Plato, Republic, ed. John Burnet, 6.486

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[486] 486a
καὶ μήν που καὶ τόδε δεῖ σκοπεῖν, ὅταν κρίνειν μέλλῃς φύσιν φιλόσοφόν τε καὶ μή.
τὸ ποῖον;
μή σε λάθῃ μετέχουσα ἀνελευθερίας· ἐναντιώτατον γάρ που σμικρολογία ψυχῇ μελλούσῃ τοῦ ὅλου καὶ παντὸς ἀεὶ ἐπορέξεσθαι θείου τε καὶ ἀνθρωπίνου.
ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη.
ἧι οὖν ὑπάρχει διανοίᾳ μεγαλοπρέπεια καὶ θεωρία παντὸς μὲν χρόνου, πάσης δὲ οὐσίας, οἷόν τε οἴει τούτῳ μέγα τι δοκεῖν εἶναι τὸν ἀνθρώπινον βίον;
ἀδύνατον, ἦ δʼ ὅς. 486b
οὐκοῦν καὶ θάνατον οὐ δεινόν τι ἡγήσεται ὁ τοιοῦτος;
ἥκιστά γε.
δειλῇ δὴ καὶ ἀνελευθέρῳ φύσει φιλοσοφίας ἀληθινῆς, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὐκ ἂν μετείη.
οὔ μοι δοκεῖ.
τί οὖν; ὁ κόσμιος καὶ μὴ φιλοχρήματος μηδʼ ἀνελεύθερος μηδʼ ἀλαζὼν μηδὲ δειλὸς ἔσθʼ ὅπῃ ἂν δυσσύμβολος ἢ ἄδικος γένοιτο;
οὐκ ἔστιν.
καὶ τοῦτο δὴ ψυχὴν σκοπῶν φιλόσοφον καὶ μὴ εὐθὺς νέου ὄντος ἐπισκέψῃ, εἰ ἄρα δικαία τε καὶ ἥμερος ἢ δυσκοινώνητος καὶ ἀγρία.
πάνυ μὲν οὖν. 486c
οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ τόδε παραλείψεις, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι.
τὸ ποῖον;
εὐμαθὴς ἢ δυσμαθής. ἢ προσδοκᾷς ποτέ τινά τι ἱκανῶς ἂν στέρξαι, ὃ πράττων ἂν ἀλγῶν τε πράττοι καὶ μόγις σμικρὸν ἀνύτων;
οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο.
τί δʼ εἰ μηδὲν ὧν μάθοι σῴζειν δύναιτο, λήθης ὢν πλέως; ἆρʼ ἂν οἷός τʼ εἴη ἐπιστήμης μὴ κενὸς εἶναι;
καὶ πῶς;
ἀνόνητα δὴ πονῶν οὐκ οἴει ἀναγκασθήσεται τελευτῶν αὑτόν τε μισεῖν καὶ τὴν τοιαύτην πρᾶξιν;
πῶς δʼ οὔ; 486d
ἐπιλήσμονα ἄρα ψυχὴν ἐν ταῖς ἱκανῶς φιλοσόφοις μή ποτε ἐγκρίνωμεν, ἀλλὰ μνημονικὴν αὐτὴν ζητῶμεν δεῖν εἶναι.
παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.
ἀλλʼ οὐ μὴν τό γε τῆς ἀμούσου τε καὶ ἀσχήμονος φύσεως ἄλλοσέ ποι ἂν φαῖμεν ἕλκειν ἢ εἰς ἀμετρίαν.
τί μήν;
ἀλήθειαν δʼ ἀμετρίᾳ ἡγῇ συγγενῆ εἶναι ἢ ἐμμετρίᾳ;
ἐμμετρίᾳ.
ἔμμετρον ἄρα καὶ εὔχαριν ζητῶμεν πρὸς τοῖς ἄλλοις διάνοιαν φύσει, ἣν ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ ὄντος ἰδέαν ἑκάστου τὸ αὐτοφυὲς εὐάγωγον παρέξει.
πῶς δʼ οὔ; 486e
τί οὖν; μή πῃ δοκοῦμέν σοι οὐκ ἀναγκαῖα ἕκαστα διεληλυθέναι καὶ ἑπόμενα ἀλλήλοις τῇ μελλούσῃ τοῦ ὄντος ἱκανῶς τε καὶ τελέως ψυχῇ μεταλήψεσθαι;

Republic. Plato. ed. John Burnet. Oxford. 1905.

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Current edition Perseus

Πολιτεία (Greek) (Platonis Opera Tomus IV: Tetralogia VIII. Burnet, John, editor. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1905.)

Translations (1)

Republic Perseus (Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vol. 5-6. Shorey, Paul, translator. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1935-37 (printing).) — 6.486 focus

[486] And there is this further point to be considered in distinguishing 486a the philosophical from the unphilosophical nature. What point? You must not overlook any touch of illiberality.¹ For nothing can be more contrary than such pettiness to the quality of a soul that is ever to seek integrity and wholeness² in all things human and divine. Most true, he said. Do you think that a mind habituated to thoughts of grandeur and the contemplation of all time and all existence³ can deem this life of man a thing of great concern⁴? Impossible, said he. 486b Hence such a man will not suppose death to be terrible?⁵ Least of all. Then a cowardly and illiberal spirit, it seems, could have no part in genuine philosophy. I think not. What then? Could a man of orderly spirit, not a lover of money, not illiberal, nor a braggart nor a coward, ever prove unjust, or a driver of hard bargains⁶? Impossible. This too, then, is a point that in your discrimination of the philosophic and unphilosophic soul you will observe—whether the man is from youth up just and gentle or unsocial and savage.⁷ Assuredly. Nor will you overlook this, 486c I fancy. What? Whether he is quick or slow to learn. Or do you suppose that anyone could properly love a task which he performed painfully⁸ and with little result⁹ from much toil? That could not be. And if he could not keep what he learned, being steeped in oblivion,¹⁰ could he fail to be void of knowledge? How could he? And so, having all his labor for naught, will he not finally be constrained to loathe himself and that occupation? 486d Of course. The forgetful soul, then, we must not list in the roll of competent lovers of wisdom, but we require a good memory. By all means. But assuredly we should not say that the want of harmony and seemliness in a nature conduces to anything else than the want of measure and proportion. Certainly. And do you think that truth is akin to measure and proportion or to disproportion? To proportion. Then in addition to our other requirements we look for a mind endowed with measure and grace, whose native disposition will make it easily guided 486e to the aspect of the ideal¹¹ reality in all things. Assuredly. Tell me, then, is there any flaw in the argument? Have we not proved the qualities enumerated to be necessary and compatible¹² with one another for the soul that is to have a sufficient and perfect apprehension of reality?

Commentary

Commentary on Plato, Republic (Plato. The Republic, Vol 1-2. Adam, James, editor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1902-1903.) focus

ἀνελευθερίας . ἀνελευθερία or σμικρολογία is in Plato the antithesis of ὑπερηφανία: cf. II 391 C and Critias 112 C. The virtuous mean is μεγαλοπρέπεια, which is a sort of highmindedness (cf. 503 C): hence μεγαλοπρέπεια just below and μεγαλοπρεπής in the summary at 487 A. Plato does not, like Aristotle ( Eth. Nic. IV cc. 4—6), restrict μεγαλοπρέπεια and its opposing vices to pecuniary dealings, although φιλοχρηματία, for example, is a symptom of ἀνελευθερία (II 391 C).

τοῦ ὅλου καὶ παντός . Cf. Theaet. 173 E ff. This and the following sentence admirably describe the peculiar genius of Plato himself. See the eloquent words of Longinus περὶ ὕψους 35, and compare them with Goethe's noble characterisation of Plato: “Er dringt in die Tiefen, mehr um sie mit seinem Wesen auszufüllen, als um sie zu erforschen. Er bewegt sich nach der Höhe, mit Sehnsucht seines Ursprungs wieder theilhaft zu werden. Alles, was er äussert, bezieht sich auf ein ewig Ganzes, Gutes, Wahres, Schönes, dessen Forderung er in jedem Busen aufzuregen strebt.”

ᾗ ‐‐ διανοίᾳ . ᾧ—διανοίας (the reading of q and some other MSS, followed by Ast and Stallbaum) is an obvious ‘emendation,’ to suit τούτῳ below. It is much less elegant, notwithstanding the irregularity involved in τούτῳ, for which Schneider compares Gorg. 523 B , a precise parallel, in spite of Stallbaum's assertion to the contrary. Cf. also X 606 B note ᾗ οὖν is moreover found in the quotation of this passage by Marcus Aurelius, according to the text of Vaticanus A: see Stich's edition p. 87 note

μέγα τι δοκεῖν . Cf. Arist. Eth. Nic. IV 7. 1123^{b} 32 τίνος γὰρ ἕνεκα πράξει αἰσχρά, ᾧ οὐθὲν μέγα (of the μεγαλόψυχος).

θάνατον κτλ. Cf. III 386 A ff.

ἀλαζών is a special case of φιλοψευδής (485 D). Cf. 489 E.

ἄδικος is used of course in the popular sense, not with the meaning assigned to it in Book IV.

ἥμερος ‐‐ ἀγρία . Cf. II 375 B ff.

εὐμαθὴς κτλ. J. and C. wrongly supply εἰ ἄρα. πότερον is often omitted in such sentences: cf. Phaedr. 270 D and other examples in Ast's Lexicon s.v. πότερον.

αὐτὴν ‐‐ εἶναι . The text is successfully defended by Vahlen ( Hermes 1877 p. 196) who compares II 375 E οὐ παρὰ φύσιν ζητοῦμεν τοιοῦτον εἶναι τὸν φύλακα and (for the pleonasm) Phaed. 101 E ἱκανοὶ γὰρ—δύνασθαι αὐτοὶ αὑτοῖς ἀρέσκειν. Madvig's proposal (adopted by Baiter) αὖ ἣν ζητοῦμεν δεῖ εἶναι is neat but unnecessary; still less should we (with Herwerden) bracket δεῖν εἶναι. With the sentiment Krohn ( Pl. St. p. 363) compares Xen. Mem. IV 1. 2.

ἀσχήμονος . Herwerden should not have conjectured ἀμνήμονος. We are passing to a fresh point. ἀμουσία and ἀσχημοσύνη (‘bad form’) tend to ἀμετρία ‘excess,’ ‘extravagance’ in behaviour (cf. Arist. Eth. Nic. IV 8. 1125^{a} 12—16); and extravagant behaviour is a form of untruth, because it makes a man appear what he is not. The love of truth will therefore save the philosopher from selfassertion and bad manners.

φύσει κτλ. The antecedent of ἥν is διάνοιαν: and φύσει (‘by nature,’ ‘naturally’) should be taken with the adjectives ἔμμετρον and εὔχαριν. It might seem possible to translate: ‘Let us insist, then, on a modest and agreeable habit of mind for a nature whose innate disposition is to make it easy to lead to the Form of each essential Being,’ making φύσει the antecedent to ἥν: but the ordinary view gives a better sense. The preceding note will explain how ἐμμετρία inclines one to the love of Truth or the Ideas. Stallbaum connects ἑκάστου with τὸ αὐτοφυές, but cf. V 480 A ad fin. and 484 D ( ἕκαστον τὸ ὄν). ἰδέαν is, I think, ‘Form,’ ‘Idea’ (so Schneider etc.), rather than ‘contemplation’ (as Stallbaum translates). The word however suggests ἰδεῖν: see on V 479 A.

ἑπόμενα ἀλλήλοις is fully justified. The love of Truth begets the love of Wisdom (485 C) and the love of Wisdom Temperance (485 D, E). Highmindedness is connected with the contemplation τοῦ ὅλου καὶ παντός (486 A), of which Courage is also a result (486 A, B). Justice and Kindness accompany the other moral virtues (486 B). Aptness to learn, memory, and the virtue of a modest and agreeable disposition also fit one for the study of the Ideas: cf. 486 D note It will be noticed that all the Virtues receive an intellectual colouring from their connexion —direct or indirect—with ‘amor intellectualis’: see above on 485 A ff.

Plato Republic 6.486

ed. John Burnet

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