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OF THE SENTIMENTS. HAVING already spoken sufficiently of the other parts, it now remains to treat of the language and the sentiments.

Poetics. Aristotle. ed. Henry James Pye. London. 1792.

Current edition Experimental

The Poetic of Aristotle (Henry James Pye, revised 1792) (OCR draft) (English) (Henry James Pye's revised 1792 English translation, corrected against the 1788 first edition, aligned to the Kassel reference edition, and supplied with a selective apparatus of substantive 1788 readings.)

Provisional text from uncorrected OCR; expect errors.

Editions (4)

Περὶ ποιητικῆς (OCR draft) (Aristotle, Poetics. Immanuel Bekker, editor, Aristotelis Opera, volume 2. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1837.) — 19 focus

Περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἄλλων ἤδη εἴρηται, λοιπὸν δὲ περὶ λέξεως ἢ διανοίας εἰπεῖν.

Τὰ μὲν οὖν περὶ τὴν διάνοιαν ἐν τοῖς περὶ ῥητορικῆς κείσθω· τοῦτο γὰρ ἴδιον μᾶλλον ἐκείνης τῆς μεθόδου.

Ἔστι δὲ κατὰ τὴν διάνοιαν ταῦτα, ὅσα ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου δεῖ παρασκευασθῆναι.

Μέρη δὲ τούτων τό τε ἀποδεικνύναι καὶ τὸ λύειν καὶ τὸ πάθη παρασκευάζειν, οἷον ἔλεον ἢ φόβον ἢ ὀργὴν καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα, καὶ ἔτι μέγεθος καὶ μικρότητα.

Δῆλον δὲ ὅτι καὶ ἐν τοῖς πράγμασιν ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν ἰδεῶν δεῖ χρῆσθαι, ὅταν ἢ ἐλεεινὰ ἢ δεινὰ ἢ μέγαλα ἢ εἰκότα δέῃ παρασκευάζειν.

Πλὴν τοσοῦτον διαφέρει, ὅτι τὰ μὲν δεῖ φαίνεσθαι ἄνευ διδασκαλίας, τὰ δὲ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ ὑπὸ τοῦ λέγοντος παρασκευάζεσθαι καὶ παρὰ τὸν λόγον γίγνεσθαι. Τί γὰρ ἂν εἴη τοῦ λέγοντος ἔργον, εἰ φανοῖτο ἡδέα καὶ μὴ διὰ τὸν λόγον;

Τῶν δὲ περὶ τὴν λέξιν ἓν μέν ἐστιν εἶδος θεωρίας τὰ σχήματα τῆς λέξεως, ἅ ἐστιν εἰδέναι τῆς ὑποκριτικῆς καὶ τοῦ τὴν τοιαύτην ἔχοντος ἀρχιτεκτονικήν, οἷον τί ἐντολὴ καὶ τί εὐχὴ καὶ διήγησις καὶ ἀπειλὴ καὶ ἐρώτησις καὶ ἀπόκρισις, καὶ εἴ τι ἄλλο τοιοῦτον.

Παρὰ γὰρ τὴν τούτων γνῶσιν ἢ ἄγνοιαν οὐδὲν εἰς τὴν ποιητικὴν ἐπιτίμημα φέρεται, ὅ τι καὶ ἄξιον σπουδῆς. Τί γὰρ ἄν τις ὑπολάβοι ἡμαρτῆσθαι ἃ Πρωταγόρας ἐπιτιμᾷ, Ὅτι εὔχεσθαι οἰόμενος ἐπιτάττει εἰπὼν

Μῆνιν ἄειδε θεά;

Τὸ γὰρ κελεῦσαι, φησί, ποιεῖν τι ἢ μὴ ἐπίταξίς ἐστιν.

Διὸ παρείσθω ὡς ἄλλης καὶ οὐ τῆς ποιητικῆς ὂν θεώρημα.

Περὶ ποιητικῆς (OCR draft) Perseus (Aristotle, De arte poetica liber. Rudolf Kassel, editor. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965. Reference edition for passage alignment.) — 19 focus

περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἄλλων εἰδῶν εἴρηται, λοιπὸν δὲ περὶ λέξεως καὶ διανοίας εἰπεῖν.

τὰ μὲν οὖν περὶ τὴν διάνοιαν ἐν 35 τοῖς περὶ ῥητορικῆς κείσθω· τοῦτο γὰρ ἴδιον μᾶλλον ἐκείνης τῆς μεθόδου.

ἔστι δὲ κατὰ τὴν διάνοιαν ταῦτα, ὅσα ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου δεῖ παρασκευασθῆναι.

μέρη δὲ τούτων τό τε ἀποδεικνύναι καὶ τὸ λύειν καὶ τὸ πάθη παρασκευάζειν (οἷον 1456b 1 ἔλεον ἢ φόβον ἢ ὀργὴν καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα) καὶ ἔτι μέγεθος καὶ μικρότητας.

