166.
mvp-aristotle-comment-166
NOTE 166. P. 104.
20.1
TO ALL DICTION BELONG, &c.See
Diss. I. p. 37.
—After having discussed three of the constituent parts of Tragedy, the fable, the manners, and the sentiments, Aristotle now comes to the diction (
Λεξις
), upon which he bestows three chapters. His subject plainly required him to speak of the
diction of Tragedy, not of poetic diction in general; much less, to descend to the grammatical elements of language in general. Yet, of his three chapters on diction, the first is merely grammatical, and such, as even in a rhetorical treatise would appear misplaced; and even the two following chapters relate to poetic language in general, without any thing applicable to the diction of Tragedy in particular—his proper subject—except a single observation, or, rather, hint, at the end of the third chapter.
1
Dacier
, who discharged, with as much fidelity as any commentator ever did, the duty of seeing nothing amiss in his author, has zealously defended the propriety of this grammatical chapter: but all he says amounts, I think, to little more than this—that the chapter should be there, because it is there.
2
No man is nice about reasons, when the point to be proved has been determined before he looks for them.
167.
mvp-aristotle-comment-167
NOTE 167. P. 104.
20.1
DISCOURSE OR SPEECH—.
ΛΟΓΟΣ
.—
Mr. Harris, in the Hermes, p. 19
, has rendered the word,
sentence. He took that part of the idea, that suited his subject; but, that this is not the whole sense of the word, but only a sense included in the word, is evident from what is said below, in the definition of
λογος
, where the entire Iliad is comprehended under that term. Had I here rendered
λογος
by
sentence, I must, to have been consistent in my translation, have there called the Iliad a sentence.
The word
λογος
here plainly answers—not to
sentence, exclusively, nor yet, exclusively, to what Mr. Harris calls
"Oration or Discourse,"
as composed of several sentences; but, it is a general term, comprehending both these, and applicable, like the Latin word
oratio
, or the English,
speech, to every significant combination of words, whether consisting of a single sentence, or of many; as, indeed, appears from Aristotle's definition itself. Nay, the word appears not even to have been limited to a complete assertive sentence; for the philosopher, in the treatise
περι Ἑρμηνειας
, gives the denomination of
λογος
to these two words—
καλος ίππος
. He says,
ἐν ΤΩ ΛΟΓΩ
, (
in hac oratione
,)
καλος ίππος
. It was what he calls a merely significant
λογος
, as distinguished from an assertive
λογος
, or proposition, such as,
καλΟΣ ΕΣΤΙΝ ίππος
.
I was unable to find any English word, that would express
λογος
adequately, and clearly. And it seems somewhat remarkable, that the Greek language, rich and copious as it is, should not afford—at least I am not aware that it does—any single word perfectly synonymous to our word,
sentence.
Λογος
, as I have observed, is too wide; it serves equally to express a single sentence, or a whole speech, or even less than a sentence. It is applied by Aristotle to a combination of two words—a substantive and an adjective, without a verb—and, to the Iliad.
Περιοδος
was only one particular kind, or form, of sentence.
3
Κωλον
did not necessarily contain a complete sense, or thought, which is essential to our word, sentence.
4
168.
mvp-aristotle-comment-168
NOTE 168. P. 105.
20.4
IN DIFFERENT PARTS OF THE MOUTH.
Τοποις
.—Clearly right; nor can I conceive, what should have induced any critic to suspect this reading. See
Dionys. Halicarn. Sect. 14
. his curious and accurate analysis of articulation: and
Aristides Quintil. p. 89, ed. Meib.
—where, in describing the formation of the letters, these expressions occur:—
ἐκ των περι τους όδοντας ΤΟΠΩΝ
—and,
ἐκ μεσου του φωνητικου ΤΟΠΟΥ
. See, also,
Hermes, III. 2, p. 322.
—
ΤΟΝΟΙΣ
, which had occurred to Mr. Winstanley,
5
would be mere tautology; for that idea is fully expressed afterwards, by
ὀξυτητι και βαρύτητι
. Thus,
Rhet. III. 1.
τοις ΤΟΝΟΙΣ, ΟΙΟΝ ὀξεια και βαρεια, και μεση
.
169.
mvp-aristotle-comment-169
NOTE 169. P. 105.
20.4
AS THEIR TONE IS ACUTE, GRAVE, OR INTER-MEDIATE.
Οξύτητι, βαρύτητι, και τω μεσω
.—All the commentators seem agreed, that by
τῷ μέσῳ
is meant the circumflex. Mr. Foster, in his
Essay on Accent, &c. expresses some degree of doubt about this
; and, I confess, it appears to me to be somewhat more than doubtful. Certainly, the only obvious and proper sense of the word mean, or middle, thus applied to the pitch of sound, is, that which is between
ὀξυ
and
βαρυ
; not, that which is compounded of the two, as the circumflex is always represented to be. At least the expression, in this latter sense, would not be very accurate and philosophical. A circumflexed syllable is described to be, a syllable that has both
an acute and a grave accent;—
ἀμφοτερας τας τασεις
, as it is expressed by
Dion. Halicarn. Sect. 11.
The voice first rises, and then falls, on the same syllable. A man would be thought to speak very strangely, who should describe any object painted half white and half black, by saying, that it was of a colour between black and white.
But, farther, I observe, that in other passages of Aristotle's works, where he speaks of accents, the word
μεσον
no where occurs. Indeed, he uses neither this, nor any other word, to denote the circumflex accent. He mentions only
ὀξυ
, and
βαρύ
, acute, and grave. See
De Soph. Elench. p. 284, C.
—
288, A.
—
304, A.
—
306, A. ed. Duval.
In the last of these passages especially, his expression is remarkable:
ἐι παρα προσῳδιαν όξειαν, Ἡ ΒΑΡΕΙΑ προσωδια λυσις· ἐι δε παρα βαρειαν, Ἡ ΟΞΕΙΑ
. That is—"If the sophism supposes the acute accent, the answer is—it is the grave accent; and vice versa."
6
Here are no traces of the triple division of accents, given by later writers, into acute, grave, and circumflex. Nay more; he speaks in the same way, even when the very ambiguity in question lies between an acute, and a circumflex, accent; as
οὐ
, (
non,) and
οὗ
(
ubi). See the passage, p. 304, A: where the circumflexed is expressed by the word
βαρυτερον
.—This, I confess, much increases my doubt with respect to the word
μεσῳ
in the passage before us. For, had that been Aristotle's term for the circumflex accent, as the common explanation supposes, we probably should have found the expression in some of the passages referred to; at least, in that last mentioned.
I cannot, surely, be misunderstood, as meaning to infer, from these passages, that the flexure itself of the voice upon a single syllable, which was afterwards denominated by Grammarians,
περισπωμενη
, was unknown to Aristotle and the earlier writers. The thing, undoubtedly, has always existed, and must exist, more
or less, in every language. But these passages do, I think, afford a pretty strong presumption, that the circumflex had then no appropriated term, and, consequently, that, in this passage, the word
μεσον
has a different, and its usual and proper, meaning;
7
that, in which it is used continually by the writers on Harmonics.
8
But, farther, it appears to be so used by Aristotle himself, in a similar passage of his Rhetoric. In the beginning of the third book, speaking of oratorical action or delivery, (
ὑποκρισις
) as far as it relates to the voice, he says,
ἐσι δε άυτη μεν ἐν τη φωνη, πως αυτη δει χρησθαι προς ἐκασον παθος· διοι, ποτε μεγαλη, και ποτε μικρα, και ποτε μεση· και πως τοις τονοις, διον, ὀξειᾳ, και βαρειᾳ, και ΜΕΣΗ
. Now, even supposing this to relate to accents, it seems, that
μεσῃ
, here, should naturally have the same meaning, with respect to
ὀξειᾳ
, and
βαρειᾳ
, as it has when applied immediately before to
μεγαλῃ
and
μικρᾳ
, where it plainly means the medium between loud and soft.—But I think the passage clearly does not relate to the mere syllabic accent: for he is there professedly speaking of the accommodation of the voice to the expression of different passions; he must therefore mean such variation of tone or pitch, as depends upon the speaker's choice; not that of the accentual acuteness and gravity; for this is always spoken of as a fixed and invariable thing.
9
Aristotle therefore means, I believe, exactly what
Cicero
has expressed in the following words; and, from the similitude of the expres-
sion, it seems probable, that he had this very passage of Aristotle before him, or in his memory.
10
"Nam voces, ut chordæ, sunt intentæ, quæ ad quemque tactum respondeant, acuta, gravis; cita, tarda; magna, parva; quas tamen inter omnes est sua quoque in genere mediocris."
That is, as it seems rightly explained by Dr. Pearce, every one of these differences of voice, high and low, loud and soft, &c. has its medium—
μεσον
.
To this passage of Cicero, I shall add one from
Quintilian
to the same purpose, and which affords a still clearer commentary upon that in the Rhetoric of Aristotle.
"Utendi voce multiplex ratio. Nam præter illam differentiam quæ est tripartita, acuta, gravis, flexa, tum intentis, tum remissis—tum elatis, tum inferioribus modis, opus est,— spatiis quoque lentioribus aut citatioribus. Sed iis ipsis MEDIA interjacent multa."
11
If the reader compares this with the passage of Aristotle, he will see how exactly it answers to the Greek. Here are three differences of voice corresponding plainly to the three mentioned by Aristotle. The difference of
intentis
and
remissis
(loud and soft) expresses his
μεγαλη και μικρα
; that of,
elatis
,
et inferioribus modis
, (acuter, or graver, tones or pitches,) his
ὀξεια και βαρεια
; and that of
spatiis lentioribus
, &c. (quicker or slower times) his
ῥυθμοις τισι
, &c. And, that Quintilian did not understand, by
ὀξειᾳ
and
βαρειᾳ
, the acute and grave syllabic accent, is clear from his expressly saying, that there are those three differences besides that of the different accents—
"præter illam differentiam,"
&c.—Lastly, the
"media interjacent multa,"
plainly alludes to the
μεση
of Aristotle.
The following passage, from the clear and accurate musical treatise of
Euclid
, will serve to illustrate, at the same time, both the terms of Aristotle,
τονοις
12
and
μεση
. Enumerating the different accep-
tations of the word
τονος
, one of which is
τασις
, tension or pitch, his instance of that sense of the word, is,
ὁ δε, ὡς τασις, τονου λεγεται, καθ' ὁ φαμεν ὀξυτονειν τινα, ἢ βαρυτονειν, ἢ ΜΕΣΩ, ΤΩΙ ΤΗΣ ΦΩΝΗΣ ΤΟΝΩΙ κεχρησθαι
: i. e. a middling pitch of voice.
13
On the whole, then, I see no reason why we should not understand the word
μέσῳ
to be used in the same sense in the passage which is the subject of this note. For though, indeed, Aristotle is there speaking of single letters, and therefore can only mean syllabic accents or tones, yet it is plain, that these accents must have admitted of the distinction of high, low, and intermediate, even in single words, when of more than two syllables;
14
much more, in whole sentences or periods, where what Mr. Foster calls the oratorial accent, (if, indeed, it be compatible with a fixed syllabic accentuation of single words, of which I profess myself not yet convinced,) must necessarily have varied the tone or pitch of the same nominal syllabic accent, from word to word.
But whatever sense of the word
μέσῳ
we adopt, there is a difficulty, in this passage, which I must leave as I find it. The mention of tone or pitch of voice here, seems to me to be strangely misplaced. Accent, or tone, belongs to syllables, not to letters, of which Aristotle is here speaking. The vowels, indeed, may be acute or grave; but as syllables making a part of words, not as letters, separately considered, as they here are. Besides; the other differences mentioned are fixed, essential differences. Of these letters, he says, some are formed in this manner, and others, in that: some are aspirated, and others smooth—some long, others short. But, can it be said, with any propriety, that some are acute, and
others grave? Are there vowels that are always acute, as there are vowels that are always long? This seems not more accurate, than it would be to conclude an enumeration of the differences of words, by adding that some are said, and some are sung: or rather, it seems just the same, as if a man, describing the different sorts of bricks that are made, should conclude with telling us, that some are put at the top of a wall, some at bottom, and some in the middle.
170.
mvp-aristotle-comment-170
NOTE 170. P. 105.
20.6
A CONJUNCTION IS A SOUND, &c.--The whole of this first definition of the conjunction appears to me to be corrupt beyond all hope of restoration from conjecture.
Mr. Harris plainly passes it over as inexplicable, and takes the second definition only.
I may well, therefore, be excused for not attempting to translate, what I confess myself totally unable to comprehend.
I do, indeed, understand very well, that a conjunction,
"neither hinders nor constitutes—neither gives nor takes away—the meaning of the sentence in which it stands."
But how this can be regarded as a definition of a conjunction, I do not understand. To define a thing only by what it does not do, (for it is here given as a separate and complete definition,) is hardly reconcileable with Aristotle's logical accuracy.
15
Dacier
, in his translation, has obviated this objection, by uniting the two definitions; but without any authority from the text.
I must, again, confess, that what follows, about the situation of the conjunction in different parts of a sentence, has not been
made intelligible to me, by any explication I have seen; particularly, the expression,
καθ' αυτον
, which
M. Batteux
, after
Castelvetro
, renders,
"by its nature:"
—
"à moins que par elle-même elle ne soit faite pour être au commencement."
But this sense cannot be admitted; nor, I think, any other, than—
"by itself—alone."
This
Mr. Winstanley
explains by
ἄνευ ἀνταποδοσεως
: but I cannot see how his translation—
"modo eas conjunctiones excipias quæ in initio periodi,
καθ' αυτους
, —ritè stare non possunt,"
&c. accords with Aristotle's words—
ὴν μη άρμοττῃ ἐν ἀρχῃ λογου τίθεναι καθ' αυτον
i. e. "unless they are such as should be placed in the beginning, by themselves." To make these words correspond to Mr. Winstanley's version, another negative seems wanting.
171.
mvp-aristotle-comment-171
NOTE 171. P. 105.
20.7
AN ARTICLE MARKS THE BEGINNING OR THE END OF A SENTENCE.The commentators all tell us, that this means the prepositive, and the subjunctive article; but none of them have clearly and fairly shewn us, how the one, because it is placed before a word, marks the beginning of a sentence or discourse, (
ΛΟΓΟΥ ἀρχην
;) or, how the other marks the end of it, because it follows the word to which it belongs. In the very sentence before us, for example,
Αρθρον δε ἐστι φωνη άσημα Ἡ λογου άρχην ἢ τελος, ἢ διορισμον, δηλοι
—in what sense does the subjunctive article,
Ἡ
, mark the end of the sentence—
τελος λογου
?
"L'article subjonctif,"
says
Dacier
,
"est celui qui marque la fin du discours: c'est-à-dire, qu'il suit la chose qu'il designe, comme, qui, lequel."
—It is easy to explain things in this manner.
For my part, I see not what is to be made of this, unless we may understand Aristotle to mean only that power of the article,
by which, in the Greek language, it distinguishes the subject from the predicate, in certain propositions, and determines the order of construction. See
Hermes, II. 1. p. 230.
—But, then, this is no other than a species of
διορισμα
, and is, indeed, given by Mr. Harris as one example of the definitive or ascertaining power of the article.
The second definition of the article, (
—φωνη άσημα —— to συντίθεσθαι
) I have omitted. It is the first definition of the conjunction repeated verbatim. It may, indeed, be true of both; but if so, it must inevitably follow, I think, either that the two things must be the same, or, that the words are not truly a definition of either. Yet this passes smoothly with all the commentators I have seen, except
Madius
and
Piccolomini
.
172.
mvp-aristotle-comment-172
NOTE 172. P. 105.
20.8
FOR EVEN IN DOUBLE WORDS, &C.Compare
cap. ii.
and
iv.
of Aristotle's treatise
Περι Ερμηνειας
. This is rendered by
Piccolomini
, with his usual accuracy,
"perochè nei nomi doppij [ò ver composti] non usiamo le parti d'essi, secondo che, da per se prese, hanno significatione: come, (per essempio) in questo nome Theodoro, quella parte (doro) non é significante."
16
173.
mvp-aristotle-comment-173
NOTE 173. P. 106.
20.9
INDICATION OF TIME IS NOT INCLUDED, &c. —
Ου ΠΡΟΣΣΗΜΑΙΝΕΙ το ποτε
. See
Hermes, I. 6, note (d), p. 96
. Aristotle has given a fuller definition of the verb, in the book
περι Ἑρμ. cap. iii.
174.
mvp-aristotle-comment-174
NOTE 174. P. 106.
20.10
OTHERS RELATE TO ACTION OR PRONUNCIATION —
Ἡ δε, κατα τα ὑποκριτικα
— sc.
σχηματα
: meaning the
σχηματα λεξεως
mentioned just before, cap. xix. with which these modes plainly coincide; for the
πτώσεις ῥηματων
here mentioned are no other than the
Ἐγκλισεις
, modes, or moods, of the Grammarians. — [See
Hermes, I. 8, p. 144
, and particularly the notes there.]
Και κατα ποιας ἐγκλισεις, ὡς δη τινες ΠΤΩΣΕΙΣ ΡΗΜΑΤΙΚΑΣ καλεσι.
Dion. Hal. de Struct. &c. Sect. 6.
— But he speaks of the term as applied only to the modes; for the tenses,
διαφοραι χρονων
, are immediately after mentioned by him, as not included in that term. But Aristotle, in the
περι ἐρμην.
expressly mentions the tenses also, as
πτωσεις ῥηματων
. See
cap. iii. Sect. 5.
175.
mvp-aristotle-comment-175
NOTE 175. P. 106.
20.12
FOR ALL DISCOURSE IS NOT COMPOSED OF VERBS AND NOUNS: THE DEFINITION OF MAN, FOR INSTANCE —
Ου γαρ άπας λογος ἐκ ῥηματων και ὀνοματων συγκειται· διον, ὁ του ἀνθρωπου ὁρισμος· ἀλλ᾽ ἐνδεχεται άνευ ῥηματων είναι λογον.
This is very ambiguously expressed. We are left to make out, as well as we can, whether the "definition of man," is referred to as an instance of a sentence without a verb, or of a sentence with both noun and verb. The construction seems, indeed, to lead more naturally to the latter interpretation. But the other, I think, is more to Aristotle's purpose, (for, an example of a sentence with both noun and verb, it was hardly necessary to produce,) and is confirmed by the following passage in his book
περι Ἑρμηνειας
:
Αναγκη δε παντα λογον ἀποφαντικον
(every assertive sentence or speech)
ἐκ ῥηματος είναι, ἢ ἐκ πτωσεως ῥηματος· και γαρ ὁ του ἀνθρωπου λογος
(i. e.
ὁρισμος
, definition; for so
λογος
is continually used by Aristotle,)
ἐαν μη το, ἐστιν, ἢ, ην, ἢ, ἐσται, ἢ τι τοιουτον ΠΡΟΣΤΕΘΗι, ουπω λογος ἀποφαντικος
.
17
The definition itself, (the same, probably, to which he alludes in the passage before us,) follows; it is,
ζωον πεζον διπουν
.
18
Now these three words alone constitute the definition, and it is of this only that Aristotle here speaks. In the full, assertive sentence,
Anthropos esti zoon pezon dipoun, the two first words are no part of the definition itself, but, as Victorius has well observed, only indicate the thing defined. And accordingly, the philosopher, we see, in the above quotation, considers the verb as superadded to the definition.
However, this sense would be so much more clearly expressed, if the words —
διον, ὁ του ἀνθρωπου ὁρισμος
followed, instead of preceding, the words
ἀλλ' ἐνδεχεται άνευ ῥηματων είναι λογον
, that I should hardly doubt of their being misplaced, if this sort of embarrassment were less frequent than it is in Aristotle's writings. This whole passage receives much illustration from that part of the treatise
περι ἐρμ.
to which I have referred.
19
A sentence without a verb is what Aristotle calls a significant sentence, but not an assertive sentence, or proposition; i. e. that affirms or denies something, and of which it may be predicated, that it is true, or false. Such only, in that logical work, it was to his purpose to consider; the other, the merely significant sentence,
20
he dismisses, as belonging rather to rhetoric and
POETRY.
Οι μεν ουν άλλοι [λογοι], ἀφεισθωσαν· ρητορικης γαρ, ἢ ΠΟΙΗΤΙΚΗΣ, οικειοτερα ἡ σκεψις· ὁ δε ἀποφαντικος της νυν θεωριας.
21
176.
mvp-aristotle-comment-176
NOTE 176. P. 106.
20.12
SIGNIFICANT, AS THE WORD CLEON IS, &C.It has been observed, that the sense seemed to require an instance of a sentence with only one significant word; at least, not composed of both verb and noun, as
βαδίζει Κλεων
is. But I rather believe, that Aristotle did not intend this as an instance of such a sentence, but merely as an explanation of the
σημαινει
, and
καθ' άυτα σημαινει τι
, that precede. "It is not," says he, "essential to what I call
λογος
,
oratio
, that it should contain both a noun and a verb, i. e. that it should be a complete proposition: but some significant part it must have; significant, I mean, as a whole word, separately taken, as
Cleon is, for example, in the sentence,
Cleon walks; not as making a part of a word, like
δωρον
in the compound name
Θεοδωρος
, which has, indeed, a meaning, but not
καθ' αυτο κεχωρισμενον
— by itself as a word in the sentence."
That this is the meaning, seems probable from the chapter in which
λογος
is defined in the book
περι Ερμηνειας
. For there, as soon as he has given the definition, (
Λογου δε ἐσι φωνη σημαντικη ἧς των μερων τι σημαντικον ἐσι ΚΕΧΩΡΙΣΜΕΝΟΝ
,) he immediately proceeds to explain the expressions; declaring what fort of significant part he means. "Significant," he says, "as the word
ανθρωπος
is; that is,
κεχωρισμενον
, by itself; not as,
syn-anthropos is, or
uk esti, which signify as assertive sentences, nor yet, as a syllable, or part of a simple word, (like
υς
in
μυς
,) or, even as a word making part of a compound word."
22
Now, what Aristotle there expresses fully, he meant, I think, to say, more briefly, in the words,
ΜΕΡΟΣ μεντοι άει τι σημαινον ἐξει· διον ἐν τῷ, Βαδίζει Κλεων, ὁ Κλεων.
177.
mvp-aristotle-comment-177
NOTE 177. P. 107.
20.13
A DISCOURSE MAY BE ONE, IN TWO SENSES, &C.Compare,
περι Ερμην. cap. v. p. 38.
—
Analyt. Post. lib. ii. cap. 10. p. 169, E.
Metaphys. VII. 4. p. 910, D.
(where he uses
τῳ συνεχει
, as equivalent to
συνδεσμῳ
) and
VIII. 6, p. 931, C.
178.
mvp-aristotle-comment-178
NOTE 178. P. 107.
21.3
LIKE MANY OF THOSE USED BY THE MEGALIOTA.I have read, in some ludicrous book, of a country that was "lost by the ignorance of geographers." This seems to have been the case of these
Megaliota, if such a people ever existed. They are nowhere recorded. —
Dacier
reads,
μεγαριζοντων
—
"ceux qui disent de grandes choses"
: and cites
Hesychius
Μεγαριζοντες — μεγαλα λεγοντες
. But this is too distant from the present reading,
Μεγαλιωτων
.
Mr. Winstanley's conjecture —
μεγαλειων, ως
,
23
is somewhat nearer, and, in other respects, preferable: but it is, I think, a strong presumption against its truth, that Aristotle constantly uses
διον
, when he gives an instance; never, as far as I recollect,
ὡς
.
I have sometimes thought it not very improbable, that the passage might originally have stood thus:
των μεγαλΑ ΔιώΚΟΝτων
: i. e. of those who affect, aim at, are fond of, grandeur and pomp of expression; who love hard words, as we say. Nothing more common than this sense of
διωκειν
. They who are versed in emendatory criticism, and the theory of transcriptive blunders, know it to have been one source of corruption in antient manuscripts, that
the transcribers, when they found vacuities and
lacunae which they could not fill up, rather than reduce the price of their copy by visible imperfection, often chose to write the passage as if there had been no such chasms; especially when that could be done, as in this case, with some passable appearance of a meaning.
24
And thus, here, if we suppose the letters I have distinguished by capitals to have been destroyed, or rendered illegible, in the original MS.
"upo notias kai seton,"
25
they would leave exactly the letters we now have —
μεγαλ...ωτων
.
If a commentator, harrassed by obscurity and perplexity, can now and then relieve his labour by treating a passage of desperate corruption as a riddle, and can amuse himself by guessing the meaning, when he cannot inform his readers by discovering it, who will envy him this harmless privilege? I have here hazarded my guess with others; but I give it for what it is. None of us, I believe, have yet deprived our successors of the same amusement. The riddle, probably, still remains, and will remain, till the arrival of those
"codices expectandi"
of which the critics talk so much; those precious manuscripts, that are always to be waited for, and never to be expected.
179.
mvp-aristotle-comment-179
NOTE 179. P. 107.
21.5
BY COMMON WORDS, I MEAN &C. —
Κυριον
. I have translated this,
common, not
proper, because this last term would convey a wrong idea; for
κυριον
here is plainly opposed, not to
μεταφορα
only, but to all the other species of words just enumerated: not to what is figurative only, as the Latin
proprium
is, but to whatever is unusual. This appears indeed from
the definition — "a word that every body uses." What we call proper words are only one fort of the
κυρια όνοματα
of Aristotle. The expression must even include all those words, which, though originally metaphorical, are, as Mr. Harris says, "so naturalized" by common use, "that ceasing to be metaphors, they are become, (as it were,) the proper words."
26
That is, as an excellent writer has expressed it, "they have nothing of the effect of metaphor upon the hearer. On the contrary, like proper terms, they suggest directly to his mind, without the intervention of any image, the ideas which the speaker proposed to convey by them."
27
The same clear opposition of
κυριον
to whatever is uncommon in speech appears throughout the next chapter, where
γλωττα, μεταφορα
, &c. are all said to be
ΠΑΡΑ το κυριον
, and included under one common term of
ξενικα
. See also
Rhet. III. 2. p. 585, A.
180.
mvp-aristotle-comment-180
NOTE 180. P. 107.
21.6
SO THAT THE SAME WORD MAY BE BOTH COMMON AND FOREIGN, &C.If
κυριον
here meant only native, in opposition to foreign, (
γλωττα
) as some commentators have supposed, it would be arrant trifling to observe, that the same word might be, at the same time,
γλωττα
and
κυριον
, i. e. foreign and native, to different nations. For it could not possibly be otherwise; as
Robortelli observes, p. 246
, and calls the observation, which he explains as Aristotle's,
"magnoperè adnotandum, et PULCHRUM SCITU."
Dacier
follows him:
"Cela ne sçauroit être autrement, le même mot qui est etranger pour celui qui l'emprunte, ne peut qu'être propre pour celui qui le prête."
But, if it must be so, why does Aristotle say it
may be —
είναι δυνατον
? — The truth is, that a foreign word is not necessarily a common word, in his sense of
κυριον
, among the people to whom it is native; it may, or may not, be so; it cannot, indeed, be to them
γλωττα
, but it may be a metaphorical word, or a word of any of the other species enumerated as
ΠΑΡΑ το κυριον
. — Aristotle seems to have added this observation on purpose to prevent the very mistake which these expositors have made — to prevent
κύριον
from being taken merely as the opposite to
γλωττα
.
181.
mvp-aristotle-comment-181
NOTE 181. P. 108.
21.9
A THOUSAND IS A CERTAIN DEFINITE MANY. —
Το γαρ μύριον, πολυ ἐστι.
— Here, I may venture, I believe, for once, to adopt the positive tone of emendatory criticism.
Legendum omnino,
πολυ ΤΙ.
The sense, indeed, no one can mistake: but the text, as it stands, does not express that sense. It says only, "for a thousand is many, which he now uses instead of many." There can be no doubt, that Aristotle added
ΤΙ
here, as in all the other instances,
ἐσταναι ΤΙ — ὠφελεων ΤΙ.
28
But, to put the matter beyond all doubt, he afterwards, speaking of the same fort of metaphor, says,
το γαρ Παντες άντι του Πόλλοι, κατα μεταφοραν, είρηται· το γαρ Παν, ΠΟΛΥ ΤΙ.
29
I am surprised that so very obvious an error should have escaped the notice of all the commentators I am acquainted with.
182.
mvp-aristotle-comment-182
NOTE 182. P. 108.
21.10
FOR HERE, THE POET USES ταμειν --- INSTEAD OF ἀρυσαι, &c.Here a commentator is not perplexed by a little glimmering of light, that promises to shew him something, and shews him nothing; but is relieved at once from all trouble by a total and comfortable obscurity. The quotations are so short, and, in all probability, so incorrect, that it seems impossible to apply to them Aristotle's definition of this metaphor, or to see how, where the Poet has used
ταμειν
,
ἀρυσαι
would have been the proper word, and
vice versa. Yet the commentators slide over this difficulty.
Victorius
, however, has noticed it, and, giving up the quotations as inexplicable and incorrigible, proposes a more intelligible example from the
Rhetoric, III. 2.
—
το φάναι, τον μεν πτωχευοντα, ευχεσθαι· τον δε ευχομενον, πτωχευειν· ὅτι ἀμφω αιτησεις.
Dacier
has entirely omitted the passage, and substituted another from the
Rhet. III. 11. p. 597, B.
— Not, however, that he did not understand the passage; it was an inviolable rule with him always to understand his author: but only, it seems, because the example could not conveniently be expressed in French —
"il ne peut être traduit en nôtre langue."
Castelvetro
gives a very pleasant illustration. He does not pretend to see how
ταμειν
and
ἀρυσαι
are put for each other in the Greek examples: but he says, that, to draw, and to cut off, might be thus metaphorically put for each other; if, for example, we should say, "Take this pruning hook, and draw some branches from the olive-tree: or, Take this pail, and cut off some water from the fountain."
30
— Undoubtedly any man may speak in this way, who choses it.
183.
mvp-aristotle-comment-183
NOTE 183. P. 108.
21.11
IN THE WAY OF ANALOGY, WHEN OF FOUR TERMS, &C.The difficulty here is, to distinguish clearly this, which Aristotle calls the analogical or proportional metaphor, from the metaphor which precedes it — that from species to species: for as to the two first sorts, that from genus to species, and
vice versa, they plainly belong, as has been observed, to the trope since denominated Synecdoche; the word
μεταφορα
being clearly used by Aristotle in its most general sense, including all the tropes — all the ways in which a word is transferred to a meaning different from its proper meaning. See
Cic. Or. cap. xxvii.
Of the four species of
μεταφοραι
here mentioned, only the two last seem to answer to our
METAPHOR — the metaphor founded on some resemblance between the thing from which, and that to which, the term is transferred.
