Poetics. Aristote. Paris. 1692.
La poëtique d'Aristote (André Dacier, 1692) (OCR draft) (fra) (André Dacier's French translation of Aristotle's Poetics, published in 1692.)
Provisional text from uncorrected OCR; expect errors.
18.
mvp-aristotle-comment-1016
1461a22
κατὰ δὲ προσῳδίαν,
scil.
δεῖ λύειν (or
διαλύειν), understood from
9
τὰ δὲ πρὸς τὴν λέξιν ὁρῶντα δεῖ διαλύειν.
κατά means 'by reference to', as in
κατὰ τὸ ἔθος τῆς λέξεως in 27; it is the equivalent of the instrumental dative we find elsewhere in the context (see on 10) with
λύειν (or
διαλύειν).
Προσῳδία with Aristotle comprises accent, breathing, and quantity—all the elements in the spoken word which in the ancient mode of writing were left to be supplied by the reader. For accent as a form of
προσῳδία see
Soph. el. 4, 166b1
(v. infra on 23);
21, 177b
; and
23, 179a14
. Breathing is distinctly said to come under this head in
Soph. el. 20, 177b3
τὸ ὄρος καὶ ὅρος τῇ προσῳδίᾳ λεχθὲν σημαίνει ἕτερον. ἀλλ᾽ ἐν μὲν τοῖς γεγραμμένοις ταὐτὸν ὄνομα, ὅταν ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν στοιχείων γεγραμμένον ᾖ καὶ ὡσαύτως, κἀκεῖ δ᾽ ἤδη παράσημα ποιοῦνται, τὰ δὲ φθεγγόμενα οὐ ταὐτά. That quantity also was regarded by Aristotle as a part of
προσῳδία may be inferred from the position of
μήκει καὶ βραχύτητι in the enumeration in
20, 1456b32
(v. Schmidt, Beitr. zur Gesch. der Grammatik p. 188). His idea of
προσῳδία, therefore, agreed with that of Choeroboscus (Scholia in Dionys. Thracis art. gramm. p. 124 Hilgard),
ἰστέον δὲ ὅτι ἐν ταῖς προσῳδίαις τρία ἐστὶν εἴδη· ἔστι γὰρ τόνος, χρόνος, πνεῦμα (comp. Egger, Apollonius Dyscole p. 29, and Schmidt, l. c. p. 185).
18.
mvp-aristotle-comment-1017
1461a22_2
Ἱππίας.
The view of Sengebusch (Hom. Diss. prior p. 206) is that he lived in the second half of the fifth century, and may perhaps be identified with the Hippias of Thasos mentioned by Lysias (13. 54 and 61) as one of the victims of the Thirty Tyrants. Schrader (Porphyr. in Il. p. 413) doubts whether there is any sufficient evidence for this date.
18.
mvp-aristotle-comment-1018
1461a22_3
δίδομεν δέ οἱ.
The parallel in
Soph. el. 4, 166b1
(v. on 23) shows that
δίδομεν δέ οἱ εὖχος ἀρέσθαι was the reading in Aristotle's Homer in
Il. 2. 15
, where our existing vulgate has
Τρώεσσι δὲ κήδε᾽ ἐφῆπται; the reference too in the parenthesis,
ὥσπερ Ἱππίας ἔλυεν ὁ Θάσιος, shows that Hippias must have had the same reading before him. It is clear that we have in this instance at any rate 25. 1461a20-23 337 1461a22 a real variant, and not one of Aristotle's misquotations.
δίδομεν δέ τοι εὖχος ἀρέσθαι occurs in
Il. 21. 297
, but in a context very unlike that of Il. 2. 15. The deceptive dream of Agamemnon in
Il. 2. 8 sqq.
had been criticized by
Plato
Rep. 382 E
, as making Zeus a deceiver; and it was felt to be a difficulty by several of the grammarians (v. Porphyr. in Il. l. c. p. 23 Schr.). As the half-line
δίδομεν δὲ οἱ εὐχος ἀρέσθαι seems to credit Zeus with a direct lie, this was doubtless the difficulty which Aristotle and Hippias thought to remove by the artifice of reading ΔΙΔΟΜΕΝ not as
δίδομεν, but as
διδόμεν, i. e. as an infinitive in the sense of an imperative, so as to shift the actual falsehood from Zeus himself to the Dream-god (comp. Wolf, Prolegomena ad Hom. p. 128 ed. Peppmüller).
18.
mvp-aristotle-comment-1019
1461a23
τὸ μὲν οὐ καταπύθεται ὄμβρῳ:
Il. 23. 327
ἔστηκε ξύλον αὖον ὅσον τ᾿ ὄργυι ὑπὲρ αἴης, ἢ δρυὸς ἢ πεύκης· τὸ μὲν οὐ καταπύθεται ὄμβρῳ. Our text of Homer embodies the suggestion of Hippias,
οὐ for
οὗ. The objection to the older mode of reading the word was probably this, that the statement was against scientific truth, oak and pine being held to be among the woods least liable to rot through moisture (
Theophr. H. P. 5. 4, 3
). The view of Hippias is given with greater fullness in
Soph. el. 4, 166b1
:
παρὰ δὲ τὴν προσῳδίαν ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἄνευ γραφῆς διαλεκτικοῖς οὐ ῥᾳδιον ποιῆσαι λόγον, ἐν δὲ τοῖς γεγραμμένοις καὶ ποιήμασι μᾶλλον, οἷον καὶ τὸν Ὅμηρον ἔνιοι διορθοῦνται πρὸς τοὺς ἐλέγχοντας ὡς ἀτόπως εἰρηκότα “τὸ μὲν οὐ καταπύθεται ὄμβρῳ”. λύουσι γὰρ αὐτὸ τῇ προσῳδίαν λέγοντες τὸ ΟΥ ὀξύτερον. καὶ τὸ περὶ τὸ ἐνύπνιον τοῦ Ἀγαμέμνονος, ὅτι οὐκ αὐτὸς ὁ Ζεὺς εἶπεν “δίδομεν δέ οἱ εὐχος ἀρέσθαι”, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἐνυπνίῳ ἐνετέλλετο διδόναι. On this passage Alexander, or rather Michael Ephesius (p. 33 Wallies), has a comment which, besides serving to explain the passage in the Soph. el., is not without interest for the history of the early criticisms on Homer:
τινὲς οὖν ἐκάκιζον τὸν Ὅμηρον, περισπωμένως τὸ οὐ ἀναγινώσκοντες καὶ λέγοντες ἄτοπόν τι αὐτὸν εἰρηκέναι διὰ τοῦτο, ὡς λέγοντα δῆθεν ὅτι τοῦ ξύλου ἐκείνου ... τὶ μὲν κατασήπεται τὶ δὲ οὐ κατασήπεται· εἰ γὰρ μὴ καὶ τοῦτο ἐδήλωσεν ἐναργῶς, τὸ τὶ δὲ οὐ κατασήπεται λέγουσιν ἄντικρυς δηλοῦσθαι διὰ τοῦ εἰρημένου, τοῦ “οὗ τὸ μὲν καταπύθεται”.... ἐπιδιορθοῦται δὲ τούτους [εν τῷ περὶ Ποιητικῆς], ὡς αὐτὸς Ἀριστοτέλης ἐν τῇ Ρητορικῇ [read with Vahlen, ἐν τῷ περὶ Ποιητικῆς] φησιν, Ἱππίας ὁ Θάσιος μὴ περισπωμένως ἀναγινώσκων τὸ οὐ ἀλλ᾽ ἀποφατικῶς, ὅπερ αὐτὸς ὀξύτερον εἴρηκεν, ἵνα ᾖ τὸ λεγόμενον ὡς ἡ πεύκη τὸ δένδρον οὐ καταπύθεται ὄμβρῳ .... τὸ δ᾽ ἕτερον [scil. παράδειγμα] τὸ ἐπαγόμενον, τὸ περὶ τὸ ἐνύπνιον τοῦ Ἀγαμέμνονος, φησι τὸν Δία εἰπεῖν τὸ “ δίδομεν δὲ οἱ εὐχος ἀρέσθαι”, οὐδαμοῦ κεῖται ἐν τῇ Ἰλιάδι . εἰσὶν οὖν τὰ ῥήματα τοῦ Διὸς πρὸς τὸν ὄνειρον ὅτι βὰς ταῦτα εἶπε τῷ Ἀγαμέμνονι ὅτι δίδομεν αὐτῷ πάντες οἱ θεοὶ τὴν νίκην. φασὶν οὖν οἱ ταῦτα λέγοντες ὡς ἐνταῦθα ἁμαρτάνει ὁ ποιητὴς εἰσάγων τὸν Δία διαλεγόμενον ταῦτα τῷ ὀνείρῳ καὶ τρόπον τινὰ ψευδόμενον, ὅπερ οὐκ ἔστι θεοῦ. οἱ γοῦν ἐπιδιορθούμενοι τοῦτόν φασιν ὡς οὐ τῷ Ἀγαμέμνονι ὁ Ζεὺς ἔλεγε τὸ εὐχος δοθῆναι ἀλλὰ τῷ ὀνείρῳ κατὰ τοῦ Ἀγαμέμνονος· ἀναγινώσκουσι δὲ οὕτως, “δίδομεν δὲ οἱ”, ἀντὶ τοῦ σοί, τῷ ὀνείρῳ. ἔστι δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ψεῦδος· ὁ γὰρ αὐτὸς νοῦς ἐστι κἂν ὁ τόνος ἀναβιβασθείη κἂν περισπασθείη ἡ ἀντωνυμία ἡ οἱ. ποῦ γοῦν [ οὖν] ἐστιν ἡ ἁμαρτία; ἢ οὐκ εἰς τὸ “ δέ οἱ” ἀλλ᾽ εἰς τὸ “δίδομεν”. εἰ γοῦν [? μὲν οὖν] τὸ “ δίδομεν δέ οἱ εὐχος ἀρέσθαι” ἀναγνῷ τις τὸν τόνον θεὶς εἰς τὸ δι τὸν Δία ποιεῖ ψευδόμενον, ὡς ὑπισχνούμενον διδόναι τὴν νίκην καὶ μὴ εἰς ἔργον ἐξάγοντα τὴν ὑπόσχεσιν· εἰ δὲ εἰς τὸ δο τὸν τόνον θεὶς ἀναγνῷ τὸ ἑξῆς, καὶ τὸν Δία τοῦ ψεύδεσθαι ἀπολύσει, καὶ τῷ Ὁμήρῳ περιποιήσεται τὸ ἀνέγκλητον, ὡς τοῦ Διὸς λέγοντος τῷ ὀνείρῳ καὶ ἐπιτάττοντος διδόμεναι αὐτὸν τὸν ὄνειρον τὸ εὐχος τῷ Ἀγαμέμνονι καὶ μὴ αὐτοῦ τοῦ Διός. καὶ γοῦν ὁ ὄνειρος ὑπισχνεῖται τῷ Ἀγαμέμνονι τὸ εὐχος καὶ ψεύδεται, καὶ οὐχ ὁ Ζεὺς αὐτός.
It will be observed that in the explanation of
Il. 23. 328
in the
Soph. el. the negative
οὐ is said to be distinguished from the pronoun
οὗ by being pronounced
ὀξύτερον, i. e.
ὀξυτόνως. This takes us back to a time when
οὐ was oxytone wheresoever it occurs (
comp.
Kühner, Gr. Gr. 1. 1 p. 331
), as it was held to be by more than one of the grammarians:
Herodian p. 504 Lentz
τὰ εἰς οῦ περισπῶνται, πανταχοῦ, ἀγχοῦ, καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ πλὴν τοῦ [? τὸ] ἰδού τὸ δεικτικόν, ἰου τὸ σχετλιαστικόν, καὶ οὗ τὸ ἀρνητικόν· τοῦτο δὲ καὶ ἐν τῇ συνεπείᾳ ὀξύνεται.
1461a24
19.
mvp-aristotle-comment-1020
τὰ δὲ διαιρέσει,
scil.
λυτέον. Διαίρεσις—a wider term than our 'punctuation '—is the opposite of
σύνθεσις (
comp.
Soph. el. 4, 166
a23
), and includes every sort of break in reading, even one only just enough to keep words from being taken together in construction.
The kind of difficulty to which this solution is applicable, may be seen from the instances in the
Sophistici elenchi,
ἐγώ σ᾽ ἔθηκα δοῦλον ὄντ᾽ ἐλεύθερον (
4, 166
a36
), and
ἔστιν ἀγαθὸν ὄντα σκυτέα μοχθηρὸν εἶναι; 339 (20, 177
b14) —where the words are ambiguous and admit of being construed in two different ways. With this may be compared what
Aristotle says in the
Rhetoric (
3. 5, 1407 b 14
) on the ambiguities in
Heraclitus :
τὰ γὰρ Ἡρακλείτου διαστίξαι ἔργον διὰ τὸ ἄδηλον εἶναι ποτέρῳ πρόσκειται, τῷ ὕστερον ἢ τῷ πρότερον, οἷον ἐν τῇ ἀρχῇ αὐτοῦ τοῦ συγγράμματος· φησὶ γὰρ “τοῦ λόγου τοῦδ᾽ ἐόντος ἀεὶ ἀξύνετοι ἄνθρωποι γίγνονται”.
ἄδηλον γὰρ τὸ ἀεί πρὸς ὁποτέρῳ (δεῖ) διαστίξαι. On the beginnings of formal punctuation in Greece see
Schmidt,
Beiträge zur Gesch. der Grammatik p. 506
, and
Meisterhans,
Grammatik³ p. 11
.
19.
mvp-aristotle-comment-1021
Ἐμπεδοκλῆς.
The passage here quoted appears in the editions of
Empedocles in a somewhat different form,
αἶψα δὲ θνήτ᾽ ἐφύοντο, τὰ πρὶν μάθον ἀθάνατ᾿ εἶναι, ζωρά τε τὰ πρὶν ἄκρητα, διαλλάξαντα κελεύθους (
fr. 35, 14-15 Diels
); and it is known that
Theophrastus read it thus, as he adduced it to show that
ζωρότερον in
Homer meant
τὸ κεκραμένον:
Athenaeus 423 F
.
Θεόφραστος δ᾽ ἐν τῷ περὶ μέθης ζωρότερόν φησιν εἶναι τὸ κεκραμένον. This is not the place to consider either the reading recognized by
Theophrastus or his interpretation of
ζωρότερον and
ζωρά.
Aristotle has a different reading,
ζωρά τε πρὶν κέκρητο; and any difficulty that may have been found in it he meets by simply affirming the possibility of another
διαίρεσις, another way of construing the words. He does not dispute the meaning which was assigned to
ζωρά; his assumption presumably was that
ζωρά=
ἄκρατα (
v.
b15
). The positive
ζωρός no longer existed in Attic; but in Ionic the comparative
ζωρότερον was to be found in
Herodotus and
Hippocrates, in the sense of 'having but a small admixture of water':
Herod. 6, 84
Κλεομένεα δὲ λέγουσι ἡκόντων τῶν Σκυθῶν... μαθεῖν τὴν ἀκρητοποσίην παρ᾿ αὐτῶν... ἔκ τε τόσου, ὡς αὐτοὶ λέγουσι, ἐπεὰν ζωρότερον βούλωνται πιεῖν, “ ἐπισκύθισον” λέγουσι (where
ζωρότερον πίνειν =
ἀκρατοποτεῖν). —
Hippocrates 2, 654 Κ.
οἶνον, ἣν μή τι κωλύῃ, πίνειν ζωρότερον παλαιὸν ἐπὶ τέσσαρας ημέρας. There is one instance of it in Attic prose, in
Theophrastus
Char. 4, 9
δεινὸς φαγεῖν καὶ ζωρότερον πιεῖν ('ungemischten Wein zu trinken', R. Meister).
Aristotle does not say what the question was that had been raised by the critics; it may be supposed, however (
comp.
Hermann
ad loc.), to have turned on the
πρίν before
κέκρητο, which owing to its ambiguous position may be construed with either
ζωρά or
κέκρητο. If one construes it with
κέκρητο, the clause will mean 'things pure had been before that mixed'; but in that case an objector might very well urge the inconsistency between this and the statement in the preceding line, in which
Empedocles speaks of the 'mortal' forms as assumed by the elements only when mixed up together in the actual world (
comp.
Zeller, Ph. d. Gr. 340 COMMENTARY 22 p. 784
). On the other hand, if the
πρίν be taken with
ζωρά, the sense will be 'things before that pure were found mixed up together' (for the tense of
κέκρητο
v.
Kühner, Gr. Gr. 1. 1 p. 152
;
Goodwin, Synt. of Gk. Moods and Tenses § 52
); and the objection of the critic is answered. The integrity of the text of the present passage has been doubted in recent times by several scholars of distinction.
Bergk (
Kl. Schriften 2 p. 86) has suggested
ζωρά τε πρὶν τὰ κέκρητο;
Gomperz (
Hermes 31 p. 469)
ζωρά τε ἃ (i. e. θ' ἃ) πρὶν κέκρητο; and
Diels (
on Emped. l. c.)
ζωρά τε τὰ πρὶν ἔκρητο (on the analogy of
ἔπλητο).
19.
mvp-aristotle-comment-1022
1461a25
ἀθάνατα.
As
Aristotle is so apt to curtail his quotations, it is hardly necessary to restore
ἀθάνατ᾿ (εἶναι). For the omission of
εἶναι see on
24, 1459
b9
.
1461a26
20.
mvp-aristotle-comment-1023
τὰ δὲ ἀμφιβολίᾳ,
scil.
δεῖ διαλύειν.
