Aristotle Poetics 20.12

Thomas Twining (Translator)

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for all discourse is not composed of verbs and nouns;-the definition of Man 1 , for instance. Discourse, or speech, may subsist without a verb: some significant part, however, it must contain significant, as the word Cleon is, in, "Cleon walks.".

Poetics. Aristotle. Thomas Twining (Translator). London, UK. 1789.

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Current edition Experimental

Poetics (Thomas Twining, 1789) (OCR draft) (English) (Thomas Twining's English translation of Aristotle's Poetics, published in 1789 and aligned to the Kassel reference passage sequence.)

Provisional text from uncorrected OCR; expect errors.

Editions (4)
Περὶ ποιητικῆς (OCR draft) (Aristotle, Poetics. Immanuel Bekker, editor, Aristotelis Opera, volume 2. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1837.) — 20 focus
Περὶ ποιητικῆς (OCR draft) Perseus (Aristotle, De arte poetica liber. Rudolf Kassel, editor. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965. Reference edition for passage alignment.) — 20 focus
Poetics, Greek text (Ingram Bywater, 1909) (OCR draft) Experimental (Ingram Bywater's Greek text of Aristotle's Poetics, published in 1909.) — 20 focus
Poetics, Greek text (Franz Ritter, 1839) (OCR draft) Experimental (Franz Ritter's 1839 Greek edition, corrected against OCR of the represented copy and aligned to the conventional Perseus chapter-and-subchapter sequence.) — 20 focus
Translations (13)
Poetics (W. H. Fyfe) (OCR draft) Perseus (William Hamilton Fyfe's English translation of Aristotle's Poetics, Loeb Classical Library, 1939 printing.) — 20 focus
Arabic Poetics (Badawī edition, 1953) (OCR draft) (The ancient Arabic translation of Aristotle's Poetics in ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Badawī's 1953 edition.) — 20 focus
Poetics (S. H. Butcher, 1911) (OCR draft) Experimental (S. H. Butcher's English translation from Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Art, fourth edition, 1911.) — 20 focus
Aristotle on the Art of Poetry (Ingram Bywater, 1909) (OCR draft) Experimental (Ingram Bywater's English translation of Aristotle's Poetics, published in 1909.) — 20 focus
The Poetic of Aristotle (Henry James Pye, revised 1792) (OCR draft) Experimental (Henry James Pye's revised 1792 English translation, corrected against the 1788 first edition, aligned to the Kassel reference edition, and supplied with a selective apparatus of substantive 1788 readings.) — 20.12 focus
It [L] is allowed there may be a sentence without a verb for every sentence is not composed both of verbs and nouns; as for instance, the definition [M] of a man. Yet, some part of it has always signification as the name Cleon, in the sentence CLEON WALKED. The unity of a sentence or discourse arises from two causes; either from having one signification or from being joined by a number of connective particles.
The Poetic of Aristotle (Theodore Alois Buckley) (OCR draft) Experimental (Theodore Alois Buckley's English translation, first published in 1850 and represented from the Henry G. Bohn 1857 printing; corrected against a second OCR and aligned to the Kassel reference passage sequence.) — 20.12 focus
for not every sentence is composed from nouns and verbs, (since the definition of man10 is a sentence without a verb,) but there may be a sentence without verbs. A sentence, however, will always have some part significant; as in the sentence Cleon walks, the word Cleon is significant. 1 But a sentence is one in a twofold respect; for it is either that which signifies one thing, or that which becomes one from many by conjunction 11.
Poetica Latine conversa (Franciscus Ritter, 1839) (OCR draft) Experimental (Franz Ritter's Latin translation, corrected against OCR of the represented copy and aligned to the conventional Perseus chapter-and-subchapter sequence.) — 20 focus
La poëtique d'Aristote (André Dacier, 1692) (OCR draft) Experimental (André Dacier's French translation of Aristotle's Poetics, published in 1692.) — 20.12 focus
Car il ne faut pas s'imaginer que l'oraiſon ſoit toûjours un compoſé de noms & de verbes, comme la définition de l'homme; Il y a des oraiſons ſans verbe, & cela n'empêche pas que quelqu'une de ſes parties ſeparées, n'ait ſa ſignification auſſi bien que dans celle-cy, Cleon marche.
Poetica d'Aristotile (Bernardo Segni, 1549) (OCR draft) Experimental (Bernardo Segni's 1549 Florentine Italian translation, aligned to the Kassel reference passage sequence.) — 20 focus
De poetica (Antonio Riccobono, 1587) (OCR draft) Experimental (Antonio Riccobono's Latin translation, first published in 1587; text represented from Immanuel Bekker's 1831 edition.) — 20 focus
De arte poetica liber (William of Moerbeke, ca. 1277) (OCR draft) Experimental (William of Moerbeke's medieval Latin translation, represented by the 1953 Aristoteles Latinus edition.) — 20 focus
Arabic Poetics (Abū Bishr Mattā; Tkatsch edition) (OCR draft) Experimental (The Arabic translation attributed to Abū Bishr Mattā, edited by Jaroslaus Tkatsch in 1928 and aligned to the Kassel reference passage sequence.) — 20 focus
Arabic Poetics (Abū Bishr Mattā; Tkatsch edition, unaligned) (OCR draft) Experimental (Tkatsch's edition of the medieval Arabic translation in its original, unaligned segmentation.) — 20 focus

Notes on the current edition

Poetics

1. The definition alluded to appears to be this, literally rendered: "A terrestrial animal with two feet." (ζωον πεζον, διπουν.) . See the NOTE .

Commentary

Commentary on the Poetics (Ingram Bywater, 1909) (OCR draft) (Ingram Bywater's English commentary on Aristotle's Poetics.) focus

4. mvp-aristotle-comment-721

ταῦτα δὲ διαφέρει. Of the five differences here noted the first and second relate to the physiological mechanism of speech; the remainder come under the head of προσῳδία-a term which with the ancients included breathing and accent, as well as quantity (see on 25, 1461 a 22 ).

4. mvp-aristotle-comment-722

σχήμασίν τε τοῦ στόματος καὶ τόποις. Plato ( Tim. 75 D ) is aware of the function of the teeth, lips, and tongue in the formation of speech, and has also described ( Crat. 426 ) the various movements of the tongue in the utterance of certain letters (comp. Xenophon Mem. 1. 4, 12 ). From Alexander's comment on Metaph. N 6, 1093 a23 ( p. 883 Hayduck ) we learn that these points in the physiology of speech had long before this engaged the attention of Archinus, the statesman to whom Athens owed the introduction of the Ionic alphabet in 403 (see Usener, Rh. Mus. 25 p. 591 ). For the σχήματα τοῦ στόματος comp. De audib. 800 a16
ἀναπνέομεν δὲ τὸν μὲν ἀέρα πάντες τὸν αὐτόν, τὸ δὲ πνεῦμα καὶ τὰς φωνὰς ἐκπέμπομεν ἀλλοίας διὰ τὰς τῶν ὑποκειμένων ἀγγείων διαφοράς· ταῦτα δὲ ἐστιν τε ἀρτηρία
 [i. e. wind-pipe] καὶ ὁ πνεύμων καὶ τὸ στόμα. πλείστην μὲν οὖν διαφορὰν ἀπεργάζονται τῆς φωνῆς αἰ τε τοῦ ἀέρος πληγαὶ καὶ οἱ τοῦ στόματος σχηματισμοί. For the τόποι τοῦ στόματος as factors in articulation see more especially H. A. 4. 9, 535 a28 ; De part. an. 2. 16, 660 a1 ; 3. 1, 661 b14 ; and Metaph. N 6, 1093 a23 (with Alexander's note).
δασύτητι καὶ ψιλότητι καὶ μήκει καὶ βραχύτητι ἔτι δὲ ὀξύτητι καὶ βαρύτητι καὶ τῷ μέσῳ. The καὶ τῷ μέσῳ in the next line belongs equally to each of the three pairs of opposites, and not merely to the last of them. The meaning of δασύτης and ψιλότης in speech may be seen from De audib. 804 b 8
δασεῖαι δ᾽ εἰσὶ τῶν φωνῶν ὅσαις ἔσωθεν τὸ πνεῦμα εὐθέως συνεκβάλλομεν μετὰ τῶν φθόγγων, ψιλαὶ δ᾽ εἰσὶ τοὐναντίον ὅσαι γίνονται χωρὶς τῆς τοῦ πνεύματος ἐκβολῆς;
 and from Dion. Hal. 5 p. 85 R.
ταῦτα [i. e. τὰ ψιλά] μὲν γὰρ τὴν ἑαυτῶν δύναμιν ἔχει μόνην, τὰ δὲ δασέα καὶ τὴν τοῦ πνεύματος προσθήκην.
 ψιλός, 'without addition' (see on 1, 1447 a29 ), means in this connexion 'without aspiration'. The threefold distinction in the text, as applied to the mutes, passed on to the grammarians, and became an accepted part of grammar (comp. Dion. Thrax p. 12
τούτων [scil. τῶν ἀφώνων] ψιλὰ μὲν τρία, \overline{\kappa}\overline{\pi}\overline{\tau} δασέα δὲ τρία, \overline{\theta}\overline{\phi}\overline{\chi}, μέσα δὲ τούτων τρία, \overline{\beta}\overline{\gamma}\overline{\delta}· μέσα δὲ εἴρηται ὅτι τῶν μὲν ψιλῶν ἐστι δασύτερα, τῶν δὲ δασέων ψιλότερα
, and Priscian 549 P. ); and it still appears in our familiar division of mutes into aspiratae, mediae, and tenues-where the tenues represent the ψιλά of the Greeks. 1

11. mvp-aristotle-comment-723

μήκει καὶ βραχύτητι. The intermediates ( μέσα) in quantity are the three dichronous vowels , , : Dion. Thrax p. 10
τῶν δὲ φωνηέντων μακρὰ μὲν ἐστι δύο, \overline{\eta} καὶ ῶ, βραχέα δὲ δύο, καὶ , δίχρονα δὲ τρία, δίχρονα δὲ λέγεται, ἐπεὶ ἐκτείνεται καὶ συστέλλεται.
 - Sextus Emp. Adv. math. 1. 100
τῶν δὲ φωνηέντων τρεῖς λέγουσι διαφοράς· δύο μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν φύσει μακρὰ λέγουσι τυγ- χάνειν, τὸ \overline{\eta} καὶ τὸ ῶ, ἰσάριθμα δὲ βραχέα, τὸ καὶ τὸ , τρία δὲ κοινὰ μήκους τε καὶ βραχύτητος, , ἅπερ δίχρονα καὶ ὑγρὰ καὶ ἀμφίβολα καὶ μεταβολικά καλοῦσιν· ἕκαστον γὰρ αὐτῶν πέφυκεν ὁτὲ μὲν ἐκτείνεσθαι ὀτὲ δὲ συστέλλεσθαι
 (comp. Dion. Hal. 5 p. 74 R. , and Aulus Gellius 16. 18.5 ).

