11.
mvp-aristotle-comment-723
μήκει καὶ βραχύτητι.
The intermediates (
μέσα) in quantity are the three dichronous vowels , , :
Dion. Thrax p. 10
τῶν δὲ φωνηέντων μακρὰ μὲν ἐστι δύο, \overline{\eta} καὶ ῶ, βραχέα δὲ δύο, καὶ , δίχρονα δὲ τρία, δίχρονα δὲ λέγεται, ἐπεὶ ἐκτείνεται καὶ συστέλλεται.
-
Sextus Emp.
Adv. math. 1. 100
τῶν δὲ φωνηέντων τρεῖς λέγουσι διαφοράς· δύο μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν φύσει μακρὰ λέγουσι τυγ- χάνειν, τὸ \overline{\eta} καὶ τὸ ῶ, ἰσάριθμα δὲ βραχέα, τὸ καὶ τὸ , τρία δὲ κοινὰ μήκους τε καὶ βραχύτητος, , ἅπερ δίχρονα καὶ ὑγρὰ καὶ ἀμφίβολα καὶ μεταβολικά καλοῦσιν· ἕκαστον γὰρ αὐτῶν πέφυκεν ὁτὲ μὲν ἐκτείνεσθαι ὀτὲ δὲ συστέλλεσθαι
(comp.
Dion. Hal.
5 p. 74 R.
, and
Aulus Gellius
16. 18.5
).
8.
mvp-aristotle-comment-735
ὄνομα.
In this definition
συνθετή differentiates the
ὄνομα from the
στοιχεῖον,
σημαντική from the
ἄρθρον and
σύνδεσμος,
ἄνευ χρόνου from the
ῥῆμα, and what remains (
ἧς μέρος οὐδὲν κτέ.) from the
λόγος. In a
λόγος ( . 8.
ζῷον πεζὸν δίπουν, οι
Κλέων βαδίζει) the parts retain their several meanings; whereas in an
ὄνομα, if the parts happen to have a meaning, it is lost in the word into which they enter;
Θεόδωρος for instance denotes a certain man, not a kind of gift:
De interpr. 2, 16
b 19
ὄνομα μὲν οὖν ἐστι φωνὴ σημαντικὴ κατὰ συνθήκην ἄνευ χρόνου, ἧς μηδὲν μέρος ἐστὶ σημαντικὸν κεχωρισμένον· ἐν γὰρ τῷ Κάλλιππος τὸ ἵππος οὐδὲν αὐτὸ καθ᾽ ἑαυτὸ σημαίνει, ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ τῷ καλὸς ἵππος
. The general term
ὄνομα must be taken to include not only the nouns, but also the adjectives, the personal and demonstrative pronouns, and possibly even the article as a kind of pronoun—in fact all the declinable parts of speech except perhaps the relatives, which may have been classed among the
ἄρθρα A verb also apart from a subject, as a mere name for an action, may be called an
ὄνομα, as it is for instance in 21, 1457 a 25; 22, 1458 b20; 25, 1461 b 31; comp.
De interpr. 3, 16
b 19
αὐτὰ μὲν οὖν καθ᾽ ἑαυτὰ λεγόμενα ὀνόματά ἐστι [scil. τὰ ῥήματα] καὶ σημαίνει τι (ἵστησι γὰρ ὁ λέγων τὴν διάνοιαν καὶ ὁ ἀκούσας ἠρέμησεν), ἀλλ᾽ εἰ ἔστιν ἢ μὴ οὔπω σημαίνει
. It is a
ῥῆμα proper only when actually said of a subject, as the predicate of a proposition.
8.
mvp-aristotle-comment-736
οὐ χρώμεθα:
comp. 21, 1457 a 33
πλὴν οὐκ ἐν τῷ ὀνόματι σημαίνοντος. The construction in the clause may be seen from
Vahlen's paraphrase,
εν τοῖς διπλοῖς οὐ χρώμεθα τῷ μέρει ἡγούμενοι καὶ αὐτὸ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ σημαίνειν. The participial
ὡς καὶ αὐτὸ καθ᾽ αὐτὸ σημαῖνον is an acc. absolute like those in 3, 1448 a 37 and 26, 1462 10.
