Plato, Republic, ed. John Burnet, 6.484

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[484] 484a
οἱ μὲν δὴ φιλόσοφοι, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ὦ Γλαύκων, καὶ οἱ μὴ διὰ μακροῦ τινος διεξελθόντες λόγου μόγις πως ἀνεφάνησαν οἵ εἰσιν ἑκάτεροι.
ἴσως γάρ, ἔφη, διὰ βραχέος οὐ ῥᾴδιον.
οὐ φαίνεται, εἶπον· ἐμοὶ γοῦν ἔτι δοκεῖ ἂν βελτιόνως φανῆναι εἰ περὶ τούτου μόνου ἔδει ῥηθῆναι, καὶ μὴ πολλὰ τὰ λοιπὰ διελθεῖν μέλλοντι κατόψεσθαι τί διαφέρει βίος 484b δίκαιος ἀδίκου.
τί οὖν, ἔφη, τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἡμῖν;
τί δʼ ἄλλο, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ἢ τὸ ἑξῆς; ἐπειδὴ φιλόσοφοι μὲν οἱ τοῦ ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ὡσαύτως ἔχοντος δυνάμενοι ἐφάπτεσθαι, οἱ δὲ μὴ ἀλλʼ ἐν πολλοῖς καὶ παντοίως ἴσχουσιν πλανώμενοι οὐ φιλόσοφοι, ποτέρους δὴ δεῖ πόλεως ἡγεμόνας εἶναι;
πῶς οὖν λέγοντες ἂν αὐτό, ἔφη, μετρίως λέγοιμεν;
ὁπότεροι ἄν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, δυνατοὶ φαίνωνται φυλάξαι νόμους τε καὶ ἐπιτηδεύματα πόλεων, τούτους καθιστάναι 484c φύλακας.
ὀρθῶς, ἔφη.
τόδε δέ, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ἆρα δῆλον, εἴτε τυφλὸν εἴτε ὀξὺ ὁρῶντα χρὴ φύλακα τηρεῖν ὁτιοῦν;
καὶ πῶς, ἔφη, οὐ δῆλον;
ἦ οὖν δοκοῦσί τι τυφλῶν διαφέρειν οἱ τῷ ὄντι τοῦ ὄντος ἑκάστου ἐστερημένοι τῆς γνώσεως, καὶ μηδὲν ἐναργὲς ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἔχοντες παράδειγμα, μηδὲ δυνάμενοι ὥσπερ γραφῆς εἰς τὸ ἀληθέστατον ἀποβλέποντες κἀκεῖσε ἀεὶ ἀναφέροντές τε 484d καὶ θεώμενοι ὡς οἷόν τε ἀκριβέστατα, οὕτω δὴ καὶ τὰ ἐνθάδε νόμιμα καλῶν τε πέρι καὶ δικαίων καὶ ἀγαθῶν τίθεσθαί τε, ἐὰν δέῃ τίθεσθαι, καὶ τὰ κείμενα φυλάττοντες σῴζειν;
οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, ἦ δʼ ὅς, οὐ πολύ τι διαφέρει.
τούτους οὖν μᾶλλον φύλακας στησόμεθα ἢ τοὺς ἐγνωκότας μὲν ἕκαστον τὸ ὄν, ἐμπειρίᾳ δὲ μηδὲν ἐκείνων ἐλλείποντας μηδʼ ἐν ἄλλῳ μηδενὶ μέρει ἀρετῆς ὑστεροῦντας;
ἄτοπον μεντἄν, ἔφη, εἴη ἄλλους αἱρεῖσθαι, εἴ γε τἆλλα μὴ ἐλλείποιντο· τούτῳ γὰρ αὐτῷ σχεδόν τι τῷ μεγίστῳ ἂν προέχοιεν.

Republic. Plato. ed. John Burnet. Oxford. 1905.

