1.
mvp-aristotle-comment-708
1.
mvp-aristotle-comment-709
1456b20
τῆς δὲ λέξεως κτέ.
This whole chapter has been condemned by
Ritter and others as an interpolation; and it must be admitted that, according to our notions of the divisions of knowledge, the matter in it belongs to grammar and philology rather than to an Art of Poetry.
Aristotle's divisions, however, are not always quite the same as ours, as his relegation of the theory of the simple sounds in language to 'metric' in the
De Partibus (
2.16, 66087
) is enough to prove.
The writer of the chapter takes the same view of the simple sounds, and tells us that they need not be discussed at any length in a book like the
Poetics.
The main difficulty, accordingly, is in his assumption that in some way or other the other 'parts of speech' come within the scope of a work on poetry.
He may perhaps have thought that some analysis of language in general was logically required as a preparation for the theory of poetical language in the next two chapters, which are成 questionably germane to the main subject of the book.
And apart from this one has to remember the historical connexion between grammar and poetry in Greek antiquity.
Grammar seems to have originated in Greece in the criticism and interpreta- tion of poetry; its relation to poetry was felt and acknowledged even in the time of
Dionysius Thrax, who begins his treatise with the definition,
γραμματική ἐστιν ἐμπειρία τῶν παρὰ ποιηταῖς τε καὶ συγγραφεῦσιν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ λεγομένων
(p. 5 Uhlig).
That certain matters of grammar come under the cognizance of poetry is implied apparently in
De interpr.4, 1785
, when a distinction is made between the logical and the extra-logical forms of statement:
οἱ μὲν οὖν ἄλλοι [scil. λόγοι] ἀφείσθωσαν· ῥητορικῆς γὰρ ἢ ποιητικῆς οἰκειοτέρα ἡ σκέψις
(comp.
Pacius ad loc.).
The a priori objection, therefore, to this chapter is not quite so conclusive as it might seem at first sight.
The chapter itself, whether an original part of the
Poetics or not, has more than one mark of date about it.
ἄρθρον and
πτῶσις have not yet acquired their usual sense of 'article' and 'case';
λόγος still retains its peculiarly Aristotelian meaning, and the definitions of
ἄρθρον,
σύνδεσμος,
ὄνομα and
ῥῆμα seem to have been framed with conscious reference to it (see on 1457 10);
the general terminology and logical forms throughout the chapter are Aristotelian; and there are also several isolated points and allusions which would be wholly unintelligible if it were not for the parallels and illus- trations we are able to find in the unquestioned writings of
Aristotle.
1.
mvp-aristotle-comment-710
ἁπάσης,
'taken as a whole', as opposed to the parts into which it may be divided; comp.
Meteor.4. 1, 379b 5
ἡ θάλασσα κατὰ μέρος μὲν διαιρουμένη τάχα σήπεται, ἅπασα δ᾽ οὔ.
—
Plato
Theaet.147 Ε
τὸν ἀριθμὸν πάντα δίχα διελάβομεν.
—
Gorg.502 c
εἴ τις περιέ- λοιτο τῆς ποιήσεως πάσης τό τε μέλος κτέ.
—
Laws737 Ε
δύο μέρη τοῦ παντὸς ἀριθμοῦ.
The Latin
omnis is used in just the same way in
Caesar
B. G.1. I
Gallia est omnis divisa in parles tres.
1.
mvp-aristotle-comment-711
τὰ μέρη.
Aristotle's
μέρη τῆς λέξεως is an anticipation of our 'parts of speech'; but the term covers more ground; his list of
μέρη comprises three distinct kinds of 'parts': (1) the elements into which words are analyzable (
στοιχεῖον and
συλλαβή) ; (2) the various kinds of words (
σύνδεσμος,
ἄρθρον, etc.); and (3) the
λόγος - the actual
λέξις being a series of
λόγοι. It includes, therefore, all the elements of language in every stage of analysis, from the simplest sounds to the proposition. It is only under the second of the above heads, i.e. in his classification of words, that
Aristotle deals with the 'parts of speech' of later grammar. This passage is cited by
Ammonius on the
De Interpretatione:
λόγου μὲν ταῦτα [i. e. articles, conjunctions, etc.] οὐ μέρη, λέξεως δὲ μέρη, ἧς καὶ ὁ λόγος αὐτὸς μέρος, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς Περὶ ποιητικῆς εἴρηται
(p. 12 Busse); and there is more than one reference to it in
Boethius on the same book:
Aristoteles in libris quos de poetica scripsit locutionis partes esse syllabas vel etiam coniunctiones tradidit
(2, p. 6 Meiser). -
In opere vero de poetica non eodem modo dividit locutionem, sed omnes omnino locutionis partes adposuit, confirmans esse locutionis partes elementa syllabas coniunctiones articulos nomina casus verba orationes. locutio namque non in solis significativis vocibus constat, sed supergradiens significationes vocum ad articulatos sonos usque consistit
(2, p. 8).
The classification before us which distinguishes words into
σύνδεσμοι,
ἄρθρα,
ὀνόματα,
ῥήματα and
πτώσεις, is an advance on that in the lost Aristotelian work known as the
τέχνης τῆς Θεοδέκτου συναγωγή (fr. 127 Teubn.), which recognized only three kinds of words,
ὀνόματα,
ῥήματα, and
σύνδεσμοι.
This lost book is men- tioned by
Dionysius of Halicarnassus and
Quintilian in their sketches of the history of the 'parts of speech';
but they both ignore the present chapter of the
Poetics.
The omission, instead of justifying
Ritter's athetesis of the chapter, merely shows that the
Poetics were but little read in certain periods of antiquity.
1.
mvp-aristotle-comment-712
ἄρθρον.
That the word has to be transposed is shown by the position of the explanation in the following statement about it (1457°6).
1.
mvp-aristotle-comment-713
στοιχεῖον:
comp.
Metaph.A 3, 1014 8 26
στοιχεῖον λέγεται ἐξ οὗ σύγκειται πρώτου ἐνυπάρχοντος ἀδιαιρέτου τῷ εἶδει εἰς ἄλλο εἶδος· οἷον φωνῆς στοιχεῖα ἐξ ὧν σύγκειται ἡ φωνὴ καὶ εἰς διαιρεῖται ἔσχατα, ἐκεῖνα δὲ μηκέτι εἰς ἄλλας φωνὰς ἑτέρας τῷ εἶδει αὐτῶν.
στοιχεῖον was properly a letter of the alphabet; it was
Plato (v.
Eudemus ap.
Simplic. in
Phys. 1 p. 7. 13 Diels) who gave it the philosophical sense of 'element', which it so often has in
Aristotle.
The present definition shows the influence of the philosophical associations connected with the word ;
a
στοιχεῖον is defined as an indivisible voice-sound capable of serving as a constituent, or element, in an intelligible voice-sound (
συνετὴ φωνή).
In thus describing it as a 'sound'
Aristotle implicitly distinguishes it from the
γράμμα, or written symbol which stands for the sound (comp.
Metaph.B 4, 1000ª 2
);
the distinction, however, is very far from being generally observed in
Aristotle (see
Diels,
Elementum p. 33).
The two terms are treated as synonyms in
Plato
Crat.426 D
.
2.
mvp-aristotle-comment-714
συνετή.
The alternative reading συνθετὴ has been accepted by several editors, as also by
Steinthal (
Gesch. d. Sprachwissenschaft 1 p. 253) and
Diels (
Elementum p. 33).