The difference between these two sorts of metaphors, as far as I am able to comprehend it, appears to me to be only this. Each of them is founded on some resemblance; but in the first, the resemblance perceived is between the two things themselves; in the other, between the relations which they, respectively, bear to two other things. Those are metaphors
ἀπ᾿ ἐιδους ἐπι ειδους
, where the likeness is perceived, as Aristotle elsewhere expresses it, "by the genus;" that is, where the common quality, which constitutes the likeness, immediately occurs, and it is, therefore, sufficient simply to substitute the one word for the other. Those are metaphors
κατ᾿ ἀναλογιαν
, where the resemblance is not thus perceived by the common quality, but by the common relation, of the two
things;
31
where, therefore, that relation must be pointed out, more or less expressly. Thus, to take Aristotle's own examples, when old age, or rather, an old man, is called "stubble," the resemblance is sufficiently perceived, by a comparison of the things themselves; in Aristotle's language, we perceive it "by the genus:" —
όταν γαρ ἐιπῃ [Όμηρος] το γήρας ΚΑΛΑΜΗΝ, ἐποιησε μαθησιν και γνῶσιν δια του γένους· ΑΜΦΩ γαρ ΑΠΗΝΘΗΚΟΤΑ.
32
But when old age is called "evening," what strikes us is the resemblance with respect to two other things, life, and day; a resemblance of relation.
In this idea of the analogical metaphor I have the concurrence of
Piccolomini
.
"La metafora di proportione è quella, che sopra la somiglianza dei rispetti che hanno l'une cose con l'altre, sarà fondata;"
&c. See his annotations, p. 305, and his clear and useful, though prolix,
Parafrase della Retor. d'Arift. tom. iii. p. 52, &c.
In the rest of his explanation he does not satisfy me.
184.
mvp-aristotle-comment-184
NOTE 184. P. 108.
21.12
AND, SOMETIMES, THE PROPER TERM IS ALSO INTRODUCED, BESIDES ITS RELATIVE TERM. —
Και ἐνιοτε προστιθεασιν ἀνθ᾿ ὁυ λεγει προς ὁ ἐστι.
— No words can well be more obscure and perplexing. Taking them as they are, they seem to admit, fairly, of only one sense — that which
Victorius
gives them.
"Et quandoque apponunt, pro quo dicit ad quod est."
That is, as he explains this literal and obscure version, they add, "ad quod refertur illud nomen quod omittunt, et pro quo aliud vocabulum usurpant."
Προστιθεασι, προς ὁ ἐστι [sc. τουτο] ἀνθ᾿ ὁυ λεγει
: i. e. they add, to the substituted word (
cup), the word to which
the proper word (
shield) relates; i. e. Mars. They not only name
cup, instead of
shield, but call it the
cup of Mars.
My objection to this sense of the passage is, that it seems to confound the analogical metaphor with that from species to species, in which one word is simply put in the room of the other, as
καλαμη
is used in the passage of Homer, referred to by Aristotle as an example of that fort of metaphor:
33
Αλλ' ἐμπης καλαμην γε σ' οἴομαι ἐισοροωντα / Γινώσκειν.
Od. ξ. 214.
For if, "sometimes,"
ἐνιοτε
, this addition is made, it is implied, that not only sometimes, but generally, and for the most part, the analogical metaphor is used in the same manner as that
ἀπ' ἐιδους
&c. and cup is merely called shield, and old age, evening. But, if I understand the matter rightly, it is essential to this kind of metaphor to express two terms, at least, of the four which constitute the analogy; i. e. to express with the metaphorical word, either the thing to which the proper word belongs, (as,
evening of life,) or, as Aristotle presently after says, a negative epithet. See NOTE 189.
And the philosopher himself seems to have said this, (for I confess the passage is not perfectly clear,) in the following words:
ΑΙΕΙ γαρ ΕΚ ΔΥΟΙΝ λεγονται [sc. ἐικονες, comparisons], ΩΣΠΕΡ Ἡ ΑΝΑΛΟΓΟΝ ΜΕΤΑΦΟΡΑ· διον, ἡ ἀσπις, φαμεν, ἐστι ΦΙΑΛΗ ΑΡΕΟΣ, και, τοξον, ΦΟΡΜΙΓΞ ΑΧΟΡΔΟΣ· ουτω μεν ουν λεγουσιν, ΟΥΧ ΑΠΛΟΥΝ το δ᾿ ἐιπειν το τοξον “φορμιγγα” ἢ την άσπιδα “φιάλην,” ῾ΑΠΛΟΥΝ.
34
Thus
"capitis nives"
35
for gray hairs;
evening of life;
morning of the year;
eye of day; and, among many instances in the Rhetoric,
δημε ροπαλον — λημη του Πειραιεως — ὁδου των λόγων
, &c.
36
The fact, indeed, seems to be, that this analogical metaphor is only a way of stating metaphors founded on resemblance, when that resemblance, depending wholly, or chiefly, on relation, would not be obvious, and the metaphor, consequently, would be harsh and obscure, unless the relation were, by some means or other, pointed out.
37
— Victorius himself allows, that, in Aristotle's own examples, the mere substitution of
cup for
shield, and of
evening for
old age, would be
"nimis durum."
I think, then, that Aristotle meant to say, and, in some way or other, had said, "And sometimes," (
ἐνιοτε
,) now and then, for the sake of clearness, "they add the proper word, (the word,
ἀνθ᾿ ὁυ
for which, the metaphorical word is put,) to, or besides, the
προς ὁ ἐστι
— i. e. that to which the proper word relates." They not only call the shield, the cup of Mars, but they mention shield also, and say, the shield is the cup of Mars: or, taking the other instance, old age is the evening of life. Thus all will follow naturally:
ΚΑΙ ἐνιοτε
— And, sometimes, they add the proper term, &c.
Ένιοις δε, ουκ ἐστιν όνομα — ἀναλογον.
— But, in some analogical metaphors, there is no proper term; in that case, therefore, the meta-
phor cannot be used: yet it may be used in the first, and most common way, as well as if such proper term subsisted; it is still an analogical metaphor, and may be used as such: —
ουδεν ήττον, ὁμοιως
[i. e.
ἀναλογως
, as Castelvetro rightly explains it,]
λεχθησεται
. Thus, in the metaphor exemplified, of sowing, applied to the sun, we may say the sun
sows his rays, though we cannot assign any proper term, for which
sows is put — any word appropriated to the dispersion of light from the sun, as, to
sow, is appropriated to the dispersion of seed. Such appears to me to be the connection of this passage.
It will, undoubtedly, be objected, that the sense I would give the words
προστιθεασι
&c. cannot be fairly obtained from them as they now stand: and I confess it cannot; unless we might be allowed to render the words thus, taking
προς
as a repetition of the preposition in
προστιθεασιν
: "they add the word, for which they use, or say, the metaphorical word, (
ἀνθ᾿ ὁυ λΕΓΕΙ
,)
το ὁ ΕΣΤΙ
To what it is — to the word which is used: they add the word that should be to the word that is." But this appears to me so harsh and improbable a construction, that I would rather suppose the passage to be defective. Perhaps it might originally be thus: —
Και ἐνιοτε προστιθ. ἀνθ᾿ ὁυ λέγει, ΠΑΡΑ [το] προς ὁ ἐστι
— i. e. besides adding the thing to which the proper term relates.
38
But there seems to be still another fault in the passage. I cannot reconcile the plural
προστιθεασιν
, with the singular,
λέγει
. Goulston renders
"apponit;"
and I am surprised that no MS. should exhibit
προστίθησιν
. That
λέγει
is right, is highly probable, from the singular verb
ἐρει
, repeatedly used here, and the
ἐποι
, afterwards:
ἐι την ἀσπίδα ΕΙΠΟΙ κ. τ. αλλ.
185.
mvp-aristotle-comment-185
NOTE 185. P. 108.
21.12
THE SHIELD, THE CUP OF MARS, &C.
Φιαλην Αρεως
. The
φιαλη
seems to have been a large, expanded, (
ἐκπεταλον
,) kind of vessel, like a ewer. See
Il. 4. 270
, and the notes.
Hesych. v. Αμφιθετο
. — It had also, sometimes, an
ὀμφαλος
, or
umbo
. See
Athen. p. 501
. It had probably, therefore, some resemblance to a shield, which makes the metaphor appear less strange; as
Piccolomini has remarked, p. 306
: who also observes, very well, that this kind of metaphor is then most clear and perfect, when the resemblance of relation is aided by some degree of resemblance between the things themselves and that here, for example, if lance were used instead of shield, the metaphor would be spoiled, though the common relation would still subsist.
This seems to have been a favourite instance of this sort of metaphor; for it occurs several times in the Rhetoric. See
III. 4, p. 588
, and
11, p. 596, E
. In the former of these passages Aristotle says, that an analogical metaphor ought to admit of inversion: thus, says he, if we may call the cup the shield of Bacchus, we may, with equal propriety, call the shield the cup of Mars. But
Demetrius
observes, alluding to that passage of the Rhetoric, that this is not the case of every such metaphor:
ἐπει την ὑπωρειαν μεν της ἴδης, ποδα ἐξην ἐιπειν τον ποιητην, τον δε του ἀνθρωπου ποδα, ἐκετι ὑπωρειαν ἐιπειν.
Sect. 79.
186.
mvp-aristotle-comment-186
NOTE 186. P. 108.
21.13
OR AS EMPEDOCLES HAS EXPRESSED IT, LIFE'S SETTING SUN.
Δυσμας βιου
. —
Victorius
has pointed out this expression in
Plato's sixth book De Legibus
, where the Athenian says,
ἡμεις δ᾽ ἐν δυσμαις του βιου, οι δε, ὡς προς ἡμας, νεοι
: probably alluding, in Plato's usual manner, to the very passage of
Empedocles
.
39
See also
Ælian, Var. Hist. II. 34
.
ἐπι δυσμαις ἐσμεν
: where, as the metaphor was sufficiently explained by the subject of the conversation, the word
βιου
is not added.
Victorius remarks, also, the
βιου ΔΥΝΤΟΣ αυγαις
of
Æschylus, Agamem. v. 1123
. The rest of that passage is very obscure;
40
but this expression seems, clearly enough, to describe the dying eye, that opens, for the last time, upon the light: —
Βλεψαι προς ΑΥΓΑΣ βουλεται τας ήλιου, / Ως οὐποτ᾿ ἀυθις, άλλα νυν πανυστατον, / Ακτινα, κυκλονθ᾿, ήλιου προσοψεται.
Eurip. Alcest. 203.
or, in the finest picture of the kind, I think, that Poetry affords, —
oculisque errantibus, alto / Quæsivit cælo lucem, ingemuitque reperta.
Æn. IV. 691.
— The poetical reader, I believe, will pardon me, if I wander so much farther from my subject, as to take occasion, from these beautiful passages, to point out three lines of
Petrarch
, which shew,
that his powers were not confined to the expression of amorous tenderness, but were capable of rising, on occasion, to the true sublime. In the sonnet,
"Se lamentar augelli,"
&c. written after the death of
Laura
, he imagines himself to hear her voice, in his solitude, consoling him for his loss, in these lines: —
Di me non pianger tu; ch' i miei di fersi / Morendo eterni; e, NEL ETERNO LUME, / Quando mostrai di chiuder gli occhi, APERSI! —
Ed. di Gesualdo, p. 288.
187.
mvp-aristotle-comment-187
NOTE 187. P. 108.
21.14
THERE IS NO PROPER ANALOGOUS TERM, &C.
Όνομα κειμενον
. —
Κειμενον
, here, is equivalent to
κυριον
; a word established by common usage.
Ετι, ἐι ΜΗ ΚΕΙΜΕΝΟΙΣ όνομασι χρηται, διον Πλατων, ὀφρυοσκιον, τον ὀφθαλμον· παν γαρ ἀσαφες το ΜΗ ΕΙΩΘΟΣ.
—
Topic. VI. 2. p. 242.
See also,
Categ. c. vii. p. 23, C.
188.
mvp-aristotle-comment-188
NOTE 188. P. 109.
21.14
SOWING ABROAD HIS HEAVEN-CREATED FLAME.
Σπειρων θεοκτισταν φλογα
. — Part of an Iambic verse, and probably from some Tragic Poet. The commentators quote
Virgil's
"Spargebat lumine terras."
This, however, is not exactly applicable, because
spargere
does not, I think, appear to have been the proper, specific word, for sowing, as
σπειρειν
was. The passage of
Lucretius
is more apposite: —
Sol etiam summo de vertice dissupat omnes / Ardorem in partes, et lumine CONSERIT arva.
p. 211.
Every reader will recollect
Milton's
beautiful application of this metaphor to the stars: —
And sow'd with stars the heav'n, thick as a field. —
P. L. VII. 358.
— and to the dew-drops, metaphorized into pearls,
V. 1.
But the idea of pouring, applied to the great fountain of light, seems both a more just, and a more elevated, metaphor. It is happily touched by
Virgil
in this line: —
Jam sole infuso, jam rebus luce retectis.
Æn. IX. 461.
— a sketch which
Thomson
has finely filled up, and finished: —
young day pours in apace, / And opens all the lawny prospect wide: / The dripping rock, the mountain's misty top, / Swell on the sight, and brighten with the dawn; / Blue, thro' the dusk, the smoaking currents shine.
Summer, 52.
In his hymn, he has taken up the metaphor in a sublimer tone: —
Great source of day! best image here below / Of thy Creator, ever POURING wide, / From world to world, the vital ocean round!
l. 66.
— To which I cannot restrain myself from adding a fine passage of the same kind in the hymn of
Dionysius
to the sun: —
᾿Ακτινα πολυστρεφον ἀμπλεκων, / ᾿Αιγλας πολυδερκεα ΠΑΓΑΝ / Περι γαιαν άπασαν ἑλισσων. / ΠΟΤΑΜΟΙ δε σεθεν ΠΥΡΟΣ ΑΜΒΡΟΤΟΥ / Τικτουσιν ἐπηρατον άμεραν.
41
189.
mvp-aristotle-comment-189
NOTE 189. P. 109.
21.16
THE WINELESS CUP. —
Φιαλην ἀοινον
. This emendation of
Victorius
, (instead of
ἀλλα οινου
, the reading of all the editions and MSS.) seems confirmed, beyond all doubt, by
Rhet. III. 6, p. 590, A.
and
11, p. 597, A.
Metaphors, from their nature, are in danger of being obscure, or forced, though it is essential to their beauty and effect, that they should be clear and apposite. For this purpose, a metaphor may be guarded in various ways.
42
If the simple substitution of the improper, for the proper, term, would be obscure, or harsh, the metaphor may be converted into an image, or comparison; it may be used analogically, and we may say,
φιαλη ΑΡΕΩΣ
, or
φιαλη ΑΟΙΝΟΣ
; or, if that be not sufficient for perspicuity — that is, if the meaning be not sufficiently pointed out by the manner, or circumstances, in which the expression is introduced, we may join these, (
φιαλη Αρεως ἀοινος
,) or even add to either of them the proper word itself.
43
There is a fine instance of this negative mode of explaining a metaphor, in
Isaiah, li. 21
.
"Thou drunken, but not with wine."
44
The
same end is often answered by an epithet, affirming of the thing expressed some quality belonging to the thing signified; thus, ships are "floating bulwarks," and the lyre a "chorded shell,"
45
where
Dryden
has made the same use of the affirmative epithet,
chorded, that
Theognis
did of the negative,
ἀχορδον
, in his metaphorical expression for a bow —
φορμιγξ άχορδος
.
46
Sometimes the explanatory epithet is itself a metaphor; as in the
πτερωτοις άρμασι
of
Euripides
; "winged chariots." Here we have a double metaphor,
chariot for
ship, and
wing for
sail.
It should be remembered, that these negative epithets are very common in the Greek Poets.
Victorius
points out many instances:
κωμον ἀναυλοτατον
,
Eurip. Phoeniss. 818
.
θιασον ἀβακχευτον
,
Orest. 319
.
μηνυτηρα ἀφθεγκτον
,
Æfch. Eumen. 245
.
ἀπτεροις πωτημασιν
,
ibid. 250
, &c.
190.
mvp-aristotle-comment-190
NOTE 190. P. 109.
21.17
AN INVENTED WORD, &C.Between this and the preceding definition Aristotle must have placed that of
Κοσμος
the ornament, or ornamental word. That it was purposely passed over by him is hardly credible. This is, most probably, one of the lamentable
διαβρωματα
that
Strabo
talks of.
47
The commentators differ widely as to the meaning of
κοσμος
.
Castelvetro
says, the word admits, here, of five different senses, which he sets up, like nine-pins, for the pleasure of knocking them all down. — The only reasonable account of the matter seems to be that given by
Dacier
from
Victorius
. It seems clear enough,
that what Aristotle here calls
κοσμος
, is included, at least, under what he calls
ὀικειον
in the Rhetoric. For he says, at the end of the next chapter (cap. xxii.) speaking of those species of words that are used in prose, that they are these three,
το κύριον
, και
μεταφορα
, και
ΚΟΣΜΟΣ
: and in the Rhetoric, after referring to the very enumeration of words in this chapter, and setting aside such as he calls poetical, (i. e.
γλωτται, διπλα ὀνοματα
, &c.) he says,
το δε κυριον, και το ΟΙΚΕΙΟΝ, και μεταφοραι, μοναι χρησιμοι προς την των ψίλων λόγων λεξιν· παντες γαρ μεταφοραις διαλεγονται, και τοις ΟΙΚΕΙΟΙΣ, και τοις κυρίοις
.
48
And these
ὀικεια ὀνοματα
, again, seem plainly synonymous with
ἐπιθετα
, mentioned presently after: —
δει δε και τα ἐπιθετα και τας μεταφ. κ. τ. λ.
— By
ὀικεια
and
ἐπιθετα
, Aristotle seems to have expressed the genus, of which,
κοσμος
, the ornamental or embellishing epithet, was a species. But as he has not, by any means, explained himself fully, nor given any definition either of
ὀικειον
or
ἐπιθετον
, the mist which he has left upon this subject must remain. I shall only remark, that the word
κοσμος
is once, (and I think but once,) used by him in his Rhetoric, apparently in the same sense as in this chapter. For, speaking of the propriety of diction, and its correspondence to the subject, he observes, that "an ornament should not be applied to a mean word; for this," says he, "has the appearance of burlesque; which is the case with
Cleophon
, who has used expressions of this sort as ridiculous, as it would be to talk of an "AUGUST fig-tree."
49
The word
κοσμος
here, and the example by which he explains it, seem to prove, that
κοσμος
, in the treatise on Poetry, means such an epithet as embellishes or elevates the thing to which it is applied. For I do not imagine that the term includes what the Grammarians call perpetual epithets, such as
"humida vina,"
γαλα λευκον
, &c. because Aristotle expressly says, that the
κοσμος
is used in common speech: now these
redundant epithets are banished, both by him, and by
Quintilian
, even from oratory; much more from ordinary discourse.
50
It may be objected, as it has been objected by
Piccolomini (p. 337)
, that, as an epithet may, at the same time, be a foreign word, a metaphorical, an extended, or of any of the other sorts, it could not be enumerated by Aristotle as a distinct species of words among the rest. But the truth is, that he is not there enumerating so many distinct species of words, which exclude each other, but only a number of distinct properties of words, several of which may subsist together in the same word. Thus, an extended word may, manifestly, be, at the same time, a metaphorical, or a foreign word, or both: a metaphorical word may be, also, an invented, extended, altered word, &c. But none of these words can be, at the same time,
κυρια
, common words; and the only exclusive distinction that Aristotle intended, is between the common word, and the others; all of which are words, on some account or other, uncommon.
191.
mvp-aristotle-comment-191
NOTE 191. P. 110.
21.21
NOUNS ARE DIVIDED, &C.In passages where great corruption and little importance meet, a commentator may be reasonably indulged in silence, or brevity. What all this has to do in the midst of an analysis of poetical language, as distinguished from that of
prose, I confess myself totally unable to see.
The defects of the passage have been fully pointed out by almost all the annotators. See
Mr. Winstanley's note, p. 300, ed. Ox. 1780
. — But we have lately been told, that all the commentators have entirely mistaken the sense of the passage, and supposed it, without reason, to be imperfect, merely because they did not see,
that Aristotle here speaks, not as a Grammarian, but as a Philosopher, and is considering, not the conventional gender of verbal inflection, but the real gender of the things signified. Thus, it is admitted, indeed, that all words ending in
ν
and
ρ
, are not masculine; yet, if we examine the nature of the things denoted by words of those terminations, we shall find, it seems, that they are masculine, though the words themselves are regarded as feminine.
51
Let us try, then.
Μητηρ
, for example, ends in
ρ
. Did Aristotle's philosophy lead him to consider a mother as of the masculine gender?
192.
mvp-aristotle-comment-192
NOTE 192. P. 110.
22.1
THE EXCELLENCE OF DICTION CONSISTS IN BEING PERSPICUOUS, WITHOUT BEING MEAN
Λεξεως ἀρετη
i. e. of diction, or language, in general; not,
"elocutionis Poeticae,"
as Goulston and others render it. For Aristotle gives the same definition of the excellence of oratorical diction, in his Rhetoric;
52
adding, only, with respect to the degree of elevation, such a restriction as his subject there required. Now had he intended here a definition of the language of Poetry, as discriminated from that of Prose, he would hardly have confined himself to two characters common to both; viz. that it should be perspicuous, and yet not mean, or low, like colloquial language, consisting only of common and proper words, without metaphors, or any of the other ornamental words which he enumerates; some of which he makes essential to the excellence (
ἀρετην
) and proper elevation, even of prose elocution.
53
For, that this is the force of
ταπεινη
, is clear from his own explanation.
Still, it is obvious to ask, why the philosopher, when his subject was the excellence of poetic diction, should thus set out with a general definition, instead of giving us, at once, the definition of the species. The reason, I suppose, was, that he conceived the poetic to differ from the rhetorical language, only in the degree of elevation above ordinary speech; and to define degrees is not easy. Nor, indeed, was even this difference common to all Poetry. If the diction of the Dithyrambic and other Lyric kinds, and the Heroic, with their pompous apparatus of compound epithets, foreign and antiquated words, and boldness of metaphor, rose far above the highest elevation of prose diction; on the other hand, that of Tragedy, we know, frequently descended, in its lowest parts, even below what Aristotle assigns as the proper level of rhetorical speech, to a style differing from common speech in no other circumstance but that of metre.
54
— Dacier, with the stiff and inflexible dignity of French Tragedy before his eyes, appears to have been shocked at the expression,
μη ταπεινη
; for he translates, not the words only, but the ideas, of his author, into French:
"La vertu de l'expression consiste dans la netteté et dans LA NOBLESSE."
193.
mvp-aristotle-comment-193
NOTE 193. P. 110.
22.2
SUCH IS THE POETRY OF CLEOPHONSee NOTE 14. From what Aristotle says of this Poet in the Rhetoric, it appears, that he sometimes variegated his vulgarity with a dash of bombast.
55
He gave fine epithets to low words. The
ἐυτελες ὀνομα
, there, agrees with what is said of him here. See the ch. of the Rhet. last referred to.
What is there said of
Cleophon
,
La Motte
says of
HOMER himself.
"Homere emploie quelquefois les mots les plus vils, et il les releve aussitôt par des epithetes magnifiques."
56
It must, indeed, be confessed, that, after all the apologies of critics and commentators, Homer's
Διος ὑφορβος
— "divine swineherd" — has not, to our ears, a much better effect than
ποτνια συκη
. The only reasonable way of defending Homer, is, surely, to content ourselves with saying, in general, that the expression could not have the same incongruous appearance in Homer's time; as, in that case, he certainly would not have used it. At least, this would be a better apology, than to assert, with
Boileau
, that
συβωτης
is one of the finest words in the Greek language.
57
194.
mvp-aristotle-comment-194
NOTE 194. P. 110.
22.2
AND THAT OF STHENELUS.This seems to explain a fragment of
Aristophanes
, in which the Poet, alluding probably to the flatness and insipidity of the diction of
Sthenelus
, as wanting the poetic seasoning of metaphor, &c. introduces some hungry fellow saying, that "he could make shift to eat even some of the words of Sthenelus, if they were but dipped in salt, or vinegar."
Και πως ἐγω Σθενελου φαγοιμ αν ῥημα τι / Εις όξος ἐμβαπτομενον ἢ λευκους άλας.
Athen. IX. init.
195.
mvp-aristotle-comment-195
NOTE 195. P. 110.
22.4
AN ENIGMA, IF COMPOSED OF METAPHORS.
"Ut modicus autem atque opportunus ejus usus illustrat orationem, ita, frequens et obscurat et tædio complet; continuus verò in allegoriam et ænigma exit."
—
Quintil. VIII. 6.
196.
mvp-aristotle-comment-196
NOTE 196. P. 110.
22.5
THE ESSENCE OF AN ENIGMA CONSISTS, &c.I can neither assent to the emendation proposed by Mr. Winstanley, nor see the least want of any emendation. The passage appears to me perfectly clear and unexceptionable, as it is.
Τα ὑπαρχοντα
must, by no means, be joined with
ἀδυνατα
. It evidently means here, in a sense very usual, things that actually exist—i. e. are true. As,
Rhet. II. 25
,
λυεται δε και τα σημεια, κ᾿αν ὑπαρχοντα
: where,
ὑπαρχοντα
is synonymous with
ἀληθες
, in
lib. i. cap. ii. p. 517
—
λυτον δε, κ᾿αν ΑΛΗΘΕΣ
.
The passage is accurately and closely rendered by Piccolomini.
"La forma e l'effentia dell' enigma confifte in quefto, che nel dir cofe, che VERAMENTE SIANO, fi congiungbino infieme cofe ch appaiano impoffibili à ftar infieme."
—And this is an exact definition of an ænigma—such an ænigma, at least, as Aristotle means. But in the other way of constructing the passage, which is that of Castelvetro, and some other interpreters, it is no definition at all. For if the essence of a riddle consists merely in "putting together things that are incompatible and impossible," —
τα ὑπαρχοντα ἀδυνατα συναψαι
then the Italian Poet made a riddle, when he described a man fighting after he was cut in two:
del colpo non accorto, / Andava combattendo, ed era morto.
58
197.
mvp-aristotle-comment-197
NOTE 197. P. 110.
22.5
NOW THIS CANNOT BE EFFECTED BY THE MERE ARRANGEMENT OF THE WORDS, &C.
Κατα μεν ουν την των ὀνοματων συνθεσιν.
— Heinsius
την των ΚΥΡΙΩΝ ὀνοματων
. But the
κυριον όνομα
, as I have already observed, is, throughout, opposed by Aristotle, not to
μεταφορα
only, but to all the other words. He would hardly, therefore, have used it here in a different sense, as opposed to metaphor only.
59
If any emendation were necessary, I should think
ΑΛΛΩΝ ὀνοματων
more probable. But perhaps no word is wanting. Aristotle had used the expression,
ἀδυνατα ΣΥΝΑΨΑΙ
—"to put together things impossible." This might lead to suppose, that an ænigma might be made by the mere
συνθεσις ὀνοματων
—by a certain arrangement or construction of the words only. Therefore he adds—"this cannot be done by the mere arrangement of the words; by the metaphorical use of them it may."
60
As this sense seems sufficiently clear, supposes no defect in the text, and, after all, coincides, in the main, with that of Heinsius, (for we must necessarily understand, an arrangement of words not metaphorical—) I have adopted it in my translation, after Dacier, and Batteux.
198.
mvp-aristotle-comment-198
NOTE 198. P. 110.
22.5
A MAN I ONCE BEHELD, &C.See
Rhet. III. 2, p. 586
, where this is called an approved, or admired, riddle:—
ἐν τῷ ἀινιγματι τῳ ευδοκιμουντι
—. I wish it may
ευδοκιμειν
with a modern reader. In Athenæus another line appears:
Ανδρ᾿ ἐιδον πυρι χαλκον ἐπ᾿ ἀνερι κολλησαντα, / Ουτω συγκολλως ὡστε συναιμα ποιειν.
Lib. ix. p. 452.
But Casaubon seems right in supposing this pentameter to have been a modern addition; for it is not found, I believe, in any more antient writer. Even in Plutarch, I observe, that the hexameter not only appears by itself, as in Aristotle, but is plainly given as the whole. See his
Symposium, p. 267, ed. H. St.
It appears from that passage to have been the production of a lady, Eumetis. I doubt whether, in these "degenerate days," it would have gained her a prize in the Lady's Diary. The Greeks were fond of these puzzles. The reader may find some curious specimens of this sort of wit in
Athenæus, X. 448, &c.
199.
mvp-aristotle-comment-199
NOTE 199. P. 111.
22.9
AS OLD EUCLID DID, OBJECTING, &C.Fontenelle talks in the same way.
"Du tems d'Homere c'étoit une grande merveille qu'un homme pût aſſujettir ſon diſcours à des meſures, à des fillabes longues et breves, & faire en même tems quelque choſe de raiſonnable. On donnoit donc aux Poetes des licences infinies, & on ſe tenoit encore trop heureux d'avoir des vers. Homère pouvoit parler dans un ſeul vers cinq langues differentes; prendre le dialecte Dorique quand l'Ionique ne l'accommodoit pas; au defaut de tous les deux, prendre l'Attique, l'Eolique, ou le commun; c'est-à-dire, parler en même tems, Picard, Gascon, Normand, Breton, & François commun. Il pouvoit allonger un mot s'il étoit trop court, l'accourcir s'il étoit trop long; personne n'y trouvoit à redire."
61
But, could this ingenious and sensible writer seriously suppose, that the language of Homer's poems had at all the same effect to a hearer, or reader, of his time, that an English poem would now have, if composed of all the provincial dialects of Great Britain? —We are always told, how Homer enriched his language by "visiting all the principal nations of Greece, and learning the peculiarities of their speech."
62
Just as if an English poet, because he had resided some time in Yorkshire, or Lancashire, might, in his next poem, put
neet for
night,
loise for
lose, or a
balliblash, a very well-sounding Lancashire word, for a
blaze.
This account makes the language of Homer no other than the
kainisma
which Quintilian reprobates, among the
vitia orationis
:
63
something worse than the "Babylonish dialect" of Hudibras;
"a party-colour'd dress / Of patch'd and piebald languages. / It had an odd promiscuous tone, / As if he'd talk'd three parts in one Which made some think, when he did gabble, / They had heard three labourers of Babel; / Or Cerberus himself pronounce / A leash of languages at once."
With such an idea of Homer's language, Fontenelle might well add—
"Cette étrange confusion de langues, cet assemblage bisarre de mots tout défigurés, etoit la langue des dieux; du moins il est bien ſûr que ce n'etoit pas celle des hommes."
—And, indeed, I firmly believe with Lord Monboddo, that "fuch a mongrel dialect was never written by any man;" and that "Homer wrote, either the language that was ſpoken in the country where he was born and educated, or that was used by the poets that had written before him, and was the eſtabliſhed language of Poetry."
