Plato Republic 4.445

ἐάν τε λανθάνῃ . Cf. 427 D and II 367 E.

βελτίων ‐‐ κολαζόμενος . II 380 B note

ᾧ ζῶμεν . Cf. I 353 D τί δ) αὖ τὸ ζῆν; ψυχῆς φήσομεν ἔργον εἶναι; μάλιστά γε and note ad loc. βιωτὸν ἄρα ἔσται should not be made interrogative. The sentence means: ‘if life, which men deem unbearable when the bodily constitution decays, even when they are surrounded by every variety of food and drink and wealth and power, shall be, forsooth, when tumult and decay affect the constitution of the very principle whereby we live, worth living, if so be we do what we desire, and take no steps to escape from wickedness and injustice, and acquire justice and virtue.’ Life is not (says Plato) βιωτός to the guilty man who works his will; it may become so if he takes steps to rid himself of vice, i.e. ἐὰν διδῷ δίκην καὶ βελτίων γίγνηται κολαζόμενος. For the sentiment cf. Crit. 47 D , E, Gorg. 477 B —E, Prot. 313 A , B.

ὅσον ‐‐ σαφέστατα . “Quam certissime fieri potest” is Ficinus' rendering, with which Schneider and later editors agree, taking κατιδεῖν as explanatory of ἐνταῦθα. But it is hard to find another instance of ὅσον οἶόν τε, although καθ’ ὅσον οἷόν τε and ὅσον δυνατόν (Thuc. I 22. 2) occur. ὡς οἷόν τε is the almost invariable phrase. For ὅσον Stephanus proposed ὅθεν, Ast ὅπου. I think the meaning is ‘now that we have come far enough to be able most clearly to descry that these things are so,’ ἐνταῦθα being equivalent to ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον, and ὅσον οἷόν τε to ὅσον ἐλθόντας οἷόν τέ ἐστιν.

ἀποκνητέον . I have reverted to the MS reading. Bekker's emendation ἀποκμητέον is very attractive, but ἀποκνητέον gives excellent sense (cf. I 349 A), and there is no real reason why Glauco should repeat the word employed by Socrates (see on V 465 E); nor does there appear to be any instance in Greek literature of the verbal of ἀποκάμνω.

ἄξια θέας . Plato does not claim that his enumeration of degenerate commonwealths is complete. Cf. VIII 544 D.

ἓν ‐‐ κακίας . An old Pythagorean principle, whence the parade with which Plato announces it. See Arist. Met. I 5. 986^{a} 22 ff. (RP.^{7} § 55) and Eth. Nic. I 4. 1096^{b} 6 with Stewart's note.

εἴδη ἔχοντες : ‘having’ (i.e. as we should say ‘forming’) ‘specific kinds’: cf. VIII 544 D.

ἐγγενομένου ‐‐ ἀριστοκρατία . Knowledge, not number, is the criterion of good government: cf. Pol. 292 C . Hitherto however the rulers have always been represented as a plurality, and we have heard nothing of a king. In the later books (from V 473 C onwards) we often hear of kingship; and in IX 576 D (as Newman points out Politics of Aristotle I p. 413 note) the ideal city is called βασιλευομένην, οἵαν τὸ πρῶτον διήλθομεν. With the present passage cf. VII 540 D ἢ πλείους ἢ εἷς and IX 587 D, where the ἀριστοκρατικός and the βασιλικός are identified. The fact is, as Henkel has pointed out ( Stud. zur Gesch. d. gr. Lehr. v. St. p. 57), that “Kingship is only a form of Aristocracy throughout the whole political theory of antiquity, and rests on no distinct and independent basis of its own.” It must be regarded as exceptional when in the Politicus (302 C ff.), probably a later dialogue, Plato distinguishes between kingship and aristocracy and places aristocracy on a lower plane. See also Whibley Gk. Olig. pp. 15 ff.

τῶν ‐‐ νόμων . For the genitive cf. (with Stallbaum) Gorg. 514 A δημοσίᾳ πράξοντας τῶν πολιτικῶν πραγμάτων, and infra VI 485 B.