[434]
From this point of view too, then, the having
1
and doing
434a
of one’s own and what belongs to oneself would admittedly be justice.
That is so.
Consider now
2
whether you agree with me. A carpenter undertaking to do the work of a cobbler or a cobbler of a carpenter or their interchange of one another’s tools or honors or even the attempt of the same man to do both—the confounding of all other functions would not, think you, greatly injure a state, would it?
Not much, he said.
But when I fancy one who is by nature an artisan or some kind of money-maker
434b
tempted and incited by wealth or command of votes or bodily strength or some similar advantage tries to enter into the class of the soldiers or one of the soldiers into the class of counsellors and guardians, for which he is not fitted, and these interchange their tools and their honors or when the same man undertakes all these functions at once, then, I take it, you too believe that this kind of substitution and meddlesomeness is the ruin of a state.
By all means.
The interference with one another’s business, then, of three existent classes and the substitution of the one for the other
434c
is the greatest injury to a state and would most rightly be designated as the thing which chiefly
3
works it harm.
Precisely so.
And the thing that works the greatest harm to one’s own state, will you not pronounce to be injustice?
Of course.
This, then, is injustice.
Again, 4 let us put it in this way. The proper functioning 5 of the money-making class, the helpers and the guardians, each doing its own work in the state, being the reverse of that 6 just described, would be justice and would render the city just. 434d I think the case is thus and no otherwise, said he. Let us not yet affirm it quite fixedly, 7 I said, but if this form 8 when applied to the individual man, accepted there also as a definition of justice, we will then concede the point—for what else will there be to say? But if not, then we will look for something else. But now let us work out the inquiry in which 9 we supposed that, if we found some larger thing that contained justice and viewed it there, 10 we should more easily discover its nature in the individual man. 434e And we agreed that this larger thing is the city, and so we constructed the best city in our power, well knowing that in the good 11 city it would of course be found. What, then, we thought we saw there we must refer back to the individual and, if it is confirmed, all will be well.
Again, 4 let us put it in this way. The proper functioning 5 of the money-making class, the helpers and the guardians, each doing its own work in the state, being the reverse of that 6 just described, would be justice and would render the city just. 434d I think the case is thus and no otherwise, said he. Let us not yet affirm it quite fixedly, 7 I said, but if this form 8 when applied to the individual man, accepted there also as a definition of justice, we will then concede the point—for what else will there be to say? But if not, then we will look for something else. But now let us work out the inquiry in which 9 we supposed that, if we found some larger thing that contained justice and viewed it there, 10 we should more easily discover its nature in the individual man. 434e And we agreed that this larger thing is the city, and so we constructed the best city in our power, well knowing that in the good 11 city it would of course be found. What, then, we thought we saw there we must refer back to the individual and, if it is confirmed, all will be well.
Republic. Plato. Paul Shorey (Translator). Cambridge, MA. 1935-37.
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