4. mvp-aristotle-comment-724

ὀξύτητι καὶ βαρύτητι. A third kind of difference is to be seen in the differences of accent. Accent with Aristotle is a part of προσῳδία (see on b31 ), but he has no special name for it; the word τόνος in Rhet. 3. 1, 1403 b29 relates to the tone or key in which something may be said, and not, as is sometimes supposed (e. g. by Cope), to the syllabic accent in words. Aristotle's intermediate accent is clearly that conventionally indicated by a circumflex, as standing between the acute and grave, and having thus something of the nature of both. This was the received view of the phonetic value of the 'circumflex' in antiquity, though the names by which it was known referred to the form of the mark rather than the nature of the accent itself; comp. the pseudo- Sergius, 4 p. 531 Keil
Ammonius Alexandrius qui Aristarchi scholae successit
ὀξύβαρυν
vocat, Ephorus autem Cymaeus
περίσπασιν,
Dionysius Olympius [read: Olynthius]
δίτονον,
Hermocrates Iasius
σύμπλεκτον,
Epicharmus Syracusius
κεκλασμένην ;
verum ea nunc ab omnibus
περισπωμένη
Graece vocatur, apud nos flexa, quoniam primo erecta rursus in gravem flectitur.
For further illustrations of the notion of the circumflex in antiquity see Nauck, Aristophanis Byz. fragmenta p. 13 , and Wilmanns, De Varronis libris grammaticis p. 187 . It is to be observed that (like Plato Crat. 399 A ) Aristotle ignores the circumflex in the passage in Soph. el. 23, 179 a 14 εἰ παρὰ προσῳδίαν ὀξεῖαν [scil. ὁ λόγος ἐστί], ἡ βαρεῖα προσῳδία λύσις, εἰ δὲ παρὰ βαρεῖαν, ἡ ὀξεῖα, and speaks as though the only substantial difference in accent were that between acute and grave. His view of it in fact was probably very like that ascribed to the Peripatetic Athenodorus in the pseudo- Sergius, 4 p. 529 Keil
Athenodorus duas esse prosodias putavit, unam inferiorem, alteram superiorem; flexam autem (nam ita nostra lingua
περισπωμένην
vocamus) nihil aliud esse quam has duas in una syllaba.

4. mvp-aristotle-comment-725

[ἐν] τοῖς μετρικοῖς: comp. infra b38 . The preposition has to be bracketed, as there is no hint of a book on metre, actual or contemplated, by Aristotle himself (comp. Bergk, Kl. Schr. 2 p. 753 ). He leaves the subject to the μετρικοί, just as he does in the parallel in De part. an. 2. 16, 660b 7
ποίας δὲ ταῦτα
 [scil. τὰ γράμματα] καί πόσας καὶ τίνας ἔχει διαφοράς, δεῖ πυνθάνεσθαι παρὰ τῶν μετρικῶν. The theory of metre, in its primitive form, took cognizance of many matters which we should relegate to grammar or phonology. It started, like grammar, with the στοιχεῖα or elementary sounds in language ( Longinus Prol. in Hephaest. p. 142 Gaisf.
τοῦ περὶ μέτρων λόγου πολλοὶ πολλαχῶς ἤρξαντο, οἱ μὲν ἀπὸ στοιχείων, ὡς Φιλόξενος
); and, as the passage in the De Partibus intimates (comp. Dion. Hal. 5 p. 74 R. ), it dealt with the whole question of the number and nature of these elements.

5. mvp-aristotle-comment-727

φωνὴν ἔχοντος includes the semivowel as well as the vowel (see on b 28 ).
καὶ γὰρ τὸ ΓΡ ἄνευ τοῦ Α = τὸ γὰρ ΓΡ καὶ ἄνευ τοῦ Α.

5. mvp-aristotle-comment-728

τῆς μετρικῆς: see on b 34 . As the foot is made up of syllables, the theory of the συλλαβή belonged to metre just as much as to grammar: Aristides Quintil. 1. 20, p. 28 Jahn
ἀρχὴ μὲν οὖν ἡ τῆς μετρικῆς ὁ περὶ στοιχείων λόγος, εἶθ᾿ ὁ περὶ συλλαβῆς, εἶθ' ὁ περὶ ποδῶν, εἶθ οὕτως ὁ περὶ μέτρων.
- Longinus Prol. in Heph. p. 142 Gaisf.
τοῦ δὲ περὶ μέτρων λόγου πολλοὶ πολλαχῶς ἤρξαντο, οἱ μὲν ἀπὸ στοιχείων, ὡς Φιλόξενος, οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ μέτρων ὅρου, ὡς Ηλιόδωρος, ἡμεῖς δὲ Ἡφαιστίωνι κατακολουθήσομεν ἀπὸ συλλαβῆς ἀρξάμενοι.
 By τούτων τὰς διαφοράς Aristotle probably meant not only the familiar distinction of syllables into long and short, but also the finer differences the ancient theory of rhythmic recognized in the times of syllables, when the time of the consonant or consonants in them is taken into account (v. Kühner, Gr. Gr. 1. 1 p. 300 ).

6. mvp-aristotle-comment-729

σύνδεσμος. The traditional text of this and the following section (that on the ἄρθρον) is confessedly corrupt. Twining finds a good deal of it unintelligible (comp. Steinthal, Gesch. der Sprachwissen- schaft 1 p. 263 ); and Vahlen, besides bracketing ἢ φωνὴ μέσου in 1457a 8-10 , has to assume two lacunas, one after συντίθεσθαι in 1457a 2 , and another after
δηλοῖ
in 1457a 7 . At this point Aristotle passes from the constituents of words (letters and syllables) to actual words; and he begins by noting this distinction: some words are φωναὶ ἄσημοι, and others φωναὶ σημαντικαί ; these latter being the nouns and verbs in language, which have a meaning of their own and stand for something even when uttered by themselves. The σύνδεσμοι and ἄρθρα however, are said to be φωναὶ ἄσημοι; i. e. they convey no meaning when uttered by themselves. If we may provisionally take them to represent in some way the little connexive words in language, the question arises as to the nature of the two kinds of connexives and the distinction Aristotle wished to draw between them. It will be observed that he describes them by reference to their position and function in the complex φωνὴ σημαντική, called a λόγος a little further on in the chapter ( 1457a 23 ). It is necessary, therefore, to go back to his idea of λόγος, and consider the various forms of λόγοι which he either recognizes or may be presumed to have recognized. λόγος in the present sense of the term has no exact English equivalent, though 'speech', 'discourse', or 'phrase' is sometimes conventionally made to stand for it. According to the definition in 1457a 23 it is a significant combination of significant words, e. g. of two (or more) nouns, or verbs (including what Aristotle would call their πτώσεις), or of a verb and a noun, or of a noun and a verb. Α λόγος, in Aristotle's sense of the term, does not necessarily involve predication. The instance he gives in 1457a 25 of a non-predicative λόγος is a definition, that of 'man', e.g. ζῷον πεζὸν δίπουν - where the combination of the three nouns is equivalent to 'man', and may replace it as one of the terms of a proposition. This form of λόγος is the λόγος ὀνοματώδης of An. post. 2. 10, 93 b 31 . Under this same head we may include certain other forms of expression, e. g. βαδίζει χαίρων (a combination of two verbs), and οἰκοῦσι νῆσον (a verb+ a noun). A more complex instance of the same type would be a combination like οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, where the terms are combined into one by the copulative, and οἰκοῦσι περὶ δυσμάς, where the terms are hyphened together by the preposition 2 (comp. Hartung, Lehren der Alten über die Dichtkunst p. 284 ). The other form of λόγος is that which involves predication-the λόγος ἀποφαντικός of the De Interpretatione (4.17a seqq.). If we may work out the hint in De Interpretatione5, 17a 20 , we may divide the λόγοι of this description into two kinds, the simple and the composite, and take the example in 1457a 28,
Κλέων βαδίζει
, as the type of the simple predicational λόγος. It is not so easy to find an Aristotelian instance of the composite predicational λόγος; but its nature is indicated in general terms in the passage in the De Interpretatione: it consists of two or more simple predicational λόγοι combined in some way or other into one single λόγος. How, then, and by means of what kinds of words is this combination effected? The De Interpretatione ignores this question. We may perhaps supply the omission, however, by reflecting for a moment on the structure of complex sentences and observing the different relations of the parts or members to the whole. In some instances the simple λόγοι ἀποφαντικοί are merely co-ordinated, and held together by copulative or similar conjunctions, as in Κλέων βαδίζει καὶ Σωκράτης κάθηται, Κλέων μὲν βαδίζει Σωκράτης δὲ κάθηται, Κλέων βαδίζει ἀλλὰ Σωκράτης κάθηται (comp. συνδέσμῳ εἷς in 1457a 30 ); in others they are subordinated to one another, and form a sort of organic whole knit into one by words which indicate relation and interdependence. This last point in the theory of the λόγος would have to be recognized in any grammatical analysis of the sentence and its construction. I venture to suggest that it may have been actually present in Aristotle's mind at the time of framing his definitions of σύνδεσμος and ἄρθρον, and that it is to be found in the text, if it be permissible to restore it in some such way as this:—
σύνδεσμος δέ ἐστι φωνὴ ἄσημος, ἢ οὔτε κωλύει οὔτε ποιεῖ φωνὴν μίαν σημαντικὴν ἐκ πλειόνων φωνῶν πεφυκυῖαν συντίθεσθαι [καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄκρων καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ μέσου], ἣν μὴ ἁρμόττει ἐν ἀρχῇ λόγου τιθέναι καθ αὑτόν, οἷον μέν, δή, τοί, δέ. ἢ φωνὴ ἄσημος ἢ ἐκ 5 πλειόνων μὲν φωνῶν μιᾶς σημαντικῶν δὲ ποιεῖν πέφυκε μίαν σημαντικὴν φωνήν, (οἷον τὸ ἀμφί καὶ τὸ περί καὶ τὰ ἄλλα). ἄρθρον δ᾽ ἐστὶ φωνὴ ἄσημος, ἢ λόγου ἀρχὴν ἢ τέλος ἢ διορισμὸν δηλοῖ [οἷον τὸ ἀμφί καὶ τὸ περί καὶ τὰ ἄλλα. φωνὴ ἄσημος ἢ οὔτε κωλύει οὔτε ποιεῖ φωνὴν μίαν σημαντικὴν ἐκ πλειόνων φωνῶν], πεφυκυῖα τίθεσθαι 10 καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄκρων καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ μέσου.
 The words bracketed after συντίθεσθαι in l. 2 I suppose to be a repetition in the wrong place of those after τίθεσθαι in l. 9; and the clause ἢ φωνὴ...φωνῶν in ll. 8–9 to have come in through a repetition of the beginning of the definition of σύνδεσμος in l. 1 (comp. Düntzer, Rettung d. aristotelischen Poetik p. 194 ). It will be seen also that the illustration οἷον τὸ ἀμφί τὰ ἄλλα is assumed to be out of place where it stands, and is transferred to l. 6, so as to form part of the second definition of σύνδεσμος—a view which has been anticipated by Hartung. Two kinds of σύνδεσμοι, then, are recognized in the text as amended. The first is said to consist of the connexive words whose presence in a λόγος does not affect the coherence of the terms. There is no difficulty in illustrating this point; if Κλέων and βαδίζει are combinable terms, the combination of them in the proposition Κλέων βαδίζει is neither hindered nor helped by the insertion after the first word of a μέν, δέ, α δή, οι τοί. Little words of this description are what the grammarians called 'expletives'. Though they stand at the beginning of the λόγος, they are not an integral part of it; they belong to it not per se ( καθ' αὑτόν), but per accidens, and only serve to indicate a relation to some other λόγος before or after it. In contradistinction to these Aristotle recognizes a second species of σύνδεσμος (l. 4), one that is a real and constitutive part of the λόγος into which it enters. This function, as I have endeavoured to show above, in the general survey of the possible forms of λόγοι, is fulfilled by the prepositions and the copulative conjunctions. Aristotle's σύνδεσμος, therefore, whatever else it may signify, may be taken to include the preposition, the copulative conjunction, and also certain particles. The sense of the word ἄρθρον is more difficult to determine owing to the absence of examples to illustrate its meaning. The term must clearly denote a particular kind of connexive required for a particular kind of λόγος. The kind of λόγος Aristotle had in mind may perhaps be inferred from the fact that the ἄρθρον in it is said to indicate the beginning, or end, or dividing-point in its structure. Such a λόγος may be assumed to be a composite proposition, and moreover one of a more complex form than that in Κλέων βαδίζει καὶ Σωκράτης κάθηται and the like. The two constituent propositions in it are either intimately connected by being related in such a way that the one is the beginning and the other the end of the whole; or they are in some way divided or separated one from the other. With this we may compare the definition of the 'period' in Rhet. 3. 9, 1409 a 35
λέγω δὲ περίοδον λέξιν ἔχουσαν ἀρχὴν καὶ τελευτὴν αὐτὴν καθ᾽ αὑτὴν καὶ μέγεθος εὐσύνοπτον
. As a conjectural interpretation of this statement it may be suggested (1) that the ἄρθρα which mark the beginning of the proposition represent the conditional and causal conjunctions, together with the relative pronouns and adverbs; (2) that those marking the end are the final and illative conjunctions; and (3) those marking the separation or division in the proposition, the disjunctives. The kinds of proposition which involve the use of such words as these are ignored in Aristotle's logical writings, but it seems to me that he may very well have had something to say of them in an analysis like that in the present chapter of the forms and constituents of ordinary speech. I am not unaware of the lacunas that may be found in this interpretation of the Aristotelian ἄρθρον. It must be taken for what it is worth, and with many allowances, as an attempt to recover the rough draft of an all but lost chapter of early grammar. For a discussion of the textual and other difficulties in these two sections I may refer to Vahlen's Beiträge, 3 p. 229 and 306 , and Schömann's Animadversiones ad veterum grammaticorum doctrinam de articulo ( Jahrb. f. class. Philol. Suppl.-Bd. V p. 5) . Both σύνδεσμος and ἄρθρον were terms taken by grammar from anatomy (see on 7, 1450 b 34 ); the former is properly a 'ligament', and the latter a 'joint'. The language in the text as to the function of the ἄρθρον or joint-word, ἢ λόγου ἀρχὴν ἢ τέλος δηλοῖ, recalls that in the passage in De anima 3. 10, 433 b 21 , which describes the physical joint as the means of locomotion in the animal:
τὸ δὲ κινοῦν ὀργανικῶς, ὅπου ἀρχὴ καὶ τελευτὴ τὸ αὐτό, οἷον ὁ γιγγλυμός· ἐνταῦθα γὰρ τὸ κυρτὸν καὶ κοῖλον τὸ μὲν τελευτὴ τὸ δ᾽ ἀρχή (διὸ τὸ μὲν ἠρεμεῖ τὸ δὲ kινεῖται), λόγῳ μὲν ἕτερα ὄντα μεγέθει δ᾽ ἀχώριστα
(comp. J. of Phil. 17 p. 64 ). The joint-word in grammar, therefore, would naturally imply a more structural and organic connexion than is to be found when the λόγοι are simply strung together by σύνδεσμοι. I should add that the instances of σύνδεσμοι in Rhet. 3. 5, 1407 a 20 are μέν and δή, together with γάρ, τέ, καί, and apparently ἐπεί [? ἔτι]; and that a distinction not unlike that in the text between the two kinds of σύνδεσμοι is implied in Probl. 16. 20, 919 a 22
ἐκ τῶν λόγων ἐνίων ἐξαιρεθέντων συνδέσμων οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ λόγος Ἑλληνικός, οἷον τὸ τέ καὶ τὸ καί, ἔνιοι δὲ οὐθὲν λυποῦσι διὰ τὸ τοῖς μὲν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι χρῆσθαι πολλάκις, εἰ ἔσται λόγος, τοῖς δὲ μή
.

