδε᾽ ἐφῆπται suo arbitrio et suo dolo sic mutatum exhiberet
Ἥρη λισσομένη·
δίδομεν δὲ οἱ εὖχος ἀρέσθαι. ipsum illud hemistichium una vocula immutata sumpsit ex Iliad.
Φ. 297.
δίδομεν δέ τοι εὖχος ἀρέσθαι. iam in loco sic reformato Hippias id reprehendit (
ἐπετίμησε) quod Iuppiter manifesto mendacio animum Agamemnonis deciperet, quod vitium ut a love optimo maximo defenderet, ille astute
διδόμεν pro
δίδομεν legendum praecepit et hunc infinitivum imperativi vices sustinere voluit, ut Iuppiter mandaret "concedas vero 10) ei (Agamemnoni) gloriam sibi parare". - Alter locus pertinet ad Iliadis F. 328. 10) Wolfius l. c., secutus Paccium ad Organon p. 485., non satis recte scripsit "sed Hippias. verbum
δίδομεν mutavit in
δε ..
ἕστηκε ξύλον αὖον ὅσον τ᾽ ὄργυι᾽ ὑπὲρ αἴης,
ἢ δρυὸς ἢ πεύκης,
τὸ μὲν οὐ καταπύθεται ὄμβρῳ. cum hoc mirum falsumque videretur, aridum quercus vel abietis lignum imbre non putrescere, Hippias illud vitium removeri voluit pronomine o
ὗ pro negatione
οὐ substituto, ut verborum intellectus hice prodiret "una eius (ligni) pars, ea scilicet quae super terram eminet, imbre putrescit. iam in utroque loco agnosces hominem futilissime argutantem, concedesque a Wolfio 1. c. inconsiderate scribi "si Hippias primus olim vulgatum
οὗ (immo
οὐ vulgatum erat) expulit, ... facile intelligitur, quam turpia vitia haeserint in exemplis huius aetatis. sed de illis plura licet suspicari quam scire." apage suspiciones ex eiusmodi fontibus haustas.
12.
mvp-aristotle-comment-195
Ritter, cap. 25 § 12
αἶψα δὲ - πρὶν κέκριτο: si quaereretur quid ipse Empedocles, cuius hic frustula nonnulla afferuntur, scriptum dederit, plura in his quamvis Poeticae codicibus repugnantibus aliter conformanda existimarem, ut alii editores existimarunt: sed cum id potius restituendum sit quod hic homo apud Empedoclem legerit, immo legere voluerit, sequi codices cum Bekkero tutissimum mihi videtur. nimirum magnus hic difficultatum et conditor et destructor Empedoclis verbis a sese pro suo consilio mutilatis et immutatis inesse difficultatem, si legendo iungamus
τὰ πρὶν μάθον ἀθάνατα ζῷα, sed eam tolli si post
ἀθάνατα incisione facta iungamus
ζῷα τε πρὶν κέκριτο, quaeque prius animalia habita erant. si veram ipsius Empedoclis sententiam cognoscere velis, adeas fontes limpidiores, quos recludunt Athenaeus X. p. 424 A. Plutarchus Quaest. convival. V, 4. Simplicius ad
δόμεν, infinitivum pro imperativo accipiendum, ut transpositus accentus culpam fraudis a love reiiceret in Somnium": immo
λυτικὸς iste neque lovem neque Somnium in culpa esse voluit, sed id dicentem fecit Iovem (concedas vero ut ille gloriam sibi comparet) quod vere factum esse narratur in Il. A 67-283.Aristotel. de Caelo tom. I. 507. ed. Brandis. Eustathius p. 746, 56., unde hi versus prodeunt
αἶψα δ' ἔθνεά 11)
τ᾽ ἐφύοντο,
τὰ πρὶν μάθον ἀθάνατ᾿ εἶναι,
ζωρά τε τὰ πρὶν ἄκρητα διαλλάξαντα κελεύθους.
