Plato Republic 4.435

Paul Shorey (Translator)

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Republic. Plato. Paul Shorey (Translator). Cambridge, MA. 1935-37.

Sponsored by Perseus Project, Tufts University.

Funding provided by The Annenberg CPB/Project.

Current edition Perseus

Republic (English) (Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vol. 5-6. Shorey, Paul, translator. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1935-37 (printing).)

Editions (1)
Πολιτεία Perseus (Platonis Opera Tomus IV: Tetralogia VIII. Burnet, John, editor. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1905.) — 4.435 focus

Notes on the current edition

Republic

1. Cf. Sophist 230 B
τιθέασι παρ’ ἀλλήλας
, Isocrates Areopagiticus 79, Nic. 17.
2. Cf. L and S. and Morgan, De Ignis Eliciendi Modis, Harvard Studies, vol. i. pp. 15, 21 ff. and 30; and Damascius (Ruelle, p. 54, line 18)
καὶ τοῦτό ἐστιν ὅπερ εξαίφνης ἀνάπτεται φῶς ἀληθείας ὥσπερ ἐκ πυρείων προστριβομένων
.
3. Cf. Gorgias 484 B, Epistle vii. 344 B.
4. Plato often observes that a certain procedure is methodical and we must follow it, or that it is at least methodical or consistent, whatever the results may be.
5. ὅ γε ταὐτόν: there are several reasons for the seeming over-elaboration of the logic in the next few pages. The analogy between the three classes in the state and the tripartite soul is an important point in Plato’s ethical theory and an essential feature in the structure of the Republic. Very nice distinctions are involved in the attempt to prove the validity of the analogy for the present argument without too flagrant contradiction of the faith elsewhere expressed in the essential unity of the soul. Cf. Unity of Plato’s Thought, p. 42. These distinctions in the infancy of logic Plato is obliged to set forth and explain as he proceeds. Moreover, he is interested in logical method for its own sake (cf.. Introduction p. xiv), and is here stating for the first time important principles of logic afterwards codified in the treatises of Aristotle. γε marks the inference from the very meaning of ταὐτόν. Cf. on 379 B, 389 B, and Politicus 278 E; cf. also Parmenides 139 E. The language suggests the theory of ideas. But Plato is not now thinking primarily of that. He is merely repeating in precise logical form the point already made (434 D-E), that the definition of justice in the individual must correspond point for point with that worked out for the state.
6. Cf. 369 A and Meno 72 B. In Philebus 12 E-13 C, Plato points out that the generic or specific identity does not exclude specific or sub-specific differences.
7. ἕξεις is here almost the Aristotelian ἕξις. Aristotle, Eth. Nic. 1105 b 20, regards πάθη, ἕξεις and δυνάμεις as an exhaustive enumeration of mental states. For δυνάμεις cf. 477 C, Simplic. De An. Hayduck, p. 289
ἀλλὰ τὰ ὧν πρὸς πρακτικὴν ἐδεῖτο ζωήν, τὰ τρία μόνα παρείληφεν
.
8. Cf. 423 C.
9. A proverb often cited by Plato with variations. Cf. 497 D-E.
10. τοῦτο by strict grammatical implication means the problem of the tripartite soul, but the reference to this passage in 504 B shows that it includes the whole question of the definition of the virtues, and so ultimately the whole of ethical and political philosophy. We are there told again that the definitions of the fourth book are sufficient for the purpose, but that complete insight can be attained only by relating them to the idea of the good. That required a longer and more circuitous way of discipline and training. Plato then does not propose the longer way as a method of reasoning which he himself employs to correct the approximations of the present discussion. He merely describes it as the higher education which will enable his philosophical rulers to do that. We may then disregard all idle guesses about a new logic hinted at in the longer way, and all fantastic hypotheses about the evolution of Plato’s thought and the composition of the Republic based on supposed contradictions between this passage and the later books. Cf. Introduction p. xvi, Idea of Good, p. 190, Unity of Plato’s Thought, p. 16, n. 90; followed by Professor Wilamowitz, ii. p. 218, who, however, does not understand the connection of it all with the idea of good. Plato the logician never commits himself to more than is required by the problem under discussion (cf. on 353 c), and Plato the moralist never admits that the ideal has been adequately expressed, but always points to heights beyond. Cf. 506 E, 533 A, Phaedo 85 C, Ti. 29 B-C, Soph. 254 C.
11. Plato takes for granted as obvious the general correspondence which some modern philosophers think it necessary to reaffirm. Cf. Mill, Logic, vi. 7. 1
Human beings in society have no properties, but those which are derived from and may be resolved into the laws and the nature of individual man
; Spencer, Autobiog. ii. p. 543
Society is created by its units. . . . The nature of its organization is determined by the nature of its units.
Plato illustrates the commonplace in a slight digression on national characteristics, with a hint of the thought partially anticipated by Hippocrates and now identified with Buckle’s name, that they are determined by climate and environment. Cf. Newman, Introduction to Aristotle Politics pp. 318-320.