64
200.
mvp-aristotle-comment-200
NOTE 200. P. 111.
22.9
AND THEN GIVING A BURLESQUE EXAMPLE OF THAT SORT OF DICTION.
Ιαμβοποιησας ἐν ἀυτη τη λεξει.
— Two senses have been given to the word
ἰαμβοποιησας
; both of them, I think, far from satisfactory. Some render it—making Iambic verses:
"Iambis usus est."
[Vict.] But, is it likely, that Euclid, meaning to ridicule Homer's hexameters, should do it in Iambic verse?—Besides that the lines themselves, such as we find them, have not the least air of Iambics, but fall easily enough, with a little help, into hexameters. In this I perfectly agree with Dacier; though I see no reason to suppose with him, that Euclid had composed—
"un ouvrage en vers heroiques."
Others, and Madius in particular, understand the word to mean, satirizing, ridiculing, the Poet; —
"ſe moque de lui."
[Dac.] A meaning that, undoubtedly, suits the passage better; whether it suits the word itself I much doubt, but will not venture to decide. As Aristotle uses
ἰαμβοποιος
,
65
in the sense of a satiric Poet—a maker of the
ἰαμβος
, or satiric poem, he may possibly have used the verb,
Ιαμβοποιειν
, here, in the correspondent sense of making a satire upon, or burlesquing:—
ἰαμβοποἰησας ἐν ἀυτη τη λεξει
—having ridiculed him "in that fort of diction," in the following manner, &c.
As this sense appears to me, on the whole, far more eligible than the other, I have followed it: for I see no third sense that can, with any shew of probability, be extracted from the present text. But that it is defective, and that
ἰαμβοποιησας
is an error, I have very little doubt. If conjecture might be indulged, I should be inclined to suppose, that what Aristotle had said was this; "that it is an easy matter to versify, even in common speech, (
ἐν αυτη τη λεξει
,)
66
if one may be allowed to extend syllables and words at pleasure, so as to convert, for instance, an Iambic foot, which is continually occurring in common conversation, into an Heroic or Spondee." And the examples that follow, were probably two prose sentences so converted, or convertible, into hexameters. But as to the manner in which Aristotle had expressed this in the text, I have no conjecture to offer that is satisfactory, even to myself. Of the mangled lines which follow, with their perplexing variety of indeterminable readings, I shall say with Victorius,
"veritate deſperatâ, nihil amplius curæ de hac re fufcipere volui."
It is some comfort however, as M. Batteux has observed, that both the objection of Euclid, and Aristotle's answer, are clear enough, independently of the examples.
I ought to mention, that Castelvetro has explained this passage, without supposing the text wrong, in a manner different from any
other interpreter, and which, in part, accords with my idea. By
ἰαμβοποιειν
he understands neither satirizing, nor making Iambic verses; but, making Iambic feet instead of spondees, in hexameter verse. And the sense he gives the whole passage is this: "It would be a very easy thing to write heroic verse, if this liberty of extension were allowed; for then, a Poet might put Iambic feet in the room of Spondees, and commit no fault, because the short syllables might be lengthened at pleasure." And the lines that follow he supposes to be examples of such defective hexameters.
There is somewhat ingenious in this explanation, as there is in many others of this acute writer: but it has likewise the fault, which many of his explanations have; that of being by no means reconcileable with the original.—See his comment. p. 481.
201.
mvp-aristotle-comment-201
NOTE 201. P. 111.
22.10
WHEN THESE LICENCES APPEAR TO BE THUS PURPOSELY USED.
Το μεν ουν ΦΑΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ πως χρωμενον, κ. τ. ἀλ.
—The force, both of
φαινεσθαι
, which I understand to be emphatic here, and of
πως
, seems perfectly well explained by Castelvetro.
"Non ſo perchè alcuni vogliano rimuovere di queſto teſto, πως, eſſendoci ſtato poſto per dimostrare, che allora il vitio ſi ſcopre, e'l riſo ſi muove, quando fi comincia in alcun modo a riconoſcere, che il poeta ha uſata a ſtudio, e ricercata queſta maniera di parole."
p. 482. So, too, Piccolomini's translation—
"l'eſſer veduto---uſar coſi fatto modo di locutione."
—For
πως
, I once suspected we should read
ΑΠΡΈπως
; as presently after—
χρωμενοι ἀπρεπως
. But I believe
πως
is right:—
aliquo modo
.
202.
mvp-aristotle-comment-202
NOTE 202. P. 111.
22.12
HOW GREAT A DIFFERENCE IS MADE, &C.
Όσον διαφερει.
Not
"quantum excellat,"
as Goulston and others translate; but, "what a difference the proper use of such words makes"—"how different the effect is." As, above, cap. x.
ΔΙΑΦΕΡΕΙ γαρ πολυ
—"it makes a great difference:" and, cap. xviii.
τι ΔΙΑΦΕΡΕΙ
.—Nothing more common than this use of the word. The difference here expressed, is, plainly, between the
ἁρμοττον
, and the
ἀπρεπως
, in the use of such words:
χρωμενα ΑΠΡΕΠΩΣ τα άυτα ἐν ἀπεργασαιτο ΤΟ ΔΕ ΑΡΜΟΤΤΟΝ όσον διαφερει κ. τ. λ.
203.
mvp-aristotle-comment-203
NOTE 203. P. 111.
22.12
AND TEMPERATE USE OF SUCH WORDS.
Εντιθεμενων των ὀνοματων ἐις το μετρον
:—literally, "the words being put into the metre:" i. e. as Victorius and others explain it, "taking care, that, in changing the words, you do it
"falvo metro."
"
67
A very unnecessary caution surely; besides that the Greek hardly says that, whatever it may mean. Let us try its meaning by the fairest test, that of strict and literal translation; for we can sometimes see nonsense in English, which we cannot see in Greek. "But what difference is made by a proper use of
such words, may be observed in hexameter verse, when the words are put into (i. e. as it is explained, adapted to) the metre." — What words?— Metaphorical, foreign, extended, &c. of which he had just been speaking. Very well. But how put in, or adapted to, the metre?—for not a word has yet been said about changing the words. Goulston understands, putting in these poetical words instead of the proper and common words. I see nothing of this in the original.
In short, it appears to me, that nothing tolerable can be made of the phrase,
ἐις το μετρον
, taken in this sense. If it might be taken, as some have taken it, adverbially, for
μετρίως
—to a moderate degree—all would be well.
68
"Let it be considered in heroic verse, what a difference is made by such words, when properly used, and not inserted, or introduced, too frequently." But I cannot think that the expression will admit of this sense, though somewhat favoured, perhaps, by the circumstance of
μετρον
having been just before used in the sense of moderation:
το δε μετρον, κοινον άπαντων
, &c. If the article
το
were omitted, the adverbial sense would be less improbable; but,
εις ΤΟ μετρον
, can only, I think, mean into the metre. Still, however, I incline to think this was Aristotle's meaning, and that he probably wrote
ἐις το ΜΕΤΡΙΟΝ
. A single letter makes all the difference. The word
μετριον
, as far as that may add any probability to my conjecture, occurs in that part of the Rhetoric where he is treating of the very same subject—the proper and moderate use of metaphors, epithets, and other tropical and ornamental words, in oratory. Thus,
III. 2, p. 586
, speaking of epithets and diminutives, he says,
ευλαβείσθαι δε δει, και παρατηρειν ἐν ἀμφοιν ΤΟ ΜΕΤΡΙΟΝ.
And again, of epithets—
δει στοχαζεσθαι ΤΟΥ ΜΕΤΡΙΟΥ.
p. 587. As this was the only satisfactory sense I could make of the words, I have ventured to give it in my version.
204.
mvp-aristotle-comment-204
NOTE 204. P. 112.
22.13
FOR A COMMON AND USUAL WORD.
Κυριου ειωθοτος.
As
κυριον
, in Aristotle's sense, is common, the addition of
ειωθοτος
, (
usual), seems, at first view, to be mere tautology. But the case, as it is very well explained by Victorius, appears to have been this. The word
ἐσθιει
, which he here calls
κυριον ειωθοτος
, was not strictly
κυριον
,
69
but only a common metaphor; that is, a word which, though originally metaphorical, had acquired, by constant use as a chirurgical term, the effect of a proper word. [See NOTE 179.]
κυριον
, therefore, in Aristotle's enumeration, was opposed
μεταφορα
, as well as to
γλωττα
, and the rest of the poetical words, the application of it here, to a word that was evidently metaphorical in its original use, might seem inconsistent: the word
ἐιωθοτος
was therefore, probably, added, to obviate, in his short way, this objection.
I cannot guess what induced Dacier to render
γλωτταν
, here, by
"mot metaphorique;"
or Castelvetro to assert, that Aristotle calls
θοιναται
a foreign word, only on account of the boldness of the metaphor. By
γλωττα
, I think, we are to understand, any word that belongs either to another language, or another dialect of the same language, and that is not naturalized by common and popular
use. For foreign words, by long usage, become common and popular words; like
entire,
dame, and a great number of other French words in our language, which were
γλωτται
when first introduced, and for a considerable time afterwards; but have now, for many years, ceased to be considered as foreign words. Such words in the Greek language Aristotle, I apprehend, did not com-
prehend under the term
γλωτται
, as not being strange, uncommon,
ξενικα
. This is evident from a passage in his Rhetoric:
αι μεν ουν ΓΛΩΤΤΑΙ, ΑΓΝΩΤΕΣ· τα δε ΚΥΡΙΑ, ΙΣΜΕΝ.
70
There is, however, one sort of poetic words not distinctly provided for in Aristotle's enumeration; I mean, obsolete words. Yet these make so considerable a part of the privileged language of verse, that we can hardly suppose him to have overlooked them.
Γλωτται
seems the only class to which they can possibly be referred: yet his definition of
γλωττα
is, "a word,
ᾗ χρωνται ΕΤΕΡΟΙ
;" which is not applicable to an obsolete word, used by nobody. Perhaps he did not think it worth while to distinguish between words belonging to another language, or dialect, and words that once belonged to the native language, but which, having long fallen into disuse, have, when occasionally revived, the effect of foreign words.
205.
mvp-aristotle-comment-205
NOTE 205. P. 112.
22.13
THE CANKEROUS WOUND THAT EATS MY FLESH.
Φαγεδαινα ἡ με σαρκας ἐσθιει ποδα.
— We should read, probably, for the sake of the metre, either
φαγεδαινα γ' ἡ
, as it is corrected in the Oxford Euripides, or, which seems still better,
φαγεδαινα δη
, which is Du Pauw's emendation. And
σαρκας
, for the same reason, must have been altered to
σαρκα
, in the verse of Euripides, as, I see, it is given in the Oxford edition.
Had Aristotle told us no more about these two lines, than that one of them was of Æschylus, and the other of Euripides, what critic would not have confidently given the
θοιναται
to Æschylus?
206.
mvp-aristotle-comment-206
NOTE 206. P. 112.
22.13
Νυν δε μ’ εων ΟΛΙΓΟΣ τε και ΟΥΤΙΔΑΝΟΣ και ΑΚΙΚΥΣ.
Od. IX. 515.
—In the altered line, thus:
Νυν δε μ’ εων ΜΙΚΡΟΣ τε και ΑΣΘΕΝΙΚΟΣ και ΑΕΙΔΗΣ.
Among these substituted terms, that
μικρὸς
answers to
ὀλίγος
is clear enough; but how
ἀειδὴς
answers to
ἄκικυς
, it is not easy to make out. This difficulty struck me, long before I had seen the comment of Victorius, who makes the same remark;
71
and I had accounted for the mistake in the same way that he does: for, if
ἄκικυς
be the true reading, the commentators must, probably, have been misled by taking it for granted, that the substituted words must necessarily correspond, in order, as well as meaning, to the original words. But it is easy to see, that
ἀειδὴς
,
ugly, or deformed, cannot answer to
ἄκικυς
, which is
weak; and that
ἀσθενικὸς
does exactly answer to it.
Ἀκικυς — ΑΣΘΕΝΗΣ, ἀδύνατος.
Hefych.
—But my difficulty goes still farther. I do not see how
ἀειδὴς
can correspond, in meaning, to
ὀυτιδανὸς
. I once thought it should be
ΑΕΙΚΗΣ
.
Ουτιδανά — ὀυδενὸς ἄξια.
Hefych.
Αεικελίας — ἐυτελεῖς, ΟΥΔΕΝΟΣ ΑΞΙΟΥΣ
: and,
ΑΕΙΚΕΣ — ΕΥΚΑΤΑΦΡΟΝΗΤΟΝ.
Id.
So
Suidas
;
Αεικελιος — ὁ ἐυκαταφρόνητος.
But, notwithstanding the authority of lexicographers, and the common derivation of the two words,
εἰκής
and
ἀεικέλιος
, I question whether the former is ever used by Homer in the sense of
ὀυτιδανός
,
contemptible, mean, &c. though
ἀεικέλιος
is.
Ἀεικὴς
seems always to mean,
indignus
,
unworthy, sad, shocking, shameful, &c. It is a word of serious indignation.
Ἀεικέλιον
seems to be used sometimes in that sense, and sometimes in the contemptuous sense, as in the line of Homer which Aristotle next produces. The only passages that I have found in Homer, where
ἀεικὴς
will admit well of this sense, are
Od. Ν. 199
, and
Od. Ω. 249
, in the expressions,
ἀεικέα ἕσσο
, and,
ἀεικέα ἕσσαι
: yet even there, it is not necessary to render it
"meanly clad;"
it may be, as in other places,
sadly, unbecomingly, indignè, &c.
72
With respect to the word
ὀυτιδανὸς
, Hesychius gives
ἀσθενὴς
as one of its meanings;
73
and
ἀσθενικὸς
might well enough answer to it here, were it not for the stronger claim of the word
ἄκικυς
;
74
which, however, after all, may possibly be a mistake. We know how variously Homer was read and quoted by the antients. Three Medicean manuscripts here give
ἀειδὴς
, instead of
ἄκικυς
;
75
and so, the ed. Ald. and the version of Valla. This reading is also mentioned by Eustathius. Perhaps, then,
ἀειδὴς
might be the reading of Aristotle's copy—the precious copy
ἐκ νάρθηκος
, of which we hear so much; and he might mean to exemplify his proposed experiment of substituting common, for poetical, expression, only in the two first words; repeating the last,
ἀειδὴς
, merely to complete his verse. But whatever becomes of this conjecture, one thing I cannot help just observing—that this reading,
ἀειδὴς
, is favoured by the preceding lines in Homer. Polyphemus says—
Ἀλλ’ ἀιεί τινα φῶτα ΜΕΓΑΝ καὶ ΚΑΛΟΝ ἐδέγμην Ἔνθαδ’ ἐλεύσεσθαι, μεγάλην ἐπιειμένον ΑΛΚΗΝ. Νῦν δέ μ’, ἐὼν ΟΛΙΓΟΣ τε καὶ ΟΥΤΙΔΑΝΟΣ καὶ ΑΚΙΚΥΣ, &c.
Od. IX. 513.
One would expect the three words in this last line to answer, as opposites, to
great,
handsome, and
strong, in the two first: which they will not do, if we read
ἄκικυς
; for
ὀυτιδανὸς
, though it may very well be opposed to
μεγάλην ἐπιειμένον ἀλκήν
, cannot be, with any propriety, opposed to
καλὸν
. Whereas, if
ἀειδὴς
be substituted for
ἄκικυς
, all will answer exactly;
ὀλίγος
, to
μέγαν
,
ὀυτιδανός
, to
μεγάλην ἐπιειμένον ἀλκήν
, and
ἀειδὴς
, to
καλὸν
.
In these examples, it is not always easy to ascertain the particular class, to which Aristotle would have referred the words which he changes. We learn, however, that all these Homeric words were
ξενικά
,
uncommon, and poetical; and that all the substituted words were
κύρια
—
words in common and familiar use.
207.
mvp-aristotle-comment-207
NOTE 207.
22.17
P. 113. FOR IT IS THIS ALONE, WHICH CANNOT BE ACQUIRED, &C.
Well translated, though very freely, by
M. Batteux
.
"C'est la seule chose qu'on ne puisse emprunter d'ailleurs. C'est la production du génie, le coup-d'œil d'un esprit qui voit les rapports."
Compare
Rhet. III. 2, p. 585, D.
and
11, p. 595, E.
where it is observed, that,
καὶ ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ, τὸ ΟΜΟΙΟΝ, ΚΑΙ ΕΝ ΠΟΛΥ ΔΙΕΧΟΥΣΙ, θεωρεῖν, ἐυστοχον.
—See
Mr. Harris's Philol. Inq. p. 186, 187
, where all these passages are quoted and translated.
208.
mvp-aristotle-comment-208
NOTE 208.
22.18
P. 113. THE DOUBLE ARE BEST SUITED TO DITHYRAMBIC POETRY, &C.
—Χρησιμωτάτη ἡ διπλῆ λέξις τοῖς διθυράμβοις· ὁυτοι γὰρ ψοφώδεις· ἀι δὲ γλῶτται, τοῖς ἐποποιοῖς· σεμνὸν γὰρ καὶ ἀυθάδες· ἡ μεταφορὰ δὲ, τοῖς ἰαμβείοις.
Rhet. III. 3, p. 587.
209.
mvp-aristotle-comment-209
NOTE 209.
22.19
P. 113. BUT TO IAMBIC VERSE, WHICH, AS MUCH AS MAY BE, AN IMITATION OF COMMON SPEECH—.
This, as I have already observed, is the only passage in these three chapters concerning the diction, that strictly relates to the subject—the diction of Tragedy, as distinguished from that of the Epic, and other species.
76
It is a hint only; but a pregnant hint, and one that might furnish matter for a dissertation of some length. How frequently, even in the best Tragedies, do we see the Poet, as it were, through the actor; hear him indulging himself in his own language, instead of imitating that of his characters; substituting declamation for passion, describing when he should express; and, in the unrestrained and epic elevation of his diction, losing all sight of that natural language, of which, undoubtedly, the language of Tragedy should be, according to the precept here implied by Aristotle, only an improved imitation. This improvement, indeed, admits of more or less; but should, at least, bear always the same proportion to what we conceive would be the natural language
77
of the persons who speak, in the situation, whatever it may be, of the scene before us. For this last circumstance makes a great difference. Tragedy has its
ἀργὰ μέρη
, its comparatively
"idle parts,"
as well as the Epic Poem;
78
and, considering how rare the talent is of true poetic fancy, and poetic expression, the critic, who would rigorously exclude them from every part of Tragedy, must be an Ariphrades, or a Euclid. The first speech of
Caractacus, in Mr. Mason's exquisite drama, is highly poetical. Possibly, a severe critic might wish it somewhat less so;—but we have so little of such Poetry! No Poet, however, knows better than Mr. Mason, when the simpler tone of nature and passion should take place. When
Caractacus is exhorted by the Druids to
"bethink him"
—
—if ought on this vain earth Still holds too firm an union with his soul, Estranging it from peace—
—he answers,
I had a Queen:— Bear with my weakness, Druid!—This tough breast Must heave a sigh—for she is unreveng'd. And can I taste true peace, she unreveng'd? —So chaste, so lov'd a queen!—ah, Evelina, Hang not thus weeping on the feeble arm That could not save thy mother.—
The reader will find some excellent observations on this subject in
Dr. Beattie's Essay on Poetry, &c. Part II. chap. i. Sect. 1, p. 224, &c.
and
Sect. 3, p. 267, 268
, where a charming example of simple Tragic language is given from
Othello. In his note, Dr. Beattie has
"translated it into the finical style."
But we see plainly, that he is by much too good a Poet to succeed well in spoiling good Poetry.
With respect to the Greek Tragedy, its earliest language appears to have been of a low and burlesque kind—the
λέξις γελοἰα
of its satyric origin, conveyed in the suitable vehicle of the dancing tetrameters.
79
When it was reformed and dignified, (
ἀπεσεμνώθη
,) Homer was the model; and ÆSCHYLUS, with a conception naturally sublime, and the
Iliad before him, raised the tone of Tragedy above its proper pitch, not only to the pomp of the Epic, but even, frequently, to the wild, and tumid, and dark audacity of the Dithyrambic: so that, sometimes, as extremes will meet, the
λέξις γελοἰα
, which he took so much pains to avoid, came round and met him, in the shape of bombast, at the very moment when he thought himself at the greatest distance from it. There could not well be any thing in the theatrical cart of Thespis more laughable, than to call smoke
"the brother of fire,"
and dust, the
"brother of mud."
80
SOPHOCLES reduced the general language of his dialogue to a more equable and sober dignity, but still, Homer, we know, was his great model;
81
and of his diction it may, perhaps, be said, that it is often Epic, though his measure is Iambic. Most modern
readers, however, will, I believe, think it, (as we are told many antient readers did,) more adapted to the genius of Tragedy than that of EURIPIDES;
82
who seems to have been regarded by the antients as the first who brought down the language of Tragedy into unison with the measure, so that the one bore the same degree of resemblance to common speech in its expressions, as the other did in its rhythm. At least, this appears to have been Aristotle's opinion, from a passage in his
Rhetoric
, where, after having explained the difference between the diction of Oratory and that of Poetry, and the foundation of that difference, he observes, that such a degree of embellishment as forces on the hearer the idea of art, and labour, and preparation, is to be avoided, not only by the Orator, but even by the Poet, if he would be natural and affecting: and he compares such evidently artificial language to the voices of the generality of actors, as opposed to the voice of Theodorus, which always appeared to be the real voice of the character he personated; whereas their voices were evidently feigned.
83
He then adds
"The best way to conceal artifice, and make your language appear easy and natural, is, by forming it, chiefly, of the words and phrases of customary speech, properly selected; as EURIPIDES does, who first set the example."
84
A passage, that precedes this, deserves to be given entire, from its close connection with the subject of this part of the treatise on Poetry, and the curious, though short, sketch it contains of the history of Tragic diction.
"As the Poets appeared to owe their reputation to their language, which never failed to be admired, however foolish and absurd the matter it conveyed; on this account, even prose diction was, at first, poetical, like that of Gorgias. And even now, they, who use such language, are looked upon, by illiterate people, as the finest speakers; which is far from being true; for oratorical diction, and poetical diction, are different things. And as a proof of this, we see what has actually happened: for now, even among the Poets themselves, those who write Tragedy no longer make use of that sort of language; but, as they had exchanged the Trochaic verse for the Iambic, because this, of all metres, approaches the nearest to common speech; so now, they have also discarded all those words and phrases, so remote from common speech, with which the earlier Tragic Poets used to embellish their diction, and which are still employed by those who write Hexameters. It would be ridiculous, therefore, to imitate the Poets in a language, which they themselves have abandoned as improper."
85
The Abbé Batteux, by understanding
ἰαμβείοις
here to mean Iambic, or satirical, Poems, has, unluckily, thrown away the only passage in these three chapters, that was strictly to Aristotle's purpose. He has, also, with Dacier, misrepresented his meaning, by rendering—
"ne peut recevoir que ce qui est employé dans la conversation."
We are, undoubtedly, to understand,
ΜΑΛΙΣΤΑ ἁρμόττει
, as before: for that Aristotle did not mean absolutely to
exclude the other Poetic words—the double, the foreign, &c. from every part of the Tragic dialogue, is plain from his allowing the occasional use of them even in prose.
Rhet. III. 2, p. 585, C.
7, p. 590, E.
591, A.
210.
mvp-aristotle-comment-210
NOTE 210.
23.4
P. 115. EVEN IN THIS, THEREFORE, &C.
Ἤδη καὶ ταύτῃ.
already even in the first operation of his genius—the very choice of his subject, and formation of his plan. Such appears to me to be the force of
ἤδη
in this passage, which, I think, is injured by those commentators who punctuate—
ὥσπερ ἔιπομεν ἤδη
"as we have already said."
211.
mvp-aristotle-comment-211
NOTE 211.
23.4
P. 115. HE HAS, FROM THE REST, INTRODUCED MANY EPISODES—
Νῦν δὲ, ἓν μέρος ἀπολαβὼν, ἐπεισοδίοις κέχρηται ΑΥΤΩΝ πολλοῖς.
—i. e. as the commentators explain it, of the other parts of the war. But, what should we think of this English—
"Selecting one part of the war, he introduces many episodes of them?"
If Aristotle meant the other parts of the war,
ἀυτῶν
must, surely, be wrong: if
ἀυτῶν
be right, I confess I cannot see what he meant. I wish we had manuscript authority for the
ἀυτοῦ
of Heinsius, which is adopted and explained by
Le Bossu, II. 5, and 6.
—But a learned friend has suggested to me a conjecture still more probable; that Aristotle wrote
ΑΛΛΩΝ. Νῦν δὲ, ἝΝ μέρος ἀπολαβὼν, ἐπεισοδίοις κέχρηται ΑΛΛΩΝ [sc. μερῶν] πολλοῖς.
"Selecting one part only of the war, he has, from other parts, introduced many Episodes,"
&c.
212.
mvp-aristotle-comment-212
NOTE 212.
23.6
P. 115. THE AUTHOR OF THE CYPRIACS, AND OF THE LITTLE ILIAD.
To the authors usually referred to on the subject of these Poems, it may now be useful to add
Heyne, Excursu primo ad Æn. II. p. 228, 229
—a very learned and curious dissertation concerning the writers on the Trojan war.
213.
mvp-aristotle-comment-213
NOTE 213.
23.6
P. 116. THE FALL OF TROY.
See
Heyne, Excursu primo ad Æn. II. p. 230, 231.
214.
mvp-aristotle-comment-214
NOTE 214
24.3
P. 116. HOMER GAVE BOTH THE FIRST, AND THE MOST PERFECT, EXAMPLE.
Ὃις ἅπασιν Ὁμηρος κέχρηται, ΚΑΙ πρῶτος, ΚΑΙ ἱκανῶς.
—
"Neque quemquam alium, cujus operis primus auctor fuerit, in eo perfectissimum, præter HOMERUM, et Archilochum, reperiemus."
Vell. Paterculus, I. 5.
Victorius, and other commentators, have, I think, done some injustice to the force of Aristotle's expression here, by taking the adverb,
ἱκανῶς
, too literally. They render it
"ita ut satis putari debeat."
(Vict.)—
"accurate satis."
(Goulston.) &c. This gives the word, indeed, but falls short of the meaning, which
Castelvetro alone has, according to my idea, adequately expressed:
"Gran lode è quella, che è data da Aristotele ad Homero, che egli sia stato il primo, che abbia usate tutte e quattro le spetie dell' Epopea, &c. e le habbia usate bene & perfettamente."
And his translation is—
"Le quali cose tutte Homero usò, e primiero, e perfettamente."
Undoubtedly, the literal meaning of
ἱκανῶς
is,
sufficiently well; but in Poetry nothing is sufficiently well, that is not as well, or nearly as well, as possible: and, farther, if I am not mistaken, the Greek writers, not unfrequently, use
ἱκανὸς
and
ἱκανῶς
, as the Italians use the word
affai; sometimes for enough, (which, I suppose, is the primary signification of
affai,) and sometimes for much, a great deal, very, &c.
Ἱκανήν· ἀρκέσαν, ΠΟΛΛΗΝ.
Hefych.
215.
mvp-aristotle-comment-215
NOTE 215
24.5
P. 117. IF THE EPIC POEM WERE REDUCED FROM ITS ANTIENT LENGTH, SO AS NOT TO EXCEED THAT OF SUCH A NUMBER OF TRAGEDIES AS ARE PERFORMED SUCCESSIVELY AT ONE HEARING.
If we knew certainly, how many Tragedies were performed at one hearing, (
ἐις μίαν ἀκρόασιν
,) we should know, with equal certainty, to what length Aristotle thought the Epic Poem ought to be reduced, in order to be perfectly, or sufficiently,
ευσύνοπτον
. But, unfortunately, the premises here are not less obscure than the conclusion; the information to be picked up in antient authors, relative to the Tragic contests and the Tetralogia, being extremely imperfect and unsatisfactory. Let us however try, what little glimmering of light may be thrown upon this subject, from those authors, or from the nature of the thing itself.
The general principle, upon which Aristotle here fixes the length of an Epic Poem, is the same with that, upon which he
fixes the length of a Tragedy: viz.
"that it should be such as to admit of our comprehending, at one view, the beginning and the end. And this,"
he goes on,
"would be the case, were it reduced from its antient length, so as not to exceed that of such a number of Tragedies, as are performed successively at one hearing."
Here then is a rule, which, at the time he wrote it, was as clear and determinate, as if he had expressly said, that an Epic Poem ought not to exceed a certain number of verses. But, as an ingenious friend has suggested to me,
"he probably chose to put his rule in the way he has put it, rather than in this latter way, as wishing to convey an intimation, that the length of an Epic Poem should be such, as would admit of its being fairly recited, or read, in a single day."
It seems to have been a commonly received opinion, that the four dramas of each Poet, which composed the Tetralogia, were always performed at one hearing—in one day
86
. In this case, if one Poet only produced his Tetralogia, there could be but four Tragedies; if two, there must be eight; if three, twelve, and so on: there could be no intermediate numbers. In so obscure a subject, I certainly shall not take upon me to decide. The passage, however, commonly adduced, I believe, as the principal authority in this matter, from Diogenes Laertius, appears to me to be against this supposition. The words are these:
Ἐκείνοι [sc. Tragici] τέτρασι δράμασιν ἠγωνίζοντο, Διονυσίοις, Ληναίοις, Παναθηναίοις, Χύτροις, ὧν τὸ τέταρτον ἦν σατυρικόν· τὰ δὲ τέτταρα δράματα ἐκαλεῖτο Τετραλογία.
87
— Here are four festivals, and four dramas; and the most obvious meaning of the passage, surely, is, that each contending Poet produced, not his entire Tetralogia at the same festival, but one Tragedy only at each different festival. And so If. Casaubon appears to have understood it.
"Quot Athenis Liberalia agitabantur, tot fabulas di- versas a Tragicis Poetis doceri solitas legimus."
88
But it seems difficult to reconcile this account with what is generally, I think, said, and what Casaubon himself has elsewhere said, of the satyric piece;
89
viz. that it was played between, or after, the serious Tragedies, on each festival, by way of relaxation and relief. For, to say, that of the four dramas exhibited by each Poet on the four different festivals, the fourth was a satyric drama, (
ὧν τὸ ΤΕΤΑΡΤΟΝ ἦν σατυρικόν
), is to say, pretty plainly, that all the satyric pieces were performed together at the fourth and last festival, the
Χύτροι
. And so indeed some commentators seem to have understood it
90
. Perhaps the matter might, not unreasonably, be compromised, by supposing the rule, in fact, to have been, that, of the different Poets contending on each day, one should always produce the satyric drama of his Tetralogia, and that drama always close the exhibition of the day. But I forbear to indulge conjecture farther upon this dark subject. Let us return to Aristotle and his rule.