δῆλον δὲ ὅτι καὶ ἐν τοῖς πράγμασιν ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν ἰδεῶν δεῖ χρῆσθαι ὅταν ἢ ἐλεεινὰ ἢ δεινὰ ἢ μεγάλα ἢ εἰκότα δέῃ παρασκευάζειν·

πλὴν τοσοῦτον 5 διαφέρει, ὅτι τὰ μὲν δεῖ φαίνεσθαι ἄνευ διδασκαλίας, τὰ δὲ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ ὑπὸ τοῦ λέγοντος παρασκευάζεσθαι καὶ παρὰ τὸν λόγον γίγνεσθαι. τί γὰρ ἂν εἴη τοῦ λέγοντος ἔργον, εἰ φαίνοιτο ᾗ δέοι καὶ μὴ διὰ τὸν λόγον;

τῶν δὲ περὶ τὴν λέξιν ἓν μέν ἐστιν εἶδος θεωρίας τὰ σχήματα τῆς λέξεως, 10 ἅ ἐστιν εἰδέναι τῆς ὑποκριτικῆς καὶ τοῦ τὴν τοιαύτην ἔχοντος ἀρχιτεκτονικήν, οἷον τί ἐντολὴ καὶ τί εὐχὴ καὶ διήγησις καὶ ἀπειλὴ καὶ ἐρώτησις καὶ ἀπόκρισις καὶ εἴ τι ἄλλο τοιοῦτον.

παρὰ γὰρ τὴν τούτων γνῶσιν ἢ ἄγνοιαν οὐδὲν εἰς τὴν ποιητικὴν ἐπιτίμημα φέρεται ὅ τι καὶ ἄξιον 15 σπουδῆς. τί γὰρ ἄν τις ὑπολάβοι ἡμαρτῆσθαι ἃ Πρωταγόρας ἐπιτιμᾷ, ὅτι εὔχεσθαι οἰόμενος ἐπιτάττει εἰπὼν

μῆνιν ἄειδε θεά;

τὸ γὰρ κελεῦσαι, φησίν, ποιεῖν τι ἢ μὴ ἐπίταξίς ἐστιν.

διὸ παρείσθω ὡς ἄλλης καὶ οὐ τῆς ποιητικῆς ὂν θεώρημα.

Poetics, Greek text (Ingram Bywater, 1909) (OCR draft) Experimental (Ingram Bywater's Greek text of Aristotle's Poetics, published in 1909.) — 19 focus

Περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἄλλων ἤδη εἴρηται, λοιπὸν δὲ περὶ
λέξεως καὶ διανοίας εἰπεῖν.

τὰ μὲν οὖν περὶ τὴν διάνοιαν ἐν
τοῖς περὶ ῥητορικῆς κείσθω· τοῦτο γὰρ ἴδιον μᾶλλον ἐκείνης
τῆς μεθόδου.

ἔστι δὲ κατὰ τὴν διάνοιαν ταῦτα, ὅσα ὑπὸ
τοῦ λόγου δεῖ παρασκευασθῆναι.

μέρη δὲ τούτων τό τε ἀποδεικνύναι
καὶ τὸ λύειν καὶ τὸ πάθη παρασκευάζειν (οἷον
ἔλεον ἢ φόβον ἢ ὀργὴν καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα) καὶ ἔτι μέγεθος
καὶ μικρότητα.

δῆλον δὲ ὅτι καὶ ἐν τοῖς πράγμασιν ἀπὸ
τῶν αὐτῶν ἰδεῶν δεῖ χρῆσθαι ὅταν ἢ ἐλεεινὰ ἢ δεινὰ ἢ
μεγάλα ἢ εἰκότα δέῃ παρασκευάζειν·

πλὴν τοσοῦτον διαφέρει,
ὅτι τὰ μὲν δεῖ φαίνεσθαι ἄνευ διδασκαλίας, τὰ δὲ
ἐν τῷ λόγῳ ὑπὸ τοῦ λέγοντος παρασκευάζεσθαι καὶ παρὰ
τὸν λόγον γίγνεσθαι. τί γὰρ ἂν εἴη τοῦ λέγοντος ἔργον, εἰ
φαίνοιτο ᾗ δέοι καὶ μὴ διὰ τὸν λόγον;

τῶν δὲ περὶ τὴν λέξιν
ἓν μέν ἐστιν εἶδος θεωρίας τὰ σχήματα τῆς λέξεως,
ἅ ἐστιν εἰδέναι τῆς ὑποκριτικῆς καὶ τοῦ τὴν τοιαύτην ἔχοντος
ἀρχιτεκτονικήν, οἷον τί ἐντολὴ καὶ τί εὐχὴ καὶ διήγησις
καὶ ἀπειλὴ καὶ ἐρώτησις καὶ ἀπόκρισις καὶ εἴ τι
ἄλλο τοιοῦτον.

παρὰ γὰρ τὴν τούτων γνῶσιν ἢ ἄγνοιαν οὐδὲν
εἰς τὴν ποιητικὴν ἐπιτίμημα φέρεται ὅ τι καὶ ἄξιον σπουδῆς.
τί γὰρ ἂν τις ὑπολάβοι ἡμαρτῆσθαι ἃ Πρωταγόρας
ἐπιτιμᾷ, ὅτι εὔχεσθαι οἰόμενος ἐπιτάττει εἰπὼν “μῆνιν ἄειδε
θεά”; τὸ γὰρ κελεῦσαι, φησίν, ποιεῖν τι ἢ μὴ ἐπίταξίς
ἐστιν.

