Poetics. Aristotle. ed. Henry James Pye. London. 1792.
The Poetic of Aristotle (Henry James Pye, revised 1792) (OCR draft) (English) (Henry James Pye's revised 1792 English translation, corrected against the 1788 first edition, aligned to the Kassel reference edition, and supplied with a selective apparatus of substantive 1788 readings.)
Provisional text from uncorrected OCR; expect errors.
1. mvp-aristotle-comment-708
1.
mvp-aristotle-comment-709
1456b20
τῆς δὲ λέξεως κτέ.
This whole chapter has been condemned by
Ritter and others as an interpolation; and it must be admitted that, according to our notions of the divisions of knowledge, the matter in it belongs to grammar and philology rather than to an Art of Poetry.
Aristotle's divisions, however, are not always quite the same as ours, as his relegation of the theory of the simple sounds in language to 'metric' in the
De Partibus (
2.16, 66087
) is enough to prove.
The writer of the chapter takes the same view of the simple sounds, and tells us that they need not be discussed at any length in a book like the
Poetics.
The main difficulty, accordingly, is in his assumption that in some way or other the other 'parts of speech' come within the scope of a work on poetry.
He may perhaps have thought that some analysis of language in general was logically required as a preparation for the theory of poetical language in the next two chapters, which are成 questionably germane to the main subject of the book.
And apart from this one has to remember the historical connexion between grammar and poetry in Greek antiquity.
Grammar seems to have originated in Greece in the criticism and interpreta- tion of poetry; its relation to poetry was felt and acknowledged even in the time of
Dionysius Thrax, who begins his treatise with the definition,
γραμματική ἐστιν ἐμπειρία τῶν παρὰ ποιηταῖς τε καὶ συγγραφεῦσιν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ λεγομένων (p. 5 Uhlig).
That certain matters of grammar come under the cognizance of poetry is implied apparently in
De interpr.4, 1785
, when a distinction is made between the logical and the extra-logical forms of statement:
οἱ μὲν οὖν ἄλλοι [scil. λόγοι] ἀφείσθωσαν· ῥητορικῆς γὰρ ἢ ποιητικῆς οἰκειοτέρα ἡ σκέψις (comp.
Pacius ad loc.).
The a priori objection, therefore, to this chapter is not quite so conclusive as it might seem at first sight.
The chapter itself, whether an original part of the
Poetics or not, has more than one mark of date about it.
ἄρθρον and
πτῶσις have not yet acquired their usual sense of 'article' and 'case';
λόγος still retains its peculiarly Aristotelian meaning, and the definitions of
ἄρθρον,
σύνδεσμος,
ὄνομα and
ῥῆμα seem to have been framed with conscious reference to it (see on 1457 10);
the general terminology and logical forms throughout the chapter are Aristotelian; and there are also several isolated points and allusions which would be wholly unintelligible if it were not for the parallels and illus- trations we are able to find in the unquestioned writings of
Aristotle.
1.
mvp-aristotle-comment-710
ἁπάσης,
'taken as a whole', as opposed to the parts into which it may be divided; comp.
Meteor.4. 1, 379b 5
ἡ θάλασσα κατὰ μέρος μὲν διαιρουμένη τάχα σήπεται, ἅπασα δ᾽ οὔ. —
Plato
Theaet.147 Ε
τὸν ἀριθμὸν πάντα δίχα διελάβομεν. —
Gorg.502 c
εἴ τις περιέ- λοιτο τῆς ποιήσεως πάσης τό τε μέλος κτέ. —
Laws737 Ε
δύο μέρη τοῦ παντὸς ἀριθμοῦ. The Latin
omnis is used in just the same way in
Caesar
B. G.1. I
Gallia est omnis divisa in parles tres.
1.
mvp-aristotle-comment-711
τὰ μέρη.