Dacier tells us, very gravely, that twelve, and sometimes sixteen, Tragedies were performed in one day:
91
an account, which, upon the very face of it, exceeds all bounds of probability. It is rather difficult to conceive, that the representation of a single Tragedy could take up less time than three hours. If however we suppose it to have taken up only two, and also, what could hardly be the case, that Tragedy succeeded Tragedy without any intermission, just
as scene succeeded scene in the same piece, the whole exhibition of the day, according to Dacier's lowest statement, would have taken up 24, and according to his highest, 32 hours. But is it conceivable, that any audience, however intemperate their fondness for this amusement, could sit so many hours together to hear Tragedies, and to hear them attentively, so as to judge of, and decide upon, their comparative merits? — This account, therefore, of Dacier, that the number of Tragedies performed
"at one hearing,"
and to the same audience, (for that is implied,) amounted to twelve, we may venture at once to reject as the most palpable impossibility. Shall we then suppose eight, the next lowest number possible, on the supposition, that the four dramas of the Tetralogia were exhibited in one day? The representation of eight Tragedies, we may venture to say, could not possibly take up less time than sixteen hours. Let any man conceive himself sitting in a Theatre, and hearing Tragedy after Tragedy, from six o'clock in the morning till ten at night, and then pronounce as to the probability of even this supposition. If we reject this number, and still adhere to the common notion of these exhibitions, we shall be reduced to a single Tetralogia; in which case there can have been no rival exhibition on the same day. It seems therefore impossible to adjust this matter in any reasonable way, without supposing, that the four dramas of the Tetralogia were exhibited on different festivals: a supposition, I think, fairly deducible from the passage of Diog. Laertius above quoted. A supposition too, which seems to be rendered more probable from the very nature of rival exhibitions; as each contending Poet would then produce his drama at the same hearing, each hearing would be a distinct day of contest, and there would be, at each contest, a sufficient ground of judgment upon the comparative merits of each performance. This idea will allow us to assign about twelve hours, as the utmost time taken up by the whole exhibition of the day; and the great difference of length, which we observe in the Greek Tra-
gedies that are extant, will also allow us to conclude, that, occasionally, five, or possibly even six Tragedies, might be brought within that compass, or nearly so
92
. On this ground, then, it will appear, I believe, that the extent, to which Aristotle proposed to limit the Epic Poem, could hardly exceed that of about 7000 lines.
But, if we admit this, we must of course admit, that he meant to include the Poems of Homer in the number of those which he regarded as too long. And that he did so mean, however unwilling Dacier and other commentators are to allow it,
93
I have no doubt. For, 1. The actual length of those Poems seems sufficiently to prove this. The number of lines in the Iliad is nearly 15,000; in the Odyssey, nearly 12,000. Now whoever can believe it possible, that an audience could sit, and make a common practice of sitting, 22, or even 18 hours together, to hear Tragedies, (which, at the lowest allowance, of two hours only for the performance of each piece, must have been the case, if Homer's Poems fell within Aristotle's rule,) may believe, that he thought those Poems of a proper length. Dacier, indeed, tells us, that even the Iliad may be read through in a single day
94
. For a wager, indeed, I will not say what might be done, if we had reading races
at Newmarket. But, 2. Had Aristotle meant to except Homer, why not expressly except him? Gladly as he appears to seize every opportunity of giving the Poet his just praise, would he not, here also, have opposed his conduct to that of other Poets, as he has done in so many other instances? Or why, indeed, refer us to the number of Tragedies successively performed in one day, when he might as well have referred at once to the Iliad, or the Odyssey? All this seems to leave no doubt, that he thought those Poems drawn out to too great a length. And this is also conformable to what he afterwards says, of the advantage which the Tragic has above the Epic Poem in this circumstance, that it effects its purpose
"in a shorter compass"
—
ἐν ἐλάττονι μήκει
.
95
I do not forget what he had said in the preceding chapter—that if Homer had taken the whole war for his subject, his Poem would not have been
ευσύνοπτον
: which, it may be urged, implies, that he thought it
πως ευσύνοπτον
as Homer had managed it, and therefore not too long. But the contradiction here is merely apparent. The
ευσύνοπτον
admits of degrees; and all that Aristotle appears to mean, in the passage before us, is, that the Poems of Homer would have been more
ευσύνοπτα
, and, in that respect, more perfect, had they been shorter.
But, to return once more to the dramatic exhibitions—the time of twelve hours seems to be the very utmost that can reasonably be allowed, and is more, I believe, than will readily be allowed, without considering the particular character of the Athenians, and the circumstances attending these theatrical exhibitions. The intemperate fondness of that people for these amusements is well known; and Aristotle himself gives us a pretty strong picture of it, when he says, though only in the way of hyperbolical supposition,
"if A HUNDRED Tragedies were to be exhibited in concurrence*."
96
We must, also, consider the variety of subjects in the
different Tragedies performed, and, indeed, the variety resulting from the very nature of the Greek drama, with its choral troop, its odes, its accompaniments of music and dance: the relief, also, of the satyric drama, which closed the performance by way of Farce; the pleasure of comparing the rival Poets and actors, the zeal of party in favour of this, or that, particular Poet or performer, &c.—And we may add to all this a curious circumstance in the dramatic history of the Greeks; that the people never sate
ἄσιτοι θεωροῦντες
, but eat, and drank, and regaled themselves with cakes, and nuts, and wine, during the performance, like an English audience at Sadler's Wells, or Bartholomew Fair.
97
In the whole theatrical system of the antients, and every thing relating to it, all seems to have been proportionably vast, extravagant, and gigantic. Their immense theatres, their colossal dresses, the stilts, buskins, or heroic pattens, on which the actor was mounted,
98
their masks that covered the whole head, their loud, chanting, and speaking-trumpet declamation
99
—all this is upon the same scale with the intemperate eagerness of the people for these amusements, the number of Tragedies exhibited in one day, and, we may add, the almost incredible number said to have been written even by their best Poets. Would not this last circumstance alone, supposing not a single drama to have been preserved, have furnished a reasonable proof,
à priori
, or, at least, a strong presumption, that the Greek Tragedy must have been, in many respects, a simple, unequal, imperfect thing, just such as, in fact, and prejudice apart, we
find it to be? SOPHOCLES, confessedly the most correct and polished of the three great Tragic Poets, is said to have written above an hundred Tragedies.
100
216.
mvp-aristotle-comment-216
NOTE 216
24.9
P. 117. FOR, IN THIS RESPECT ALSO, THE NARRATIVE IMITATION IS ABUNDANT, AND VARIOUS, BEYOND THE REST.
Περιττὴ γὰρ καὶ ἡ διηγηματικὴ μίμησις τῶν ἄλλων.
—
περιττὴ
is rendered, by almost all the commentators,
eximia, præstantior
,
more excellent, than the other imitations; which makes Aristotle directly contradict himself. And this Victorius allows, at the same time that he adheres to that sense:—
"præstantiorem esse [hanc poesin] inter cæteras, et altiorem locum tenere."
How this can be reconciled with the critic's decided preference of Tragedy in the last chapter, I do not see. I believe Dacier is right, in giving to
περιττὴ
, in this passage, the sense of,
more abundant—
la plus excessive de toutes.
101
The text, however, appears to me to be defective: for what becomes of the
καὶ
, which Dacier, and other translators, have been forced to neglect? The only fair version of the passage, as we now read it, is this:—
"for the narrative imitation ALSO, is more abundant, &c. ΚΑΙ ἡ διηγ. μιμ. "
— of which I can make no reasonable sense. Farther, some word seems wanting, to express in what the Epic is
περιττὴ
; and this Dacier found himself obliged to supply in his translation and note:
en cela la plus excessive—.
I cannot, therefore, help suspecting, that
τούτοις [sc. ξενικοῖς ὀνόμασι]
, or rather
ταύτῃ
, has been omitted; and that we should read thus—
περιττὴ γὰρ, καὶ ΤΑΥΤΗι, ἡ διηγηματικὴ μίμησις τῶν ἄλλων
"In this respect too"
—alluding to the several other respects mentioned in this chapter, in which the Epic imitation was
περιττὴ τῶν ἄλλων
: as, in the time of its action, and the length of the Poem itself; in its Episodes, and the variety and
μεγαλοπρέπεια
arising from them, and from the admission of contemporary events; in the degree, also, to which it admits of the wonderful, and even the incredible. This, also, agrees perfectly with what he had said,
cap. xxii.
καὶ ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἡρωικοῖς ΑΠΑΝΤΑ χρήσιμα τὰ εἰρημένα.
102
217.
mvp-aristotle-comment-217
NOTE 217
24.11
P. 117. HAVE MORE MOTION.
Κινητικά.
The scruple of Victorius, who proposed to read
κινητά
, from a doubt, whether
κινητικὰ
would admit of a passive sense, seems to have been ill-founded. The passage in
Plutarch, De primo frigido
, referred to by Goulston in his note, is this:
ὡς βραδεῖα καὶ ΣΤΑΣΙΜΟΣ [ἀντίκειται] πρὸς ὀξυρροπὸν καὶ ΚΙΝΗΤΙΚΟΝ.
P. 1755, ed. H. S.
But the word is used in the same sense by Aristotle himself, in the 50th of the
Harmonic Problems, p. 770,
where
κινητικὰ
is applied to the acuter sound of a concord, on account of the velocity of its vibrations, and opposed to
ἠρεμαῖον
, by which he characterizes the graver sound.
218.
mvp-aristotle-comment-218
NOTE 218
24.11
P. 117. THE OTHER, ADAPTED TO ACTION AND BUSINESS.
Πρακτικόν.
— See
NOTE 45, P. 234.
219.
mvp-aristotle-comment-219
NOTE 219
24.14
P. 118. THE POET, IN HIS OWN PERSON, &C.
The reader may compare
Plato's account of Homer, De Rep. lib. iii. p. 393, ed. Serr. p. 178, ed. Massey.
220.
mvp-aristotle-comment-220
NOTE 220
24.15
P. 118. BUT EPIC POETRY----ADMITS EVEN THE IMPROBABLE AND INCREDIBLE, FROM WHICH THE HIGHEST DEGREE OF THE SURPRISING RESULTS, BECAUSE, THERE, THE ACTION IS NOT SEEN.
Δεῖ μὲν οὖν ἐν ταῖς Τραγῳδίαις ποιεῖν τὸ θαυμαστὸν· μᾶλλον δ’ ἐνδέχεται ἐν τῇ ἐποποιΐᾳ τὸ ἄλογον, δι’ ὃ συμβαίνει μάλιστα τὸ θαυμαζον, διὰ τὸ μὴ ὁρᾶν ἐις τὸν πράττοντα.
Such is the reading which I have followed. The sense, which I have given it, accords very nearly, if not exactly, with that given by Victorius and Goulston, and adopted by Dacier and M. Batteux
103
. Victorius supports his emendation—
ΑΛΟΓΟΝ
, instead of
ἀνάλογον
—by reasons of considerable cogency: viz. the difficulty, or, rather, the impossibility, of making any satisfactory sense of
τὸ ἀνάλογον
, as the rest of the passage stands;
104
the explanatory instance itself, which immediately follows, and is, plainly, an instance of the
ἄλογον
, and even expressly called
γελοῖον
,
ridiculously improbable; and the similar instance, presently after given, of the landing of Ulysses in the Odyssey, which he expressly calls,
τὰ ἐν Ὀδυσσειᾳ ΑΛΟΓΑ
, &c.
But, though I think the sense of the passage, thus read, and thus explained, is, in itself, unexceptionable, yet I can by no means rely with perfect confidence upon the reading from which it is obtained. All the manuscripts, it seems, give, with one consent,
ΑΝΑΛΟΓΟΝ
. This circumstance, in a passage not free, in other respects, from suspicion, should be sufficient to prevent our admitting the emendation of Victorius, however probable, without some reserve—
"expectandi codices."
I should perhaps, therefore, have done better, had I omitted the doubtful part of the passage—the words,
τὸ ἀνάλογον, δι’ ὃ μάλιστα συμβαίνει τὸ θαυμαστόν
: for the omission will leave a clear and complete sense; and, moreover, a sense, in which the only meaning that can well be given to the words omitted, seems, in fact, to be implied.
Δεῖ μὲν οὖν ἐν ταῖς τραγῳδίαις ποιεῖν τὸ θαυμαστόν· μᾶλλον δ’ ἐνδέχεται ἐν τῇ ἐποποιΐᾳ, — διὰ τὸ μὴ ὁρᾶν ἐις τὸν πράττοντα.
"The surprising is necessary in Tragedy: but the Epic Poem admits of it to a greater degree, because, there, the action is not seen."
221.
mvp-aristotle-comment-221
NOTE 221.
24.16
P. 119. ACHILLES MAKING SIGNS, &C.
The passage is this:
Λαοῖσιν δ’ ἀνένευε καρήατι δῖος Ἀχιλλεὺς, Οὐδ’ ἔα ἵεμεναι ἐπὶ Ἕκτορι πικρὰ βέλεμνα, Μή τις κῦδος ἄροιτο βαλὼν, ὁ δὲ δεύτερος ἔλθοι.
Il. 22. 205.
222.
mvp-aristotle-comment-222
NOTE 222.
24.18
P. 119. IT CONSISTS IN A SORT OF SOPHISM, &c.
In the words,
δεὶ δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν προσθεῖναι
, inclusively, the text seems evidently mangled beyond all hope of conjectural restoration. This
ulcus insanabile
I presume not to touch, either as commentator, or as translator. I can make nothing consistent of it myself: I have seen nothing consistent made of it by others.
The words,
τοῦτο δὲ ἐστι ψεῦδος
, are ambiguous. Victorius doubts, whether they mean,
"this posterior fact is false,"
(the
τοδὶ γίνεται
,) or,
"this conclusion is false"
—namely,
εἰ τὸ ὕστερον ἐστι, καὶ τὸ πρότερον εἶναι.
What follows, had it been tolerably clear, would, probably, have fixed the sense of
ψεῦδος
. As this is not the case, I have given it that sense which appears to me most obvious; and I think I am warranted by the very same expression used in the same sense, in the
Rhetoric, II. 23, p. 579, A
, where,
ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο ψεῦδος
, clearly means,
this is a false conclusion.
But the most important question is, in what manner Aristotle meant to apply this logical paralogism to Homer's management of fiction. None of the commentators, whom I have seen, appear to me to have given any satisfactory explanation.
The paralogism
παρ’ ἑπόμενον
,
à consequenti
, here alluded to, the reader will find clearly explained in several parts of the philosopher's other works.
105
It consists in taking a proposition as convertible, that is not so. Because rain wets the ground, we conclude, when we see the ground wet, that it must have rained. Because every man in a fever is hot, we conclude, that a person who is hot must be in a fever:
ἀνάγκη ΚΑΙ τὸν θερμὸν πυρέττειν.
These are some of Aristotle's own explanatory instances. Now, he tells us here, that Homer's art of lying—
ψευδῆ λέγειν ὡς δεῖ
—consists in imposing his marvellous fictions upon the reader's imagination by a sort of poetic sophism, similar to this logical sophism. And this is all he says. He has left us to make out the similitude as well as we can. No writer, I believe, ever paid more frequent compliments of this kind to the sagacity of his readers.
Dacier, with other commentators, seems to understand nothing more, than that artful intermixture of historical, or acknowledged, truth, which, by throwing the mind, as it were, into a posture of belief and conviction, has its effect even upon what we know to be feigned, and makes the false pass glibly with the true. But I cannot think, that this comes up to Aristotle's meaning, nor that his observation, here, amounts only to that of
Strabo
:—
ἐκ μηδενὸς ἀληθὲς ἀνάπτειν καινὴν τερατολογίαν, οὐχ Ὁμηρικόν, κ. τ. λ.
106
For no one has attempted to shew, and I believe no one can shew, how that, which Aristotle says of the particular paralogism denominated
παρ’ ἑπόμενον
, is applicable to the intermixture—the mere juxtaposition, of fact and fiction.
The similitude of the logical and poetic sophism appears to me to be this. It is not merely, that, where there is a mixture of history
and fiction, the truth makes the fiction pass; but the comparison, I think, relates to the connection between the fictions of the Poet, considered as cause and effect, as antecedent and consequent. The Poet invents certain extraordinary characters, incidents, and situations. When the actions, and the language, of those characters, and, in general, the consequences of those events, or situations, as drawn out into detail by the Poet, are such as we know, or think, to be true—that is to say, poetically true, or natural; such, as we are satisfied must necessarily, or would probably, follow, if such characters and situations actually existed; this probability, nature, or truth, of representation, imposes on us, sufficiently for the purposes of Poetry. It induces us to believe, with hypothetic and voluntary faith, the existence of those false events, and imaginary personages, those
ἀδύνατα, ἄλογα, ψευδῆ
—those marvellous and incredible fictions, which, otherwise managed, we should have rejected: that is, their improbability, or impossibility, would have so forced themselves upon our notice, as to destroy, or disturb, even the slight and willing illusion of the moment.
Whenever, says the philosopher, supposing such a thing to be, it would certainly be followed by such effects; if we see those effects, we are disposed to infer the existence of that cause. And thus, in Poetry, and all fiction, this is the logic of that temporary imposition on which depends our pleasure. The reader of a play, or a novel, does not, indeed, syllogize, and say to himself
"Such beings as are here supposed, had they existed, must have acted and spoken exactly in this manner; therefore, I believe they have existed:"
—but he feels the truth of the premises, and he consents to feel the truth of the conclusion; he does not revolt from the imagination of such beings. Every thing follows so naturally, and, even, as it seems, so necessarily, that the probability and truth of nature, in the consequences, steals, in a manner, from our view, even the impossibility of the cause, and flings an air of truth over the whole. With respect to fact, indeed, all is equally
ψεῦδος
; for if the causes exist not, neither can the effects. But the consequent lies are so told, as to impose on us, for the moment, the belief of the antecedent, or fundamental fiction.
107
For instances of this art, no reader can be at a loss. He will find them, not only in almost all the
"speciosa miracula"
of Homer, but even in the wilder and more absurd miracles of Ariosto; whose poem is, indeed, a striking example of the most improbable, and, in themselves, revolting lies,
108
to which, however, every poetical reader willingly throws open his imagination; principally, I believe, from the easy charm of his language and versification, and the remarkable distinctness of his painting; but, partly too, from the truth and nature which he has contrived to fling into the detail of his description. But were I to choose, from the productions of poetic genius at large, an example, which would, singly, illustrate this passage of Aristotle, more than any other that I recollect, it should be the
Caliban of Shakspeare.
I shall only add, without troubling the reader with any comment of mine, one passage of the
Rhetoric
, which may serve, both to illustrate the paralogism itself, here alluded to, and to confirm the application which I have given it. In that passage, Aristotle applies the paralogism
παρ’ ἑπόμενον
, to the effect of oratorical elocution, in producing persuasion and conviction in the hearers.
Πιθανοῖ δὲ τὸ πρᾶγμα, καὶ ἡ οἰκεία λέξις· ΠΑΡΑΛΟΓΙΖΕΤΑΙ γὰρ ἡ ψυχὴ, ὡς ἀληθῶς λεγόντων, ὅτι, ἐπὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις, οὕτως ἔχουσιν· ὥστε οἴονται, εἰ καὶ μὴ οὕτως ἔχει, ὡς ὁ λέγων, τὰ πράγματα, οὕτως ἔχειν.
109
"What the Orator says, is, likewise, rendered probable and credible by a suitable diction and elocution. For we are cheated into the persuasion, that the orator speaks truly, merely because we know that men, so circumstanced as he assumes to be, are actually affected in that manner: so that we take it for granted, that things are really as the speaker represents them to be, when, in fact, they are not so."
The art here pointed out by Aristotle, as eminent in Homer's poetry, evidently extends to fiction in general; but, by
ψεῦδη
, I understand him to allude, chiefly, to fictions of the extraordinary, marvellous, and improbable kind—such as require the utmost art and management of the Poet to make them pass. The connection of the whole passage, if I am not mistaken, shews this to be the author's meaning; the application of
ψεῦδη
being fixed, both by the terms
θαυμαστὸν
, and
ἄλογον
, in what precedes, and by the
ἀδύνατα καὶ εἰκότα
which follow, and which I take to be, or, at least, to include, those very
ψευδῆ λεγόμενα ὡς δεῖ
, of which he had, immediately before, been speaking.
223.
mvp-aristotle-comment-223
NOTE 223.
24.21
P. 120. IF, HOWEVER, ANY THING OF THIS KIND, &C.
I much doubt of the integrity of the text. The sense I have given seems to be the only one, which the passage, as it now stands, will reasonably bear. Dacier, after Victorius, understands—
"if the admission of one improbable circumstance be the means of giving more probability to the rest."
I do not well comprehend this: I am sure it is not what Aristotle has said. His words are,
ἂν δὲ θῇ, καὶ φαίνηται εὐλογώτερον
i. e.
"if he has introduced such a circumstance, or incident, and it (not the rest, the whole) has some appearance of probability,"
&c.
I suppose Aristotle meant to say, that, though improbabilities are certainly faults, and ought to be carefully avoided in the first choice and structure of a fable, yet, they might be so well managed by a Poet of genius, (especially in the Epic, which is here the subject,) as to appear rather probable—
εὐλογώτερον
; to pass with some shew of probability; and, in this case, should be admitted, or tolerated, even though pushed to the
ἄτοπον
, or absurd. This sense accords perfectly with what immediately follows, which is precisely an instance of such management; of absurdity, or, at least, improbability, (
τὰ ἐν Ὀδυσσειᾳ ἄλογα
) veiled by the charms of poetry, and finding almost as ready an admission into the imagination of the reader, under the passport of the beauties by which it is accompanied, as if it were, in itself, ever so consonant to nature and experience.
With respect to the words
ἐνδέχεσθαι καὶ ἄτοπον
—it seems necessary to adopt one or the other of the two manuscript readings
ἐκδέχεσθαι
, or
ἀποδέχεσθαι
. The former of these verbs
Mr. Winstanley
takes in the sense of
ἀπείργειν, κωλύειν
, upon the authority of
Suidas
. But in the very passage adduced by that lexicographer, the immediate sense of
ἐκδέχεσθαι
is,
to receive.
Γέρρα τε παρατεταγμένα ἦν, ἐις τὸ ΕΚΔΕΧΕΣΘΑΙ τὰ τῶν βαρβάρων τοξεύματα.
i. e.
to receive them;
and by receiving them to keep them off from their bodies. Arcere, here, is only what we may call the consequential meaning of the word. I do not see, that it may not, in this place, very well bear the sense of receiving, admitting, or, rather, tolerating: but of this I would not be understood to speak positively. This seems, at least, to be the sense, which the purport of the passage requires; and it refers, I think, not to the Poet himself, as some understand it, but to the audience, or the reader. When Aristotle has just said,
ἂν δὲ θῇ
i. e.
"but if he has introduced, or admitted it,"
how can he be understood to add,
"he should admit it?"
Farther, the word
ἀνεκτά
, (
tolerabilia
), which, in the instance immediately subjoined, clearly relates to the hearer, or reader, seems sufficiently to
fix the same reference of the correspondent word,
ἐκδέχεσθαι
, or
ἀποδέχεσθαι
, here.
Mr. Harris, in his Philol. Inquiries, p. 220
, though he has not quoted, or translated, this particular passage, appears, pretty clearly, to allude to it, and to have understood the verb as here explained. He says, speaking of improbabilities in the drama—
"'Tis true, indeed, did such plays exist,"
[
ἂν δὲ θῇ
]
"and were their other dramatic requisites good, these improbabilities might be endured, and the plays be still admired."
The version of
Piccolomini
agrees with mine:—
"Ma se, ponendovisi poi qualche cosa, che in sè habbia del non ragionevole, si adornerà, & si tratterà, in maniera, ch'ella apparir possa ragionevole, potrà, in tal caso, trovarvi luogo."
p. 392.
224.
mvp-aristotle-comment-224
NOTE 224.
24.22
P. 121. THE ABSURDITY IS CONCEALED UNDER THE VARIOUS BEAUTIES, &C.
In the language of
Pindar
,—
Καὶ πού τι καὶ βροτῶν φρένας, ὑπὲρ τὸν ἀληθῆ λόγον, δεδαιδαλμένοι ψεύδεσι ποικίλοις ἐξαπατῶντι μῦθοι. ΧΑΡΙΣ δ’, ἅπερ ἅπαντα τευ- -χει τὰ μείλιχα θνατοῖς, ἐπιφέροισα τιμὰν, ΚΑΙ ΑΠΙΣΤΟΝ ἘΜΗΣΑΤΟ ΠΙΣΤΟΝ ΕΜΜΕΝΑΙ.
Olymp. I.
"L'homme est de glace aux verités, Il est de feu pour les mensonges."
La Fontaine, Fab. 174.
The reader, I believe, will be pleased with the comparison of a poetical passage so remarkably apposite to this observation of the philosopher; and, indeed, to all this part of his treatise, relative to the management of fiction. On account of the same general relation to the subject, I may be excused for adding these agreeable lines of Plautus:—
Sed quasi Poeta, tabulas cum cepit sibi, Quærit quod nusquam est gentium, reperit tamen, Facit illud verisimile quod mendacium est, Nunc ego Poeta fiam.
Pseud. Act I. Sc. 4.
225.
mvp-aristotle-comment-225
NOTE 225.
24.23
P. 121. THE IDLE PARTS OF THE POEM-.
ἈΡΓΑ μέρη.
The expression is best explained, according to my idea of it, by
Castelvetro
.—
"Dobbiamo intendere per parti otiose, quelle, nelle quali il poeta parla di sua persona, & con favella sua ci fa vedere quello che si fa: le quali perciò si domandano, μέρη ἀργὰ, che non sono in atto, ed operanti, come sono quelle, le quali sono rappresentate in palco, & quelle, nelle quali per gli poeti epopei sono introdotte le persone à favellare; le quali parti, perche paiono pressoche montare in palco, ed operare, si contrappongono alle parti otiose, e contengono, principalmente, le sententie, ed, accessoriamente, i costumi."
p. 578.
Dacier's
"parties foibles,"
in which he is followed by
M. Batteux
, presents a different, and, I think, a wrong idea.
226.
mvp-aristotle-comment-226
NOTE 226.
24.23
P. 121. IN WHICH NEITHER MANNERS NOR SENTIMENTS PREVAIL.
It has been inquired, why Aristotle here passes over in silence the passionate parts of the Poem; to which a laboured and splendid diction seems as ill suited, as it is to the expression of manners and sentiments. This inquiry has produced another; whether he did, or did not, mean to include the passionate parts in
διανοητικοῖς
.
Madius
contends that he did:
Victorius
, that he did not. I believe the latter is right. For if we take
διάνοια
, here, in that wide sense which is given it in
cap. xix.
it will include
"whatever is the object of speech;"
110
"every thing,"
as
Mr. Harris
has explained it,
"for which men employ language."
111
If, therefore, the
μέρη διανοητικὰ
, here, comprehend those thoughts which express passion, they will also comprehend such as express manners, or character; from which Aristotle expressly distinguishes them:
μήτε ἠθικοῖς, μήτε διανοητικοῖς.
But, whether he did, or did not, mean to include the passionate parts of the Poem, it seems true, and he would probably have allowed it, that such a diction as he here describes is improper for the expression of passion: nor is this at all inconsistent, as, on a superficial view, it may seem to be, with the following passage in his
Rhetoric
. —
Τὰ δὲ ὀνόματα, τὰ ἐπίθετα, καὶ διπλᾶ πλείω, καὶ τὰ ξένα, μάλιστα ἁρμόττει λέγοντι ΠΑΘΗΤΙΚΩΣ· συγγνώμη γὰρ ὀργιζομένῳ, κακὸν φάναι "ὀυρανόμηκες," "πελώριον" εἰπεῖν, &c.
112
The strong and figurative language, and, what may be called, the natural Poetry of
passion—a sort of Poetry which we every day hear from the mouths of those, who never made, and scarce, perhaps, ever read, a verse—this is a very different thing from the
ΔΙΑΠΟΝΕΙΝ λέξει
, the
ΛΙΑΝ ΛΑΜΠΡΑ λέξις
, of which the philosopher here speaks.—But, for an exact, though short, discussion of this subject, with its proper distinctions and limitations, I must refer the reader to an excellent note on v. 94, of
Horace's Epistle to the Pisos
.
113
It will be found, I think, perfectly consistent with both the passages of Aristotle here considered, and will afford the best support to the above remarks.
114
227.
mvp-aristotle-comment-227
NOTE 227.
24.23
P. 121. OBSCURED BY TOO SPLENDID A DICTION.
ΑΠΟΚΡΥΠΤΕΙ γὰρ πάλιν ἡ λίαν λαμπρὰ λέξις τὰ ἤθη καὶ τὰς διανοἰας.
—In the same sense, in which
ἐγκρύπτεται
is used, in a similar passage of
Longinus, Sect. 15.
—where, speaking of the effect of lively imagery, in stealing one's attention from argument, he says,
Φύσει δέ πως, ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις ἅπασιν, ἀεὶ τοῦ κρείττονος ἀκούομεν· ὅθεν, ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀποδεικτικοῦ περιελκόμεθα ἐις τὸ κατὰ φαντασίαν ἐκπληκτικόν, ᾧ τὸ πραγματικὸν ΕΓΚΡΥΠΤΕΤΑΙ ΠΕΡΙΛΑΜΠΟΜΕΝΟΝ.
So also,
Sect. 17.
—
ΑΠΕΚΡΥΨΕ τὸ σχῆμα τῷ ΦΩΤΙ ΑΥΤΩ.
—And again—
διὰ ΛΑΜΠΡΟΤΗΤΑ τὴν τέχνην ΑΠΟΣΚΙΑΖΕΙ, καὶ ὁῖον ἐν ΚΑΤΑΚΑΛΥΨΕΙ τηρεῖ.
The following passage of the Rhetoric, concerning the mixture of the argumentative with the pathetic, will also help to illustrate that before us.
Καὶ ὅταν πάθος ποιῇς, μὴ λέγε ἐνθύμημα· ἢ γὰρ ἐκκρούσει τὸ πάθος, ἢ μάτην εἰρημένον ἔσται, τὸ ἐνθύμημα· ἐκκρούουσι γὰρ αἱ κινήσεις ἀλλήλας, αἱ ἅμα καὶ, ἢ ΑΦΑΝΙΖΟΥΣΙΝ, ἢ ἀσθενεῖς ποιοῦσιν.
Rhet. III. 17. p. 604, E.
In the same manner the expression of Aristotle is well explained by
Piccolomini
, in his commentary,
p. 394.
228.
mvp-aristotle-comment-228
NOTE 228.