The main argument in favour of συνθετὴ is that, as defined in b 34, the syllable is a
φωνὴ συνθετή, and that the syllable is viewed in sundry Aristotelian passages (
Bon. Ind. 702 b 39) as a synthesis of
στοιχεῖα.
This is true enough. But it has to be remembered on the other side that
Aristotle often speaks of the
στοιχεῖα ας
στοιχεῖα φωνῆς (
Bon. Ind. 702 b 35)-where
φωνή means the same thing as the
συνετὴ φωνή of the present passage.
And if we assume συνθετὴ to be the original reading, the excepting clause (οὐ πᾶσα δὲ κτέ.), which puts the 'indivisible sounds' of the brutes into a different category, is irrelevant.
Aristotle's argument here seems to be something like this: In the utterances of the brutes there are indivisible sounds, but these 'noises' of theirs are directly significant in themselves (
De interpr.2, 16229
);
they are not
στοιχεῖα φωνῆς, because they do not combine as elements to form a
φωνὴ συνετή.
The indivisible sounds, on the other hand, in human speech exist as elements in speech, and they have no meaning in themselves;
the meaning in human speech is in the words and propositions -not in the 'elements' which analysis reveals in them (comp.
Vahlen,
Beitr. 3 p. 220).
φωνὴ συνετή is perhaps the nearest Aristotelian equivalent for our term 'word'.
It may be taken as including not only the
φωνὴ σημαντική, the word that stands for something, but also the
φωνὴ ἄσημος-words like
ἀμφί,
περί,
μέν,
δέ, etc. (
Aristotle's
ἄρθρα and
σύνδεσμοι), which stand for nothing by themselves, though they have a certain significance in their place in intelligible human speech.
3.
mvp-aristotle-comment-715
ταύτης δὲ μέρη κτέ.:
Plato
Crat.424 C
ἆρ᾽ οὖν καὶ ἡμᾶς οὕτω δεῖ πρῶτον μὲν τὰ φωνήεντα διελέσθαι, ἔπειτα τῶν ἑτέρων κατὰ εἴδη τά τε ἄφωνα καὶ ἄφθογγα· οὗτωσὶ γάρ που λέγουσιν οἱ δεινοὶ περὶ τούτων· καὶ τὰ αὐ φωνήεντα μὲν οὖ, οὐ μέντοι γε ἄφθογγα;
-
Phil.18 в
ἐπειδὴ φωνὴν ἄπειρον κατενόησεν εἴτε τις θεὸς εἴτε καὶ θεῖος ἄνθρωπος, ὡς λόγος ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ Θεύθ τινα τοῦτον γενέσθαι λέγων, ὃς πρῶτος τὰ φωνήεντα ἐν τῷ ἀπείρῳ κατενόησεν οὐχ ἓν ὄντα ἀλλὰ πλείω, καὶ πάλιν ἕτερα φωνῆς μὲν οὖ, φθόγγου δὲ μετέχοντά τινος, ἀριθμὸν δέ τινα καὶ τούτων εἶναι· τρίτον δὲ εἶδος γραμμάτων διεστήσατο τὰ νῦν λεγόμενα ἄφωνα ἡμῖν· τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο διῄρει τά τε ἄφθογγα καὶ ἄφωνα μέχρι ἑνὸς ἑκάστου, καὶ τὰ φωνήεντα καὶ τὰ μέσα κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον, ἕως ἀριθμὸν αὐτῶν λαβὼν ἑνί τε ἑκάστῳ καὶ ξύμπασι στοιχεῖον ἐπωνό- μασεν.
Here
Plato's
μέσα are
Aristotle's
ἡμίφωνα. In later theory the
ἡμίφωνα and
ἄφωνα of
Aristotle come under the more general designation of 'consonants',
σύμφωνα:
Sextus Emp.
Adv. math.1. 100
τὰ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν [scil. τῶν στοιχείων] φωνάεντα προσαγορεύουσι τὰ δὲ σύμφωνα, καὶ φωνάεντα μὲν ἑπτά, αεηιουω, σύμφωνα δὲ τὰ λοιπά
102
των δὲ συμφώνων τὰ μὲν ἡμίφωνά ἐστι κατ᾽ αὐτοὺς .. τὰ δὲ ἄφωνα.
3.
mvp-aristotle-comment-716
φωνῆεν.
The word had been already used by
Euripides, fr. 578 ed.
Nauck
ἄφωνα φωνήεντα συλλαβὰς τιθεὶς ἐξηῦρον ἀνθρώποισι γράμματ᾽ εἰδέναι.
It may be observed that both
Plato (
Theaet.203 B
) and
Aristotle (
Metaph.N 6, 1093 13
) recognize the vowels as being seven in number.
3.
mvp-aristotle-comment-717
ἄνευ προσβολῆς:
the opposite of μετὰ προσβολῆς in the next line.
The difference between the vowels and consonants is that the latter imply a certain προσβολή as the condition of their becoming audible, whereas no such προσβολή is required to make the vowels audible.
The sense of the word προσβολή as here used is far from clear.
It has been taken to mean
additio (
Valla),
adiectio (
Paccius),
ictus (
Victorius),
percussio (
Robortello), and
allisus (
Goulston);
Castelvetro, who renders it by percossa, confesses that he does not know what it means.
The idea of most interpreters is that the term refers in some way or other to the physical mechanism of speech;
to the impact of the tongue, for instance, on the parts within the mouth, or something of that sort.
Twining, who translates it by articulation (with
Batteux), tells us in a note that it is 'literally percussion: i. e.
of the tongue against the palate or teeth, the lips against the teeth or against each other, and all other modes of consonant articulation'.
In support of this physiological interpretation
Vahlen (
Beitr. 3 p. 224) quotes
De part. an.2. 16, 6608 2
ὁ λόγος ὁ διὰ τῆς φωνῆς ἐκ τῶν γραμμάτων σύγκειται, τῆς δὲ γλώττης μὴ τοιαύτης οὔσης μηδὲ τῶν χειλῶν ὑγρῶν οὐκ ἂν ἦν φθέγγεσθαι τὰ πλεῖστα τῶν γραμμάτων τὰ μὲν γὰρ τῆς γλώττης εἰσὶ προσβολαί, τὰ δὲ συμβολαὶ τῶν χειλῶν ;
and argues to show that προσβολή may be used here in a sense wide enough to include the συμβολὴ τῶν χειλῶν, as well as the προσβολὴ τῆς γλώττης, of the De Partibus.
This view, however, is open to more than one objection.
( ) It is hard to see how, in the absence of some explanation in the context, προσβολή can stand for προσβολή γλώττης, or can be taken to include the notion of συμβολὴ χειλῶν.
(2) Such a reference to the physiology of articulation would be out of place in the definition;
the differences in the mechanism of articulation are a separate point, which
Aristotle recognizes apparently for the first time in another section further on in the chapter ( 31 ταῦτα δὲ διαφέρει σχήμασί τε τοῦ στόματος καὶ τόποις).
I think that
Valla was probably right in taking προσβολή in the sense of
additio or
adiectio, i. e.
as equivalent to προσθήκη-the word actually used by
Lucian in a very similar context to mark the distinction between the vowels and semivowels (
Iud. Voc. 5, 88 R.).
