Plato Republic 4.435

καθ’ ὁδόν . Cf. (with Schneider) infra VII 533 B and Crat. 425 B . μέθοδον for καθ’ ὁδόν (Herwerden) is a sorry piece of criticism.

μεῖζον ‐‐ ἔλαττον : ‘whether greater or smaller.’ The insertion of ὄν after ἔλαττον, suggested by Dobree, is unnecessary.

τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα εἴδη . εἴδη used in this sense is slightly confusing after εἶδος has just been applied to δικαιοσύνη; and τῶν αὐτῶν τούτων γενῶν would lead us to expect γένη. The psychological elements are called εἴδη, γένη, or μέρη: εἴδη in 435 B, C, E, 439 E, γένη in 441 C, 443 D, μέρη in 442 B, C and (by implication) 439 B, C, D and passim. Cf. Brandt l.c. p. 17 and Zeller^{4} II 1, p. 845. εἴδη ψυχῆς does not, strictly speaking, mean ‘ varieties of soul’ but rather ‘kinds’ belonging to or present in soul ( εἴδη ἐν ψυχῇ 439 E: see also on III 402 C), and much the same is true of γένη. There is some authority for holding that the Pythagoreans before the time of Plato recognised at least two ‘parts’ of soul— an ἄλογον and a λογικόν (see Diels Dox. Gr. pp. 389 f. and other evidence in Rohde Psyche^{2} II p. 170 note); but Zeller I^{5} pp. 447, 448 may be right in regarding the Pythagorean form of this theory as post-Platonic.

φαῦλον is of course ironical, although Glauco pretends to take it seriously. Cf. (with J. and C.) 423 C—E, 426 A, B.

καὶ εὖ γ) ‐‐ ἐξαρκέσει . The difficulties connected with this passage have led to much discussion: see for example Rettig Proleg. pp. 126 ff., Krohn Pl. St. pp. 128 ff., 144, Pfleiderer Zur Lösung etc. pp. 25, 73, Hirmer Entst. u. Komp. etc. p. 618. τοῦτο in ἀκριβῶς μὲν τοῦτο and in ἡ ἐπὶ τοῦτο ἄγουσα ought, so far as grammar goes, to mean the question whether the soul has τρία εἴδη or not. But the μακροτέρα περίοδος in VI 504 B ff., where Plato expressly refers back to this passage, eschews the psychological problem altogether. The μακροτέρα περίοδος of Books VI—VII is in harmony with the present enquiry in so far as it seeks to determine the nature of Justice and the other virtues (VI 504 D, 506 A), but it is nowhere in the Republic expressly used either to confirm or to overthrow the triple division of soul which is here propounded. (The analysis of mental faculties in VI 509 D—511 E is introductory to the μακροτέρα περίοδος, not a result obtained by it; nor has that analysis, strictly speaking, any bearing on the question whether soul has three εἴδη or not: cf. Pfleiderer Zur Lösung etc. p. 25.) Krohn accordingly holds that the ‘longer ways’ of IV and VI are different and distinct ( Pl. St. p. 128); and Schleiermacher supposes ( Einleitung p. 71) that the πλείων ὁδός of IV is to be found in the psychology of the Timaeus; but that Plato meant the two ways to be identical is certain, for he explicitly says that they are (VI 504 B ff.). The only way out of these difficulties is to suppose that τοῦτο here was not intended by Plato to refer to the psychological, but to the ethical question, to which the psychological enquiry is introductory. τοῦτο must then be taken as δικαιοσύνης τε πέρι καὶ σωφροσύνης καὶ ἀνδρείας καὶ σοφίας δ ἕκαστόν ἐστι (VI 504 A). This view becomes easy if we suppose that the words καὶ εὖ γε—ἐξαρκέσει were not written by Plato immediately after he wrote 435 C, but at a later time, when VI 504 A—D was composed. It is in itself highly probable that the most important passages referring forward or backward to one another throughout the dialogue were either written together, or at all events revised by Plato side by side. Cf. Brandt l. c. p. 13 note 3, where a kindred view is taken. In any case, we must adhere to our explanation of τοῦτο, if we would preserve the artistic unity of the Republic. See also on VI 504 A—D.

ἄλλη . See cr. n. ἄλλη is in itself much better, to say the least, than ἀλλά, and is confirmed by ἄλλη μακροτέρα— περίοδος in VI 504 B. The corruption was easy, owing to the frequency of ἀλλὰ γάρ .

ὅτι γε ‐‐ πόλει . Broadly speaking, what Plato says is true, that the predominant character of a State depends on the predominant character of the individual citizens (cf. Bosanquet Companion pp. 147 f.): but it does not necessarily follow, because a city contains three psychologically different classes of citizens, that each of us ( ἑκάστῳ ἡμῶν) has within his soul the three corresponding psychological elements. In making this assertion, Plato relies upon the fundamental hypothesis of the Republic, viz. that the individual is a commonwealth writ small. See on II 369 A. γε after ὅτι, though omitted in Ξ, is strictly appropriate, and warns us of a further point— τόδε δὲ ἤδη χαλεπόν 436 A—on which agreement is not so easy.

οἳ δὴ ‐‐ αἰτίαν : ‘that is, among peoples who bear this reputation.’ ταύτην is τοῦ θυμοειδεῖς εἷναι. The phrase αἰτίαν ἔχειν is used both in a good and in a bad sense as the passive of αἰτιῶμαι: for the good sense cf. (with Ast) Gorg. 503 B . What follows is (as Teichmüller observes Lit. Fehd. I p. 146) conceived in the vein of Hippocrates' enquiries as to the influence of climate on character: see his treatise de aere aquis locis 12 ff. ed. Kuehlewein, and cf. also Arist. Physiog. 2. 806^{b} 15, Probl. XIV 8, 15, 16, and especially Pol. H 7. 1327^{b} 23—33 with Susemihl's note. Aristotle for his part represents the Greek nature as the mean between the two extremes of oriental διανοητικόν and τεχνικόν and northern θυμός. There is no good reason for supposing (with Steinhart Einleitung p. 191) that Plato was thinking of the wild races of the North when he instituted his second order of citizens, and of Egyptians etc. when he established his third. On the Phoenician and Egyptian characters cf. Laws 747 C ff.

τὸν ἄνω τόπον : ‘the Northern region,’ not ‘the highland country’ (L. and S.): cf. Arist. Meteor. II 5. 362^{a} 33 τὸν ἄνω πόλον and Hdt. I 142 al.

αἰτιάσαιτο . εἶναι should be understood. For the construction cf. X 599 E.