Commentary

Commentary on Plato, Republic (Plato. The Republic, Vol 1-2. Adam, James, editor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1902-1903.) focus

καθ’ ὁδόν . Cf. (with Schneider) infra VII 533 B and Crat. 425 B . μέθοδον for καθ’ ὁδόν (Herwerden) is a sorry piece of criticism.

μεῖζον ‐‐ ἔλαττον : ‘whether greater or smaller.’ The insertion of ὄν after ἔλαττον, suggested by Dobree, is unnecessary.

τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα εἴδη . εἴδη used in this sense is slightly confusing after εἶδος has just been applied to δικαιοσύνη; and τῶν αὐτῶν τούτων γενῶν would lead us to expect γένη. The psychological elements are called εἴδη, γένη, or μέρη: εἴδη in 435 B, C, E, 439 E, γένη in 441 C, 443 D, μέρη in 442 B, C and (by implication) 439 B, C, D and passim. Cf. Brandt l.c. p. 17 and Zeller^{4} II 1, p. 845. εἴδη ψυχῆς does not, strictly speaking, mean ‘ varieties of soul’ but rather ‘kinds’ belonging to or present in soul ( εἴδη ἐν ψυχῇ 439 E: see also on III 402 C), and much the same is true of γένη. There is some authority for holding that the Pythagoreans before the time of Plato recognised at least two ‘parts’ of soul— an ἄλογον and a λογικόν (see Diels Dox. Gr. pp. 389 f. and other evidence in Rohde Psyche^{2} II p. 170 note); but Zeller I^{5} pp. 447, 448 may be right in regarding the Pythagorean form of this theory as post-Platonic.

φαῦλον is of course ironical, although Glauco pretends to take it seriously. Cf. (with J. and C.) 423 C—E, 426 A, B.