It may be observed, too, that προσβάλλειν and προστι- θέναι are synonyms in
Antiphanes fr. 206
Kock. The general sense, then, according to this view of
προσβολή, will be that the vowels are audible by themselves (
ἄνευ προσβολῆς); whereas the semivowels and mutes (the consonants) require the support or addition of a vowel (
μετὰ προσβολῆς) to make them audible. This was certainly the distinction in later grammar:
Dionysius Thrax
p. 11 Uhlig
σύμφωνα δὲ λέγονται ὅτι αὐτὰ μὲν καθ ἑαυτὰ φωνὴν οὐκ ἔχει, συντασσόμενα δὲ μετὰ τῶν φωνηέντων φωνὴν ἀποτελεῖ
-
Sextus Emp.
Adv. math. 1. 102
ἄφωνα δέ ἐστι τὰ μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων συνεκφωνούμενα.
-
Diomedes
418 P.
mutae dictae quod per se sine adminiculo vocalium non possunt enuntiari.
3.
mvp-aristotle-comment-718
ἡμίφωνον:
Aristoxenus (quoted below). -
Dionysius Thrax
p. 12 Uhlig
ἡμίφωνα δὲ λέγεται [ότι] παρόσον ἧττον τῶν φωνηέντων εὔφωνα καθέστηκεν ἔν τε τοῖς μυγμοῖς καὶ σιγμοῖς.
-
Sextus Emp.
Adv. math. 1. 102
ἡμίφωνα μὲν ὅσα δι᾽ αὐτῶν ῥοῖζον ἢ σιγμὸν ἢ μυγμὸν τινα παραπλήσιον ἦχον κατὰ τὴν ἐκφώνησιν ἀποτελεῖν πεφυκότα.
--
Diomedes
416 P.
Semivocales dictae quod dimidium eius potestatis habent: etenim per se enuntiantur, sed per se nec syllabam nec plenam vocem faciunt.
Plato only knows the semivowels as
τὰ μέσα (v. supra on
b24
).
3.
mvp-aristotle-comment-719
ἔχον φωνὴν ἀκουστήν.
Apart from the vowels the semivowels have some sort of sound as noises, not a distinctly audible voice-sound (
φωνὴ ἀκουστή) like the vowels; this it is that distinguishes them from the mutes, which have no sound at all by themselves. Comp.
Plato
Theaet. 203 Β
τό τε σίγμα τῶν ἀφώνων ἐστί, ψόφος τις μόνον οἷον συριττούσης τῆς γλώττης· τοῦ δ᾽ αὖ βῆτα οὔτε φωνὴ οὔτε ψόφος, οὐδὲ τῶν πλείστων στοιχείων.
-
Aristoxenus ap.
Dion. Hal.
5 p. 72 R.
των μὴ φωνηέντων μὲν καθ᾽ ἑαυτὰ ψόφους ὁποίους δή τινας ἀποτελεῖν πέφυκε, ῥοῖζον ἢ σιγμὸν ἢ μυγμὸν ἢ τοιούτων τινῶν άλλων ἤχων δηλωτικούς, δέ ἐστιν ἁπάσης ἄμοιρα φωνῆς καὶ ψόφου, καὶ οὐχ οἷά τε ἠχεῖσθαι καθ' ἑαυτά· διὸ δὴ ταῦτα μὲν ἄφωνά τινες ἐκάλεσαν, θάτερα δὲ ἡμίφωνα.
3.
mvp-aristotle-comment-720
ἄφωνον.
In the definition
μετὰ προσβολῆς serves to distinguish the mute from the vowel; the idea of it, however, is repeated in a more explicit form in
μετὰ τῶν ἐχόντων τινὰ φωνὴν. The expression
τῶν ἐχόντων τινὰ φωνήν is wide enough to include the semivowels as well as the vowels. The semivowels are audible by themselves, though only as noises (comp.
Plato
Phileb. 18
έτερα φωνῆς μὲν οὖ, φθόγγου δὲ μετέχοντά τινος
); and a semivowel is sufficient to make a mute audible, though only as a noise-not as a
φωνὴ ἀκουστή.
Aristotle carefully chooses his words, therefore, in saying
γινόμενον ἀκουστόν ; since
ἔχον φωνὴν ἀκουστήν, 'with an audible voice-sound', would have been true only of the combination of a mute and a vowel.
4.
mvp-aristotle-comment-721
ταῦτα δὲ διαφέρει.
Of the five differences here noted the first and second relate to the physiological mechanism of speech; the remainder come under the head of
προσῳδία-a term which with the ancients included breathing and accent, as well as quantity (see on
25, 1461
a 22
).
4.
mvp-aristotle-comment-722
σχήμασίν τε τοῦ στόματος καὶ τόποις.
Plato (
Tim. 75 D
) is aware of the function of the teeth, lips, and tongue in the formation of speech, and has also described (
Crat. 426
) the various movements of the tongue in the utterance of certain letters (comp.
Xenophon
Mem. 1. 4, 12
). From
Alexander's comment on
Metaph. N 6, 1093
a23
(
p. 883 Hayduck
) we learn that these points in the physiology of speech had long before this engaged the attention of
Archinus, the statesman to whom Athens owed the introduction of the Ionic alphabet in 403 (see
Usener, Rh. Mus. 25 p. 591
). For the
σχήματα τοῦ στόματος comp.
De audib. 800
a16
ἀναπνέομεν δὲ τὸν μὲν ἀέρα πάντες τὸν αὐτόν, τὸ δὲ πνεῦμα καὶ τὰς φωνὰς ἐκπέμπομεν ἀλλοίας διὰ τὰς τῶν ὑποκειμένων ἀγγείων διαφοράς· ταῦτα δὲ ἐστιν τε ἀρτηρία
[i. e. wind-pipe]
καὶ ὁ πνεύμων καὶ τὸ στόμα. πλείστην μὲν οὖν διαφορὰν ἀπεργάζονται τῆς φωνῆς αἰ τε τοῦ ἀέρος πληγαὶ καὶ οἱ τοῦ στόματος σχηματισμοί. For the
τόποι τοῦ στόματος as factors in articulation see more especially
H. A. 4. 9, 535
a28
;
De part. an. 2. 16, 660
a1
;
3. 1, 661
b14
; and
Metaph. N 6, 1093
a23
(with
Alexander's note).
δασύτητι καὶ ψιλότητι καὶ μήκει καὶ βραχύτητι ἔτι δὲ ὀξύτητι καὶ βαρύτητι καὶ τῷ μέσῳ.
The
καὶ τῷ μέσῳ in the next line belongs equally to each of the three pairs of opposites, and not merely to the last of them. The meaning of
δασύτης and
ψιλότης in speech may be seen from
De audib. 804
b 8
δασεῖαι δ᾽ εἰσὶ τῶν φωνῶν ὅσαις ἔσωθεν τὸ πνεῦμα εὐθέως συνεκβάλλομεν μετὰ τῶν φθόγγων, ψιλαὶ δ᾽ εἰσὶ τοὐναντίον ὅσαι γίνονται χωρὶς τῆς τοῦ πνεύματος ἐκβολῆς;
and from
Dion. Hal.
5 p. 85 R.
ταῦτα [i. e. τὰ ψιλά] μὲν γὰρ τὴν ἑαυτῶν δύναμιν ἔχει μόνην, τὰ δὲ δασέα καὶ τὴν τοῦ πνεύματος προσθήκην.