Aristotle's
μέρη τῆς λέξεως is an anticipation of our 'parts of speech'; but the term covers more ground; his list of
μέρη comprises three distinct kinds of 'parts': (1) the elements into which words are analyzable (
στοιχεῖον and
συλλαβή) ; (2) the various kinds of words (
σύνδεσμος,
ἄρθρον, etc.); and (3) the
λόγος - the actual
λέξις being a series of
λόγοι. It includes, therefore, all the elements of language in every stage of analysis, from the simplest sounds to the proposition. It is only under the second of the above heads, i.e. in his classification of words, that
Aristotle deals with the 'parts of speech' of later grammar. This passage is cited by
Ammonius on the
De Interpretatione:
λόγου μὲν ταῦτα [i. e. articles, conjunctions, etc.] οὐ μέρη, λέξεως δὲ μέρη, ἧς καὶ ὁ λόγος αὐτὸς μέρος, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς Περὶ ποιητικῆς εἴρηται (p. 12 Busse); and there is more than one reference to it in
Boethius on the same book:
Aristoteles in libris quos de poetica scripsit locutionis partes esse syllabas vel etiam coniunctiones tradidit (2, p. 6 Meiser). -
In opere vero de poetica non eodem modo dividit locutionem, sed omnes omnino locutionis partes adposuit, confirmans esse locutionis partes elementa syllabas coniunctiones articulos nomina casus verba orationes. locutio namque non in solis significativis vocibus constat, sed supergradiens significationes vocum ad articulatos sonos usque consistit (2, p. 8).
The classification before us which distinguishes words into
σύνδεσμοι,
ἄρθρα,
ὀνόματα,
ῥήματα and
πτώσεις, is an advance on that in the lost Aristotelian work known as the
τέχνης τῆς Θεοδέκτου συναγωγή (fr. 127 Teubn.), which recognized only three kinds of words,
ὀνόματα,
ῥήματα, and
σύνδεσμοι.
This lost book is men- tioned by
Dionysius of Halicarnassus and
Quintilian in their sketches of the history of the 'parts of speech';
but they both ignore the present chapter of the
Poetics.
The omission, instead of justifying
Ritter's athetesis of the chapter, merely shows that the
Poetics were but little read in certain periods of antiquity.
1.
mvp-aristotle-comment-712
ἄρθρον.
That the word has to be transposed is shown by the position of the explanation in the following statement about it (1457°6).
1.
mvp-aristotle-comment-713
στοιχεῖον:
comp.
Metaph.A 3, 1014 8 26
στοιχεῖον λέγεται ἐξ οὗ σύγκειται πρώτου ἐνυπάρχοντος ἀδιαιρέτου τῷ εἶδει εἰς ἄλλο εἶδος· οἷον φωνῆς στοιχεῖα ἐξ ὧν σύγκειται ἡ φωνὴ καὶ εἰς διαιρεῖται ἔσχατα, ἐκεῖνα δὲ μηκέτι εἰς ἄλλας φωνὰς ἑτέρας τῷ εἶδει αὐτῶν.
στοιχεῖον was properly a letter of the alphabet; it was
Plato (v.
Eudemus ap.
Simplic. in
Phys. 1 p. 7. 13 Diels) who gave it the philosophical sense of 'element', which it so often has in
Aristotle.
The present definition shows the influence of the philosophical associations connected with the word ;
a
στοιχεῖον is defined as an indivisible voice-sound capable of serving as a constituent, or element, in an intelligible voice-sound (
συνετὴ φωνή).
In thus describing it as a 'sound'
Aristotle implicitly distinguishes it from the
γράμμα, or written symbol which stands for the sound (comp.
Metaph.B 4, 1000ª 2
);
the distinction, however, is very far from being generally observed in
Aristotle (see
Diels,
Elementum p. 33).
The two terms are treated as synonyms in
Plato
Crat.426 D
.
1.
mvp-aristotle-comment-726
συλλαβή.
As here defined a
συλλαβή is a combination of a mute and a 'letter with a sound', i. e. either a vowel or a semivowel (see on
b 28
), to make the mute audible. An instance of the first combination is BA (see
Metaph. Z 17, 1041 b13
); of the second ГР (comp.