Aristotle now passes on to another kind of ambiguous statement, one capable of two interpretations through the presence of an ambiguous term. Such a term is said to be
ἀμφίβολον (
a26;
comp.
Rhet. 3. 5, 1407 a 32
); and its effect is
ἀμφιβολία.
ἀμφιβολία is here the same thing as what
Aristotle often calls elsewhere
ὁμωνυμία. It may be noted, as an instance of his variations in the use of technical language, that in
Soph. el. 4, 165
b26
ἀμφιβολία is distinguished from
ὁμωνυμία, and used to describe the ambiguity arising from some ambiguous collocation of terms.
20.
mvp-aristotle-comment-1024
παρώχηκεν δὲ πλέω νύξ:
Il. 10. 251
ἀλλ᾽ ἴομεν μάλα γὰρ νὺξ ἄνεται, ἐγγύθι δ᾽ ἠώς, ἄστρα δὲ δὴ προβέβηκε, παρῴχωκεν δὲ πλέων νὺξ τῶν δύο μοιράων, τριτάτη δ᾽ ἔτι μοῖρα λέλειπται. The reading
πλέω, which still survives in some of the MSS. of
Homer, and was a recognized variant in antiquity, has a certain interest as showing the affinity of
Aristotle's
Homer with that of
Zenodotus, who is known to have admitted forms like
ἀμείνω for
ἀμείνων,
γλυκίω for
γλυκίων, and
κρείσσω for
κρείσσων (
La Roche, Hom. Textkr. p. 302
;
Lobeck, Path. Elem. 2 p. 281
).
The problem was to explain how, if more than two-thirds of the night had gone, a third could be still left. According to
Porphyry
ad loc. (p. 147 Schr.) this was one of the earliest difficulties found in
Homer :
τῶν παλαιῶν ζητημάτων ὡμολόγηται εἶναι τὸ τοιοῦτο, ἐν οἷς φησιν “ ἄστρα ... λέλειπται”. πῶς γάρ, εἰ αἱ δύο μοῖραι ἐξήκουσιν αὐταί τε καὶ ἔτι τούτων πλέον, ἡ τριτάτη μοῖρα λέλειπται, ἀλλ᾽ οὐχὶ τῆς τρίτης μόριον ; Among the many solutions he mentions is one from the Aristotelian
Ἀπορήματα Ομηρικά (
fr. 161 Teubn.
),
ἐπεὶ οὖν καὶ τῆς νυκτὸς αἱ δώδεκα μοῖραι εἰς δύο ἴσας μερίδας μερίζεσθαι δύνανται, 341 εἰς ἕξ, ηὐξήθη δὲ καὶ πλέον γεγονὸς θάτερον μέρος, ἄδηλον δὲ τὸ πόσαις ὥραις (καὶ γὰρ μιᾷ καὶ δύο καὶ τρισὶ καὶ πλείοσιν ἡ αὔξησις δύναται γίνεσθαι)· ἀφορίζων ὁ ποιητὴς τὸ ἀόριστον τοῦ πλείονος πόσον ἦν καὶ ὅτι β ὥραις ηὐξήθη, ἐπήγαγεν ὅτι τριτάτη μοῖρα λέλειπται, ὡς ὀκτὼ μὲν γενέσθαι τὰς παρωχηκυίας ὥρας, καταλείπεσθαι δὲ τέσσαρας, αἵπερ εἰσὶ τοῦ ὅλου τρίτον. This highly artificial interpretation, which makes
πλέω νὺξ τῶν δύο μοιράων mean 'the greater part of two-thirds of the night', can hardly be what
Aristotle has in mind, as he distinctly says that the solution of the difficulty may be found in recognizing
πλέω as an amphibolous word, i. e. in giving it not its usual sense of 'more', but some different sense. This other sense was probably that of 'full', which is mentioned by
Porphyry
ad loc. (p. 147) as the suggestion of a certain
Metrodorus :
Μητρόδωρος μὲν οὖν τὸ πλεῖον δύο σημαίνειν φησὶ παρ Ὁμήρῳ· καὶ γὰρ τὸ σύνηθες καὶ τὸ πλῆρες, ὡς ἐν τῷ σὸν δὲ πλεῖον δέπας αἰεὶ ἔστηκε, καὶ ἐν τῷ πλεῖαί τοι χαλκοῦ κλισίαι. νῦν οὖν τὸ πλέον ἀντὶ τοῦ πλῆρες εἰρῆσθαι· πλήρης γὰρ ἡ νὺξ τῶν δύο μοιρῶν γεγονυῖα παρώχηκε, τριτάτη δ᾽ ἔτι περιλέλειπται.
Aristonicus seems to have accepted this interpretation of
πλέω ἀντὶ τοῦ πλήρης (
Schol. Ven. A. Il. 9. 71
); and it survives also in the gloss of
Hesychius
πλέω· πλήρης.
1461a27
21.
mvp-aristotle-comment-1025
τὸ ἔθος τῆς λέξεως.
Vahlen quotes
Soph. el. 4, 166
a14
εἰσὶ δὲ τρεῖς τρόποι τῶν παρὰ τὴν ὁμωνυμίαν καὶ τὴν ἀμφιβολίαν, εἷς μὲν ὅταν ἢ ὁ λόγος ἢ τοὔνομα κυρίως σήμαινῃ πλείω, οἷον ἀετὸς καὶ κύων· εἷς δὲ ὅταν εἰωθότες ὦμεν οὕτω λέγειν.
21.
mvp-aristotle-comment-1026
τὸν κεκραμένον
is to my mind a much more probable correction here than the others that have been suggested,
τὸ κεκραμένον (
Madius),
πᾶν κεκραμένον (
Bursian),
(ὅσα) τῶν κεκραμένων (
Vahlen),
τῶν κεκραμένων (οἱονοῦν) (
Tucker).
τὸν κεκραμένον, with
οἶνον in close proximity in the context, means
τὸν κεκραμένον οἶνον. There is the same ellipse in
Aristoph.
Eq. 1187
πιεῖν κεκραμένον τρία καὶ δύο (
comp.
Gildersleeve, Syntax of Class. Gk. 32
); and it is certainly not uncommon with
ἄκρατος (
comp.
ἀκρατοπότης, etc.). The general sense then of the whole passage will be this: In common parlance a mixture of wine and water is said to be 'wine'; and on the same principle
Homer's 'tin' may be an amalgam of tin and another metal.
Aristotle is apparently replying to some critic who took exception to the idea of the greaves being made of so soft a metal as tin, a point which modern archaeologists also have some difficulty in explaining (
comp.
Helbig, Das homerische Epos¹ p. 196
). 342 COMMENTARY
21.
mvp-aristotle-comment-1027
οἶνον:
Plutarch
Coni. praec. 140 F
το κρᾶμα καίτοι ὕδατος μετέχον πλείονος οἶνον καλοῦμεν. The fact is recognized and explained in
De gen. et corr. 1. 5, 321b35
το ἐπικρατοῦν λέγεται ἐν τῇ μίξει, οἷον ὅτι οἶνος· ποιεῖ γὰρ τὸ τοῦ οἴνου ἔργον ἀλλ᾽ οὐ τὸ τοῦ ὕδατος τὸ σύνολον μίγμα.
21.
mvp-aristotle-comment-1028
1461a28
κνημὶς νεοτεύκτου κασσιτέροιο:
Il. 21. 592
.
21.
mvp-aristotle-comment-1029
1461a29
χαλκέας.
Aristotle adduces this use of
χαλκεύς, to justify the language in
Il. 20. 234
, on the assumption that by a similar extension of meaning
οἰνοχοεύειν may be used for the serving out of nectar as well as that of wine.
χαλκεύς and its cognates are often found in this more general sense in the literature after
Homer :
Schol. Ven. B. Il. 19. 283
παλαιὰ ἡ χρῆσις τοῦ χαλκὸν ὀνομάζειν τὸν σίδηρον. ἀμέλει καὶ χαλκέας λέγομεν τοὺς τὸν σίδηρον ἐργαζομένους. —
Pollux 7. 106
χαλκεύειν δὲ καὶ τὸ σιδηρεύειν ἔλεγον, καὶ χαλκέας τοὺς τὸν σίδηρον ἐργαζομένους. The language in these two passages may be a distant reminiscence of
Aristotle's words.
21.
mvp-aristotle-comment-1030
1461a30
οἰνοχοεύειν:
Il. 20. 234
τὸν καὶ ἀνηρείψαντο θεοὶ Διὶ οἰνοχοεύειν. On the other hand, we are told elsewhere (
Il. 5. 341
) that the gods do not drink wine,
οὐ πίνουσ᾽ αἴθοπα οἶνον. For the infinitive—actually found in the Homeric text—
comp.
An. post. 2. 30, 97 b 6
τοῦτο δ᾽ εἴρηται μὴ διαφέρειν. —
Top. 2. 3. 110b3
οὔτ᾽ εἰ παντὶ οὔτ᾽ εἰ μηδενὶ ὑπάρχειν εἴρηται.
21.
mvp-aristotle-comment-1031
1461a31
εἴη δ᾽ ἂν τοῦτό γε κατὰ μεταφοράν.
Aristotle apparently prefers to explain
Homer's use of
οἰνοχοεύειν as a metaphor; referring, it would seem, to the
μεταφορὰ κατὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον considered in
21, 1457 b 16 sqq.
22.
mvp-aristotle-comment-1032
δεῖ δὲ κτέ.
This is a general word of caution very like that in
a4. Just as we have to consider all the attendant circumstances before condemning an act as wrong or immoral, so too, when the question turns on a word, we should consider its context and its possible meanings in the context before pronouncing it to be improper; we must be quite sure of our interpretation before passing an adverse judgement on the poet.
1461a33
οἷον
τῷ =
οἷον ἐν τῷ, the preposition being understood from the preceding ἐν τῷ εἰρημένῳ (see on
2, 1448a10
).
22.
mvp-aristotle-comment-1033
τῇ ῥ᾽ ἔσχετο χάλκεον ἔγχος:
Il. 20. 267
οὐδὲ τότ᾿ Αἰνείαο δαίφρονος ὄβριμον ἔγχος ῥῆξε σάκος· χρυσὸς γὰρ ἐρύκακε, δώρα θεοῖο ἀλλὰ δύω μὲν ἔλασσε διὰ πτύχας, αἱ δ᾽ ἄρ᾽ ἔτι τρεῖς ἦσαν, ἐπεὶ πέντε πτύχας ἤλασε κυλλοποδίων, τὰς δύο χαλκείας, δύο δ᾽ ἔνδοθι κασσιτέροιο, τὴν δὲ μίαν χρυσέην· τῇ ῥ᾽ ἔσχετο μείλινον ἔγχος. The difficulty found here may be seen from the note of
Porphyry (p. 244 343 Digitized by Google Original from UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA Schr.):
τῆς γὰρ χρυσῆς πτυχὸς δοκούσης πρώτης εἶναι, εἴ γε κόσμου ἕνεκα τὴν χρυσῆν εἰς τὸ ἔξω καὶ ὁρώμενον πρώτην ἐνέθηκεν, ὑπ᾿ αὐτὴν δὲ στερεότητος ἕνεκα τὰς δύο χαλκᾶς, μαλάγματος χάριν καὶ τελευταίας τὰς κασσιτερίνας, πῶς δύο τε διέκοψε πτύχας, καὶ ἐν τῇ χρυσῇ πτυχὶ ἔξω οὖσῃ καὶ διατμηθείσῃ ἐνεσχέθη τὸ δόρυ; The answer of
Aristotle was perhaps this, that the plate of gold sufficed to stop the course of the spear, though the spear-point actually pierced it and indented the underlying plates of brass. This is practically the same as the solution quoted from
Autochthon in
Schol. Ven. B
and
Eustathius
ad loc.
Aristarchus also is said to have acknowledged its plausibility:
Schol. Ven. A Il. 20. 269
ἵνα δὲ μὴ δοκῇ λύσεως ἠπορηκέναι καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἠθετηκέναι, φησὶν ὅτι τῆς χρυσῆς πτυχῆς πρώτης κατὰ τὴν ἐπιφάνειαν κειμένης νοητέον τὸ δόρυ τῆς πλείονος ὁρμῆς ἐγκοπὴν εἰληφέναι [=Aristotle's κωλυθῆναι], διακεκόφθαι μέντοι τὸ σάκος ἕως τῆς τρίτης πτυχῆς, ὃν τρόπον ἐπὶ τῆς πτυχῆς Μενελάου λέγει “ ἡ οἱ πλεῖστον ἔρυτο, διὰ πρὸ δὲ εἶσατο καὶ τῆς ”.
22.
mvp-aristotle-comment-1034
1461a34
κωλυθῆναι:
Metaph. A 23, 1023a17
ἔτι τὸ κωλύον κατὰ τὴν αὑτοῦ ὁρμήν τι κινεῖσθαι ἢ πράττειν ἔχειν λέγεται τοῦτο αὐτό, οἷον καὶ οἱ κίονες τὰ ἐπικείμενα βάρη, καὶ ὡς οἱ ποιηταὶ τὸν ᾿Ἄτλαντα ποιοῦσι τὸν οὐρανὸν ἔχειν ὡς συμπεσόντ᾽ ἂν ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν.
22.
mvp-aristotle-comment-1035
ἐνδέχεται,
scil.
σημαίνειν (see on
24, 1460b34
).
ὡδὶ ἢ ὡδί =
πότερον
ὡδὶ ἢ ὡδί (see on
a4). The clause, with the punctuation given in the text, is appositional to
ποσαχῶς ἂν σημαίνοι (see on
25, 1460b25
). For
ὡδὶ ἢ ὡδί
comp.
An. pr. 1. 31, 46a28
ἀγνοεῖται τὸ πότερον ὧδε ἢ ὧδε ἔχει. —
Soph. el. 18, 177a5
ἀναιροῦντες ἢ ὧδε ἢ ὧδε. —
Rhet. 3. 1, 1404a10
διαφέρει γάρ τι πρὸς τὸ δηλῶσαι ὡδὶ ἢ ὡδὶ εἰπεῖν.
23.
mvp-aristotle-comment-1036
1461a35
μάλιστ᾽ ἄν τις ὑπολάβοι.
The comma (or colon) which recent editors place after this I have removed in order that
μάλιστα may be taken with
κατὰ τὴν καταντικρύ;
comp.
Metaph. A 8, 989a30
μάλιστ ἂν ὑπολάβοι κατὰ λόγον ὃν ἐκεῖνος μὲν οὐ διήρθρωσεν κτέ. (also
Phys. 7. 3, 245b6
;
Metaph. Z 16, 1040b10
).
23.
mvp-aristotle-comment-1037
κατὰ τὴν καταντικρύ =
ἐξ ἐναντίας or
ἐναντίως. The
ἢ ὡς which follows
Vahlen illustrates from
22, 1458b3
ἄλλως ἔχειν ἢ ὡς τὸ κύριον. —
An. post. 1. 17, 80b35
ληπτέαι ἐναντίως ἢ ὡς ἔχουσιν αἱ προτάσεις. —
De caelo 2. 2, 285b25
ἐναντίως ἢ ὡς οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι λέγουσιν. —
Meteor. 1. 12, 348b12
τουναντίον ἢ ὡς Ἀναξαγόρας λέγει. A similar construction is found after a comparative adverb in
Eth. N. 3. 13, 1118b23
μᾶλλον ἢ ὡς οἱ πολλοί. The clause
ὅτι ἔνια κτέ. is explanatory of
ὡς Γλαύκων λέγει, 'the way described by Glaucon', and apparently a quotation.
24.
mvp-aristotle-comment-1038
1461b2
1461a31
Γλαύκων.
Aristotle is probably referring to the Glaucon mentioned as an authority in Homeric matters in
Plato's
Ion 530 D
, where the rhapsodist says of himself:
καὶ οἶμαι κάλλιστ᾽ ἀνθρώπων λέγειν περὶ Ὁμήρου, ὡς οὔτε Μητρόδωρος ὁ Λαμψακηνὸς οὔτε Στησίμβροτος ὁ Θάσιος οὔτε Γλαύκων οὔτε ἄλλος οὐδεὶς τῶν πώποτε γενομένων ἔσχεν εἰπεῖν οὕτω πολλὰς καὶ καλὰς διανοίας περὶ Ὁμήρου ὅσας ἐγώ. The absence of a local appellative here seems to imply that the Glaucon in question was an Athenian. If this inference is right, we cannot identify him with the
Γλαύκων ὁ Τήιος of
Rhet. 3. 1, 1403 b 26
or with Glaucus of Rhegium (
comp.
Hiller, Rh. Mus. 41 p. 398
); he may perhaps be the same as the Glaucus or Glaucon (
v.
Düntzer, Rettung der aristot. Poetik p. 227
) mentioned by
Porphyry on
Il. 11. 636 (p. 168 Schr.)
along with other early interpreters of
Homer.
24.
mvp-aristotle-comment-1039
1461b
αὐτοὶ καταψηφισάμενοι
resumes the idea of
ἔνια ἀλόγως προυπολαμβάνουσιν, and anticipates that in
τῇ αὐτῶν οἰήσει. The common rendering, 'postquam ipsi condemnationis sententiam tulerint' (
Tyrwhitt), gives
καταψηφισάμενοι a sense too near to that of the
ἐπιτιμῶσιν in the following line. The probability is, as
Vahlen has seen (
comp.