διὸ παρείσθω ὡς ἄλλης καὶ οὐ τῆς ποιητικῆς ὂν
θεώρημα.

Poetics, Greek text (Franz Ritter, 1839) (OCR draft) Experimental (Franz Ritter's 1839 Greek edition, corrected against OCR of the represented copy and aligned to the conventional Perseus chapter-and-subchapter sequence.) — 19 focus

Περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἄλλων ἤδη εἴρηται, λοιπὸν δὲ περὶ λέξεως ἢ διανοίας εἰπεῖν.

τὰ μὲν οὖν περὶ τὴν διάνοιαν ἐν τοῖς περὶ ῥητορικῆς κείσθω· τοῦτο γὰρ ἴδιον μᾶλλον ἐκείνης τῆς μεθόδου.

ἔστι δὲ κατὰ τὴν διάνοιαν ταῦτα, ὅσα ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου δεῖ παρασκευασθῆναι.

μέρη δὲ τούτων τό τε ἀποδεικνύναι καὶ τὸ λύειν καὶ τὸ πάθη παρασκευάζειν, οἷον ἔλεον ἢ φόβον ἢ ὀργὴν καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα, καὶ ἔτι μέγεθος καὶ μικρότητα.

δῆλον δὲ ὅτι καὶ ἐν τοῖς πράγμασιν ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν ἰδεῶν δεῖ χρῆσθαι, ὅταν ἢ ἐλεεινὰ ἢ δεινὰ ἢ μεγάλα ἢ εἰκότα ιοδέῃ παρασκευάζειν.

πλὴν τοσοῦτον διαφέρει, ὅτι τὰ μὲν δεῖ φαίνεσθαι ἄνευ διδασκαλίας, τὰ δὲ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ ὑπὸ τοῦ λέγοντος παρασκευάζεσθαι καὶ παρὰ τὸν λόγον γίγνεσθαι. τί γὰρ ἂν εἴη τοῦ λέγοντος ἔργον, εἰ φανοῖτο ἡδέα καὶ μὴ διὰ τὸν λόγον;

τῶν δὲ περὶ τὴν λέξιν ἓν μέν ἐστιν εἶδος θεωρίας τὰ σχήματα τῆς λέξεως, ἃ ἐστιν εἰδέναι τῆς ὑποκριτικῆς καὶ¹ τοῦ τὴν τοιαύτην ἔχοντος ἀρχιτεκτονικήν, οἷον τί ἐντολὴ καὶ τί εὐχὴ καὶ διήγησις καὶ ἀπειλὴ καὶ ἐρώτησις καὶ ἀπόκρισις, καὶ εἴ τι ἄλλο τοιοῦτον.

παρὰ γὰρ τὴν τούτων γνῶσιν ἢ ἄγνοιαν οὐδὲν εἰς τὴν ποιητικὴν ἐπιτίμημα φέρεται, ὅ τι καὶ ἄξιον σπουδῆς. τί γὰρ ἄν τις ὑπολάβοι ἡμαρτῆσθαι ἃ Πρωταγόρας ἐπιτιμᾷ, ὅτι εὔχεσθαι οἰόμενος ἐπιτάττει εἰπὼν “μῆνιν ἄειδε θεά;” τὸ γὰρ κελεῦσαι, φησί, ποιεῖν τι ἢ μὴ ἐπίταξίς ἐστιν.

διὸ παρείσθω ὡς ἄλλης καὶ οὐ τῆς ποιητικῆς ὂν θεώρημα.

Translations (13)

Poetics (W. H. Fyfe) (OCR draft) Perseus (William Hamilton Fyfe's English translation of Aristotle's Poetics, Loeb Classical Library, 1939 printing.) — 19 focus

The other factors have been already discussed. It remains to speak of Diction and Thought.

All that concerns Thought may be left to the treatise on Rhetoric, for the subject is more proper to that inquiry.¹

Under the head of Thought come all the effects to be produced by the language.

Some of these are proof and refutation, 1456b 1 the arousing of feelings like pity, fear, anger, and so on, and then again exaggeration and depreciation.²

It is clear that in the case of the incidents, too, one should work on the same principles, when effects of pity or terror or exaggeration or probability have to be produced.

There is just this difference, that some effects must be clear without explanation,³ whereas others are produced in the speeches by the speaker and are due to the speeches. For what would be the use of a speaker, if the required effect were likely to be felt without the aid of the speeches?

Under the head of Diction one subject of inquiry is the various modes of speech, the knowledge of which is proper to elocution or to the man who knows the master art⁴—I mean for instance, what is a command, a prayer, a statement, a threat, question, answer, and so on.

The knowledge or ignorance of such matters brings upon the poet no censure worth serious consideration. For who could suppose that there is any fault in the passage which Protagoras censures, because Homer, intending to utter a prayer, gives a command when he says, Sing, goddess, the wrath? To order something to be done or not is, he points out, a command.

So we may leave this topic as one that belongs not to poetry but to another art.

Arabic Poetics (Badawī edition, 1953) (OCR draft) (The ancient Arabic translation of Aristotle's Poetics in ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Badawī's 1953 edition.) — 19 focus

〈الفكرة والمقولة〉

أما فى الأنواع الأخر فقد قلنا. فينبغى الآن أن نتكلم فى المقولة وفى الضمير والذهن.