25.3
P. 123. IN WORDS, EITHER COMMON, OR FOREIGN, &C.
Λέξει ἢ καὶ γλώτταις—.
Heinf. [Heinsius]
ΚΥΡΙΑι λέξει, ἢ καὶ γλώτταις.
The insertion seems necessary, but would, perhaps, be better thus:
λέξει, Η ΚΥΡΙΑι, καὶ γλώτταις,
&c. Victorius and other commentators suppose
κυρίᾳ
to be understood. But this I cannot conceive.
Λέξις
appears clearly to be used here, as in
cap. xxii.
for diction in general, including, as in that chapter, every sort of words.
229.
mvp-aristotle-comment-229
NOTE 229.
25.3
P. 123. WHICH ARE THE PRIVILEGE OF POETS.
ΔΙΔΟΜΕΝ γὰρ ταῦτα τοῖς ποιηταῖς.
The same expression is made use of by
Isocrates
, in the following passage, to which I referred in
NOTE 5, p. 158,
and in which the privileges and advantages of the Poet are well set forth, and the importance of verse to the effect of even the best poetry, is strongly insisted on.
Τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ποιηταῖς πολλοὶ ΔΕΔΟΝΤΑΙ κόσμοι. Καὶ γὰρ πλησιάζοντας τοῖς ἀνθρώποις τοὺς θεοὺς οἷόν τ’ αὐτοῖς ἐστι ποιῆσαι, καὶ διαλεγομένους, καὶ συναγωνιζομένους, οἷς ἂν βουληθῶσι· καὶ περὶ τούτων δηλῶσαι, μὴ μόνον τοῖς τεταγμένοις ὀνόμασιν, ἀλλὰ, τὰ μὲν, ξένοις, τὰ δὲ, καινοῖς, τὰ δὲ, μεταφοραῖς· καὶ μηδὲν παραλιπεῖν, ἀλλὰ πᾶσι τοῖς εἴδεσι διαποικῖλαι τὴν ποἰησιν.
115
Τοῖς δὲ περὶ τοὺς λόγους οὐδὲν ἔξεστι τῶν τοιούτων· ἀλλ’ ἀποτόμως, καὶ τῶν ὀνομάτων τοῖς πολιτικοῖς, καὶ τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων τοῖς περὶ αὐτὰς τὰς πράξεις, ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστι χρῆσθαι.
116
Πρὸς δὲ τούτοις, οἱ μὲν μετὰ μέτρων καὶ ῥυθμῶν ἅπαντα ποιοῦσιν· οἱ δὲ οὐδενὸς τούτων κοινωνοῦσιν· ἃ τοσαύτην ἔχει χάριν, ὥς, ἂν καὶ τῇ λέξει, καὶ τοῖς ἐνθυμήμασιν, ἔχῃ κακῶς, ὅμως ταῖς γε εὐρυθμίαις καὶ ταῖς συμμετρίαις ψυχαγωγοῦσι τοὺς ἀκούοντας. Καταμάθοι δ’ ἄν τις ἐκεῖθεν τὴν δύναμιν αὐτῶν· ἢν γάρ τις τῶν ποιημάτων τῶν εὐδοκιμούντων τὰ μὲν ὀνόματα καὶ τὰς διανοἰας καταλίπῃ, τὸ δὲ ΜΕΤΡΟΝ διαλύσῃ, φανήσεται πολὺ καταδεεστέρα τῆς δόξης, ἧς νῦν ἔχομεν περὶ αὐτῶν.
117
See
NOTE 5, p. 158,
the passage from
Plato
.
230.
mvp-aristotle-comment-230
NOTE 230.
25.4
P. 123. WHAT IS RIGHT IN THE POETIC ART, IS A DISTINCT CONSIDERATION FROM WHAT IS RIGHT IN THE POLITICAL, OR ANY OTHER ART.
This is one of those passages, which the commentators appear to me to have darkened by illustration. See, particularly, Dacier's note. His account of the difference between Poetry and all other arts, seems evidently false. What Aristotle says of Poetry—that it has two kinds of faults, essential, and incidental—is, at least, true of all other imitative arts. It is even true, as Beni has shewn, of Rhetoric and Logic.
118
Aristotle only says, (to give the passage literally,)
"the rightness of the poetic, and the rightness of the political art, are not the same, nor of any other art and the poetic art."
The plain meaning of which appears to me to be that which I have given—that the
ὀρθότης
, or rectitude, of Poetry itself, is not to be confounded with that of Politics, nor of any
other art that may be the incidental subject of the Poetry, which, in itself, may be good, and even excellent, though it may deliver things false or inaccurate in Politics, Natural History, Navigation, Geography, &c. This sense of the passage seems clear of all the difficulties with which the common explanation is embarrassed, and leads naturally to the following division of the faults of Poetry, into essential and incidental. Castelvetro is the only one, of the commentators I have consulted, who appears to agree with me, if I understand him rightly, in this explanation of the passage.
The allusion, here, to the severe objections of PLATO, who would allow of Poetry no farther than as it could be made to coincide with the views of his own strict and moral legislation, has been sufficiently pointed out.
119
The reader may see, particularly, a fine passage to this purpose in the seventh book of his Laws, [
p. 817, ed. Serr.
], where, addressing the Tragic Poets, he refuses to admit them into his republic, till the magistrates have satisfied themselves, by inspection of their poems, that they contain nothing but what is in perfect unison with the laws and moral discipline of the state.
—Μὴ δὴ δόξητε ἡμᾶς ῥᾳδίως γε οὕτως ὑμᾶς ποτε παρ’ ἡμῖν ἐάσειν, σκηνάς τε πήξαντας κατ’ ἀγορὰν, καὶ καλλιφώνους ὑποκριτὰς εἰσαγομένους, μεῖζον φθεγγομένους ἡμῶν, ἐπιτρέψειν ὑμῖν δημηγορεῖν πρὸς παῖδάς τε καὶ γυναῖκας καὶ τὸν πάντα ὄχλον, τῶν αὐτῶν λέγοντας ἐπιτηδευμάτων πέρι μὴ τὰ αὐτὰ ἅπερ ἡμεῖς, ἀλλ’, ὡς τὸ πολὺ, καὶ ἐναντία τὰ πλεῖστα. Σχεδὸν γάρ τοι κἂν μαινοἰμεθα τελέως ἡμεῖς τε καὶ ἅπασα ἡ πόλις, ἥτις ἐν ὑμῖν ἐπιτρέποι δρᾶν τὰ νῦν λεγόμενα, πρὶν κρῖναι τὰς ἀρχὰς, εἴτε ῥητὰ καὶ ἐπιτήδεια πεποιήκατε λέγειν εις τὸ μέσον, εἴτε μή. Νῦν οὖν, παῖδες μαλακῶν μουσῶν ἔκγονοι, ἐπιδείξαντες τοῖς ἄρχουσι πρῶτον τὰς ὑμετέρας παρὰ τὰς ἡμετέρας ᾠδὰς, ἂν μὲν τὰ αὐτὰ γε, ἢ καὶ βελτίω, τὰ παρ’ ὑμῶν φαίνηται λεγόμενα, δώσομεν ὑμῖν χορόν· εἰ δὲ μὴ, ὦ φίλοι, οὐκ ἂν ποτε δυναίμεθα.
—
De Leg. VII. p. 817.
To this way of talking it was a plain and direct answer,
to say—
Οὐχ ἡ αὐτὴ ὀρθότης ἐστὶ τῆς ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΗΣ καὶ τῆς ΠΟΙΗΤΙΚΗΣ.
In what is added—
οὐδὲ ἄλλης τέχνης καὶ ποιητικῆς
—Aristotle may, I think, be supposed to glance more particularly at that part of the tenth book of Plato's Republic, where he exposes the idle notion, current among the rhapsodists, that Homer was a perfect master of all arts and sciences. And with respect to the absurdity of this notion, Aristotle undoubtedly agreed with him. But there was danger, lest the credit of Homer should suffer from the manner in which Plato combated this idea. For those extravagant admirers of Homer not only asserted the fact, that he had an accurate knowledge of every art and science on which he touched, but they went farther, and maintained, that such accuracy was essential to a good Poet:
Ἀνάγκη γὰρ,
they urged,
τὸν ἀγαθὸν ποιητὴν, εἰ μέλλει περὶ ὧν ἂν ποιῇ, καλῶς ποιήσειν, εἰδότα ἄρα ποιεῖν, ἢ μὴ οἷόντε εἶναι ποιεῖν.
Now Plato, whose object here is to vindicate his rigid exclusion of all mimetic poetry, and that of Homer in particular, from his republic, confutes the fact, without confuting the general position. While he shews the pretensions of the Homerists to be false, he seems, at least, to allow, that they ought to be true. For he flings in no savings; he no where says, what Aristotle has here said for him—that the want of this supposed accurate knowledge of arts and sciences no way affects the character of Homer as a Poet. By denying that he had that knowledge, and, at the same time, not denying, or not expressly denying, that he ought to have it, he leaves the reader to understand, that he meant to detract, on this account, from his merit as an imitator. And this, indeed, is
perfectly consonant to the whole design of this part of his work, which was, to discredit poetic imitation in general, by shewing the distance of its representations from truth.
120
231.
mvp-aristotle-comment-231
NOTE 231.
25.5
P. 123. THE FAULTS OF POETRY, &C.
The original is—
ΑΥΤΗΣ δὲ τῆς ποιητικῆς διττὴ ἡ ἁμαρτία.
The word
αὐτῆς
appears to me to make strange confusion. For Aristotle is here distinguishing two sorts of faults in Poetry, essential and incidental; and his expression, presently after, for the former, is
ΑΥΤΗΣ ἡ ἁμαρτία
—
"a fault of the Poetry itself."
As the text stands, therefore, it is just as if he had said—
"There are two faults of the Poetry itself: one, of the Poetry itself, and the other, incidental."
— Accordingly Dacier, Batteux, and almost all the translators, neglect the word
αὐτῆς
. Possibly it might, originally, have stood thus : —
οὐδὲ ἄλλης τέχνης, καὶ ποιητικῆς ἀυτῆς. Τῆς ΔΕ ποιητικῆς,
&c.
232.
mvp-aristotle-comment-232
NOTE 232.
25.6
P. 123. IF THE POET HAS UNDERTAKEN TO IMITATE WITHOUT TALENTS FOR IMITATION--.
Εἰ μὲν γὰρ προείλετο μιμήσασθαι ἀδυναμίαν.
—So, the MSS. But
ἀδυναμία
never, I believe, means
impossibility, but
want of power, incapacity. This was, long ago, sufficiently proved by Victorius. If the word be right, some preposition must be wanting. Heinsius supplies—
ΚΑΤ’ ἀδυναμίαν
. The credit of the conjecture is due to Castelvetro. Still the phrase,
μιμήσασθαι κατ’ ἀδυναμίαν
, for
imitating without ability, or talents, for imitation, is harsh, and, as far as I know, unsupported by any other example. It seems not improbable, that Aristotle might have written it—
ΠΑΡΑ ΔΥΝΑΜΙΝ
. Supposing the three first letters of the preposition to have been destroyed, the passage would stand thus—
μιμήσασθαι * * ΑΔΥΝΑΜΙΝ
: which it was obvious enough for the transcriber to miscorrect into
ἀδυναμίαν
. The phrase,
προείλετο μιμήσασθαι παρὰ δύναμιν
, would be clear and unexceptionable. So,
cap. ix.
—
παρὰ τὴν δύναμιν παρατείναντες μῦθον.
Victorius remarks, and, I think, justly, that Horace probably had his eye upon this passage, in the lines—
Sumite materiam vestris, qui scribitis, æquam Viribus; et versate diu, quid ferre recusent, Quid valeant, humeri. ... Cui lecta potenter erit res, &c.
—
Epist. ad Pis. v. 38, &c.
—where Aristotle's
προαιρεῖσθαι
, he thinks, is expressed by
"sumite materiam,"
and,
"lecta res:"
and
κατ’ ἀδυναμίαν
glanced at in the other expressions, but, particularly, in the adverb—
"potenter."
121
233.
mvp-aristotle-comment-233
NOTE 233.
25.7
P. 123. TO HAVE REPRESENTED THINGS IMPOSSIBLE WITH RESPECT TO SOME OTHER ART, &c.
No interpretation that I have seen, or been able to devise, of this whole ambiguous, perplexed, and, probably, mangled passage, is without its difficulties. All I could do was, to choose that, which, after the closest attention to the original, and to the best comments, appeared to me
"minimis urgeri."
I will not attempt to drag the reader after me, through the detail of my own doubts and embarrassments. But lest my version, from that degree of closeness, to which, in all passages where the meaning is doubtful, I have thought it right to confine myself, should retain, in some degree, the ambiguity, or obscurity, of the original, some explanation may be necessary.
By the various expressions,
μιμήσασθαι κατ’ ἀδυναμίαν — ἁμαρτία ἡ καθ’ αὑτὴν — αὐτῆς — καθ’ ἑαυτὴν,
and, above all, by
ΚΑΚΟΜΙΜΗΤΩΣ ἔγραψε
, which seems to fix clearly the sense of the rest, Aristotle means, I think, to indicate all such faults as are incompatible with good imitation—that is, in his view, with good Poetry. All other faults he denominates,
κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς
—
incidental. Faults he allows them to be; but smaller, and more pardonable, faults:
ΕΛΑΤΤΟΝ γὰρ, εἰ μὴ ᾔδει,
&c. In this class he reckons,
τὰ ἀδύνατα
—
things impossible. The expression is unhappily ambiguous : for we may understand either
ἀδύνατα in general, or,
ἀδύνατα κατ’ ἰατρικὴν ἢ ἄλλην τέχνην.
The commentators are divided. I cannot be of their party, who adopt the first of these senses. I see not how impossibilities, or absurdities,
122
in general, could, consist-
ently with Aristotle's principles, be admitted by him into the number of merely incidental faults—
κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς
—such as affected not the Poetry itself. We must, I think, understand—
ἁμαρτήματα ἢ ἀδύνατα
—
things inaccurate, or, what is worse, impossible,
καθ’ ἑκάστην τέχνην
—
upon the principles of some other art.
123
Aristotle then goes on, and applies his solution, founded on the foregoing distinction, to the worst species of such incidental faults—to things
ἀδύνατα
. Take, he says, the worst: suppose the Poet to have represented something impossible, with respect to some particular art, as that of medicine, geography, &c. This, strictly speaking, is a fault; but it is a fault that may even be justified, (
ὀρθῶς ἔχοι
,) if, by means of it, the Poet has answered, better than he could have done without it, the end of his own art, &c. Still, he continues, supposing this not to be the case, we are to consider, whether the fault, admitting it to be a fault, be
τῶν κατὰ τὴν τέχνην, ἢ κατ’ ἄλλο συμβεβηκὸς
, &c. If the pursuit of Hector cannot be absolutely justified by the
θαυμαστὸν
, the
ἔκπληξις
which is produced by it, still it is not
κακομιμήτως γεγραμμένον
; the Poetry is good, and the end of Poetry, the pleasure arising from the wonderful and the striking, is actually attained, though it be true, that it might have been attained without the fault in question.
By the expression,
τὰ πρὸς ἀυτὴν τὴν τέχνην ἀδύνατα
, I understand—with respect to the art of which the Poet speaks; not, with respect to the art of Poetry itself: though I confess the latter sense to be that, which the words,
ἀυτὴν τὴν τέχνην
,
the art itself, most naturally present. But this sense of the expression seems to me to be utterly irreconcilable with the sense of the whole passage. In rejecting it I have the concurrence of Victorius, Piccolomini, and M. Batteux. Besides, that the expression itself seems to be jargon.
124
For, what are
"things impossible to, (or, with respect to,) the art of Poetry itself?"
—The only reasonable meaning of the phrase is—things, which it is beyond the power of the art to represent or imitate; as it is beyond the power of painting to imitate sounds.
125
But how can the phrase be applied, as Dacier applies it, to the
ἄλογον
,
"deraisonnable tout ce qui est absurde?"
Is it not just as possible for Poetry to represent a horse flying, as a ship sailing? — The sense, which I have given, seems also supported by the antithetic expression that follows—
τέλος τὸ ΑΥΤΗΣ
—
" its own purpose;"
and still more by the clearer phrase which he presently after uses —
τὴν ΠΕΡΙ ΤΟΥΤΩΝ τέχνην
—
" the art to which these things belong."
I must, however, repeat my confession, that no passage of this treatise appears to me to be of more desperate perplexity than this; nor is there any of the numerous and stubborn difficulties I have had to encounter, of which I wish to be understood to offer my solution with less confidence. Here, as in many other places, had I waited for perfect satisfaction, I might have stood still for ever:—
—ἐικέλοι ἀνδρὶ Κείνῳ, ὃς ἐν τριοδοῖσι πολυτρίπτοισι κυρήσας Ἕστη ἐφορμαίνων· κραδίη δέ οἱ ἄλλοτε λαιὴν, Ἄλλοτε δεξιτερὴν ἐπιβάλλεται ἐις ὁδὸν ἐλθεῖν. Παπταίνει δ’ ἑκατέρθε· νόος δέ οἱ ἠΰτε κῦμα Εἰλεῖται, μάλα δ’ ὄψε μιῆς ὠρέξατο βουλῆς.
126
234.
mvp-aristotle-comment-234
NOTE 234.
25.8
P. 123. ACCORDING TO WHAT HAS BEEN ALREADY SAID OF THAT END.
Τὸ γὰρ τέλος ΕΙΡΗΤΑΙ.
This reading has been questioned; but, I think, without sufficient reason. It may very well be understood to refer to all that Aristotle had said, or, at least,
hinted, about the end of the art—the
θαυμαστόν
,
ch. xxiv.
—
ἔκπληξις
,
cap. xiv.
and
xvi.
&c. This is not the only instance in this treatise, of reference to something implied, as if it had been expressly said. See
NOTE 150, p. 396, and note (g.)
Victorius illustrates
ἐκπληκτικώτερον
by an apt quotation from Aristotle himself:
Δοκεῖ δὲ ἡ ΕΚΠΛΗΞΙΣ ΘΑΥΜΑΣΙΟΤΗΣ εἶναι ΥΠΕΡΒΑΛΛΟΥΣΑ.
Top. lib. iv.
Strabo says—
Μύθου ΤΕΛΟΣ, ἡδονὴν καὶ ΕΚΠΛΗΞΙΝ.
p. 25. ed. Caf.
235.
mvp-aristotle-comment-235
NOTE 235.
25.10
P. 124. WHETHER A FAULT BE, &C.
Ποτέρων ἐστὶ τὸ ἁμάρτημα τῶν κατὰ τὴν τέχνην, ἢ κατ’ ἄλλο συμβεβηκός.
—I cannot perceive, that this wants any emendation; much less, that it is, as
Mr. Winstanley
says,
"nullo sensu."
He contends for the certainty of
ΑΤΟΠΩΤΕΡΟΝ
—a reading, which Robortelli says he found in all the manuscripts he consulted. I would only ask, whether Aristotle can be conceived to have written such a sentence as this?
"A fault in the Poetry itself is a more absurd thing than a fault in some other incidental matter; FOR it is a less fault,"
&c. Yet this, I think, is the plain English of the Greek—
Ἔτι, ἀτοπώτερόν ἐστι τὸ ἁμάρτημα τῶν κατὰ τὴν τέχνην, ἢ κατ’ ἄλλο συμβεβηκός· ἔλαττον ΓΑΡ κ. τ. λ.
Victorius contends strongly, and, I think, with much better reason, for
ποτέρων
. He says well—
"Nam quæ adjunguntur videntur significare ita prorsus legi debere: duo enim genera peccatorum contraria inter se indicant. Utrorum igitur peccatorum id, cujus arguitur poeta, videndum esse præcipit: alterum enim eorum genus faciliorem excusationem habet."
p. 274.
236.
mvp-aristotle-comment-236
NOTE 236.
25.11
P. 124. HAS NOT REPRESENTED THINGS CONFORMABLY TO TRUTH-.
Οὐκ ἀληθῆ.
— An
ἐπιτίμησις
very frequent in the mouth of PLATO, to whom, undoubtedly, Aristotle here alludes.
"The Poets ought not,"
says Plato, speaking of the representations of Hesiod and Homer,
" to be permitted to tell us—ὡς θεοὶ θεοῖς πολεμοῦσί τε, καὶ ἐπιβουλεύουσι καὶ μάχονται· ΟΥΔΕ γὰρ ΑΛΗΘΗ."
—They ought not,
λοιδορεῖν ἁπλῶς οὕτω τὰ ἐν ᾅδου, ἀλλὰ, μᾶλλον, ἐπαινεῖν ὡς ΟΥΤ’ ΑΛΗΘΗ λέγοντας, οὔτ’ ὠφέλιμα τοῖς μέλλουσι μαχίμοις ἔσεσθαι.
So again, of Homer's account of the cruel treatment of the body of Hector by Achilles, and of his sacrificing twelve Trojan captives to the manes of Patroclus [
Il. Ψ. 175.
]:
ξύμπαντα ταῦτα ΟΥ φήσομεν ΑΛΗΘΗ εἰρῆσθαι.
— And again, presently after—
οὐθ’ ὅσια ταῦτα, ΟΥΤ’ ΑΛΗΘΗ.
To all which objections, as appears from what follows, Aristotle's answer would have been—
ὅτι οὕτω ΦΑΣΙΝ.
127
128
129
237.
mvp-aristotle-comment-237
NOTE 237.
25.11
P. 124. SOPHOCLES—DREW MEN, SUCH AS THEY SHOULD BE; EURIPIDES, SUCH AS THEY ARE.
The difference here intended, between the two great Tragic Poets, seems to me to be rightly explained by
Dacier
in few words:
"Sophocle tâchoit de rendre ses imitations parfaites, en suivant toujours bien plus ce qu' une belle nature etoit capable de faire, que ce qu'elle faisoit. Au lieu qu' Euripide ne travailoit qu' à les rendre semblables, en consultant davantage ce que cette même nature faisoit, que ce qu'elle etoit capable de faire."
p. 458.
It is thus indeed, that, by comparing different passages, we shall find Aristotle clearly explain himself. What he here means by
ἀληθῆ
, is sufficiently clear from the synonymous expressions,
οἷοἰ εἰσι
—
οἷα ἦν, ἢ ἔστιν
, in this chapter, and
ὁμοἰους καθ' ἡμᾶς
—and,
οἱ νῦν
, in
chapter ii.
where he explains the different objects of poetic imitation.
130
To these expressions are opposed another set of expressions, which I take to be synonymous with each other—
οἷα εἶναι δεῖ
—
οἵους δεῖ
, here;
τὸ βέλτιον
, and the
παράδειγμα ὑπερέχον
, presently after;
131
καλλίους
,
cap. xv.
132
βελτίονας καθ' ἡμᾶς — βελτίονας τῶν νῦν
,
cap. ii.
All these expressions correspond to the various expressions of,
improved nature—la belle nature—ideal beauty, &c. in modern writers.
The objection then, to which Aristotle here points out the best answer, I understand to be this—
"Your imitation is not true; it is not an exact copy of such nature as we see about us."
The answer is—
"No: but it is an improved copy. If I have not represented things as they are, I have represented them as they ought to be."
A very different explanation of this passage has been given by an eminent critic;
133
but, I confess, it appears to me to be irreconcilable with Aristotle's expressions, clearly interpreted, as I think they are, by comparison with each other. According to that explanation, the answer of Sophocles to the objection—
οὐκ ἀληθῆ
, and indeed the sense of the objection itself, are very different from what Dacier, and, I believe, all the commentators, have represented them to be. —The explanation is this:
"And this will further explain an essential difference, as we are told, between the two great rivals of the Greek stage. Sophocles, in return to such as objected a want of truth in his characters, used to plead, that he drew men such as they ought to be, Euripides such as they were.
Σοφοκλῆς ἔφη, αὐτὸς μὲν οἵους δεῖ ποιεῖν, Εὐριπίδης δὲ, οἷοἰ εἰσι.
The meaning of which is, Sophocles, from his more extended commerce with mankind, had enlarged and widened the narrow, partial conception, arising from the contemplation of particular characters, into a complete comprehension of the kind. Whereas the philosophic Euripides, having been mostly conversant in the academy, when he came to look into life, keeping his eye too intent on single, really existing personages, sunk the kind in the individual; and so painted his characters naturally indeed, and truly, with regard to the objects in view, but sometimes without that general and universally striking likeness, which is demanded to the full exhibition of poetical truth."
—Again—after an illustration of this meaning, by a comparative examination of the
Electra of Sophocles with that of Euripides, the conclusion is—
"Whether this representation of Sophocles be not more agreeable to truth, as collected from wide observation, i. e. from human nature at large, than that of Euripides, the capable reader will judge. If it be, the reason I suppose to have been, that Sophocles painted his characters,
such as, from attending to numerous instances of the same kind, he would conclude they ought to be; Euripides, such, as a narrower sphere of observation had persuaded him
they were."
134
From these two passages compared, it appears, I think, that by
οἷα δεῖ εἶναι
—
such as they ought to be—the learned commentator understands,
such as they ought to be in order to possess "that general and universally striking likeness, which is demanded to the full exhibition of poetical truth." But a comparison of Aristotle with himself, in the several passages above referred to, seems to fix the sense clearly to that ideal perfection, that poetic elevation and improvement of nature, which may be said, rather, to exclude such
"general and universally striking likeness"
of
"human nature at large:"
and this, I think, was the very objection made to Sophocles by the patrons of his rival.
According to the interpretation which I am taking the liberty to examine, Sophocles is made to answer the charge by denying its truth: for the answer, as here stated, will be this—
You say, my representations are not true, and those of Euripides are true. I deny this. You use the term improperly. My representations are "agreeable to truth," because they are "collected from wide observation, i. e. from human nature at large;" those of Euripides are not agreeable to truth, because they are representations, not of the kind, but of individuals.
The answer, as I understand Aristotle, is very different. The charge is not denied, or explained away, but admitted and justified.
135
Sophocles says,
"If you would have men represented as they are—
οἷοἰ εἰσι
—you must, indeed, go to Euripides.
I have not drawn them so—I never intended to draw them so. I have done better—I have delineated mankind, not such as they really are, but such as they ought to be."
Euripides does not appear to have been charged, by those objectors, with what may be termed
individual improbability of imitation, but with too close and portrait-like delineation of
general nature.
In short, the difference, which I understand to be here intended, between the two Poets, cannot be more exactly expressed, than it is by the ingenious commentator himself, in the beginning of the note to which I refer; where it is observed, [
p. 253
] that
"truth may be followed too closely in works of imitation, as is evident in two respects. For, 1. the artist, when he would give a copy of nature, may confine himself too scrupulously to the exhibition of particulars, and so fail of representing the general idea of the kind. Or, 2. in applying himself to give the general idea, he may collect it from an enlarged view of real life, whereas it were still better taken from the nobler conception of it as subsisting only in the mind."
Now, if we apply the latter of these differences to the two Poets in question—if we say,
"In applying himself to give the general idea, Euripides collected it from an enlarged view of real life; whereas Sophocles took it from the nobler conception of it, as subsisting only in the mind"
—this will express exactly what I take to be the sense of Aristotle.
To the support, which the common interpretation of this passage receives from Aristotle himself, may be added that which it receives, and, I believe, is generally acknowledged to receive, from the Tragedies themselves, which are extant, of the two Poets in question. That Euripides is, in general, liable to the censure of particular imitation—of
"sinking the kind in the individual,"
I cannot say I have observed. But who can read this Poet without observing the examples, with which he every where abounds, of that very
"general and universally striking likeness, which is demanded to the full exhibition of poetical truth?"
In Sophocles, we find more elevation, more dignity, more of that improved likeness, and ideal perfection, which the philosopher expresses by his
οἷα δεῖ — πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον
, &c. In Euripides, we find more of the
ἀληθὲς
, the
ὅμοιον
, &c. —
we are oftener reminded of the common nature and common life, which we all see around us. And if this, in conjunction with other causes, be sometimes found to lower the imitations of this Poet, beneath the proper level of Tragic dignity, and to produce something of the
κωμῳδία τις ἠθολογουμένη
, which
Longinus
attributes to the
Odyssey,
136
the fault is amply redeemed, perhaps in those very parts, by the pleasure which results from the closeness and obviousness of the imitation; certainly, in many others, by those precious touches of nature, which must, at once, strike every individual of every audience;
137
such, if I mistake not, as are much more rarely to be found in Sophocles, and such, perhaps, as, after all that we have heard about the
beau ideal and improved nature, can only be produced by an exact transcript of nature, as it is—of what the Poet has actually felt himself, and actually seen in others.
The truth seems to be, that both in Poetry, and in Painting, if the sublime be aimed at, the Poet, and the Artist, must look up to the
οἷα ΔΕΙ εἶναι
: their eyes may
"glance from earth to heaven,"
and they may
"body forth the form of things unknown."
But, if emotion and the pathetic be their object, they will, neither of them, attain their end, unless they submit to descend a little towards earth, and to copy with some closeness that nature which is before their eyes. We are told of Michael Angelo, that
"his people are a superior order of beings;"
that
"there is nothing about them, nothing in the air of their actions, or their attitudes, or the style and cast of their very limbs or features, that puts one in mind of their belonging to our own species."
138
If this be the character of that painter's works, I must confess, for my own part, that I should be disposed to turn from them to those of the charming artist, whose words I quote, where we see human nature
improved, but not forgotten. I am very well content to be reminded of my own species, as he reminds me of them. But this, at least, is certain, that such a character, applied to a Tragic Poet, would be the severest censure that criticism could pronounce.
139
238.
mvp-aristotle-comment-238
NOTE 238.
25.13
P. 124. BUT, AS XENOPHANES SAYS, &C.
Ἀλλ’ ἔτυχεν, ὥσπερ Ξενοφάνης· ἀλλ’ ΦΑΣΙ τάδε.
Thus all the MSS. and editions. Victorius proposed—
ἀλλ’ ΣΑΦΗ τάδε
: and supported his conjecture by the following fragment of Xenophanes, preserved in
Sext. Empiricus
, to which he supposes Aristotle to allude:
Καὶ τὸ μὲν οὖν ΣΑΦΕΣ οὔτις ἀνὴρ ἴδεν, οὐδέ τις ἔσται Εἰδὼς, ἀμφὶ θεῶν τε, καὶ ὅσσα λέγω περὶ πάντων. Εἰ γὰρ καὶ τὰ μάλιστα ΤΥΧΟΙ τετελεσμένον εἰπὼν, Αὐτὸς ὅμως οὐκ οἶδε, δόκος δ’ ἐπὶ πᾶσι τέτυκται.
140
Few conjectural emendations invite assent by a more remarkable union of ingenuity and probability: and, as it appears to me, that, without some emendation, nothing consistent or satisfactory can be made of the passage, we need, I think, have little scruple in admitting the reading of Victorius as true, till manuscript authority produces something better.