Bon. Ind. 376 a 56
), that it means in the present instance 'to decide', or to 'affirm' or 'accept' something. As a term of politics
καταψηφίζεσθαι is the opposite of
ἀποψηφίζεσθαι (to reject a proposal):
Pol. 4. 14, 1298 a 36
ἀποψηφιζόμενον μὲν γὰρ κύριον δεῖ ποιεῖν τὸ πλῆθος, καταψηφιζόμενον δὲ μὴ κύριον, ἀλλ' ἐπαναγέσθω πάλιν ἐπὶ τοὺς ἄρχοντας· ἐν γὰρ ταῖς πολιτείαις ἀντεστραμμένως ποιοῦσιν· οἱ γὰρ ὀλίγοι ἀποψηφισάμενοι μὲν κύριοι, καταψηφισάμενοι δὲ οὐ κύριοι, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπανάγεται εἰς τοὺς πλείστους αἰεί.
24.
mvp-aristotle-comment-1040
εἰρηκότος,
scil.
τοῦ ποιητοῦ (see on
6, 1449 b 26
).
25.
mvp-aristotle-comment-1041
1461b3
τοῦτο δὲ πέπονθε:
De anima 1. 5, 410 b 27
τοῦτο δὲ πέπονθε καὶ ὁ ἐν τοῖς Ὀρφικοῖς ἔπεσι καλουμένοις λόγος.
25.
mvp-aristotle-comment-1042
1461b4
τὰ περὶ Ἰκάριον.
The question which
Aristotle regards as based on a mere assumption, survives in
Porphyry on
Od. 4. 1 (p. 40 Schr.)
διὰ τί ὁ Τηλέμαχος εἰς Λακεδαίμονα ἐλθὼν οὐκ ἐνέτυχε τῷ Ἰκαρίῳ ; καίτοι ἄλογον ἐλθόντα τῷ πατρὶ τῆς μητρὸς μὴ ἐντυχεῖν, and in
Schol. Od. 1. 285
(
comp.
Schol. Od. 2. 52
)
πῶς εἰς Σπάρτην ἐλθὼν οὐ συντυγχάνει Ἰκαρίῳ ; The assumption of the critics, that the father of Penelope (called in
Homer Icarius) was a Lacedaemonian,
Aristotle meets by quoting on the other side the Cephallenian tradition which made him a Cephallenian. This same solution of the difficulty reappears incidentally in
Schol. Od. 15. 16
ὅτι Ιθακήσιος ὁ Ἰκάριος, οὐ Σπαρτιάτης, ἀδελφὸς Τυνδάρεω ... ὁ δὲ Ἰκάριος ἐκ Μεσσήνης ἦν τῆς Κεφαλληνιακῆς, ἐπεὶ οὐχ ὁρᾶται ἐν Ἰθάκῃ ἀναστρεφόμενος· ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ Λάκων· ὅθεν οὐδὲ ἐνέτυχεν αὐτῷ Τηλέμαχος ἐν τῇ εἰς Λακεδαίμονα ἀποδημίᾳ (
comp.
E. Meyer, Hermes 30 p. 265
).
25.
mvp-aristotle-comment-1043
τὸ δ᾽ ἴσως:
comp.
An. post. 1. 9, 76 a 29
;
Soph. el. 1, 165 a 10
.
25.
mvp-aristotle-comment-1044
1461b6
Κεφαλλῆνες.
Though the form
Κεφαληνία is found in the text of
H. A. 8. 28, 605 b 27
, there is little doubt that
Aristotle must have written the word with a double
λ. This is the normal spelling in Attic Inscriptions (
Meisterhans, Gr. p. 96
), and also in literature, according to
Eustathius on
Dion. Perieg. 431
,
τοὺς δὲ Κεφαλλῆνας καὶ τὴν Κεφαλληνίαν ἐν δυσὶ
λ ἡ παλαιὰ χρῆσις ἅπασα ἔχει.
25.
mvp-aristotle-comment-1045
παρ᾿ αὐτῶν γὰρ γῆμαι.
For the preposition
comp.
Plato
Polit. 310 D
γαμοῦσί τε παρὰ τούτων. —
Isocrates 386 c
ἔγημεν ἐκ Σερίφου παρ᾿ ἀνθρώπων πολὺ πλείονος ἀξίων ἢ κατὰ τὴν αὑτῶν πόλιν, ἐξ ἧς ἐγένετο Σώπαλις.
25.
mvp-aristotle-comment-1046
1461b8
Ἰκάδιον.
The name is presumably the same as
Εἰκάδιος, on which see
Fick, Gr. Personennamen p. 296
.
1461b9
25.
mvp-aristotle-comment-1047
εἰκός ἐστιν,
scil.
εἶναι (see on
24, 1459 b 9
). The alternative is to take the clause (with
Madius) as meaning 'it is through an error that the question (i. e. the objection), seems probable and reasonable'.
26.
mvp-aristotle-comment-1048
ὅλως δὲ κτέ.
This concluding paragraph, in intention at any rate, puts the main points in the preceding discussion into a more general form. The language in b 23 is to be noticed;
ἀδύνατα is clearly used as the opposite of the
οἷα ἦν ἢ ἔστιν,
ἄλογα of the
οἷά φασιν καὶ δοκεῖ, and
βλαβερά of the
οἷα εἶναι δεῖ in
25, 1460 b 10
. Some of the points in the previous statement are either passed over or only just hinted at.
On the other hand two new points are introduced: the plea of poetical necessity, instead of being limited to 'impossibilities' (
comp.
25, 1460 b 23
), is indirectly said to be an excuse for the 'improbable' and the 'morally offensive' also (
comp.
b 19
ἀλογίᾳ καὶ μοχθηρίᾳ); and besides this we have the dialectical rule of caution in b 15, which might very well have found a place in the main discussion, as a pendant to that in 31. The whole chapter in fact, however excellent in substance, is hardly a model of logical arrangement.
26.
mvp-aristotle-comment-1049
τὸ ἀδύνατον μὲν πρὸς τὴν ποίησιν.
Vahlen takes these words together in the sense of 'the impossible in poetry', and supposes only two solutions to be recognized, those denoted by
πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον ἢ πρὸς τὴν δόξαν. The chief objection to this view is that it seems to exclude the solution given in
25, 1460 b 24
, where poetical necessity is said to justify even 'impossibilities'. The reason that follows,
πρός τε γὰρ τὴν ποίησιν κτέ., adds a very necessary qualification, viz. that the impossibility has to be disguised and made credible (
πιθανόν) by arts of expression;
comp.
24, 1460 a 27
ἀδύνατα εἰκότα, and
24, 1460 b 2
ἀφανίζει ἡδύνων τὸ ἄτοπον. A second solution is by reference
πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον—a point which
Aristotle illustrates here from painting, and not as in
25, 1460 b 33
from poetry. A third is by reference
πρὸς τὴν δόξαν i. e. by showing that the impossibility has been accepted and sanctioned by opinion (
comp.
25, 1460 b 10
οἷά φασιν καὶ δοκεῖ, and
1460 b 35
οὕτω φασίν).
26.
mvp-aristotle-comment-1050
1461b10
πρὸς τὴν ποίησιν:
Meteor. 2. 3, 357 a 26
πρὸς ποίησιν μὲν γὰρ οὕτως εἰπὼν [scil.
Empedocles] ἴσως εἴρηκεν ἱκανῶς (ἡ γὰρ μεταφορὰ ποιητικόν), πρὸς δὲ τὸ γνῶναι τὴν φύσιν οὐχ ἱκανῶς. —
Fr. 147 (Teubn.)
οὐδὲ γὰρ πρὸς τὴν ποίησιν πρὸ ἔργου ἦν ἡ τούτων μνήμη.
26.
mvp-aristotle-comment-1051
ἀνάγειν,
to explain by reference to something (
comp.
Bon. Ind. 42 a 37
).
27.
mvp-aristotle-comment-1052
1461b11
αἱρετώτερον πιθανὸν ἀδύνατον:
24, 1460 a 26
προαιρεῖσθαί τε δεῖ ἀδύνατα εἰκότα μᾶλλον ἢ δυνατὰ ἀπίθανα.
28.
mvp-aristotle-comment-1053
1461b12
οἵους Ζεύξις ἔγραφεν.
In
25, 1460 b 18
also the allusion is apparently to a picture. We have been told in an earlier chapter (
6, 1450 a 27
) that the personages of
Zeuxis lacked character, i. e. that he sacrificed expression to beauty. The criticism implied in the present passage is that they are 'impossibilities', in other words, of an impossible beauty, not like real men and women (i. e. not
οἷα ἦν ἢ ἔστιν,
25, 1460 b 10
).
The answer to this is that they are, like the characters in
Sophocles (
25, 1460 b 33
), better than the reality, what men and women ought to be. This justification of
Zeuxis, which recalls what has been said elsewhere of
Polygnotus (
2, 1448 a 5
), and of
Homer (
15, 1454 b 14
), may very well represent
Aristotle's own view of him and his work. It was certainly a common view of him in antiquity (
comp.
Maximus Tyrius
Diss. 32. 5
).
28.
mvp-aristotle-comment-1054
1461b13
ἀλλὰ βέλτιον
(
scil.
τοιούτους εἶναι) is a vivid way of putting the respondent's answer to the objection (see on
25, 1460 b 33
).
28.
mvp-aristotle-comment-1055
τὸ γὰρ παράδειγμα δεῖ ὑπερέχειν.
As
Aristotle says in
15, 1454 b 9
, a true artist, instead of keeping too closely to his model, will make his portrait more beautiful than the real man.
1461b14
29.
mvp-aristotle-comment-1056
πρὸς ἅ φασιν τἄλογα,
scil.
δεῖ ἀνάγειν. It will be seen that a
δέ is wanting, and also that the next clause (
οὕτω τε καὶ ὅτι ποτὲ οὐκ ἄλογόν ἐστιν) comes in without a conjunction. This may perhaps be taken as another sign of the
Poetics being in places only the rough draft of a book (see on
22, 1458 b 30
). It would have been easy on revision to make the text read thus:
πρὸς δὲ ἅ φασι τἄλογα ἀνάγοντας οὕτω τε λυτέον καὶ ὅτι ποτὲ οὐκ ἄλογόν ἐστιν. For the ellipse
comp.
25, 1460 b 35
ὅτι οὕτω φασίν,
scil.
λυτέον.
29.
mvp-aristotle-comment-1057
τἄλογα.
The first appearance of the word in this chapter, though it has been used more than once in chap. 24.
τὸ ἄλογον, said of a fact or statement, means that which we cannot account for, and thus find a difficulty in accepting as either true or possible (see on
15, 1454 b 6
). There is an obvious distinction between it and
τὸ ἀδύνατον, that which is not and cannot be true, the one being only 'improbable', and the other 'impossible'. The charge of improbability according to
Aristotle may be met in two ways: one may urge (1) that the statement criticized has the sanction of opinion (
φασιν), or (2) that the incident was not so improbable, if one remembers the time (
ποτέ) when it is supposed to have occurred. These two solutions have already appeared in the main discussion in
1460 b 35 — 1461 a 4
, but in answer to a somewhat different allegation, that of untruth (
ὅτι οὐκ ἀληθῆ
1460 b 33
). A third answer, the plea of poetical necessity, is indirectly suggested in b 19.
29.
mvp-aristotle-comment-1058
ὅτι ποτὲ οὐκ ἄλογον:
comp.
fr. 164 (Teubn.)
λύων οὖν ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης τὸ τάλαντον οὔτε ἴσον φησὶ τότε καὶ νῦν οὔτε ἀφωρισμένῳ χρῆσθαι σταθμῷ, and the passages quoted above on
25, 1461 a 2
. For the emphatic
ποτέ
comp.
Top. 3. 2, 117 a 36
αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀεὶ ἡ δὲ ποτὲ χρησίμη (also
Top. 5. 1, 128 b 20
).
29.
mvp-aristotle-comment-1059
εἰκὸς γὰρ κτέ.
See on
18, 1456 a 23
(
ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο εἰκὸς).
1461b15
The maxim being Agathon's, it might be quoted for controversial purposes when better arguments were not to be had. The text details context for controversial usage.
30.
mvp-aristotle-comment-1060
τὰ δ᾽ ὑπεναντίως εἰρημένα
covers the ground of the group of difficulties considered in
1461 a 9–31
. The common point in these is that they turn primarily on the language rather than the matter of the poem, and may be met by finding another interpretation for the word or phrase to which the critic has taken exception. The difficulties themselves are very far from being all of one kind.
In the second (
εἶδος κακός
a 12
), fourth (
ἄλλοι μὲν
a 16
), eighth (
αἶψα δὲ
a 34
), and eleventh (
οἰνοχοεύειν
a 30
) the supposed fault is clearly some inconsistency or self-contradiction; in the third (
ζωρότερον
a 14
) and sixth (
δίδομεν
a 22
), however, it is an offence against morals; in the fifth (
οἴη
a 20
), seventh (
οὗ
a 23
), and ninth (
πλέω
a 26
) one against scientific or other truth; and in the first (
οὐρῆας
a 10
) and tenth (
κασσιτέροιο
a 28
) one against general probability.
The formula, therefore,
ὑπεναντίως εἰρημένα, instead of being restricted to logical incompatibilities, seems to include words and phrases which in the view of the critic are at variance with other standards of judgement. That it was meant to bear this wider sense is shown by the fuller formula in the context, ὥστε καὶ αὐτὸν [scil.
ἐναντίως εἰρηκέναι] ἢ πρὸς ἃ αὐτὸς λέγει ἢ ὃ ἂν φρόνιμος ὑποθῆται (b 18).
30.
mvp-aristotle-comment-1061
1461b16
ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἔλεγχοι.
The sense shows that a passive verb (σκεπτέοι?) has to be understood. The same sort of ellipse may be the explanation of the nominative
ὥσπερ σφαῖρα in
De anima 3. 11, 434 a 13
, where
κινεῖται is probably to be supplied from the text which precedes the comparison (see
J. of Phil. 17 p. 67
). The converse of this, an active understood from a passive, is found in
Metaph. I 2, 1053 b 14
πῶς δεῖ γνωριμωτέρως λεχθῆναι καὶ μᾶλλον ὥσπερ οἱ περὶ φύσεως (
scil.
λέγουσιν).
The statement in the text is a word of caution not unlike those we have already had in 4 and 31.
Aristotle reminds us that the difficulties of language pointed out by the critics are not always real ones, and that, before they are admitted to be real, they should be scrutinized and tested in just the same way as in a dialectical discussion one tests the contradiction or confutation of one's opponent which is sometimes a genuine confutation (
ἔλεγχοs ἀληθινός), and sometimes only the semblance of one (
ἔλεγχος φαινόμενος:
v.
Bon. Ind. 235 b 42
). The main points to be considered are briefly indicated in the context,
εἰ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ὡσαύτως. A fuller enumeration of the marks of a genuine
ἔλεγχος is found in
Soph. el. 5, 167 a 23
ἔλεγχος μὲν γὰρ ἀντίφασις τοῦ αὐτοῦ καὶ ἑνός, μὴ ὀνόματος ἀλλὰ πράγματος, καὶ ὀνόματος μὴ συνωνύμου ἀλλὰ τοῦ αὐτοῦ, ἐκ τῶν δοθέντων, ἐξ ἀνάγκης, μὴ συναριθμουμένου τοῦ ἐν ἀρχῇ, κατὰ ταὐτὸ καὶ πρὸς ταὐτὸ καὶ ὡσαύτως καὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ χρόνῳ.
26, 181 a 1
τοῖς δὲ παρὰ τὸν ὁρισμὸν γινομένοις τοῦ ἐλέγχου ἀπαντητέον σκοποῦσι τὸ συμπέρασμα πρὸς τὴν ἀντίφασιν, ὅπως ἔσται τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ὡσαύτως καὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ χρόνῳ.
30.
mvp-aristotle-comment-1062
1461b18
ὥστε καὶ αὐτὸν κτὲ.
ὥστε καὶ τὸν ποιητὴν ὑπεναντίως εἰρηκέναι ἢ πρὸς ἃ αὐτὸς λέγει ἢ πρὸς ὃ ἂν φρόνιμος ὑποθῆται (
comp.
Vahlen, Beitr. 4 p. 384
). The sense is: The word or phrase in question must be first ascertained to be really inconsistent either with some actual statement in the poem itself, in the context or elsewhere, or with what may be reasonably assumed as true or probable. In saying
ὃ ἂν φρόνιμος ὑποθῆται,
Aristotle sets aside the hasty or arbitrary assumptions which underlay a good deal of the current poetical criticism (see b 3 sqq.).
The statement in the text may be compared with the rule laid down for dialectic in
Soph. el. 15, 174 b 19
ἔτι καθάπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ῥητορικοῖς καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐλεγκτικοῖς ὁμοίως τὰ ἐναντιώματα θεωρητέον ἢ πρὸς τὰ ὑφ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ λεγόμενα ἢ πρὸς οὓς ὁμολογεῖ καλῶς λέγειν ἢ πράττειν. In the note on this passage in his edition
Vahlen supposes the clause to mean
ὥστε καὶ αὐτόν,
scil.
σκοπεῖν δεῖ τὸν ποιητήν—as though
Aristotle were now offering a word of advice to the poets. It seems to me that he is still thinking of the critics and apologists of poetry, and that he is merely telling them to examine the supposed
ὑπεναντία and make quite sure they are real ones. These, to be real, must be like the
εναντιώματα in a genuine confutation, and capable of standing the same logical tests. The whole point in fact is that the incongruities found in the language of a poem may turn out on examination to be imaginary, just as a confutation in argument may be only a sham confutation.
1461b19
31.
mvp-aristotle-comment-1063
ἀλογίᾳ καὶ μοχθηρίᾳ.
