With regard to problems, ¹ and the various solutions of them, how many kinds there are, and the nature of each kind, all will be clear if we look at them like this.

Since the poet represents life, as a painter does or any other maker of likenesses, he must always represent one of three things—either things as they were or are; or things as they are said and seem to be; or things as they should be.

These are expressed in diction with or without rare words and metaphors, there being many modifications of diction, all of which we allow the poet to use.

Moreover, the standard of what is correct is not the same in the art of poetry as it is in the art of social conduct or any other art.

In the actual art of poetry there are two kinds of errors, essential and accidental.

If a man meant to represent something and failed through incapacity, that is an essential error. But if his error is due to his original conception being wrong and his portraying, for example, a horse advancing both its right legs, that is then a technical error in some special branch of knowledge, 20 in medicine, say, or whatever it may be; or else some sort of impossibility has been portrayed, but that is not an essential error.

These considerations must, then, be kept in view in meeting the charges contained in these objections.

Let us first take the charges against the art of poetry itself. If an impossibility has been portrayed, an error has been made.

But it is justifiable if the poet thus achieves the object of poetry—what that is has been already stated—and makes that part or some other part of the poem more striking. The pursuit of Hector is an example of this. ²

If, however, the object could have been achieved better or just as well without sacrifice of technical accuracy, then it is not justifiable, for, if possible, there should be no error at all in any part of the poem.

Again one must ask of which kind is the error, is it an error in poetic art or a chance error in some other field? It is less of an error not to know that a female stag has no horns than to make a picture that is unrecognizable.

Next, supposing the charge is That is not true, one can meet it by saying But perhaps it ought to be, just as Sophocles said that he portrayed people as they ought to be and Euripides portrayed them as they are.

If neither of these will do, then say, Such is the tale; for instance, tales about gods.

Very likely there is no advantage in telling them, and they are not true either, but may well be what Xenophanes declared ³ —all the same such is the tale.

1461a 1 In another case, perhaps, there is no advantage but such was the fact, e.g. the case of the arms, Their spears erect on butt-spikes stood, ⁴ for that was then the custom, as it still is in Illyria .

As to the question whether anything that has been said or done is morally good or bad, this must be answered not merely by seeing whether what has actually been done or said is noble or base, but by taking into consideration also the man who did or said it, and seeing to whom he did or said it, and when and for whom and for what reason; for example, to secure a greater good or to avoid a greater evil.

Some objections may be met by reference to the diction, for example, by pleading rare word, e.g. οὐρῆας μὲν πρῶτον, for perhaps he means not mules but sentinels. ⁵ And Dolon, One that was verily evil of form, it may be not his deformed body but his ugly face, for the Cretans use fair-formed for fair-featured. ⁶ And again Livelier mix it may mean not undiluted as for drunkards but quicker. ⁷

Other expressions are metaphorical, for example: while yet he says: 20 All is used instead of many metaphorically, all being a species of many. ⁸ And again, Alone unsharing ⁹ is metaphorical; the best known is called the only one.

By intonation also; for example, the solutions of Hippias of Thasos , his δίδομεν δέ οἱ ¹⁰ and τὸ μὲν οὗ καταπύθεται ὄμβρῳ ¹¹ ;

and by punctuation; for example, the lines of Empedocles: ¹²

Or again by ambiguity, e.g. παρῴχηκεν δὲ πλέω νύξ, where πλείω is ambiguous. ¹³

Others according to the habitual use of the phrase, e.g. wine and water is called wine so you get the phrase greaves of new-wrought tin; ¹⁴ or workers in iron are called braziers, and so Ganymede is said to pour wine for Zeus, though they do not drink wine. This last might however be metaphorical. ¹⁵

Whenever a word seems to involve a contradiction, one should consider how many different meanings it might bear in the passage, e.g. in There the bronzen shaft was stayed, ¹⁶ we should ask in how many ways being stayed might be taken,

interpreting the passage in this sense or in that,

and keeping as far as possible from the attitude which Glaucon ¹⁷ describes 1461b 1 when he says that people make some unwarrantable presupposition and having themselves given an adverse verdict proceed to argue from it, and if what they think the poet has said does not agree with their own preconceived ideas, they censure him, as if that was what he had said.

This is what has happened in the case of Icarius. ¹⁸ They assume that he was a Spartan and therefore find it odd that when Telemachus went to Sparta he did not meet him. But the truth may be, as the Cephallenians say, that Odysseus married a wife from their country and that the name was not Icarius but Icadius. So the objection is probably due to a mistake.

In general any impossibility may be defended by reference to the poetic effect or to the ideal or to current opinion.

For poetic effect a convincing impossibility is preferable to that which is unconvincing though possible.

It may be impossible that there should be such people as Zeuxis ¹⁹ used to paint, but it would be better if there were; for the type should improve on the actual.

Popular tradition may be used to defend what seems irrational, and you can also say that sometimes it is not irrational, for it is likely that unlikely things should happen.

Contradictions in terms must be examined in the same way as an opponent’s refutations in argument, to see whether the poet refers to the same thing in the same relation and in the same sense, and has contradicted either what he expressly says himself or what an intelligent person would take to be his meaning.

It is right, however, to censure both improbability and depravity where there is no necessity and no use is made of the improbability. 20 An example is Euripides’ intro duction of Aegeus ²⁰ or(of depravity)the character of Menelans in the Orestes.

The censures they bring are of five kinds; that things are either impossible or irrational or harmful or inconsistent or contrary to artistic correctness. The solutions must be studied under the heads specified above, twelve in number. ²¹

With respect to critical difficulties and their solu-
tions, the number and nature of the sources from which
they may be drawn may be thus exhibited.

The poet being an imitator, like a painter or any
other artist, must of necessity imitate one of three
objects, things as they were or are, things as they are
said or thought to be, or things as they ought to be.

The vehicle of expression is language, either current
terms or, it may be, rare words or metaphors.
There
are also many modifications of language, which we
concede to the poets.

Add to this, that the standard of
correctness is not the same in poetry and politics, any
more than in poetry and any other art.

Within the art of
poetry itself there are two kinds of faults, those
which touch its essence, and those which are accidental.

If a poet has chosen to imitate something,
imitated it incorrectly> through want of capacity, the
error is inherent in the poetry.
But if the failure is
due to a wrong choice—if he has represented a horse
as throwing out both his off legs at once, or introduced
technical inaccuracies in medicine, for example, or in
any other art—the error is not essential to the poetry.

These are the points of view from which we should
consider and answer the objections raised by the
critics.
First as to matters which concern the poet's own
art.
If he describes the impossible, he is guilty of
an error;

but the error may be justified, if the end
of the art be thereby attained (the end being that
already mentioned),—if, that is, the effect of this or
any other part of the poem is thus rendered more
striking.
A case in point is the pursuit of Hector.

If, however, the end might have been as well, or
better, attained without violating the special rules of the
poetic art, the error is not justified: for every kind of
error should, if possible, be avoided.

Again, does the error touch the essentials of the
poetic art, or some accident of it?
For example, not
to know that a hind has no horns is a less serious matter
than to paint it inartistically.

Further, if it be objected that the description is not
true to fact, the poet may perhaps reply,—'But the
objects are as they ought to be': just as Sophocles said
that he drew men as they ought to be;
Euripides, as
they are. In this way the objection may be met.

If,
however, the representation be of neither kind, the poet
may answer,—'This is how men say the thing is.'
This
applies to tales about the gods.

It may well be that
these stories are not higher than fact nor yet true to
fact: they are, very possibly, what Xenophanes says of
them. But anyhow, 'this is what is said.'

Again, a
description may be no better than the fact: 'still, it was
the fact';
as in the passage about the arms: 'Upright
upon their butt-ends stood the spears.'
This was the
custom then, as it now is among the Illyrians.

Again, in examining whether what has been said or
done by some one is poetically right or not, we must
not look merely to the particular act or saying, and ask
whether it is poetically good or bad.
We must also con-
sider by whom it is said or done, to whom, when, by
what means, or for what end;
whether, for instance, it
be to secure a greater good, or avert a greater evil.

Other difficulties may be resolved by due regard to
the usage of language.
We may note a rare word, as in
οὐρῆας μὲν πρῶτον, where the poet perhaps employs
οὐρῆας not in the sense of mules, but of sentinels.
So,
again, of Dolon: 'ill-favoured indeed he was to look upon.'
It is not meant that his body was ill-shaped, but that his
face was ugly;
for the Cretans use
the word εὐειδές,
'well-favoured,' to denote a fair face.
Again, ζωρότερον
δὲ κέραιε, 'mix the drink livelier,' does not mean 'mix
it stronger' as for hard drinkers, but 'mix it quicker.'

Sometimes an expression is metaphorical, as 'Now all
gods and men were sleeping through the night,'—while at
the same time the poet says: 'Often indeed as he turned
his gaze to the Trojan plain, he marvelled at the sound
of flutes and pipes.'
'All' is here used metaphorically
for 'many,' all being a species of many.
So in the
verse, 'alone she hath no part..,' οἴη, 'alone,' is
metaphorical;
for the best known may be called the
only one.

Again, the solution may depend upon accent or
breathing.
Thus Hippias of Thasos solved the difficulties
in the lines,—δίδομεν (διδόμεν) δέ οἱ, and τὸ μὲν οὗ (οὐ)
καταπύθεται ὄμβρῳ.