13.
mvp-aristotle-comment-196
Ritter, cap. 25 § 13
τὰ δὲ ἀμφιβολίᾳ, “
παρῴχηκεν δὲ πλέων νύξ”: alias quaestiones sive difficultates advocato ambiguitatis auxilio solvere licet. quod exempli gratia subiicitur id sine ulla particula et vinculo solutum accedit. respicitur Iliadis locus K. 252.
ἄστρα δὲ δὴ προβέβηκε,
παρώχηκεν δὲ πλέων νύξ,
τῶν δύο μοιράων,
τριτάτη δ᾽ ἔτι μοῖρα λέλειπται. in hoc loco sane haud difficili cum coniungerent nonnulli
παρώχηκεν δὲ πλέων (vel
πλέον)
νύξ τῶν δύο μοιράων, et
δύο quamvis dicendi usu Homerico repugnante pro genitivo acciperent, anquirebant quomodo poeta primo loco plus duabus noctis partibus praeterisse et continuo tertiam superesse dicere potuerit. copiose quid in his versibus haeserint et quomodo difficilia solverint exposuit Porphyrius in Schol. ad Il. 1. c. pag. 284 b 42., unde nonnulla inter mea recipiam.
πῶς γάρ,
εἰ αἱ δύο μοῖραι ἐξήκουσιν αὐταί τε καὶ ἔτι τούτων πλέον,
ἡ τριτάτη μοῖρα λέλειπται,
ἀλλ' οὐχὶ τῆς τρίτης μόριον; Pseudo-Aristoteles et ipse iunxit
παρώχηκεν δὲ πλέων νύξ τῶν δύο μοιράων, sed ambigua vocis
πλέων significatione advocata totam noctem in duas partes a poeta divisam cogitari ponit, quarum partium amplior alterius duplum sit. hanc eandem solutionem Porphyrius 1. c. p. 285 b 6. copiose et putide exsecutus est ex Aristotelis (ita ipse credidit) Problematis Homericis in hunc modum :
Αριστοτέλης δὲ οὗτως ἀξιοῦ λύειν,
ἐν οἷς φησίν·
ἡ εἰς β΄ διαίρεσις εἰς ἴσην δύναται γενέσθαι ἐν τούτοις,
ἐπειδὴ τὸ πλέον τοῦ ἡμίσεος ἀὁριστόν ἐστιν.
ὅταν τοσοῦτον αὐξηθῇ ὡς τοῦ ὅλου τρίτον ἀπολείπεσθαι,
ἀκριβῶς ἂν εἴη τὸ ἀφορίσαι τοῦτο καὶ δηλῶ- 11) alii
αἶψα δὲ θνητὰ φύοντο cet..
σαι ὅσον ἐστὶ τὸ καταλειφθέν,
ἵνα ὅσον ηυξήθη τοῦ ὅλου τὸ ἥμισυ δῆλον γένηται.
κτλ.
14.
mvp-aristotle-comment-197
Ritter, cap. 25 § 14
ὅθεν τὸν κεκραμένον οἶνόν φασιν εἶναι: ex dicendi usu explicandum est quod ea potio quae ex aqua et vino commixta est tamen vinum nominatur. nove dictum
φασιν εἶναι pro
λέγουσιν.
ὅθεν addidi ex coniectura, et hoc casu quodam excidisse puto, propterea quod bis rediret. Aldus o
ἷor inseruit, sed id scribere interpolator vix potuit, cum sic subsequens
ὅθεν πεποίηται non iam ad
ἔθος τῆς λέ ξεως, ut debet, sed ad
οἶνόν φασιν εἶναι referatur.
ὅθεν πεποίηται “
κνημίς νεοτεύκτου κασσιτέροιο”: respexit II. Ф. 592.
ἀμφὶ δέ μιν κνημίς νεοτεύκτου κασσιτέροιο σμερδαλέον κονάβησε· sententiam personati auctoris obscuram in hunc modum intelligendam esse arbitror:
νεότευκτον κασσίτερον esse, si nomen prematur nove factum, sed a fabro non fieri stannum sed conformari tantummodo, quod ut in
νεοτεύκτῳ intelligatur, efficere sermonis usum.