For the datives see
Bon. Ind. 166 c 61
,
281 b 24
, and
875 a 53
.
31.
mvp-aristotle-comment-1064
μὴ ἀνάγκης οὔσης:
15, 1454 a 28
παράδειγμα πονηρίας μὲν ἤθους μὴ ἀναγκαίου οἷον ὁ Μενέλαος ὁ ἐν τῷ Ὀρέστῃ. The plea of poetic necessity was indirectly recognized as a valid answer to certain criticisms in
25, 1460 b 24
, and before that in
15, 1454 a 28
;
comp. also
24, 1460 a 12
.
31.
mvp-aristotle-comment-1065
1461b21
Αἰγεῖ:
The appearance of Aegeus is in
Aristotle's view (1)
ἄλογον, because no sufficient reason can be given for it, and (2) unnecessary, because no use is made of it in the after-part of the play. The explanations of certain of the editors of
Euripides are hardly an adequate answer to
Aristotle's criticism.
31.
mvp-aristotle-comment-1066
ἐν Ὀρέστῃ:
see on
15, 1454 a 29
(
μὴ ἀναγκαίου).
1461b22
32.
mvp-aristotle-comment-1067
ἐκ πέντε εἰδῶν φέρουσιν.
The various heads under which the faults in poetry have been classified are termed
εἴδη, because they represent distinct 'kinds' of faults. It is one thing to say of something that it is
ἀδύνατον, another that it is
ἄλογον, and another that it is
βλαβερόν (etc.). For this use of
φέρειν
comp.
19, 1456 b 14
ἐπιτίμημα φέρεται. —
An. pr. 2. 26, 69 b 1
φέρεται ἡ ἔνστασις. —
An. post. 1. 14, 79 a 19
φέρουσι τὰς ἀποδείξεις. —
Rhet. 2. 18, 1391 b 24
δόξαι καὶ προτάσεις εἰσίν, ἐξ ὧν τὰς πίστεις φέρουσιν.
32.
mvp-aristotle-comment-1068
1461b23
ὡς ἀδύνατα,
scil.
ὄντα τὰ εἰρημένα.
32.
mvp-aristotle-comment-1069
1461b23_2
βλαβερά:
the opposite of the
οἷα εἶναι δεῖ in
25, 1460b 11
. The word may be a reminiscence of
Plato's condemnation of certain legends in
Rep. 391 D
οὔθ᾽ ὅσια ταῦτα οὔτ᾽ ἀληθῆ . . . καὶ μὴν τοῖς γε ἀκούουσι βλαβερά· πᾶς γὰρ ἑαυτῷ ξυγγνώμην ἕξει κακῷ ὄντι, πεισθεὶς ὡς ἄρα τοιαῦτα πράττουσί τε καὶ ἔπραττον καὶ “ οἱ θεῶν ἀγχίσποροι ”.
32.
mvp-aristotle-comment-1070
1461b23_3
ὑπεναντία:
the
ὑπεναντίως εἰρημένα of
b15.
32.
mvp-aristotle-comment-1071
1461b24
παρὰ τὴν ὀρθότητα τὴν κατὰ τέχνην
must refer, as
Twining has seen, to the technical inaccuracies of description considered in
25, 1460b 16 sqq.
It is to be observed that the present statement clearly recognizes two kinds of error, only incidentally distinguished in the early part of the chapter (
25, 1460b 20
), the fault of impossibility and the fault of technical inaccuracy. The distinction is a very real one in controversy; to say of a picture, for instance, that it is not scientifically or historically correct is not quite the same thing as saying that it represents an impossibility.
κατὰ τέχνην is apparently used as an equivalent for the
καθ᾽ ἑκάστην τέχνην in
25, 1460b 19
. The older interpreters understand the passage differently.
Goulston makes it mean 'tanquam ea quae a poeticae vel alterius artis norma ac veritate discedunt', thus giving
κατὰ τέχνην a sense wide enough to include poetry as well as
ἰατρική,
πολιτική, etc.
Heinsius (after
Victorius) renders it by 'ut quae cum ipsa artis poeticae pugnant natura'—just as though the text had either
κατὰ τὴν τέχνην (which
Hermann wished to restore) or
κατ᾿ αὐτὴν τὴν τέχνην. The objection to such interpretations is sufficiently obvious. The criticism that something is poetically wrong is not one of the
ἐπιτιμήματα considered in this chapter; and it cannot be met by any of the counter-arguments which
Aristotle has suggested for the use of the apologist.
32.
mvp-aristotle-comment-1072
1461b24_2
ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ἀριθμῶν.
The precise meaning of this is far from clear.
Goulston's paraphrase
1 is 'ex antedictis formarum numeris, seu specialibus differentiis'; and
Vahlen's 'aus den genannten Zahlen oder Stücken' (
Beitr. 4, 389
). To illustrate the sense of
ἀριθμῶν
Tyrwhitt quotes
Isocrates 224 c
ἅπαντας τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς περιλαβὼν ἐξ ὧν ἄριστ᾽ ἄν τις τὰ κοινὰ διοικήσειεν;
Plutarch
De aud. 45 B
τὸ μὲν καλὸν ἐκ πολλῶν οἷον ἀριθμῶν εἰς ἕνα καιρὸν ἡκόντων ὑπὸ συμμετρίας τινὸς καὶ ἁρμονίας ἐπιτελεῖται; comparing also the similar use of numeri in Latin. Another of
Tyrwhitt's quotations is perhaps more directly to the purpose,
Eurip.
Ion 1014
ὁ δεύτερος δ᾽ ἀριθμὸς ὃν [ὧν
L. Dindorf] λέγεις τί δρᾷ;—to which may be added
Eurip.
Heracl. 997
εἰδὼς μὲν οὐκ ἀριθμὸν ἀλλ᾽ ἐτητύμως ἄνδρ᾽ ὄντα τὸν σὸν παῖδα, and the passage in
Aristotle (cited by
Teichmüller) in
De gen. an. 3. 10, 760
a33
αὐτοὶ μὲν γὰρ γίγνονται, ἄλλο δ᾽ οὐδὲν γεννῶσιν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν τῷ τρίτῳ ἀριθμῷ πέρας ἔσχεν ἡ γένεσις. It would seem from these instances that
ἀριθμός may sometimes have the sense of an item or term in a series, and that
ἀριθμῶν in the present passage may thus stand for 'points enumerated'
1. If this interpretation is possible, the reference in
ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ἀριθμῶν is to the list of assumptions in the opening of this chapter.
Twining draws attention to the parallelism between the language in the text,
αἱ λύσεις ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ἀριθμῶν σκεπτέαι, and that in
1460b 21
ὥστε δεῖ τὰ ἐπιτιμήματα ἐκ τούτων ἐπισκοποῦντα λύειν. The advantage of this view of the reference in
ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ἀριθμῶν is that it simplifies the explanation of the next clause,
εἰσὶ δὲ δώδεκα (
scil.
οἱ ἀριθμοί). It is usual to explain the number by adding up the various
λύσεις actually found and described in the preceding discussion (
1460b 21—1461b 21
), and counting in statements like those in
1460b 29
and
1461a 4
31 (
v. ad loc.), though they are hardly
λύσεις in the present sense of the term (see on
1460b 29
). If we look back, however, to the opening paragraph in the chapter, it will be seen that
Aristotle begins by laying down a series of postulates concerning poetry. The first is that, as the poet is an imitator, the poetic picture may represent either
οἷα ἦν ἢ ἔστιν or
οἷά φασι καὶ δοκεῖ or
οἷα εἶναι δεῖ. There are thus, if we separate the alternatives (as
Aristotle himself has done in the course of the discussion), five possibilities,
οἷα ἦν,
οἷά ἐστιν,
οἷά φασιν (εἶναι),
οἷα δοκεῖ (εἶναι),
οἷα εἶναι δεῖ; and they are each of them available in reply to criticism; if the critic, for instance, says that the picture is not of things
οἷα εἶναι δεῖ, it is a valid answer to reply that it represents
οἷα ἦν (
v. 1461a 2
) or
οἷά ἐστιν, etc. The second postulate is that, as poetic language is not quite the same as ordinary speech, it may have to be explained by certain arts of interpretation. This point is merely indicated in
1460b11-13
; the statement there has to be supplemented from that in
1461a9-31
where we are told that six modes of interpretation of the written letter of poetry (
γλώττῃ,
κατὰ μεταφοράν,
κατὰ προσῳδίαν,
διαιρέσει,
ἀμφιβολίᾳ,
κατὰ τὸ ἔθος τῆς λέξεως) are available, and may be legitimately assumed, whenever a
λύσις of difficulties arising from the poet's language is wanted. The third postulate is that poetry, as a distinct art, has a correctness of its own, apart from that of every other art or science—which implies, as the next section (
1460b 23-29
) explains, that a description may be poetically right, even though it involves some impossibility, or offends against some technical standard of correctness. The various assumptions, therefore, in this series of postulates may serve as major premisses for the apologist; and as a matter of fact every one of them appears in some form or other in the specimen
λύσεις in this chapter. It will be seen, too, that they are just 12 (5+6+1) in number.
1
Goulston may possibly have remembered the expression
τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς ἑκάστου τῶν νοσημάτων in
Hippocrates 3 p. 27 K. as interpreted by
Foes,
Oec. Hippocr. p. 92.
1 The word seems to bear the same sense in [
Dion. Hal.]
Ars Rhet. p. 414 R.
γίνεται δὲ τοῦτο ἐν τοῖς ἀριθμοῖς οἷς εἴπομεν, τοῖς ἑπτά—where
ἀριθμοῖς represents the
τόποι of p. 400.
34.
mvp-aristotle-comment-630
25.18
34. Il arrive auſſi quelquefois qu'on répond ſolidement aux Cenſures des Critiques par un ſeul changement de ton ou d'ac-cent; & c'est ainsi qu Hippias de Thasos a fauve Homere ſur cet endroit, où Jupiter envoye un Songe à Agamemnon; car on l'accuſoit d'avoir fait dire un mensonge par Jupiter.]
1
35.
mvp-aristotle-comment-631
25.19
35. Le même Hippias défend auſſi par le même moyen ce Poëte dans ce paſſage, où aprés avoir parlé d'un bois bien sec, on l'accuſe de dire ensuite, qu'une partie de ce bois eft corrompue par la pluye.]
2
36.
mvp-aristotle-comment-632
25.20
36. On fauve auſſi beaucoup d'endroits par une differente ponctuation, & c'est ce qui a juſtifié Empedocle qu'on avoit accuſe de s'être contredit dans les vers où il expliquoit les principes des choſes.]
3
37.
mvp-aristotle-comment-633
25.21
37. Quelquefois on a recours à l'ambiguité, comme dans ce paſſage, où Homere dit que la nuit eſt plus des deux tiers paſſée, & qu'il en reste encore le tiers.]
4
38.
mvp-aristotle-comment-634
25.22
38. Pour défendre les Poëtes on employe ſouvent auſſi l'autorité de l'usage qui fait, par exemple, qu'on appelle du vin, un vin qui eſt mélé d'eau.]
5
39.
mvp-aristotle-comment-635
25.23
39. Toutes les fois qu'un mot ſemble ſignifier quelque chose de contraire au deſſein du Poëte, il faut examiner toutes les differentes fignifications que ce mot peut avoir dans le paſſage en que-stion.]
6
40.
mvp-aristotle-comment-636
25.23
40. Et le plus court moyen de ſe tirer de ces endroits, c'est de prendre le mot dans un ſens tout contraire à celuy qu'on luy donne ordinairement.]
7
41.
mvp-aristotle-comment-637
25.24
41. Il arrive auſſi tres ſouvent, comme Glaucon l'a fort bien dit, que les Critiques se préoccupent & s'entètent ſans raiſon de certaines chofes avant que de lire les Poëtes, & perfuadez que leur fentiment est le ſeul raisonnable, ils condamnent fans autre examen tout ce qui se trouve contraire à leur opinion.]
8
42.
mvp-aristotle-comment-638
43.
mvp-aristotle-comment-639
25.25
43. C'eſt de ce faux préjugé qu'est née la Critique qu'on a faite à Homere ſur le ſujet d'Icarius pere de Penelope; car ces Cenfeurs prévenus que cet Icarius étoit Lacedemonien. ]
10
44.
mvp-aristotle-comment-640
25.26
44. En general, quand on accuſe les Poëtes d'avoir dit quelque chose d'impoſſible, il faut examiner cette impoſibilité par raport à la Poësie, par raport à ce qui est mieux, ou par raport à la Renommée.]
11
45.
mvp-aristotle-comment-641
25.27
45. Par raport à la Poësie, car on montre que l'impoſſible vray-femblable doit être preferé au poſſible qui n'a aucune vray-ſemblance, & qui ne seroit pas crû.]
12
46.
mvp-aristotle-comment-642
47.
mvp-aristotle-comment-643
48.
mvp-aristotle-comment-644
25.28
48. Enfin par raport à la Renommée, car on prouve qu'on ne fait que ſuivre l'opinion commune.)
15
49.
mvp-aristotle-comment-645
25.29
49. Tout ce qui paroit abfurde se peut justifier par ces trois moyens, & par cette maxime qu'on a déja raportée, &c.]
16
50.
mvp-aristotle-comment-646
25.30
50. Pour les choses qui ſemblent contraires, à ce que l'on a dėja dit, il faut les examiner comme on examine les objections dans la Dialectique.]
17
51.
mvp-aristotle-comment-647
25.31
51. Les Critiques juſtes & auſquelles on ne peut répondre, font celles où l'on fait voir qu'un endroit est déraisonnable & abfurde, & qu'un autre est méchant.]
18
52.
mvp-aristotle-comment-648
25.31
52. Un Poëte tombe dans le premier vice, lorſque ſsans aucune neceſſité il a recours à une choſe qui eſt ſans raiſon, & telle est la faute d' Euripide dans le rolle d' Egée.]
19
53.
mvp-aristotle-comment-649
25.31
53. Et il tombe dans le ſecond, quand il introduit, par exem-ple, un méchant caractère ſsans neceſſité, & tel est le caractére de Menelas dans l'Oreste d'Euripide.]
20
54.
mvp-aristotle-comment-650
55.
mvp-aristotle-comment-651
25.32
55. Et les réponſes qu'on y peut faire ſe tirent des lieux que nous avons marquez, & qui ſont douze en tout.]
22
244.
mvp-aristotle-comment-244
NOTE 244. P. 127.
25.18
ΔΙΔΟΜΕΝ δέ οἱ εὖχος ἀρέσθαι.
Καὶ τὸ περὶ τὸ ἐνύπνιον τὸ Ἀγαμέμνονθ’, ὅτι ΟΥΚ ΑΥΤΟΣ ὁ Ζεὺς εἶπεν, "δίδομεν δέ οἱ εὖχος ἀρέσθαι," ἀλλὰ ΤΩΙ ΕΝΥΠΝΙΩΙ ΕΝΕΤΕΛΛΕΤΟ διδόναι. —
De Soph. Elench. p. 284, ed. Duval.
— This clearly confirms the common explanation, which makes Hippias substitute
διδόμεν, the infinitive, (for
διδόμεναι,) used imperatively, instead of
δίδομεν, the first person plural of the present tense. A very curious solution this. Jupiter tells no lie. He only orders the dream to lie for him:
"Ce qui est très different," says
Dacier
;
"car alors le mensonge ne vient pas de Jupiter, il vient du songe." — Dacier tells us also, that this hemistich, which does not appear in our copies of Homer, was altered,
"par une fraude pieuse."
1
I cannot see any great piety in the fraud; because nothing appears to be added to the impiety of the passage by the words objected to, or to be taken from it, by the suppression of them. If the words were in Aristotle's Homer, they were probably in Plato's also. Yet, in the passage at the end of the second book of his Republic, where he alludes to this part of Homer, he, very properly, takes no notice of these words, but censures the whole circumstance, of Jupiter's being represented as sending such a deceitful dream: —
τὴν τοῦ ἐνυπνίου ΠΟΜΠΗΝ ὑπὸ Διὸς τῷ Ἀγαμέμνονι.
2
The theology, indeed, of this charming writer, was of a very different complexion from that of Hippias, or of Dacier. —
Κομιδῇ ἄρα ὁ ΘΕΟΣ ἁπλοῦν καὶ ἀληθὲς, ἔν τε ἔργῳ, καὶ ἐν λόγῳ· καὶ οὔτε αὐτὸς μεθίσταται, οὔτε ἄλλους ἐξαπατᾷ, οὔτε κατὰ φαντασίας, οὔτε κατὰ λόγους, οὔτε κατὰ σημείων πομπὰς, οὔθ’ ὕπαρ, οὐδ’ ὄναρ.
3
245.
mvp-aristotle-comment-245
NOTE 245. P. 127.
25.18
Τὸ μὲν ΟΥ καταπύθεται ὄμβρῳ.
This correction, also, of Hippias, is somewhat more explicitly mentioned,
De Soph. Elench. p. 284.
The passage was censured as absurd, (
ὡς ἀτόπως εἰρηκότα) by those critics who read
οὗ.
4
But what the absurdity was, we are not told by Aristotle. His com- mentators tell us, that it consisted in first calling the post
"dry,"
αὖον, and then saying
"where it was rotted by rain." I cannot say I comprehend this. Are rottenness and dryness, as
Beni
very well asks, incompatible? — Nor is it clear, what construction, or what sense, was given to the passage, by those who read
οὗ, instead of
οὐ. — But the reader will hardly thank me for detaining him with a dissertation upon a rotten post.
246.
mvp-aristotle-comment-246
NOTE 246.