Metaph. N 6, 1093b 22
), where the I becomes audible at any rate as part of a complex 'noise'. In the further combination we have an articulate, as well as an audible, sound-
φωνὴ ἀκουστή, not a mere
ἀκουστόν.
Aristotle, however, does not stop to note the difference. The meaning given to
συλλαβή in the Aristotelian definition is apparently the proper technical sense of the term:
Dionysius Thrax p. 16 Uhlig
συλλαβή ἐστι κυρίως σύλληψις συμφώνων μετὰ φωνηέντος ἢ φωνηέντων, οἷον καρ, βοῦς· καταχρηστικῶς δὲ καὶ ἡ ἐξ ἑνὸς φωνηέντος, οἷον ᾶ, \overline{\eta} (see also
Charisius 2 P.
, and
Marius Victorinus 2470-5 P.
). In ordinary speech, however, the term was often used to denote the units of sound or 'syllables' (as we say) into which a word, a foot, or a verse is divisible.
Plato, for intance, speaks of
ΣΩ as the 'first syllable' in Socrates (
Theaet. 203 c
), and of words as 'made up of syllables' (
Crat. 424 Ε
συλλαβὰς συντιθέντες, ἐξ ὧν τά τε ὀνόματα καὶ τὰ ῥήματα συντίθενται); words also like ἐû and ἤια etc. were said to be disyllables, trisyllables, etc.
Aristotle has lapsed into this use of the term even in the
Poetics, in
21, 1457b 2
where the a in
Πηληιάδεω is regarded as a
συλλαβὴ ἐμβεβλημένη (see note on the passage); and it is by no means uncommon in other Aristotelian writings; see
Cat. 6, 4b 33
;
De interpr. 4, 16b31
;
De gen. an. 1. 18, 722a 32
;
Metaph. N 6, 1093b 1
;
Rhet. 3. 2, 1405 a 31
(comp.
Bon. Ind. 710b 45
; and for the general history of the term
Schmidt,
Beiträge zur Gesch. der Grammatik p. 126
). It is to be observed that
Aristotle ignores the
φωναὶ συνθεταί called diphthongs; for the ancient view of them see
Blass,
Aussprache p. 20
.
1.
mvp-aristotle-comment-740
πτῶσις,
as a term of grammar, has not yet acquired the special sense of 'case' which it has in the grammarians; and there is no equivalent for it in our modern terminology. We may perhaps translate it by 'modification' or 'mode'. Given a word, a noun or a verb, with a certain meaning, a
πτῶσις of it embodies that meaning with some secondary idea superadded. It does not necessarily involve a difference of form;
βαδίζει; as a question, is a
πτῶσις of the affirmative
βαδίζει, 'he walks', and
δῶρον as an accusative a
πτῶσις of
δώρον as a nominative. In most instances, however, a
πτῶσις is distinguished from the original noun or verb by some difference of form, e. g. by a difference of termination. Under the general head of
πτώσεις
Aristotle includes the following species of words :- (1) the oblique cases of all nouns, as compared with the nominative, e. g.
Φίλωνος etc. from
Φίλων (
De interpr. 2, 16
a 33
). (2) The nominative also of common nouns; it is a
πτῶσις through the idea of number which it suggests thus
ἄνθρωπος is 'a man', and
ἄνθρωποι 'several men'. (3) The forms involving a distinction of gender, e.g.
οὗτος, αὕτη, τοῦτο and the like (
Soph. el. 14, 173
b 27
). (4) The paronymous adjectives, e. g.
χαλκούς from
χαλκός (
Rhet. 3. 9, 1410
a 32
),
ἀνδρεῖος as compared with the substantive
ἀνδρία (
Rhet. 1. 7, 1364
b 36
;
Cat. 1, 1
a 14
). (5) The comparatives and superlatives as compared with the positive adjectives, e. g.