Xenophanes is here introduced, probably, because he had written against the theology of HOMER and HESIOD.
141
The following lines are quoted from him by Sextus Empiricus:
Πάντα θεοῖς ἀνέθηκαν Ὅμηρός θ’ Ἡσίοδός τε, Ὅσσα παρ’ ἀνθρώποισιν ὀνείδεα καὶ ψόγος ἐστὶ, ΚΛΕΠΤΕΙΝ, ΜΟΙΧΕΥΕΙΝ τε, καὶ ΑΛΛΗΛΟΥΣ ΑΠΑΤΕΥΕΙΝ.
By alluding to those other verses, where he descants on the uncertainty and obscurity of all inquiries relative to the nature of the Gods, and asserts, that all, on that subject, is mere conjecture and opinion, Aristotle seems, slily enough, to have intended to make Xenophanes answer himself; and to excuse Homer's theology, even by the testimony of one who had been most forward to condemn it.
"These may be opinions taken up at random, as Xenophanes says; and his representation of the Gods may be the true:—but, as he himself owns, these are matters not clearly known.
Ἀλλ’ οὐ σαφῆ τάδε.
—Homer was therefore right, as a Poet, in following popular tradition and belief."
Aristotle also alludes here, without doubt, to the objections of PLATO,
De Repub. II. p. 150, &c. ed. Massey.
I cannot forbear to mention one curious maxim of Xenophanes about drinking, which we find in some pleasant elegiac lines preserved in Athenæus.
142
It was his opinion, it seems, that no man had drunk too much, provided he was able to walk home without a guide.
Οὐχ ὕβρις πίνειν δ’ ὁπόσον μεν ἔχων ἀφίκοιο Οἴκαδ’ ΑΝΕΥ ΠΡΟΠΟΛΟΥ. —
143
And what says the severe and moral PLATO on this subject?—He forbids young men this indulgence, but allows it to old:—
μέθης δὲ, καὶ πολυοινίας τὸ παράπαν ΤΟΝ ΝΕΟΝ ἀπέχεσθαι.
Till the age of 18, he allows no wine; for, to drink it at that time of life, he says, is
"adding fire to fire, both in body and mind."
—
πῦρ ἐπὶ πῦρ ὀχετεύειν, ἐις τε τὸ σῶμα, καὶ τὴν ψυχήν.
From 18 to 30, a moderate use of wine might be allowed:—
οἴνου γεύεσθαί τε ΜΕΤΡΙΟΥ.
At 40, and after, it might be used in a jolly kind of way—
ἐις παιδιάν—ὥστε ἀνηβᾶν ἡμᾶς, καὶ δυσθυμίας ΛΗΘΗΝ γίγνεσθαι, μαλακώτερον ἐκ σκληροτέρου τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἦθος, καθάπερ ἐις πῦρ σίδηρον ἐντεθέντα, γιγνόμενον καὶ οὕτως εὐπλαστότερον εἶναι.
For wine, says he, was given to man, as—
φάρμακον — ἐπίκουρον τῆς τοῦ ΓΗΡΩΣ αὐστηρότητος.
—
De Leg. II. p. 666. ed. Serr.
239.
mvp-aristotle-comment-239
NOTE 239.
25.14
P. 125. WHETHER WHAT IS SAID, OR DONE, &c.
I believe Victorius is right in referring this to the accusation, or
ἐπιτίμησις
, which Aristotle, at the end of the chapter, expresses by
ὡς βλαβερά
.
"Arbitror autem rationem hanc pertinere ad formam eam, quam vocavit, ὡς βλαβερά. Docet enim nunc, si poeta arguitur, quod personam aliquam induxerit, quæ quippiam dixerit aut fecerit, quod meritò reprehendi possit, aut speciem habeat nocendi, quomodo illud defendi purgarique debeat."
p. 278.
It is true, the word
βλαβερόν
does not here occur: but Aristotle uses other words, as synonymous, at the conclusion of the chapter;
ἀλογία, μοχθηρία, πονηρία
: and here, the same thing is sufficiently indicated by the moral expressions,
μὴ καλῶς
, and
φαῦλον
. And though this solution cannot, that I see, be considered as arising from the application of any of the three principles laid down at the beginning of the chapter, yet it seems plainly connected, as I have observed in the notes on the translation, with what precedes.
240.
mvp-aristotle-comment-240
NOTE 240.
25.16
P. 125. FOR THE SOLUTION OF SOME OBJECTIONS, WE MUST HAVE RECOURSE TO THE DICTION.
Τὰ δὲ, πρὸς τὴν λέξιν ὁρῶντα δεῖ διαλύειν.
So, undoubtedly, the passage should be punctuated; not, as in some editions, very absurdly,
τὰ δὲ πρὸς τὴν λέξιν, ὁρῶντα δεῖ διαλύειν
: of which the fair, and only fair, translation would be—
"Those objections, which relate to the diction, we must solve by looking at them!"
144
Goulston, who adopts this perverse construction, is forced to supply:
"his modis intuentem:"
and Heinsius has inserted
οὕτως
in his text; on what authority, I know not. But the true construction certainly is,
ὁρῶντα πρὸς τὴν λέξιν
—i. e.
"by having an eye to, or, considering, the diction."
And so the passage was, long ago, well explained by Victorius; who was followed by Castelvetro, Piccolomini, and Beni. Dacier, though he translates rightly, mistakes the sense with those, whose translation is wrong. He supposes Aristotle here to be suggesting answers to objections against the diction.
145
But the instances might have set him right; none of them appearing to be criticisms on the diction, but, all of them, objections to the sense, though the answers are drawn from the diction. Indeed Dacier seems to have seen this, and is therefore forced to make the diction,
Λέξις
, include the thoughts,
διάνοιαν
; thus confounding Aristotle's clear distinction.
In this whole chapter, words are considered no farther, than as they afford the means of obviating objections against the sense.
241.
mvp-aristotle-comment-241
NOTE 241.
25.16
P. 126. WHEN ON THE TROJAN PLAIN HIS ANXIOUS EYE, &C.
The censure, here, is generally supposed to have fallen on the word
ἀθρήσειε
, and the absurdity of making Agamemnon see the Trojan camp, and the Grecian fleet, by night, and when he was
shut up in his tent. To this, Aristotle is understood to reply, that the word is metaphorical; he saw with his mind's eye. For my part, I would much rather confess, that I do not understand the instance at all, than suppose the philosopher capable of thus explaining away one of the finest descriptive touches in the whole
Iliad. The entire passage is this:
Ἦτοι ὅτ’ ἐς πεδίον τὸ Τρωϊκὸν ἀθρήσειε, Θαύμαζεν πυρὰ πολλὰ, τὰ καίετο Ἰλιόθι πρὸ, Αὐλῶν συρίγγων τ’ ἐνοπὴν, ὅμαδόν τ’ ἀνθρώπων.
Il. Χ. [Κ.] v. 11-13.
I can hardly think it possible for any man, of the least taste, to read these lines, and understand them to express merely the thoughts of Agamemnon. Mr. Pope, who has shewn so much taste in making the most of all Homer's picturesque descriptions,
146
has, in his translation, done ample justice to this.
147
Yet, in the note, this cruel metaphorical sponge is applied, without compunction, upon the supposed authority of Aristotle; though, after all, the evident corruption and deficiency of this whole passage leaves it dubious, whether this, or, indeed, any other meaning, assigned, or assignable, be the true one.
All, in this description, seems clearly literal. The verb,
ἀθρῆσαι
, is no where in Homer, I believe, applied to mental vision. Still
less is
θαύμαζεν
applicable to mere thought, or recollection. And what, after all, is Agamemnon made to see? Only what he might easily see, even as he lay on his couch—the fires of the Trojan camp. Add to this, the sense still more evidently literal of what follows of his hearing the military music,
148
and
"the busy hum of men."
There are few descriptions in Homer, that, to me, appear more beautiful than this little military night-scene. Whatever may be supposed with respect to Agamemnon, we, who read, are made to see, and hear. But, take away the literal sense, and you take away, with it, the whole beauty of the passage. And, after all, what is the difficulty? Agamemnon, though retired to his tent, was kept awake by his anxiety. The enemy was not far off; and he apprehended the design of some nocturnal incursion.
149
In this situation, is it difficult to imagine, that he might frequently rise, and look with an anxious eye towards the Trojan camp, and towards the ships?—for this is all which the expressions,
ΕΣ πεδίον ἀθρήσειε—ΕΣ νῆας ἴδοι
—here imply. Nor is it at all improbable, that he might have these views as he lay upon his bed, through windows, or apertures, made perhaps for that very purpose. The commentators seem to have thought only of a modern officer, snugly shut up in a
close and comfortable tent, and disturbed by no fear, but that of a sore throat, or the rheumatism. The tents of the antients were mere huts, or hovels.
150
The marquee of Achilles himself, as it is minutely described by Homer,
151
seems to have been little better than a cow-house.
As I have given the passage from Homer, the reader may not be displeased to compare that sketch with a far more finished and exquisite night-piece, but of the same kind, by our own great Poet.
From camp to camp, through the foul womb of night, The hum of either army stilly sounds, That the fix'd centinels almost receive The secret whispers of each other's watch: Fire answers fire; and through their paly flames Each battle sees the other's umber'd face: Steed threatens steed, in high and boastful neighs, Piercing the night's dull ear; and from the tents, The armourers, accomplishing the knights, With busy hammers closing rivets up, Give dreadful note of preparation.
Henry V. Act iv. [Prologue]
242.
mvp-aristotle-comment-242
NOTE 242.
25.17
Αὐλῶν συρίγγωνθ’ ὅμαδον.
—
Il. Χ. [Κ.] v. 13.
—So Aristotle. In our editions of Homer, the whole line is—
Αὐλῶν συρίγγων τ’ ἐνοπὴν, ὅμαδόν τ’ ἀνθρώπων.
I cannot agree with those commentators who take the objection here to fall upon the word
ἐνοπὴν
, which means, voice,
"& ne se dit proprement,"
says
Dacier
,
"que des hommes."
This would be a mere verbal objection; for the meaning is plain enough. But Aristotle, as I have already observed, is not here considering criticisms on the diction, but, such criticisms on the
διάνοια
, or thoughts, as may be obviated by means of the diction.
Farther; he is here shewing, how objections may be removed by having recourse to metaphor—by saying,
"the expression is not to be taken in its proper, but, in its metaphorical sense."
But Dacier's explanation makes the objection to be, not the impropriety of the literal sense, (for that was out of the question here), but only the impropriety, or harshness, of the metaphor; and the answer, according to him, is no other, than a denial of the charge, and a justification of the metaphor. And this will be equally the case, whether we take Aristotle's quotation as it stands—
συρίγγων θ’ ὅμαδον
—or suppose him to mean,
συρίγγων τ’ ἐνοπὴν
, as we read it in our editions: except, that the former would be much the bolder and harsher metaphor of the two.
So much then for, what the criticism was not. What it was, must always, I fear, in the present condition of the text, remain a problem. One conjecture only occurs to me, and that, such as I cannot take upon me to offer with any degree of confidence. Perhaps Aristotle had, originally, quoted, or meant, at least, to refer to, the whole verse, as we read it; and the censure might be pointed at the expression—
ὍΜΑΔΟΝ τ’ ἀνθρώπων
. The proper and derivative sense of
ὅμαδος
seems to be that of
a crowd, a multitude, a heap;
152
its secondary sense, by a common metonymy of cause for effect,
the murmur, or tumult, occasioned by a multitude. So Hesychius:
Ὅμαδος· (1.) ΑΘΡΟΙΣΙΣ, (2.) ΘΟΡΥΒΟΣ. (1.) ΟΧΛΟΣ, (2.) ΤΑΡΑΧΟΣ. ΣΤΡΑΤΟΣ, ἀπὸ τοῦ, ὁμοῦ.
— Perhaps, then, some hypercritic might take, or chuse to take, the word here in its primary sense, of multitude, and ask, how Agamemnon could, by night, perceive, and
"wonder at,"
the multitude of men?
θαύμαζεν—ὅμαδον ἀνθρώπων.
To this it would be a proper answer, to say—you mistake the meaning of the word
ὅμαδον
: it is not used here in its proper sense, of a multitude, but, in its metaphorical sense, for the effect produced by the voices and the bustle of a multitude. The criticism, I confess, would be frivolous enough; yet not more so than many others, to which Aristotle has condescended to furnish answers. It will perhaps be thought a more solid objection to my conjecture, that the word,
ὅμαδος
, seems to be constantly used by Homer in the secondary sense. So,
Il. Μ. 471.
—
Β. 96.
Od. Κ. 556
:
Κινυμένων δ’ ἑτάρων ΟΜΑΔΟΝ ΚΑΙ ΔΟΥΠΟΝ ΑΚΟΥΣΑΣ.
Nor can I say, that I have found any instance in Homer, of this word used in its primary sense. The other sense may, therefore, appear
too common and established to have admitted of any difficulty. But to this circumstance, a critic, disposed to cavil, and furnished with sufficient authorities for the primary sense from other authors, may easily be imagined to have paid no regard.
243.
mvp-aristotle-comment-243
NOTE 243.
25.17
P. 127. ALL, IS PUT FOR MANY—.
Τὸ γὰρ ΠΑΝΤΕΣ, ἀντὶ τοῦ ΠΟΛΛΟΥ, κατὰ μεταφορὰν εἴρηται.
The word,
πάντες
, does not occur in any of the preceding examples. But, says
M. Batteux
, it is virtually contained in the first example—
ἌΛΛΟΙ μέν ῥα θεοἰ τε καὶ ἀνέρες,
&c. —for
ἄλλοι
means
ΠΑΝΤΕΣ ἄλλοι.
"Aristote traduit l'idée, & non le mot."
Dacier
understands the passage in the same manner. This explanation appears to me forced and improbable. Aristotle says plainly,
Τὸ πάντες εἴρηται
i. e.
and I believe, with Victorius, Piccolomini, and Heinsius, that some corresponding example is lost, as the explanations of the other examples appear to be likewise.
244.
mvp-aristotle-comment-244
NOTE 244. P. 127.
25.18
ΔΙΔΟΜΕΝ δέ οἱ εὖχος ἀρέσθαι.
Καὶ τὸ περὶ τὸ ἐνύπνιον τὸ Ἀγαμέμνονθ’, ὅτι ΟΥΚ ΑΥΤΟΣ ὁ Ζεὺς εἶπεν, "δίδομεν δέ οἱ εὖχος ἀρέσθαι," ἀλλὰ ΤΩΙ ΕΝΥΠΝΙΩΙ ΕΝΕΤΕΛΛΕΤΟ διδόναι.
—
De Soph. Elench. p. 284, ed. Duval.
— This clearly confirms the common explanation, which makes Hippias substitute
διδόμεν
, the infinitive, (for
διδόμεναι
,) used imperatively, instead of
δίδομεν
, the first person plural of the present tense.
A very curious solution this. Jupiter tells no lie. He only orders the dream to lie for him:
"Ce qui est très different,"
says
Dacier
;
"car alors le mensonge ne vient pas de Jupiter, il vient du songe."
— Dacier tells us also, that this hemistich, which does not appear in our copies of Homer, was altered,
"par une fraude pieuse."
153
I cannot see any great piety in the fraud; because nothing appears to be added to the impiety of the passage by the words objected to, or to be taken from it, by the suppression of them. If the words were in Aristotle's Homer, they were probably in Plato's also. Yet, in the passage at the end of the second book of his Republic, where he alludes to this part of Homer, he, very properly, takes no notice of these words, but censures the whole circumstance, of Jupiter's being represented as sending such a deceitful dream: —
τὴν τοῦ ἐνυπνίου ΠΟΜΠΗΝ ὑπὸ Διὸς τῷ Ἀγαμέμνονι
.
154
The theology, indeed, of this charming writer, was of a very different complexion from that of Hippias, or of Dacier. —
Κομιδῇ ἄρα ὁ ΘΕΟΣ ἁπλοῦν καὶ ἀληθὲς, ἔν τε ἔργῳ, καὶ ἐν λόγῳ· καὶ οὔτε αὐτὸς μεθίσταται, οὔτε ἄλλους ἐξαπατᾷ, οὔτε κατὰ φαντασίας, οὔτε κατὰ λόγους, οὔτε κατὰ σημείων πομπὰς, οὔθ’ ὕπαρ, οὐδ’ ὄναρ.
155
245.
mvp-aristotle-comment-245
NOTE 245. P. 127.
25.18
Τὸ μὲν ΟΥ καταπύθεται ὄμβρῳ.
This correction, also, of Hippias, is somewhat more explicitly mentioned,
De Soph. Elench. p. 284.
The passage was censured as absurd, (
ὡς ἀτόπως εἰρηκότα
) by those critics who read
οὗ
.
156
But what the absurdity was, we are not told by Aristotle. His com-
mentators tell us, that it consisted in first calling the post
"dry,"
αὖον
, and then saying
"where it was rotted by rain."
I cannot say I comprehend this. Are rottenness and dryness, as
Beni
very well asks, incompatible? — Nor is it clear, what construction, or what sense, was given to the passage, by those who read
οὗ
, instead of
οὐ
. — But the reader will hardly thank me for detaining him with a dissertation upon a rotten post.
246.
mvp-aristotle-comment-246
NOTE 246.
25.19
P. 128. AND MIX'D BEFORE UNMIX'D.
Ζωρά τε τὰ πρὶν ΑΚΡΗΤΑ,
[
διαλλάττοντα κελεύθους
: for so the verse is completed, in Simplicius and Athenæus.] This seems the best and most authentic reading, and Dacier's the most reasonable explanation. The meaning of the words,
ζωρόν, ζωρότερον
, was matter of great dispute among the antients themselves. See
Plutarch's Sympos. Prob. V. 4.
— M. Batteux, taking it to mean
pure, unmixed, reads, consistently with that idea, for
ἄκρητα, ΚΕΚΡΑΤΟ.
But, that this word, whatever it was, meant unmixed, seems plain from the passage of
Athenæus, p. 423, 424
, about
Theophrastus
; who, it seems, in a treatise on drunkenness, adduced these very lines of Empedocles to prove, that the meaning of
ζωρότερον
was, not pure wine, but wine mixed with water.
The expression,
διαλλάττοντα κελεύθους
, seems to prove, as Dacier has explained it, that the second verse was not intended merely as explanatory repetition, in other terms, of the change described in the first, but as descriptive of a contrary change; an interpretation which is somewhat supported by the two following lines of the same Poet, on the same subject: —
Ἄλλοτε μὲν, φιλότητι συνερχόμεν’ εἰς ἓν ἅπαντα, Ἄλλοτε δ’ αὖ, δίχ’ ἕκαστα φορεύμενα νείκεος ἔχθει.
157
—and, perhaps, still better, by the lines quoted by Aristotle,
Phys. Auscult. VIII. p. 408.
The expression —
ΜΑΘΟΝ ἀθάνατ’ εἶναι
— is well explained by
Casaubon, upon Athenæus, p. 718,
μαθον
,
pro εἰώθεισαν, aut ἐπεφύκεισαν
: —
"didicerant esse, pro erant, vel solebant, esse,"
&c. See also the verses just referred to, in the
Phys. Auscult. where the same expression occurs —
ΜΕΜΑΘΗΚΕ φύεσθαι.
Of
διαίρεσις
and
σύνθεσις
, and the ambiguity of punctuation, as a source of sophistical argumentation, more may be seen, if it be thought worth seeing,
Rhet. II. 24, p. 580.
De Soph. Elench. p. 284, 288, 303, ed. Duval.
247.
mvp-aristotle-comment-247
NOTE 247.
25.20
P. 128. TO AMBIGUITY—.
Ἀμφιβολία.
i. e. such ambiguity, as does not depend on the different senses of single words, (which Aristotle calls
ὁμωνυμία
,) but on the different senses, of which two or more words are capable, independently of their punctuation. See,
De Soph. Elench. I. cap. iv.
which clears up his distinctions, between
διαίρεσις, ἀμφιβολία, ὁμωνυμία
, &c.
248.
mvp-aristotle-comment-248
NOTE 248.
25.21
P. 128. WHATEVER IS POURED OUT TO DRINK AS WINE.
Upon
v. 363 of Od. Ω. [v. 364]
(
—κερώντας αἴθοπα οἶνον—
)
Eustathius
says —
τουτέστιν, ἐμβάλλοντας εἰς κρατῆρας
: and
Gataker
remarks, on
occasion of the same passage —
"τὸ κεραν, sive κερασαι, licet miscere proprie significet, usurpatur tamen simpliciter ἀντὶ τοῦ, ἐγχεῖν, καὶ διδόναι πιεῖν pro infundere, in calicem scil. sive cyathum, et bibendum porrigere."
158
As a proof that the verb was so used, without the idea of mixing, we meet with it applied to nectar:
—ΚΕΡΑΣΣΕ δὲ νέκταρ ἐρυθρόν.
Od. Ε. 93.
The Gods hardly drank nectar and water. But it is even applied to pure water itself:
Θυμῆρες ΚΕΡΑΣΑΣΑ κατὰ κρατός τε καὶ ὤμων.
i. e. pouring it over my head and shoulders.
Od. Κ. 362.
249.
mvp-aristotle-comment-249
NOTE 249.
25.21
P. 128. HENCE GANYMEDE, &C.
I have adhered, without scruple, to the transposition mentioned in
Mr. Winstanley's note
;
159
which had been proposed, I know not by whom, before Victorius published his commentary. Victorius opposes it; but, I think, without sufficient reason. Piccolomini saw, and has well defended, the necessity of it, which appears to me to be obvious. I would read the whole passage thus:
Τὰ δὲ, κατὰ τὸ ἔθος τῆς λέξεως· οἷον, τὸν [forte, ΤΟ] κεκραμμένον, οἶνόν φασιν εἶναι· ὅθεν εἴρηται ὁ Γανυμήδης, "Διῒ οἰνοχοεύειν," πινόντων οἶνον. Εἴη δ’ ἂν τοῦτό γε καὶ κατὰ μεταφοράν. Καὶ, Χαλκέας, τοὺς τὸν σίδηρον ἐργαζομένους· ὅθεν πεποἰηται, "Κνημὶς νεότευκτος κασσιτέροιο."
This differs from Mr. Winstanley's arrangement, only with respect to the words —
εἴη δ’ ἂν τοῦτό γε
, &c. which appear to me to be-
long to the single example immediately preceding them in the editions. The commentators agree, I think, in making them refer to all the examples. But I cannot be persuaded, that Aristotle, after formally proposing the
ἔθος λέξεως
, as a distinct solution, would immediately say, that all the instances he gives might as well be defended
κατὰ μεταφοράν
. I understand him to say —
"though this example, indeed, may also be defended by metaphor."
The expression confirms this : —
εἴη δ’ ἂν ΤΟΥΤΟ ΓΕ καὶ κατὰ μεταφοράν.
Besides, there seems to be a pretty plain reason, why this instance might be considered as a metaphor, and the others not so. Nectar was the wine of the Gods; and the resemblance was sufficiently obvious, to make the substitution of the one for the other an easy metaphor. With the other examples the case is different. Brass and iron are indeed, each of them, species of metals. But the common genus is too general to constitute that obvious resemblance which is requisite to a metaphor. Their likeness, to use the philosopher's own language, is not perceived by the genus. Oil and vinegar are both liquids; yet the substitution of the one for the other would make a very strange sort of metaphor; because they have no other resemblance to each other, but as liquids. Hence, Aristotle denominates such substitutions not metaphors, but customary modes of speech; both because the resemblance is not obvious enough for metaphor, and because, as the name implies, they are common and established expressions, (
κύρια
,) however, in themselves, improper.
160
250.
mvp-aristotle-comment-250
NOTE 250.
25.22
P. 129. THE MEANING IS, WAS STOPPED ONLY, OR REPELLED.
Dacier
supposes the critics to have objected to the improba-
bility of a long spear's remaining fixed in a shield, like an arrow, or light dart. I cannot so conceive it. The lines themselves are the best comment here.
Οὐδὲ τότ’ Αἰνείαο δαΐφρονος ὄβριμον ἔγχος Ῥῆξε σάκος· χρυσὸς γὰρ ἐρύκακε, δῶρα θεοῖο· Ἀλλὰ δύω μὲν ἔλασσε διὰ πτύχας, αἱ δ’ ἄρ’ ἔτι τρεῖς Ἦσαν· ἐπεὶ πέντε πτύχας ἤλασε Κυλλοποδίων, Τὰς δύο, χαλκείας, δύο δ’ ἔνδοθι, κασσιτέροιο, Τὴν δὲ μίαν, χρυσῆν· τῇ ῥ’ ἔσχετο χάλκεον ἔγχος.
Il. Υ. 267, &c.
The shield was composed of five plates; the two first, of brass; the two innermost, next the body, (for that seems to be the sense of
ἔνδοθι
161
,) of tin,
κασσιτέροιο
162
; and one in the middle, of gold; and there the spear was stopped:
ΤΗΙ ῥ’ ἔσχετο
. Now this might mean,
stuck, or, was fastened, in it. But this, it was objected, would have been a manifest contradiction; for Homer had said, not only
that the gold stopped it—
χρυσὸς γὰρ ἐρύκακε
—but, still more expressly, that the spear penetrated two of the plates, and that the three others remained unpierced. But the spear could not well be fixed, or fastened, in the plate of gold, which was the third, without piercing it. And thus the objection appears to have been rightly understood by Victorius and Goulston.
251.
mvp-aristotle-comment-251
NOTE 251.
25.23
P. 129. OF HOW MANY DIFFERENT SENSES, &c.
I may say with Victorius,
"hic locus valde me torsit."
The words are these: —
τὸ δὲ, ποσαχῶς ἐνδέχεται, ὧδί πως μάλιστ’ ἄν τις ὑπολάβοι κατὰ τὴν κατ’ ἀντικρύ.
— In this passage, as in many others, there is just glimpse enough of some meaning, to mock a commentator with the hopes of discovery, and to deprive him of the comfort of doing at once, what, after all his efforts, he will probably find himself obliged to do at last — of abandoning the passage as unintelligible. For my own part, I do not see one clear and satisfactory sense, that can be made of the words, without conjectural emendation; and if we open that door, we shall be, again, confounded by the number of different senses which ingenuity may propose, with equal pretensions to our acceptance.
Dacier
translates thus:
"Et le plus court moyen de se tirer de ces endroits, c'est de prendre le mot dans un sens tout contraire à celui qu'on lui donne ordinairement."
Piccolomini
and
Beni
understand it thus:
"How many senses a word admits of, may best be known by considering the significations opposed to it:"
a sense preferable, I think, at least, to any other that has been offered, because it certainly does receive some support from the
15th chapter of Aristotle's first book of Topics
; where he treats of Homonymy, or equivocation, and points out different means, by which we may
discover, what, and how many, different senses a word will admit of;
163
and among these is the rule here supposed to be alluded to; i. e. that any single word must admit of as many different significations as are opposed to it. As, for example, to the word
acute, we oppose, sometimes
grave, sometimes
blunt, sometimes
dull, or
stupid.
Acute therefore has, of course, three different senses, corresponding to those three opposite senses.
But though this explanation of the passage must be allowed to give an Aristotelic meaning, yet I cannot think it a meaning that arises, fairly and clearly, from the text. In particular, the expression,
ΚΑΤΑ τὴν [scil. σημασίαν for so it is supplied—] KAT’ ANTIKPY,
has, to me, a very suspicious appearance. I much doubt, whether Aristotle would have used the word
ἀντικρύ
to denote contrariety of meaning, or any thing but local opposition. I believe he would have used
ἐναντίον
, or
ἀντικείμενον
; as he does constantly in those parts of his logical works, where he treats of contrariety, and of the opposite senses of words;
164
and where I have not found the phrase,
κατ’ ἀντικρύ
, once made use of in that sense. — However, as this interpretation seems to be the least exceptionable of any, and I see nothing better to propose, I have admitted it in my version: but I should certainly not accuse any reader of being very fastidious, if he preferred a blank to this, or any other meaning, that has been given to this dark saying. Emendatory conjectures, indeed, have occurred to me, as to others; but none of them plausible enough even to impose upon myself.
252.
mvp-aristotle-comment-252
NOTE 252.
25.24
P. 129. ARGUE FROM THESE PREVIOUS DECISIONS OF THEIR OWN.
Αὐτοὶ ΚΑΤΑΨΗΦΙΣΑΜΕΝΟΙ.
— I cannot think this word so free from all difficulty as
Mr. Winstanley
does. He says,
"Egregie dictum καταψηφισάμενοι, ut sensus sit: hi perinde ac judices quidam decernentes ratiocinantur,"
&c. But the question is, whether the word will admit that sense, or any other, than that of condemning, passing sentence against, &c. which is not to Aristotle's purpose in this place. The fair sense of
καταψηφισάμενοι συλλογίζονται
, is, if I mistake not,
"they argue, or form their conclusion, after, or, in consequence of, having condemned"
what? — We must necessarily understand them to have condemned, either the passage in question, or, the opinion of others about the sense of it. But
Aristotle, in what follows, says plainly, that they condemned the passage, or the opinions of others relative to it, in consequence of their own preconceived and erroneous notions; and the idea of condemnation, or censure, here, would be only an awkward, tautological anticipation of the
ἘΠΙΤΙΜΩΣΙΝ, ἂν ὑπεναντίον ᾖ τῇ αὑτῶν οἰήσει
, which follows. I think, therefore, that the proposed correction of
Heinsius
καταΣΟφισάμενοι
, must be allowed the praise, both of ingenuity and probability. In my version, however, I have contented myself with making the best I could of that reading which has the authority of all the manuscripts, and all the commentators, except Heinsius, on its side. —
Victorius
thinks the word will bear the sense of
"cum sententiam tulerint;"
but he adds —
"quamvis in præpositione, quæ verbo adjuncta est, vis insit contra alios id faciendi."
253.
mvp-aristotle-comment-253
NOTE 253.
25.25
P. 130. THE OBJECTION ITSELF, THEREFORE, IS PROBABLY FOUNDED ON A MISTAKE.
Δι’ ἁμάρτημα δὲ τὸ πρόβλημα εἰκός ἐστι.
"Metuo ne hic locus corruptus mancusve sit."
Victor.
— To give these words any meaning that may not easily be controverted, is, I believe, impossible. I have made them say, what it seems to me most probable that the author meant to say:
"So far is this criticism from proving Homer to be wrong, that it is, itself, probably, founded on a mistake."
254.
mvp-aristotle-comment-254
NOTE 254.
25.28
P. 130. THE IMITATIONS OF POETRY SHOULD RESEMBLE THE PAINTINGS OF ZEUXIS-.
Τοιούτους δ’ εἶναι, οἵους Ζεῦξις ἔγραφεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον· τὸ γὰρ παράδειγμα δεῖ ὑπερέχειν.