ψιλός, 'without addition' (see on
1, 1447
a29
), means in this connexion 'without aspiration'. The threefold distinction in the text, as applied to the mutes, passed on to the grammarians, and became an accepted part of grammar (comp.
Dion. Thrax p. 12
τούτων [scil. τῶν ἀφώνων] ψιλὰ μὲν τρία, \overline{\kappa}\overline{\pi}\overline{\tau} δασέα δὲ τρία, \overline{\theta}\overline{\phi}\overline{\chi}, μέσα δὲ τούτων τρία, \overline{\beta}\overline{\gamma}\overline{\delta}· μέσα δὲ εἴρηται ὅτι τῶν μὲν ψιλῶν ἐστι δασύτερα, τῶν δὲ δασέων ψιλότερα
, and
Priscian 549 P.
); and it still appears in our familiar division of mutes into aspiratae, mediae, and tenues-where the tenues represent the
ψιλά of the Greeks.
1
11.
mvp-aristotle-comment-723
μήκει καὶ βραχύτητι.
The intermediates (
μέσα) in quantity are the three dichronous vowels , , :
Dion. Thrax p. 10
τῶν δὲ φωνηέντων μακρὰ μὲν ἐστι δύο, \overline{\eta} καὶ ῶ, βραχέα δὲ δύο, καὶ , δίχρονα δὲ τρία, δίχρονα δὲ λέγεται, ἐπεὶ ἐκτείνεται καὶ συστέλλεται.
-
Sextus Emp.
Adv. math. 1. 100
τῶν δὲ φωνηέντων τρεῖς λέγουσι διαφοράς· δύο μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν φύσει μακρὰ λέγουσι τυγ- χάνειν, τὸ \overline{\eta} καὶ τὸ ῶ, ἰσάριθμα δὲ βραχέα, τὸ καὶ τὸ , τρία δὲ κοινὰ μήκους τε καὶ βραχύτητος, , ἅπερ δίχρονα καὶ ὑγρὰ καὶ ἀμφίβολα καὶ μεταβολικά καλοῦσιν· ἕκαστον γὰρ αὐτῶν πέφυκεν ὁτὲ μὲν ἐκτείνεσθαι ὀτὲ δὲ συστέλλεσθαι
(comp.
Dion. Hal.
5 p. 74 R.
, and
Aulus Gellius
16. 18.5
).
4.
mvp-aristotle-comment-724
ὀξύτητι καὶ βαρύτητι.
A third kind of difference is to be seen in the differences of accent. Accent with
Aristotle is a part of
προσῳδία (see on
b31
), but he has no special name for it; the word
τόνος in
Rhet. 3. 1, 1403 b29
relates to the tone or key in which something may be said, and not, as is sometimes supposed (e. g. by
Cope), to the syllabic accent in words.
Aristotle's intermediate accent is clearly that conventionally indicated by a circumflex, as standing between the acute and grave, and having thus something of the nature of both. This was the received view of the phonetic value of the 'circumflex' in antiquity, though the names by which it was known referred to the form of the mark rather than the nature of the accent itself; comp. the pseudo-
Sergius,
4 p. 531 Keil
Ammonius Alexandrius qui Aristarchi scholae successit
ὀξύβαρυν
vocat, Ephorus autem Cymaeus
περίσπασιν,
Dionysius Olympius [read: Olynthius]
δίτονον,
Hermocrates Iasius
σύμπλεκτον,
Epicharmus Syracusius
κεκλασμένην ;
verum ea nunc ab omnibus
περισπωμένη
Graece vocatur, apud nos flexa, quoniam primo erecta rursus in gravem flectitur.
For further illustrations of the notion of the circumflex in antiquity see
Nauck,
Aristophanis Byz. fragmenta p. 13
, and
Wilmanns,
De Varronis libris grammaticis p. 187
. It is to be observed that (like
Plato
Crat. 399 A
)
Aristotle ignores the circumflex in the passage in
Soph. el. 23, 179 a 14
εἰ παρὰ προσῳδίαν ὀξεῖαν [scil.
ὁ λόγος ἐστί],
ἡ βαρεῖα προσῳδία λύσις, εἰ δὲ παρὰ βαρεῖαν, ἡ ὀξεῖα, and speaks as though the only substantial difference in accent were that between acute and grave. His view of it in fact was probably very like that ascribed to the Peripatetic
Athenodorus in the pseudo-
Sergius,
4 p. 529 Keil
Athenodorus duas esse prosodias putavit, unam inferiorem, alteram superiorem; flexam autem (nam ita nostra lingua
περισπωμένην
vocamus) nihil aliud esse quam has duas in una syllaba.
4.
mvp-aristotle-comment-725
[ἐν] τοῖς μετρικοῖς:
comp. infra
b38
. The preposition has to be bracketed, as there is no hint of a book on metre, actual or contemplated, by
Aristotle himself (comp.
Bergk,
Kl. Schr. 2 p. 753
). He leaves the subject to the
μετρικοί, just as he does in the parallel in
De part. an. 2. 16, 660b 7
ποίας δὲ ταῦτα
[scil.
τὰ γράμματα]
καί πόσας καὶ τίνας ἔχει διαφοράς, δεῖ πυνθάνεσθαι παρὰ τῶν μετρικῶν. The theory of metre, in its primitive form, took cognizance of many matters which we should relegate to grammar or phonology. It started, like grammar, with the
στοιχεῖα or elementary sounds in language (
Longinus
Prol. in Hephaest. p. 142 Gaisf.
τοῦ περὶ μέτρων λόγου πολλοὶ πολλαχῶς ἤρξαντο, οἱ μὲν ἀπὸ στοιχείων, ὡς Φιλόξενος
); and, as the passage in the
De Partibus intimates (comp.
Dion. Hal.
5 p. 74 R.
), it dealt with the whole question of the number and nature of these elements.
1.
mvp-aristotle-comment-726
συλλαβή.
As here defined a
συλλαβή is a combination of a mute and a 'letter with a sound', i. e. either a vowel or a semivowel (see on
b 28
), to make the mute audible. An instance of the first combination is BA (see
Metaph. Z 17, 1041 b13
); of the second ГР (comp.
Metaph. N 6, 1093b 22
), where the I becomes audible at any rate as part of a complex 'noise'. In the further combination we have an articulate, as well as an audible, sound-
φωνὴ ἀκουστή, not a mere
ἀκουστόν.
Aristotle, however, does not stop to note the difference. The meaning given to
συλλαβή in the Aristotelian definition is apparently the proper technical sense of the term:
Dionysius Thrax p. 16 Uhlig
συλλαβή ἐστι κυρίως σύλληψις συμφώνων μετὰ φωνηέντος ἢ φωνηέντων, οἷον καρ, βοῦς· καταχρηστικῶς δὲ καὶ ἡ ἐξ ἑνὸς φωνηέντος, οἷον ᾶ, \overline{\eta}
(see also
Charisius 2 P.
, and
Marius Victorinus 2470-5 P.
). In ordinary speech, however, the term was often used to denote the units of sound or 'syllables' (as we say) into which a word, a foot, or a verse is divisible.
Plato, for intance, speaks of
ΣΩ as the 'first syllable' in Socrates (
Theaet. 203 c
), and of words as 'made up of syllables' (
Crat. 424 Ε
συλλαβὰς συντιθέντες, ἐξ ὧν τά τε ὀνόματα καὶ τὰ ῥήματα συντίθενται
); words also like ἐû and ἤια etc. were said to be disyllables, trisyllables, etc.