وقد وضعت الأشياء التى هى نحو الذهن والضمير فى كتاب «البلاغة» وذلك أن هذا هو من شأن تلك الصناعة ومما يخصها. والأشياء التى فى الذهن قد يجب أن ترتب وتعد تحت القول. وأجزاء هذه هى أن يبين، 〈وأن يفند〉 وأن يستثير الألم بمنزلة الحزن أو الخوف أوالحرد أو أشباه هذه، وأيضاً الكبر والصغر.

وظاهر أن فى الأمور أيضاً من هذه الصور والخلق ينبغى أن يستعمل متى كان إما الأمران وإما الصفات وإما العظائم، ويستعد التى هى حقائق. غير أن مقدار الفرق فى هذا هو أن منها 〈ما〉 يرى دائماً بلا تعظيم ومنها ما يعدها الذى يتكلم والقائل، وهى خارج عن القول. وإلا فما فعل ذلك الذى إما أن يقول، وإما أن يبين فيه اللذات؟

وليس سبب القول ونوع النظر للى هى نحو المقولة هو نوعاً واحداً، مثلا أشكال المقولة، وهذه ترى الأخذ بالوجوه والذى له مثل أعنى النبأ وصناعة القيام عليه، بمنزلة ما الأمر وما الصلاة أو حديث أو جزم أو سؤال أو جواب، وإن كان شىء آخر مما هو نظير لهذه. وذلك أنه لا شىء آخر خارج عن علم هذه، ولا علم مما هو تهجين يؤتى به فى صناعة الشعر يستحق الحرص والعناية. وإلا فماذا للإنسان أن يتوهم أنه وقع فى الزلل فى التى كان فروطاغورس يهجن بها من أنه كان يأمر [يظن] غير ما كان يظن أن يصلى ويقول: «خبرى أيتها الإلهة على السخطة والحرد...»؛ وذلك أنه زعم أن معنى أنه أمر بأن يفعل شىء أو لا يفعل هو: أمر، ولذلك يتخلى ذلك لصناعة 〈أخرى〉 لا على أنه من شأن صناعة الشعراء، ويترك.

Poetics (S. H. Butcher, 1911) (OCR draft) Experimental (S. H. Butcher's English translation from Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Art, fourth edition, 1911.) — 19 focus

It remains to speak of Diction and Thought, the
other parts of Tragedy having been already discussed.

Concerning Thought, we may assume what is said in
the Rhetoric, to which inquiry the subject more strictly
belongs.

Under Thought is included every effect which
has to be produced by speech,

the subdivisions being,—
proof and refutation;
the excitation of the feelings, such as pity, fear, anger, and the like;
the suggestion of importance or its opposite.

Now, it is evident that
the dramatic incidents must be treated from the same
points of view as the dramatic speeches, when the object
is to evoke the sense of pity, fear, importance, or probability.

The only difference is, that the incidents
should speak for themselves without verbal exposition;
while the effects aimed at in speech should be produced by the speaker, and as a result of the speech.
For what were the business of a speaker, if the Thought were revealed quite apart from what he says?

Next, as regards Diction. One branch of the inquiry
treats of the Modes of Utterance.
But this province of knowledge belongs to the art of Delivery and to
the masters of that science.
It includes, for instance, —what is a command, a prayer, a statement,
a threat, a question, an answer, and so forth.

To know or not to know these things involves no serious
censure upon the poet's art.
For who can admit the fault imputed
to Homer by Protagoras,—that in the words, 'Sing,
goddess, of the wrath,' he gives a command under the
idea that he utters a prayer? For to tell some one to do a thing or not to do it is, he says, a command.

We may, therefore, pass this over as an inquiry that belongs
to another art, not to poetry.

Aristotle on the Art of Poetry (Ingram Bywater, 1909) (OCR draft) Experimental (Ingram Bywater's English translation of Aristotle's Poetics, published in 1909.) — 19 focus

The Plot and Characters having been discussed, it remains
to consider the Diction and Thought.

As for the Thought,
we may assume what is said of it in our Art of Rhetoric,
as it belongs more properly to that department of inquiry.

The Thought of the personages is shown in everything to
be effected by their language-

in every effort to prove or
disprove, to arouse emotion (pity, fear, anger, and the like),
or to maximize or minimize things.

It is clear, also, that
their mental procedure must be on the same lines in their
actions likewise, whenever they wish them to arouse pity
or horror, or have a look of importance or probability.

The
only difference is that with the act the impression has to
be made without explanation; whereas with the spoken word
it has to be produced by the speaker, and result from his
language. What, indeed would be the good of the speaker,
if things appeared in the required light even apart from
anything he says?

As regards the Diction, one subject for inquiry under
this head is the turns given to the language when spoken;
e. g. the difference between command and prayer, simple
statement and threat, question and answer, and so forth.

The theory of such matters, however, belongs to Elocution
and the professors of that art. Whether the poet knows
these things or not, his art as a poet is never seriously criti-
cized on that account. What fault can one see in Homer's
'Sing of the wrath, Goddess'?-which Protagoras has criti-
cized as being a command where a prayer was meant, since
to bid one do or not do, he tells us, is a command.

Let us
pass over this, then, as appertaining to another art, and
not to that of poetry.