25.19
P. 128. AND MIX'D BEFORE UNMIX'D.
Ζωρά τε τὰ πρὶν ΑΚΡΗΤΑ, [
διαλλάττοντα κελεύθους: for so the verse is completed, in Simplicius and Athenæus.] This seems the best and most authentic reading, and Dacier's the most reasonable explanation. The meaning of the words,
ζωρόν, ζωρότερον, was matter of great dispute among the antients themselves. See
Plutarch's Sympos. Prob. V. 4.
— M. Batteux, taking it to mean
pure, unmixed, reads, consistently with that idea, for
ἄκρητα, ΚΕΚΡΑΤΟ. But, that this word, whatever it was, meant unmixed, seems plain from the passage of
Athenæus, p. 423, 424
, about
Theophrastus
; who, it seems, in a treatise on drunkenness, adduced these very lines of Empedocles to prove, that the meaning of
ζωρότερον was, not pure wine, but wine mixed with water.
The expression,
διαλλάττοντα κελεύθους, seems to prove, as Dacier has explained it, that the second verse was not intended merely as explanatory repetition, in other terms, of the change described in the first, but as descriptive of a contrary change; an interpretation which is somewhat supported by the two following lines of the same Poet, on the same subject: —
Ἄλλοτε μὲν, φιλότητι συνερχόμεν’ εἰς ἓν ἅπαντα, Ἄλλοτε δ’ αὖ, δίχ’ ἕκαστα φορεύμενα νείκεος ἔχθει.
5
—and, perhaps, still better, by the lines quoted by Aristotle,
Phys. Auscult. VIII. p. 408.
The expression —
ΜΑΘΟΝ ἀθάνατ’ εἶναι — is well explained by
Casaubon, upon Athenæus, p. 718,
μαθον,
pro εἰώθεισαν, aut ἐπεφύκεισαν: —
"didicerant esse, pro erant, vel solebant, esse," &c. See also the verses just referred to, in the
Phys. Auscult. where the same expression occurs —
ΜΕΜΑΘΗΚΕ φύεσθαι.
Of
διαίρεσις and
σύνθεσις, and the ambiguity of punctuation, as a source of sophistical argumentation, more may be seen, if it be thought worth seeing,
Rhet. II. 24, p. 580.
De Soph. Elench. p. 284, 288, 303, ed. Duval.
247.
mvp-aristotle-comment-247
NOTE 247.
25.20
P. 128. TO AMBIGUITY—.
Ἀμφιβολία. i. e. such ambiguity, as does not depend on the different senses of single words, (which Aristotle calls
ὁμωνυμία,) but on the different senses, of which two or more words are capable, independently of their punctuation. See,
De Soph. Elench. I. cap. iv.
which clears up his distinctions, between
διαίρεσις, ἀμφιβολία, ὁμωνυμία, &c.
248.
mvp-aristotle-comment-248
NOTE 248.
25.21
P. 128. WHATEVER IS POURED OUT TO DRINK AS WINE.
Upon
v. 363 of Od. Ω. [v. 364]
(
—κερώντας αἴθοπα οἶνον—)
Eustathius
says —
τουτέστιν, ἐμβάλλοντας εἰς κρατῆρας: and
Gataker
remarks, on occasion of the same passage —
"τὸ κεραν, sive κερασαι, licet miscere proprie significet, usurpatur tamen simpliciter ἀντὶ τοῦ, ἐγχεῖν, καὶ διδόναι πιεῖν pro infundere, in calicem scil. sive cyathum, et bibendum porrigere."
6
As a proof that the verb was so used, without the idea of mixing, we meet with it applied to nectar:
—ΚΕΡΑΣΣΕ δὲ νέκταρ ἐρυθρόν.
Od. Ε. 93.
The Gods hardly drank nectar and water. But it is even applied to pure water itself:
Θυμῆρες ΚΕΡΑΣΑΣΑ κατὰ κρατός τε καὶ ὤμων. i. e. pouring it over my head and shoulders.
Od. Κ. 362.
249.
mvp-aristotle-comment-249
NOTE 249.
25.21
P. 128. HENCE GANYMEDE, &C.
I have adhered, without scruple, to the transposition mentioned in
Mr. Winstanley's note
;
7
which had been proposed, I know not by whom, before Victorius published his commentary. Victorius opposes it; but, I think, without sufficient reason. Piccolomini saw, and has well defended, the necessity of it, which appears to me to be obvious. I would read the whole passage thus:
Τὰ δὲ, κατὰ τὸ ἔθος τῆς λέξεως· οἷον, τὸν [forte, ΤΟ] κεκραμμένον, οἶνόν φασιν εἶναι· ὅθεν εἴρηται ὁ Γανυμήδης, "Διῒ οἰνοχοεύειν," πινόντων οἶνον. Εἴη δ’ ἂν τοῦτό γε καὶ κατὰ μεταφοράν. Καὶ, Χαλκέας, τοὺς τὸν σίδηρον ἐργαζομένους· ὅθεν πεποἰηται, "Κνημὶς νεότευκτος κασσιτέροιο."
This differs from Mr. Winstanley's arrangement, only with respect to the words —
εἴη δ’ ἂν τοῦτό γε, &c. which appear to me to be- long to the single example immediately preceding them in the editions. The commentators agree, I think, in making them refer to all the examples. But I cannot be persuaded, that Aristotle, after formally proposing the
ἔθος λέξεως, as a distinct solution, would immediately say, that all the instances he gives might as well be defended
κατὰ μεταφοράν. I understand him to say —
"though this example, indeed, may also be defended by metaphor." The expression confirms this : —
εἴη δ’ ἂν ΤΟΥΤΟ ΓΕ καὶ κατὰ μεταφοράν.
Besides, there seems to be a pretty plain reason, why this instance might be considered as a metaphor, and the others not so. Nectar was the wine of the Gods; and the resemblance was sufficiently obvious, to make the substitution of the one for the other an easy metaphor. With the other examples the case is different. Brass and iron are indeed, each of them, species of metals. But the common genus is too general to constitute that obvious resemblance which is requisite to a metaphor. Their likeness, to use the philosopher's own language, is not perceived by the genus. Oil and vinegar are both liquids; yet the substitution of the one for the other would make a very strange sort of metaphor; because they have no other resemblance to each other, but as liquids. Hence, Aristotle denominates such substitutions not metaphors, but customary modes of speech; both because the resemblance is not obvious enough for metaphor, and because, as the name implies, they are common and established expressions, (
κύρια,) however, in themselves, improper.
8
250.
mvp-aristotle-comment-250
NOTE 250.
25.22
P. 129. THE MEANING IS, WAS STOPPED ONLY, OR REPELLED.
Dacier
supposes the critics to have objected to the improba- bility of a long spear's remaining fixed in a shield, like an arrow, or light dart. I cannot so conceive it. The lines themselves are the best comment here.
Οὐδὲ τότ’ Αἰνείαο δαΐφρονος ὄβριμον ἔγχος Ῥῆξε σάκος· χρυσὸς γὰρ ἐρύκακε, δῶρα θεοῖο· Ἀλλὰ δύω μὲν ἔλασσε διὰ πτύχας, αἱ δ’ ἄρ’ ἔτι τρεῖς Ἦσαν· ἐπεὶ πέντε πτύχας ἤλασε Κυλλοποδίων, Τὰς δύο, χαλκείας, δύο δ’ ἔνδοθι, κασσιτέροιο, Τὴν δὲ μίαν, χρυσῆν· τῇ ῥ’ ἔσχετο χάλκεον ἔγχος.
Il. Υ. 267, &c.
The shield was composed of five plates; the two first, of brass; the two innermost, next the body, (for that seems to be the sense of
ἔνδοθι
9
,) of tin,
κασσιτέροιο
10
; and one in the middle, of gold; and there the spear was stopped:
ΤΗΙ ῥ’ ἔσχετο. Now this might mean,
stuck, or, was fastened, in it. But this, it was objected, would have been a manifest contradiction; for Homer had said, not only that the gold stopped it—
χρυσὸς γὰρ ἐρύκακε—but, still more expressly, that the spear penetrated two of the plates, and that the three others remained unpierced. But the spear could not well be fixed, or fastened, in the plate of gold, which was the third, without piercing it. And thus the objection appears to have been rightly understood by Victorius and Goulston.
251.
mvp-aristotle-comment-251
NOTE 251.
25.23
P. 129. OF HOW MANY DIFFERENT SENSES, &c.
I may say with Victorius,
"hic locus valde me torsit." The words are these: —
τὸ δὲ, ποσαχῶς ἐνδέχεται, ὧδί πως μάλιστ’ ἄν τις ὑπολάβοι κατὰ τὴν κατ’ ἀντικρύ. — In this passage, as in many others, there is just glimpse enough of some meaning, to mock a commentator with the hopes of discovery, and to deprive him of the comfort of doing at once, what, after all his efforts, he will probably find himself obliged to do at last — of abandoning the passage as unintelligible. For my own part, I do not see one clear and satisfactory sense, that can be made of the words, without conjectural emendation; and if we open that door, we shall be, again, confounded by the number of different senses which ingenuity may propose, with equal pretensions to our acceptance.
Dacier
translates thus:
"Et le plus court moyen de se tirer de ces endroits, c'est de prendre le mot dans un sens tout contraire à celui qu'on lui donne ordinairement."
Piccolomini
and
Beni
understand it thus:
"How many senses a word admits of, may best be known by considering the significations opposed to it:" a sense preferable, I think, at least, to any other that has been offered, because it certainly does receive some support from the
15th chapter of Aristotle's first book of Topics
; where he treats of Homonymy, or equivocation, and points out different means, by which we may discover, what, and how many, different senses a word will admit of;
11
and among these is the rule here supposed to be alluded to; i. e. that any single word must admit of as many different significations as are opposed to it. As, for example, to the word
acute, we oppose, sometimes
grave, sometimes
blunt, sometimes
dull, or
stupid.
Acute therefore has, of course, three different senses, corresponding to those three opposite senses.
But though this explanation of the passage must be allowed to give an Aristotelic meaning, yet I cannot think it a meaning that arises, fairly and clearly, from the text. In particular, the expression,
ΚΑΤΑ τὴν [scil. σημασίαν for so it is supplied—] KAT’ ANTIKPY, has, to me, a very suspicious appearance. I much doubt, whether Aristotle would have used the word
ἀντικρύ to denote contrariety of meaning, or any thing but local opposition. I believe he would have used
ἐναντίον, or
ἀντικείμενον; as he does constantly in those parts of his logical works, where he treats of contrariety, and of the opposite senses of words;
12
and where I have not found the phrase,
κατ’ ἀντικρύ, once made use of in that sense. — However, as this interpretation seems to be the least exceptionable of any, and I see nothing better to propose, I have admitted it in my version: but I should certainly not accuse any reader of being very fastidious, if he preferred a blank to this, or any other meaning, that has been given to this dark saying. Emendatory conjectures, indeed, have occurred to me, as to others; but none of them plausible enough even to impose upon myself.
252.
mvp-aristotle-comment-252
NOTE 252.
25.24
P. 129. ARGUE FROM THESE PREVIOUS DECISIONS OF THEIR OWN.
Αὐτοὶ ΚΑΤΑΨΗΦΙΣΑΜΕΝΟΙ. — I cannot think this word so free from all difficulty as
Mr. Winstanley
does. He says,
"Egregie dictum καταψηφισάμενοι, ut sensus sit: hi perinde ac judices quidam decernentes ratiocinantur," &c. But the question is, whether the word will admit that sense, or any other, than that of condemning, passing sentence against, &c. which is not to Aristotle's purpose in this place. The fair sense of
καταψηφισάμενοι συλλογίζονται, is, if I mistake not,
"they argue, or form their conclusion, after, or, in consequence of, having condemned" what? — We must necessarily understand them to have condemned, either the passage in question, or, the opinion of others about the sense of it. But Aristotle, in what follows, says plainly, that they condemned the passage, or the opinions of others relative to it, in consequence of their own preconceived and erroneous notions; and the idea of condemnation, or censure, here, would be only an awkward, tautological anticipation of the
ἘΠΙΤΙΜΩΣΙΝ, ἂν ὑπεναντίον ᾖ τῇ αὑτῶν οἰήσει, which follows. I think, therefore, that the proposed correction of
Heinsius
καταΣΟφισάμενοι, must be allowed the praise, both of ingenuity and probability. In my version, however, I have contented myself with making the best I could of that reading which has the authority of all the manuscripts, and all the commentators, except Heinsius, on its side. —
Victorius
thinks the word will bear the sense of
"cum sententiam tulerint;" but he adds —
"quamvis in præpositione, quæ verbo adjuncta est, vis insit contra alios id faciendi."
253.
mvp-aristotle-comment-253
NOTE 253.
25.25
P. 130. THE OBJECTION ITSELF, THEREFORE, IS PROBABLY FOUNDED ON A MISTAKE.
Δι’ ἁμάρτημα δὲ τὸ πρόβλημα εἰκός ἐστι.
"Metuo ne hic locus corruptus mancusve sit."
Victor.
— To give these words any meaning that may not easily be controverted, is, I believe, impossible. I have made them say, what it seems to me most probable that the author meant to say:
"So far is this criticism from proving Homer to be wrong, that it is, itself, probably, founded on a mistake."
254.
mvp-aristotle-comment-254
NOTE 254.
25.28
P. 130. THE IMITATIONS OF POETRY SHOULD RESEMBLE THE PAINTINGS OF ZEUXIS-.
Τοιούτους δ’ εἶναι, οἵους Ζεῦξις ἔγραφεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον· τὸ γὰρ παράδειγμα δεῖ ὑπερέχειν.
M. Batteux proposes this arrangement:—
Ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον· τὸ γὰρ παράδειγμα δεῖ ὑπερέχειν, τοιούτους δ’ εἶναι, οἵους Ζεῦξις ἔγραφεν.
13
That the words,
τοιούτους δ’ εἶναι, οἵους Ζεῦξις ἔγραφεν, belong to the second way of defending the impossible, by referring it to the
βέλτιον — οἷα δεῖ εἶναι, &c. seems clear. Nor is it any objection to this, as some have thought it,
14
that Aristotle had before mentioned the paintings of Zeuxis, as deficient in the expression of the manners.
15
For it by no means follows, from this deficiency of Zeuxis as to manners, that he did not represent
πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον, with respect to beauty, grace, dignity of form, &c.: and it seems to be this kind of improvement, in painting, by which Aristotle, here and elsewhere, illustrates the
μίμησις βελτίον of poetry.
16
Compare, particularly,
cap. xv.
Ἐπεὶ δὲ μίμησίς ἐστιν ἡ Τραγῳδία βελτιόνων δεῖ...
17
The story of the manner, in which Zeuxis is said to have collected the
βέλτιον for his famous picture of Helen, is well known. See
Cic. de Invent. II. 1.
Plin. Nat. Hist. XXXV. 9.
Bayle, art. ZEUXIS.
I agree, therefore, perfectly with Mr. Winstanley, that the words,
τοιούτους δ’ εἶναι οἵους Ζ. ἔγρ. should be transposed: but I do not see, that any alteration, farther than the mere transposition, is necessary. I would read —
Ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον· [scil. δεῖ ἀνάγειν] τοιούτους δ’ εἶναι [scil. δεῖ] οἵους Ζεῦξις ἔγραφεν· τὸ γὰρ παράδειγμα δεῖ ὑπερέχειν.
255.
mvp-aristotle-comment-255
NOTE 255.
25.29
P. 130. TO OPINION, OR WHAT IS SAID TO BE, MAY BE REFERRED, &c.
Πρὸς ἃ φασί, τὰ ἄλογα: [scil.
δεῖ ἀνάγειν: for so, I think, with Mr. Winstanley, the passage is to be understood; and so it is explained and translated by Castelvetro. The expression,
ἃ φασί, or
οἷα φασί, is used by Aristotle as synonymous with
δόξα, and
οἷα δοκεῖ. Thus, —
οἷα ΦΑΣΙ καὶ ΔΟΚΕΙ, at the beginning of this chapter: and afterwards —
οὕτω φασιν.
But it will not, I think, be found possible to give this passage a consistent sense, unless we understand him to mean, what, as the text stands, he does not expressly say, i. e.
"By general opinion we may excuse, not only the
As if he had written,
πιθανὸν ἀδύνατον, but even such things as are manifestly improbable, or absurd."πρὸς ἃ φασί, ΚΑΙ τὰ ἄλογα. And thus Goulston has supplied: —
"Ad ea quæ aiunt, [rediguntur hæc quæ dixi; et] illa, quæ sine ratione sunt."
256.
mvp-aristotle-comment-256
NOTE 256.
25.30
P. 131. WHEN THINGS, WHICH APPEAR TO BE CONTRADICTORY—.
Τὰ δ’ ὑπεναντία ὡς εἰρημένα—. The words,
ὡς εἰρημένα, have distressed all the commentators; and no sense, which they have laboured to force upon the expression, is, to my apprehension, satisfactory. Heinsius corrected by transposition —
Τὰ δ’ ὡς ὑπεναντία εἰρημένα:
"Ea, quæ tanquam subcontraria dicta videntur." — An easier and more probable emendation, I think, would be —
Τὰ δ’ ΥΠΕΝΑΝΤΙΩΣ εἰρημένα.
257.
mvp-aristotle-comment-257
NOTE 257.
25.30
P. 131. AND IN THE SAME SENSE—.
The word is,
ὡσαύτως:
"simili modo," as all the commentators render it. I cannot say I have been able thoroughly to satisfy myself, as to the precise meaning of the expression, from any thing I have found in Aristotle's logical works.