Aristotle has lapsed into this use of the term even in the
Poetics, in
21, 1457b 2
where the a in
Πηληιάδεω is regarded as a
συλλαβὴ ἐμβεβλημένη (see note on the passage); and it is by no means uncommon in other Aristotelian writings; see
Cat. 6, 4b 33
;
De interpr. 4, 16b31
;
De gen. an. 1. 18, 722a 32
;
Metaph. N 6, 1093b 1
;
Rhet. 3. 2, 1405 a 31
(comp.
Bon. Ind. 710b 45
; and for the general history of the term
Schmidt,
Beiträge zur Gesch. der Grammatik p. 126
). It is to be observed that
Aristotle ignores the
φωναὶ συνθεταί called diphthongs; for the ancient view of them see
Blass,
Aussprache p. 20
.
5.
mvp-aristotle-comment-727
φωνὴν ἔχοντος
includes the semivowel as well as the vowel (see on
b 28
).
καὶ γὰρ τὸ ΓΡ ἄνευ τοῦ Α =
τὸ γὰρ ΓΡ καὶ ἄνευ τοῦ Α.
5.
mvp-aristotle-comment-728
τῆς μετρικῆς:
see on
b 34
. As the foot is made up of syllables, the theory of the
συλλαβή belonged to metre just as much as to grammar:
Aristides Quintil.
1. 20, p. 28 Jahn
ἀρχὴ μὲν οὖν ἡ τῆς μετρικῆς ὁ περὶ στοιχείων λόγος, εἶθ᾿ ὁ περὶ συλλαβῆς, εἶθ' ὁ περὶ ποδῶν, εἶθ οὕτως ὁ περὶ μέτρων.
-
Longinus
Prol. in Heph. p. 142 Gaisf.
τοῦ δὲ περὶ μέτρων λόγου πολλοὶ πολλαχῶς ἤρξαντο, οἱ μὲν ἀπὸ στοιχείων, ὡς Φιλόξενος, οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ μέτρων ὅρου, ὡς Ηλιόδωρος, ἡμεῖς δὲ Ἡφαιστίωνι κατακολουθήσομεν ἀπὸ συλλαβῆς ἀρξάμενοι.
By
τούτων τὰς διαφοράς
Aristotle probably meant not only the familiar distinction of syllables into long and short, but also the finer differences the ancient theory of rhythmic recognized in the times of syllables, when the time of the consonant or consonants in them is taken into account (v.
Kühner, Gr. Gr. 1. 1 p. 300
).
6.
mvp-aristotle-comment-729
σύνδεσμος.
The traditional text of this and the following section (that on the
ἄρθρον) is confessedly corrupt.
Twining finds a good deal of it unintelligible (comp.
Steinthal,
Gesch. der Sprachwissen- schaft 1 p. 263
); and
Vahlen, besides bracketing
ἢ φωνὴ μέσου in
1457a 8-10
, has to assume two lacunas, one after
συντίθεσθαι in
1457a 2
, and another after
δηλοῖ
in
1457a 7
. At this point
Aristotle passes from the constituents of words (letters and syllables) to actual words; and he begins by noting this distinction: some words are
φωναὶ ἄσημοι, and others
φωναὶ σημαντικαί ; these latter being the nouns and verbs in language, which have a meaning of their own and stand for something even when uttered by themselves. The
σύνδεσμοι and
ἄρθρα however, are said to be
φωναὶ ἄσημοι; i. e. they convey no meaning when uttered by themselves.
If we may provisionally take them to represent in some way the little connexive words in language, the question arises as to the nature of the two kinds of connexives and the distinction
Aristotle wished to draw between them. It will be observed that he describes them by reference to their position and function in the complex
φωνὴ σημαντική, called a
λόγος a little further on in the chapter (
1457a 23
). It is necessary, therefore, to go back to his idea of
λόγος, and consider the various forms of
λόγοι which he either recognizes or may be presumed to have recognized.
λόγος in the present sense of the term has no exact English equivalent, though 'speech', 'discourse', or 'phrase' is sometimes conventionally made to stand for it. According to the definition in
1457a 23
it is a significant combination of significant words, e. g. of two (or more) nouns, or verbs (including what
Aristotle would call their
πτώσεις), or of a verb and a noun, or of a noun and a verb. Α
λόγος, in
Aristotle's sense of the term, does not necessarily involve predication.
The instance he gives in
1457a 25
of a non-predicative
λόγος is a definition, that of 'man', e.g.
ζῷον πεζὸν δίπουν - where the combination of the three nouns is equivalent to 'man', and may replace it as one of the terms of a proposition. This form of
λόγος is the
λόγος ὀνοματώδης of
An. post. 2. 10, 93 b 31
.
Under this same head we may include certain other forms of expression, e. g.
βαδίζει χαίρων (a combination of two verbs), and
οἰκοῦσι νῆσον (a verb+ a noun). A more complex instance of the same type would be a combination like
οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, where the terms are combined into one by the copulative, and
οἰκοῦσι περὶ δυσμάς, where the terms are hyphened together by the preposition
2
(comp.
Hartung,
Lehren der Alten über die Dichtkunst p. 284
). The other form of
λόγος is that which involves predication-the
λόγος ἀποφαντικός of the
De Interpretatione (4.17a seqq.).
If we may work out the hint in
De Interpretatione5, 17a 20
, we may divide the
λόγοι of this description into two kinds, the simple and the composite, and take the example in
1457a 28,
Κλέων βαδίζει
, as the type of the simple predicational
λόγος. It is not so easy to find an Aristotelian instance of the composite predicational
λόγος; but its nature is indicated in general terms in the passage in the
De Interpretatione: it consists of two or more simple predicational
λόγοι combined in some way or other into one single
λόγος.
How, then, and by means of what kinds of words is this combination effected? The
De Interpretatione ignores this question. We may perhaps supply the omission, however, by reflecting for a moment on the structure of complex sentences and observing the different relations of the parts or members to the whole. In some instances the simple
λόγοι ἀποφαντικοί are merely co-ordinated, and held together by copulative or similar conjunctions, as in
Κλέων βαδίζει καὶ Σωκράτης κάθηται, Κλέων μὲν βαδίζει Σωκράτης δὲ κάθηται, Κλέων βαδίζει ἀλλὰ Σωκράτης κάθηται (comp.
συνδέσμῳ εἷς in
1457a 30
); in others they are subordinated to one another, and form a sort of organic whole knit into one by words which indicate relation and interdependence. This last point in the theory of the
λόγος would have to be recognized in any grammatical analysis of the sentence and its construction. I venture to suggest that it may have been actually present in
Aristotle's mind at the time of framing his definitions of
σύνδεσμος and
ἄρθρον, and that it is to be found in the text, if it be permissible to restore it in some such way as this:—
σύνδεσμος δέ ἐστι φωνὴ ἄσημος, ἢ οὔτε κωλύει οὔτε ποιεῖ φωνὴν μίαν σημαντικὴν ἐκ πλειόνων φωνῶν πεφυκυῖαν συντίθεσθαι [καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄκρων καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ μέσου], ἣν μὴ ἁρμόττει ἐν ἀρχῇ λόγου τιθέναι καθ αὑτόν, οἷον μέν, δή, τοί, δέ. ἢ φωνὴ ἄσημος ἢ ἐκ 5 πλειόνων μὲν φωνῶν μιᾶς σημαντικῶν δὲ ποιεῖν πέφυκε μίαν σημαντικὴν φωνήν, (οἷον τὸ ἀμφί καὶ τὸ περί καὶ τὰ ἄλλα). ἄρθρον δ᾽ ἐστὶ φωνὴ ἄσημος, ἢ λόγου ἀρχὴν ἢ τέλος ἢ διορισμὸν δηλοῖ [οἷον τὸ ἀμφί καὶ τὸ περί καὶ τὰ ἄλλα. φωνὴ ἄσημος ἢ οὔτε κωλύει οὔτε ποιεῖ φωνὴν μίαν σημαντικὴν ἐκ πλειόνων φωνῶν], πεφυκυῖα τίθεσθαι 10 καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄκρων καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ μέσου.
The words bracketed after
συντίθεσθαι in l. 2 I suppose to be a repetition in the wrong place of those after
τίθεσθαι in l. 9; and the clause
ἢ φωνὴ...φωνῶν in ll. 8–9 to have come in through a repetition of the beginning of the definition of
σύνδεσμος in l. 1 (comp.
Düntzer,
Rettung d. aristotelischen Poetik p. 194
). It will be seen also that the illustration
οἷον τὸ ἀμφί τὰ ἄλλα is assumed to be out of place where it stands, and is transferred to l. 6, so as to form part of the second definition of
σύνδεσμος—a view which has been anticipated by
Hartung. Two kinds of
σύνδεσμοι, then, are recognized in the text as amended. The first is said to consist of the connexive words whose presence in a
λόγος does not affect the coherence of the terms. There is no difficulty in illustrating this point; if
Κλέων and
βαδίζει are combinable terms, the combination of them in the proposition
Κλέων βαδίζει is neither hindered nor helped by the insertion after the first word of a
μέν,
δέ, α
δή, οι
τοί. Little words of this description are what the grammarians called 'expletives'. Though they stand at the beginning of the
λόγος, they are not an integral part of it; they belong to it not
per se (
καθ' αὑτόν), but
per accidens, and only serve to indicate a relation to some other
λόγος before or after it. In contradistinction to these
Aristotle recognizes a second species of
σύνδεσμος (l. 4), one that is a real and constitutive part of the
λόγος into which it enters. This function, as I have endeavoured to show above, in the general survey of the possible forms of
λόγοι, is fulfilled by the prepositions and the copulative conjunctions.
Aristotle's
σύνδεσμος, therefore, whatever else it may signify, may be taken to include the preposition, the copulative conjunction, and also certain particles.
The sense of the word
ἄρθρον is more difficult to determine owing to the absence of examples to illustrate its meaning. The term must clearly denote a particular kind of connexive required for a particular kind of
λόγος. The kind of
λόγος
Aristotle had in mind may perhaps be inferred from the fact that the
ἄρθρον in it is said to indicate the beginning, or end, or dividing-point in its structure. Such a
λόγος may be assumed to be a composite proposition, and moreover one of a more complex form than that in
Κλέων βαδίζει καὶ Σωκράτης κάθηται and the like. The two constituent propositions in it are either intimately connected by being related in such a way that the one is the beginning and the other the end of the whole; or they are in some way divided or separated one from the other. With this we may compare the definition of the 'period' in
Rhet. 3. 9, 1409
a 35
λέγω δὲ περίοδον λέξιν ἔχουσαν ἀρχὴν καὶ τελευτὴν αὐτὴν καθ᾽ αὑτὴν καὶ μέγεθος εὐσύνοπτον
. As a conjectural interpretation of this statement it may be suggested (1) that the
ἄρθρα which mark the beginning of the proposition represent the conditional and causal conjunctions, together with the relative pronouns and adverbs; (2) that those marking the end are the final and illative conjunctions; and (3) those marking the separation or division in the proposition, the disjunctives. The kinds of proposition which involve the use of such words as these are ignored in
Aristotle's logical writings, but it seems to me that he may very well have had something to say of them in an analysis like that in the present chapter of the forms and constituents of ordinary speech.
I am not unaware of the lacunas that may be found in this interpretation of the Aristotelian
ἄρθρον. It must be taken for what it is worth, and with many allowances, as an attempt to recover the rough draft of an all but lost chapter of early grammar. For a discussion of the textual and other difficulties in these two sections I may refer to
Vahlen's
Beiträge, 3 p. 229 and 306
, and
Schömann's
Animadversiones ad veterum grammaticorum doctrinam de articulo (
Jahrb. f. class. Philol. Suppl.-Bd. V p. 5)
.
Both
σύνδεσμος and
ἄρθρον were terms taken by grammar from anatomy (see on
7, 1450
b 34
); the former is properly a 'ligament', and the latter a 'joint'. The language in the text as to the function of the
ἄρθρον or joint-word,
ἢ λόγου ἀρχὴν ἢ τέλος δηλοῖ, recalls that in the passage in
De anima 3. 10, 433
b 21
, which describes the physical joint as the means of locomotion in the animal:
τὸ δὲ κινοῦν ὀργανικῶς, ὅπου ἀρχὴ καὶ τελευτὴ τὸ αὐτό, οἷον ὁ γιγγλυμός· ἐνταῦθα γὰρ τὸ κυρτὸν καὶ κοῖλον τὸ μὲν τελευτὴ τὸ δ᾽ ἀρχή (διὸ τὸ μὲν ἠρεμεῖ τὸ δὲ kινεῖται), λόγῳ μὲν ἕτερα ὄντα μεγέθει δ᾽ ἀχώριστα
(comp.
J. of Phil. 17 p. 64
). The joint-word in grammar, therefore, would naturally imply a more structural and organic connexion than is to be found when the
λόγοι are simply strung together by
σύνδεσμοι.
I should add that the instances of
σύνδεσμοι in
Rhet. 3. 5, 1407
a 20
are
μέν and
δή, together with
γάρ,
τέ,
καί, and apparently
ἐπεί [?
ἔτι]; and that a distinction not unlike that in the text between the two kinds of
σύνδεσμοι is implied in
Probl. 16. 20, 919
a 22
ἐκ τῶν λόγων ἐνίων ἐξαιρεθέντων συνδέσμων οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ λόγος Ἑλληνικός, οἷον τὸ τέ καὶ τὸ καί, ἔνιοι δὲ οὐθὲν λυποῦσι διὰ τὸ τοῖς μὲν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι χρῆσθαι πολλάκις, εἰ ἔσται λόγος, τοῖς δὲ μή
.
6.
mvp-aristotle-comment-730
1
κωλύει,
scil.
ποιεῖσθαι.
7.
mvp-aristotle-comment-731
φωνῶν:
1.e.
φωνῶν σημαντικῶν.
7.
mvp-aristotle-comment-732
λόγου.
The term is explained in 23.
Aristotle is using it without explanation, as though it were a familiar and well-understood word. Just before this (in 1) he employed the periphrasis
φωνὴ μία σημαντική in lieu of it.
καθ᾽ αὑτόν is to be taken with
λόγου (comp.
Top. 8. 11, 161
b 19
). The
λόγος as such is tacitly distinguished from the
λόγος as brought into relation with some other
λόγος by the insertion of a word which is no integral part of it
per se.
καθ᾽ αὑτό is the opposite of
πρὸς ἕτερον ἢ
κατὰ συμβεβηκός (
Bon. Ind. 212
a 3
).
7.
mvp-aristotle-comment-733
διορισμός
seems to mean here 'separation' or 'disjunction', a metaphorical extension of the sense it has in the
De Partibus:
3. 10, 672
a 14
τοῦ διορισμοῦ χάριν ἐστὶ (scil. τὸ διάζωμα) τοῦ τε περὶ τὴν κοιλίαν τόπου καὶ τοῦ περὶ τὴν καρδίαν
.
7.
mvp-aristotle-comment-734
πεφυκυῖα τίθεσθαι καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄκρων καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ μέσου
does not necessarily mean any more than this, that some of the
ἄρθρα have one and others another of these three possible places in the complex form of
λόγος.
πεφυκυῖα τίθεσθαι implies that the rule is general and not always observed in practice.
8.
mvp-aristotle-comment-735
ὄνομα.
In this definition
συνθετή differentiates the
ὄνομα from the
στοιχεῖον,
σημαντική from the
ἄρθρον and
σύνδεσμος,
ἄνευ χρόνου from the
ῥῆμα, and what remains (
ἧς μέρος οὐδὲν κτέ.) from the
λόγος. In a
λόγος ( . 8.
ζῷον πεζὸν δίπουν, οι
Κλέων βαδίζει) the parts retain their several meanings; whereas in an
ὄνομα, if the parts happen to have a meaning, it is lost in the word into which they enter;
Θεόδωρος for instance denotes a certain man, not a kind of gift:
De interpr. 2, 16
b 19
ὄνομα μὲν οὖν ἐστι φωνὴ σημαντικὴ κατὰ συνθήκην ἄνευ χρόνου, ἧς μηδὲν μέρος ἐστὶ σημαντικὸν κεχωρισμένον· ἐν γὰρ τῷ Κάλλιππος τὸ ἵππος οὐδὲν αὐτὸ καθ᾽ ἑαυτὸ σημαίνει, ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ τῷ καλὸς ἵππος
. The general term
ὄνομα must be taken to include not only the nouns, but also the adjectives, the personal and demonstrative pronouns, and possibly even the article as a kind of pronoun—in fact all the declinable parts of speech except perhaps the relatives, which may have been classed among the
ἄρθρα A verb also apart from a subject, as a mere name for an action, may be called an
ὄνομα, as it is for instance in 21, 1457 a 25; 22, 1458 b20; 25, 1461 b 31; comp.
De interpr. 3, 16
b 19
αὐτὰ μὲν οὖν καθ᾽ ἑαυτὰ λεγόμενα ὀνόματά ἐστι [scil. τὰ ῥήματα] καὶ σημαίνει τι (ἵστησι γὰρ ὁ λέγων τὴν διάνοιαν καὶ ὁ ἀκούσας ἠρέμησεν), ἀλλ᾽ εἰ ἔστιν ἢ μὴ οὔπω σημαίνει
. It is a
ῥῆμα proper only when actually said of a subject, as the predicate of a proposition.
8.
mvp-aristotle-comment-736
οὐ χρώμεθα:
comp. 21, 1457 a 33
πλὴν οὐκ ἐν τῷ ὀνόματι σημαίνοντος. The construction in the clause may be seen from
Vahlen's paraphrase,
εν τοῖς διπλοῖς οὐ χρώμεθα τῷ μέρει ἡγούμενοι καὶ αὐτὸ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ σημαίνειν. The participial
ὡς καὶ αὐτὸ καθ᾽ αὐτὸ σημαῖνον is an acc. absolute like those in 3, 1448 a 37 and 26, 1462 10.
8.
mvp-aristotle-comment-737
τῷ Θεοδώρῳ:
i.e. 'the word
Θεόδωρος'; comp. infra 28
ὁ Κλέων, ' the word
Κλέων'. —
Plato
Crat. 392 D
τὸν Ἀστυάνακτα
, ' the name Astyanax'; for the similar Latin usage v. Wilkins on
Cicero
De Oratore 2, 193
. In the
De interpr. we have the more scholastic form of expression with a nominative,
ἐν τῷ Κάλλιππος.
τὸ δῶρον: i. e. the word
δῶρον implied in
Θεόδωρος. As the parallel in the
De interpr. is
ἐν τῷ Κάλλιππος τὸ ἵππος οὐδὲν αὐτὸ καθ ἑαυτὸ σημαίνει, it has been proposed to restore here
τὸ δωρος for
τὸ δῶρον. The two cases, however, as
Düntzer reminds us, are not quite similar, since
δωρος does not exist as a separate word, as
ἵππος does, and there would therefore be no point in saying of it that it is without meaning (
οὐ σημαίνει).
9.
mvp-aristotle-comment-738
ῥῆμα:
De interpr. 3, 16b 6
ῥῆμα δέ ἐστι τὸ προσσημαῖνον χρόνον, οὐ μέρος οὐδὲν σημαίνει χωρίς, καὶ ἔστιν ἀεὶ τῶν καθ᾽ ἑτέρου λεγομένων σημεῖον. λέγω δ᾽ ὅτι προσσημαίνει χρόνον, οἷον ὑγίεια μὲν ὄνομα, τὸ δὲ ὑγιαίνει ῥῆμα προσσημαίνει γὰρ τὸ νῦν ὑπάρχειν ... 16 τὸ ὑγίανεν ἢ τὸ ὑγιανεῖ οὐ ῥῆμα ἀλλὰ πτώσεις ῥήματος διαφέρει δὲ τοῦ ῥήματος, ὅτι τὸ μὲν τὸν παρόντα προσσημαίνει χρόνον, τὰ δὲ τὸν πέριξ
. In this passage (though not in
De interpr. 10, 19b 13
) the past and future tenses of the verb are set aside as
πτώσεις, the verb in the logical theory of predication being always in the present (comp. Mansel,
Prolegomena Logica p. 273). It is to be noted that in these instances of verbs, the verb is in the third person singular of the present; the reason for this is that a proper name like
Κλέων οι
Κορίσκος is tacitly assumed to be its subject. With
Plato, it may be observed, the
ῥῆμα includes the predicative adjective as well as the verb (v.
Crat. 399 A
).
9.
mvp-aristotle-comment-739
προσσημαίνει.
Boethius,
In Aristot. de Interpr. 2 p. 66 Meiser
, translates this by
consignificat
, thus identifying its sense with that of the later word
συσσημαίνειν.
1.
mvp-aristotle-comment-740
πτῶσις,
as a term of grammar, has not yet acquired the special sense of 'case' which it has in the grammarians; and there is no equivalent for it in our modern terminology. We may perhaps translate it by 'modification' or 'mode'. Given a word, a noun or a verb, with a certain meaning, a
πτῶσις of it embodies that meaning with some secondary idea superadded. It does not necessarily involve a difference of form;
βαδίζει; as a question, is a
πτῶσις of the affirmative
βαδίζει, 'he walks', and
δῶρον as an accusative a
πτῶσις of
δώρον as a nominative. In most instances, however, a
πτῶσις is distinguished from the original noun or verb by some difference of form, e. g. by a difference of termination. Under the general head of
πτώσεις
Aristotle includes the following species of words :- (1) the oblique cases of all nouns, as compared with the nominative, e. g.
Φίλωνος etc. from
Φίλων (
De interpr. 2, 16
a 33
). (2) The nominative also of common nouns; it is a
πτῶσις through the idea of number which it suggests thus
ἄνθρωπος is 'a man', and
ἄνθρωποι 'several men'. (3) The forms involving a distinction of gender, e.g.
οὗτος, αὕτη, τοῦτο and the like (
Soph. el. 14, 173
b 27
). (4) The paronymous adjectives, e. g.
χαλκούς from
χαλκός (
Rhet. 3. 9, 1410
a 32
),
ἀνδρεῖος as compared with the substantive
ἀνδρία (
Rhet. 1. 7, 1364
b 36
;
Cat. 1, 1
a 14
). (5) The comparatives and superlatives as compared with the positive adjectives, e. g.
βέλτιστος from
ἀγαθός (
Top. 5. 7, 136
b 30
). (6) The adverbs as compared with the corresponding adjectives, e. g.
δικαίως from
δίκαιος (
Top. 1. 15, 106
b 29
;
5. 7, 136
b 15
). (7) The past and future tenses of the verb (
De interpr. 3, 16
b 16
); and presumably also the forms embodying distinctions of person, number, voice, etc. To these must be added (8)
τὰ ὑποκριτικά, the modifications of sense words may acquire through differences in the mode of enunciation. This synopsis of the different uses of the term in
Aristotle may be sufficient to show that
πτῶσις with him is a logical rather than a philological conception, and that it is only in certain of its applications that it corresponds to our declension or inflexion or derivation. It is the sense rather than the word itself that is conceived as derivative; a
πτῶσις takes its meaning, i. e. the fundamental part of it, from the primary word; and the idea of this latter is involved in any explanation we give of the
πτῶσις;
Φίλωνοs for instance means 'of
Φίλων', and
γραμματικός means 'possessing
γραμματική'—both being accordingly
πτώσεις, the one of
Φίλων and the other of
γραμματική. With
Aristotle's use of
πτῶσις we may compare
Varro's equally heterogeneous instances of 'declinatio':
a Terentius Terenti, ab equo equiso, ab homine homunculus, a mamma mammosae, a prudentia prudens, a pugnando et currendo pugiles et cursores
(
L. L. 8, 14
).
9.
mvp-aristotle-comment-741
ἄνθρωπος:
Phys. 3. 7, 207
b 34
ἄνθρωπος εἷς ἄνθρωπος καὶ οὐ πολλοί
.
10.
mvp-aristotle-comment-742
τὰ ὑποκριτικά:
see on
19, 1456 b 10.
ἐπίταξιν:
see on
19, 1456b 16
.
10.
mvp-aristotle-comment-743
βάδιζε:
to be read as
βάδιζε , i. e. as a dictatorial imperative.
11.
mvp-aristotle-comment-744
λόγος.
The definition is framed to distinguish a
λόγος from an
ὄνομα; see above on 10, and comp.
De interpr. 4, 16
b 26
λόγος δέ ἐστι φωνὴ σημαντικὴ κατὰ συνθήκην, ἧς τῶν μερῶν τι σημαντικόν ἐστι κεχωρισμένον, ὡς φάσις, ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ὡς κατάφασις ἢ ἀπόφασις
.
λέγω δέ, οἷον ἄνθρωπος σημαίνει μέν τι, ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ὅτι ἔστιν ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀλλ᾽ ἔσται κατάφασις ἢ ἀπόφασις, ἐάν τι προστεθῇ
. The clause
ἧς ἔνια μέρη καθ᾽ αὑτὰ σημαίνει τι refers to the nouns and verbs (with their
πτώσεις) as the significant parts of all
λόγοι;
the
σύνδεσμοι and
ἄρθρα are
φωναὶ ἄσημοι. For the meaning of
λόγος and the various forms of
λόγοι see on
20, 1456
b 38
(also
Bon. Ind. 433
b 48
).
12.
mvp-aristotle-comment-745
οὐ γὰρ ἅπας, κτέ.
An indirect reproof, perhaps, to
Plato, who seems to speak as though a
λόγος were always in the form of a proposition:
Soph. 262 Α
οὐκοῦν ἐξ ὀνομάτων μὲν μόνων συνεχώς λεγομένων οὐκ ἔστι ποτὲ λόγος, οὐδ᾽ αὖ ῥημάτων χωρὶς ὀνομάτων λεχθέντων
.
12.
mvp-aristotle-comment-746
ὁ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ὁρισμός:
e.g.
ζῷον πεζὸν δίπουν (
Top. 1. 7, 103
a 27
) οἱ
ζῷον ἐπιστήμης δεκτικόν (
Top. 5. 2, 130 b8
).
12.
mvp-aristotle-comment-747
ἐνδέχεται ἄνευ ῥημάτων εἶναι λόγον.
This is the
λόγος ὀνοματώδης of
An. post. 2. 10, 93b31
—a combination of words that may serve as an equivalent for a name, and take the place of one as a term in a proposition (comp.
De interpr. 11, 21 a 29
). It may be a more or a less exact equivalent; the most exact is what
Aristotle calls a definition (comp.
Metaph. Z 4, 1030 a 14
).
11.
mvp-aristotle-comment-748
εἷς δὲ ἐστι λόγος διχῶς.
That a
λόγος, in spite of its composite nature, has a certain unity in it is tacitly assumed in the definition in a 23
λόγος δὲ φωνὴ συνθετὴ κτέ. This unity, as the text implies, is not of the same order in all kinds of
λόγοι. A definition (a
λόγος without predication) is one, because the combination of terms in it signifies and stands for one thing (
ἓν σημαίνει), just in the same way as a name may do. The proposition also, e. g.
Κλέων βαδίζει, is one because the combination of terms describes a single act or fact (comp.
De interpr. 5, 17 a 16
ὁ ἓν δηλῶν λόγος
), and admits of only one assertion or denial. On the other hand in a composite
λόγος consisting of two or more propositions with copulative or other coordinating conjunctions to connect them together, the formal unity of the whole is due to this conjunction of the parts, the several propositions which compose it. The
Iliad is an extreme instance of such a
λόγος. This point, the difference in the unity in these two kinds of
λόγοι, is more than once noticed by
Aristotle elsewhere in very similar terms:
De interpr. 5, 17 a 8
ἔστι δὲ εἰς πρῶτος [? πρώτως] λόγος ἀποφαντικὸς κατάφασις, εἶτα ἀπόφασις· οἱ δ᾽ ἄλλοι [scil. λόγοι ἀποφαντικοί] πάντες συνδέσμῳ εἷς ἔστι δὲ εἷς λόγος ἀποφαντικὸς ἢ ὁ ἓν δηλῶν ἢ ὁ συνδέσμῳ εἷς, ... πολλοὶ δὲ οἱ πολλὰ καὶ μὴ ἓν ἢ οἱ ἀσύνδετοι
.
An. post. 2. 10, 93 b 35
λόγος δ᾽ εἷς ἐστι διχῶς, ὁ μὲν συνδέσμῳ, ὥσπερ ἡ Ἰλιάς, ὁ δὲ τῷ ἓν καθ᾽ ἓν δηλοῦν μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός
. —
Metaph. Η 6, 1045 a 12
:
ὁ δ᾽ ὁρισμὸς λόγος ἐστὶν εἷς οὐ συνδέσμῳ καθάπερ ἡ Ἰλιάς, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἑνὸς εἶναι
(comp. also
Metaph. Z 4, 1030 b 9
).
13.
mvp-aristotle-comment-749
ἐκ πλειόνων
,
scil.
λόγων.