καὶ εὖ γ) ‐‐ ἐξαρκέσει . The difficulties connected with this passage have led to much discussion: see for example Rettig Proleg. pp. 126 ff., Krohn Pl. St. pp. 128 ff., 144, Pfleiderer Zur Lösung etc. pp. 25, 73, Hirmer Entst. u. Komp. etc. p. 618. τοῦτο in ἀκριβῶς μὲν τοῦτο and in ἡ ἐπὶ τοῦτο ἄγουσα ought, so far as grammar goes, to mean the question whether the soul has τρία εἴδη or not. But the μακροτέρα περίοδος in VI 504 B ff., where Plato expressly refers back to this passage, eschews the psychological problem altogether. The μακροτέρα περίοδος of Books VI—VII is in harmony with the present enquiry in so far as it seeks to determine the nature of Justice and the other virtues (VI 504 D, 506 A), but it is nowhere in the Republic expressly used either to confirm or to overthrow the triple division of soul which is here propounded. (The analysis of mental faculties in VI 509 D—511 E is introductory to the μακροτέρα περίοδος, not a result obtained by it; nor has that analysis, strictly speaking, any bearing on the question whether soul has three εἴδη or not: cf. Pfleiderer Zur Lösung etc. p. 25.) Krohn accordingly holds that the ‘longer ways’ of IV and VI are different and distinct ( Pl. St. p. 128); and Schleiermacher supposes ( Einleitung p. 71) that the πλείων ὁδός of IV is to be found in the psychology of the Timaeus; but that Plato meant the two ways to be identical is certain, for he explicitly says that they are (VI 504 B ff.). The only way out of these difficulties is to suppose that τοῦτο here was not intended by Plato to refer to the psychological, but to the ethical question, to which the psychological enquiry is introductory. τοῦτο must then be taken as δικαιοσύνης τε πέρι καὶ σωφροσύνης καὶ ἀνδρείας καὶ σοφίας δ ἕκαστόν ἐστι (VI 504 A). This view becomes easy if we suppose that the words καὶ εὖ γε—ἐξαρκέσει were not written by Plato immediately after he wrote 435 C, but at a later time, when VI 504 A—D was composed. It is in itself highly probable that the most important passages referring forward or backward to one another throughout the dialogue were either written together, or at all events revised by Plato side by side. Cf. Brandt l. c. p. 13 note 3, where a kindred view is taken. In any case, we must adhere to our explanation of τοῦτο, if we would preserve the artistic unity of the Republic. See also on VI 504 A—D.

ἄλλη . See cr. n. ἄλλη is in itself much better, to say the least, than ἀλλά, and is confirmed by ἄλλη μακροτέρα— περίοδος in VI 504 B. The corruption was easy, owing to the frequency of ἀλλὰ γάρ .

ὅτι γε ‐‐ πόλει . Broadly speaking, what Plato says is true, that the predominant character of a State depends on the predominant character of the individual citizens (cf. Bosanquet Companion pp. 147 f.): but it does not necessarily follow, because a city contains three psychologically different classes of citizens, that each of us ( ἑκάστῳ ἡμῶν) has within his soul the three corresponding psychological elements. In making this assertion, Plato relies upon the fundamental hypothesis of the Republic, viz. that the individual is a commonwealth writ small. See on II 369 A. γε after ὅτι, though omitted in Ξ, is strictly appropriate, and warns us of a further point— τόδε δὲ ἤδη χαλεπόν 436 A—on which agreement is not so easy.

οἳ δὴ ‐‐ αἰτίαν : ‘that is, among peoples who bear this reputation.’ ταύτην is τοῦ θυμοειδεῖς εἷναι. The phrase αἰτίαν ἔχειν is used both in a good and in a bad sense as the passive of αἰτιῶμαι: for the good sense cf. (with Ast) Gorg. 503 B . What follows is (as Teichmüller observes Lit. Fehd. I p. 146) conceived in the vein of Hippocrates' enquiries as to the influence of climate on character: see his treatise de aere aquis locis 12 ff. ed. Kuehlewein, and cf. also Arist. Physiog. 2. 806^{b} 15, Probl. XIV 8, 15, 16, and especially Pol. H 7. 1327^{b} 23—33 with Susemihl's note. Aristotle for his part represents the Greek nature as the mean between the two extremes of oriental διανοητικόν and τεχνικόν and northern θυμός. There is no good reason for supposing (with Steinhart Einleitung p. 191) that Plato was thinking of the wild races of the North when he instituted his second order of citizens, and of Egyptians etc. when he established his third. On the Phoenician and Egyptian characters cf. Laws 747 C ff.

τὸν ἄνω τόπον : ‘the Northern region,’ not ‘the highland country’ (L. and S.): cf. Arist. Meteor. II 5. 362^{a} 33 τὸν ἄνω πόλον and Hdt. I 142 al.

αἰτιάσαιτο . εἶναι should be understood. For the construction cf. X 599 E.