Or again, the question may be solved by punctuation,
as in Empedocles, 'Of a sudden things became mortal
that before had learnt to be immortal, and things un-
mixed before mixed.'

Or again, by ambiguity of meaning, ας παρῴχηκεν δὲ πλέω νύξ, where the word πλέω
is ambiguous.

Or by the usage of language.
Thus any mixed
drink is called οἶνος, 'wine.'
Hence Ganymede is said
'to pour the wine to Zeus,' though the gods do not
drink wine.
So too workers in iron are called χαλκέας,
or workers in bronze.
This, however, may also be taken
as a metaphor.

Again, when a word seems to involve some incon-
sistency of meaning, we should consider how many
senses it may bear in the particular passage.

For
example: 'there was stayed the spear of bronze'—we
should ask in how many ways we may take 'being
checked there.'

The true mode of interpretation is the
precise opposite of what Glaucon mentions.
Critics, he
says, jump at certain groundless conclusions; they pass
adverse judgment and then proceed to reason on it;
and,
assuming that the poet has said whatever they happen
to think, find fault if a thing is inconsistent with their
own fancy.

The question about Icarius has been treated
in this fashion. The critics imagine he was a Lacedae-
monian.
They think it strange, therefore, that Tele-
machus should not have met him when he went to
Lacedaemon.
But the Cephallenian story may perhaps
be the true one.
They allege that Odysseus took a wife
from among themselves, and that her father was Icadius
not Icarius.
It is merely a mistake, then, that gives
plausibility to the objection.

In general, the impossible must be justified by
reference to artistic requirements, or to the higher
reality, or to received opinion.

With respect to the
requirements of art, a probable impossibility is to be
preferred to a thing improbable and yet possible.

Again,
it may be impossible that there should be men such as
Zeuxis painted.
'Yes,' we say, 'but the impossible is
the higher thing; for the ideal type must surpass the
reality.'

To justify the irrational, we appeal to what is
commonly said to be.
In addition to which, we urge
that the irrational sometimes does not violate reason;
just as 'it is probable that a thing may happen contrary
to probability.'

Things that sound contradictory should be examined
by the same rules as in dialectical refutation—whether
the same thing is meant, in the same relation, and in the
same sense.
We should therefore solve the question by
reference to what the poet says himself, or to what is
tacitly assumed by a person of intelligence.

The element of the irrational, and, similarly, depravity
of character, are justly censured when there is no inner
necessity for introducing them.
Such is the irrational
element in the introduction of Aegeus by Euripides and
the badness of Menelaus in the Orestes.

Thus, there are five sources from which critical
objections are drawn.
Things are censured either as
impossible, or irrational, or morally hurtful, or contra-
dictory, or contrary to artistic correctness.
The answers
should be sought under the twelve heads above mentioned.

As regards Problems and their Solutions, one may see
the number and nature of the assumptions on which they
proceed by viewing the matter in the following way.

(1) The
poet being an imitator just like the painter or other maker
of likenesses, he must necessarily in all instances represent
things in one or other of three aspects, either as they were
or are, or as they are said or thought to be or to have
been, or as they ought to be.

(2) All this he does in
language, with an admixture, it may be, of strange words
and metaphors, as also of the various modified forms of
words,

since the use of these is conceded in poetry.
(3) It is to be remembered, too, that there is not the same kind
of correctness in poetry as in politics, or indeed any other
art.

There is, however, within the limits of poetry itself
a possibility of two kinds of error, the one directly, the
other only accidentally connected with the art.

If the poet meant to describe the thing correctly, and failed through
lack of power of expression, his art itself is at fault. But
if it was through his having meant to describe it in some
incorrect way (e.g. to make the horse in movement have
both right legs thrown forward) that the technical error
(one in a matter of, say, medicine or some other special
science), or impossibilities of whatever kind they may be,
have got into his description, his error in that case is not
in the essentials of the poetic art.

These, therefore, must
be the premisses of the Solutions in answer to the criticisms
involved in the Problems.
I. As to the criticisms relating to the poet's art itself.
Any impossibilities there may be in his descriptions of things
are faults.

But from another point of view they are justifiable,
if they serve the end of poetry itself—if (to assume what we
have said of that end) they make the effect of some portion
of the work more astounding. The Pursuit of Hector is
an instance in point.

If, however, the poetic end might
have been as well or better attained without sacrifice of
technical correctness in such matters, the impossibility is
not to be justified, since the description should be, if it can,
entirely free from error.

One may ask, too, whether the
error is in a matter directly or only accidentally connected
with the poetic art; since it is a lesser error in an artist
not to know, for instance, that the hind has no horns, than
to produce an unrecognizable picture of one.

II. If the poet's description be criticized as not true to
fact, one may urge perhaps that the object ought to be as
described—an answer like that of Sophocles, who said that
he drew men as they ought to be, and Euripides as they
were.
If the description, however, be neither true nor of the
thing as it ought to be, the answer must be then, that it is
in accordance with opinion.

The tales about Gods, for
instance, may be as wrong

as Xenophanes thinks, neither
true nor the better thing to say; but they are certainly in
accordance with opinion.

Of other statements in poetry
one may perhaps say, not that they are better than the
truth, but that the fact was so at the time; e.g. the descrip-
tion of the arms: ‘their spears stood upright, butt-end upon
the ground’; for that was the usual way of fixing them then,
as it is still with the Illyrians.

As for the question whether
something said or done in a poem is morally right or not,
in dealing with that one should consider not only the intrinsic
quality of the actual word or deed, but also the person who
says or does it, the person to whom he says or does it,
the time, the means, and the motive of the agent—whether
he does it to attain a greater good, or to avoid a greater
evil.

III. Other criticisms one must meet by considering the
language of the poet: (1) by the assumption of a strange
word in a passage like , where by
Homer may perhaps mean not mules but sentinels. And
in saying of Dolon, , his meaning
may perhaps be, not that Dolon's body was deformed, but
that his face was ugly, as is the Cretan word for
handsome-faced. So, too, may mean not
‘mix the wine stronger,’ as though for topers, but ‘mix it
quicker.’

(2) Other expressions in Homer may be explained
as metaphorical; e.g. in , as compared with what he tells us at the
same time, , the word , ‘all,’ is metaphorically
put for ‘many,’ since ‘all’ is a species of ‘many.’ So also
his is metaphorical, the best known standing
‘alone.’

(3) A change, as Hippias suggested, in the mode
of reading a word will solve the difficulty in ,
and .

(4) Other difficulties may
be solved by another punctuation; e.g. in Empedocles, .

(5) Or by the assumption of an equivocal term, as in , where is equivocal.

(6) Or by an
appeal to the custom of language. Wine-and-water we
call ‘wine’; and it is on the same principle that Homer
speaks of a , a ‘greave of new-
wrought tin.’ A worker in iron we call a ‘brazier’;
and it is on the same principle that Ganymede is de-
scribed as the ‘wine-server’ of Zeus, though the Gods do
not drink wine. This latter, however, may be an instance of
metaphor.

But whenever also a word seems to imply some
contradiction, it is necessary to reflect how many ways there
may be of understanding it in the passage in question; e.g.
in Homer's one should consider
the possible senses of ‘was stopped there’—

whether by
taking it in this sense

or in that one will best avoid the fault
of which Glaucon speaks:
‘They start with some improbable
presumption; and having so decreed it themselves, proceed
to draw inferences, and censure the poet as though he
had actually said whatever they happen to believe, if his
statement conflicts with their own notion of things.’

This
is how Homer's silence about Icarius has been treated.
Starting with the notion of his having been a Lacedaemonian,
the critics think it strange for Telemachus not to have met
him when he went to Lacedaemon. Whereas the fact may
have been as the Cephallenians say, that the wife of Ulysses
was of a Cephallenian family, and that her father's name
was Icadius, not Icarius. So that it is probably a mistake
of the critics that has given rise to the Problem.

Speaking generally, one has to justify (1) the Impossible
by reference to the requirements of poetry, or to the better,
or to opinion.

For the purposes of poetry a convincing
impossibility is preferable to an unconvincing possibility;

and if men such as Zeuxis depicted be impossible, the
answer is that it is better they should be like that, as the
artist ought to improve on his model.

(2) The Improbable
one has to justify either by showing it to be in accordance
with opinion, or by urging that at times it is not im-
probable; for there is a probability of things happening
also against probability.

(3) The contradictions found in
the poet's language one should first test as one does
an opponent's confutation in a dialectical argument, so as
to see whether he means the same thing, in the same rela-
tion, and in the same sense, before admitting that he has
contradicted either something he has said himself or what
a man of sound sense assumes as true.

But there is no
possible apology for improbability of Plot or depravity of
character, when they are not necessary and no use is made
of them, like the improbability in the appearance of Aegeus
in Medea and the baseness of Menelaus in Orestes.

The objections, then, of critics start with faults of five
kinds: the allegation is always that something is either (1)
impossible, (2) improbable, (3) corrupting, (4) contradictory,
or (5) against technical correctness. The answers to these
objections must be sought under one or other of the above-
mentioned heads, which are twelve in number.