8.
mvp-aristotle-comment-737
τῷ Θεοδώρῳ:
i.e. 'the word
Θεόδωρος'; comp. infra 28
ὁ Κλέων, ' the word
Κλέων'. —
Plato
Crat. 392 D
τὸν Ἀστυάνακτα
, ' the name Astyanax'; for the similar Latin usage v. Wilkins on
Cicero
De Oratore 2, 193
. In the
De interpr. we have the more scholastic form of expression with a nominative,
ἐν τῷ Κάλλιππος.
τὸ δῶρον: i. e. the word
δῶρον implied in
Θεόδωρος. As the parallel in the
De interpr. is
ἐν τῷ Κάλλιππος τὸ ἵππος οὐδὲν αὐτὸ καθ ἑαυτὸ σημαίνει, it has been proposed to restore here
τὸ δωρος for
τὸ δῶρον. The two cases, however, as
Düntzer reminds us, are not quite similar, since
δωρος does not exist as a separate word, as
ἵππος does, and there would therefore be no point in saying of it that it is without meaning (
οὐ σημαίνει).
9.
mvp-aristotle-comment-738
ῥῆμα:
De interpr. 3, 16b 6
ῥῆμα δέ ἐστι τὸ προσσημαῖνον χρόνον, οὐ μέρος οὐδὲν σημαίνει χωρίς, καὶ ἔστιν ἀεὶ τῶν καθ᾽ ἑτέρου λεγομένων σημεῖον. λέγω δ᾽ ὅτι προσσημαίνει χρόνον, οἷον ὑγίεια μὲν ὄνομα, τὸ δὲ ὑγιαίνει ῥῆμα προσσημαίνει γὰρ τὸ νῦν ὑπάρχειν ... 16 τὸ ὑγίανεν ἢ τὸ ὑγιανεῖ οὐ ῥῆμα ἀλλὰ πτώσεις ῥήματος διαφέρει δὲ τοῦ ῥήματος, ὅτι τὸ μὲν τὸν παρόντα προσσημαίνει χρόνον, τὰ δὲ τὸν πέριξ
. In this passage (though not in
De interpr. 10, 19b 13
) the past and future tenses of the verb are set aside as
πτώσεις, the verb in the logical theory of predication being always in the present (comp. Mansel,
Prolegomena Logica p. 273). It is to be noted that in these instances of verbs, the verb is in the third person singular of the present; the reason for this is that a proper name like
Κλέων οι
Κορίσκος is tacitly assumed to be its subject. With
Plato, it may be observed, the
ῥῆμα includes the predicative adjective as well as the verb (v.
Crat. 399 A
).
9.
mvp-aristotle-comment-739
προσσημαίνει.
Boethius,
In Aristot. de Interpr. 2 p. 66 Meiser
, translates this by
consignificat
, thus identifying its sense with that of the later word
συσσημαίνειν.
9.
mvp-aristotle-comment-741
ἄνθρωπος:
Phys. 3. 7, 207
b 34
ἄνθρωπος εἷς ἄνθρωπος καὶ οὐ πολλοί
.
10.
mvp-aristotle-comment-742
τὰ ὑποκριτικά:
see on
19, 1456 b 10.
ἐπίταξιν:
see on
19, 1456b 16
.
10.
mvp-aristotle-comment-743
βάδιζε:
to be read as
βάδιζε , i. e. as a dictatorial imperative.
11.
mvp-aristotle-comment-744
λόγος.
The definition is framed to distinguish a
λόγος from an
ὄνομα; see above on 10, and comp.
De interpr. 4, 16
b 26
λόγος δέ ἐστι φωνὴ σημαντικὴ κατὰ συνθήκην, ἧς τῶν μερῶν τι σημαντικόν ἐστι κεχωρισμένον, ὡς φάσις, ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ὡς κατάφασις ἢ ἀπόφασις
.
λέγω δέ, οἷον ἄνθρωπος σημαίνει μέν τι, ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ὅτι ἔστιν ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀλλ᾽ ἔσται κατάφασις ἢ ἀπόφασις, ἐάν τι προστεθῇ
. The clause
ἧς ἔνια μέρη καθ᾽ αὑτὰ σημαίνει τι refers to the nouns and verbs (with their
πτώσεις) as the significant parts of all
λόγοι;
the
σύνδεσμοι and
ἄρθρα are
φωναὶ ἄσημοι. For the meaning of
λόγος and the various forms of
λόγοι see on
20, 1456
b 38
(also
Bon. Ind. 433
b 48
).
12.
mvp-aristotle-comment-745
οὐ γὰρ ἅπας, κτέ.
An indirect reproof, perhaps, to
Plato, who seems to speak as though a
λόγος were always in the form of a proposition:
Soph. 262 Α
οὐκοῦν ἐξ ὀνομάτων μὲν μόνων συνεχώς λεγομένων οὐκ ἔστι ποτὲ λόγος, οὐδ᾽ αὖ ῥημάτων χωρὶς ὀνομάτων λεχθέντων
.
12.
mvp-aristotle-comment-746
ὁ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ὁρισμός:
e.g.
ζῷον πεζὸν δίπουν (
Top. 1. 7, 103
a 27
) οἱ
ζῷον ἐπιστήμης δεκτικόν (
Top. 5. 2, 130 b8
).
12.
mvp-aristotle-comment-747
ἐνδέχεται ἄνευ ῥημάτων εἶναι λόγον.
This is the
λόγος ὀνοματώδης of
An. post. 2. 10, 93b31
—a combination of words that may serve as an equivalent for a name, and take the place of one as a term in a proposition (comp.
De interpr. 11, 21 a 29
). It may be a more or a less exact equivalent; the most exact is what
Aristotle calls a definition (comp.
Metaph. Z 4, 1030 a 14
).
11.
mvp-aristotle-comment-748
εἷς δὲ ἐστι λόγος διχῶς.
That a
λόγος, in spite of its composite nature, has a certain unity in it is tacitly assumed in the definition in a 23
λόγος δὲ φωνὴ συνθετὴ κτέ. This unity, as the text implies, is not of the same order in all kinds of
λόγοι. A definition (a
λόγος without predication) is one, because the combination of terms in it signifies and stands for one thing (
ἓν σημαίνει), just in the same way as a name may do. The proposition also, e. g.
Κλέων βαδίζει, is one because the combination of terms describes a single act or fact (comp.
De interpr. 5, 17 a 16
ὁ ἓν δηλῶν λόγος
), and admits of only one assertion or denial. On the other hand in a composite
λόγος consisting of two or more propositions with copulative or other coordinating conjunctions to connect them together, the formal unity of the whole is due to this conjunction of the parts, the several propositions which compose it. The
Iliad is an extreme instance of such a
λόγος. This point, the difference in the unity in these two kinds of
λόγοι, is more than once noticed by
Aristotle elsewhere in very similar terms:
De interpr. 5, 17 a 8
ἔστι δὲ εἰς πρῶτος [? πρώτως] λόγος ἀποφαντικὸς κατάφασις, εἶτα ἀπόφασις· οἱ δ᾽ ἄλλοι [scil. λόγοι ἀποφαντικοί] πάντες συνδέσμῳ εἷς ἔστι δὲ εἷς λόγος ἀποφαντικὸς ἢ ὁ ἓν δηλῶν ἢ ὁ συνδέσμῳ εἷς, ... πολλοὶ δὲ οἱ πολλὰ καὶ μὴ ἓν ἢ οἱ ἀσύνδετοι
.
An. post. 2. 10, 93 b 35
λόγος δ᾽ εἷς ἐστι διχῶς, ὁ μὲν συνδέσμῳ, ὥσπερ ἡ Ἰλιάς, ὁ δὲ τῷ ἓν καθ᾽ ἓν δηλοῦν μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός
. —
Metaph. Η 6, 1045 a 12
:
ὁ δ᾽ ὁρισμὸς λόγος ἐστὶν εἷς οὐ συνδέσμῳ καθάπερ ἡ Ἰλιάς, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἑνὸς εἶναι
(comp. also
Metaph. Z 4, 1030 b 9
).
13.
mvp-aristotle-comment-749
ἐκ πλειόνων
,
scil.
λόγων.
