διὰ μακροῦ ‐‐ λόγου
: ‘through the conclusion of a somewhat lengthy argument.’
διεξελθόντος is intransitive, as Schneider saw: cf.
Laws 805 B
ἀλλὰ γὰρ εἶπον τὸν μὲν λόγον ἐᾶσαι διεξελθεῖν, εὖ διελθόντος δὲ οὕτω τὸ δοκοῦν αἱρεῖσθαι δεῖν. (The reference in
εἶπον is to 799 E
κἂν ἡ διέξοδος αὕτη ὅλη σχοῦσα τέλος ἱκανῶς ἂν μηνύσειε κτλ.) Cf. also Dem.
in Mid. 84. The word
διεξελθόντος is not otiose, because it is not till the very end of the argument that the
φιλόσοφος is discovered (V 480 A). The mistaken notion (held by Stallbaum) that the word must be transitive induced Herwerden (
Mnem. N. S. XIX p. 333) to propose
διεξελθοῦσι, a conjecture repeated also by Richards. Baiter (after Hermann and Ast) reads
διεξελθόντες with three inferior MSS, as if the philosophers had “run the gauntlet of the argument through which their nature is revealed” (J. and C.).
τοῦ λόγου (found in a few MSS) is favoured by Stallbaum, and suggested as an alternative also by Herwerden, as if
διὰ μακροῦ τινὸς could mean ‘at some length.’ The first hand in
Ξ omits
διά, but it occurs in all the other MSS. None of these expedients is nearly so good as the reading of the best MSS, if Schneider's explanation be adopted.
μακροῦ has also caused difficulty, since the investigation extends over only six pages of Stephanus: see Krohn
Pl. St. pp. 105 ff. By Pfleiderer (
Zur Lösung etc. p. 54), who maintains (in partial agreement with Spengel) that V 471 C—VII (inclusive) embodies the dialogue
Φιλόσοφος announced in the beginning of the
Politicus and
Sophist,
μακροῦ is hailed as a significant
lapsus calami, and referred to the investigations of the
Sophist, Euthydemus and
Politicus. But
μακροῦ is qualified by
τινός, and surely 474 C—480 A may be described as ‘a somewhat lengthy enquiry.’ There is no allusion to the proverbial
μακρὸς λόγος of which Aristotle speaks in
Met. N 3. 1091^{a} 7 ff.
ὁ Σιμωνίδου μακρὸς λόγος· γίγνεται γὰρ ὁ μακρὸς λόγος ὥσπερ ὁ τῶν δούλων, ὅταν μηδὲν ὑγιὲς λέγωσιν .
οἵ
is found only in A and
Π^{1}: all the other MSS have
οἷοι. For
οἵ cf. (with Schneider) 493 B and VIII 559 A.
πολλὰ κτλ.
Herwerden conjectures
πολλὰ <ἦν>, which would weaken the emphasis on
πολλά. For the omission of
ἦν see Schanz
Nov. Comm. Pl. p. 33. From the standpoint of Books VI and VII it is impossible to say what ‘just life’ means unless we know the
ἰδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ etc. (see 506 A): hence
πολλὰ τὰ λοιπὰ διελθεῖν.
πάντως κτλ.
παντοίως was conjectured by Ast and is read by Stallbaum. It occurs as a late correction in
Π as well as in A (see cr. n.), and has some insignificant MS authority besides. The difference is like that between
ὅς and
οἷος: see 484 A note With
πλανώμενοι cf.
πλανητόν in V 479 D. It is the fluctuation of the Object which makes the Subject fluctuate.
καθιστάναι
: “sc.
λέγοντες h.e.
κελεύοντες” Schneider.
τυφλῶν
. They who cannot see the Ideas are blind: cf. Plato's retort to Antisthenes quoted on V 476 D.
καὶ μηδὲν κτλ.
A transcendental
παράδειγμα of which he knew nothing would be useless to the philosopherking. It does not however follow that the Ideas are not
αὐτὰ καθ’ αὑτά, but merely that we are concerned with them in so far as they are known by the
φιλόσοφος. See on V 476 A.
ὡς οἷόν τε ἀκριβέστατα admits that he may not see them in all their fulness and purity.
εἰς τὸ ἀληθέστατον κτλ.
Cf. 500 C, 500 E—501 C (where the same figure is employed). The political value of the philosopher's knowledge of the Idea is here for the first time explicitly affirmed and explained: see V 479 D note
ἐκεῖσε
: because truth is ‘yonder’— in the Heaven of the Ideas. The philosopher must call it from Heaven to Earth, by assimilating to it ‘the earthly canons’ (
τὰ ἐνθάδε νόμιμα).
οὕτω δή
=‘then and not till then’ suggests that it is otherwise in existing States.
ἐὰν δέῃ τίθεσθαι
. If he has the happiness to be born ‘in his own country’ (IX 592 A), whose institutions are already modelled on the Ideas, he need only guard (
φυλάττοντες suggests the
φύλακες) and preserve what is already established. Otherwise he must himself become a legislator. Cobet's excision of
τίθεσθαι is wholly gratuitous: his omission of
τά in
τὰ κείμενα is even worse, for the laws need not be of the philosopher's own making.
διαφέρει
. It would be easy to write
διαφέρειν (with
q etc.), but
διαφέρει may be impersonal, or Glauco may be substituting the singular for the plural: see on I 347 A and V 465 E. Cf. also infra 496 A.
ἐλλείποιντο
. Cf.
Xen.
Mem. II 6. 5
μὴ ἐλλείπεσθαι εὖ ποιῶν τοὺς εὐεργετοῦντας ἑαυτόν and
Soph. 258 B
.
κἀκεῖνα
: viz.
τἄλλα, as defined in
ἐμπειρίᾳ—ὑστεροῦντας.
ταῦτα
: i.e. ‘the special attributes of the philosopher’ (J. and C.).
ἐλέγομεν
. V 474 B.
δεῖ
. See cr. n. and
Introd. § 5.
ἐκείνης τῆς οὐσίας
. For the genitive cf. IV 445 E note
γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς
have not yet been employed in this half-technical sense (Krohn
Pl. St. p. 112). The substance of the Ideas always ‘is’: that of phenomena ‘is driven to and fro by generation and destruction’—by generation when it becomes determined in one particular direction (e.g.
καλόν, ἵππος, ἄνθρωπος), by destruction when it loses that particular determination and puts on another. Cf. V 479 A, B. Plato's form of expression seems to imply that there is a sort of
οὐσία or substratum in phenomena. At a later stage he seems to have identified this with space—the
ἐκμαγεῖον —κινούμενόν τε καὶ διασχηματιζόμενον ὑπὸ
τῶν εἰσιόντων, φαίνεται δὲ δἰ ἐκεῖνα ἄλλοτε ἀλλοῖον (
Tim. 50 C
): but of this there is no hint here. Cf. Zeller^{4} II 1. p. 725.
πάσης αὐτῆς
: i.e.
οὐσίας τῆς ἀεὶ οὔσης, not (as Ast)
ἐπιστήμης or
μαθήσεως.
οὔτε τιμιωτέρου κτλ.
Cf.
Parm. 130 C
—E.
πρόσθεν
. V 474 D—475 B.
τὴν ἀψεύδειαν κτλ.
Cf. III 389 B.
ἑκόντας εἶναι
is ‘voluntarily,’ not ‘if it can be helped’ (D. and V.): cf. I 336 E note
ψεῦδος
should be understood in its strict Platonic sense, as ‘ignorance in the soul respecting the truth’ (II 382 B notes). The politician who knows not the Ideal is, according to Plato, a liar, not the statesman who employs for example
κλῆροί τινες κομψοί to attain his Ideal. There is absolutely no reason to suppose (with Bosanquet) that Plato means to withdraw from the regulations of V 460 A.
τὸν ἐρωτικῶς κτλ.
Love me, love my friend. The Philosopher loves Wisdom, and Truth is Wisdom's kinswoman and familiar friend.
ὥσπερ ῥεῦμα κτλ.
The simile becomes almost an identification, as often in Greek: the desires
are as it were a stream diverted
εἰς ἕν τι. Cf. III 401 C (reading
τις—ὥσπερ αὔρα), VII 519 A
τὰς τῆς γενέσεως ξυγγενεῖς ὥσπερ μολυβδίδας and VII 534 D note To explain
ἀπωχετευμένον as for
ἀπωχετευμέναι (with Stallbaum and others) is to obtrude our standpoint upon the Greeks. Schneider formerly agreed with Stallbaum, but afterwards drew back (
Addit. p. 45) and translated “wie ein dorthin abgeleiteter Strom.”
τὰς δέ
. τάς is probably an ‘internal accusative’ depending on
ἐκλείποιεν, though rendered easier by the occurrence of
περὶ τὴν ἡδονὴν—εἶεν ἄν just before. Schneider carries on
περί, but the preposition is difficult to supply when the two clauses have different verbs. Cf. IV 428 C note
σώφρων κτλ.
Cf. III 389 D —390 E.
ὧν γὰρ ἕνεκα
: i.e. such bodily and other delights as money can buy.
χρήματα ‐‐ δαπάνης
: ‘wealth with its accompaniment of lavish outlay.’
μετὰ πολλῆς δαπάνης should not, I think, be taken with
σπουδάζεται (Schneider, D. and V., J. and C., although Jowett's translation takes the correct view), but rather with
χρήματα. Herwerden formerly explained
δαπάνης as=
τῆς τοῦ δαπανᾶν ἐπιθυμίας, but afterwards (
Mnem. N. S. XIX p. 333) took it to mean “pecunia cuius ope sumptus fieret” comparing
inter alia VIII 550 D and
Laws 718 A. This view agrees closely with mine, but it is not necessary to suppose that
δαπάνη means more than simply ‘outlay.’