18
If,
"in the same manner," does not mean,
"in the same sense," I confess I do not know what it means. I understand Aristotle to say, that, if the subject of the propositions, charged with being contradictory, be the same, and spoken of in the same respect, we must still examine, farther, whether the two propositions admit of a sense really and accurately opposite to each other; which cannot be the case, unless the same words, in each proposition, have exactly the same sense.
And this meaning seems to be supported by the following passage from the treatise
Περὶ Ἑρμηνείας
: —
Καὶ ἔστω τοῦτο ΑΝΤΙΦΑΣΙΣ, (nempe) κατάφασις καὶ ἀπόφασις αἱ ἀντικείμεναι. Λέγω δὲ ἀντικεῖσθαι, τὴν ΤΟΥ ΑΥΤΟΥ κατὰ ΤΟΥ ΑΥΤΟΥ, μὴ ὉΜΩΝΥΜΩΣ δέ.
19
That is, as it is well explained in the analytical Synopsis prefixed to Duval's edition:—
"Affirmatio & negatio oppositæ, contradictionem faciunt. Oppositio est ejusdem, de eodem, non homonymè; nam accipi debent termini in oppositione, EODEM MODO AC SENSU."
All that follows—viz.
ὥστε καὶ αὐτὸν, ἢ πρὸς ἃ αὐτὸς λέγει, ἢ ὃ ἂν φρόνιμος ὑποθῆται is either so corrupt, or so darkly expressed, that I have only to confess myself unable even to guess what Aristotle meant to say.
20
Commentators indeed have explained, and translators have translated; but I have seen no explanation that approaches to satisfaction, nor any translation, but what is either unintelligible, or unwarrantable, or both. I do not mean to except myself; for I had translated thus:—
"We must also consider the person who speaks, and whether the contradiction be to what he himself said, or to what any reasonable man would understand him to have said." But, to wave other objections, which, no doubt, the learned reader will easily make for me, the verb,
ὑποθέσθαι, will, I believe, by no means bear this sense, of
supposing, understanding—
ὑπολαβεῖν. At least, Aristotle seems always to use it in that of
advising, suggesting, &c. So
Rhet. I. 9, p. 533
.
ὅταν ἐπαινεῖν βούλῃ, ὅρα τί ἂν ΥΠΟΘΟΙΟ· καὶ ὅταν ΥΠΟΘΕΣΘΑΙ, ὅρα τί ἂν ἐπαινέσειας. Accordingly, Goulston has given the word this sense in his version: —
"videndumque, an eâ in re, quod prudens præceperit, secutus sit." But, of what force this circumstance is, or how it is to be applied to obviate the charge of contradiction, I do not see.
Being therefore obliged to reject the only version, which seemed to me to offer any tolerable meaning, I have left a blank in my translation.
258.
mvp-aristotle-comment-258
NOTE 258.
25.31
P. 131. WHEN EXCUSED BY NO NECESSITY, &c.
—
Ὅταν μὴ ἀνάγκης οὔσης, μηθὲν χρήσηται τῷ ἀλόγῳ, ὥσπερ Εὐριπίδης τῷ Αἰγειἤτε πονηρίᾳ, ὥσπερ ἐν Ὀρέστῃ τοῦ Μενελάου. — Such was the confused state in which
Robortelli
found the text, which he, very ingeniously and solidly, rectified thus:
—
Ὅταν μὴ ἀνάγκης οὔσης μηθὲν, χρήσηται τῷ ἀλόγῳ, ὥσπερ Εὐριπίδης ΕΝ τῷ ΑΙΓΕΙ, ΤΗι πονηρίᾳ, ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ Ὀρέστῃ τοῦ Μενελάου.
Some MSS. for
Αἰγειἤτε, give
Αἰγεητη, which, as Goulston has observed, suggests the true reading—
ἐν τῷ ΑΙΓΕΙ, ΤΗι πονηρίᾳ... &c.
By the
Aegeus, Robortelli understood the character of that name, in the
Medea of Euripides
. To this
Victorius
very reasonably objected, that the mode of expression,
ἐν τῷ Αἰγεῖ, seems plainly to indicate a Tragedy so named; not a character only in a Tragedy of a different name. But this is no objection to Robortelli's reading, though it is to his explanation of it. See the fragments at the end of the Oxford Euripides, where several passages of the
Aegeus are quoted from
Stobæus
, &c.
259.
mvp-aristotle-comment-259
NOTE 259.
25.32
P. 131. THUS THE SOURCES OF OBJECTIONS ARE FIVE, &C.
This enumeration may seem, at the first view, to be deficient; for one of the objections was —
Οὐκ ἀληθῆ: —
"the representation is not conformable to truth." But this, perhaps, may be considered as falling under the charge of
ἄλογον. For he, who accuses a Poet of departing from nature, experience, and the
οἷα ἦν, ἢ ἔστι, says, in other words, it is improbable, incredible, absurd, &c. Or, when this objection was relative to truth of another sort—to theological truth, as violated by the poetic representations of the Gods, it then came, properly, under the
βλαβερόν; it was of immoral and pernicious tendency. And thus we find Plato objecting continually to the theology of Homer; sometimes, as not true—
ΟΥΚ ΑΛΗΘΗ
21
; sometimes, as hurtful—
τοῖς ἀκούουσι ΒΛΑΒΕΡΑ
22
.
The objections answered by considerations drawn from the diction, (Sect. 5.) appear to be all reducible to one or other of these five sources.
260.
mvp-aristotle-comment-260
NOTE 260.
25.32
P. 131. OR, OF IMMORAL TENDENCY.
Βλαβερά: i. e. hurtful on account of their immoral tendency. So the word is used by
Plato
; to whose objections, and to the very language in which he expresses them, Aristotle so frequently alludes. Censuring the immoral tendency of some of Homer's representations of his hero Achilles, Plato says—
Οὔθ’ ὅσια ταῦτα, οὔτ’ ἀληθῆ· καὶ μὴν τοῖς γε ἀκούουσι ΒΛΑΒΕΡΑ. The reason follows:
πᾶς γὰρ ἑαυτῷ συγγνώμην ἕξει, κακῷ ὄντι, πεισθεὶς, ὡς ἄρα τοιαῦτα πράττουσί ΤΕ καὶ ἔπραττον "Οἱ θεῶν ἀγχίσποροι." Ὧν ἕνεκα, παυστέον τοὺς τοιούτους μύθους, μὴ ἡμῖν πολλὴν εὐχέρειαν ἐντίκτωσι τοῖς νέοις, πονηρίας.
De Rep. III. p. 176, ed. Mass.
Compare the precept,
cap. xv.
about making the character as morally good as possible
23
; and see
NOTE 108
. It is obvious however to observe, that when the
μοχθηρία, the villainy of a character, is overcharged, it brings with it its own antidote. Such characters as
Iago
24
, or Glenalvon, can be
βλαβερά to no reader or spectator. They excite only pure and unmitigated disgust. Not all the art of the Poet, or the charms of Poetry, can cheat us into any degree of sympathy with them, even for the moment in which they are speaking. We feel, there, no such struggle between immoral approbation and moral indignation, as
Dr. Johnson
has described, in his observations upon the different effects produced on the spectator, by the villainy of Rowe's
Lothario, and that of Richardson's
Lovelace. The passage is so much to the purpose of this note, so justly thought, and so well expressed, that I am persuaded I shall gratify the reader by transcribing it.
"The character of Lothario seems to have been expanded by Richardson into Lovelace; but he has excelled his original in the moral effect of the fiction. Lothario, with gaiety which cannot be hated, and bravery which cannot be despised, retains too much of the spectator's kindness. It was in the power of Richardson alone to teach us at once esteem and detestation, to make virtuous resentment overpower all the benevolence which wit, and elegance, and courage, naturally excite, and to lose at last the hero in the villain."
25
261.
mvp-aristotle-comment-261
NOTE 261.
25.32
P. 131. OR AS CONTRARY TO TECHNICAL ACCURACY.
—
Παρὰ τὴν ὀρθότητα, τὴν κατὰ τέχνην. Most of the commentators understand the art of Poetry itself. But, if I am right in the explanation I have given,
NOTE 233
, of the expression,
πρὸς αὐτὴν τὴν τέχνην, the sense of the expression here must be the same.
26
I understand Aristotle to mean, the rightness, not of Poetry itself, but of other arts, which may be incidentally the subject of the Poetry; and the words, I think, express the source, or
εἶδος, as he terms it, of objections relative to all faults
κατὰ συμβεβηκός, as opposed to those, which he distinguishes by the various expressions of,
ἁμαρτίαι καθ’ ἑαυτὴν, &c.
The other interpretation of the words is fairly liable, I think, to the following objections.
1. If we understand the poetic art itself to be meant, then the objection to faults
κατὰ συμβεβηκός — to impossibilities and inaccuracies with respect to other arts and sciences — will be entirely omitted in this enumeration. This is very improbable, considering how common a source of critical censure this was. For while, on the one hand, the extravagant admirers of Homer made no scruple to assert, that his Poems contained the principles of all arts and sciences; on the other, we know how eagerly the Zoilists caught at every apparent inaccuracy of this kind; and, particularly, with respect to his geography. One instance, at least, of this sort of cavil, we have in this chapter: the censure of the passage,
Οἴη δ’ ἄμμορος,
Il. Σ. 489
, fell on Homer's ignorance of astronomy.
27
2. By the manner in which Aristotle here mentions, first, the five sources of critical censures, and then, immediately, the twelve sources of
λύσεις or answers, it is plain, I think, that he means answers to those censures, and to all of them. But this cannot be the case, if we understand essential faults in the Poetry itself, or bad imitation: for this admits of no answer, but a direct denial of the fact. Whereas, if we understand incidental errors in other arts, all will be consistent; and every fault enumerated will find its answer in some of the
λύσεις, which had been pointed out in the preceding part of the chapter, and are referred to in this enumeration.
3. If the art here mentioned be the art of Poetry itself, and the faults against that art be, as I understand them to be, essential faults, faults which constitute bad Poetry, i. e. in Aristotle's view, bad imitation, this plainly implies, that the four other faults enumerated are not essential, but accidental faults;
κατὰ συμβεβηκός. But, that such faults as improbability, and immorality, (
ἄλογα, βλαβερά,) which had just before been singled out from the rest, as
ὀρθαὶ ἐπιτιμήσεις—as the most solid objections, and such as admitted of no excuse—that these should be considered by Aristotle as faults merely incidental, not to be objected to the Poetry itself, not affecting the merit of the imitation,
καθ’ ΕΑΥΤΗΝ ἁμαρτίαι, is what, as I have before said, I cannot easily conceive.
28
The expression itself—
παρὰ τὴν ὀρθότητα τὴν κατὰ τέχνην, is indeed ambiguous; and they, who prefer the sense which I have rejected, will perhaps think it favoured by the similar expression, clearly applied to faults against the art of Poetry itself, in the passage, —
ποτέρων ἐστὶ τὸ ἁμάρτημα, τῶν ΚΑΤΑ ΤΗΝ ΤΕΧΝΗΝ, ἢ κατ’ ἄλλο συμβεβηκός. The expressions, however, are not exactly the same. There, it is,
κατὰ ΤΗΝ τέχνην—
"against the art:" here, —
κατὰ τέχνην—
"contrary to the rectitude of art." — But Aristotle had before used an expression, that seemed still more strongly to point at the art of Poetry:
τὰ πρὸς ΑΥΤΗΝ ΤΗΝ ΤΕΧΝΗΝ ἀδύνατα: which, however, it seems necessary, for the reasons given in NOTE 233, to understand in the same sense, which I have here given to
κατὰ τέχνην. But that passage, and indeed this whole chapter, is, in its present state, so full of obscurity and ambiguity, that every interpretation which can be given must necessarily be, in a great measure, conjectural and disputable. All I can venture to be confident of is, that my explanation of this passage is consistent with my explanation of the other; and that either both are right, or both are wrong.
262.
mvp-aristotle-comment-262
NOTE 262.
25.32
P. 131. THE ANSWERS, WHICH ARE TWELVE, &C.
How the different
Λύσεις or solutions proposed throughout the chapter are reducible to 12, and which are the 12 that Aristotle meant, are questions, which the defective state of the original renders it very difficult, if not impossible, to answer, with any certainty. And indeed the matter is of so little importance, that it is by no means worth while to enter into any examination of the various modes of reckoning, by which different expositors have endeavoured to solve the problem.
Victorius
, indeed, is so wise, as to give up the attempt. It will be very easy however, and therefore, I hope, not very foolish, just to enumerate all the
λύσεις, which actually have been mentioned in the chapter, in the order in which they occur, and then to examine, by way of experiment, whether they are any way reducible to twelve.
1.
τυγχάνει τοῦ τέλους, τοῦ αὑτῆς. — i. e. The end of Poetry is better answered, &c.
2.
κατὰ συμβεβηκός — The fault is incidental.
3. —
οἷα δεῖ, (or,
βέλτιον) — It is what is best, or what should be.
4. —
οἷα φασὶ, (or,
οἷα δοκεῖ) — It is according to general opinion.
5. —
οἷα ἦν, ἢ ἔστιν (or,
οὕτως εἶχεν, or,
ἀληθῆ) — to truth.
[6.
σκεπτέον εἰς τὸν πράττοντα, πρὸς ὅν, ὅτε, &c.] — [Consider circumstances.]
7.
Γλώττῃ — Defend, by the foreign sense of the word.
8. —
Μεταφορᾷ — by Metaphor.
9.
κατὰ Προσῳδίαν — by Accent.
10. —
Διαιρέσει — by Punctuation.
11. —
Ἀμφιβολίᾳ — by Ambiguity.
12.
κατὰ τὸ ἔθος τῆς λέξεως — by Customary speech.
13. —
Ποσαχῶς ἂν σημήνειε or,
καθ’ ὁμωνυμίαν — by the different senses of a word.
[14. —
Γλαύκωνος λύσις] — [Glauco's answer.]
[15.
εἰκὸς, καὶ παρὰ τὸ εἰκὸς γίνεσθαι] — [Probable, that many things should happen improbably.]
[16. —
Οὐ τὸ αὐτὸ, ἢ οὐ πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ, &c.] [The same thing is not spoken of, or, not in the same respect, &c.]
Here are, then, 16 different answers. Of these, it seems, upon the whole, most probable, that the 12 not enclosed in brackets, are the 12 which Aristotle means. My reason is, that in the beginning of the chapter, after laying down the three distinct considerations, of the different objects of imitation, the privileges of poetical language, and the distinction of essential and incidental faults, he immediately, and explicitly, refers to those three principles, as sources of all the answers.
Ὥστε δεῖ τὰ ἐπιτιμήματα — ΕΚ ΤΟΥΤΩΝ ἐπισκοποῦντα ΛΥΕΙΝ. Now it will be found, I believe, that the 12 answers above mentioned are drawn from those sources, and that the four remaining answers are not.
But why these four, which evidently are proposed as answers, and seem to be distinct answers, were not admitted in the concluding enumeration, it may not be easy to shew. Perhaps, Aristotle reckoned only as one solution, the two which he assigns to the same objection, with an
ἢ, or
οὕτως τε καὶ, &c. This would throw out Nos 14, and 15, which seem, indeed, to be mentioned only as a sort of secondary or subsidiary answers. As to Nos 6, and 16, he might consider them as one; both of them, in fact, saying the same thing, and nearly in the same words—i. e.
"circumstances must be considered." Still however, taking these together as one answer, that answer will be supernumerary; and how it is fairly to be got rid of, it is difficult to see: the more difficult, because it is the only
λύσις furnished by the whole chapter to the objection of immoral tendency, (
βλαβερά,) upon which so great stress is laid.
All that seems tolerably clear is, that the 12 answers intended in the recapitulation are those 12, which are deducible from the three principles laid down at the opening of the chapter. In this idea, which I had formed before I consulted any commentator, I was glad to find myself supported by
Goulston
, in his accurate analysis; where he makes the 12 answers to be those here assigned, and draws them from the three sources at the beginning of the chapter: viz. three from the first source, (Nos 3, 4, 5,) — seven from the second — the diction, (Nos 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13,) and two from the third source, (Nos 1 and 2.)
25.14.
mvp-aristotle-comment-122
25.19
THE IMPOSSIBLE SHOULD BE CONSIDERED AS CONDUCING ON THE WHOLE EITHER TO THE END, WHICH IT IS THE AIM OF POETRY TO ATTAIN, OR TO EXCELLENCE OF CHARACTER, OR AS BEING AGREEABLE TO RECEIVED OPΙΝΙΟΝ.
I IMAGINE Aristotle alludes here to the pursuit of Hector in the Iliad, which he has twice mentioned as incurring this blame, and that he is now shewing us on what principles it may be vindicated. [C] Note VII. Chap. xv. First,
POETIC OF ARISTOTLE. First, It conduces to the main end of poetry, the production of interest, [D] for we must be more interested for the event of a single combat than the destruction of one person by superior numbers; and such a circumstance will afford greater variety and produce greater effect in the detail. Secondly, The character of Achilles, in point of courage at least, if not [E] of conduct, will be raised; and the valor and address of both combatants will be shewn in a more confpicuous light. It is impoffible for contempt of inevitable death to be more strongly expressed than in the two lines uttered by Achilles after the dying prophecy of Hector. • Die thou the first-when Jove and heav'n ordain, • I follow thee.' [F] And thirdly, As to its being agreeable to received opinion, it is very possible it might be fo; and we may safely give it credit on the authority of the Stagirite. Our modern novel writers are sometimes apt to carry the second excuse a little too far, and favor us with perfect monsters. Sir Charles Grandifon is a much more improbable character than Caliban. The. [D] 'Even in comic composition expreffions, though sometimes falling into the improbable, ← become probable from exciting laughter, as this, "he possessed an estate no bigger than a. " Lacedæmonian's letter;" laughter being a paffion though a pleasing one... LONGINUS,, Sect. XXXVIII.. [E] Note v. Chap. xxiv.. [F] Τέθναθι,-Κῆρα δ᾽ ἐγὼ τότε δέξομαι ὑππότε κεν δὴ Ζεὺς ἐθέλη τελέσαι, ἠδ'᾽ ἀθάναλοι θεὸι ἄλλοι. 3 X 2 manners
manners of Caliban, for what we know, may be very natural for a being composed of a witch and a fiend; but we immediately know the manners of Sir Charles Grandison are perfectly unnatural in a mere man. Perfection of character, befides the objection [G] formerly made to it, will always be infipid and uninteresting. I am inclined to think the Helen of Zeuxis, if it were composed, as we are told it was, from a selection of the best features of the most beautiful women of Greece, could not be a very interesting piece. The Abbe Terrasson, who seems to push the idea of perfection as far as it can reasonably go, speaking of the Telemachus, which he praises above all other epopees for drawing so excellent a character of a young hero, adds, 'The epic hero being proposed as a model for imitation, it is not allowable to elevate him above human nature. We may leave him flight failings which may even sometimes draw him into misfortunes, • if we chuse it, in the course of the poem. I have not therefore faid, ' that the hero of the epopee should be perfectly virtuous. I have only • said that he ought to be essentially virtuous.' [G] Note III. Chap. XIII. NOTE
25.15.
mvp-aristotle-comment-123
25.21
AS TO THE WAY IN WHICH CONTRADICTIONS MAY BE AN- SWERED, THEY SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN THE SAME LIGHT AS CONFUTATIONS IN AN ARGUMENT. WE SHOULD OBSERVE IF THE SAME THINGS ARE SPOKEN OF, OR TO THE SAME PERSON, OR IN THE SAME MANNER.
THIS seems to be extending the same principle to account for and excuse contradictions, that is employed before (see note v. on this chapter) to excuse sentiments that seem immoral. As there the immorality is no fault unless carried to a great excess, if it proceeds from an immoral character apparently shewn so, who will not interest us in his favor; fo here contradictions in opinion will be proper or improper according to the manners and sentiments of the speaker. In real life people see things in different lights according to their different habits, mode of education, or profession. A painter will not speak of a wood like a timber-merchant, or a mathematician deliver his opinion on Homer or Milton in the fame terms with a poet. This the composer of fictitious fable is to imitate; and indeed from the nice discrimination of this arises the variety of ferious, and the humour of comic poetry. Romeo and the Friar fhould not be affected in the fame manner at the appearance of Juliet. Prince Henry will not address his father, Percy, and Falstaff, in the same terms. Sincerity will not be expected from Iago, or wisdom from the mouth of Malvolio. Horace exemplifies this difference of sentiment arifing from difference of character in the epistle to the Pifos. ' Much
• Much boots the speaker's character to mark : . God, hero, grave old man, or hot young spark, • Matron, or busy nurse, who's used to roam • Trading abroad, or plows his field at home: • If Colchian or Affyrian fill the scene, • Theban or Argian note the shades between [H].' COLMAN.
25.16.
mvp-aristotle-comment-124
25.22
THE REPREHENSIONS OF IMPIETY AND ABSURDITY WILL IN- DEED BE JUST WHEN THEY ARE INTRODUCED WITHOUT NE- CESSITY.
ARISTOTLE gives examples of each. Of unnecessary absurdity from the Egeus of Euripides a few fragments only of which remain; and of impiety from the character of Menelaus in the Orestes of the fame poet, which he has already mentioned in the fifteenth chapter as an example of the fame. Dryden, in his tragedy of Tyrannic Love, has saved us the trouble of seeking for two instances, as the character of Maximin furnishes at the same time an example of both. We should be shocked at the blafphemies he utters, if their complete absurdity did not rather incline us to laugh. I hardly know a more ridiculous circumstance even [H] Intererit multum divusne loquatur an heros: Maturusne senex an adhuc florente juventâ Fervidus; an matrona potens an sedula nutrix, Mercatorne vagus cultorne virentis agelli, Colchus an Affyrius; Thebis nutritus an Argis. in
POETIC OF ARISTOTLE. in Tom Thumb, than occurs in one line. He has declared war with the gods, and being from custom betrayed into an oath immediately corrects himself. • Now by the gods!-By Maximin I mean.' The author of the Letters of Literature mentions [1] a new figure of rhetoric which he calls ἄνοια, or UTTER ABSURDITY, a figure which he shews by examples, many writers of high reputation have made a very free use of. (K) To the instances he gives may be added the conduct of Virgil in regard to Ascanius. In the second book of the Æneid he is a little boy accompanying his father. • Haud paffibus æquis.' • And with unequal paces tripp'd along.' DRYDEN. And in the third book Andromache, speaking of her own son, says to him, < O mihi fola mei super Astyanactis imago, Sic oculos, fic ille manus, fic ora ferebat • Et nunc æquali tecum pubefceret ævo.' • In thee my loft Astyanax I trace, • Such were his eyes, his form, his blooming face; } • Such now, had fate decreed, his manhood's ripening grace.' Again, Virgil in one part of his fourth book makes him a child in lap, and in another an active youth following the chace on a fiery courser, and wishing to encounter a wild boar or a lion. [1] Letter XXII. [K] See Curiosities of Literature, Article Virgil, printed for J. Murray, 1791. There
There is a striking instance of this figure in Tancred and Sigismunda. Sigifmunda is in despair at Tancred's supposed infidelity in forsaking her and offering his hand to Constantia, after having given her the strongest afsurances of unaltered attachment. At this juncture Siffredi comes in and presses his daughter to give her hand to Ofmond: and to overcome her reluctance at taking this step he tries to rouse her pride, and induce her to shew the king that her heart
• Disdains to wear • A chain that his has greatly thrown aside.' A very natural argument, and which prevails afterwards in the mouth of Laura, and from whence the novel in Gil Blas from which the fable and part of the language of the tragedy are taken, receives its name [L]. But how does Siffredi conduct his argument? ، • But above all you must root out for ever From the king's breast the least remain of hope, • And henceforth make his mention'd love dishonor. Was not this effectually done by Tancred's match with Conftantia? In fact this (to use a vulgar proverb) is letting the cat out of the bag; and acquainting his daughter with the reluctance of Tancred to obey the late king's will; and defiring her to act the very part in regard to her lover, for which she herself is so enraged against him as to run into another man's arms, merely from a principle of revenge. [L] La Marriage du Vengeance.' Which Smollet (with an eye I presume to the figure in question) has rendered The Baleful Marriage.' In
POETIC OF ARISTOTLE. In these lines of Shenstone, otherwise beautiful, there is a manifest absurdity. Pleasing when youth is long expired to trace • The forms our pencil or our pen design'd; " Such was our youthful air, and shape, and face, Such the foft image of our youthful mind." This is comparing the sister arts in a circumstance where they have not the leaft refemblance: the early productions of a young poet, if written from the heart, may shew the • Soft image of his youthful mind.' But I cannot possibly see how • His youthful air, and shape, and face,' can be traced in the juvenile designs of the painter. I shall conclude these examples with one from Shakespear. In the Merchant of Venice, Portia quotes the Lord's Prayer to perfuade a Jew (calling him fo only three lines before.) • We do pray for mercy; And that same prayer doth teach us all to render • The deeds of mercy.'- 3 Y NOTE
25.17.
mvp-aristotle-comment-125
25.24
THE ANSWERS TO THESE OBJECTIONS MAY BE COLLECTED FROM WHAT WE HAVE SAID, AND THEY ARE TWELVE IN NUMBER.
THOUGH in the note on the translation I have given what appeared to me the most probable arrangement of these solutions; yet I must avow my indecision on a subject which has occafioned so many various opinions among the different commentators. CHAP.
11.
mvp-aristotle-comment-194
Ritter, cap. 25 § 11
κατὰ δὲ προσῳδίαν (
δεῖ λύειν),
ὥσπερ Ἱππίας ἔλυεν ὁ Θάσιος τὸ “
δίδομεν δέ οἱ”
καὶ “
ιὸ μὲν οὐ καταπύθεται ὄμβρῳ”: vir iste tanta lectionis copia doctrinaque tumet, ut nonnisi fastigia rerum leviter attingat; et hoc quidem loco ita se contraxit, ut quae voluit dicere vix perciperemus, nisi auxilio veniret verus Aristoteles qui in Elenchis sophisticis c. 4. p. 166 b 3. haec scripsit:
οἷον καὶ τὸν Ὅμηρον ἔνιοι διορθοῦνται πρὸς τοὺς ἐλέγχοντας ὡς ἀτόπως εἰρηκότα “
τὸ μὲν οὐ 9)
καταπύθεται ὄμβρῳ.”
λύουσι γὰρ αὐτὸ τῇ προσῳδίᾳ,
λέγοντες τὸ “
οὗ”
ὀξύτερον,
καὶ τὸ περὶ τὸ ἐνύπνιον τοῦ ᾿Αγαμέμνονος,
ὅτι οὐκ 9) Bekkerus pro
οὐ dedit o
ὗ et paulo post o
ὔ pro o
ὗ, a libris suis praeter consuetudinem bis deficiens ad coniecturas, nisi quod secundo loco ou inesse codici C (Coisliniano 330) ex silentio eius colligere licet. sed illi scripturae et sententia repugnat et locus Poeticae quem tractamus, ut omittam neutiquam hoc verisimile videri, turpe illud vitium (
τὸ μὲν οὖ) ante Hippiam Thasium in vulgatis Homeri exemplis resedisse, eundemque hominem priore loco ineptissimas quidem argutias agitasse, alterum autem emendavisse sapientissime. quod o
ὗ prae
οὐ ὀξύτερον vocatur, id mirum videri non debet: nam o
ὗ accentu acuto gravique simul feritur (
δύ),
οὐ sine accentu profertur. Bekkerum alioqui satis cautum deceptum esse puto iis quae Alexander Aphrodisiensis et falso et perturbate ad h. 1. conseribillavit. vid. Scholia in Aristot. tom. I. p. 299 b 33 ed. Brandis.
αὐτὸς ὁ Ζεὺς εἶπεν “
δίδομεν δὲ οἱ εὖχος ἀρέσθαι,”
ἀλλὰ τῷ ἐνυπνίῳ ἐνετέλλετο διδόναι. his adiuti possumus explicare quid Hippias Thasius (non ille Eleus) in Homeri verbis tentaverit, id quod adhuc non satis perspexerunt neque interpretes neque Wolfius in Prolegomenis ad Hom. p. CLXVII sq. Iuppiter igitur Somnio mandavit ut Agamemnoni diceret
δίδομεν δὲ οἱ εὖχος ἀρέσθαι. sed hic hexametri exitus nusquam in Iliade locum habere potuit nisi in Iovis ad Somnium mandato B. 8-15, neque tamen illic usquam comparet. quid igitur statuemus? utrum versum aliquem excidisse dicemus. ex nostris exemplaribus, an in vetere quadam Iliadis recensione, quam Aristoteles versaverit, hoc hemistichium in versu 15. inventum fuisse, ubi iam illud
Τρώεσσι δὲ κήδε᾽ ἐφῆπται substitutum legimus? hoc alterum cum alii crediderunt, tum Wolfius 1. c. qui hoc indicio erectus (p. CLXVIII) exclamat adeo mutatus est textus noster. ego neutrum admittam, sed eandem explicandi viam ingrediar qua paulo ante (§. 10) verum repperi. Hippias igitur
ἀποριῶν et
λύσεων acute excogitandarum cupidus id fraudis commisit ut versum Iliadis B. 15.
Ἥρη λισσομένη·
Τρώεσσι δὲ κήδε᾽ ἐφῆπται suo arbitrio et suo dolo sic mutatum exhiberet
Ἥρη λισσομένη·
δίδομεν δὲ οἱ εὖχος ἀρέσθαι. ipsum illud hemistichium una vocula immutata sumpsit ex Iliad.
Φ. 297.
δίδομεν δέ τοι εὖχος ἀρέσθαι. iam in loco sic reformato Hippias id reprehendit (
ἐπετίμησε) quod Iuppiter manifesto mendacio animum Agamemnonis deciperet, quod vitium ut a love optimo maximo defenderet, ille astute
διδόμεν pro
δίδομεν legendum praecepit et hunc infinitivum imperativi vices sustinere voluit, ut Iuppiter mandaret "concedas vero 10) ei (Agamemnoni) gloriam sibi parare". - Alter locus pertinet ad Iliadis F. 328. 10) Wolfius l. c., secutus Paccium ad Organon p. 485., non satis recte scripsit "sed Hippias. verbum
δίδομεν mutavit in
δε ..
ἕστηκε ξύλον αὖον ὅσον τ᾽ ὄργυι᾽ ὑπὲρ αἴης,
ἢ δρυὸς ἢ πεύκης,
τὸ μὲν οὐ καταπύθεται ὄμβρῳ. cum hoc mirum falsumque videretur, aridum quercus vel abietis lignum imbre non putrescere, Hippias illud vitium removeri voluit pronomine o
ὗ pro negatione
οὐ substituto, ut verborum intellectus hice prodiret "una eius (ligni) pars, ea scilicet quae super terram eminet, imbre putrescit. iam in utroque loco agnosces hominem futilissime argutantem, concedesque a Wolfio 1. c. inconsiderate scribi "si Hippias primus olim vulgatum
οὗ (immo
οὐ vulgatum erat) expulit, ... facile intelligitur, quam turpia vitia haeserint in exemplis huius aetatis. sed de illis plura licet suspicari quam scire." apage suspiciones ex eiusmodi fontibus haustas.
12.
mvp-aristotle-comment-195
Ritter, cap. 25 § 12
αἶψα δὲ - πρὶν κέκριτο: si quaereretur quid ipse Empedocles, cuius hic frustula nonnulla afferuntur, scriptum dederit, plura in his quamvis Poeticae codicibus repugnantibus aliter conformanda existimarem, ut alii editores existimarunt: sed cum id potius restituendum sit quod hic homo apud Empedoclem legerit, immo legere voluerit, sequi codices cum Bekkero tutissimum mihi videtur. nimirum magnus hic difficultatum et conditor et destructor Empedoclis verbis a sese pro suo consilio mutilatis et immutatis inesse difficultatem, si legendo iungamus
τὰ πρὶν μάθον ἀθάνατα ζῷα, sed eam tolli si post
ἀθάνατα incisione facta iungamus
ζῷα τε πρὶν κέκριτο, quaeque prius animalia habita erant. si veram ipsius Empedoclis sententiam cognoscere velis, adeas fontes limpidiores, quos recludunt Athenaeus X. p. 424 A. Plutarchus Quaest. convival. V, 4. Simplicius ad
δόμεν, infinitivum pro imperativo accipiendum, ut transpositus accentus culpam fraudis a love reiiceret in Somnium": immo
λυτικὸς iste neque lovem neque Somnium in culpa esse voluit, sed id dicentem fecit Iovem (concedas vero ut ille gloriam sibi comparet) quod vere factum esse narratur in Il. A 67-283.Aristotel. de Caelo tom. I. 507. ed. Brandis. Eustathius p. 746, 56., unde hi versus prodeunt
αἶψα δ' ἔθνεά 11)
τ᾽ ἐφύοντο,
τὰ πρὶν μάθον ἀθάνατ᾿ εἶναι,
ζωρά τε τὰ πρὶν ἄκρητα διαλλάξαντα κελεύθους.
13.
mvp-aristotle-comment-196
Ritter, cap. 25 § 13
τὰ δὲ ἀμφιβολίᾳ, “
παρῴχηκεν δὲ πλέων νύξ”: alias quaestiones sive difficultates advocato ambiguitatis auxilio solvere licet. quod exempli gratia subiicitur id sine ulla particula et vinculo solutum accedit. respicitur Iliadis locus K. 252.
ἄστρα δὲ δὴ προβέβηκε,
παρώχηκεν δὲ πλέων νύξ,
τῶν δύο μοιράων,
τριτάτη δ᾽ ἔτι μοῖρα λέλειπται. in hoc loco sane haud difficili cum coniungerent nonnulli
παρώχηκεν δὲ πλέων (vel
πλέον)
νύξ τῶν δύο μοιράων, et
δύο quamvis dicendi usu Homerico repugnante pro genitivo acciperent, anquirebant quomodo poeta primo loco plus duabus noctis partibus praeterisse et continuo tertiam superesse dicere potuerit. copiose quid in his versibus haeserint et quomodo difficilia solverint exposuit Porphyrius in Schol. ad Il. 1. c. pag. 284 b 42., unde nonnulla inter mea recipiam.
πῶς γάρ,
εἰ αἱ δύο μοῖραι ἐξήκουσιν αὐταί τε καὶ ἔτι τούτων πλέον,
ἡ τριτάτη μοῖρα λέλειπται,
ἀλλ' οὐχὶ τῆς τρίτης μόριον; Pseudo-Aristoteles et ipse iunxit
παρώχηκεν δὲ πλέων νύξ τῶν δύο μοιράων, sed ambigua vocis
πλέων significatione advocata totam noctem in duas partes a poeta divisam cogitari ponit, quarum partium amplior alterius duplum sit. hanc eandem solutionem Porphyrius 1. c. p. 285 b 6. copiose et putide exsecutus est ex Aristotelis (ita ipse credidit) Problematis Homericis in hunc modum :
Αριστοτέλης δὲ οὗτως ἀξιοῦ λύειν,
ἐν οἷς φησίν·
ἡ εἰς β΄ διαίρεσις εἰς ἴσην δύναται γενέσθαι ἐν τούτοις,
ἐπειδὴ τὸ πλέον τοῦ ἡμίσεος ἀὁριστόν ἐστιν.