βέλτιστος from
ἀγαθός (
Top. 5. 7, 136
b 30
). (6) The adverbs as compared with the corresponding adjectives, e. g.
δικαίως from
δίκαιος (
Top. 1. 15, 106
b 29
;
5. 7, 136
b 15
). (7) The past and future tenses of the verb (
De interpr. 3, 16
b 16
); and presumably also the forms embodying distinctions of person, number, voice, etc. To these must be added (8)
τὰ ὑποκριτικά, the modifications of sense words may acquire through differences in the mode of enunciation. This synopsis of the different uses of the term in
Aristotle may be sufficient to show that
πτῶσις with him is a logical rather than a philological conception, and that it is only in certain of its applications that it corresponds to our declension or inflexion or derivation. It is the sense rather than the word itself that is conceived as derivative; a
πτῶσις takes its meaning, i. e. the fundamental part of it, from the primary word; and the idea of this latter is involved in any explanation we give of the
πτῶσις;
Φίλωνοs for instance means 'of
Φίλων', and
γραμματικός means 'possessing
γραμματική'—both being accordingly
πτώσεις, the one of
Φίλων and the other of
γραμματική. With
Aristotle's use of
πτῶσις we may compare
Varro's equally heterogeneous instances of 'declinatio':
a Terentius Terenti, ab equo equiso, ab homine homunculus, a mamma mammosae, a prudentia prudens, a pugnando et currendo pugiles et cursores (
L. L. 8, 14
).
1.
mvp-aristotle-comment-466
166.
mvp-aristotle-comment-166
NOTE 166. P. 104.
20.1
TO ALL DICTION BELONG, &c.See
Diss. I. p. 37.
—After having discussed three of the constituent parts of Tragedy, the fable, the manners, and the sentiments, Aristotle now comes to the diction (
Λεξις), upon which he bestows three chapters. His subject plainly required him to speak of the diction of Tragedy, not of poetic diction in general; much less, to descend to the grammatical elements of language in general. Yet, of his three chapters on diction, the first is merely grammatical, and such, as even in a rhetorical treatise would appear misplaced; and even the two following chapters relate to poetic language in general, without any thing applicable to the diction of Tragedy in particular—his proper subject—except a single observation, or, rather, hint, at the end of the third chapter.
1
Dacier
, who discharged, with as much fidelity as any commentator ever did, the duty of seeing nothing amiss in his author, has zealously defended the propriety of this grammatical chapter: but all he says amounts, I think, to little more than this—that the chapter should be there, because it is there.
2
No man is nice about reasons, when the point to be proved has been determined before he looks for them.
167.
mvp-aristotle-comment-167
NOTE 167. P. 104.
20.1
DISCOURSE OR SPEECH—.
ΛΟΓΟΣ.—
Mr. Harris, in the Hermes, p. 19
, has rendered the word,
sentence. He took that part of the idea, that suited his subject; but, that this is not the whole sense of the word, but only a sense included in the word, is evident from what is said below, in the definition of
λογος, where the entire Iliad is comprehended under that term. Had I here rendered
λογος by
sentence, I must, to have been consistent in my translation, have there called the Iliad a sentence.
The word
λογος here plainly answers—not to
sentence, exclusively, nor yet, exclusively, to what Mr. Harris calls
"Oration or Discourse," as composed of several sentences; but, it is a general term, comprehending both these, and applicable, like the Latin word
oratio, or the English,
speech, to every significant combination of words, whether consisting of a single sentence, or of many; as, indeed, appears from Aristotle's definition itself. Nay, the word appears not even to have been limited to a complete assertive sentence; for the philosopher, in the treatise
περι Ἑρμηνειας
, gives the denomination of
λογος to these two words—
καλος ίππος. He says,
ἐν ΤΩ ΛΟΓΩ, (
in hac oratione,)
καλος ίππος. It was what he calls a merely significant
λογος, as distinguished from an assertive
λογος, or proposition, such as,
καλΟΣ ΕΣΤΙΝ ίππος.