Poetics (Thomas Twining, 1789) (OCR draft) Experimental (Thomas Twining's English translation of Aristotle's Poetics, published in 1789 and aligned to the Kassel reference passage sequence.) — 19.1 focus

Of the other parts of Tragedy enough has now been said. We are next to consider the DICTION, and the SENTIMENTS.

[22]

The Poetic of Aristotle (Theodore Alois Buckley) (OCR draft) Experimental (Theodore Alois Buckley's English translation, first published in 1850 and represented from the Henry G. Bohn 1857 printing; corrected against a second OCR and aligned to the Kassel reference passage sequence.) — 19.1 focus

OF the other parts of tragedy enough has now been said. But it remains that we should speak concerning the diction and the sentiments. The particulars, therefore, respecting the sentiments, are unfolded in the treatise on Rhetoric, to which it more properly belongs.

Poetica Latine conversa (Franciscus Ritter, 1839) (OCR draft) Experimental (Franz Ritter's Latin translation, corrected against OCR of the represented copy and aligned to the conventional Perseus chapter-and-subchapter sequence.) — 19 focus

De ceteris iam expositum est, restat autem ut de dictione vel sententia dicamus.

sed quae ad sententiam pertinent in libris de arte dicendi exprompta sunto: hoc enim proprium est magis illius disputationis.

pertinent autem ad sententiam haec, quaecumque oratione parari debent.

partes eorum sunt demonstrare et solvere et perturbationes facere, veluti miserationem vel timorem vel iram et quae sunt ciusdem generis, ac praeterea exaggerationem et extenuationem.

patet vero etiam in factis hauriendum esse ex isdem locis, cum sive miseranda sive timenda sive exaggerata sive verisimilia afferenda sunt.

nisi quod hoc intercedit discrimen, quod alia prodire debent sine expositione, alia per orationem a dicente parari et secundum orationem fieri. nam quid dicente opus esset, si iucunda comparerent etiam sine oratione?

ex iis autem quae ad dictionem pertinent unum est genus contemplationis quod figuras dictionis complectitur, quas cognitas habere est artis histrionalis et eius qui talem architecturam profitetur, veluti quid sit mandatum et quid precatio et enarratio et comminatio et interrogatio et responsio, et si quid aliud eiusdem generis.

nam ex horum intellectu aut ignoratione nulla in poeticam vituperatio manat, quae quidem operae pretium sit. quid enim est quod quis existimet peccatum esse in iis quae reprehendit Protagoras, quod precari se opinatus imperet dicens "iram cane dea?” iubere enim, inquit, facere aliquid aut non praeceptio est.

quare mittatur haec ratio, ut quae ad aliam artem et non ad poeticam pertineat.

La poëtique d'Aristote (André Dacier, 1692) (OCR draft) Experimental (André Dacier's French translation of Aristotle's Poetics, published in 1692.) — 19.1 focus

NOus avons ſuffiſament traité de toutes les autres parties de la Tragedie, il reſte à parler de la diction & des ſentimens.

Poetica d'Aristotile (Bernardo Segni, 1549) (OCR draft) Experimental (Bernardo Segni's 1549 Florentine Italian translation, aligned to the Kassel reference passage sequence.) — 19 focus

Tquanto alle coſe, che fon'nel Diſcorſo, nella Rettotica ſen'è parlato.¹

Che inuero tal ragionamento è più propio di quella inſtitutione. Nel Difcorſo fi dicono eſſere tutte quelle coſe, che col parlare ſi debbono andare preparando;

delle quali parte ne conſiſte in dimostrare, & in foluere, & in eccitare gli affetti;

come è la Mifericordia, ò il Timore, ò l'Ira, ò altre fimili perturbationi:& parte d'eſſe ne conſiſte circa alla Amplificatione, & alla Diminutione.

Et è manifeſto, che nelle ſopradette parti e' biſogni vſare; l'Ampli fication' dico, & la Diminutione dalle medeſime fpetre cioè quando e' s'habbia à preparar coſe compaſsio neuoli,ò terribili, ò grandi,ò verifimili.

Doue nondimanco è da vſare queſta diſtintione, che certe coſe è di neceſsità, che appariſchino ſenza aiuto alcuno di dottrina; & certe altre le debbe, chi dice, preparare co parlare:anzi debbe fare, che elle interuenghino per for za d'effo.

Imperoche qual farebbe l'uffitio di chi dice, ſe le coſe appariſsino piaceuoli; ma non per via del parlare? Vanto alla Locutione, vna parte di lei ſta in cofiderare le figure d'effa, lequali s'appartengono à ſapere all'arte Iſtriouica; ò à chi ſia prepo fto à tale arte:che cofa, dico, fia il Commandamento, che il Prego, che la Narratione, che il Minacciò, che l'Interrogatione, che la Riſpoſta, ò qualunche altra cofa, che à queſte ſia ſimigliante.

Concioſia che' per ſapere,ò non ſaper queſte coſe, la Poetica non ne ſia incari cata per tal cagione di carico, che meriti il pregio. Imperoche chi farebbe mai, che ſtimaſſe eſſere errore in quelle coſe, che Protagora mette per errore?cioè quan do vno penſando di pregare inquel cambio comandi in queſto modo. L'ira contami, o Dea. Perchè il dire, che vn faccia, ò non faccia-vna coſa, dice egli, e' vn comandamento.²

Laſsiſi pertanto queſta confideratione, come ſe ella fuſſe d'altra faculta, & non propia diqueſta.