M. Batteux proposes this arrangement:—
Ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον· τὸ γὰρ παράδειγμα δεῖ ὑπερέχειν, τοιούτους δ’ εἶναι, οἵους Ζεῦξις ἔγραφεν.
165
That the words,
τοιούτους δ’ εἶναι, οἵους Ζεῦξις ἔγραφεν
, belong to the second way of defending the impossible, by referring it to the
βέλτιον — οἷα δεῖ εἶναι
, &c.
seems clear. Nor is it any objection to this, as some have thought it,
166
that Aristotle had before mentioned the paintings of Zeuxis, as deficient in the expression of the manners.
167
For it by no means follows, from this deficiency of Zeuxis as to manners, that he did not represent
πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον
, with respect to beauty, grace, dignity of form, &c.: and it seems to be this kind of improvement, in painting, by which Aristotle, here and elsewhere, illustrates the
μίμησις βελτίον
of poetry.
168
Compare, particularly,
cap. xv.
Ἐπεὶ δὲ μίμησίς ἐστιν ἡ Τραγῳδία βελτιόνων δεῖ...
169
The story of the manner, in which Zeuxis is said to have collected the
βέλτιον
for his famous picture of Helen, is well known. See
Cic. de Invent. II. 1.
Plin. Nat. Hist. XXXV. 9.
Bayle, art. ZEUXIS.
I agree, therefore, perfectly with Mr. Winstanley, that the words,
τοιούτους δ’ εἶναι οἵους Ζ. ἔγρ.
should be transposed: but I do not see, that any alteration, farther than the mere transposition, is necessary. I would read —
Ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον· [scil. δεῖ ἀνάγειν] τοιούτους δ’ εἶναι [scil. δεῖ] οἵους Ζεῦξις ἔγραφεν· τὸ γὰρ παράδειγμα δεῖ ὑπερέχειν.
255.
mvp-aristotle-comment-255
NOTE 255.
25.29
P. 130. TO OPINION, OR WHAT IS SAID TO BE, MAY BE REFERRED, &c.
Πρὸς ἃ φασί, τὰ ἄλογα
: [scil.
δεῖ ἀνάγειν
: for so, I think, with Mr. Winstanley, the passage is to be understood; and so it is explained and translated by Castelvetro. The expression,
ἃ φασί
, or
οἷα φασί
, is used by Aristotle as synonymous with
δόξα
, and
οἷα δοκεῖ
. Thus, —
οἷα ΦΑΣΙ καὶ ΔΟΚΕΙ
, at the beginning of this chapter: and afterwards —
οὕτω φασιν
.
But it will not, I think, be found possible to give this passage a consistent sense, unless we understand him to mean, what, as the
text stands, he does not expressly say, i. e.
"By general opinion we may excuse, not only the
πιθανὸν ἀδύνατον
, but even such things as are manifestly improbable, or absurd."
As if he had written,
πρὸς ἃ φασί, ΚΑΙ τὰ ἄλογα.
And thus Goulston has supplied: —
"Ad ea quæ aiunt, [rediguntur hæc quæ dixi; et] illa, quæ sine ratione sunt."
256.
mvp-aristotle-comment-256
NOTE 256.
25.30
P. 131. WHEN THINGS, WHICH APPEAR TO BE CONTRADICTORY—.
Τὰ δ’ ὑπεναντία ὡς εἰρημένα—.
The words,
ὡς εἰρημένα
, have distressed all the commentators; and no sense, which they have laboured to force upon the expression, is, to my apprehension, satisfactory. Heinsius corrected by transposition —
Τὰ δ’ ὡς ὑπεναντία εἰρημένα
:
"Ea, quæ tanquam subcontraria dicta videntur."
— An easier and more probable emendation, I think, would be —
Τὰ δ’ ΥΠΕΝΑΝΤΙΩΣ εἰρημένα.
257.
mvp-aristotle-comment-257
NOTE 257.
25.30
P. 131. AND IN THE SAME SENSE—.
The word is,
ὡσαύτως
:
"simili modo,"
as all the commentators render it. I cannot say I have been able thoroughly to satisfy myself, as to the precise meaning of the expression, from any thing I have found in Aristotle's logical works.
170
If,
"in the same manner,"
does not mean,
"in the same sense,"
I confess I do not know what it means. I understand Aristotle to say, that, if the subject of the propositions, charged with being contradictory, be
the same, and spoken of in the same respect, we must still examine, farther, whether the two propositions admit of a sense really and accurately opposite to each other; which cannot be the case, unless the same words, in each proposition, have exactly the same sense.
And this meaning seems to be supported by the following passage from the treatise
Περὶ Ἑρμηνείας
: —
Καὶ ἔστω τοῦτο ΑΝΤΙΦΑΣΙΣ, (nempe) κατάφασις καὶ ἀπόφασις αἱ ἀντικείμεναι. Λέγω δὲ ἀντικεῖσθαι, τὴν ΤΟΥ ΑΥΤΟΥ κατὰ ΤΟΥ ΑΥΤΟΥ, μὴ ὉΜΩΝΥΜΩΣ δέ.
171
That is, as it is well explained in the analytical Synopsis prefixed to Duval's edition:—
"Affirmatio & negatio oppositæ, contradictionem faciunt. Oppositio est ejusdem, de eodem, non homonymè; nam accipi debent termini in oppositione, EODEM MODO AC SENSU."
All that follows—viz.
ὥστε καὶ αὐτὸν, ἢ πρὸς ἃ αὐτὸς λέγει, ἢ ὃ ἂν φρόνιμος ὑποθῆται
is either so corrupt, or so darkly expressed, that I have only to confess myself unable even to guess what Aristotle meant to say.
172
Commentators indeed have explained, and translators have translated; but I have seen no explanation that approaches to satisfaction, nor any translation, but what is either unintelligible, or unwarrantable, or both. I do not mean to except myself; for I had translated thus:—
"We must also consider the person who speaks, and whether the contradiction be to what he himself said, or to what any reasonable man would understand him to have said."
But, to wave other objections, which, no doubt, the learned reader will easily make for me, the verb,
ὑποθέσθαι
, will, I believe, by no means bear this sense, of
supposing, understanding—
ὑπολαβεῖν
. At least, Aristotle seems always to use it in that of
advising, suggesting, &c. So
Rhet. I. 9, p. 533
.
ὅταν ἐπαινεῖν βούλῃ, ὅρα τί ἂν ΥΠΟΘΟΙΟ· καὶ ὅταν ΥΠΟΘΕΣΘΑΙ, ὅρα τί ἂν ἐπαινέσειας.
Accordingly, Goulston has given the word this sense in his version: —
"videndumque, an eâ in re, quod prudens præceperit, secutus sit."
But, of what force this circumstance is, or how it is to be applied to obviate the charge of contradiction, I do not see.
Being therefore obliged to reject the only version, which seemed to me to offer any tolerable meaning, I have left a blank in my translation.
258.
mvp-aristotle-comment-258
NOTE 258.
25.31
P. 131. WHEN EXCUSED BY NO NECESSITY, &c.
—
Ὅταν μὴ ἀνάγκης οὔσης, μηθὲν χρήσηται τῷ ἀλόγῳ, ὥσπερ Εὐριπίδης τῷ Αἰγειἤτε πονηρίᾳ, ὥσπερ ἐν Ὀρέστῃ τοῦ Μενελάου.
— Such was the confused state in which
Robortelli
found the text, which he, very ingeniously and solidly, rectified thus:
—
Ὅταν μὴ ἀνάγκης οὔσης μηθὲν, χρήσηται τῷ ἀλόγῳ, ὥσπερ Εὐριπίδης ΕΝ τῷ ΑΙΓΕΙ, ΤΗι πονηρίᾳ, ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ Ὀρέστῃ τοῦ Μενελάου.
Some MSS. for
Αἰγειἤτε
, give
Αἰγεητη
, which, as Goulston has observed, suggests the true reading—
ἐν τῷ ΑΙΓΕΙ, ΤΗι πονηρίᾳ...
&c.
By the
Aegeus, Robortelli understood the character of that name, in the
Medea of Euripides
. To this
Victorius
very reasonably objected, that the mode of expression,
ἐν τῷ Αἰγεῖ
, seems plainly to indicate a Tragedy so named; not a character only in a Tragedy of a different name. But this is no objection to Robortelli's reading, though it is to his explanation of it. See the fragments at the end of the Oxford Euripides, where several passages of the
Aegeus are quoted from
Stobæus
, &c.
259.
mvp-aristotle-comment-259
NOTE 259.
25.32
P. 131. THUS THE SOURCES OF OBJECTIONS ARE FIVE, &C.
This enumeration may seem, at the first view, to be deficient; for one of the objections was —
Οὐκ ἀληθῆ
: —
"the representation is not conformable to truth."
But this, perhaps, may be considered as falling under the charge of
ἄλογον
. For he, who accuses a Poet of departing from nature, experience, and the
οἷα ἦν, ἢ ἔστι
, says, in other words, it is improbable, incredible, absurd, &c. Or, when this objection was relative to truth of another sort—to theological truth, as violated by the poetic representations of the Gods, it then came, properly, under the
βλαβερόν
; it was of immoral and pernicious tendency. And thus we find Plato objecting continually to the theology of Homer; sometimes, as not true—
ΟΥΚ ΑΛΗΘΗ
173
; sometimes, as hurtful—
τοῖς ἀκούουσι ΒΛΑΒΕΡΑ
174
.
The objections answered by considerations drawn from the diction, (Sect. 5.) appear to be all reducible to one or other of these five sources.
260.
mvp-aristotle-comment-260
NOTE 260.
25.32
P. 131. OR, OF IMMORAL TENDENCY.
Βλαβερά
: i. e. hurtful on account of their immoral tendency. So the word is used by
Plato
; to whose objections, and to the very language in which he expresses them, Aristotle so frequently alludes. Censuring the immoral tendency of some of Homer's
representations of his hero Achilles, Plato says—
Οὔθ’ ὅσια ταῦτα, οὔτ’ ἀληθῆ· καὶ μὴν τοῖς γε ἀκούουσι ΒΛΑΒΕΡΑ.
The reason follows:
πᾶς γὰρ ἑαυτῷ συγγνώμην ἕξει, κακῷ ὄντι, πεισθεὶς, ὡς ἄρα τοιαῦτα πράττουσί ΤΕ καὶ ἔπραττον "Οἱ θεῶν ἀγχίσποροι." Ὧν ἕνεκα, παυστέον τοὺς τοιούτους μύθους, μὴ ἡμῖν πολλὴν εὐχέρειαν ἐντίκτωσι τοῖς νέοις, πονηρίας.
De Rep. III. p. 176, ed. Mass.
Compare the precept,
cap. xv.
about making the character as morally good as possible
175
; and see
NOTE 108
. It is obvious however to observe, that when the
μοχθηρία
, the villainy of a character, is overcharged, it brings with it its own antidote. Such characters as
Iago
176
, or Glenalvon, can be
βλαβερά
to no reader or spectator. They excite only pure and unmitigated disgust. Not all the art of the Poet, or the charms of Poetry, can cheat us into any degree of sympathy with them, even for the moment in which they are speaking. We feel, there, no such struggle between immoral approbation and moral indignation, as
Dr. Johnson
has described, in his observations upon the different effects produced on the spectator, by the villainy of Rowe's
Lothario, and that of Richardson's
Lovelace. The passage is so much to the purpose of this note, so justly thought, and so well expressed, that I am persuaded I shall gratify the reader by transcribing it.
"The character of Lothario seems to have been expanded by Richardson into Lovelace; but he has excelled his original in the moral effect of the fiction. Lothario, with gaiety which cannot be hated, and bravery which cannot be despised, retains too much of the spectator's kindness. It was in the power of Richardson alone to teach us at once esteem and detestation, to make virtuous resentment overpower all the benevolence which wit, and elegance, and courage, naturally excite, and to lose at last the hero in the villain."
177
261.
mvp-aristotle-comment-261
NOTE 261.
25.32
P. 131. OR AS CONTRARY TO TECHNICAL ACCURACY.
—
Παρὰ τὴν ὀρθότητα, τὴν κατὰ τέχνην.
Most of the commentators understand the art of Poetry itself. But, if I am right in the explanation I have given,
NOTE 233
, of the expression,
πρὸς αὐτὴν τὴν τέχνην
, the sense of the expression here must be the same.
178
I understand Aristotle to mean, the rightness, not of Poetry itself, but of other arts, which may be incidentally the subject of the Poetry; and the words, I think, express the source, or
εἶδος
, as he terms it, of objections relative to all faults
κατὰ συμβεβηκός
, as opposed to those, which he distinguishes by the various expressions of,
ἁμαρτίαι καθ’ ἑαυτὴν
, &c.
The other interpretation of the words is fairly liable, I think, to the following objections.
1. If we understand the poetic art itself to be meant, then the objection to faults
κατὰ συμβεβηκός
— to impossibilities and inaccuracies with respect to other arts and sciences — will be entirely omitted in this enumeration. This is very improbable, considering how common a source of critical censure this was. For while, on the one hand, the extravagant admirers of Homer made no scruple to assert, that his Poems contained the principles of all arts and sciences; on the other, we know how eagerly the Zoilists caught at every apparent inaccuracy of this kind; and, particularly, with respect to his geography. One instance, at least, of this sort of cavil, we have in this chapter: the censure of the passage,
Οἴη δ’ ἄμμορος
,
Il. Σ. 489
, fell on
Homer's ignorance of astronomy.
179
2. By the manner in which Aristotle here mentions, first, the five sources of critical censures, and then, immediately, the twelve sources of
λύσεις
or answers, it is plain, I think, that he means answers to those censures, and to all of them. But this cannot be the case, if we understand essential faults in the Poetry itself, or bad imitation: for this admits of no answer, but a direct denial of the fact. Whereas, if we understand incidental errors in other arts, all will be consistent; and every fault enumerated will find its answer in some of the
λύσεις
, which had been pointed out in the preceding part of the chapter, and are referred to in this enumeration.
3. If the art here mentioned be the art of Poetry itself, and the faults against that art be, as I understand them to be, essential faults, faults which constitute bad Poetry, i. e. in Aristotle's view, bad imitation, this plainly implies, that the four other faults enumerated are not essential, but accidental faults;
κατὰ συμβεβηκός
. But, that such faults as improbability, and immorality, (
ἄλογα, βλαβερά
,) which had just before been singled out from the rest, as
ὀρθαὶ ἐπιτιμήσεις
—as the most solid objections, and such as admitted of no excuse—that these should be considered by Aristotle as faults merely incidental, not to be objected to the Poetry itself, not affecting the merit of the imitation,
καθ’ ΕΑΥΤΗΝ ἁμαρτίαι
, is what, as I have before said, I cannot easily conceive.
180
The expression itself—
παρὰ τὴν ὀρθότητα τὴν κατὰ τέχνην
, is indeed ambiguous; and they, who prefer the sense which I have rejected, will perhaps think it favoured by the similar expression, clearly applied to faults against the art of Poetry itself, in the passage, —
ποτέρων ἐστὶ τὸ ἁμάρτημα, τῶν ΚΑΤΑ ΤΗΝ ΤΕΧΝΗΝ, ἢ κατ’ ἄλλο συμβεβηκός.
The expressions, however, are not exactly the same. There, it is,
κατὰ ΤΗΝ τέχνην
—
"against the art:"
here, —
κατὰ τέχνην
—
"contrary to the rectitude of art."
— But Aristotle had before used an expression, that seemed still more strongly to point at the art of Poetry:
τὰ πρὸς ΑΥΤΗΝ ΤΗΝ ΤΕΧΝΗΝ ἀδύνατα
: which, however, it seems necessary, for the reasons given in NOTE 233, to understand in the same sense, which I have here given to
κατὰ τέχνην
. But that passage, and indeed this whole chapter, is, in its present state, so full of obscurity and ambiguity, that every interpretation which can be given must necessarily be, in a great measure, conjectural and disputable. All I can venture to be confident of is, that my explanation of this passage is consistent with my explanation of the other; and that either both are right, or both are wrong.
262.
mvp-aristotle-comment-262
NOTE 262.
25.32
P. 131. THE ANSWERS, WHICH ARE TWELVE, &C.
How the different
Λύσεις
or solutions proposed throughout the chapter are reducible to 12, and which are the 12 that Aristotle meant, are questions, which the defective state of the original renders it very difficult, if not impossible, to answer, with any certainty. And indeed the matter is of so little importance, that it is by no means worth while to enter into any examination of the various modes of reckoning, by which different expositors have endeavoured to solve the problem.
Victorius
, indeed, is so wise, as to give up the attempt. It will be very easy however, and therefore, I hope, not very foolish, just to enumerate all the
λύσεις
, which actually have been mentioned in the chapter, in the order in which they occur, and then to examine, by way of experiment, whether they are any way reducible to twelve.
1.
τυγχάνει τοῦ τέλους, τοῦ αὑτῆς.
— i. e. The end of Poetry is better answered, &c.
2.
κατὰ συμβεβηκός
— The fault is incidental.
3. —
οἷα δεῖ
, (or,
βέλτιον
) — It is what is best, or what should be.
4. —
οἷα φασὶ
, (or,
οἷα δοκεῖ
) — It is according to general opinion.
5. —
οἷα ἦν, ἢ ἔστιν
(or,
οὕτως εἶχεν
, or,
ἀληθῆ
) — to truth.
[6.
σκεπτέον εἰς τὸν πράττοντα, πρὸς ὅν, ὅτε
, &c.] — [Consider circumstances.]
7.
Γλώττῃ
— Defend, by the foreign sense of the word.
8. —
Μεταφορᾷ
— by Metaphor.
9.
κατὰ Προσῳδίαν
— by Accent.
10. —
Διαιρέσει
— by Punctuation.
11. —
Ἀμφιβολίᾳ
— by Ambiguity.
12.
κατὰ τὸ ἔθος τῆς λέξεως
— by Customary speech.
13. —
Ποσαχῶς ἂν σημήνειε
or,
καθ’ ὁμωνυμίαν
— by the different senses of a word.
[14. —
Γλαύκωνος λύσις
] — [Glauco's answer.]
[15.
εἰκὸς, καὶ παρὰ τὸ εἰκὸς γίνεσθαι
] — [Probable, that many things should happen improbably.]
[16. —
Οὐ τὸ αὐτὸ, ἢ οὐ πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ
, &c.] [The same thing is not spoken of, or, not in the same respect, &c.]
Here are, then, 16 different answers. Of these, it seems, upon the whole, most probable, that the 12 not enclosed in brackets, are the 12 which Aristotle means. My reason is, that in the beginning of the chapter, after laying down the three distinct considerations, of the different objects of imitation, the privileges of poetical language, and the distinction of essential and incidental faults, he immediately, and explicitly, refers to those three principles, as sources of all the answers.
Ὥστε δεῖ τὰ ἐπιτιμήματα — ΕΚ ΤΟΥΤΩΝ ἐπισκοποῦντα ΛΥΕΙΝ.
Now it will be found, I believe, that the 12 answers above mentioned are drawn from those sources, and that the four remaining answers are not.
But why these four, which evidently are proposed as answers, and seem to be distinct answers, were not admitted in the concluding enumeration, it may not be easy to shew. Perhaps, Aristotle reckoned only as one solution, the two which he assigns to the same objection, with an
ἢ
, or
οὕτως τε καὶ
, &c. This would throw out Nos 14, and 15, which seem, indeed, to be mentioned only as a sort of secondary or subsidiary answers. As to Nos 6, and 16, he might consider them as one; both of them, in fact, saying the same thing, and nearly in the same words—i. e.
"circumstances must be considered."
Still however, taking these together as one answer, that answer will be supernumerary; and how it is fairly to be got rid of, it is difficult to see: the more difficult, because it is the only
λύσις
furnished by the whole chapter to the objection of immoral tendency, (
βλαβερά
,) upon which so great stress is laid.
All that seems tolerably clear is, that the 12 answers intended in the recapitulation are those 12, which are deducible from the three principles laid down at the opening of the chapter. In this idea, which I had formed before I consulted any commentator, I was glad to find myself supported by
Goulston
, in his accurate analysis; where he makes the 12 answers to be those here assigned, and draws them from the three sources at the beginning of the chapter: viz. three from the first source, (Nos 3, 4, 5,) — seven from the second — the diction, (Nos 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13,) and two from the third source, (Nos 1 and 2.)
263.
mvp-aristotle-comment-263
NOTE 263.
26.2
P. 132. IF THAT WHICH IS THE LEAST VULGAR OR POPULAR BE THE BEST.
—
Ἧττον ΦΟΡΤΙΚΗ.
— The word
φορτικόν
is used in a number of different, and sometimes nicely discriminated, senses, which cannot, all of them, be expressed by any single word in our lan-
guage. Sometimes, for example, it is to be rendered by
extravagant, violent, charged, outré, &c. as in the following passage of
Diog. Laertius about Bion
: —
ἦν δὲ καὶ θεατρικὸς, καὶ πολὺς ἐν τῷ γελοἰῳ διαφορῆσαι, ΦΟΡΤΙΚΟΙΣ ὀνόμασι κατὰ τῶν πραγμάτων χρώμενος.
181
i. e. extravagant, exaggerated, outrés, as
Bayle
has well explained it, art. BION, note [B], where he gives an instance of this extravagance of expression in that philosopher, from
Plutarch
, who calls it
ΦΟΡΤΙΚΩΤΕΡΟΝ
.
182
Sometimes, applied to persons, it means
troublesome, tiresome, &c. as in
Aelian—πολὺς ἦν λαλῶν, καὶ ἐδόκει ΦΟΡΤΙΚΟΣ.
Var. Hist. XII. 13.
— Sometimes,
insolent, overbearing, &c. as, in the same writer, it is said of a famous courtesan, —
Ἡ δὲ ἦν ΥΠΕΡΗΦΑΝΟΣ καὶ δεινῶς ΦΟΡΤΙΚΗ,
XII. 63
.
183
— Sometimes, again, and that very frequently, it is used as synonymous with
ἀνελεύθερος, βάναυσος
,
popular, low, vulgar, &c. as opposed to what is
liberal, refined, delicate, genteel, &c.
184
Thus
Plutarch—ἀνελευθέρους κομιδῇ καὶ ΦΟΡΤΙΚΑΣ φαντασίας.
P. 216, ed. H. S.
And
Plato—ὁ φιλότιμος τὴν μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν χρημάτων ἡδονὴν ΦΟΡΤΙΚΗΝ τινα ἡγεῖται
—
"The ambitious man looks upon gain as a vulgar sort of pleasure,"
De Rep. IX. p. 254, ed. Mass.
Jul. Pollux
describes a species of dance called
Μόθων
, as,
ΦΟΡΤΙΚΟΝ ὄρχημα καὶ ναυτικὸν
—
"a vulgar and sailor-like dance;"
the hornpipe, I suppose, of the Greeks.
185
And thus
Athenæus
, where he mentions, from
Herodotus
, the curious story of Agarista, (the daughter of Clisthenes, king of Sicyon,) and her suitors, says, that Clisthenes rejected Hippoclides,
ἰδὼν—ΦΟΡΤΙΚΩΣ ὀρχησάμενον
: because he did not dance like a gentleman; a charge, which, according to Herodotus, seems indeed to have been pretty well founded; for he tells us, that Hippoclides got upon a table and danced upon his head.
186
But let us return to Aristotle. This last sense of the word
φορτικόν
appears to me clearly to be that, in which it is here used by him. I cannot think, that by
φορτική
, he intended to express, as Dacier, and the commentators before him, explain it, the trouble and expense of theatrical exhibition—the number of things wanted—actors, scenes, dresses, music, &c.
187
Of all the commentators I have seen,
M. Batteux
alone gives, in a short note, what I think the true meaning of the word in this place:
"Φορτικός, grossier, digne des mercenaires. Aristote, Politic. VIII. c. 6. oppose le spectateur mercenaire & ignorant,
φορτικός
, au spectateur honnête; & le plaisir grossier,
ἡδονὴ φορτική
, les danses grossieres,
κινήσεις φορτικωτέρας
, au plaisir delicat, aux danses honnêtes."
Aristotle himself will here be his best commentator, in the passages to which M. Batteux refers. Some sorts of rhythm, he says,
ΦΟΡΤΙΚΩΤΕΡΑΣ ἔχουσι τὰς κινήσεις
, (violent and vulgar,)
αἱ δὲ, ΕΛΕΥΘΕΡΙΩΤΕΡΑΣ.
188
Again, in the
next chapter, relative to the musical education of youth, he speaks of the pleasure of a popular musical audience, as a vulgar, illiberal sort of pleasure.
"The performer there,"
he says,
"aims only at the pleasure of the hearers,
καὶ ταύτης ΦΟΡΤΙΚΗΣ· διόπερ οὐ ΤΩΝ ΕΛΕΥΘΕΡΩΝ κρίνομεν εἶναι τὴν ἐργασίαν,
("such performance does not become a gentleman,")
ἀλλὰ ΘΗΤΙΚΩΤΕΡΑΝ
(the playing of a man who is paid for playing:)
καὶ ΒΑΝΑΥΣΟΥΣ δὴ
(mechanics)
συμβαίνει γίγνεσθαι· πονηρὸς γὰρ ὁ σκοπὸς πρὸς ὃν ποιοῦνται τὸ τέλος· ὁ γὰρ ΘΕΑΤΗΣ, ΦΟΡΤΙΚΟΣ ὢν, μεταβάλλειν εἴωθε τὴν μουσικήν—."
— In the next chapter is the following passage, still more directly to our present purpose, in which he expressly distinguishes, as here, the two sorts of spectators, or hearers:—
θεατὴς διττὸς, ὁ μὲν ΕΛΕΥΘΕΡΟΣ καὶ ΠΕΠΑΙΔΕΥΜΕΝΟΣ, ὁ δὲ ΦΟΡΤΙΚΟΣ, ἐκ βαναύσων, καὶ θητῶν, καὶ ἄλλων τοιούτων, συγκείμενος.
191
The word occurs frequently in other parts of Aristotle's writings, and seems generally, if not always, to be used in the same sense.
192
By
φορτική
, then, applied to Tragedy, I think it clear, that he means only—calculated for
φορτικοὶ
spectators; adapted to the entertainment of popular audiences—to the taste, as we commonly
express it, of the upper gallery, as opposed to the refined and cultivated taste of men of reading and reflection.
193
As far as I can judge, from a comparison of the different senses of the word with its etymology,
194
the common idea, which runs through and connects them all, is that of excess, or, perhaps, more exactly, of offensive, disgusting, or burdensome, by excess, of some kind or other.
264.
mvp-aristotle-comment-264
NOTE 264. P. 132.
26.3
AS IF THE AUDIENCE, WITHOUT THE AID OF ACTION, &c.—
Ὡς γαρ ἐκ αισθανομένων, ἀν μη ΑΥΤΟΣ ΠΡΟΣΘΗΙ, πολλην κίνησιν κινενται
. This wound has been sufficiently probed. When I found, that the
"medica manus"
of Mr. Toup had been tried upon it, I looked, at least, for the
"salubres Ambrosiae succos, et odoriferam panaceam,"
if not for the precious
Dictamnus, that would entirely heal it.
195
He proposed to read—
ὠν μη ΑΥΛΟΣ ΠΡΟΣΗ
. I should be very sorry to do any injustice to the emendation of so masterly a Greek scholar; but I am obliged to confess, that I do not understand it.
"The imitators have recourse to every kind of motion, just as if the audience were not able to understand (or, to hear) them, without the addition or accompaniment of a flute." How any sense can be made of this, or of any other fair version of the passage, so corrected, I cannot discover. The emendation, surely, requires to be explained, at least; and if Mr. Toup gave any explanation in his letter to Mr. Winstanley, it is to be wished, that the learned editor had communicated it to the public in his note.
As far as I can judge, from a comparison of the different senses of the word with its etymology, the common idea, which runs through and connects them all, is that of excess, or, perhaps, more exactly, of offensive, disgusting, or burdensome, by excess, of some kind or other.
196
197
It is some comfort, however, that the general meaning of the passage seems liable to little or no difficulty; and, accordingly, in that, all the commentators, I think, are agreed, however widely they may differ as to the reading.
265.
mvp-aristotle-comment-265
NOTE 265. P. 132.
26.6
LIKE BAD FLUTE-PLAYERS, WHO WHIRL THEMSELVES ROUND, WHEN THEY WOULD IMITATE THE MOTION OF THE DISCUS—.
This is one of those antique curiosities, which we stare at, without knowing very well what to make of it. —
Αν ΔΙΣΚΟΝ δεη μιμείσθαι
. We should think it very strange, if we were told of a flute-player having occasion to imitate a quoit. But we are not to understand this of a mere instrumental solo, but of a performer accompanying words sung by a Chorus, (as appears from the mention of the
Coryphæus,) and endeavouring, in an absurd manner, to express them. The antient
Αυλητης
, or
Tibicen
, was not, it seems, a mere sedentary performer, like those of a modern orchestra. He accompanied the Chorus with his person, as well as with his instrument, and seems to have paraded about the stage, in a pompous dress; to have made a part of the
ὄψις
, or show, and to have joined in all the turns, and returns, and various evolutions, of the choral dance. Hence the description of
Horace
:
A. P. 214.
Sic priscae motumque et luxuriam addidit arti
Tibicen, traxitque VAGUS per pulpita vestem.
Lucian, in his Harmonides
, describing the requisites of a good
Αυλητης
, mentions, among the rest, —
και ΒΑΙΝΕΙΝ ἐν ῥυθμῳ
.
198
The great masters, no doubt, respected themselves, and confined their motion to the dignity of a sort of rhythmic strut. But
Aristotle
here, is describing the tricks of the
φαυλοι
or
φορτικοι
performers. Such a performer might have occasion, or rather take occasion, to imitate the whirling or rolling of a disc, if the subject, for example, of the choral song chanced to be the story of
Apollo and Hyacinthus; which is mentioned by
Lucian
in a long list of fabulous subjects, enumerated as a part of the knowledge requisite to an accomplished pantomimic dancer. Or, the subject might be taken from
Homer, Od. 6. 186, &c.
Κυλιόμενοι
.
Dacier
, in his note, translates this, "rolling themselves upon the ground." This would be
φορτικον
indeed. Yet in this idea he follows
Victorius
; who enters into a discussion, of some length, to prove that
κυλιομενοι
can mean nothing but rolling on the ground. Nor will he allow the difficulty of doing this while they were playing to be a sufficient objection. Certainly, the usual and proper sense of the word is on his side. But it was natural enough, surely, to apply to the motion imitating, the term proper to the motion imitated.
199
266.
mvp-aristotle-comment-266
NOTE 266. P. 132.
26.6
AND PULL THE CORYPHÆUS WHEN SCYLLA IS THE SUBJECT.