6. mvp-aristotle-comment-730

1 κωλύει, scil. ποιεῖσθαι.

7. mvp-aristotle-comment-731

φωνῶν: 1.e. φωνῶν σημαντικῶν.

7. mvp-aristotle-comment-732

λόγου. The term is explained in 23. Aristotle is using it without explanation, as though it were a familiar and well-understood word. Just before this (in 1) he employed the periphrasis φωνὴ μία σημαντική in lieu of it. καθ᾽ αὑτόν is to be taken with λόγου (comp. Top. 8. 11, 161 b 19 ). The λόγος as such is tacitly distinguished from the λόγος as brought into relation with some other λόγος by the insertion of a word which is no integral part of it per se. καθ᾽ αὑτό is the opposite of πρὸς ἕτερον ἢ κατὰ συμβεβηκός ( Bon. Ind. 212 a 3 ).

7. mvp-aristotle-comment-733

διορισμός seems to mean here 'separation' or 'disjunction', a metaphorical extension of the sense it has in the De Partibus: 3. 10, 672 a 14
τοῦ διορισμοῦ χάριν ἐστὶ (scil. τὸ διάζωμα) τοῦ τε περὶ τὴν κοιλίαν τόπου καὶ τοῦ περὶ τὴν καρδίαν
.

7. mvp-aristotle-comment-734

πεφυκυῖα τίθεσθαι καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄκρων καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ μέσου does not necessarily mean any more than this, that some of the ἄρθρα have one and others another of these three possible places in the complex form of λόγος. πεφυκυῖα τίθεσθαι implies that the rule is general and not always observed in practice.

8. mvp-aristotle-comment-735

ὄνομα. In this definition συνθετή differentiates the ὄνομα from the στοιχεῖον, σημαντική from the ἄρθρον and σύνδεσμος, ἄνευ χρόνου from the ῥῆμα, and what remains ( ἧς μέρος οὐδὲν κτέ.) from the λόγος. In a λόγος ( . 8. ζῷον πεζὸν δίπουν, οι Κλέων βαδίζει) the parts retain their several meanings; whereas in an ὄνομα, if the parts happen to have a meaning, it is lost in the word into which they enter; Θεόδωρος for instance denotes a certain man, not a kind of gift: De interpr. 2, 16 b 19
ὄνομα μὲν οὖν ἐστι φωνὴ σημαντικὴ κατὰ συνθήκην ἄνευ χρόνου, ἧς μηδὲν μέρος ἐστὶ σημαντικὸν κεχωρισμένον· ἐν γὰρ τῷ Κάλλιππος τὸ ἵππος οὐδὲν αὐτὸ καθ᾽ ἑαυτὸ σημαίνει, ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ τῷ καλὸς ἵππος
. The general term ὄνομα must be taken to include not only the nouns, but also the adjectives, the personal and demonstrative pronouns, and possibly even the article as a kind of pronoun—in fact all the declinable parts of speech except perhaps the relatives, which may have been classed among the ἄρθρα A verb also apart from a subject, as a mere name for an action, may be called an ὄνομα, as it is for instance in 21, 1457 a 25; 22, 1458 b20; 25, 1461 b 31; comp. De interpr. 3, 16 b 19
αὐτὰ μὲν οὖν καθ᾽ ἑαυτὰ λεγόμενα ὀνόματά ἐστι [scil. τὰ ῥήματα] καὶ σημαίνει τι (ἵστησι γὰρ ὁ λέγων τὴν διάνοιαν καὶ ὁ ἀκούσας ἠρέμησεν), ἀλλ᾽ εἰ ἔστιν ἢ μὴ οὔπω σημαίνει
. It is a ῥῆμα proper only when actually said of a subject, as the predicate of a proposition.

8. mvp-aristotle-comment-736

οὐ χρώμεθα: comp. 21, 1457 a 33 πλὴν οὐκ ἐν τῷ ὀνόματι σημαίνοντος. The construction in the clause may be seen from Vahlen's paraphrase, εν τοῖς διπλοῖς οὐ χρώμεθα τῷ μέρει ἡγούμενοι καὶ αὐτὸ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ σημαίνειν. The participial ὡς καὶ αὐτὸ καθ᾽ αὐτὸ σημαῖνον is an acc. absolute like those in 3, 1448 a 37 and 26, 1462 10.

8. mvp-aristotle-comment-737

τῷ Θεοδώρῳ: i.e. 'the word Θεόδωρος'; comp. infra 28 ὁ Κλέων, ' the word Κλέων'. — Plato Crat. 392 D
τὸν Ἀστυάνακτα
, ' the name Astyanax'; for the similar Latin usage v. Wilkins on Cicero De Oratore 2, 193 . In the De interpr. we have the more scholastic form of expression with a nominative, ἐν τῷ Κάλλιππος. τὸ δῶρον: i. e. the word δῶρον implied in Θεόδωρος. As the parallel in the De interpr. is ἐν τῷ Κάλλιππος τὸ ἵππος οὐδὲν αὐτὸ καθ ἑαυτὸ σημαίνει, it has been proposed to restore here τὸ δωρος for τὸ δῶρον. The two cases, however, as Düntzer reminds us, are not quite similar, since δωρος does not exist as a separate word, as ἵππος does, and there would therefore be no point in saying of it that it is without meaning ( οὐ σημαίνει).

9. mvp-aristotle-comment-738

ῥῆμα: De interpr. 3, 16b 6
ῥῆμα δέ ἐστι τὸ προσσημαῖνον χρόνον, οὐ μέρος οὐδὲν σημαίνει χωρίς, καὶ ἔστιν ἀεὶ τῶν καθ᾽ ἑτέρου λεγομένων σημεῖον. λέγω δ᾽ ὅτι προσσημαίνει χρόνον, οἷον ὑγίεια μὲν ὄνομα, τὸ δὲ ὑγιαίνει ῥῆμα προσσημαίνει γὰρ τὸ νῦν ὑπάρχειν ... 16 τὸ ὑγίανεν ἢ τὸ ὑγιανεῖ οὐ ῥῆμα ἀλλὰ πτώσεις ῥήματος διαφέρει δὲ τοῦ ῥήματος, ὅτι τὸ μὲν τὸν παρόντα προσσημαίνει χρόνον, τὰ δὲ τὸν πέριξ
. In this passage (though not in De interpr. 10, 19b 13 ) the past and future tenses of the verb are set aside as πτώσεις, the verb in the logical theory of predication being always in the present (comp. Mansel, Prolegomena Logica p. 273). It is to be noted that in these instances of verbs, the verb is in the third person singular of the present; the reason for this is that a proper name like Κλέων οι Κορίσκος is tacitly assumed to be its subject. With Plato, it may be observed, the ῥῆμα includes the predicative adjective as well as the verb (v. Crat. 399 A ).

9. mvp-aristotle-comment-739

προσσημαίνει. Boethius, In Aristot. de Interpr. 2 p. 66 Meiser , translates this by
consignificat
, thus identifying its sense with that of the later word συσσημαίνειν.

9. mvp-aristotle-comment-741

ἄνθρωπος: Phys. 3. 7, 207 b 34
ἄνθρωπος εἷς ἄνθρωπος καὶ οὐ πολλοί
.

10. mvp-aristotle-comment-742

τὰ ὑποκριτικά: see on 19, 1456 b 10.
ἐπίταξιν:
 see on 19, 1456b 16 .

10. mvp-aristotle-comment-743

βάδιζε: to be read as βάδιζε , i. e. as a dictatorial imperative.

11. mvp-aristotle-comment-744

λόγος. The definition is framed to distinguish a λόγος from an ὄνομα; see above on 10, and comp. De interpr. 4, 16 b 26
λόγος δέ ἐστι φωνὴ σημαντικὴ κατὰ συνθήκην, ἧς τῶν μερῶν τι σημαντικόν ἐστι κεχωρισμένον, ὡς φάσις, ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ὡς κατάφασις ἢ ἀπόφασις
.
λέγω δέ, οἷον ἄνθρωπος σημαίνει μέν τι, ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ὅτι ἔστιν ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀλλ᾽ ἔσται κατάφασις ἢ ἀπόφασις, ἐάν τι προστεθῇ
. The clause ἧς ἔνια μέρη καθ᾽ αὑτὰ σημαίνει τι refers to the nouns and verbs (with their πτώσεις) as the significant parts of all λόγοι; the σύνδεσμοι and ἄρθρα are φωναὶ ἄσημοι. For the meaning of λόγος and the various forms of λόγοι see on 20, 1456 b 38 (also Bon. Ind. 433 b 48 ).

12. mvp-aristotle-comment-745

οὐ γὰρ ἅπας, κτέ. An indirect reproof, perhaps, to Plato, who seems to speak as though a λόγος were always in the form of a proposition: Soph. 262 Α
οὐκοῦν ἐξ ὀνομάτων μὲν μόνων συνεχώς λεγομένων οὐκ ἔστι ποτὲ λόγος, οὐδ᾽ αὖ ῥημάτων χωρὶς ὀνομάτων λεχθέντων
.

12. mvp-aristotle-comment-746

ὁ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ὁρισμός: e.g. ζῷον πεζὸν δίπουν ( Top. 1. 7, 103 a 27 ) οἱ ζῷον ἐπιστήμης δεκτικόν ( Top. 5. 2, 130 b8 ).

12. mvp-aristotle-comment-747

ἐνδέχεται ἄνευ ῥημάτων εἶναι λόγον. This is the λόγος ὀνοματώδης of An. post. 2. 10, 93b31 —a combination of words that may serve as an equivalent for a name, and take the place of one as a term in a proposition (comp. De interpr. 11, 21 a 29 ). It may be a more or a less exact equivalent; the most exact is what Aristotle calls a definition (comp. Metaph. Z 4, 1030 a 14 ).

11. mvp-aristotle-comment-748

εἷς δὲ ἐστι λόγος διχῶς. That a λόγος, in spite of its composite nature, has a certain unity in it is tacitly assumed in the definition in a 23 λόγος δὲ φωνὴ συνθετὴ κτέ. This unity, as the text implies, is not of the same order in all kinds of λόγοι. A definition (a λόγος without predication) is one, because the combination of terms in it signifies and stands for one thing ( ἓν σημαίνει), just in the same way as a name may do. The proposition also, e. g. Κλέων βαδίζει, is one because the combination of terms describes a single act or fact (comp. De interpr. 5, 17 a 16
ὁ ἓν δηλῶν λόγος
), and admits of only one assertion or denial. On the other hand in a composite λόγος consisting of two or more propositions with copulative or other coordinating conjunctions to connect them together, the formal unity of the whole is due to this conjunction of the parts, the several propositions which compose it. The Iliad is an extreme instance of such a λόγος. This point, the difference in the unity in these two kinds of λόγοι, is more than once noticed by Aristotle elsewhere in very similar terms: De interpr. 5, 17 a 8
ἔστι δὲ εἰς πρῶτος [? πρώτως] λόγος ἀποφαντικὸς κατάφασις, εἶτα ἀπόφασις· οἱ δ᾽ ἄλλοι [scil. λόγοι ἀποφαντικοί] πάντες συνδέσμῳ εἷς ἔστι δὲ εἷς λόγος ἀποφαντικὸς ἢ ὁ ἓν δηλῶν ἢ ὁ συνδέσμῳ εἷς, ... πολλοὶ δὲ οἱ πολλὰ καὶ μὴ ἓν ἢ οἱ ἀσύνδετοι
. An. post. 2. 10, 93 b 35
λόγος δ᾽ εἷς ἐστι διχῶς, ὁ μὲν συνδέσμῳ, ὥσπερ ἡ Ἰλιάς, ὁ δὲ τῷ ἓν καθ᾽ ἓν δηλοῦν μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός
. — Metaph. Η 6, 1045 a 12 :
ὁ δ᾽ ὁρισμὸς λόγος ἐστὶν εἷς οὐ συνδέσμῳ καθάπερ ἡ Ἰλιάς, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἑνὸς εἶναι
(comp. also Metaph. Z 4, 1030 b 9 ).

13. mvp-aristotle-comment-749

ἐκ πλειόνων , scil. λόγων.

Remarques sur la poëtique d'Aristote (André Dacier, 1692) (OCR draft) (André Dacier's French commentary on Aristotle's Poetics.) focus

5. mvp-aristotle-comment-470

20.4 5. Il y a encore entr'elles une autre difference qui ſe tire, on ou de la conformation de la bouche, & des autres endroits qui ſer-vent à la prononciation. ] 1

6. mvp-aristotle-comment-471

20.4 6. Ou de ce qu'elles font afpirées, ou douces ] 2

7. mvp-aristotle-comment-472

20.4 7. Breves ou longues, graves ou aigues, ou circonflexes.] 3

8. mvp-aristotle-comment-473

20.4 8. Mais il ne convient de traiter en détail de toutes ces dif-ferentes qualitez des lettres, que dans les traitez qui enſeignent l'art de faire des vers.] 4

9. mvp-aristotle-comment-474

20.5 9. La fyllabe est un ſon qui ne ſignifie rien, & qui est compo- Fée compoſée d'une muete & d'une voyelle.] 5

10. mvp-aristotle-comment-475

20.6 10. La conjonction eſt un ſon qui ne ſignifiant rien par luy-mème, ne fait ny n'empèche que chacun des autres avec lesquels elle se trouve, n'ait sa fignification, mais qui les détermine tous à n'en avoir qu'une feule, & ne fait qu'un ſeul & mème ſon de tous les differens ſons qu'elle unit.] 6

11. mvp-aristotle-comment-476

20.6 11. Elle ſe met d'ordinaire à la fin, ou au milieu, & quelque-fois au commencement.] 7

12. mvp-aristotle-comment-477

20.7 12. L'article est un ſon, qui ne ſignifiant rien par luy-mème, ſert ſeulement à montrer le commencement ou la fin du discours] 8

13. mvp-aristotle-comment-478

20.8 13. Le nom est un ſon composé, qui fignifie quelque choſe ſans marquer le temps, & dont les parties qui le compoſent ne fignifient rien ſeules.] 9

14. mvp-aristotle-comment-479

20.8 14. Car même dans les noms doubles, chaque nom ſeparé n'a aucune fignification, comme Theodore.] 10

15. mvp-aristotle-comment-480

20.9 15. Mais le verbe a cet avantage ſur le nom qu'il marque le temps, ce que le nom ne fait pas.] 11

16. mvp-aristotle-comment-481

20.10 16. Le cas est dans les noms & dans les verbes.] 12

17. mvp-aristotle-comment-482

20.11 17. L'oraiſon, ou le diſcours, eſt un ſon compoſe qui fignifie, & dont quelques parties ſeparées ont leur ſignification.] 13

18. mvp-aristotle-comment-483

20.12 18. Car il ne faut pas s'imaginer que l'oraiſon ſoit toujours un composé de noms & de verbes, comme la définition de l'homme.] 14

19. mvp-aristotle-comment-484

20.13 19. On appelle l'oraiſon, une, en deux manières.] 15

Commentary on the Poetics (Thomas Twining, 1789) (OCR draft) (Thomas Twining's notes on Aristotle's Poetics, aligned to the Kassel reference edition.) focus

168. mvp-aristotle-comment-168

NOTE 168. P. 105.

20.4 IN DIFFERENT PARTS OF THE MOUTH.
Τοποις
.—Clearly right; nor can I conceive, what should have induced any critic to suspect this reading. See Dionys. Halicarn. Sect. 14 . his curious and accurate analysis of articulation: and Aristides Quintil. p. 89, ed. Meib. —where, in describing the formation of the letters, these expressions occur:—
ἐκ των περι τους όδοντας ΤΟΠΩΝ
—and,
ἐκ μεσου του φωνητικου ΤΟΠΟΥ
. See, also, Hermes, III. 2, p. 322. —
ΤΟΝΟΙΣ
, which had occurred to Mr. Winstanley, 1 would be mere tautology; for that idea is fully expressed afterwards, by
ὀξυτητι και βαρύτητι
. Thus, Rhet. III. 1.
τοις ΤΟΝΟΙΣ, ΟΙΟΝ ὀξεια και βαρεια, και μεση
.

169. mvp-aristotle-comment-169

NOTE 169. P. 105.

20.4 AS THEIR TONE IS ACUTE, GRAVE, OR INTER-MEDIATE.
Οξύτητι, βαρύτητι, και τω μεσω
.—All the commentators seem agreed, that by
τῷ μέσῳ
is meant the circumflex. Mr. Foster, in his Essay on Accent, &c. expresses some degree of doubt about this ; and, I confess, it appears to me to be somewhat more than doubtful. Certainly, the only obvious and proper sense of the word mean, or middle, thus applied to the pitch of sound, is, that which is between
ὀξυ
and
βαρυ
; not, that which is compounded of the two, as the circumflex is always represented to be. At least the expression, in this latter sense, would not be very accurate and philosophical. A circumflexed syllable is described to be, a syllable that has both an acute and a grave accent;—
ἀμφοτερας τας τασεις
, as it is expressed by Dion. Halicarn. Sect. 11. The voice first rises, and then falls, on the same syllable. A man would be thought to speak very strangely, who should describe any object painted half white and half black, by saying, that it was of a colour between black and white.
But, farther, I observe, that in other passages of Aristotle's works, where he speaks of accents, the word
μεσον
no where occurs. Indeed, he uses neither this, nor any other word, to denote the circumflex accent. He mentions only
ὀξυ
, and
βαρύ
, acute, and grave. See De Soph. Elench. p. 284, C. — 288, A. — 304, A. — 306, A. ed. Duval. In the last of these passages especially, his expression is remarkable:
ἐι παρα προσῳδιαν όξειαν, Ἡ ΒΑΡΕΙΑ προσωδια λυσις· ἐι δε παρα βαρειαν, Ἡ ΟΞΕΙΑ
. That is—"If the sophism supposes the acute accent, the answer is—it is the grave accent; and vice versa." 2 Here are no traces of the triple division of accents, given by later writers, into acute, grave, and circumflex. Nay more; he speaks in the same way, even when the very ambiguity in question lies between an acute, and a circumflex, accent; as
οὐ
, ( non,) and
οὗ
( ubi). See the passage, p. 304, A: where the circumflexed is expressed by the word
βαρυτερον
.—This, I confess, much increases my doubt with respect to the word
μεσῳ
in the passage before us. For, had that been Aristotle's term for the circumflex accent, as the common explanation supposes, we probably should have found the expression in some of the passages referred to; at least, in that last mentioned.
I cannot, surely, be misunderstood, as meaning to infer, from these passages, that the flexure itself of the voice upon a single syllable, which was afterwards denominated by Grammarians,
περισπωμενη
, was unknown to Aristotle and the earlier writers. The thing, undoubtedly, has always existed, and must exist, more or less, in every language. But these passages do, I think, afford a pretty strong presumption, that the circumflex had then no appropriated term, and, consequently, that, in this passage, the word
μεσον
has a different, and its usual and proper, meaning; 3 that, in which it is used continually by the writers on Harmonics. 4
But, farther, it appears to be so used by Aristotle himself, in a similar passage of his Rhetoric. In the beginning of the third book, speaking of oratorical action or delivery, (
ὑποκρισις
) as far as it relates to the voice, he says,
ἐσι δε άυτη μεν ἐν τη φωνη, πως αυτη δει χρησθαι προς ἐκασον παθος· διοι, ποτε μεγαλη, και ποτε μικρα, και ποτε μεση· και πως τοις τονοις, διον, ὀξειᾳ, και βαρειᾳ, και ΜΕΣΗ
. Now, even supposing this to relate to accents, it seems, that
μεσῃ
, here, should naturally have the same meaning, with respect to
ὀξειᾳ
, and
βαρειᾳ
, as it has when applied immediately before to
μεγαλῃ
and
μικρᾳ
, where it plainly means the medium between loud and soft.—But I think the passage clearly does not relate to the mere syllabic accent: for he is there professedly speaking of the accommodation of the voice to the expression of different passions; he must therefore mean such variation of tone or pitch, as depends upon the speaker's choice; not that of the accentual acuteness and gravity; for this is always spoken of as a fixed and invariable thing. 5 Aristotle therefore means, I believe, exactly what Cicero has expressed in the following words; and, from the similitude of the expres- sion, it seems probable, that he had this very passage of Aristotle before him, or in his memory. 6
"Nam voces, ut chordæ, sunt intentæ, quæ ad quemque tactum respondeant, acuta, gravis; cita, tarda; magna, parva; quas tamen inter omnes est sua quoque in genere mediocris."
That is, as it seems rightly explained by Dr. Pearce, every one of these differences of voice, high and low, loud and soft, &c. has its medium—
μεσον
.
To this passage of Cicero, I shall add one from Quintilian to the same purpose, and which affords a still clearer commentary upon that in the Rhetoric of Aristotle.
"Utendi voce multiplex ratio. Nam præter illam differentiam quæ est tripartita, acuta, gravis, flexa, tum intentis, tum remissis—tum elatis, tum inferioribus modis, opus est,— spatiis quoque lentioribus aut citatioribus. Sed iis ipsis MEDIA interjacent multa."
7 If the reader compares this with the passage of Aristotle, he will see how exactly it answers to the Greek. Here are three differences of voice corresponding plainly to the three mentioned by Aristotle. The difference of
intentis
and
remissis
(loud and soft) expresses his
μεγαλη και μικρα
; that of,
elatis
,
et inferioribus modis
, (acuter, or graver, tones or pitches,) his
ὀξεια και βαρεια
; and that of
spatiis lentioribus
, &c. (quicker or slower times) his
ῥυθμοις τισι
, &c. And, that Quintilian did not understand, by
ὀξειᾳ
and
βαρειᾳ
, the acute and grave syllabic accent, is clear from his expressly saying, that there are those three differences besides that of the different accents—
"præter illam differentiam,"
&c.—Lastly, the
"media interjacent multa,"
plainly alludes to the
μεση
of Aristotle.
The following passage, from the clear and accurate musical treatise of Euclid , will serve to illustrate, at the same time, both the terms of Aristotle,
τονοις
8 and
μεση
. Enumerating the different accep- tations of the word
τονος
, one of which is
τασις
, tension or pitch, his instance of that sense of the word, is,
ὁ δε, ὡς τασις, τονου λεγεται, καθ' ὁ φαμεν ὀξυτονειν τινα, ἢ βαρυτονειν, ἢ ΜΕΣΩ, ΤΩΙ ΤΗΣ ΦΩΝΗΣ ΤΟΝΩΙ κεχρησθαι
: i. e. a middling pitch of voice. 9
On the whole, then, I see no reason why we should not understand the word
μέσῳ
to be used in the same sense in the passage which is the subject of this note. For though, indeed, Aristotle is there speaking of single letters, and therefore can only mean syllabic accents or tones, yet it is plain, that these accents must have admitted of the distinction of high, low, and intermediate, even in single words, when of more than two syllables; 10 much more, in whole sentences or periods, where what Mr. Foster calls the oratorial accent, (if, indeed, it be compatible with a fixed syllabic accentuation of single words, of which I profess myself not yet convinced,) must necessarily have varied the tone or pitch of the same nominal syllabic accent, from word to word.
But whatever sense of the word
μέσῳ
we adopt, there is a difficulty, in this passage, which I must leave as I find it. The mention of tone or pitch of voice here, seems to me to be strangely misplaced. Accent, or tone, belongs to syllables, not to letters, of which Aristotle is here speaking. The vowels, indeed, may be acute or grave; but as syllables making a part of words, not as letters, separately considered, as they here are. Besides; the other differences mentioned are fixed, essential differences. Of these letters, he says, some are formed in this manner, and others, in that: some are aspirated, and others smooth—some long, others short. But, can it be said, with any propriety, that some are acute, and others grave? Are there vowels that are always acute, as there are vowels that are always long? This seems not more accurate, than it would be to conclude an enumeration of the differences of words, by adding that some are said, and some are sung: or rather, it seems just the same, as if a man, describing the different sorts of bricks that are made, should conclude with telling us, that some are put at the top of a wall, some at bottom, and some in the middle.

170. mvp-aristotle-comment-170

NOTE 170. P. 105.

20.6 A CONJUNCTION IS A SOUND, &c.--The whole of this first definition of the conjunction appears to me to be corrupt beyond all hope of restoration from conjecture. Mr. Harris plainly passes it over as inexplicable, and takes the second definition only. I may well, therefore, be excused for not attempting to translate, what I confess myself totally unable to comprehend.
I do, indeed, understand very well, that a conjunction,
"neither hinders nor constitutes—neither gives nor takes away—the meaning of the sentence in which it stands."
But how this can be regarded as a definition of a conjunction, I do not understand. To define a thing only by what it does not do, (for it is here given as a separate and complete definition,) is hardly reconcileable with Aristotle's logical accuracy. 11 Dacier , in his translation, has obviated this objection, by uniting the two definitions; but without any authority from the text.
I must, again, confess, that what follows, about the situation of the conjunction in different parts of a sentence, has not been made intelligible to me, by any explication I have seen; particularly, the expression,
καθ' αυτον
, which M. Batteux , after Castelvetro , renders,
"by its nature:"
—
"à moins que par elle-même elle ne soit faite pour être au commencement."
But this sense cannot be admitted; nor, I think, any other, than—
"by itself—alone."
This Mr. Winstanley explains by
ἄνευ ἀνταποδοσεως
: but I cannot see how his translation—
"modo eas conjunctiones excipias quæ in initio periodi,
καθ' αυτους
, —ritè stare non possunt,"
&c. accords with Aristotle's words—
ὴν μη άρμοττῃ ἐν ἀρχῃ λογου τίθεναι καθ' αυτον
i. e. "unless they are such as should be placed in the beginning, by themselves." To make these words correspond to Mr. Winstanley's version, another negative seems wanting.

171. mvp-aristotle-comment-171

NOTE 171. P. 105.

20.7 AN ARTICLE MARKS THE BEGINNING OR THE END OF A SENTENCE.The commentators all tell us, that this means the prepositive, and the subjunctive article; but none of them have clearly and fairly shewn us, how the one, because it is placed before a word, marks the beginning of a sentence or discourse, (
ΛΟΓΟΥ ἀρχην
;) or, how the other marks the end of it, because it follows the word to which it belongs. In the very sentence before us, for example,
Αρθρον δε ἐστι φωνη άσημα Ἡ λογου άρχην ἢ τελος, ἢ διορισμον, δηλοι
—in what sense does the subjunctive article,
Ἡ
, mark the end of the sentence—
τελος λογου
?
"L'article subjonctif,"
says Dacier ,
"est celui qui marque la fin du discours: c'est-à-dire, qu'il suit la chose qu'il designe, comme, qui, lequel."
—It is easy to explain things in this manner.
For my part, I see not what is to be made of this, unless we may understand Aristotle to mean only that power of the article, by which, in the Greek language, it distinguishes the subject from the predicate, in certain propositions, and determines the order of construction. See Hermes, II. 1. p. 230. —But, then, this is no other than a species of
διορισμα
, and is, indeed, given by Mr. Harris as one example of the definitive or ascertaining power of the article.
The second definition of the article, (
—φωνη άσημα —— to συντίθεσθαι
) I have omitted. It is the first definition of the conjunction repeated verbatim. It may, indeed, be true of both; but if so, it must inevitably follow, I think, either that the two things must be the same, or, that the words are not truly a definition of either. Yet this passes smoothly with all the commentators I have seen, except Madius and Piccolomini .

172. mvp-aristotle-comment-172

NOTE 172. P. 105.

20.8 FOR EVEN IN DOUBLE WORDS, &C.Compare cap. ii. and iv. of Aristotle's treatise Περι Ερμηνειας . This is rendered by Piccolomini , with his usual accuracy,
"perochè nei nomi doppij [ò ver composti] non usiamo le parti d'essi, secondo che, da per se prese, hanno significatione: come, (per essempio) in questo nome Theodoro, quella parte (doro) non é significante."
12

173. mvp-aristotle-comment-173

NOTE 173. P. 106.

20.9 INDICATION OF TIME IS NOT INCLUDED, &c. —
Ου ΠΡΟΣΣΗΜΑΙΝΕΙ το ποτε
. See Hermes, I. 6, note (d), p. 96 . Aristotle has given a fuller definition of the verb, in the book περι Ἑρμ. cap. iii.

174. mvp-aristotle-comment-174

NOTE 174. P. 106.

20.10 OTHERS RELATE TO ACTION OR PRONUNCIATION —
Ἡ δε, κατα τα ὑποκριτικα
— sc.
σχηματα
: meaning the
σχηματα λεξεως
mentioned just before, cap. xix. with which these modes plainly coincide; for the
πτώσεις ῥηματων
here mentioned are no other than the
Ἐγκλισεις
, modes, or moods, of the Grammarians. — [See Hermes, I. 8, p. 144 , and particularly the notes there.]
Και κατα ποιας ἐγκλισεις, ὡς δη τινες ΠΤΩΣΕΙΣ ΡΗΜΑΤΙΚΑΣ καλεσι.
Dion. Hal. de Struct. &c. Sect. 6. — But he speaks of the term as applied only to the modes; for the tenses,
διαφοραι χρονων
, are immediately after mentioned by him, as not included in that term. But Aristotle, in the περι ἐρμην. expressly mentions the tenses also, as
πτωσεις ῥηματων
. See cap. iii. Sect. 5.

175. mvp-aristotle-comment-175

NOTE 175. P. 106.

20.12 FOR ALL DISCOURSE IS NOT COMPOSED OF VERBS AND NOUNS: THE DEFINITION OF MAN, FOR INSTANCE —
Ου γαρ άπας λογος ἐκ ῥηματων και ὀνοματων συγκειται· διον, ὁ του ἀνθρωπου ὁρισμος· ἀλλ᾽ ἐνδεχεται άνευ ῥηματων είναι λογον.
This is very ambiguously expressed. We are left to make out, as well as we can, whether the "definition of man," is referred to as an instance of a sentence without a verb, or of a sentence with both noun and verb. The construction seems, indeed, to lead more naturally to the latter interpretation. But the other, I think, is more to Aristotle's purpose, (for, an example of a sentence with both noun and verb, it was hardly necessary to produce,) and is confirmed by the following passage in his book περι Ἑρμηνειας :
Αναγκη δε παντα λογον ἀποφαντικον
(every assertive sentence or speech)
ἐκ ῥηματος είναι, ἢ ἐκ πτωσεως ῥηματος· και γαρ ὁ του ἀνθρωπου λογος
(i. e.
ὁρισμος
, definition; for so
λογος
is continually used by Aristotle,)
ἐαν μη το, ἐστιν, ἢ, ην, ἢ, ἐσται, ἢ τι τοιουτον ΠΡΟΣΤΕΘΗι, ουπω λογος ἀποφαντικος
. 13 The definition itself, (the same, probably, to which he alludes in the passage before us,) follows; it is,
ζωον πεζον διπουν
. 14 Now these three words alone constitute the definition, and it is of this only that Aristotle here speaks. In the full, assertive sentence, Anthropos esti zoon pezon dipoun, the two first words are no part of the definition itself, but, as Victorius has well observed, only indicate the thing defined. And accordingly, the philosopher, we see, in the above quotation, considers the verb as superadded to the definition.
However, this sense would be so much more clearly expressed, if the words —
διον, ὁ του ἀνθρωπου ὁρισμος
followed, instead of preceding, the words
ἀλλ' ἐνδεχεται άνευ ῥηματων είναι λογον
, that I should hardly doubt of their being misplaced, if this sort of embarrassment were less frequent than it is in Aristotle's writings. This whole passage receives much illustration from that part of the treatise περι ἐρμ. to which I have referred. 15 A sentence without a verb is what Aristotle calls a significant sentence, but not an assertive sentence, or proposition; i. e. that affirms or denies something, and of which it may be predicated, that it is true, or false. Such only, in that logical work, it was to his purpose to consider; the other, the merely significant sentence, 16 he dismisses, as belonging rather to rhetoric and POETRY.
Οι μεν ουν άλλοι [λογοι], ἀφεισθωσαν· ρητορικης γαρ, ἢ ΠΟΙΗΤΙΚΗΣ, οικειοτερα ἡ σκεψις· ὁ δε ἀποφαντικος της νυν θεωριας.
17

176. mvp-aristotle-comment-176

NOTE 176. P. 106.

20.12 SIGNIFICANT, AS THE WORD CLEON IS, &C.It has been observed, that the sense seemed to require an instance of a sentence with only one significant word; at least, not composed of both verb and noun, as
βαδίζει Κλεων
is. But I rather believe, that Aristotle did not intend this as an instance of such a sentence, but merely as an explanation of the
σημαινει
, and
καθ' άυτα σημαινει τι
, that precede. "It is not," says he, "essential to what I call
λογος
,
oratio
, that it should contain both a noun and a verb, i. e. that it should be a complete proposition: but some significant part it must have; significant, I mean, as a whole word, separately taken, as Cleon is, for example, in the sentence, Cleon walks; not as making a part of a word, like
δωρον
in the compound name
Θεοδωρος
, which has, indeed, a meaning, but not
καθ' αυτο κεχωρισμενον
— by itself as a word in the sentence."
That this is the meaning, seems probable from the chapter in which
λογος
is defined in the book περι Ερμηνειας . For there, as soon as he has given the definition, (
Λογου δε ἐσι φωνη σημαντικη ἧς των μερων τι σημαντικον ἐσι ΚΕΧΩΡΙΣΜΕΝΟΝ
,) he immediately proceeds to explain the expressions; declaring what fort of significant part he means. "Significant," he says, "as the word
ανθρωπος
is; that is,
κεχωρισμενον
, by itself; not as, syn-anthropos is, or uk esti, which signify as assertive sentences, nor yet, as a syllable, or part of a simple word, (like
υς
in
μυς
,) or, even as a word making part of a compound word." 18 Now, what Aristotle there expresses fully, he meant, I think, to say, more briefly, in the words,
ΜΕΡΟΣ μεντοι άει τι σημαινον ἐξει· διον ἐν τῷ, Βαδίζει Κλεων, ὁ Κλεων.

177. mvp-aristotle-comment-177

NOTE 177. P. 107.

20.13 A DISCOURSE MAY BE ONE, IN TWO SENSES, &C.Compare, περι Ερμην. cap. v. p. 38. — Analyt. Post. lib. ii. cap. 10. p. 169, E. Metaphys. VII. 4. p. 910, D. (where he uses
τῳ συνεχει
, as equivalent to
συνδεσμῳ
) and VIII. 6, p. 931, C.

Commentary on the Poetics (Henry James Pye, 1792) (OCR draft) (Henry James Pye's 1792 English commentary, aligned to the Kassel reference edition.) focus

20.3. mvp-aristotle-comment-83 20.7

AN ARTICLE IS AN UNMEANING SOUND WHICH MARKS THE BEGINNING, THE END, OR SOME PARTICULAR DISTINCTION OF A SENTENCE.

HOW an article can be said to mark the end of a fentence, is I own beyond my comprehenfion. By the distinction of a sentence I imagine Aristotle means such words or phrafes as are diftinguished by an article, and by that distinction feparated from the rest of the difscourse, and in fact made substantives; as when we say, the conjunction AND,' ' the article THE.' In this power 'the Latin, for want of an article, is greatly deficient; and the critical writers in that language are sometimes obliged to have recourse to the Greek article; as for inftance Goulston, in his paraphrase of a sentence in this treatise, uses rò prius, and τὸ pofterius. By means of the article in English a whole sentence is frequently made a substantive, as sometimes also a single gerund is. I say sometimes; as what Dr. Lowth has observed in his grammar, (p. 140) on the gerund being always a substantive when the article THE is prefixed to it, and requiring to be followed by the genitive cafe, I can by no means affent to. In some instances it certainly is so, but in nine out of
POETIC OF ARISTOTLE. of ten, when the article is prefixed, it is because the whole sentence, and not the gerund only, is the substantive. For instance, in the example in Lilly's Grammar of a fentence being the nominative case to a verb.
Ingenuas didiciffe fideliter artes • Emollit mores, nec finit esse feros.' If we translate as we may [L], • The having learned the liberal arts,' furely were we to alter the tense of the infinitive from the preterite to the present, we should retain the same general sense and say, 'The learning ' the liberal arts,' not • The learning of the liberal arts.' The gerund seems never to be properly a substantive but when the noun that it governs would be its nominative case if it continued a verb. To explain myself more clearly, were I to say, suppose speaking of a court of justice, such a thing happened before the swearing the evidence, meaning previous to the clerk of the court's adminiftering the oath, SWEARING is a gerund governing EVIDENCE, and THE makes a fubstantive of the whole sentence. But were I to say, before the swearing of the evidence,' I should conceive EVIDENCE as the governing cafe of the verb, which would not then be transative but neuter, and express the act of the evidence and not of the officer of the court, and in this case it would indeed be a substantive. In such expreffions as • the crowing of a cock,'' the neighing of a • horse,' the gerunds are compleatly changed into substantives, and as such will admit a plural. [L] There is no doubt but in this as in several other of the instances, the article may be more elegantly omitted, but it is equally clear that it may also be prefixed, and in some cafes - must be prefixed, which is quite sufficient for the purpose. • Steed
• Steed answers steed in high and boastful neighings.' Or the English genitive, as a horse's neighing. But whether I say ' eating bread,' or 'the eating of bread,' ' EATING' will neither admit the plural, nor the English genitive. The flying a kite' is the diversion of a boy or the experiment of an electrician. • The flying of a kite' is the motion of the machine, or the action of the bird from which it is named. • The carving a door' is the act of the artist; ' the carving of a door' the object of that act compleated. Another proof that the word still continues a gerund without assuming any of the characters of a substantive is the necessity of its being followed by an infinitive, and its incapacity to govern another gerund. We cannot say' the defiring of feeing' as we might the ' defire of feeing, we must say ' the defiring to see.' That the fentence and not the gerund is to be confidered as the fubstantive, will be further proved from instances where the gerund is preceded by a noun in the English genitive case, or a pronoun possessive, which equally with the article mark one or other of them to be a fubftantive. • Peter's denying Christ, would any correct writer say' of • Chrift?' • My reading a passage of Ariftotle;' Would you say' of a passage of Ariftotle ?" if you do you change the sense. Reading will indeed be a substantive, but will fignify some alteration affecting the fenfe, and not the pronunciation of the words.. Dr. Lowth mentions the use of CONTINUAL and CONTINUALLY, the adjective and adverb as a criterion in this cafe. By that criterion. I am
POETIC OF ARISTOTLE. am content that my hypothefis shall be tried. If the gerund can poffibly be connected with an adjective, I give up my cause. • He is continu- ، ally teaching Paul.' Is 'the continually teaching Paul laudable ?' Here the article is necessarily prefixed in the last member of the sentence; but it is said if THE is prefixed of must follow. Then must we fay • the continually teaching of Paul?' If we do the sense is entirely changed; of ceases to be a fign of the genitive case, and becomes a prepofition, and would be rendered in Latin by ' de Paulo,' concerning, about Paul. If the adverb CONTINUALLY is made an adjective, and we say' the continual teaching of Paul,' TEACHING will undoubtedly be a substantive, but Paul will be the teacher. Instead of • the soundly beating a man,' could we say the found beating of a • man? Or to take Dr. Lowth's own example, instead of by well • observing which,' could we say, ' by the good observing of which ?' for directly gaining wisdom,' could we say, • the direct gaining of • wisdom?' for ' easily supplying our wants,'' the easy supplying of our wants?' for ' quietly enjoying,'' the quiet enjoying?' It must be observed this is marked most strongly when WELL and Good are the examples, as in other cafes the adjective and adverb are sometimes confounded by incorrect speakers. I must however allow that the gerund, confidered merely as such, may sometimes be followed by a genitive case on the authority of the Latin, whose grammar in doubtful cases is generally allowed to be decifive as to our own. For example: ‘Aliquid fuit principium generandi ← animalium.' VARRO. • Fuit exemplorum legendi potestas.' CICERO. • Vestri adhortdi causa.' TACITUS. !.. • Generandi gloria mellis.' VIRGIL. NOTE

20.4. mvp-aristotle-comment-84 20.8

IN NAMES COMPOSED OF TWO WORDS WE NEVER CONCEIVE EITHER OF THE PARTS TAKEN SEPARATELY TO HAVE ANY MEANING.

THE same observation is just as to common nouns or names of things as well as persons if they are either of foreign or obsolete derivation [M]. And fometimes even if the words are compounded of terms in general use. This is well illustrated in Mr. Jackson's Letters. ، Perhaps,' (he says)' it may be imagined that those words which carry their fignification with them should be most expreffive, whether long or short; that is when they are compounded of known words which express that fignification. But this is not so; when we say " adieu," " farewell," we mean no more than a ceremony at parting. No one < confiders " adieu" as a recommendation to God, or "farewell" as a wish for happiness. Frequent use destroys all idea of derivation; • but if we speak a compound or self-fignificant word that is not common, we perceive the derivation of it. Thus if a Londoner says " butter-milk," he has an idea of something composed of " butter" " and " milk," but to an Irishman or Hollander it is as fimple an idea. as either of the words taken separately is to us.' LETTER III. [M] See for example what is said of Curfew, Note IV. Chap. XIV. NOTE

20.5. mvp-aristotle-comment-85 20.9

A CASE IS INCIDENT BOTH TO THE NOUN AND THE VERB.

AS much of the elegance and peculiarity of speech depends on the inflection of verbs, and as most languages in this respect deviate at times from what may be called the rules of universal grammar, I shall venture briefly to mention a few cursory observations that I have made on this point in the course of my reading. Dr. Lowth has mentioned the confufion frequently made even by good writers, of the participle and preterite of such verbs as form the participle in En, as 'wrote,' ' written,' ' rode,' ' ridden;' which has indeed been more carefully avoided, even in conversation by those who are tolerably accurate, since his admonition. But he has either overlooked, or neglected to mention the distinction custom has made as to the impropriety of using the preterite for the participle, in the different circumstance of its being connected with the auxiliary verb ' to have,' ' to be,' or being connected with a substantive as a verbal adjective. 'It is wrote' seems to convey a more ungrammatical found to the ear than ' I have ' wrote;' but no person whatever would say, ' wrote language' for • written language.' This appears even in cafes where the proper participle, as used with the auxiliary verbs, is nearly obsolete. It might favour a little of pedantry to say, in common conversation, ' I have beaten him,' ' I have • eaten it; but we always say 'weather-beaten,'' moth-eaten.' 3 G The
The two auxiliary verbs, ' shall' and 'will, which constitute the future tense in English, are perpetually confounded not only by foreigners, but by the Scotch and Irish. The proper fimple future is this, ' I shall,' 'Thou wilt,' or 'You will,' 'He will,' 'We shall,' 'You, or Ye ' will,'' They will.' Were I to say ' I will go,' or • You shall go,' it is no longer the simple future, but speaks determination in one instance, and command or compulfion in the other. What a difference between these expreffions, • I shall not succeed in this but you will,' and I will not fucceed in this but you shall.' The last part is nonsense, fince the verb 'fucceed' being accidental requires only the simple future; but for 'fucceed,' substitute ' attempt,' which is in the power of the agent, the fimple future will be the fame; but change the signs, say ' I will not attempt this, you shall ; and determination on one part, and command on the other are clearly expressed. On this principle it is that our neighbours often raise a laugh at their own expence, by telling us they will break their necks, and that their friends shall win a rubber at whift. It feems very wonderful that two languages so very different, and in all apparent circumstances fo entirely unconnected as the English and modern Greek, should unite in the fingular circumstance of using the verb ' I will' for a fign of the future tenfe, the latter ufing θέλω for this purpose. A fanciful writer might perhaps be tempted to impute this corruption of the Greek tongue to the conversation of the Barangi, a body of English guards, to whom the particular defence of the Grecian Emperor's person was entrusted, and who preferved the use of their native language to the last age of the empire [o]. [o] See a quotation from Codinus in Note 48, on Chap. LV. of Mr. Gibbon's History. Πολυχρονιζᾶσι ὁι Βάραγγοι καλὰ τῶν παλρίον γλῶσσαν ἀνθῶν, ἡτὸι Ιγκληνισὶ. There
POETIC OF ARISTOTLE. There is a distinction in the passive voice of the ancient languages to which all the modern ones I have any knowledge of are strangers, I mean the perfect and imperfect present, AMATUS SUM and AMOR. This is observed by the later editor of Lilly's grammar; but AMO being the example it is not so clear, it not being very easy in that verb to mark the distinction, though by accurate investigation it may be traced. AMOR means simply, that at the present time I am beloved; AMATUS SUM has in this verb a kind of retrospect. It is the word Prior's Henry would have used to express his situation. • When industry and time, (the mighty two • That bring our wishes nearer to our view,) • Made him perceive that the inclining fair • Received his vows with no reluctant ear.'- The distinction is more obvious in DOCEOR, which means ' I am now learning,' or ' in the act of being taught; whereas DOCTUS SUM fignifies the completion of my purpose, ' I am instructed.' The same advantage that the Latin has over the English in the passive, the English in its turn has over the Latin in the active voice, from using the auxiliary, 'I am,' with the participle, ' I think, I am thinking.' In verbs deponent in Latin, the active voice has also the same advantage and from the same cause. There is an anomaly in the Italian verb substantive exactly resembling the Latin deponent. It is conjugated by itself, assuming, as an auxiliary, the power of TO HAVE, SONO STATO, 'I have been.' The cause appears to be this. The Latin verb sum having nothing like the 3G 2 paffive
paffive participle, its derivative the Italian borrowed one for the verb STARE; and SONO STATO literally means ' I AM PLACED.' There is a remarkable nicety in Spanish between SER and ESTAR, the first always fignifying only fimple essence; as for instance, SER QUATRO LUGARES DI LONDRA, would not signify being four leagues distant from London; but being actually the four leagues, the proper verb here iS ESTAR. In fome languages, the Hebrew for instance, the genders of the perfons are fignified by the termination of the verb itself. At first sight this may appear an advantage, but in fact it is a defect, for it often enforces difcrimination where difcrimination cannot be really made. What happens from this to the Hebrew in all its persons, happens to the French, Italian, and Spanish in the third person of both numbers, from the use of the pronoun. Here Greek and Latin have manifeftly the advantage, as where discrimination is necessary they can employ the pronoun or nominative cafe, or otherwise, omit them. In the fingular pronoun the English is in the fame cafe with the other modern languages; and we feel an inconvenience when we wish to mention a circumstance relating to a person, whose sex we either do not know or wish to conceal; and we must either use a periphrafis, or have recourse to the colloquial barbarism of substituting the third person plural, ' They.' CHAP.

Commentarius in Aristotelis Poeticam (Franciscus Ritter, 1839) (OCR draft) (Ritter's Latin commentary, extracted from the 1839 volume, divided by Ritter's chapters and sections, and linked to the corresponding Perseus reference subsections.) focus

4. mvp-aristotle-comment-138

Ritter, cap. 20 § 4

ταῦτα δὲ διαφέρει σχήμασί τε τοῦ στόματος καὶ τόποις: σχήματα τοῦ στόματος sunt varii habitus in quos formatur os nostrum dum litteras proferimus, τόποι sunt oris loci unde litterae inter pronuntiandum praecipue afficiuntur, dentes et lingua et labia et guttur. καὶ δασύτητι καὶ ψιλότητι: prout spiritu aspero aut leni ( δασείᾳ et ψιλῇ) enuntiantur. ἔτι δὲ ὀξύτητι καὶ βαρύτητι καὶ τῷ μέσῳ: accentum acutum designat ὀξύτης, gravem βαρύτης, circumflexum ex acuto gravique compositum ideoque media natura praeditum τὸ μέσον. – περὶ ὧν καθ' ἕκαστον ἐν τοῖς μετρικοῖς προσήκει θεω - ρεῖν: homo perdiligens et accuratus paulo post monet similiter ἀλλὰ καὶ τούτων θεωρῆσαι τὰς διαφορὰς τῆς μετρικῆς ἐστίν. prodere haec videntur grammaticum Alexandrinum : Aristotelis aevo doctrina metrica a grammatica nondum seiuncta et nondum tamquam propria et peculiaris disciplina constituta videtur fuisse. videant alii. interpolator ubique τέχνας suas crepat. vid. Comment. ad c. 25, 5.

5. mvp-aristotle-comment-139

Ritter, cap. 20 § 5

καὶ γὰρ τὸ ΓΡ ἄνευ τοῦ Α συλλαβή: inauditum hoc est et falsum. nimirum vir sapiens qui haec scripsit suis se laqueis irretivit: nam cum posuisset syllabam constare ex ἀφώνου καὶ φωνὴν ἔχοντος (non καὶ φωνήεντος), inde falsum hoc consequitur, syllabam esse FP, cum Put ἡμίφωνον habere vocem ( ἔχειν φωνήν) negari nequeat. ex his mihi se prodit grammaticus et mediocris et argutiarum studiosus. eiusdem studii specimina magis manifesta in subsequentibus producemus.

6. mvp-aristotle-comment-140

Ritter, cap. 20 § 6

σύνδεσμος δ' ἐστὶ φωνὴ ἄσημος-πεφυ κυῖαν συντίθεσθαι: quae hac §. comprehendimus, in iis tria interpretibus et editoribus mira et offensioni obnoxia visa sunt, primum huius definitionis forma et ingenium, tum quod continuo alia subsequitur definitio, quasi scriptor suae definiendi arti parum ipse crediderit, deinde quod alteradefinitio priori prorsus contraria videtur. quae incommoda dum tollere aut allevare conantur, audacibus fere coniecturis indulgent, quibus loci recte pertractandi fundamenta subtrahuntur. ego quae tradita sunt explicare in hunc modum adgredior. auctor falsus alicubi legerat σύνδεσμον esse vocem ἄσημον, h. e. quae neque quod est ut nomen, neque quod fit ut verbum, significet. iam ille nomini συνδέσμῳ conchae instar adhaerescens sapientiam suam profert. scilicet quamquam est σύνδεσμος, tamen neque facit neque impedit vocem unam significativam, quae ut ex pluribus vocibus componatur natura sua inclinat: quid enim συνδέσμῳ opus est ad vocem ex pluribus componendam, si sua sponte coalescere potest ( ἐκ πλειόνων πεφυκυῖα συντίθεσθαι)? adhuc nonnisi duae negantes notionis συνδέσμου notae prolatae sunt; quae praeterea accedunt, de collocatione convinctionum nonnulla monent plane inutilia : καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄκρων καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ μέσου, h. e. convinctiones alias in extremitatibus (in principio aut fine enuntiatorum) comparere, alias in medio, si non conveniat in principio solas ponere. earum convinctionum quas in principio enuntiati ponere nudas non conveniat affert tres, μέν, ἤτοι, δή. particula ἤτοι non pro asseverante sed pro disiungente (aut) accipi debet: nam eo intellectu inchoari ab ea pronuntiatum nequit. pessima sane definitio, quae non declarat quid sit σύνδεσμος, sed potius quid non sit enarrat. sed nondum quiescit: immo σοφιστικῶς aliam συνδέσμου ponit definitionem quae priori contraria videtur esse, sed re vera non est. nam si voces una plures assunt, quarum quaevis per se significativa est, ut θεὸς καὶ δῶρον, convinctionis ea vis est, ut ex diversis totum quoddam efficiat. hoc est illud φωνὴ ἄσημος ἐκ πλειόνων μὲν φωνῶν μιᾶς, σημαντικῶν δέ, ποιεῖν πεφυκυῖα μίαν σημαντικὴν φωνήν. utramque definitionem (ita liceat appellare) exemplo planam faciam. in enuntiato παρὰ Θεόδωρον βαδίζω convinctio παρὰ (praepositiones enim συνδέσμοις comprehenduntur) neque facit neque impedit vocem unam significativam ( Θεόδωρον), ex pluribus vocibus (ex voce θεὸς et δῶρον) aptam componi, ac posita est in enuntiati principio. sed in enuntiato θεὸς ἢ θεοῦ δῶρόν ἐστι convinctio ἢ ex pluribus vocibus quae per se significant totum quoddam efficit et posita est in medio. hoc totum quoddam interpolator argute disputans et obscura captans dixit μίαν σημαντικὴν φωνήν. haec quae probabiliter proposui (nam certi quid in eiusmodi locis vix afferre possumus), si vere exро- sita sunt, frigidum habemus verborum lusum semidocto nugatore utique dignum, nihil amplius. Unum etiamnum monendum videtur, ab Aristotele omnem praeter nomina et verba linguae materiem voce συνδέσμου (convinctionis) comprehensam fuisse, adverbia et articulos et praepositiones et coniunctiones et interiectiones: idem factum est a personato, nisi quod is quartam orationis partem articulum Stoicos secutus constituit. frustra, ut mihi quidem videtur, sanam sententiam huic loco conciliare viri et ingeniosi et docti tentaverunt, verborum contextum immutando, supplendo, transponendo. lege prae ceteris quae conatus est Hermannus in suis ad h. 1. Commentariis et post cum Classenus de Grammaticae Gr. primordiis p. 57. ego hanc normam tenendam putavi, ut ab immutandis vocabulis et transponendis religiose abstineam, et haec esse hominis in grammaticis caecutientis declarem.

7. mvp-aristotle-comment-141

Ritter, cap. 20 § 7

ἄρθρον δ' ἐστὶ φωνὴ ἄσημος-διορισμὸν δηλοῖ: quod articulus orationis sive enuntiati initium designare dicitur, hoc intelligi videtur, multa enuntiata ab articulo inchoari: quomodo idem τέλος indicet ego non expedio. exempla τὸ φημί et τὸ περί solam postremam articuli vim, ubi distinctionem denotat, respiciunt. sed ut quod deest virtuti definitionis, numero compensetur, iam altera articuli explicatio succedit, ἢ φωνὴ ἄσημος, ἢ οὔτε κωλύει οὔτε ποιεῖ φωνὴν μίαν σημαντικὴν ἐκ πλειόνων φωνῶν, πεφυκυῖα τίθεσθαι καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄκρων καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ μέσου. quae συνδέσμου definitio modo posita erat, eadem paucis omissis paucisque mutatis iam pro altera articuli definitione venditatur. num mirum hoc est? mihi secus videtur: nam quipaulo ante duas convinctionis definitiones non veras attulit, cur idem articuli duas non minus ineptas non producat? at haec nimium similis est illi convinctionis definitioni. est sane et esse potest. nam quemadmodum σύνδεσμος est (sic ille fere cogitavit) id quod convincit, ita ἄρθρον est quod iungit ( ἄρει) 1). quapropter indicare voluit quatenus vox illa non iungat, ne quis nomine ἄρθρον decipi se pateretur.

8. mvp-aristotle-comment-142

Ritter, cap. 20 § 8

ὄνομα δ᾽ ἐστὶ φωνὴ συνθετή - καθ' αὑτὸ σημαντικόν: haec omnia non bene repetita sunt ex libro Aristotelis de Interpretatione c. 2., ubi legimus ὄνομα μὲν οὖν φωνὴ σημαντική κατὰ συνθήκην ἄνευ χρόνου, ἧς μηδὲν μέρος ἐστὶ σημαντικόν κεχωρισμένον. pro κατὰ συνθήκην (ex consensu, ex instituto) falsus Aristoteles dedit συθετήν, h. e. componendam, vocem ambiguam atque eo magis ambiguam, quod eandem in syllabae definitione posuit §. 5. οἷον ἐν τῷ Θεοδώρῳ τὸ δῶρον οὐ σημαίνει: debuit οἷον ἐν τῷ Θεόδωρος τὸ δῶρος οὐ σημαίνει. male imitatus est verum Aristolelem qui scribit de Interp. c. 2. ἐν γὰρ τῷ Κάλλιππος τὸ ἵππος οὐδὲν αὐτὸ καθ' ἑαυτὸ σημαίνει.

9. mvp-aristotle-comment-143

Ritter, cap. 20 § 9

ῥῆμα δὲ φωνὴ συνθετή, σημαντική μετὰ χρόνου: melius verus Aristoteles de Interpr. c. 3. ῥῆμα δὲ ἐστι τὸ προσσημαῖνον χρόνον, οὗ μέρος οὐδὲν σημαίνει χωρίς, καὶ ἔστιν ἀεὶ τῶν καθ' ἑτέρου λεγομένων σημεῖον. exempla quae definitionem sequuntur hominem male sedulum lectoribusque non multum tribuentem produnt.

10. mvp-aristotle-comment-144

Ritter, cap. 20 § 10

πτῶσις - εἴδη ἐστίν: πτῶσιν (casum) Graeci tam nominum quam verborum terminationum affectiones appellant. vid. Aristotel. de Interpr. c. 2 et 3. Latini quoque varias verborum positiones casuum nomine interdum denotaverunt. statim in illis ἡ μὲν τὸ κατὰ τὸ τούτου alterum τὸ accepi a Robortello sustentandae structurae plane necessarium. 1) Ego non is sum qui illam nominis ἄρθρον explicandi rationem veram esse contendam, immo ἄρθρον passivo intellectu dictum existimo.

11. mvp-aristotle-comment-145

Ritter, cap. 20 § 11

λόγος δὲ φωνὴ συνθετὴ σημαντική, ἧς ἔνια μέρη καθ' αὑτὰ σημαίνει τι: exprimere voluit locum ex libro de Interpretatione c. 4. λόγος δὲ ἐστι φωνὴ σημαντική κατὰ συνθήκην, ἧς τῶν μερῶν τι σημαντικὸν κεχωρισμένον. sed male admisit συνθετή pro κατὰ συνθήκην, male quoque ἧς ἔνια μέρη pro ἧς τῶν μερῶν τι κεχωρισμένον, quae sequuntur οὐ γὰρ ἅπας λόγος ἐκ ῥημάτων καὶ ὀνομάτων σύγκειται, οἷον ὁ ἀνθρώπου ὁρισμός, haec saltem hoc loco supervacanea sunt. λόγον Aristoteles dixit non modo enuntiatum (Satz) sed etiam quamcumque significantium vocum copulationem, v. c. ζῷον ἄπτερον, ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός. interpolator quaerenti τί ἄνθρωπος respondentem aliquem cogitat ζῷον πεζὸν δίπουν 2), non ζῷον πεζὸν δίπουν ἐστίν, qui est λόγος ἀποφαντικός. vid. de Interpr. ἀνάγκη δὲ πάντα λόγον ἀποφαντικὸν ἐκ ῥήματος εἶναι ἢ πτώσεως ῥήματος· καὶ * γὰρ ὁ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου λόγος, ἐὰν μὴ τὸ ἔστιν ἢ ἦν ἢ ἔσται ἤ τι τοιοῦτον προσθετῇ, οὔπω λόγος ἀποφαντικός. sed plane absurda et falsa quae post haec allata legimus, μέρος μέντοι ἀεί τι σημαῖνον ἕξει ( ὁ λόγος), οἷον ἐν τῷ “ βαδίζει Κλέων” ὁ Κλέων. hic homo Aristotelis sententiam in libro de Interpretatione propositam adeo non intellexit, ut βαδίζει pro voce non significante habuerit.

12. mvp-aristotle-comment-146

Ritter, cap. 20 § 12

εἷς δ᾽ ἐστὶ λόγος διχῶς- τῷ ἓν σημαί νειν: imitatus est sed non intellexit illa de Interpr. ἔστι δὲ εἷς λόγος ἀποφαντικὸς ἢ ὁ ἓν δηλῶν ἢ ὁ συνδέσμῳ εἷς 3). λόγος ὁ ἓν δηλῶν v. gr. est “ ζῷον πεζὸν δίπουν," quippe qui pluribus verbis unum quid (hominem) denotet. λόγος συνδέσμῳ εἷς est “ εἰ ὁ θεὸς ἀγαθός, ἀἴδιον τὸ πᾶν.” vid. quae Ammonius ad 1. c. copiose disputavit in Scholiis in Aristotelem I. p. 110 a 31 - 111 a 9. ed. Brandis. falsus Aristoteles τὸν λόγον qui est oratio vel enuntiatum commutavit cum τῷ λόγῳ qui est notio, quasi adhuc de notionibus locu- 2) Conf. de Interpr. c. 5. Metaphys. Z. 12 init. 3) Codices in Poeticae loco συνδέσμων exhibent, quod librarii vitio irrepsisse pro συνδέσμῳ liquet.tus esset. itaque pro notione multa in unum comprehendente nomen collectivum Ἰλιάδα posuit. - sapienti sat. qui haec partim perobscura partim falsa partim absurda et inutilia Aristoteli, acutissimo homini prudentissimoque harum rerum arbitro tribuere potest, is suo iudicio fruatur: ego non potui.