[1] ¹ 25.1 [WITH respect to critical objections1, and the solutions of them, the number and quality of their species ^{2 3 4 5 6} will become apparent from surveying them as follows. Since the poet is an imitator, in the same manner as a painter, 25.2 or any other person who makes likenesses, it is necessary that he should always imitate one of the three [objects of imitation]. For he must either imitate things such as they were or are, or such as they are said and appear to be2, or such as they ought to be. ⁷ But these are enunciated either by [common] diction, 25.3 or by foreign words and metaphors. For there are many modifications of diction; and we concede these to the poets. ⁸ Besides this, there is not the same rectitude of politics and poetry, nor of any other art and poetry. But of poetry itself, the error is twofold; the one essential, the other accidental. ⁹ For the error is essential, when it attempts to imitate that which is beyond its power; but [when it attempts to imitate improperly, as4] if for instance, a horse should be described as moving both its right legs together, or an error in any of the ^{10 11 12 13 14} arts be committed in poetry, 25.4 as in medicine, 25.5 or any other art, when it fabricates things that are impossible, these, therefore, whatever they may be, are not the essential errors of poetry. ¹⁵ Hence, one must refute the objections of critics from surveying these particulars. 25.6 For in the first place, indeed, the poet errs, if what he fabricates is impossible according to the art itself; but it will be right if the end of poetry is obtained by it. 25.7 For we have before shown what the end is, viz. if the poet thus renders what he fabricates, or any other part of the poem, more capable of producing a more striking effect5. An example of this is the pursuit of Hector. 25.8 If, however, this end can be more or less attained, 25.9 and that according to the art pertaining to these things, then the fault will not be excusable. For it is requisite if possible to be entirely without error. 25.10 Further still, it should be considered whether the error ranks among things essential to the poetic art, or foreign and incidental. For it is a less fault not to know that a hind has no horns, than to depict a bad copy of one. Besides this, also, if the poet is blamed for ¹⁶ not imitating things as they truly are, the reply is, but he imitates them as they should be. Thus Sophocles said, that he described men such as they should be, but Euripides such as they are. 25.11 If, however, it should be objected, that the poet represents things in neither of these ways, he may say that he represents them as men say they are; as, for instance, in things pertaining to the gods. For per- ¹⁷ Laps it is neither better thus to speak, nor true, but it is just as it may happen; 25.12 as Xenophanes observes, “At any rate they tell us such things6." Perhaps, however, it may be said, that it is not better, indeed, thus to speak, but that the thing was so; as in the passage concerning the arms [of the sleeping soldiers of Diomed]: ^{18 19}

ἔγχεα δέ σφιν ὄρθ' ἐπὶ σαυρωτῆρος,

fixed upright in the earth

Their spears stood by

For such was the custom at that time, as it is now ²⁰ with the Illyrians. With respect, however, to the inquiry whether a thing is said or done by any one well or ill, we must not only regard the thing itself which is done or said, whether it is good or bad, but we must also [consider] the person by whom it is done or said, viz. concerning whom, or when, or to whom, or on what account, he speaks or acts; as whether it is for the sake of bringing to pass a greater good, or in order to avoid a greater evil. ²¹ But it is requisite to remove some objections by looking to the diction; as, for instance, to foreign words: On mules th' infection first began. For perhaps he does not use ούρῆας to signify mules, but guards8. 25.13 And in what he says of Dolon, —— of form unhappy It may be said that εἶδος κακὸς does not signify a body without symmetry, but a deformed face. For the Cretans call a man with a good face εὺειδής. And, For ζωρότερον may not mean undiluted wine, as for ^{22 23 24 25} intemperate drinkers, but wine poured out rapidly. But a thing is said metaphorically, 25.14 as, ²⁶ The other gods and men " Slept all the night. And at the same time he says :

ἤτοι ὅτ᾽ ἐς πέδιον τὸ Τρωικὸν ἀθρήσειεν

αὐλῶν συρίγγων θ᾽ ὁμαδόν.

For all is said metaphorically, instead of many, all' being a species of many. 25.15 And thus οἲη δ’ ἂμμορος is said of Orion metaphorically. For that which is most known, is called alone or sole13. 25.16 Objections also ²⁷ may be solved from accent, as Hippias the Thasian solved the following passages : And, Objections likewise may be solved by punctuation; ²⁸ as in the following instance from Empedocles, ^{29 30 31 32 33 34} Or by ambiguous expressions, as [in Iliad, x.]

παρῴχηκεν δὲ δὲ πλέων νυξ16.

25.17 Night of two parts the greater share had waned,

But of her empire still a third remain'd.

³⁵ 25.18 For the word πλέων is ambiguous. Or objections may be answered from the custom of diction; as when wine is called κεκραμένον, mixed17; whence has been said, Greaves of new-wrought tin. And those that work on iron are called braziers18. Whence Ganymede is said To pour out wine for Jove 19; II. 20. though the gods do not drink wine. But this may also be metaphorically said. ³⁶ It is necessary, however, 25.19 when a word appears to signify something of a contrary nature, to consider how many significations it may have in the passage before us; 25.20 as,

τῇ ῥ᾽ ἔσχετο χάλκεον ἔγχος

There stuck the lance20 :

For here the word stuck implies that the lance was impeded. Of how many different senses a word may admit, one may learn thus, by a contrary manner ^{37 38 39 40 41 42} from what Glauco says21, [when he asserts that] " some men presuppose irrationally, and then reason from their own decision: 25.21 and, having once pronounced their opinion, reprobate whatever is contrary to their [preconceived] opinion." This was the case with respect to Icarius. For the multitude fancy that he was a Laconian. On this supposition, therefore, it is absurd that Telemachus should not meet him, on his arrival at Lacedaemon22. Perhaps, however, the truth is as the Cephalenians say, viz. that Ulysses married among them, and that Icadius, and not Icarius, [was his father-in-law]. ⁴³ 25.22 It is probable, therefore, that this objection is erroneous. 25.23 In short, it is necessary to refer the impossible either to the poetry, or to that which is better, or to opinion. For, with respect to poetry, probable impossibility is more eligible, than the improbable and possible, and things should be such as Zeuxis23 painted. 25.24 And also [we may refer the impossible] to that which is better24: for it is necessary that the pattern should transcend those things which are said to be irrational. 25.25 The objection, also, that something is irrational may be solved by saying, that sometimes it is not irrational; for it is probable that what is improbable may have happened. ⁴⁴ But with respect to the solution of apparent contraries, these are to be considered in the same manner as ^{45 46 47 48} elenchi20 in arguments, if the same thing [is affirmed or denied], and with respect to the same thing, and after the same manner, and whether it is the same person [who affirms and denies], and also with what reference he speaks, and what a wise man would understand from his words26. ⁴⁹ The reprehension [of poets] on the score of improbability27 and vicious manners will be right, through which it is shown, that they have without any necessity devised something irrational. 25.26 Thus irrationality is used [without any necessity] by Euripides in his Aegeus, and viciousness, in the character of Menelaus, in his ⁵⁰ Orestes. The reprehensions, therefore, may be derived from five species. 25.27 For they are either made because impossibilities are introduced, 25.28 or absurdities, 25.29 or things of evil tendency, 25.30 or contraries, or as errors committed against the rectitude of art. 25.31 But the solutions may be surveyed from the above-mentioned number; 25.32 for they are twelve.28]

[De quaestionibus autem et solutionibus, ex quot et quibus formis sint, sic fere considerantibus manifestum fiet.

nam quia imitator est poeta, quasi si pictor vel alius imaginum opifex, necesse est ut imitetur, cum numero tria sint, unum ex iis semper: aut quae erant sive sunt, aut quae dicunt et credunt, aut quae esse oportet.

haec autem enuntiantur oratione vel etiam glossis et translationibus.

atque multae affectiones orationis sunt: has enim damus poetis. ad haec non eadem recti norma est politicae artis atque poeticae, neque alius artis atque poeticae.

ipsius autem poeticae duplex est peccatum: alterum quod ad ipsam pertinet, alterum quod ad accidens.

nam si delegit imitari quod fieri nequit, ipsius est peccatum: sin autem [delectio non recte instituta, sed] equum utroque pede dextro proiecto sive quidquid quaeque ars peccavit, veluti quod pertinet ad medicinam vel aliam artem, quae impossibilia admisit, quaecumque est, non ipsius est peccatum.

decet igitur reprehensiones in quaestionibus hinc considerandas solvere.

primum, si quae ad ipsam artem pertinent impossibilia posita sunt, peccatum est. sed bene se habet, si consequitur finem suum: finis enim expositus est, si sic admirabiliorem aut eam aut aliam reddat partem.

exemplum Hectoris persecutio. si tamen finis aut magis aut minus potuit subesse etiam secundum huius rei artem, peccatum est non recte: oportet enim, si licet, omnino nusquam vitium admissum esse.

porro quorum est peccatum, eorum quae ad artem pertinent aut ad aliud quod est accidens? minus enim, si ignorabat cervam cornua non habere, quam si male imitando descripsit.

ad haec autem si reprehenditur non vera esse, at quae oportet, ut etiam Sophocles dixit se quos oporteret facere, Euripides autem qui essent, ita solvendum est.

sin autem neutra ratione, quod sic dicunt, veluti illa de dis.

fortasse enim neque melius sic dicere nec vera sunt, sed evenere ut apud Xenophanem:

at ea non dicunt. fortasse non melius quidem, sed sic se habuere, velut illa de armis, hastaeque iis rectae in cuspide:” sic enim tum consueverunt, quemadmodum etiamnnun Illyrii.