καὶ χαλκέας τοὺς τὸν σίδηρον ἐργαζομένους: vitiosa est elocutio. interpolator
φασιν εἶναι ex proxime superioribus videtur huc traxisse. qui verbis transponendis structuram sanare student, ii ne Maurum lavare frustra allaborent vereor. res ipsa in aperto est. conf. Schol. in Hom. Il.
Τ. 283.
χαλκῷ:
παλαιὰ ἡ χρῆσις τοῦ χαλκὸν ὀνομάζειν τὸν σίδηρον,
ἀμέλει καὶ χαλ κέας λέγομεν τοὺς τὸν σίδηρον ἐργαζομένους. Pollux VII, 106.
ὅθεν εἴρηται - οἶνον: intellexit Iliadis 1. 234.
τὸν καὶ ἀνηρείψαντο θεοὶ Διῒ οἰνοχοεύειν. di nectar bibunt, non vinum: sed nihilo minus deorum pincerna
οἰνοχοεύειν dicitur. miram ellipsin
οὐ πινόντων (intellige
τῶν θεῶν)
οἶ- vov scriptor negligentissimus admisit, cum mentis suae oси- los in Homeri verba (ibi est
ἀνηρείψαντο θεοί) defixisset. conf. Schol. in Iliad. 1.3. p. 120 a 31. Eustath. ad Odyss. I. 374.
εἴη δ᾽ ἂν τοῦτό γε κατὰ μεταφοράν: hoc postremum exemplum incertus est utrum referat ad dicendi usum an ad metaphoram.
οἰνοχοεύειν si pro
ἐγχέεινdicitur, translatio est
ἀπ' εἴδους ἐπὶ γένος, vid. c. 21, 5. homo lectionis copia refertus in his postremis (§. 11-14) cum furore quodam exempla cumulavit.
15.
mvp-aristotle-comment-198
Ritter, cap. 25 § 15
si vocabulum quoddam loci sententiae repugnare videtur, explorandum est, quot modis dici intelligique possit, ut veram eius potestatem et loco aptam eliciamus.
οἷον “
τῇ ὁ᾽ ἔσχετο χάλκεον ἔγχος”: versus Homerici ex Iliad. Y. 272. hemistichium est, atque pertinet ad illos quattuor versus (269-272) quos insertos esse ab aliquo quaestiones et solutiones agitaturo ad §. 10. Aristonico tradenti credidimus. nam concutias, quaeso, ipsos versus tarde prioribus succedentes et ita factos ut multarum
ἀποριῶν ansam praebeant. vid. Schol. p. 560 a 42-561 b 19. primaria quaestio erat haec,
ἀτρώ των (p. 560 b 3)
ὑπαρχόντων παρ' Ομήρῳ τῶν ᾿Αχιλλέως ὅπλων,
καὶ ἔξωθεν κατ' ἐνίους τεταγμένης διὰ πλείονα κόσμον τῆς χρυσῆς πτυχός,
οὕτως ἀποδοτέον τὸν λόγον (hinc sequitur solutio satis arguta)·
ἀλλὰ μέχρι μὲν δύο πτυχῶν προῆλθεν ἡ τῆς πληγῆς ἐνέργεια,
εἶξεως καὶ οἱονεὶ συνιζήσεως γενομένης,
ἐν δὲ τῇ τρίτῃ ἐπεσχέθη. idem hic noster Pseudo-Aristoteles significari a se voluit: nimirum
ἔσχετο non esse haesit, sed impedita est hasta, ut scuti strata (
πτύχας, Schichten) cessisse, non perrupta esse dicerentur. solutionem ineptam esse verbo moneri sufficiat. ceterum in nostris Homeri exemplaribus est
μείλινον ἔγχος, non
χάλκεον ἔγχος, sed hoc
χάλκεον non tam consulto admissum quam incauto scriptori excidisse videatur. neque vero id silentio praetereundum est, ex hoc loco haud consequi illos quattuor Iliadis versus (vero) Aristotele antiquiores esse, ut visum est K. Lehrsio de Aristarchi studiis Homericis pag. 210. pro
τὸ ταύτῃ vulgo codicibus repugnantibus legunt
τῷ ταύτῃ. ad
τὸ ex praecedentibus
σημαίνει sumendum.