I was unable to find any English word, that would express
λογος adequately, and clearly. And it seems somewhat remarkable, that the Greek language, rich and copious as it is, should not afford—at least I am not aware that it does—any single word perfectly synonymous to our word,
sentence.
Λογος, as I have observed, is too wide; it serves equally to express a single sentence, or a whole speech, or even less than a sentence. It is applied by Aristotle to a combination of two words—a substantive and an adjective, without a verb—and, to the Iliad.
Περιοδος was only one particular kind, or form, of sentence.
3
Κωλον did not necessarily contain a complete sense, or thought, which is essential to our word, sentence.
4
1.
mvp-aristotle-comment-135
Ritter, cap. 20 § 1
Partes sermonis enumerantur earumque definitiones proponuntur. Quae hoc capite traduntur Aristoteli abiudicanda putavi argumentis permotus, quae primum sub unum conspectum collecta afferre et deinde, cum singula explicabo, accuratius persequi in animo est. 1. quae hic docentur, ea pro sese sola posita sunt et nullo vinculo cum ceteris cohaerent. nihil ad definiendam dictionem poeticam inde sumi potest et nihil indesumptum videmus c. 22., ubi dictionis virtutes et vitia enumerantur. immo prima artis grammaticae rudimenta inepte propinantur, eaque a ceteris disiuncta, quasi sublimia haerent. ratio igitur et consilium deest, cur haec explicentur. 2. insunt quae Aristotelem non scripsisse testimoniis non contemnendis constat, quo pertinet §. 1 et 6 et 7. ut mox videbimus. 3. offendunt quae tribui prudenti viro nequeunt. sed priusquam de singulis dicam, unum etiam quod contra dici possit amovendum videtur. scilicet moneo, ne quis hisce Rhetoricorum locis sententiam meam convelli putet, III, 1 extr. III, 2. pag. 1404 b 5 et 28. et pag. 1405 a 5. nam primo loco Aristoteles nihil dicit nisi se disputasse de dictione poetica in opere de arte poetica conscripto, quod re vera factum est c. 21 et 22. quae pro Aristoteliis agnoscimus; secundo loco memorat nominum species a sese enumeratas esse in Poetica, idque factum est c. 21.; idem repetit tertio loco; quarto denique ad disputationem suam de metaphoris provocat in Poetica expromptam, quam legimus c. 21. itaque tantum abest, ut ex illis locis pro c. 20. praesidium petatur, ut ipsum silentium contra id adhiberi forsitan possit.
τῆς δὲ λέξεως κτλ. totius sermonis partes ab hoc magistro octo numerantur
στοιχεῖον,
συλλαβή,
σύνδεσμος,
ὄνομα,
ῥῆμα,
ἄρθον,
πτῶσις,
λόγος. secernendae sunt ex hac serie quae non tam partes sermonis quam elementa vocabulorum sunt littera et syllaba, secernenda est
πτῶσις, h. e. varia et nominum et verborum terminatio, secernenda est oratio sive pronuntiatum (
λόγος), quod ex sermonis partibus demum componitur. haec quamquam mire huc congesta quomodocumque defendantur. dicant omnem linguae materiam, qua opus sit ut oratio oriatur, comprehendere Aristoteli destinatum fuisse. si minus iusta est defensio (praesertim
πτῶσις vix in hunc modum defendi poterit), certe aliqua est. relicua sunt igitur
ὄνομα,
ῥῆμα,
σύνδεσμος,
ἄρθρον, nomen, verbum, coniunctio, articulus. nomina et verba primus distinxit Plato in Sophista p. 261 E. conf. Classen de Grammaticae Graecae primordiis p. 45 sqq. post Platonem Aristoteles... idem argumentum retractans tripartitam linguae divisionem instituit, cum praeter
ὄνομα et
ῥῆμα ceteram linguae materiam nomine
συνδέσμου complecteretur, ut testatur Dionysius Halicarn. de Compositione verb. c. 2. init.
ταῦτα δὲ καὶ Θεοδέκτης μὲν καὶ ᾿Αριστοτέλης καὶ οἱ κατ' ἐκείνους φιλοσοφήσαντες τοὺς χρόνους ἄχρι τριῶν προήγαγον,
ὀνόματα καὶ ῥήματα καὶ συνδέσμους πρῶτα μέρη τῆς λέξεως ποιοῦντες.
οἱ δὲ μετ' αὐτοὺς γενόμενοι καὶ μάλιστα οἱ τῆς Στωϊκῆς αἱρέσεως ἡγέμονες ἕως τεττάρων προυβίβασαν χωρίσαντες ἀπὸ τῶν συνδέ σμων τὰ ἄρθρα. idem de Praestantia Demosthenis p. 1101. Reisk.
τοῖς πρώτοις μορίοις τῆς λέξεως –,
εἴτε τρία ταῦτ᾽ ἐστιν,
ὡς Θεοδέκτῃ τε καὶ ᾿Αριστοτέλει δοκεῖ,
ὀνόματα καὶ ῥήματα καὶ σύνδεσμοι,
εἴτε πλείω,
δύο ταῦτα ἀκολουθεῖ,
μέλος καὶ χρόνος ἴσα. Quintilianus I. 0. 1, 4, 18. tum videbit ad quem hoc pertinet, quot et quae sint partes orationis, quamquam de numero parum convenit. veteres enim, quorum fuerunt Aristoteles atque Theodectes, verba modo et nomina et convinctiones tradiderunt paulatim a philosophis et maxime Stoicis auctus est numerus, et primum convinctionibus articuli adiecti, mox praepositiones. sed ecce in hoc nostro Poeticae loco non tripartitam divisionem sed quadripartitam reperimus. habemus articulos quos demum a Stoicis adiectos, h. e. ex convinctionibus secretos fuisse Dionysius cum Quintiliano testatur. numne igitur Dionysium et Quintilianum Poeticam ignorasse aut neglexisse existimabimus cum Classeno 1. c. p. 60.? id equidem non faciam. immo hunc nostrum locum et Dionysius et Quintilianus sane ignoraverunt, sed eosdem ex alio integrae et non interpolatae Poeticae loco nobis deperdito sua hausisse mihi paene certum videtur. nimirum Aristoteles cum in libro suo de Interpretatione c. 2 et 3 et 4. nominis verbique et enuntiati rationem breviter pro suo consilio explicuisset, uberiorem eius rei explicationem aliis libris iam tum reservavit c. 4 extr.
ῥητορικῆς γὰρ ἢ ποιητικῆς οἰκειοτέρα ἡ σκέψις. hanc vero a sese in Poetica expromptam esse profitetur quattuor illis Rhetoricorum locis, quos modo (pag. 222.) indicavimus. itaque Aristoteles eo libro, quem de arte oratoria diu post editam de Interpretatione commentationem (sub ipsum ut videtur vitae finem) conscripsit, lectores suos ad Poeticam amandavit, si de
λέξει poetarum, et quae sint nominum species et translationum genera edoceri se velint. Dionysium igitur, quem rhetoricos Aristotelis libros perdiligenter versasse nemo infitiabitur, huius de orationis partibus doctrinam ex integra Poetica hausisse admodum probabile, ne dicam certum, videtur. quid igitur inde consequitur, cum in hoc libro quartam orationis partem a Stoicis inventam deprehendimus ? quid nisi haec ab aliena manu addita esse, veram autem disputationem intercidisse? haec quae adhuc disputavimus, nisi alia essent, apud me ipsum nonnisi eo valerent, ut suspicio de hoc loco oreretur, ac de illis praecipue quae dicta sunt de octo orationis partibus §. 1. et de convinctionis et articuli natura §. 6 et 7.: sed accedunt alia multa, quibus adducor ut totum caput Aristoteli subtrahendum existimem, quae deinceps persequemur.