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Current edition Perseus

Πολιτεία (Greek) (Platonis Opera Tomus IV: Tetralogia VIII. Burnet, John, editor. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1905.)

Translations (1)

Republic Perseus (Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vol. 5-6. Shorey, Paul, translator. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1935-37 (printing).) — 6.484 focus

[484] 484a
So now, Glaucon, I said, our argument after winding¹ a long² and weary way has at last made clear to us who are the philosophers or lovers of wisdom and who are not. Yes, he said, a shorter way is perhaps not feasible. Apparently not, I said. I, at any rate, think that the matter would have been made still plainer if we had had nothing but this to speak of, and if there were not so many things left which our purpose³ of discerning the difference between the just and 484b the unjust life requires us to discuss. What, then, he said, comes next? What else, said I, but the next in order? Since the philosophers are those who are capable of apprehending that which is eternal and unchanging,⁴ while those who are incapable of this but lose themselves and wander⁵ amid the multiplicities of multifarious things, are not philosophers, which of the two kinds ought to be the leaders in a state? What, then, he said, would be a fair statement of the matter? Whichever, I said, appear competent to guard the laws and pursuits of society, 484c these we should establish as guardians. Right, he said. Is this, then, said I, clear, whether the guardian who is to keep watch over anything ought to be blind or keen of sight? Of course it is clear, he said. Do you think, then, that there is any appreciable difference between the blind⁶ and those who are veritably deprived of the knowledge of the veritable being of things, those who have no vivid pattern⁷ in their souls and so cannot, as painters look to their models, fix their eyes⁸ on the absolute truth, and always with reference to that ideal and in the exactest possible contemplation of it 484d establish in this world also the laws of the beautiful, the just and the good, when that is needful, or guard and preserve those that are established? No, by heaven, he said, there is not much difference. Shall we, then, appoint these blind souls as our guardians, rather than those who have learned to know the ideal reality of things and who do not fall short of the others in experience⁹ and are not second to them in any part of virtue? It would be strange indeed, he said, to choose others than the philosophers, provided they were not deficient in those other respects, for this very knowledge 485a of the ideal would perhaps be the greatest of superiorities.

Commentary

Commentary on Plato, Republic (Plato. The Republic, Vol 1-2. Adam, James, editor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1902-1903.) focus

διὰ μακροῦ ‐‐ λόγου : ‘through the conclusion of a somewhat lengthy argument.’ διεξελθόντος is intransitive, as Schneider saw: cf. Laws 805 B ἀλλὰ γὰρ εἶπον τὸν μὲν λόγον ἐᾶσαι διεξελθεῖν, εὖ διελθόντος δὲ οὕτω τὸ δοκοῦν αἱρεῖσθαι δεῖν. (The reference in εἶπον is to 799 E κἂν ἡ διέξοδος αὕτη ὅλη σχοῦσα τέλος ἱκανῶς ἂν μηνύσειε κτλ.) Cf. also Dem. in Mid. 84. The word διεξελθόντος is not otiose, because it is not till the very end of the argument that the φιλόσοφος is discovered (V 480 A). The mistaken notion (held by Stallbaum) that the word must be transitive induced Herwerden ( Mnem. N. S. XIX p. 333) to propose διεξελθοῦσι, a conjecture repeated also by Richards. Baiter (after Hermann and Ast) reads διεξελθόντες with three inferior MSS, as if the philosophers had “run the gauntlet of the argument through which their nature is revealed” (J. and C.). τοῦ λόγου (found in a few MSS) is favoured by Stallbaum, and suggested as an alternative also by Herwerden, as if διὰ μακροῦ τινὸς could mean ‘at some length.’ The first hand in Ξ omits διά, but it occurs in all the other MSS. None of these expedients is nearly so good as the reading of the best MSS, if Schneider's explanation be adopted. μακροῦ has also caused difficulty, since the investigation extends over only six pages of Stephanus: see Krohn Pl. St. pp. 105 ff. By Pfleiderer ( Zur Lösung etc. p. 54), who maintains (in partial agreement with Spengel) that V 471 C—VII (inclusive) embodies the dialogue Φιλόσοφος announced in the beginning of the Politicus and Sophist, μακροῦ is hailed as a significant lapsus calami, and referred to the investigations of the Sophist, Euthydemus and Politicus. But μακροῦ is qualified by τινός, and surely 474 C—480 A may be described as ‘a somewhat lengthy enquiry.’ There is no allusion to the proverbial μακρὸς λόγος of which Aristotle speaks in Met. N 3. 1091^{a} 7 ff. ὁ Σιμωνίδου μακρὸς λόγος· γίγνεται γὰρ ὁ μακρὸς λόγος ὥσπερ ὁ τῶν δούλων, ὅταν μηδὲν ὑγιὲς λέγωσιν .

οἵ is found only in A and Π^{1}: all the other MSS have οἷοι. For οἵ cf. (with Schneider) 493 B and VIII 559 A.

πολλὰ κτλ. Herwerden conjectures πολλὰ <ἦν>, which would weaken the emphasis on πολλά. For the omission of ἦν see Schanz Nov. Comm. Pl. p. 33. From the standpoint of Books VI and VII it is impossible to say what ‘just life’ means unless we know the ἰδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ etc. (see 506 A): hence πολλὰ τὰ λοιπὰ διελθεῖν.

πάντως κτλ. παντοίως was conjectured by Ast and is read by Stallbaum. It occurs as a late correction in Π as well as in A (see cr. n.), and has some insignificant MS authority besides. The difference is like that between ὅς and οἷος: see 484 A note With πλανώμενοι cf. πλανητόν in V 479 D. It is the fluctuation of the Object which makes the Subject fluctuate.

καθιστάναι : “sc. λέγοντες h.e. κελεύοντες” Schneider.

τυφλῶν . They who cannot see the Ideas are blind: cf. Plato's retort to Antisthenes quoted on V 476 D.

καὶ μηδὲν κτλ. A transcendental παράδειγμα of which he knew nothing would be useless to the philosopherking. It does not however follow that the Ideas are not αὐτὰ καθ’ αὑτά, but merely that we are concerned with them in so far as they are known by the φιλόσοφος. See on V 476 A. ὡς οἷόν τε ἀκριβέστατα admits that he may not see them in all their fulness and purity.

εἰς τὸ ἀληθέστατον κτλ. Cf. 500 C, 500 E—501 C (where the same figure is employed). The political value of the philosopher's knowledge of the Idea is here for the first time explicitly affirmed and explained: see V 479 D note

ἐκεῖσε : because truth is ‘yonder’— in the Heaven of the Ideas. The philosopher must call it from Heaven to Earth, by assimilating to it ‘the earthly canons’ ( τὰ ἐνθάδε νόμιμα).

οὕτω δή =‘then and not till then’ suggests that it is otherwise in existing States.

ἐὰν δέῃ τίθεσθαι . If he has the happiness to be born ‘in his own country’ (IX 592 A), whose institutions are already modelled on the Ideas, he need only guard ( φυλάττοντες suggests the φύλακες) and preserve what is already established. Otherwise he must himself become a legislator. Cobet's excision of τίθεσθαι is wholly gratuitous: his omission of τά in τὰ κείμενα is even worse, for the laws need not be of the philosopher's own making.

διαφέρει . It would be easy to write διαφέρειν (with q etc.), but διαφέρει may be impersonal, or Glauco may be substituting the singular for the plural: see on I 347 A and V 465 E. Cf. also infra 496 A.

ἐλλείποιντο . Cf. Xen. Mem. II 6. 5 μὴ ἐλλείπεσθαι εὖ ποιῶν τοὺς εὐεργετοῦντας ἑαυτόν and Soph. 258 B .

Plato Republic 6.484

ed. John Burnet

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