ὅταν τοσοῦτον αὐξηθῇ ὡς τοῦ ὅλου τρίτον ἀπολείπεσθαι,
ἀκριβῶς ἂν εἴη τὸ ἀφορίσαι τοῦτο καὶ δηλῶ- 11) alii
αἶψα δὲ θνητὰ φύοντο cet..
σαι ὅσον ἐστὶ τὸ καταλειφθέν,
ἵνα ὅσον ηυξήθη τοῦ ὅλου τὸ ἥμισυ δῆλον γένηται.
κτλ.
14.
mvp-aristotle-comment-197
Ritter, cap. 25 § 14
ὅθεν τὸν κεκραμένον οἶνόν φασιν εἶναι: ex dicendi usu explicandum est quod ea potio quae ex aqua et vino commixta est tamen vinum nominatur. nove dictum
φασιν εἶναι pro
λέγουσιν.
ὅθεν addidi ex coniectura, et hoc casu quodam excidisse puto, propterea quod bis rediret. Aldus o
ἷor inseruit, sed id scribere interpolator vix potuit, cum sic subsequens
ὅθεν πεποίηται non iam ad
ἔθος τῆς λέ ξεως, ut debet, sed ad
οἶνόν φασιν εἶναι referatur.
ὅθεν πεποίηται “
κνημίς νεοτεύκτου κασσιτέροιο”: respexit II. Ф. 592.
ἀμφὶ δέ μιν κνημίς νεοτεύκτου κασσιτέροιο σμερδαλέον κονάβησε· sententiam personati auctoris obscuram in hunc modum intelligendam esse arbitror:
νεότευκτον κασσίτερον esse, si nomen prematur nove factum, sed a fabro non fieri stannum sed conformari tantummodo, quod ut in
νεοτεύκτῳ intelligatur, efficere sermonis usum.
καὶ χαλκέας τοὺς τὸν σίδηρον ἐργαζομένους: vitiosa est elocutio. interpolator
φασιν εἶναι ex proxime superioribus videtur huc traxisse. qui verbis transponendis structuram sanare student, ii ne Maurum lavare frustra allaborent vereor. res ipsa in aperto est. conf. Schol. in Hom. Il.
Τ. 283.
χαλκῷ:
παλαιὰ ἡ χρῆσις τοῦ χαλκὸν ὀνομάζειν τὸν σίδηρον,
ἀμέλει καὶ χαλ κέας λέγομεν τοὺς τὸν σίδηρον ἐργαζομένους. Pollux VII, 106.
ὅθεν εἴρηται - οἶνον: intellexit Iliadis 1. 234.
τὸν καὶ ἀνηρείψαντο θεοὶ Διῒ οἰνοχοεύειν. di nectar bibunt, non vinum: sed nihilo minus deorum pincerna
οἰνοχοεύειν dicitur. miram ellipsin
οὐ πινόντων (intellige
τῶν θεῶν)
οἶ- vov scriptor negligentissimus admisit, cum mentis suae oси- los in Homeri verba (ibi est
ἀνηρείψαντο θεοί) defixisset. conf. Schol. in Iliad. 1.3. p. 120 a 31. Eustath. ad Odyss. I. 374.
εἴη δ᾽ ἂν τοῦτό γε κατὰ μεταφοράν: hoc postremum exemplum incertus est utrum referat ad dicendi usum an ad metaphoram.
οἰνοχοεύειν si pro
ἐγχέεινdicitur, translatio est
ἀπ' εἴδους ἐπὶ γένος, vid. c. 21, 5. homo lectionis copia refertus in his postremis (§. 11-14) cum furore quodam exempla cumulavit.
15.
mvp-aristotle-comment-198
Ritter, cap. 25 § 15
si vocabulum quoddam loci sententiae repugnare videtur, explorandum est, quot modis dici intelligique possit, ut veram eius potestatem et loco aptam eliciamus.
οἷον “
τῇ ὁ᾽ ἔσχετο χάλκεον ἔγχος”: versus Homerici ex Iliad. Y. 272. hemistichium est, atque pertinet ad illos quattuor versus (269-272) quos insertos esse ab aliquo quaestiones et solutiones agitaturo ad §. 10. Aristonico tradenti credidimus. nam concutias, quaeso, ipsos versus tarde prioribus succedentes et ita factos ut multarum
ἀποριῶν ansam praebeant. vid. Schol. p. 560 a 42-561 b 19. primaria quaestio erat haec,
ἀτρώ των (p. 560 b 3)
ὑπαρχόντων παρ' Ομήρῳ τῶν ᾿Αχιλλέως ὅπλων,
καὶ ἔξωθεν κατ' ἐνίους τεταγμένης διὰ πλείονα κόσμον τῆς χρυσῆς πτυχός,
οὕτως ἀποδοτέον τὸν λόγον (hinc sequitur solutio satis arguta)·
ἀλλὰ μέχρι μὲν δύο πτυχῶν προῆλθεν ἡ τῆς πληγῆς ἐνέργεια,
εἶξεως καὶ οἱονεὶ συνιζήσεως γενομένης,
ἐν δὲ τῇ τρίτῃ ἐπεσχέθη. idem hic noster Pseudo-Aristoteles significari a se voluit: nimirum
ἔσχετο non esse haesit, sed impedita est hasta, ut scuti strata (
πτύχας, Schichten) cessisse, non perrupta esse dicerentur. solutionem ineptam esse verbo moneri sufficiat. ceterum in nostris Homeri exemplaribus est
μείλινον ἔγχος, non
χάλκεον ἔγχος, sed hoc
χάλκεον non tam consulto admissum quam incauto scriptori excidisse videatur. neque vero id silentio praetereundum est, ex hoc loco haud consequi illos quattuor Iliadis versus (vero) Aristotele antiquiores esse, ut visum est K. Lehrsio de Aristarchi studiis Homericis pag. 210. pro
τὸ ταύτῃ vulgo codicibus repugnantibus legunt
τῷ ταύτῃ. ad
τὸ ex praecedentibus
σημαίνει sumendum.
16.
mvp-aristotle-comment-199
Ritter, cap. 25 § 16
ποσαχῶς ἐνδέχεται: hoc negligenter scribenti concedendum erit. rectius sane
ποσαχῶς δὲ ἐνδ. vel
τὸ δὲ ποσαχῶς ἐνδ. dedisset, sed hoc quamquam apud Aldum legimus, libris non addicentibus non audeo recipere. -
κατά τὴν καταντικρὺ ἤ ὡς Γλαύκων λέγει: dicere voluitsi quis a praeconceptis opinionibus sibi caveat. sed hanc vulgarem sententiam sic ille voluit effari: si quis contra faciat ac Glauco dicit. nimirum is homines temere existimantes et iudicantes reprehenderat. itaque in re manifesta sibi temperare non potuit quo minus provocando ad auctorem lectionis copiam ostentaret. nam hic noster ex eorum numero est qui tum demum aliquid persuasum sibi habent, si alium dicentem id auctorem producere possunt. sed quis ille est? in Rhetoricis III, 1. p. 1403 b 26.
Γλαύκων ὁ Τήϊος de recitatione scripsisse dicitur, quem hunc nostrum fuisse nihil est unde pateat: immo quaerendus videtur is qui de Homero scripserit, et talis est Glauco Tarsensis, qui in eo opere quo glossas Homericas persecutus est et de variis vocum significationibus disputavit, aptissime hanc admonitionem proferre potuit. vid. Schol. in Hom. Il. A. 1.
μῆνιν:
οἱ δὲ περὶ Γλαύκωνα (h. e. Glauco ipse)
τὸν Ταρσέα ἠξίουν ὀξύνειν τὸ ὄνομα. Athen. XI. p. 480 F.
Γλαύκων δ᾽ ἐν ταῖς γλώσσαις Κυπρίους φησὶ τὴν κοτύλην κύλικα καλεῖν. videtur igitur imprudenter laudare grammaticum qui saltem multo post Aristotelem vixit, quamquam certi quidquam de eius aetate definiri nequit.
καὶ αὐτοὶ καταψηφισάμενοι συλλογίζονται: ipsi ratiocinari demum incipiunt, cum secum iam damnarunt ea quae examinare volunt. “
ὅτι δοκεῖ est formula quae a iudicibus aut a concione pronuntiari solet, id quod fugit interpretes. eos Glauco reprehendit qui in expiscandis contrariis tam certi sibi videntur et tam secure agunt, quam illi qui in iudicio vel in concione sententiam suam praeconceptam secum afferunt, non ex rerum expositione hauriunt. -
τοῦτο δὲ πέπονθε τὰ περὶ Ἰκάριον - εἶναι Ἰκάδιον ἀλλ' οὐκ Ἰκάριον: illi ad quaestiones solvendas prompti quaerebant, cur Telemachus ad patrem investigandum Lacedaemona profectus ab Homero in quarta Odysseae rhapsodia ad Menelaum, non ad avum Icarium Penelopae matris suae patrem, deducatur. hanc difficultatem hic noster sic solvit: Icarius non fuit Lacedaemonius sed in Cephalenensibus natus, id quod ipsa Cephalenensium fama probatur. aliam huius quaestionis solutionem et certe prudentiorem apud Strabonem (X. p. 708 vel 461 ed. Casaub.) legimus; aliam attulit scholiasta ad Odyss. A. 285. ed. Buttm. p. 37.
πῶς εἰς Σπάρτην ἐλθὼν οὐ συντυγχάνει Ἰκαρίῳ;
ἢ ἐκείνου καθ' Ὅμηρον ἐν Ἰθάκῃ ὄντος,
ἢ ἀπέχθονται αὐτῷ αὐτός τε καὶ ἡ μήτηρ ἀναγκάζοντε αὐτὴν γαμηθῆναι,
ὡς αὐτή φησι, “
μάλα δ᾽ ὀτρύνουσι τοκῆες γήμασθαι” (
Τ. 158).
17.
mvp-aristotle-comment-200
Ritter, cap. 25 § 17
-19. hic idem recurrit quod in capitis 12. segmento 1 et 3. deprehendimus: nam ut illic quae multo sudore excogitavit bis propinavit interpolator ineptissime, sic quae iam subsequuntur (§. 17) eadem sunt atque quae paulo ante (§. 4-8) posita erant, et quae proxime sequuntur (§. 18), ea partim §. 15. partim §. 8. proposita erant: quae autem §. 19. continentur, ea vero Aristoteli (c. 15, 5) furatus est. iste hoc argumentum tam grave esse putavit, ut bis de eo exponendum videretur. -
διαμάρτημα τὸ πρόβλημα είκός ἐστιν: problema exercitationis causa ad reprehendendum poetam inventum errore fere nititur.
εἰκός adverbii loco positum videtur, ut idem sit quod
κατ' εἰκός.
ὅλως δὲ τὸ ἀδύνατον - δεῖ ἀνάγειν: si poeta aliquis quod fieri non potest admisit, id ad poesin referre decet, h. e. videndum utrum ipsa peccaverit an alius artis peccatum acceperit. argutam hanc distinctionem accuratius persecutus est §. 4-8.
τοιούτους δ' εἶναι οἷους Ζεύξις ἔγραφεν: Zeuxis quos pinxit, ii maxime ad similitudinem veritatis expressi erant et apti ad illusionem faciendam, sed idem eo colorum splendore imagines suas exornavit, ut in rerum natura nihil quod plane simile esset inveniri posset. conf. Od. Mülleri Archaeolog. art. §. 137 ed. 2.
νατον ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον: subintellige
τὸ ἀδύ δεῖ ἀνάγειν. quae sequuntur
τὸ γὰρ παράδειγμα δεῖ ὑπερέχειν πρὸς ἃ φασι τἄλογα, eorum haec est sententia: exemplar enim assurgere debet prae iis quae ratione carere dicunt. oratio negligenter conformata est. conf. §. 6.interdum vero ratione non carent quae videntur carere,
οὕτω τε καὶ ὅτι - παρὰ τὸ εἰκὸς γίνεσθαι. haec in brevius contracta transcripta sunt ex c. 18, 6.
18.
mvp-aristotle-comment-201
Ritter, cap. 25 § 18
τὰ δ' ὑπεναντία ὡς εἰρημένα οὕτω σκοπεῖν: nihil videtur facilius fieri posse quam cum D. Heinsio scribere
τὰ δ᾽ ὡς ὑπεναντία aut cum Twiningio
τὰ δ' ὑπεναντίως, sed qui tam multa orationis male constructae specimina edidit, ei haec insolita verborum collocatio tutius relinquetur. conf. §. 8 et 15.
ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἔλεγχοι : quemadmodum in orationibus confutationes, h. e. quae in oratoria institutione tradi solent.
εἰ τὸ αὐτὸ: an idem dictum sit quod contrarie dictum fertur. conf. §. 16.
εἰ πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ: an ad idem referatur, quod cogitat qui contrarie dictum deprehendisse sibi videtur. conf. §. 8.
εἰ ὡσαύτως: an eadem ratione dictum sit, quam statuit qui contrarium quoddam arguit. conf. §. 15.
ὥστε καὶ αὐτὸν: intellige
δεῖ σκοπεῖν ἡμᾶς. ipse qui loquitur spectandus est, ut quae verbis illius sententia subsit intelligamus. hoc est quod modo dixit
εἰ τὸ αὐτό. tum videndum est ad quae rettulerit sua is qui dicit,
πρὸς ἃ αὐτὸς λέγει, denique quid prudens ex eius verbis intelligat,
ὃ ἂν φρόνιμος ὑποθῆται. hoc paulo ante significavit per
εἰ ὡσαύτως, illud per
εἰ πρὸς τὸ αὐτό.
19.
mvp-aristotle-comment-202
Ritter, cap. 25 § 19
ὥσπερ Εὐριπίδης τῷ Αἰγεῖ: obscure loquitur ut solet, sed id mihi certum videtur, per illud
τῷ Αἰγεῖ haud intelligi Euripidis Aegea fabulam nobis exceptis paucis frustulis perditam, sed Aegea hominem in Euripidis Medeam v. 663-755. sinistre productum. quippe scripsit
τῷ Αἰγεῖ (intellige
χρῆται vel
κέχρηται), non
ἐν τῷ Αἰγεῖ vel
ἐν Αἰγεῖ. Aegeus illic apparet et discedit ita, ut iusta huius episodii cum ceteris fabulae partibus coniunctio utique desideretur. itaque Aegei personam sine iusta causa (
αλόγως) Euripides in Medea sua adhibuit.
ὥσπερ ἐν Ὀρέστῃ τοῦ Μενελάου: intellige
πονηρίᾳ χρῆται. fortasse
ἐν Ὀρέστῃ ab aliena manu insertum est: mirum certe, ante
τῷ Αἰγεῖ fabulae nomen reticeri in qua Aegeus
ἀλόγως prodit, continuo autem ad
τοῦ Μενελάου positum esse. ceterum haec postrema repetuntur ex c. 15, 5.
20.
mvp-aristotle-comment-203
Ritter, cap. 25 § 20
αἱ δὲ λύσεις - δώδεκα: loci illi duodecim unde solutio petatur hi sunt. 1. si hoc reprehenditur, admissa esse quae fieri nequeunt, respondemus
ἀλλὰ τοῦ τέλους τοῦ αὐτῆς τυγχάνει ἡ τέχνη. vid. §. 5. 2. si haec excusatio proferri iure non potest, dicimus
ἡμάρτηται μέν,
ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός. vid. §. 5. 3. si non vera vitio dantur, in promptu est excusatio illa
ἀλλ' οἷα δεῖ. §. 6. 4. si neque vera neque bona sunt quae finxit poeta, dicere licet
οὕτω φασίν. §. 7. 5. si admitti ea excusatio non potest, causemur
οὕτως εἶχε. §. 7. 6. si quis prava dicere vel facere videatur a poeta inductus, videndum est quo tempore et quo statu rerum et quo consilio dicat vel faciat. §. 8. hi sunt sex loci, unde quaestionum solutiones hauriuntur: sex relicuos dictionis exploratio praebet, unum glossa (§. 9), alterum metaphora (§. 10), tertium accentus (§.11), quartum distinctio (§. 12), quintum ambiguitas (§. 13), sextum dicendi usus (§. 14). ex his locis a dictione petendis modo
τὸ ἀδύνατον, modo
τὸ ἄλογον, modo
τὸ βλαβερόν, modo
τὸ ὑπεναντίωμα, modo
τὸ παρὰ τὴν ὀρθότητα τὴν κατὰ τέχνην solvitur. aliquatenus conferri cum hisce possunt quae verus Aristoteles, sed et prudenter et certo cum consilio, disputavit in Elench. sophist. c. 4. init.
τρόποι δ᾽ εἰσὶ τοῦ ἐλέγχειν δύο·
οἱ μὲν γάρ εἰσι παρὰ τὴν λέξιν,
οἱ δ᾽ ἔξω τῆς λέξεως.
ἔστι δὲ τὰ μὲν παρὰ τὴν λέξιν ἓξ τὸν ἀριθμόν ·
ταῦτα δὲ ἐστὶν ὁμωνυμία,
ἀμφιβολία,
σύνθεσις,
διαίρεσις,
προσῳδία,
σχῆμα λέξεως. ..: