διαφέρει
. See on 484 D. Herwerden ejects the word, quite needlessly, as usual.
ποἶ ἄττα ‐‐ δόξας
. Cf.
Symp. 210 D
πολλοὺς καὶ καλοὺς λόγους καὶ μεγαλοπρεπεῖς τίκτῃ καὶ διανοήματα ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ ἀφθόνῳ. τίκτειν or
γεννᾶν ἐν is the usual expression for begetting on or out of: cf.
τόκος ἐν καλῷ
Symp. 206 B
.
προσήκοντα κτλ.
: ‘deserving to be called sophisms.’ The fallacies in the
Euthydemus are cases in point : cf. 495 D note With
φρονήσεως ἀληθινῆς ἐχόμενον cf.
Euthyd. 306 D
.
ἄξιον, which occurs in A after
φρονήσεως, is probably, as Cobet supposed, a marginal note directing attention to this vigorous and highly elaborated passage: cf. 504 E note and see the curious description by Diogenes Laertius (III 65 f.) of the different
σημεῖα by which it was customary to draw attention to noteworthy or difficult places in the text of Plato. Schneider and Jowett can hardly be right in retaining the word. Stephanus' conjecture
οὐδὲ ἄξιον οὐδὲ φρονήσεως ἀληθινῆς is awkward and not likely to be correct. Campbell neatly conjectures
ἀξίως, but Cobet's solution, which Ast foreshadowed, is more probable.
ὑπὸ φυγῆς καταληφθέν
: ‘arrested by exile,’ so as not
ἐκπεσεῖν ἐκ τοῦ ἐπιτηδεύματος (495 A): cf.
κατασχεῖν below. Stallbaum's explanation ‘overtaken by exile,’ which D. and V. apparently accept, is in my judgment wrong. The reading
καταλειφθέν (
q and several other MSS, followed by Ast and one or two other scholars) is less expressive and picturesque, though it gives a fair sense if interpreted as
καταλειφθὲν τῇ φιλοσοφίᾳ. Van Heusde's conjecture
ἀπὸ φυγῆς καταλειφθέν would (as Schneider observes) mean ‘those who survived after exile’ and is wholly inadmissible, as well as
ἀπὸ φυγῆς καταληφθέν (‘debarred from exile’), which Herwerden proposes, inserting also
ἤ after
ἦθος. Has Plato any special instances in view? Steinhart (
Einleitung p. 208) thinks of Anaxagoras, and even of Plato himself. But it cannot be said that either of them was saved by exile from deserting Philosophy, and Plato was hardly exiled, even metaphorically speaking. Krohn (
Pl. St. pp. 117, 384) declares for Xenophon. It is however more than doubtful, even after Boeckh's attempt to overthrow the tradition about unfriendliness between Xenophon and Plato (
De simultate quam Pl. c. Xen. exercuisse fertur 1811), whether Plato would have gone out of his way to pay a compliment to his fellow-disciple. Can Plato be thinking of his friend Dio? If so, this passage must have been written in or after 367 B.C., the year of Dio's banishment from Syracuse. A personal reference is easily combined with the description of a class, and a tribute to Dio would be very pleasing here. I have lately found the same conjecture in Thomas Gray's notes on the
Republic. See also
Introd. § 4 and (for Plato's connexion with Dio) Grote X pp. 332 ff. See also 499 B note
ὅταν κτλ.
There is no reason to suppose (with e.g. Steinhart
Einleitung p. 208) that Plato means Euclides of Megara. Heraclitus is a good instance, although Ephesus was hardly a
σμικρὰ πόλις .
βραχὺ δέ πού τι κτλ.
Some have thought of Phaedo of Elis, and Simon the Athenian, both of whom were members of the Socratic circle (Steinhart l.c. p. 208). The latter (whose very existence has been denied by some recent critics, but—as Hirzel
Der Dialog pp. 102 ff. shews—on wholly inadequate grounds) was once a shoemaker (D. L. II 122). We may also in some respects compare the architect-philosopher Hippodamus of Miletus: see Susemihl and Hicks'
Politics of Aristotle I pp. 331—334. Zeller^{4} II 1, p. 52 note 1 thinks Plato may have had Socrates himself in view, but the
δαιμόνιον σημεῖον accounts for him.
Θεάγους
. Cf.
Ap. 33 E
, where it is implied that Theages died before Socrates. The tribute which Plato pays to his memory is all the more touching because Greek literature too seldom recognises that physical weakness may be combined with mental and moral strength: see III 406 C note Plutarch (
de tuenda san. praecepta 126 C, quoted by Stallbaum) remarks
καὶ γὰρ φιλοσοφεῖν ἀρρωστίαι πολλοὺς παρέχουσι—a reminiscence, perhaps, of Plato.
τὸ δαιμόνιον σημεῖον
. Socrates regarded his divine sign as a special if not unique revelation from God, without submitting it to further analysis. As here, so in
Ap. 31 D
, it is this which forbids him to enter on political life (
τοῦτ’ ἔστιν ὅ μοι ἐναντιοῦται τὰ πολιτικὰ πράττειν). What the phenomenon really was, is a question which different writers have answered differently, according to their different points of view: see Zeller^{4} II 1 pp. 75—91. The subject is treated with great fulness in Ribbing's
Socrat. Stud. II pp. 1 ff. and in Riddell's edition of the
Apology pp. 109—117.
τῶν ἔμπροσθεν γέγονε does not deny that such a sign may be vouchsafed to others in the future. Schneider conjectures that Plato added this limitation with a view to himself—an unlikely supposition, although no doubt the present passage is in some measure intended as a defence of Plato's abstention from political life: cf. 496 D note
ἢ γάρ που κτλ.
Cobet and Herwerden reject
ἄλλῳ, because
ἤ τις ἢ οὐδείς is the regular phrase: cf.
Ap. 17 B
and Hdt. III 140. But the separation of
ἤ from
τινι makes
ἄλλῳ desirable to help out the meaning of
τινι, and to
ἄλλῳ in itself there cannot possibly be any objection.
τούτων ‐‐ γενόμενοι
: ‘those who have become members of this small band.’ J. and C. quote an exact parallel from Thuc. III 56. 6
ὧν ἡμεῖς γενόμενοι: cf. also supra II 360 A,
Phaed. 69 D
,
Parm. 127 D
(
τὸν τῶν τριάκοντα γενόμενον) and
Laws 754 D.
γευόμενοι is found in some inferior MSS, and was accepted till Schneider, who restored the true reading. Liebhold absurdly conjectures
ἑλόμενοι .
ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν
. See on I 341 B.
τῷ δικαίῳ
was restored by Schneider instead of
τῶν δικαίων, on the sole authority of Vind. F. It has since been found that
τῷ δικαίῳ is actually the reading of A.
ἡ τῶν δικαίων βοήθεια would mean something quite different, as Schneider shews; viz. “auxilium vel a iustis vel rebus in iustis, vel contra iustos seu iusta latum vel ferendum.” With the general sentiment cf.
Ap. 31 E
—32 A, a passage which proves —if proof were needed—that Liebhold's extraordinary proposal to read
σπουδάζοι for
σῴζοιτο is untenable.
εἰς θηρία ἄνθρωπος κτλ.
Herwerden would read
ἀνθρώπους ‘among men who are as beasts.’ But the point is that the philosopher in existing commonwealths is like a lonely human being in the midst of wild beasts. Cf.
Timon of Athens IV 3 “The commonwealth of Athens is become a forest of beasts.” The comparison may have been suggested to Plato by Pherecrates'
Ἄγριοι, to which he alludes in
Prot. 327 D
. In Pherecrates' play the
Ἄγριοι were savages, to whom apparently some Athenians betook themselves, in the hope of finding more happiness than they enjoyed in Athens: see Kock's
Com. Graec. Fr. I pp. 146—150. Plato points out that there are savages enough at home. In
πᾶσιν ἀγρίοις the emphasis is on
πᾶσιν: we should translate ‘to hold out alone where all are savages.’ Cf.
ὑπὸ πάντων πολεμίων IX 579 B. Herwerden weakens the effect by adding
οὖσιν after
ἀγρίοις.
λαβών
: singular, in spite of
γενόμενοι in 496 C. Cf. I 347 A note
οἷον ἐν χειμῶνι κτλ.
Jowett construes
χειμῶνι with
κονιορτοῦ; but
χειμὼν κονιορτοῦ for ‘a storm of dust’ is scarcely a Greek idiom.
κονιορτοῦ—φερομένου is of course a descriptive genitive absolute. In this way Schneider also took the passage.
ζάλη is ‘tempestuous rain’
μετὰ ὄμβρου πνοή, as Hesychius explains.
χαλάζης was once conjectured by Ast, but he afterwards rightly withdrew the suggestion. Herwerden proposes
οἷον ἐν ζάλῃ κονιορτοῦ ὑπὸ κτλ., and Richards
ἐν χειμῶνι καὶ κονιορτοῦ ζάλῃ (or
ζάλῃ κονιορτοῦ). Neither proposal is supported by any of the ancient citations, except that of Themistius (
Or. VIII p. 104 C) whose reproduction of this passage is in other respects, as in this, extremely inaccurate: see Schneider's note. And
ζάλη κονιορτοῦ is, to say the least, a questionable phrase. It is not well to mar the wonderful force and beauty of writing such as this by tasteless and inept conjectures. The passage has often been compared with Lucretius' “Suave mari magno,” but the difference is greater than the resemblance. The Platonic philosopher is content (
ἀγαπᾷ), if he can keep his own soul pure, because he cannot, as things now are, save both himself and others. But it is no pleasure for him to see “quibus ipse malis careat,” for he would fain help others if they would but let him. That they will not is a misfortune, not for others only, but for him (
αὐτός τε μᾶλλον αὐξήσεται κτλ.). We seem to catch in Plato's words a certain tone of sorrow, as if he had not himself attained the highest of which he was capable, because he could not find a philosophic city in which to dwell: see Morgenstern
De Plat. rep. p. 161, where reference is made to
Ap. 31 E
and to the Platonic Epistles V 322 A, B, VII 324 B—326 B, 330 C—331 D: cf. also
Gorg. 515 A
— 522 E, and Susemihl
Gen. Entw. II p. 190.