16.
mvp-aristotle-comment-199
Ritter, cap. 25 § 16
ποσαχῶς ἐνδέχεται: hoc negligenter scribenti concedendum erit. rectius sane
ποσαχῶς δὲ ἐνδ. vel
τὸ δὲ ποσαχῶς ἐνδ. dedisset, sed hoc quamquam apud Aldum legimus, libris non addicentibus non audeo recipere. -
κατά τὴν καταντικρὺ ἤ ὡς Γλαύκων λέγει: dicere voluitsi quis a praeconceptis opinionibus sibi caveat. sed hanc vulgarem sententiam sic ille voluit effari: si quis contra faciat ac Glauco dicit. nimirum is homines temere existimantes et iudicantes reprehenderat. itaque in re manifesta sibi temperare non potuit quo minus provocando ad auctorem lectionis copiam ostentaret. nam hic noster ex eorum numero est qui tum demum aliquid persuasum sibi habent, si alium dicentem id auctorem producere possunt. sed quis ille est? in Rhetoricis III, 1. p. 1403 b 26.
Γλαύκων ὁ Τήϊος de recitatione scripsisse dicitur, quem hunc nostrum fuisse nihil est unde pateat: immo quaerendus videtur is qui de Homero scripserit, et talis est Glauco Tarsensis, qui in eo opere quo glossas Homericas persecutus est et de variis vocum significationibus disputavit, aptissime hanc admonitionem proferre potuit. vid. Schol. in Hom. Il. A. 1.
μῆνιν:
οἱ δὲ περὶ Γλαύκωνα (h. e. Glauco ipse)
τὸν Ταρσέα ἠξίουν ὀξύνειν τὸ ὄνομα. Athen. XI. p. 480 F.
Γλαύκων δ᾽ ἐν ταῖς γλώσσαις Κυπρίους φησὶ τὴν κοτύλην κύλικα καλεῖν. videtur igitur imprudenter laudare grammaticum qui saltem multo post Aristotelem vixit, quamquam certi quidquam de eius aetate definiri nequit.
καὶ αὐτοὶ καταψηφισάμενοι συλλογίζονται: ipsi ratiocinari demum incipiunt, cum secum iam damnarunt ea quae examinare volunt. “
ὅτι δοκεῖ est formula quae a iudicibus aut a concione pronuntiari solet, id quod fugit interpretes. eos Glauco reprehendit qui in expiscandis contrariis tam certi sibi videntur et tam secure agunt, quam illi qui in iudicio vel in concione sententiam suam praeconceptam secum afferunt, non ex rerum expositione hauriunt. -
τοῦτο δὲ πέπονθε τὰ περὶ Ἰκάριον - εἶναι Ἰκάδιον ἀλλ' οὐκ Ἰκάριον: illi ad quaestiones solvendas prompti quaerebant, cur Telemachus ad patrem investigandum Lacedaemona profectus ab Homero in quarta Odysseae rhapsodia ad Menelaum, non ad avum Icarium Penelopae matris suae patrem, deducatur. hanc difficultatem hic noster sic solvit: Icarius non fuit Lacedaemonius sed in Cephalenensibus natus, id quod ipsa Cephalenensium fama probatur. aliam huius quaestionis solutionem et certe prudentiorem apud Strabonem (X. p. 708 vel 461 ed. Casaub.) legimus; aliam attulit scholiasta ad Odyss. A. 285. ed. Buttm. p. 37.