de illo autem, utrum bene an non bene dictum ab aliquo sit factumve, non solum quaerendum est ipsius facti dictive ratione habita, utrum honestum an malum, sed etiam eius qui facit aut dicit ad quem vel quando vel cui vel cuius causa, velut an maioris boni, ut id fiat, an maioris mali, ut id vitetur.

alia dictionis ratione habita solvere decet, ut per glossam οὐρίας μὲν πρῶτον. fortasse enim non mulos dicit sed vigiles. atque Dolonem ὃς δή τοι εἶδος μὲν ἔην κακός, non corpore indecorum sed facie turpem: nam quod εὐειδές, id Creten. ses εὐπρόσωπον vocant. atque illud ζωρότερον δὲ κέραιε non merum ut vinosis, sed idem quod velocius.

alia per translationem dicta sunt, ut ἄλλοι μέν ῥα θεοί τε καὶ ἀνέρες εὗδον παννύχιοι: simulque ait ἤτοι ὅτ᾽ ἐς πεδίον τὸ Τρωϊκὸν ἀθρήσειεν, αὐλῶν συρίγγων θ' ὁμαδόν. scilicet illud πάντες pro πολλοὶ secundum translationem dictum est: omne enim multum quid. atque illud οἴη δ᾽ ἄμμορος secundum trans lationem : quod enim nobilissimum unum est.

per accentum vero, ut Hippias Thasius solvebat illud δίδομεν δέ οἱ et τὸ μὲν οὐ καταπύθεται ὄμβρῳ.

alia per distinctionem, ut Empedocles αἶψα δὲ θνήτ᾽ ἐρύοντο, τὰ πρὶν μάθον ἀθάνατα ζῷά τε πρὶν κέκριτο.

alia per ambiguitatem, παρώχηκεν δὲ πλέων νύξ: nam πλέων ambiguum est.

alia ex consuetudine sermonis, unde quod mixtum vinum esse aiunt, unde factum ocrea recens facti stanni," et aerarios eos qui ferrum cudunt, unde dictus Ganymedes Iovi vinum infundere, quamquam non bibunt vinum. fortasse hoc fuerit secundum translationem.

oportet autem, si nomen quoddam repugnantiam aliquam videatur significare, considerare quot modis significare hoc possit in eo loco, velut τῇ ῥ' ἔσχετο χάλκεον ἔγχος, h. e. ibi impeditam hastam esse. quot modis fieri possit sic fere maxime quis perceperit,

contraria ratione ac Glauco dicit, scilicet nonnullos temere praeconcipere opiniones,

et ipsos cum damnassent ratiocinari, et quasi pronuntiassent "ita videri" reprehendere, si contrarium sit ipsorum opinioni. hoc autem accidit illis circa Icarium.

opinantur enim illum Laconem esse: absurdum igitur quod cum eo non convenit Telemachus ubi Lacedaemonem accessit. hoc autem fortasse se habet ut Cephalenenses aiunt: ab se enim uxorem duxisse dicunt Ulixem, et esse Icadium sed non Icarium. aberratio vero quaestio est, ut videtur.

omnino autem quod fieri nequit ad poesin aut ad id quod melius aut ad opinionem decet revocare.

etenim ad poesin praeferendum credibile idemque impossibile quam incredibile et possibile; tales quippe esse quales Zeuxis pingebat.

sed etiam ad id quod melius: exemplar enim debet eminere prae iis quae tradunt absurda.

sic quoque quod interdum non absurdum est: verisimile enim etiam praeter similitudinem veri fieri.

quae autem repugnantia dicta, sic considerare, quemadmodum in orationibus confutationes, an idem et ad idem et eodem modo, ita ut ipsum vel ob quae is dicat vel quod prudens subiiciat.

iusta vero reprehensio et absurditas et pravitas, si nulla necessitate cogente absurdo utatur, ut Euripides Aegeo, vel pravitate, ut in Oreste Menelai.

reprehensiones itaque ex quinque formis ferunt: aut enim quod impossibilia aut quod absurda aut quod noxia aut quod repugnantia aut quod praeter recti normam ab arte praescriptam solutiones vero ex dictis numeris considerandae, sunt autem duodecim.

1.

24.1 IL y a neceſſairement autant de ſortes d'Epopée, qu'il y a d'eſpeces de Tragedie; car l'Epopée doit être ſimple, ou implexe; morale ou pathetique. 24.2 L'Epopée a auſſi les mêmes parties que la Tragedie, ſi l'on en excep-te la muſique & la décoration, car elle a ſes péripeties, ſes reconnoiſſances, ſes paſſions. De plus les ſentimens n'y doivent pas moins éclater que la diction. 24.3 Homere eſt le premier qui a mêlé toutes ces choſes dans ſa Poësie, & qui les y a mêlées avec beaucoup de ſageſſe & de jugement.

2.

En effet, ſi l'on examine bien ſes deux Poëmes, on trouvera que l'Iliade eſt ſimple & pathetique, & que l'Odyſſée eſt implexe & morale; car par tout il y a des reconnoiſſances, & la morale y regne depuis le commencement juſqu'à la fin. Et pour ce qui eſt de la diction & des ſentimens, bien loin qu'il les ait negligez, il y a ſurpaſſé tous les autres Poëtes.

3.

24.4 L'Epopée ne differe donc de la Tragedie, que par ſon étendue & par ſes vers. Il ſeroit inutile de luy marquer d'autres bornes que celles dont on a déja parlé. 24.5 Il ſuffit qu'on puiſſe voir d'un coup d'œil ſon commencement & ſa fin, & on le fera ſans doute, ſi l'on dreſſe des plans plus courts que ceux des Anciens, & ſi l'on fait en ſorte que le recit d'un Poëme Epique n'occupe pas plus de temps que les repreſentations des differentes Tragedies qu'on joüe dans un ſeul jour.

4.

24.6 L'Epopée a cela de propre en ſoy, qu'elle peut être beaucoup plus étendue que la Tragedie, car celle-cy ne peut pas imiter pluſieurs choſes qui ſe paſſent en même temps, il faut neceſſairement qu'elle ſe renferme dans les bornes étroites de ſon Theatre, & dans un certain nombre d'Acteurs, au lieu que dans le Poëme Epique, qui eſt une narration, on peut ſans peine faire voir tout à la fois pluſieurs choſes qui s'executent en même temps, & en differens lieux, & qui étant toutes propres au ſujet donnent à ce Poëme une étenduë que l'autre n'a pas, 24.7 & cet avantage eſt ſi conſiderable, que par ſon moyen le Poëte jette de la grandeur & de la majeſté dans ſes vers, promene ſon Auditeur dans une varieté admirable d'avantures, & diverſifie ſon ouvrage par quantité d'Epiſodes differens, ce qui ne ſe peut dans la Tragedie, ou la reſſemblance, qui ne manque jamais de produire bientôt l'ennuy & le degoût, eſt la cauſe la plus ordinaire de tous ſes mauvais ſuccez.

5.

24.8 Pour ce qui eſt du vers de l'Epopée, l'experience a fait voir que le vers heroïque eſt le ſeul qui luy convienne. 24.9 En effet ſi quelqu'un entreprenoit de faire un Poëme Epique, en un autre genre de vers, ou en mêlant pluſieurs vers de different genre, cela ſeroit ſans grace, & ne réuſſiroit point du tout, car le vers heroïque eſt le plus grave & le plus pompeux, auſſi reçoit-il particuerement les mots étrangers & les metaphores, & cette imitation, qui conſiſte dans la narration, s'en accommode, beaucoup plus que toutes les autres. 24.10 Or le vers ïambe & le tetrametre ſont propres à donner du mouvement; car le tetrametre eſt bon pour faire danſer, & l'iambe pour faire agir. 24.11 Mais il ſeroit encore plus ridicule de les mêler enſemble, comme a fait Cheremon. 24.12 Voilà pourquoy perſonne n'a entrepris de faire un long Poëme en aucune autre ſorte de vers, qu'en vers heroïques, la Nature ayant elle-même enſeigné, comme je l'ay déja dit, à faire un juſte partage, & à luy donner ce qui luy convient.

6.

24.13 Homere merite d'être loüé pour pluſieurs autres choſes, mais ſur tout, parce qu'il eſt le ſeul de tous les Poëtes, qui connoiſſe bien ce qu'il faut faire. 24.14 Le Poëte doit peu parler luy-même, car ce n'eſt pas en cela qu'il eſt Imitateur. Tous les autres Poëtes n'imitent que rarement, & ne pouſſent pas loin leur imitation, au lieu qu'Homere aprés avoir dit peu de choſe luy-même, introduit d'abord quelqu'un de ſes perſonnages, un homme, ou une femme, ou quelqu'autre choſe qui ait des mœurs, car il ne met rien qui n'en ait, tout a des mœurs dans ſon Poëme.

7.

24.15 Il faut jetter le merveilleux dans la Tragedie, mais encore plus dans l'Epopée, qui va en cela juſqu'au deraiſonnable; car, comme dans l'Epopée on ne voit pas les perſonnages qui agiſſent, tout ce qui paſſe les bornes de la raiſon eſt tres propre à y produire l'admirable & le merveilleux. 24.16 Par exemple, ce qu'Homere dit d'Hector, pourſuivi par Achille, ſeroit ridicule ſur le Theatre; car on ne pourroit s'empêcher de rire, de voir d'un côté les Grecs debout ſans faire aucun mouvement, & A-chille de l'autre, qui pourſuit Hector, & qui fait ſigne aux Troupes. Mais c'eſt ce qui ne paroît pas dans l'Epopée. 24.17 Or le merveilleux eſt toûjours agreable, & une preuve de cela, c'eſt que ceux qui racontent quelque choſe ajoûtent d'ordinaire à la verité pour plaire d'avantage à ceux qui les écoutent.

8.

24.18 Homere eſt celuy qui a le mieux enſeigné aux autres Poëtes à faire, comme il faut ces agreables menſonges, & c'eſt proprement un paralogiſme, car comme tous les hommes ſont naturellement perſuadez, que quand une telle choſe eſt, ou ſe fait, une telle autre choſe arrive, on leur fait aiſément croire, que ſi la derniere eſt, la premiere eſt auſſi par conſequent. Mais outre que cette derniere qu'on donne pour vraye eſt ſouvent fauſſe, la premiere l'eſt auſſi le plus ſouvent. En effet de ce qu'une telle choſe eſt, il ne s'enfuit pas toûjours neceſſairement que l'autre ſoit, mais parce que nous ſommes perſuadez de la verité de la derniere, nous concluons fauſſement que la premiere eſt vraye auſſi.

9.

24.19 Le Poëte doit plûtôt choiſir les choſes impoſſibles, pourvû qu'elles ſoient vray-ſemblables, que les poſſibles qui ſont incroyables avec toute leur poſſibilité.

10.

24.20 Il doit auſſi tâcher de ne rien mettre dans ſon ſujet, qui n'ait ſa raiſon, & ſi cela eſt entierement impoſſible, il faut que ce qu'il y a de des-raiſonnable ſoit hors du ſujet, comme dans l'Edipe l'ignorance où eſt ce Prince de la maniere dont Lajus a été tué. Cela ne doit pas ſe trouver dans tout ce qui paroît ſur le Theatre, & qui fait le corps de l'action comme dans l'Electre, où l'on vient annoncer la nouvelle de la mort d'Oreſte qui s'eſt tué dans les jeux Pythiques, & comme dans les Myſiens, où l'on voit un Courrier qui vient de Tegée en Myſie, ſans avoir dit une ſeule parole.

11.

24.21 De dire que cette exactitude va à détruire les fables, cela eſt riſible; car dés le commencement il faut faire tous ſes efforts pour dreſſer autrement le plan de ſon ſujet, & ſi ce ſujet eſt fait de maniére qu'on ne puiſſe éviter quelqu'un de ces endroits qui paroiſſent abſurdes, il faut le recevoir, ſur tout s'il peut contribuer à rendre le reſte plus vray-ſemblable.

12.

24.22 Dans l'Odyſſée l'endroit où Ulyſſe eſt expoſé par les Pheaciens ſur le rivage d'Itaque, eſt plein de ces abſurditez qui ne ſeroient pas ſupportables ſi un méchant Poëte nous les eût données. Mais ce grand homme les cache toutes ſous une infinité de choſes admirables, dont il aſſaiſonne toute cette partie de ſon Poëme, & qui ſont comme autant de charmes qui nous empêchent d'en appercevoir le défaut.

13.

24.23 Auſſi doit on reſerver tous ces ornemens de la diction pour les endroits foibles; ceux qui renferment, ou de beaux ſentimens, ou des mœurs, n'en ont aucun beſoin. Une expreſſion éclatante & lumineuſe leur nuit au contraire, & ne ſert qu'à les cacher.

Vanto alle dubitationi, & folutioni di quante, & di quali ſpetie elle ſieno compoſte, fia manife ſto tal coſa à chi l'andrà confiderando. ^{1 2}

Effendo il Poeta adunche imitatore non altrimenti che vn' dipintore, ò vno ſtatuario, però e'di necefsita, che e' vada ſempre di tre coſe imitabili imitandone vna, cioè di qual forte furono, ò ſono le coſe;ò di qual forte e' fi dice, ch'elle fieno o che e' par' che elle fieno: ò di qual forte elle douerrebbono eſſere.

Et tutte le coſe dette nella Locutione ſi raccontano,ò per via di parole foreſtiere,ò per via di Metafore. Et molti ſono inuero gli accidenti della Locutione, che a' Poeti ſono attribuiti.

Oltradiqueſto e' non è il medefimo il retto, che hà la ciuile faculta, & quello, che hà la Poetica; & ancora non è il medefimo quello della Poetica con quello diqual fi uoglia altra facultà.

Peccaſi in queſta Arte Poetica in due modi, in vno, che procede da lei ſteſſa, & in vnaltro, che procede da lei accidentalmente.

Procede da lei ſteſſa l'errore, quando ella fi propone ad imitare coſe impoſsibili à effere imitate. Procede da lei accidentalmente, quando ella ſi propone ad imitare vna coſa & non l'imita bene; come è à dire, che il cauallo muoua l'uno, & l'altro pie deſtro,ò uero quan do e' fi pecca in qual ſi uoglia arte particulare, come è nella medicina, dò inaltra, ò quando e fi fingono cofe impoſsibili ad eſſere. I peccati adunche di queſta tal for te non fono peccati propiamente della Poetica: onde interuiene, che chi andra per queſto uerſo confideran do potra foluere l'obiettionı, ch'alla Poetica ſaran' fat te,dicédo primieramente ch'e ſi pecca, s'e fi finge coſe impoſsibili, ſecondo queſta artesma nondimaco che vn tale errore fia ben fatto, ſe mediate lui ella hara conſeguito il fuo fine & quale egli fia è ſtato già detto, cioè, ſe in tal modo il caſo ò qualche parte d'effo hara piu dello ſpauétoſo, ſiaci in eſempio di ciò la perfecutione contro ad Hettore.

Se il fine adunche ſi puo meglio, & peggio conſeguitare in altro modo offeruando l'arte certamente, ch'es' erra ſenza ragione concioſia, che in neſſuno neſſun' modo (ſa poſsibile è) non ſi debba cõmettere errore.

Anchora più diſconueneuole è l'errore, che ſi commette per via dell'arte, di quello che ſi commette per via di qualche accidéte. Che inuero egli errerà mã co chi non ſa, che la Ceruia manchi di corna, di chi l'imita malamente.

Anchora ſe vno fia accufato per non hauer' detto coſe vere, folua queſto tale l'accuſa con dire d'hauerle dette nel modo, che elle doueuono effere; fi come vſo Sofocle di dire, che fingeua gli huomini in quel modo, che e'doueuono effer e: & che Euripide gli fingeua nel modo, che egli erano.

Onde per queſta via ſi può ſcuſare il difetto. Ma quando e' non s'erra ne nellun'modo nè nell'altro ſcuſiſiilPoeta có allegare che cofi fi dice di loro, come auuiene nelle coſe, che degli Dei fi fingono.

Et puoſsi anchor foluere có di re che forſe no era il meglio ch'elle ſteſsin coſi, nè era la verità, ma che' fu detto à cafo;ficome diſſe Xenofane la coſa nó ſta nel verſo. Et puoſsi anchor'foluere che ſebe ne non era il meglio ch'elle ſteſsi coſi, che non dimanco elle ſtauan' coſi anticamente, ficome è quello, che fi dice dell'armi.

-L'hafte eran fitte in terra. Che cofi era allhora in costume, come è hoggi ancora appreſſo degli Schiauoni.

Anchora per vedere ſe una coſa è detta,ò è fatta bene,ò non bene, fi debbe confiderare non pure al detto, & al fatto, ſe egli è, dico, honeſto, ò vituperoſo;

ma ſi debbe confiderare anchora à chỉ lo dice, & à chi lo fà, & verſo di chi egli è detto,ò quando, o perchi,ò per cagione di che coſa; come dire, ſe ella è per conto di maggior bene, acciochè eſeguiſle; ò ſe ella fu per cagion'dı maggiorʼmale, accioche e'non fi faceffe.

Pofſonſiſoluere anchora l'obbiettioni con rifguardare à eſſa Locutione; come è per via della lin- XX gua, come è quel verſo d'Homero ὀυρήασ μεν πρῶτον. T Perchè forſe vna tal voce no ſignifica i muli, ma ſignifi cale guardie. Et come altroue dice parlado di Dolone. Gli era brutto d' afpetto. Non perchè egli haueſſe la perſona mal fatta, ma perchè egli haueua brutto il volto: perchè queſto vocabo 1ο ενφλέσ. i Cretenfſi l'intendono per bello di volto. Et quello altro, che dice. ξωρότερον λὲ κέραιρε. Che vuol dire E' beeua il vin'pretto; doue queſto nome ζωρότερον in tal luogo nó è poſto per ber'il vin' pretto, di.che gli Ebbriprendon' piacere;ma è preſo per be re frequentemente.

Solueſi anchora per via della Me tafora, come è in Homero Già gli Dei tutti e i cavalieri armati Teneua un alto ſonno. Et quell'altro. Quand a campi Troiani e uolfe 1 lumi. Et queſt'altro che dice. Di Flauti la noce, di Zampogne. Et certo, che il vocabolo di Tutti metaforicamente ſi piglia per Molti; conciofia che il Tutto ſia vn certo affai. Et queſto altro che dice. Vnica ſenza mai ting erfiinlonde. Perchè quello, che è notiſsimo, ſi dice eſſere vnico, & folo.

Fafsi anchorala Solutione per via dello accento come fece Ippia da Thaſio, che diffe Λίλομεν δὲ οἱ, che vuol dire Ma noi diamo; perchè quello oi è articolo: doue s'e's'aggiugne l'accento circunfleſſo ſignifica il pronome. Et come è anchor' queſto altro, che dice οὐ καταπύθεται ὄμβρω, che vuol dire Ella già non marciſce mai per l'acqua. - Perchè quella particella ou che è negatiua ſe e'vi fi mer ete l'accento circunfleſſo con l'aſpiratione ſuona vnal tra coſa.

Solueſi anchora per via della diſtintione, co me è appreſſo d'Empedocle า αἴμα λὲ θνητά ἐφύοντο τὰ πρὶν μάθον ἀθάνατα εἶναι · ζωρὰ τὰ τὰ πρὶν ἄκριτα Solueſi anchora per l'Anfibologia, come è Piu notte era paſſata.

Perchè la parola πλέον è dubbia. Anchora ſi ſolue per la confuetudine della Locutione, come è queſto nome κεχραμένον, che vuol dire Meſcolato; il quale ſi pone pel vino.

Onde è quel verſo Et fabbricogli di ferro i gambali. Doue il nome greco κασσιτέροιο fignifica Di ſtagno.

Et queſt'altra parola che dice χαλκέασ La qual voce altroue ſignificando i tabbri, che fondono il bronzo; qui è preſa per quegli, che affettano il ferro:có la quale ragione medefimaméte fi dice Ganimede mefcere il vino agli Dei, nè però è che gli Dei beino vino. Ne tal coſa può dirſi per Metafora.

Ma quando nel nome ſteſſo appariſce contrarieta di fignificatione, è da vedere inquate forti di ſignificati è varii circa à quel ſubbietto, Et li uietò che'l pugnal non traeſſe, come dire. Che è detto con queſte parole. · τῆς᾽ ἔσχετο χάλκεον ἔγχοσ.

Perchè in queſto luogo il verbo ἴσχετο, che altro ue ſignifica.

E's'accoſtaua, qui è preſo per Prohibiua, & in tal modo ſi può confiderar l'aſſai ſignificationi; cioè, ſe vno andra pigliando i contrarii, che ſono • oppoſti per fronte: ò come dice Glaucone: Che li calumniatori à torto dicono certe coſe eſſer ſenza ragio ne, & per tal verſo le van diſcorrendo, & biafimano quelche pare, come ſe fufſe, ſe egli è contrario alla loro oppinione, Nel quale genere ſono le coſe che d'Icaro XX.

ii ſono biaſimate:imperochè ſtimado eſsi ch'e' fufſe Spar tano, par' loro incóueniente per ciò che Telemaco andando in Sparta non fufſe ito ad alloggiar' con ſeco Che forſe la coſa ſtà nel modo, che i Cefaléſi affermano cioè che Vliſſe appreſſo di loro toglieſſe moglie, & che'l fuocero di detto Icadio, & no Icario Ma il pecca to, che coſtoro appogono à Homero vn' obiettiõe ve rifimile.

In fomma quello, che è detto impoſsibilmente ſi debbe ſcuſare, ò per via d'eſſa Poefia, ò per via di ri ſpetto migliore, ò per via della fama, che innazifene hab bia:

perchè nella poeſia ſi debbe piutoſto eleggere vno impoſsibile, che ſia creduto, che vn poſsibile che non ſi poſſa far credere.

Et di tal maniera debbono eſſere gli huomini, che nella Poeſia ſono indotti, quali furono gli dipinti da Zeuſi; anzi ſi debbe ſempre fargli incli nare nel meglio;

perchè l'eſempio debbe ſempre auanzare:& debbono riſpondere i Poeti alle obiettioni fatte loro, d'hauere cioè detto coſe contro à ragione; che certe volte tali non mancano di ragione, concioſia che egli è uerifimile, che molte coſe interuenghino fuori del verifimile.

Ma i detti contrarii in tal modo debbo no eſſer' confiderati, ſicome ſono conſiderati gli Elen ci nel parlare ſciolto, cioè, ſe il detto è il medesimo, & ſe egli è detto per il medesimo, & fe egli è detto in vn medefimo modo, ſi come ſe:

chi parla e il medesimo, o coloro à chi egli parla, ò ſe le coſe ſono le medeſi me, che vn'huom ſaggio porrebbe.Che inuero retta è quella accuſa, che ſi fa contro alle coſe, che mancano, ò di ragione, ò di bontà, cioè quádo e' s'uſa di dir' coſe ſenza ragione,nó eſſendo da neſſuna neceſsità ſtretto, ficome vsò Euripide la maluagità in Egeo, & quella di Menelao nell'Oreste.

Tutte adunche le obbiettioni che ſi fanno nella poeſia procedono da cinque cagioni cioè ò dall'impoſsibile, ò dal mancamento di ragione, ô dal nociuo, ò dal contrario,ò da quello, che trapafsi il rétto dell'arte poetica, & le folutioni ſecondo inumeri detti debbono effer confiderate, le quali in tutto fono dodeci.

Iam de quaestionibus et solutionibus, tum ex quot tum ex qualibus formis sint, hoc pacto contemplantibus het sine dubio manifestum.

quoniam enim poëta est imitator, quemadmodum etiam pictor vel quis alius imaginum effector, necesse est imitari de iis quae numero sunt tria, unum aliquod semper: aut enim qualia erant aut sunt; aut qualia aiunt aut videntur; aut qualia esse oportet.

haec autem exponuntur dictione vel et linguis et translationibus. et multae affectiones sunt dictionis: haec enim poëtis concedimus.

praeterea vero non est eadem rectitudo politicae et poëticae, neque aliarum artium et poëticae.

ipsius autem poëticae duplex erratum: nam unum per se, alterum per accidens.

etenim aut praeeligit imitationem rei quae ultra facultatem est, quod erratum ipsius est; aut praeeligit non recte, quod per accidens est, sed fecit equum moventem utramque dextram partem. aut erratum est secundum unamquamque artem, quemadmodum secundum medicinam aut aliam artem. aut quae fieri non possunt, ficta sunt. haec igitur qualiacunque fuerint, non per se sunt. quare reprehensiones in quaestionibus ex his considerando solvendae sunt. primum enim si quae adversus ipsam artem sunt, ficta sint huiusmodi ut fieri non possint, erratum sit. sed recte se res habet, si consequitur finem ipsius. finis enim dictus est, quemadmodum si sit magis ad consternandum vel ipsa accommodetur vel alteram partem accommodet. exemplum Hectoris insectatio.

nam si finis vel magis vel minus contingebat inesse, etiam secundum eam artem quae de his est, peccatum est non recte: oportet enim, si fieri potest, omnino nusquam errari.

praeterea utrorum est peccatum maius, eorumne quae sunt secundum artem, an eorum quae sunt secundum aliud accidens. minus enim est, si nesciebat in cervorum specie feminam cornua non habere, quam si mala imitatione describeret.

ad haec si opponitur non esse vera, at qualia oportet, ut Sophocles inquit se quidem facere quales oportet, Euripides vero quales sunt, quamobrem hac ratione solvendum est. sin autem neutro modo, quod sic aiunt, ut quae de deis dicuntur.

fortasse enim neque licet dicere melius sic, neque vera sunt, sed casu accidit, quemadmodum Xenophanes, sed non aiunt haec.

fortasse autem non melius quidem, sed sic se res habebat, quemadmodum quae de armis dicuntur "lanceae vero ipsius rectae in saurotere:

id enim tunc institutum habebant, quemadmodum etiam nunc Illyrici.

de illo autem quod bene aut non bene ant aut dictum est ab aliquo aut factum, non solum considerandum est,

in ipsum quod factum est aut dictum intuendo, utrum ipsum laude an reprehensione dignum sit, sed etiam in agentem aut dicentem, erga quem aut quando aut quomodo aut cuius causa, quemadmodum aut maioris boni, ut fiat, aut maioris mali, ut ne fiat.

haec autem intuendo ad elocutionem solvenda sunt, quemadmodum per linguam oveñas μev pτov "mulos quidem prius." fortasse enim non mulos sed custodes dicit. et in Dolonem "specie quidem erat malus," non corpore incomposito, sed facie turpi: nam Cretenses pulchritudinem faciei vocant evides. et illud Sporepov de xspaupe *meracius autem misce," non meracius, ut temulentis, sed citius. illud autem per translationem dictum est, ἄλλοι μέν ῥα Θεοί τε καὶ ἀνέρες εἶδον παννύχιοι “alii quidem diique et homines dormiebant totam noctem."

et illud ἤτοι ὅτ᾽ ἐς πεδίον τὸ Τρωϊκὸν ἀθρήσειεν, καὶ αὐλῶν συρίγγων τε ὁμαδόν “sive hic in campum Troianum respiceret, et tibiarum fistularumque vocem. nan πάντες omnes” pro hac voce nohoi "multi" secundum translationem dictum est, quia nav "omne" est nokú re “multum quiddam." et illud oin d'auuoco; "sola expers” secundum translationem: quod enim notissimum est, solum est.

et secundum accentum, quemadmodum Hippias Thasius solvebat illud δίδομεν δέ οἱ. εἰ τὸ μὲν οὗ καταπύθεται ὄμβρῳ hoc quidem, ubi corrumpitur imbre." haec autem divisione, ut Empedocles αἶψα δε θνητ᾽ ἐφύοντο τὰ πρὶν μάθον ἀθάνατα εἶναι,

ζῶρά τε piv axpnta "extemplo autem mortalia nata sunt, quae prius didiceram immortalia esse, mixtaque prius pura." haec vero per ambiguitatem, παρώχηκε δὲ πλέον νύξ.

praeteriit autem plus nox: illud iov ambiguum est. atque haec secundum consuetudinem locutionis: ut aqua temperatum yinum dicunt esse.

unde factum nam * est κνημὶς νεοτεύκτου “κασσιτέροιο ocrea recens fabrefacti stammi.

et vocanti xaλxias aerarios, qui ferrum exercent. unde dictus est Ganymedes lovi olvoxosusiv vinum ministrare, non bibentibus vinum diis.

quando autem nomen aliquod videtur subcontrarium aliquod significare, attendendum est quotupliciter significet hoc in eo quod dictum est, ut pσXεTO Xaλxεov lyxos, eo quod prohibitum sit. illud autem quotupliciter" contingit sic quodammodo.

maxime vero si quis suspicetur per eam rationem quae e regione est,

velut ut Glauco dicit, quod nonnulli sine ratione praesumunt et ipsi, cum iam alterum condemnaverint, syllogismo concludunt, et tanquam eos qui dixerint quod videtur reprehendunt, si subcontrarium fuerit ipsorum existimationi. atque hoc patiuntur quae de Icario dicuntur. existimant enim ipsum Laconem esse: absurdum igitur,

aiunt, est non congressum esse cum eo Telemachum, cum Lacedaemona ivit. idque fortasse se habet ut Cephalenes aiunt: a se enim uxorem duxisse dicunt Ulyssem, et esse Icadium, non Icarium propter erratum. quaestio autem res verisimilis est.

omnino vero, quod fieri non potest, vel ad poësim vel ad melius vel ad opinio- nem opinionem oportet redigere.

nam quod attinet ad poësim, magis eligendum est appositum ad persuadendum, quod fieri non potest, quam non appositum ad persuadendum, quod fieri potest.

ac fieri non potest ut tales sint quales Zeuxis pingebat. verum spectatur etiam melius: nam exemplum debet exsuperare.

ad ea quae aiunt, reducuntur ea quae sine ratione sunt. et sic etiam dicendum, quod aliquando non est praeter rationem: verisimile enim est etiam praeter verisimile fieri.

subcontraria vero, ut dicta sunt, oportet considerare, quemadmodum in sermonibus refutationes, si idem et ad idem et simili modo. quare et ipse respicit aut ad ea quae ipse dicit, aut ad id quod prudens supponat.

iam recta reprehensio est et vacare ratione, et pravum apparere, quando, dum necessitas non est, usus fuerit aliquo quod vacet ratione, quemadmodum Euripides illo Aegeesti, et pravitate, ut Menelai in Oreste.

atque has quidem reprehensiones ex quinque formis afferunt: nam sunt aut tanquam ea quae fieri non possunt, aut tanquam sine ratione, aut tanquam perniciosa, aut tanquam subcontraria, aut tanquam praeter eam rectitudinem quae secundum artem est. solutiones vero ex dictis numeris considerandae; et duodecim sunt.

De problematibus autem et solutionibus, ex quantisque et qualibus utique speciebus sunt, sic considerantibus fiet utique manifestum.

Quoniam enim est imitator poeta sicut pictor aut aliquis alius ymaginum factor, necesse imitari trium entium numero unum aliquid ; aut enim qualia sint aut qualia aiunt, et videtur qualia esse oportet.

Hec autem enuntiantur locutione aut et linguis et metaforis; et multe passiones locutionis sunt ; damus enim hec poetis. —

Ad hec autem non eadem rectificatio est politice et poetice ; neque alterius artis et poetice. —

Ipsius autem poetice duplex peccatum, hoc quidem enim secundum se ipsam, hoc autem secundum accidens.

Si quidem enim preeligebat imitari inpossibilitatem ipsius peccatum. — Si autem preeligebat non recte, sed equum ambo dextra preicientem, aut quod secundum unamquamque artem peccatum, puta quod secundum medicativam aut aliam artem qualemcumque poetizata sunt, qualemcumque non secundum se ipsam. —

Quare oportet increpationes in problematibus ex hiis considerantem solvere.

Primo quidem igitur que ad ipsam artem inpossibilia poetizata sunt, peccata sunt, sed recte habet que optinet finem ipsius ; finis enim dictus est, si sic magis stupefaciens sit ipsum aut aliam facit partem. Exemplum Hectoris persecutio, equidem finis aut minus contingebat existere

et secundum eam que de hiis artem peccare non recte ; oportet enim, si contingit, totaliter nequaquam peccare.

Adhuc utrum est peccatum, eorum que secundum artem aut secundum aliud accidens ? Minus enim si non sciat quod cerva femina cornua non babet, quam si non imitative scripsit.

Ad hec autem, si increpatur quod non vera, sed forte utique (velut et Sofocles inquit ipse quidem quales oportet facere, Euripedes autem quales sunt) sic solvendum.

Si autem neutro modo, quod sic aiunt ;

velut que de diis, forte enim neque melius neque dicere neque vera, sed contigit sicut Xenofanem; sed non aiunt.

Hec forte non melius quidem, sed sic habebat, velut que de armis, «lanceam autem ipsis rectam ex servatorio»; sic enim tunc putabant sicut nunc Illyrioi. —

De eo autem quod bene aut non bene aut dictum est ab aliquo aut actum est, non solum considerandum ad ipsum quod actum est aut dictum aspicientem, si studiosum aut pravum, sed et ad agentem aut dicentem ad quem aut quando aut cui aut cuius gratia, puta si maioris boni, ut fiat, aut maioris mali, ut removeatur. —

Que autem ad locutionem aspicientem oportet dissolvere, puta lingua « oureas quidem primo » ; forte enim non mulos dicit sed custodes. Et Dolonem «ut specie quidem si erat malus» non corpus incommensuratum sed facies turpis ; nam eueides (idest bone speciei) Cretenses 'euprosopon' (idest bone faciei) vocant. Et quod «ferventius autem miscebat » non quod non mixtum, ut vini avidis, sed quod citius.

Hoc autem secundum metaforam dictum est, puta «alii quidem dii et viri galeati dormiebant tota nocte»; simul autem inquit «aut quando campus Troikus vidit, fistularum tubarumque consonantiam»; nam 'omne' pro 'multum' secundum metaforam dictum est, nam omne multum aliquid ; et hoc « sola autem expers » secundum metaforam ; quod enim notissimum solum. —

Secundum accentum autem, sicut Ippias Thasius solvit istud « damus autem ipsi », et « hoc quidem non putrescit imbre ».

Hec autem divisione, velut Empedocles « cito autem mortalia nascebantur que ante didici inmortalia animaliaque ante quam segregarentur». —

Hec autem amfibolia «transivit autem pleonyx» (idest plus noctis) ; nam "pleio' amfibologicum est. —

Hec autem secundum consuetudinem locutionis; eorum qui miscuerunt vinum aiunt esse, unde poetizata est «caliga nuper preparati stagni » ; et 'erarios' eos qui ferrum laborant, unde dictum est Ganymedes «Iovi vinum fundit» non bibenti vinum. Erit autem utique hoc secundum metaforam. —

Oportet autem et quando nomen aliquid videtur significare, considerare quot modis utique significet hoc in dicto, puta «longam habebat eream lanceam »

per sic prohiberi quot modis contingit ; sic aut sic maxime utique quid suspicabitur.

Secundum eam que secundum econtrarietatem, ut Glaucon dicit, quid quedam irrationabiliter presuspicantur et ipsi contrasententiati sillogizantur, et ac si dixissent quia videtur, increpant, si subcontrarium sit ipsorum estimationi.

Hoc autem passa sunt que circa Karium. Putant enim ipsum Lakonen esse; inconveniens igitur non occurrere Thelemachum ipsi in Lacedemonem venientem. Hoc autem forte habet sicut Kefalenes aiunt; penes ipsum enim dicunt Odyssea, et esse Ikadium sed non Ikarium. Propter peccatum autem problema verisimile est. —

Totaliter autem inpossibile quidem ad poesim aut ad melius aut ad gloriam oportet reducere.

Ad poesim enim eligibilius probabile inpossibille quam inprobabile.

Et possibile tales esse, quale Xeuxis scripsit, sed melius ; exemplum enim oportet existere.

Ad que aiunt irrationabilia ; sicque et quod aliquando non irrationabile est ; verisimile enim et preter verisimile fieri.

Que autem subcontraria ut dicta considerare, sicut qui in hiis que in idem et ad idem et eodem modo, quare et ipsum aut ad que ipse dicit aut quodcumque prudentiale supponitur.

Recta autem increpatio et irrationabilitas et pravitas, quando non necessitate existente nichil utitur irrationabili, sicut Euripedes Egieti malitia, sicut in Horeste Menelai. —

Increpationes quidem igitur ex quinque speciebus ferunt, aut enim ut inpossibilia aut ut irra- tionabilia aut ut nociva aut ut subcontraria aut ut preter rectitudinem eam que secundum artem. Solutiones autem ex dictis numeris considerande, sunt autem duodecim.

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‏بشى ما بمنزلة الخير انه فاصل حتى يكون الشى معنى الشر كالذى لم يكن

‏واما الذى ٮرٮدوں نحو المقولة فقد ينبغى ان يحل بمنزلة الكٮاڡ ما بلاورياس اولا ولعل ان يكون ليس يعنى بذلك البغال لكن يعنى الحفظة من قبل ان اورياس فى لغة اليونانى يدل على البغال وعلى الحفظة وايضا اذا ما قال انه قبيح المنظر ليس انما يعنى بذلك قبيح الوجه لكن عنا لا اعتدال البدن غير ان اهل قريطس يسمون الحسن المنظر للحسن الوجه ويسمون السكران المتقبل الوجه

‏واما الاسما التى ضربت من التادية وهى من التادية هى ايضا كما يقول اوميروس الرجال الاخر واللهة متسلحة على الخيل كانوا رقادين الليل كله وقال مع ذلك امن حيث كانوا اليونانيون مجتمعين فى صحراة طرواس واجتمع بينهم ٮٮات وشى وسوٮٮاٮ وصفرات الزمر وذلك ان هذه باجمعها بحسب التادية انما قيلت بدل من الكثير

‏وايضا يقول ان ثاسيوس كان يحل الخيل وٮعمل الحٮله ان يفوز هو ٮالفحر وانه واما تلك فلا ٮٮصٮ

‏واما اسم الحياة فيقسم وافادقلس ايضا يقول انه كانوا الذين لم يزالوا غير ماٮتـ** منذ قط ينشون من ساعتهم مايتين واما الحياة فالتى خلقت لهم قديما

‏اما التى قال انها موضع قوله ان ان الليل اكثر وذلك انه موضع للشك كثيرا

‏واما التى قالها بحسب عادة المقولة ڡكما يقول فى الشراب انه ممتزج ومن هاهنا *عمل ما للساق المصوعة من الرصاص والحدادين وايضا من هاهنا يقال الغانوميدس شرب الشراب لا انه يشرب للشراب من قبل ا**** بحسب التادية ايضا

‏وينبغى ان يتفقد من امر الاسم متى كان ذاك على تضاد ما انه ٮدا** هذه التى قيلت على طريق الكمية بمنزلة ما قيل ان دورط النحاس تفرق ويدل هاهنا الى كثير ما امتنعت يده من ان يحل

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‏حتى يظن الانسان خاصة بغلوقس انه ضد هذا وايضا لا الافراد منهم يريدون وياخذون بغير نطق من حيث يحكمون لهم ايضا ويعملون قياسا و** انهم قالوا انه يظن الذين يبكتون ان ذلك يعمله هو ضد

‏وانما كان ساب هذا اهرٯارس وذلك انهم كانوا يظنون به انه لاقوناى فمن القبيح الا يكون يلقاه طيلاماخس فى لاقادامونيا عند ما صار الى هنالك ولعل هنالك كما قال اهل قادلينس و*ر انهم قالوا ان عندهم عمل اودوساوس وايقاريس الاساسات من قبل ان ذلك حق

‏وينبغى ان يكون ترقية هذه الى الشعر اعنى ممكنة اكثر من لا امكان ترقيتها الى الافضل واكثر من لا امكانها الى العحر

‏وذلك انها غير صناعة هى اكثر فى باب المسلة والاقناع ولا **ـكان وذلك انه لعله ان لا يمكن ان يكون

‏مثل هذه التى هى كما فعل زاوكسس **ن الذى هو جيد ٮتريد وٮڡصل المثال

‏وان يكون نحو [ان ٮنحو وٮتحلص من] لا ناطقين فانه على ****و يكون ذاك الذى هو شى ما ليس هو لا ناطق ذلك الذى هو لا ناطق وذلك انه يكو**** واقل من الصدق

‏فهذه التى قيلت على طريق التضاد هكذى ينبغى ان تنظر وٮٮـ****ـا*حال فى التبكيتات التى تكون فى الكلام ففى هذا بعينه ونحوه يقولون عـ**** وضع اى داهية كان

‏والانتهار الذى هو لا نطق هو ايضا مستقيم متى يكون صـ**** اما الى استعمال الٮاوسه او الى استعمال القول كما استعمل اوريفيدس الرد***** او كاٮوسطس فى تلك التى لمنالاوس

‏والانواع التى ياتون بها للتوبيخ والانتهار خمسة ****** ان ياتوا بها كالغير ممكنة واما كالتى هى دون الاستقامة او كالضاده او كالا*ر** *لـ* الصناعة او كالتى هى غير ناطقة والحلات فمن الاعداد التى قيلت ينبغى ان تتفقد وهى اثنا عشر

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‏بشى ما بمنزلة الخير انه فاصل حتى يكون الشى معنى الشر كالذى لم يكن

‏واما الذى ٮرٮدوں نحو المقولة فقد ينبغى ان يحل بمنزلة الكٮاڡ ما بلاورياس اولا ولعل ان يكون ليس يعنى بذلك البغال لكن يعنى الحفظة من قبل ان اورياس فى لغة اليونانى يدل على البغال وعلى الحفظة

‏وايضا اذا ما قال انه قبيح المنظر ليس انما يعنى بذلك قبيح الوجه لكن عنا لا اعتدال البدن غير ان اهل قريطس يسمون الحسن المنظر للحسن الوجه

‏ويسمون السكران المتقبل الوجه

‏واما الاسما التى ضربت من التادية وهى من التادية هى ايضا كما يقول اوميروس الرجال الاخر واللهة متسلحة على الخيل كانوا رقادين الليل كله وقال مع ذلك امن حيث كانوا اليونانيون مجتمعين فى صحراة طرواس واجتمع بينهم ٮٮات وشى وسوٮٮاٮ وصفرات الزمر

‏وذلك ان هذه باجمعها بحسب التادية انما قيلت بدل من الكثير

—

‏وايضا يقول ان ثاسيوس كان يحل الخيل وٮعمل الحٮله ان يفوز هو ٮالفحر وانه واما تلك فلا ٮٮصٮ

‏واما اسم الحياة فيقسم وافادقلس ايضا يقول انه كانوا الذين لم يزالوا غير ماٮتـ** منذ قط ينشون من ساعتهم مايتين

‏واما الحياة فالتى خلقت لهم قديما

‏اما التى قال انها موضع قوله ان ان الليل اكثر وذلك انه موضع للشك كثيرا

‏واما التى قالها بحسب عادة المقولة ڡكما يقول فى الشراب انه ممتزج ومن هاهنا *عمل ما للساق المصوعة من الرصاص والحدادين وايضا من هاهنا يقال الغانوميدس شرب الشراب لا انه يشرب للشراب من قبل ا****

‏بحسب التادية ايضا

‏وينبغى ان يتفقد من امر الاسم متى كان ذاك على تضاد ما انه ٮدا** هذه التى قيلت على طريق الكمية بمنزلة ما قيل ان دورط النحاس تفرق ويدل هاهنا الى كثير ما امتنعت يده من ان يحل

‏حتى يظن الانسان خاصة بغلوقس انه ضد هذا وايضا لا الافراد منهم يريدون وياخذون بغير نطق من حيث يحكمون لهم ايضا ويعملون قياسا و** انهم قالوا انه يظن الذين يبكتون ان ذلك يعمله هو ضد

‏وانما كان ساب هذا اهرٯارس

‏وذلك انهم كانوا يظنون به انه لاقوناى فمن القبيح الا يكون يلقاه طيلاماخس فى لاقادامونيا عند ما صار الى هنالك

‏ولعل هنالك كما قال اهل قادلينس و*ر انهم قالوا ان عندهم عمل اودوساوس وايقاريس

‏الاساسات من قبل ان ذلك حق

‏وينبغى ان يكون ترقية هذه الى الشعر اعنى ممكنة اكثر من لا امكان ترقيتها الى الافضل واكثر من لا امكانها الى العحر

‏وذلك انها غير صناعة هى اكثر فى باب المسلة والاقناع ولا **ـكان وذلك انه لعله ان لا يمكن ان يكون مثل هذه التى هى كما فعل زاوكسس **ن

‏الذى هو جيد ٮتريد وٮڡصل المثال

‏وان يكون نحو [ان ٮنحو وٮتحلص من] لا ناطقين فانه على ****و يكون ذاك الذى هو شى ما ليس هو لا ناطق ذلك الذى هو لا ناطق وذلك انه يكو**** واقل من الصدق

‏فهذه التى قيلت على طريق التضاد هكذى ينبغى ان تنظر وٮٮـ****ـا*حال فى التبكيتات التى تكون فى الكلام ففى هذا بعينه ونحوه يقولون عـ**** وضع اى داهية كان

‏والانتهار الذى هو لا نطق هو ايضا مستقيم متى يكون صـ**** اما الى استعمال الٮاوسه او الى استعمال القول كما استعمل اوريفيدس الرد***** او كاٮوسطس فى تلك التى لمنالاوس

‏والانواع التى ياتون بها للتوبيخ والانتهار خمسة ****** ان ياتوا بها كالغير ممكنة واما كالتى هى دون الاستقامة او كالضاده او كالا*ر** *لـ* الصناعة او كالتى هى غير ناطقة والحلات فمن الاعداد التى قيلت ينبغى ان تتفقد وهى اثنا عشر