De poetica (Antonio Riccobono, 1587) (OCR draft) Experimental (Antonio Riccobono's Latin translation, first published in 1587; text represented from Immanuel Bekker's 1831 edition.) — 19 focus

Ac de aliis quidem iam dictum est.

reliquum vero est de elocutione vel sententia dicere. ac quae pertinent quidem ad sententiam, in libris de rhetorica posita sunt: hoc enim methodi illius magis est proprium. sunt autem secundum sententiam ea quaecunque ab oratione paranda sunt.

et eorum partes sunt tum demon¿ strare et solvere,

tum perturbationes parare, ut misericordiam vel metum vel iram et quaecunque talia, tum praeterea amplificare et diminuere.

manifestum autem est et in actionibus utendum esse iisdem formis, cum miserabilia aut terribilia aut magna aut verisimilia parare oportuerit;

nisi quod ea sola differentia est, quod haec quidem apparere sine doctrina oportet, quae vero in oratione posita sunt, a dicente parari et per orationem fieri.

quod enim esset dicentis munus, si apparerent iucunda et non per orationem? eorum vero quae pertinent ad elocutionem una species est contemplationis, quae considerat figuras elocutionis, quas scire est histrionicae, et eius qui talem habeat architectonicam, ut quid sit mandatum et quid precatio et narratio et mina et interrogatio et responsio, et si quid aliud huiusmodi.

ab horum enim cognitione vel ignorantia nulla reprehensio in poeticam affertur, quae curanda sit. qui enim fieri potest ut aliquis existimet errorem commissum esse in iis quae Protagoras reprehendit, quod putans precari praecipit, dicens 'iram diya cane?" nam iubere, inquit, ut aliquid faciat aut non faciat praeceptio est.

quamobrem omittatur, ut quae alterius et non poeticae sit contemplatio.

De arte poetica liber (William of Moerbeke, ca. 1277) (OCR draft) Experimental (William of Moerbeke's medieval Latin translation, represented by the 1953 Aristoteles Latinus edition.) — 19 focus

De aliis quidem igitur iam dictum est. Reliquum autem de locutione aut ratiocinatione dicere.

Que quidem igitur circa dianoiam (idest ratiocinationem) in hiis que de rethorica supponantur; hoc enim proprium magis illius methodi.

Sunt autem secundum dianoiam hec, quecumque a ratione oportet preparari

Partes autem horum demonstrareque et solvere et passiones preparare, puta miserationem aut terrorem aut iram et quecumque talia, et adhuc magnitudinem et parvitatem.

Palam autem quod et in rebus ab eisdem speciebus oportet uti, quando aut miserabilia aut dira aut magna aut verisimilia oportet exhibere;

preter quam tantum differt, quod hec quidem oportet apparere sine doctrina, hec autem in sermone a dicente preparari et preter rationem fieri. Quid enim utique sit dicentis opus, apparebit idea et non propter sermonem. —

Eorum autem que circa locutionem una quidem est species theorie scemata locutionis, que scire est ypocritice et habentis talem architectonicam, puta quid mandatum et quid oratio et narratio et comminatio et interrogatio et responsio et si quid aliud tale.

Preter enim horum cognitionem aut ignorantiam nulla in poeticam increpatio fertur, que sit digna studio. Quid enim utique quis existimet peccasse que Protagoras increpat, quod orare putans precipit dicens «insaniam vide dea» ? Nam iubere, inquit, facere aliquid aut non preceptio est.

Propter quod pretermittatur tamquam alterius et non poetice ens theorema. —

Arabic Poetics (Abū Bishr Mattā; Tkatsch edition) (OCR draft) Experimental (The Arabic translation attributed to Abū Bishr Mattā, edited by Jaroslaus Tkatsch in 1928 and aligned to the Kassel reference passage sequence.) — 19 focus

‏اما فى الانواع الاخر فقد قلنا فينبغى الان ان نتكلم فى المقولة وفى الضمير والذهن

‏وقد وصعت الاشيا التى هى نحو الذهن والضمير فى كتاب البلاغة وذلك ان هذا هو من شان تلك الصناعة ومما يخصها

‏والاشيا التى فى الذهن قد يجب ان ترتب وتعد تحت القول

‏واجزا هذه هى ان يبين وان يستقر للالم بمنزلة الحزن او الخوف او الحرد او اشباه هذه وايضا الكبر والصغر

‏وظاهر ان فى الامور ايضا من هذه الصور والخلق ينبغى ان يستعمل متى كان اما الاحزان واما الصفات واما العظايم ويستعد التى هى حقايق

‏غير [ال] ان مقدار الفرق فى هذا هو ان منها يرى دايما بلا تعطيم ومنها ما يعدها الذى يتكلم والقايل وهى خارج عن القول والا فما فعل ذلك الذى اما ان يقول واما ان يبين فيه اللذات وليس سٮٮ القول

‏ونوع النظر للتى هى نحو المقولة هو نوعا واحدا مٮلا اشكال المقولة وهذه ترى للاخر بالوجوه والذى له مثل اعنى البنا وصناعة القيام عليه بمنزلة ما الامر وما الصلاة او حديث او حرض او سوال او جواب وان كان شى اخر مما هو نظير لهذه

‏وذلك انه لا شى اخر خارج عن علم هذه ولا علم من ما هو تهجين يوتا به فى صناعة الشعر يستحق الحرص والعناية والا فماذا للانسان ان يتوهم انه وقع الزلل فى التى كان فروطاغورس يهجن بها من انه كان يامر [ٮطں] عـٮر ما كاں يطں ان يصلى ويقول خبرى انه الاله على السخطة والحرد وذلك انه زعم ان معنى انه امر بان يفعل شى او لا يفعل هو امر

‏ولذلك لٮحلا ذلك الصناعة لا على انه من شان صناعة الشعرا

Arabic Poetics (Abū Bishr Mattā; Tkatsch edition, unaligned) (OCR draft) Experimental (Tkatsch's edition of the medieval Arabic translation in its original, unaligned segmentation.) — 19 focus

‏اما فى الانواع الاخر فقد قلنا فينبغى الان ان نتكلم فى المقولة وفى الضمير والذهن

‏وقد وصعت الاشيا التى هى نحو الذهن والضمير فى كتاب البلاغة وذلك ان هذا هو من شان تلك الصناعة ومما يخصها

‏والاشيا التى فى الذهن قد يجب ان ترتب وتعد تحت القول

‏واجزا هذه هى ان يبين وان يستقر للالم بمنزلة الحزن او الخوف او الحرد او اشباه هذه وايضا الكبر والصغر

‏غير [ال] ان مقدار الفرق فى هذا هو ان منها يرى دايما بلا تعطيم ومنها ما يعدها الذى يتكلم والقايل وهى خارج عن القول

‏والا فما فعل ذلك الذى اما ان يقول واما ان يبين فيه اللذات وليس سٮٮ القول

‏وذلك انه لا شى اخر خارج عن علم هذه ولا علم من ما هو تهجين يوتا به فى صناعة الشعر يستحق الحرص والعناية

‏والا فماذا للانسان ان يتوهم انه وقع الزلل فى التى كان فروطاغورس يهجن بها من انه كان يامر [ٮطں] عـٮر ما كاں يطں ان يصلى ويقول خبرى انه الاله على السخطة والحرد

‏وذلك انه زعم ان معنى انه امر بان يفعل شى او لا يفعل هو امر

‏ولذلك لٮحلا ذلك الصناعة لا على انه من شان صناعة الشعرا

Commentary

Commentary on the Poetics (Ingram Bywater, 1909) (OCR draft) (Ingram Bywater's English commentary on Aristotle's Poetics.) focus

1. mvp-aristotle-comment-686

1. mvp-aristotle-comment-687

1456a34 λέξεως καὶ διανοίας. This is the usual order of the two terms in the Poetics (v. 6, 1450 a9, 14, 29 and 24, 1459 b16 ). The only instance of the reverse order, which is that of their logical importance ( 6, 1450 b12 ; comp. Rhet. 2. 26, 1403 b36 ), is in 24, 1459 b12

ἔτι τὰς διανοίας καὶ τὴν λεξιν ἔχειν καλῶς.

For the meaning of διάνοια see on 6, 1450 a6 .

κατὰ τὴv διάνοιαν; comp. Phys. 4. 14, 222 b31

τὸ θᾶττον καὶ βραδύτερον κατὰ πᾶσάν ἐστι μεταβολήν.

In Bon. Ind. 369 b8

κατὰ τὴν διάνοιαν

is explained as equivalent to διανοητικά.

Remarques sur la poëtique d'Aristote (André Dacier, 1692) (OCR draft) (André Dacier's French commentary on Aristotle's Poetics.) focus

1. mvp-aristotle-comment-457

19.1 1. Pour ce qui est des sentimens, on peut voir ce qui en a été dit dans nos Livres de la Rhetorique ; car ils font proprement du reſſort de ſon art.]¹

Commentary on the Poetics (Henry James Pye, 1792) (OCR draft) (Henry James Pye's 1792 English commentary, aligned to the Kassel reference edition.) focus

19.1. mvp-aristotle-comment-77 19.1

THE LANGUAGE AND THE SENTIMENTS.

By the first of these Aristotle means the fimple and grammatical construction of speech, as is manifeft from the succeeding chapter, and by the second the sense and intention that is declared by it. For in the fixth chapter he declares the sentiments, (διάνοια,) to be ‘' the means by • which the intention or opinion of those who speak is discovered.' • In • short (to use the words of Mr. Harris) sentiment in this sense means • little less than the universal subjects of our difcourse.' The modern drama confiders sentiments in a more confined sense; and, as now used, it is properly enough defined by Lord Kaims, 'the expref- • sion of a thought prompted by passion.' Sentiments of this fort well applied so as to flatter the taste, the feelings, or the prejudices of the audience, are the surest traps for applause. In one of the critical papers either in the Tatler, Guardian, or Spectator, the virtue of a Roman theatre is exalted above our own, for the applaufe given to a virtuous sentiment, in one of [A] Terence's comedies. Since [A] Homo fum, nihil humani a me alienum puto.' • I am a man myself, and can think nothing indifferent to me that concerns human kind.' 3 D I have

I have known the theatre, I can answer for a British audience being to the full as virtuous as the citizens of Rome in this respect. This is fo well known, both by poets and players, that our comedies abounded. with these moral fentences to an excess, which became perfectly ridiculous: a very little exaggeration of which, by the masterly pen of Mr. Sheridan, has now in a great measure delivered the stage from their redundancy at leaft.