πῶς εἰς Σπάρτην ἐλθὼν οὐ συντυγχάνει Ἰκαρίῳ;
ἢ ἐκείνου καθ' Ὅμηρον ἐν Ἰθάκῃ ὄντος,
ἢ ἀπέχθονται αὐτῷ αὐτός τε καὶ ἡ μήτηρ ἀναγκάζοντε αὐτὴν γαμηθῆναι,
ὡς αὐτή φησι, “
μάλα δ᾽ ὀτρύνουσι τοκῆες γήμασθαι” (
Τ. 158).
17.
mvp-aristotle-comment-200
Ritter, cap. 25 § 17
-19. hic idem recurrit quod in capitis 12. segmento 1 et 3. deprehendimus: nam ut illic quae multo sudore excogitavit bis propinavit interpolator ineptissime, sic quae iam subsequuntur (§. 17) eadem sunt atque quae paulo ante (§. 4-8) posita erant, et quae proxime sequuntur (§. 18), ea partim §. 15. partim §. 8. proposita erant: quae autem §. 19. continentur, ea vero Aristoteli (c. 15, 5) furatus est. iste hoc argumentum tam grave esse putavit, ut bis de eo exponendum videretur. -
διαμάρτημα τὸ πρόβλημα είκός ἐστιν: problema exercitationis causa ad reprehendendum poetam inventum errore fere nititur.
εἰκός adverbii loco positum videtur, ut idem sit quod
κατ' εἰκός.
ὅλως δὲ τὸ ἀδύνατον - δεῖ ἀνάγειν: si poeta aliquis quod fieri non potest admisit, id ad poesin referre decet, h. e. videndum utrum ipsa peccaverit an alius artis peccatum acceperit. argutam hanc distinctionem accuratius persecutus est §. 4-8.
τοιούτους δ' εἶναι οἷους Ζεύξις ἔγραφεν: Zeuxis quos pinxit, ii maxime ad similitudinem veritatis expressi erant et apti ad illusionem faciendam, sed idem eo colorum splendore imagines suas exornavit, ut in rerum natura nihil quod plane simile esset inveniri posset. conf. Od. Mülleri Archaeolog. art. §. 137 ed. 2.
νατον ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον: subintellige
τὸ ἀδύ δεῖ ἀνάγειν. quae sequuntur
τὸ γὰρ παράδειγμα δεῖ ὑπερέχειν πρὸς ἃ φασι τἄλογα, eorum haec est sententia: exemplar enim assurgere debet prae iis quae ratione carere dicunt. oratio negligenter conformata est. conf. §. 6.interdum vero ratione non carent quae videntur carere,
οὕτω τε καὶ ὅτι - παρὰ τὸ εἰκὸς γίνεσθαι. haec in brevius contracta transcripta sunt ex c. 18, 6.
18.
mvp-aristotle-comment-201
Ritter, cap. 25 § 18
τὰ δ' ὑπεναντία ὡς εἰρημένα οὕτω σκοπεῖν: nihil videtur facilius fieri posse quam cum D. Heinsio scribere
τὰ δ᾽ ὡς ὑπεναντία aut cum Twiningio
τὰ δ' ὑπεναντίως, sed qui tam multa orationis male constructae specimina edidit, ei haec insolita verborum collocatio tutius relinquetur. conf. §. 8 et 15.
ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἔλεγχοι : quemadmodum in orationibus confutationes, h. e. quae in oratoria institutione tradi solent.
εἰ τὸ αὐτὸ: an idem dictum sit quod contrarie dictum fertur. conf. §. 16.
εἰ πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ: an ad idem referatur, quod cogitat qui contrarie dictum deprehendisse sibi videtur. conf. §. 8.
εἰ ὡσαύτως: an eadem ratione dictum sit, quam statuit qui contrarium quoddam arguit. conf. §. 15.
ὥστε καὶ αὐτὸν: intellige
δεῖ σκοπεῖν ἡμᾶς. ipse qui loquitur spectandus est, ut quae verbis illius sententia subsit intelligamus. hoc est quod modo dixit
εἰ τὸ αὐτό. tum videndum est ad quae rettulerit sua is qui dicit,
πρὸς ἃ αὐτὸς λέγει, denique quid prudens ex eius verbis intelligat,
ὃ ἂν φρόνιμος ὑποθῆται. hoc paulo ante significavit per
εἰ ὡσαύτως, illud per
εἰ πρὸς τὸ αὐτό.
19.
mvp-aristotle-comment-202
Ritter, cap. 25 § 19
ὥσπερ Εὐριπίδης τῷ Αἰγεῖ: obscure loquitur ut solet, sed id mihi certum videtur, per illud
τῷ Αἰγεῖ haud intelligi Euripidis Aegea fabulam nobis exceptis paucis frustulis perditam, sed Aegea hominem in Euripidis Medeam v. 663-755. sinistre productum. quippe scripsit
τῷ Αἰγεῖ (intellige
χρῆται vel
κέχρηται), non
ἐν τῷ Αἰγεῖ vel
ἐν Αἰγεῖ. Aegeus illic apparet et discedit ita, ut iusta huius episodii cum ceteris fabulae partibus coniunctio utique desideretur. itaque Aegei personam sine iusta causa (
αλόγως) Euripides in Medea sua adhibuit.
ὥσπερ ἐν Ὀρέστῃ τοῦ Μενελάου: intellige
πονηρίᾳ χρῆται. fortasse
ἐν Ὀρέστῃ ab aliena manu insertum est: mirum certe, ante
τῷ Αἰγεῖ fabulae nomen reticeri in qua Aegeus
ἀλόγως prodit, continuo autem ad
τοῦ Μενελάου positum esse. ceterum haec postrema repetuntur ex c. 15, 5.
20.
mvp-aristotle-comment-203
Ritter, cap. 25 § 20
αἱ δὲ λύσεις - δώδεκα: loci illi duodecim unde solutio petatur hi sunt. 1. si hoc reprehenditur, admissa esse quae fieri nequeunt, respondemus
ἀλλὰ τοῦ τέλους τοῦ αὐτῆς τυγχάνει ἡ τέχνη. vid. §. 5. 2. si haec excusatio proferri iure non potest, dicimus
ἡμάρτηται μέν,
ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός. vid. §. 5. 3. si non vera vitio dantur, in promptu est excusatio illa
ἀλλ' οἷα δεῖ. §. 6. 4. si neque vera neque bona sunt quae finxit poeta, dicere licet
οὕτω φασίν. §. 7. 5. si admitti ea excusatio non potest, causemur
οὕτως εἶχε. §. 7. 6. si quis prava dicere vel facere videatur a poeta inductus, videndum est quo tempore et quo statu rerum et quo consilio dicat vel faciat. §. 8. hi sunt sex loci, unde quaestionum solutiones hauriuntur: sex relicuos dictionis exploratio praebet, unum glossa (§. 9), alterum metaphora (§. 10), tertium accentus (§.11), quartum distinctio (§. 12), quintum ambiguitas (§. 13), sextum dicendi usus (§. 14). ex his locis a dictione petendis modo
τὸ ἀδύνατον, modo
τὸ ἄλογον, modo
τὸ βλαβερόν, modo
τὸ ὑπεναντίωμα, modo
τὸ παρὰ τὴν ὀρθότητα τὴν κατὰ τέχνην solvitur. aliquatenus conferri cum hisce possunt quae verus Aristoteles, sed et prudenter et certo cum consilio, disputavit in Elench. sophist. c. 4. init.
τρόποι δ᾽ εἰσὶ τοῦ ἐλέγχειν δύο·
οἱ μὲν γάρ εἰσι παρὰ τὴν λέξιν,
οἱ δ᾽ ἔξω τῆς λέξεως.
ἔστι δὲ τὰ μὲν παρὰ τὴν λέξιν ἓξ τὸν ἀριθμόν ·
ταῦτα δὲ ἐστὶν ὁμωνυμία,
ἀμφιβολία,
σύνθεσις,
διαίρεσις,
προσῳδία,
σχῆμα λέξεως. ..: