ὡς γλίσχρως εἰκάζω
: ‘how greedy I am of parables’ (lit. ‘how greedily I make parables), not (as J. and C.) ‘what a poor hand I am’ at similes, an interpretation which deprives
ἔτι μᾶλλον of all its force.
γλίσχρος (connected with
γλία ‘glue’ and
γλίχομαι) is used as in
Ar.
Ach. 452
γλίσχρος προσαιτῶν λιπαρῶν τε. ‘Niggardly,’ ‘stingy’ is a secondary meaning, as for example in VIII 553 C and
Crat. 414 C
. The idea is that a man must be greedy of similes when he runs all over the world to find one (
ἐκ πολλῶν ξυναγαγεῖν).
αὐτό should be taken with
εἰκάζοντα, by an easy hyperbaton.
τραγελάφους
and similar fantastic creations were of frequent occurrence in Oriental art. The word is fully illustrated by Blaydes on
Ar.
Frogs 937
.
μιγνύντες
should be taken with
γράφουσι: ‘as painters paint goat-stags and the like by fusing creatures together.’
τοιουτουὶ κτλ.
There is no occasion to read
τοιοῦτόν τι: see III 388 D note For
γενόμενον Richards would write
γιγνόμενον, because of
ὁρῶντα etc. in B ff. and
γιγνομένων in 488 E. But Plato rightly asks us to
conceive of the completed scene, although the scene itself must of course be described by present participles.
ναύκληρον κτλ.
The
ναύκληρος is the Demos, as Aristotle observed (
Rhet. III 4. 1406^{b} 35): cf. also Olympiodorus
Proleg. 27 ed. Hermann. Cope on Arist. l.c. erroneously asserts that the
ναύκληρος is the ‘governor or governors of the unruly mob of citizens’; and Windelband's identification of the
ναύκληρος with the younger Dionysius is a strange freak of fancy: see Hirmer
Entsteh. u. Komp. etc. p. 620. As the
ναύκληρος owned his own ship (II 371 B note), it is right that the Demos should be
ναύκληρος in a democracy. For the frequent comparison of the State to a ship in Greek literature see Smyth's
Gk. Melic Poets p. 215. With
ὑπόκωφος cf.
Ar.
Knights 42
, 43
Δῆμος πυκνίτης, δύσκολον γερόντιον ὑπόκωφον and Blaydes ad loc. Plato's picture of the
Δῆμος is not unamiable: cf. 499 E ff. Though unwieldy, sluggish, and dullwitted (cf.
Ap. 30 E
ὑπὸ μεγέθους δὲ νωθεστέρῳ καὶ δεομένῳ ἐγείρεσθαι ὑπὸ μύωπός τινος), he is placid, and not deliberately vicious. It is the
δημαγωγοί (in the widest sense of the term, including demagogues, sophists etc.), and not the
δῆμος who are here attacked. With
μεγέθει καὶ ῥώμῃ cf.
μεγάλου καὶ ἰσχυροῦ 493 A.
μήτε μαθόντα ‐‐ ἐμάνθανεν
. See V 473 C note and
Xen.
Mem. IV 2. 4
—7. Politics, according to both Socrates and Plato, is a science: see especially
Mem. III 9. 11. The heaviest count in their indictment of Athenian democracy was its practical denial of this fact.
φάσκοντας κτλ.
The thesis that ‘Politics cannot be taught’ was (in Plato's view) the theoretical basis of Athenian political life: see
Prot. 319 A
—320 D. We are here invited to suppose that it was actually maintained in so many words by sophists, demagogues, and others. Something of the sort is asserted by Isocrates
adv. Soph. 14, 21; but it is unlikely that Plato is alluding to Isocrates in particular, as Teichmüller supposes (
Lit. Fehd. I p. 104).
τὸν λέγοντα κτλ.
as Socrates and Plato constantly did.
ἑτοίμους κατατέμνειν admirably expresses the vindictive fury of the insulted demagogues, but should not be taken as an allusion to Socrates' fate. Plato felt his master's death too deeply to exaggerate on such a subject. See VII 517 A note
αὐτῷ
is ejected by Herwerden “quod omni vi caret.” Bywater (
J. Ph. X p. 73) proposes
αὖ. The translators for the most part ignore the word, except Schneider, who translates ‘him, the master of the ship.’ Perhaps
αὐτῷ is ‘by himself,’
ipsi in the sense of
soli, as in
αὐτοὶ γάρ ἐσμεν, and we should translate ‘while they themselves constantly swarm around the solitary master of the ship.’ Failing this explanation we must follow Schneider; unless we venture to take
αὐτῷ in the sense of ‘the Master’ (cf. I 327 B note) and regard
τῷ ναυκλήρῳ as an explanatory gloss. On the whole I am inclined to think that Schneider is right.
περικεχύσθαι
: an anacoluthon, like
ἄρχειν and
πλεῖν below: we should expect
περικεχυμένους. For a parallel see
Laws 686 A. Here, doubtless, the change of construction is in order to avoid too many participles.
ἀποκτεινύντας
. On the orthography of this word see
Introd. § 5.
ἀποκτεινῦντας (
sic) in
v and Vind. F may also be a trace of the spelling with
ει. The reference in
ἀποκτεινύντας ἢ ἐκβάλλοντας is of course to the slaying or banishment of rival candidates for office: cf.
Gorg. 466 B
.
μανδραγόρᾳ κτλ.
False rulers dull the senses of the Demos by the opiate of Pleasure, and so escape detection. With
μανδραγόρᾳ cf. [Dem.]
Phil. 4. 6
ἀλλὰ μάνδραγόραν πεπωκόσιν ἤ τι φάρμακον ἄλλο τοιοῦτον ἐοίκαμεν ἀνθρώποις.
πίνοντάς τε κτλ.
They are the
ἑστιάτορας εὐδαίμονας of IV 421 B, where see note. For
ὡς τὸ εἰκός Cobet writes
ὡς εἰκός, and so also Herwerden, who suggests as an alternative that we should bracket
τοὺς τοιούτους. The expression
ὡς εἰκός would refer to
πίνοντάς τε καὶ εὐωχουμένους (“and pass their time at sea in drinking and feasting, as you might expect with such a crew” D. and V.); but with
ὡς τὸ εἰκός (sc.
πλεῖν) the meaning is “make just such a voyage as might be expected of men like them” (J. and C. with Schneider, comparing
Pol. 302 A
and
Laws 906 D), i.e. make shipwreck.
ἐπαινοῦντας
is omitted by Cobet, but (as Richards points out)
ψέγοντας supports it. Richards would transpose and read
μὲν ναυτικόν. But
ναυτικὸν μὲν καλοῦντας etc. is only an explanatory reduplication of
ἐπαινοῦντας: hence
μέν is placed where it would have been if
ἐπαινοῦντας had been omitted. In any other position it would have failed to mark the antithesis between
ναυτικόν (with its companion epithets) and
ἄχρηστον. For the rhetorical asyndeton cf. II 362 B note An alternative (less good) is to take
ἐπαινοῦντας as logically subordinate to
καλοῦντας (‘in awarding praise they call’ etc.).
ὃς ἂν ξυλλαμβάνειν κτλ.
Jackson suggests that Isocrates is intended (
Proceedings of the Camb. Phil. Soc. XI 1882, p. 13). Possibly: but for my own part I do not think the description is sufficiently apposite to justify the identification.
ἐπαΐοντες
. I should adopt the accusative with Stallbaum and others were it not for
οἰόμενοι. Schneider is fully justified in saying “si Plato
ἐπαΐοντες scripserat et
οἰόμενοι, fieri vix poterat, quin prius vitiosum quibusdam et in accusativum mutandum videretur: alterum ipsa distantia tutum erat.” This is precisely what has happened, for while
q (with some other MSS, but not
Π or
Ξ) has
ἐπαΐοντας,
all the MSS, without exception, have
οἰόμενοι. The anacoluthon is not harsher than other instances in which the best MSS have the nominative of the participle instead of the accusative, e.g.
Phaedr. 241 D
,
Soph. 219 E
,
Laws 885 D,
Phaed. 81 A
. See also Classen on Thuc. II 53. 4, where many parallel instances are quoted from Thucydides. A long and unperiodic sentence like the present is peculiarly liable to anacolutha: and one has occurred already in 488 C. For these reasons I now agree with Schneider and others that the text is sound. The nominatives
πείθοντες and
βιαζόμενοι may have suggested the change to Plato: “
ψέγοντας propter
ἐπαινοῦντας tenuit, mox velut impatiens tenoris diu servati paullisper de via deflexit” (Schneider). Similar ungrammatical anacolutha are found occasionally also in Inscriptions, when the sentence runs to a considerable length: see Meisterhans^{3} pp. 203, 205.
ὅπως δὲ...κυβερνητικήν
. The sailors, Plato has already told us, have not the smallest idea that the true pilot must study the year and the seasons etc., if he is to be truly qualified to rule a ship (that is to say, from Plato's point of view,
if he is to know how to steer), but as for
how he shall steer—let people wish him to or no—of
that they think it impossible to acquire either art or study and therewith (lit. ‘at-once-and’) the art of steersmanship. We may translate the sentence thus: ‘but art or system of
how to steer, let alone whether people wish him to steer or no—that they think it impossible to acquire, and therewithal the art of steering.’ The true pilot, according to Plato, is one who knows
how to steer. Whether others wish him to steer or no, is wholly irrelevant; see
Pol. 293 A
ff., where this principle is declared to be of universal application, and illustrated as follows from the case of doctors:
ἰατροὺς δὲ οὐχ ἥκιστα νενομίκαμεν, ἐάν τε ἑκόντας ἐάν τε ἄκοντας ἡμᾶς ἰῶνται— πάντως οὐδὲν ἧττον ἰατρούς φαμεν, ἕωσπερ ἂν ἐπιστατοῦντες τέχνῃ—σῴζωσιν οἱ θεραπεύοντες ἕκαστοι τὰ θεραπευόμενα. Cf. ibid. C
ἀναγκαῖον δὴ καὶ πολιτειῶν— ταύτην ὀρθὴν διαφερόντως εἶναι καὶ μόνην πολιτείαν, ἐν ᾗ τις ἂν εὑρίσκοι τοὺς ἄρχοντας ἀληθῶς ἐπιστήμονας καὶ οὐ δοκοῦντας μόνον, ἐάν τε κατὰ νόμους ἐάν τε ἄνευ νόμων ἄρχωσι, καὶ ἑκόντων καὶ ἀκόντων κτλ. The expressions
ἐάν τε ἑκόντας ἐάν τε ἄκοντας, and
καὶ ἑκόντων καὶ ἀκόντων in these two passages, the general drift of which is the same as Plato's argument throughout this part of the
Republic, exactly correspond to
ἐάν τέ τινες βούλωνται ἐάν τε μή, and enable us to interpret that clause, as Schneider has already pointed out. Cf. also 296 E— 297 B. Plato, indeed, is ready to go farther still, and would maintain that he who knows how to steer is a true pilot, even although he does not touch the helm (cf. ibid. 292 E). If others wish for his services, it is their business to apply to him, not his to sue for the opportunity of doing them a service (infra 489 B, C). A like principle holds good in the government of cities, and the Platonic Socrates, though abstaining from political life, may fairly claim
ἐπιχειρεῖν τῇ ὡς ἀληθῶς πολιτικῇ τέχνῃ καὶ πράττειν τὰ πολιτικὰ μόνος τῶν νῦν (
Gorg. 521 D
). The foolish sailors, on the other hand, desire only to get the helm into their hands (488 C): how to handle it, they know not, and deny that it is possible to learn (
μήτε τέχνην— λαβεῖν). What of
ἅμα καὶ τὴν κυβερνητικήν? These words should be taken closely with what goes before. The literal translation is (to acquire) ‘at once and the art of steering’: cf.
Phil. 22 D
ὁ βίος οὗτος γέγονεν αἱρετὸς ἅμα καὶ ἀγαθός ‘this life is at once choiceworthy and good.’ Now ‘to acquire at once the art of how to steer (
ὅπως κυβερνήσει, τούτου τέχνην) and the art of steering’ is merely a way of saying ‘to acquire the art of how to steer and therewith the art of steering.’ He who learns the art and study of how to steer necessarily learns therewith the art of steering (“quarum qui compos factus sit, simul gubernatoriam artem teneat” Schneider): for
κυβερνητική is, according to Plato, simply and solely the art of
how to steer.
τὴν κυβερνητικήν, in short, is nothing but the
τέχνη and
μελέτη τούτου ὅπως κυβερνήσει, expressed from Plato's point of view. Thus in denying that it is possible to learn either
τέχνη or
μελέτη of
how to steer, the sailors are in effect emphatically denying that it is possible to learn
κυβερνητική in Plato's sense of the word at all: cf. 488 B
φάσκοντες μηδὲ διδακτὸν εἶναι. So much for the meaning of this passage as a whole. In regard to details, it should be noted that
ὅπως means ‘how’: ‘
ὅπως ad
τούτου spectans modum et rationem potius quam finem significat’ (after Schneider). With Schneider also I understand
κυβερνήσει as ‘shall steer’ and not ‘shall get possession of the helm.’
μελέτη is ‘study’ (in the more concrete sense of the word), rather than actual exercise or practice: cf. III 402 B
ἔστι τῆς αὐτῆς τέχνης τε καὶ μελέτης. With
τέχνην λαβεῖν cf.
Pol. 300 E
.
οἰόμενοι
. οἰομένους is read by Stallbaum and others, but see note on line 25.
μετεωροσκόπον κτλ.
A frequent taunt: cf. e.g.
Pol. 299 B
μετεωρολόγον, ἀδολέσχην τινὰ σοφιστήν,
Phaedr. 270 A
,
Parm. 135 D
,
Ap. 18 B
, Isocrates
adv. Soph. 8,
Antid. 262, and
Ar.
Clouds 228
, 1480 with Blaydes' note. The implication is that
ὁ μετεωροσκόπος is blind to
τὰ ἐν ποσίν: cf.
Theaet. 174 A
. Cobet revives Porson's conjecture
μετεωροκόπον (after
μετεωροκοπεῖς in
Ar.
Peace 92
), but the text is perfectly good: cf.
μετεωρολέσχας in 489 C.