Commentarius in Aristotelis Poeticam (Franciscus Ritter, 1839) (OCR draft) (Ritter's Latin commentary, extracted from the 1839 volume, divided by Ritter's chapters and sections, and linked to the corresponding Perseus reference subsections.) focus

1. mvp-aristotle-comment-130

Ritter, cap. 19 § 1

Διάνοια aptius in arte rhetorica quam in poetica pertractatur; neque de λέξει quae exponi possunt, ad poeticam pertinent omnia. Explicata argumenti conformatione a poeta tragico instituenda (c. 7-11 et c. 13-14) et descripto morum habitu ab eodem in tragoediis observando (c. 15) et utraque disputatione praeceptis quibusdam tragoediarum scriptori destinatis conclusa (c. 17 et c. 18, 4-7), iam ad animi sensa ( διά- votar quam una voce sententiam appellare licet) a personis in scenam productis expromenda pervenit. quae cum dictione ( λέξει) proferantur, hanc tractandam sibi sumpsit, illa Rhetoricis reservanda putavit. περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἄλλων ἤδη εἴρηται: cetera quae dicit, sunt fabula, mores, spectaculum, melopoeia. de fabula quae disputata sunt sufficere videantur, de moribus quae docuit in epitomam contracta esse intelleximus: spectaculum vero et melopoeia nonnisi brevissime commemoravit c. 6, 4 et c. 18, 71). at vero spectaculum et melopoeiam accuratius ab Aristotele explicata non esse et nullis praeceptis a tragoediarum scriptore servandis instructa, vix est cur existimemus: immo c. 18, 7. cum chori tragici rite conformandi praeceptum paucis verbis proponit, ita disputat ut antegressa ampliore expositione niti videatur. quae igitur de ὄψει et μελοποιίą uberius explanata ab Aristotele erant, omisit, opinor, ille qui ex integra Aristotelis Poetica plura et egregia conservavit. nimirum inutilia illa videbantur poetis Alexandrinis (Alexandrinos dico omnes qui post Alexandri Magni aevum sive Alexandriae sive in aliis Grae- 1) Falsus Aristoteles etiam c. 6, 19. ad ὄψιν et μελοποιίαν revolvitur, sed nihil affert quae alicuius momenti videantur esse.cis urbibus artem tragicam factitabant), qui lectoribus magis quam spectatoribus scribebant, quique tragoedias edebant aut nullis aut paucis chori carminibus distinctas. - λοιπὸν δὲ περὶ λέξεως ἢ διανοίας εἰπεῖν: postquam de quattuor illis partibus dictum est, iam restat de διανοίᾳ vel λέξει disputare, ut de omnibus sex partibus ante constitutis (c. 6, 4-7) explicatio absolvatur. vide mihi Aristotelem ipsum pronuntiare se ex illis sex tragoediae partibus adhuc quattuor disputatione amplexum esse, duabus etiamnum relicuis de quibus dicatur. inde iam novo documento apparet, et illa quae de alteris κατὰ τὸ ποσὸν tragoediae partibus c. 12. posita sunt, et quae de quattuor formis tragoediarum c. 18, 2-3., quaeque de tragoediae δέσει et λύσει c. 18, 1. narrantur, quae omnia suis locis gravibus de causis pro suppositiciis declaravi, haec inquam ab Aristotele non scripta esse. – περὶ λέξεως ἢ διανοίας scribit, cum absolutis quattuor partibus iam ex duabus relicuis alterutram explicandam eligere possit. statim monet quae de διανοία dicenda sint, ea in Rhetoricis aptius explicari posse. ἐν τοῖς περὶ ῥητορικῆς: quamquam quae de animi sensis dicenda sunt in Rhetoricorum tribus libris comprehensorum primo et secundo libro legimus, inde tamen non consequitur Poeticam post artem illam rhetoricam a philosopho emissam esse: immo in Rhetoricis quater provocat ad Poeticam iam editam. lege III, 1 et 2. ars dicendi cum pluribus ac diversis libris ab Aristotele tractata et tradita sit, hoc loco lectores non ad tres illos Rhetoricorum libros sed ad alios prius evulgatos ablegantur. de operibus Aristotelis rhetoricis disputavit Titze de Aristotelis operum serie et distinctione p. 34 sqq. ἔστι δὲ κατὰ τὴν διάνοιαν ταῦτα, ὅσα ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου δεῖ παρασκευασθῆ - ναι: pertinent ad sententiam haec, quaecumque oratione parari debent, h. e. quae personae in scenam productae sentiunt verbisque pronuntiant. quod statim sequitur τὸ λύειν, est obstantia sive ab adversariis dicta dissolvere.

Aristotle Poetics 19.1

ed. Henry James Pye

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Commentary

THE LANGUAGE AND THE SENTIMENTS.

Ritter, cap. 19 § 1

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