Έλκοντες τον Κορυφαιον
. — To imitate Scylla, —
"naves in saxa trahentem,"
as
Virgil
has expressed it. But it is not easy to see, how the performer, at least while he was playing, could well spare a hand for this operation. This was even worse than what we call humouring a catch; when, for instance, a singer who is performing
Purcell's
"Fie, nay prithee, John" thinks it necessary to collar his neighbour.
267.
mvp-aristotle-comment-267
NOTE 267. P. 133.
26.10
THE TRAGIC IMITATION, WHEN ENTIRE—.
Ἡ ὉΛΗ τέχνη
.
Heinsius
proposed,
ἡ ΑΛΛΗ τεχνη
. But I believe the established reading to be right. The whole art—i. e. Tragedy, as represented; with all its constituent parts, and, as it was said before,
άπαντα μιμεμενη
. For it might, as
Aristotle
presently observes, be read, or recited, like an Epic Poem; and, in that view, the comparison here made would not hold.
Τεχνη
. . . the Tragic art: for so he uses the word, cap. i. not for the whole Poetic art, but for a single branch of it:
ἐν ταις ειρημεναις ΤΕΧΝΑΙΣ
i. e. Epic Poetry, Tragedy, Comedy, &c. So too at the end of that chapter:
τας διαφορας ΤΩΝ ΤΕΧΝΩΝ
. And, again, at the end of this chapter, (as I understand the passage,)
της ΤΕΧΝΗΣ ἔργῳ
. See
NOTE 277
.
268.
mvp-aristotle-comment-268
NOTE 268. P. 133.
26.11
TO HEARERS OF THE BETTER SORT—.
Θεατας ἐπιεικεις
: to which he opposes
φαυλους
. The word
ἐπιεικεις
seems rightly explained here by
Dacier
— "les honnêtes gens; c'est à dire, les gens qui ont eu une meilleure education." The passage, which he quotes from
Plato
, is much to the purpose of this chapter.
Συγχωρω δη τόγε τοσετον και ἐγω τοις πολλοις, δειν την μεσικην ήδονη κρινεσθαι μη μεντοι των ἐπιτυχοντων άλλα σχεδον ἐκεινην είναι μεσαν καλλιστην, ἡτις ΤΟΥΣ ΒΕΛΤΙΣΤΟΥΣ, και ΙΚΑΝΩΣ ΠΕΠΑΙΔΕΥΜΕΝΟΥΣ τερπει
. —
De Leg. II. p. 658.
Aristotle
uses
ἐπιεικης
in the same sense,
Eth. Nicom. IV. 8, p. 186, ed. Wilk.
—
τοιαυτα λεγειν και άκκειν, δια τῳ ΕΠΙΕΙΚΕΙ ΚΑΙ ΕΛΕΥΘΕΡΩι άρμοττει
.
269.
mvp-aristotle-comment-269
NOTE 269. P. 133.
Και διᾳδοντα
. There seems great reason to suspect this word. For, what is the force of the preposition here? Some commentators, without disputing the reading, neglect the preposition entirely, and render the word as if it were the simple participle,
άδαντα
. Others understand, singing throughout:
"qui continenter canit."
Goulst.
But the proper sense of
διᾳδειν
, would, I think, be — to sing dissonantly — to sing out of tune, — as,
ΔΙΑφωνειν
. And so the word is actually used in the treatise
Περι Κοσμα
, in Aristotle's works, and opposed to
ΣΥΝᾳδον
, as
ΔΙΑφωνειν
is to
ΣΥΜφωνειν
: —
συμφερομενον, και διαφερομενόν συνᾳδον, και ΔΙΑΙΔΟΝ
.
"The agreeing, and the disagreeing, the consonant, and the dissonant." But as the word cannot here be admitted, in that which appears to be its only proper and warrantable sense, I suspect, it might, originally, have been only
ᾠδοντα
. Considering how frequently
Δ
and
Λ
were confounded by transcribers,
ΚΑΙ ΑΙΔΟΝΤΑ
might easily be blundered into
ΚΑΙ ΔΙΑΙΔΟΝΤΑ
. One MS. reading is
διαΔΙδοντα
; where the
ΔΙ
, plainly enough, arose from the
ΑΙ
.
The commentators understand from this passage, that there were two sorts of rhapsodists; one, of those who recited Epic Poetry, and another, of those who sung it. Whether this can be proved from other passages of antient authors, I know not. From this, it certainly cannot. Aristotle says,
ΚΑΙ ῥαψωδεντα—ΚΑΙ διᾳδοντα
. Whatever the
διαδων
was, he is here clearly distinguished from the
ῥαψωδων
— the rhapsodist.
That the rhapsodists did not, in the strict and musical sense, at least, of the word, sing the verses of Homer, but recited or declaimed them only, we may pretty safely infer, from what is expressly said of Epic Poetry at the beginning of this work — that "it imitates by words only," without melody and rhythm — i. e. without music. This, indeed, will not prove that Epic Poetry was never sung, any more than what was said of Tragedy — that it imitates by words and music — will prove that it was never recited, or read. Yet the least, I think, that can be inferred from it, is, that Epic Poetry was, in general, and for the most part, recited or declaimed only; and, consequently, that the rhapsodists, properly so called, being the established performers of Epic Poetry, as the actors were of Tragic, performed it always in that manner; without singing, any farther, than as the tones of loud and sustained declamation approach more nearly to singing than those of common reading.
The earliest Lyric Poet-Musicians, indeed, as we learn from
Plutarch
and
Athenæus
, used to sing even the hexameters of
Homer and
Hesiod, as well as their own, to the lyre. But they, plainly, speak of this, as of an antient practice: —
τον Τερπανδρον, ΚΙΘΑΡΩΔΙΚΩΝ ποιητην όντα νομων, [hymns,] κατα νομον ἐκασον, ΤΟΙΣ ΕΠΕΣΙ, τοις ἑαυτε, και ΤΟΙΣ ΟΜΗΡΟΥ, ΜΕΛΗ περιτιθέντα, ΑιΔΕΙΝ ἐν τοις ἀγωσιν
.
Plut. Dial. de Mus. p. 2074, ed. H. St.
And afterwards
ότι δε οι κιθαρωδικοι νομοι, ΟΙ ΠΑΛΑΙ, ἐξ ΕΠΩΝ συνισταντο, Τιμοθέου ἐδηλωσε
, &c.
p. 2075.
So, too,
Athenæus
: "Chamæleon, in his book about Stesichorus,
και μελωδηθηναι φησι, ἐ μονον τα Ὁμηρε, άλλα και Ἡσιοδε, και Αρχιλοχε
, &c."
ΚΑΙ μελωδηθηναι
— "were even sung." p. 620.
It is not, however, at all improbable, that Homer might be sometimes sung, in Aristotle's time, and that this
Mnasitheus, (of whom nothing is known,) might be a performer in this way. But, that this was a distinct thing from
ῥαψῳδια
seems pretty clear.
200
201
202
270.
mvp-aristotle-comment-270
NOTE 270. P. 133.
26.7
WHOSE GESTURES RESEMBLE THOSE OF IMMODEST WOMEN.
The passage of
Aulus Gellius
, to which I referred in my note on the translation, as a story, both curious in itself, and confirming what was there advanced, is this.
"Histrio in terrâ Græciâ fuit famâ celebri: qui, gestûs et vocis claritudine & venustate, cæteris antestabat. Nomen fuisse aiunt POLUM. Tragœdias poetarum nobilium scitè atque asseveratè actitavit. Is Polus unicè amatum filium morte amisit. Eum luctum quum satis visus est eluxisse, rediit ad quæstum artis. In eo tempore Athenis Electram Sophoclis acturus, gestare urnam quasi cum Orestis ossibus debebat. Ita compositum fabulæ argumentum est, ut, veluti fratris reliquias ferens Electra, comploret commisereturque interitum ejus, qui per vim exstinctus existimatur. Igitur Polus, lugubri habitu Electræ indutus, ossa atque urnam à sepulchro tulit filii; &, quasi Orestis amplexus, opplevit omnia, non simulachris neque imitamentis, sed luctu atque lamentis veris & spirantibus. Itaque, quum agi fabula videretur, dolor actitatus est."
A. Gell. VII. 5.
271.
mvp-aristotle-comment-271
NOTE 271. P. 134.
26.10
THE MUSIC AND THE DECORATION, BY THE LATTER OF WHICH THE ILLUSION IS HEIGHTENED, &C.
The Greek, here, in either of the two readings warranted by manuscript authority, is unsatisfactory and suspicious, and the sense, consequently, uncertain. The reading of the old editions —
δὶ ἧς τας ἡδονας ἐπιστανται ἐναργεστατα
: which
Victorius
renders —
"per quam voluptates percipiunt evidentissime"
:
"through, or by means of, which, they perceive the pleasures most evidently." Nothing can well be more harsh, or strange.
ἐπιστανται
they perceive: — Who? — The spectators. To this mode of speaking, however, I should not object; because this ellipsis, of
ὁἱ ἀνθρωποι
, is frequent in both the Greek and Latin writers. Thus, in the beginning of this chapter,
κνωνται
. This answers to that very convenient idiom, of which the French make so much use, and which we so often find the want of
on s'agite — on apperçoit
, &c.
203
But, the verb,
ἐπιστανται
, will, I apprehend, by no means bear the sense here forced upon it, of perceiving pleasure; or any sense, but that of understanding, or knowing. Were I, therefore, obliged to make some sense of this reading, it would be this: —
"[quae efficiuntur] voluptates, norunt homines apertissime"
: — "the pleasures, which are produced through which, are clearly understood — well known to all." But this, I confess, is violent interpretation; and, in particular, I doubt whether the word
ἐναργες
is ever used, by Aristotle at least, as merely synonymous to
φανερον
; as evident to reason or understanding, and opposed to doubtful. It always means, I believe, evident, clear, visible, to the eye of imagination. Thus,
cap. xvii.
—
Δει δε τες μυθες συνισταναι ότι μαλισα ΠΡΟ ΟΜΜΑΤΩΝ τιθέμενον· ὕτω γαρ ἐν ΕΝΑΡΓΕΣΤΑΤΑ ΟΡΩΝ, ώσπερ ΠΑΡ ΑΥΤΟΙΣ ΓΙΓΝΟΜΕΝΟΣ ΤΟΙΣ ΠΡΑΤΤΟΜΕΝΟΙΣ
, &c. These words seem to furnish the best comment upon the passage in question, and will perhaps lead us to the most reasonable and least exceptionable interpretation of it; for perfect satisfaction is not, I think, to be expected, in the present condition of the text.
We ought, surely, at all events, to adhere to the proper and clear meaning of the adverb
ἐναργεστατα
, as used in the passage just cited; where the word itself, and the explanatory expressions which accompany it, afford a pretty strong presumption, that Aristotle, here, meant to express the particular advantage which Tragedy receives from the
ὄψις
, or, from actual representation,
204
205
as giving to the imitation the greatest possible reality of effect, and producing the most perfect illusion in the spectator. Yet this, it must be owned, is very obscurely expressed, if it be expressed, by the Greek; which, according to the best reading, that of
Victorius
, and of many MSS. will stand thus:
και ἐτι, μικρον μερα την μεσικην και την όψιν ἐχει, δὲ ἡς ῾ΑΙ ΗΔΟΝΑΙ ΣΥΝΙΣΤΑΝΤΑΙ ἐναργεστατα
: that is, according to the only sense which I can find for it —
"and the decoration, or spectacle; by means of which, the pleasures we receive from Tragedy, are rendered more sensible, striking, illusive," &c. But many objections may, undoubtedly, be made. For the fair and literal version would be this:
"by means of which, the pleasures are formed, composed, constructed, or constituted, in the clearest and most visible manner."
I give, here, what I apprehend to be the only fair sense of the verb,
συνιστασθαι
; but it seems to be, by no means, the proper word in this place, and probably is not the word which Aristotle wrote. If any one MS. would offer me
ΠΑΡιστανται
, I would readily accept it.
Ælian
, describing the effect of a trumpet, sounding suddenly, at the instant when a famous painting was exhibited, of a warrior in the act of rushing to the battle, says —
ἁμα τε ἐν το μελθ ήκκετο τραχύ και φοβερου και οὐδεικνυτο ἡ γραφη, και ὁ στρατιωτης ἐβλεπετο, το μέλες ΕΝΑΡΓΕΣΤΕΡΑΝ την φαντασιαν τε ἐκβοηθεντα ἐτι και μαλλον ΠΑΡΑΣΤΗΣΑΝΤΟΣ
: i. e.
"presenting to the imagination a still more lively and striking image." But again —
ἡδοναι
, is not
206
207
208
what one would expect here. To speak, indeed, of terror and pity, as the pleasures of Tragedy, is perfectly agreeable, both to the doctrine, and to the language, of the author, throughout. But, it is not, properly, the pleasure — it is not the terror, or the pity — that is rendered more
ἐναργες
; but that pleasure is heightened by the action being rendered so.
Upon the whole, however, I see no other meaning that can be obtained from the words, without still greater violence and improbability of interpretation.
Dacier
,
Batteux
, and
Goulston
, make the assertion —
ὡι ήδοναι
, &c. relate to both music and decoration. But it is, surely, quite unwarrantable to give to —
ἩΣ
, the sense of,
δὶ ΩΝ
, or
δ' 'AIN
. Besides that the music, however great the pleasure it may afford, cannot, I think, properly be considered as contributing to the
ἐναργεια
, or as heightening the illusion, of Tragedy.
Victorius
, who read
την μεσικην και ΤΑΣ ΟΨΕΙΣ
, very consistently made
ἧς
refer to
μεσικη
only: and
Castelvetro
very properly observes, that, if we read
την όψω
—
"le predette parole [. . δι ἧς ἀι ήδοναι, κ. τ. αλ.] havranno rispetto alla vista; & conteneranno la commendatione della detta vista, per la quale si constituisca il diletto più manifestamente che non si fa per le parole dell epopea."
p. 690. He appears, I think, to have understood the passage in the way I have proposed. But he mentions another reading, which I have not seen noticed anywhere else —
ἐνΕργεστατα
. This had occurred to me, formerly, as a conjecture, before I had seen Castelvetro's commentary. But it gives much the same sense, and would remove no difficulty with respect to the passage itself — though, as I shall presently have occasion to observe, it might suit better with what follows. See
NOTE 277
.
272.
mvp-aristotle-comment-272
NOTE 272. P. 134.
26.11
IT HAS THE ADVANTAGE OF GREATER CLEARNESS—AS WELL IN READING, AS IN REPRESENTATION.
Ειτα, και το ἐναργες ἐχει, και ἐν τῇ ἀναγνωσει, και ἐπι των ἐργων.
— It seems rather strange, that, immediately after mentioning the
ἐναργες
of the
ὄψις
,
Aristotle
should say —
"Then, it has also the
ἐναργες
,"
&c. It was this which induced me to suspect, that for
ἐναργεστατα
, in the preceding passage, we should read —
ἐνΕργεστατα
:
"By means of which, [i. e. of the
ὄψις
,] the pleasures we receive from Tragedy (those, of terror and pity excited by imitation, as he says cap. xiv.
209
) are rendered more forcible and efficacious."
But the objection is, perhaps, not of sufficient force to warrant a departure from the established reading of all the manuscripts,
ἐναργεστατα
: and we may, well enough, understand the author, as if he had said —
"Then, farther, another advantage is, that Tragedy has this
ἐναργες
, not only on the stage, and on account of the
Ὄψις
, but even in reading also."
That
ἀναγνωσει
is right, (not
ἀναγνωρισει
,) I cannot entertain a doubt. Nothing can be more evidently nonsensical than this distinction —
"both in the discoveries, and in the incidents;"
as if a discovery were not an incident.
The expression,
ἔπι των ἐργων
, for,
in representation, acting, performance, &c. seems liable to no difficulty. Thus,
De Rep. VIII. 455
,
δηλον ἐκ των ΕΡΓΩΝ
— from what happens in the performance of such music. And see
ibid. cap. vi.
throughout which,
ἐργα
is repeatedly used for musical performance; particularly,
p. 457
, —
τα θαυμασια και περιττα ΤΩΝ ΕΡΓΩΝ
,
"surprising and elaborate performance."
273.
mvp-aristotle-comment-273
NOTE 273. P. 134.
26.12
ATTAINING THE END OF ITS IMITATION IN A SHORTER COMPASS.
Dryden
says of this passage —
"It is one reason of Aristotle's, to prove that Tragedy is the more noble, because it turns in a shorter compass; the whole action being circumscribed within the space of four and twenty hours. He might prove as well, that a mushroom is to be preferred before a peach, because it shoots up in the compass of a night."
&c. If Aristotle had said, that Tragedy was the more noble, because a Poet could compose a Tragedy in much less time than an Epic Poem, the simile would have been justly applied.
Dryden
had, but just before, said, that
"the effects of Tragedy are too violent to be lasting."
But he did not give himself time to see, that Tragedy owes this greater violence of effect to the shortness of its plan; that is, to its stricter unity, its more concentrated and unbroken interest, its
"close accelerated plot;"
to that
ἀθροον
, as Aristotle calls it, so essential to the purpose of Tragedy, which is, to give the pleasure of strong emotion. The Epic Poem is of too tedious a length, too various and episodic, to produce that effect in
the same degree as Tragedy, which is read, or seen, at once, and without interruption.
But the case was, that
Dryden
, (who, as I have before had occasion to remark, appears to have taken his idea of
Aristotle
from French translation,) wrote this in the preface to his translation of
210
an Epic Poem: on the contrary, when he was writing on Tragedy, he gave Tragedy the preference.
211
212
274.
mvp-aristotle-comment-274
NOTE 274. P. 134.
26.13
HIS POEM, IF PROPORTIONABLY CONTRACTED, WILL APPEAR CURTAILED.
Μυερον
. — Nothing is more diverting than the explanation which some commentators give of this word, and its application here. The Poem, it seems, is compared to the tail of a mouse, or a rat, which grows less and less towards the end:
"versus extremum attenuata."
213
I never heard, that any naturalists have observed this property to be peculiar to the tails of rats and mice. The fact seems to be, that the words
μυερον
, and
μειερον
, however their etymologies may appear to differ, have both the same meaning — that of
cropped, curtailed, tronqué, as
M. Batteux
translates it.
Μεικρού σιχθώ
. . .
ὁ κατα το τελοι ἐλλειπων χρονῳ
. [
Hephast. p. 92, ed. De Pauw
.] To which is opposed,
δολιχουρ
a long-tailed verse:
ὁ κατα το τελώ πλεονάζων συλλαβη
.
In the
Rhetoric
,
Aristotle
applies
μειρά
to a period that is too short, and disappoints the ear by ending abruptly. The passage is curious for its expression, and illustrates both the word itself, and its application, here, to a Poem, which disappoints the expectation of a reader in the same manner, by ending before its time.
Rhet. III. 9, p. 592, ed. Duval.
Δει δε, και τα κωλα, και τας περιοδες, μητε ΜΕΙΟΥΡΟΥΣ είναι, μητε ΜΑΚΡΑΣ· το μεν γαρ ΜΙΚΡΟΝ [. .
μειερον
] προσπταίειν πολλάκις ποιει τον ἀκροατην· ἀναγκη γαρ, όταν, ἐτι ὁρμων ἐπι το πορρω, και το μετρον ἔχει ἐν ἑαυτῳ ὁρε, ΑΝΤΙΣΠΑΣΘΗ παυσαμένε, ΟΙΟΝ, ΠΡΟΣΠΤΑΙΕΙΝ γίγνεσθαι, δια την ΑΝΤΙΚΡΟΥΣΙΝ.
275.
mvp-aristotle-comment-275
NOTE 275. P. 134.
26.13
IF EXTENDED TO THE USUAL LENGTH.
Ακολεθέντα τῳ το μετρο μηκεί.
Almost all the commentators and translators understand
answerable to the length of the metre. And this is, certainly, the most obvious and unforced sense of the words: for, had Aristotle meant, by
μέτρον
, the standard measure, or length, of the Poem, as other commentators understand it, he, probably, would have rather said
τῳ το ΜΗΚΟΥΣ ΜΕΤΡΩΝ
.
214
Μετρον
is so used in the passage given in the last note —
το ΜΕΤΡΟΝ ἔχει ἐν ἑαυτῳ ὁρε
. If, however,
metre be the sense, (for, after all, the passage is ambiguous,) the expression must, I think, be understood as a short way of saying
"conformable to the usual length of Poems in that metre"
— of Poems in heroic verse. See what is said,
cap. xxiv.
about the adaptation of the hexameter to Epic Poetry:
οὐδεις ΜΑΚΡΑΝ συστασιν ἐν ἀλλῳ πεποιηκεν τῳ ἡρωῳ.
— I cannot conceive that
Aristotle
meant to say, that the length of the Epic Poem was proportioned, or ought to be proportioned, to the length of the metre. Yet so the commentators.
"Si — Poeta secutus fuerit longitudinem, quae instar videtur ejus carminis."
Vict.
—
"Si cum metri longitudine provebatur."
Goulst.
&c. It was not the length of the hexameter which made it the fittest measure for heroic Poetry, but the nature of the feet of which it is composed; and on that account it was preferred, as
στασιμωτατον και ὀγκωδεστατον των μετρων
.
cap. xxiv.
The length of a verse is to be measured by the times (
χρονοι
) which compose it. Now the hexameter is but
one third longer than the Iambic trimeter; their respective times being 24, and 18: so that the length of an Epic Poem would be strictly proportioned to the length of its verse —
τῳ τε μετρε μηκει
— were it longer by one third only than a Tragedy.
276.
mvp-aristotle-comment-276
NOTE 276. P. 134.
Ὑδαρη
— watery. Aristotle uses the same metaphor in the following passage of his second book
De Republicâ
, where, opposing the community of wives and children proposed by
Plato
, he very justly objects, that it would weaken the bond of social union, by diluting the social affections, and destroying—
Par. Loft, IV. 756.
Relations dear, and all the charities
Of father, son, and brother,
—
Εν δε τη πόλει, την ΦΙΛΙΑΝ ἀναγκαιον ὙΔΑΡΗ γινεσθαι, δια την κοινωνιαν την τοιαυτην, και ήκιστα λέγειν τον ἐμον, ἡ ὑιον, πατερα, ὑιον.
215
Ωσπερ γαρ μικρον γλυκύ, εις πολυ ύδωρ μιχθεν, ἀναισθητον ποιει την κρασιν, ότω συμβαινει και την οικειοτητα, την προς άλληλες, την άπο των ὀνοματων τετων—κ . λ.
I stop there, because the passage is evidently defective, though the sense is plain.
277.
mvp-aristotle-comment-277
NOTE 277. P. 135.
26.15
AND, ALSO, IN THE PECULIAR END AT WHICH IT AIMS—.
Και, ἐτι, τῷ της τέχνης ἔργῳ.
The expression is ambiguous. It may mean, either the end, or business, of the Poetic art in general, or, that of Tragedy — of the Tragic art.
216
The latter, however, seems, pretty clearly, to be the meaning: for his expression —
τουτοις τε διαφέρει πασί, ΚΑΙ ΕΤΙ τῳ της τεχνης ἔργῳ
— shews the author to be speaking, here, of a distinct advantage. But, if we understand it to mean, that Tragedy answers the end of Poetry better than the Epic, this cannot be considered as an advantage distinct from those enumerated before, which are, plainly, such as contribute to the general end of Poetry — that of giving pleasure — of interesting, delighting, striking, &c. Whereas, if the peculiar end of Tragedy be superior to that of Epic Poetry, this, indeed, is an additional and separate advantage. Besides, the parenthetical insertion which immediately follows —
δει ΓΑΡ, την τυχεσαν ήδονην ποιειν αυτας
(i. e. the Epic and Tragic Poems,)
άλλα την ἐιρημενην
— plainly implies, that the
τεχνης ἐργον
, of which he had been speaking, was that of affording the particular pleasure proper to the species. And thus, too, the word
ἐργον
is used in other passages:
τραγῳδιας ἐργον
,
cap. vi.
and
cap. xiii.
The words,
μαλλον το τέλες τυγχανεσα
, present a similar, but more embarrassing, ambiguity. Is
τελ
, here, the end of Poetry, or the end of Tragedy? If we take it in the latter sense,
Aristotle
will say, that Tragedy is superior, both because its end — the peculiar effect which it purposes to produce — is superior to that of
the Epic Poem, and, because it attains that end more perfectly than the Epic attains its end. But this Aristotle has not proved, nor does it appear to be true. On the other hand, if we understand
τελ
to mean the end of the poetic art,
217
it is obviously true, that, if Tragedy be superior in all those respects which he had mentioned — in its closer unity, its brevity, its
ἐναργεια
, its music, and its decorations — and, besides, (
και ἐτι
) in the specific end at which it aims — it must, on the whole, be preferable to the Epic Poem, as answering more effectually the end of Poetry, by giving greater pleasure.
For, that this, in Aristotle's view, was the great end of the art, and of all its branches, appears, if I mistake not, evidently, from many other passages of this treatise, as well as from that now before us. Nor does he, any where, appear to me to give any countenance to an idea, which rational criticism has, now, pretty well exploded — that utility and instruction are the end of Poetry. That it may indeed be rendered, in some degree, useful and improving, few will deny; none, that it ought to be made so, if it can. But, that the chief end and purpose of Poetry is to instruct — that
Homer
wrote his
Iliad
on purpose to teach mankind the mischiefs of discord among chiefs, and his
Odyssey
, to prove to them the advantages of staying at home and taking care of their families — this is so manifestly absurd, that one is really astonished to see so many writers, one after the other, discoursing gravely in defence of it.
218
It is true indeed, that
Aristotle
, in his account of Tragedy, mentions the correction and refinement of the passions, pity, terror, &c. as a useful effect of Tragic representations. But he no where, either in his definition, where we might surely have expected him to be explicit, or in any other part of his book, calls that effect the end of Tragedy. All his expressions prove, that his end, both of Tragic and of Epic Poetry, was pleasure;
219
though, with respect to Tragedy, he asserts, (by way, as I have before suggested,
220
of obviating
Plato's
objections to it,) that the pleasure arising from it was so far from being pernicious, that it was even useful; so far from inflaming the passions of men, that it tended, on the contrary, to purify and moderate them in common life. When the reader sees the expressions, to which I allude, laid together, he will hardly, I think, entertain any doubt upon this head. —
τα μέγιστα, δις ΨΥΧΑΓΩΓΕΙ΄ ἡ Τραγῳδια, μυθε μερη ἐσιν
,
&c. cap. vi.
—
ἐστι δε ἐχ αυτη ἀπο Τραγῳδιας ἩΔΟΝΗ.
cap. xiii.
—
γαρ πασαν δει ζητειν ἩΔΟΝΗΝ ἀπο Τραγῳδιας, άλλα ΤΗΝ ΟΙΚΕΙΑΝ.
—
Επει δε την ἀπο ἐλει και φοβε, δια μιμησεως, δει ἩΔΟΝΗΝ παρασκευαζειν τον ποιητην
cap. xiv.
—
ὶν, ώσπερ ζωον ἐν όλον, ποιῃ την ΟΙΚΕΙΑΝ ΗΔΟΝΗΝ.
cap. xxiii.
—
την όψιν, δι ἧς ΑΙ ΗΔΟΝΑΙ, &c. cap. ult.
—
δει γαρ ἐ την τυχεσαν ἩΔΟΝΗΝ ποιειν ΑΥΤΑΣ, άλλα την ειρημενην.
ibid.
From all this it appears, I think, indubitably, that the great end of Poetry in general, was, in Aristotle's opinion, to give plea-
sure; as
Castelvetro
, long ago, rightly contended.
"Coloro, che vogliono, che la poesia fia trovata principalmente per giovare, o per giovare & per dilettare infieme, veggano che non s'oppongono all' autorità d'Aristotele, il quale, qui ed altrove, non par che le affegni altro, che diletto; e se pure le concede alcuno giovamento, gliele concede per accidente come è la purgatione dello spavento & della compassione per mezzo della Tragedia."
p. 505
.
The peculiar end of Tragedy, he has expressly told us, is to afford that pleasure, which results from fictitious terror and pity:
την άπο ἐλει και φοβε δια μιμησεως ήδονην.
— What he regarded as the peculiar end of Epic Poetry, I observe that he has no where distinctly said. But from what he has said, of the advantages which its plan affords, with respect to grandeur, and variety, and the admission of the wonderful and surprising, and also of the superior richness of its language,
221
we may collect, that his ideas on this subject accorded with those of the best modern critics; and that he held the end of the Epic Poem to be, according to the exact description of an eminent writer,
"admiration, produced by a grandeur of design, and variety of important incidents, and sustained by all the energy and minute particularity of description."
222
This end, however, and these peculiar advantages, of the Epic plan, Aristotle has not, as I have before remarked, brought forward, to complete the comparison in this chapter: but he plainly, and, I think, justly, considered them as more than compensated by the closer interest, more perfect illusion, stronger emotion, deeper impression, and, in bis view, more useful tendency, of Tragedy. The Epic Poem loses in force of effect, what it gains in variety; in nature and passion, what it gains in grandeur and sublimity. The very necessity, and the merit, of its variety, and of the
ἐπεισοδιων ἀνομοἰοις ἐπεισοδίοις
,
223
are a confession of its defects, as implying a too great extent of plan, a feebleness of interest, a want of relief. It seems, indeed, to be the great art of the Epic Poet, to make us amends, by the striking beauty of particular parts, for the fatigue and ennui which unavoidably results, more or less, from the whole.
A strong proof of the superiority of Tragedy, and of the justness of Aristotle's decision, is, that every reader is most delighted with the Episodes of Epic Poetry; with those subordinate and more compressed actions, which give us the very pleasure of Tragedy — which interest and affect us by exciting pity and terror: with the meeting of
Hector and Andromache, and the supplication of
Priam to Achilles for the body of his son, in the
Iliad
; with the love, despair, and death, of
Dido, the episode of
Nisus and Euryalus, and the parting scene between old
Evander and his son, in the
Eneid
.
224
But though, of all the pleasures which Poetry, or Music, or Painting, can afford, the pleasure of emotion deserves to be esteemed the greatest, yet all those arts certainly afford considerable pleasures of other kinds; and, perhaps, to do full justice to the Epic Poem, we ought not to characterize it by any one particular and principal pleasure, but by that variety, which is peculiar to it, and which comprehends, in some degree or other, every sort of pleasure, that serious Poetry can give.
225
Whatever, therefore, may be decided
with respect to the comparative excellence of the Poems themselves, we may safely perhaps assent to the general decision of criticism, respecting the comparative merits of the Poets, and allow, that
"the first praise of genius is due to the writer of an Epic Poem; as it requires an assemblage of all the powers which are singly sufficient for other compositions."
226
