Plato, Republic, ed. John Burnet, 4.433

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[433] 433a
ἀλλʼ, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ἄκουε εἴ τι ἄρα λέγω. ὃ γὰρ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐθέμεθα δεῖν ποιεῖν διὰ παντός, ὅτε τὴν πόλιν κατῳκίζομεν, τοῦτό ἐστιν, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, ἤτοι τούτου τι εἶδος ἡ δικαιοσύνη. ἐθέμεθα δὲ δήπου καὶ πολλάκις ἐλέγομεν, εἰ μέμνησαι, ὅτι ἕνα ἕκαστον ἓν δέοι ἐπιτηδεύειν τῶν περὶ τὴν πόλιν, εἰς ὃ αὐτοῦ ἡ φύσις ἐπιτηδειοτάτη πεφυκυῖα εἴη.
ἐλέγομεν γάρ.
καὶ μὴν ὅτι γε τὸ τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττειν καὶ μὴ πολυπραγμονεῖν δικαιοσύνη ἐστί, καὶ τοῦτο ἄλλων τε πολλῶν 433b ἀκηκόαμεν καὶ αὐτοὶ πολλάκις εἰρήκαμεν.
εἰρήκαμεν γάρ.
τοῦτο τοίνυν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ὦ φίλε, κινδυνεύει τρόπον τινὰ γιγνόμενον ἡ δικαιοσύνη εἶναι, τὸ τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττειν. οἶσθα ὅθεν τεκμαίρομαι;
οὐκ, ἀλλὰ λέγʼ, ἔφη.
δοκεῖ μοι, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, τὸ ὑπόλοιπον ἐν τῇ πόλει ὧν ἐσκέμμεθα, σωφροσύνης καὶ ἀνδρείας καὶ φρονήσεως, τοῦτο εἶναι, ὃ πᾶσιν ἐκείνοις τὴν δύναμιν παρέσχεν ὥστε ἐγγενέσθαι, καὶ ἐγγενομένοις γε σωτηρίαν παρέχειν, ἕωσπερ ἂν 433c ἐνῇ. καίτοι ἔφαμεν δικαιοσύνην ἔσεσθαι τὸ ὑπολειφθὲν ἐκείνων, εἰ τὰ τρία εὕροιμεν.
καὶ γὰρ ἀνάγκη, ἔφη.
ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, εἰ δέοι γε κρῖναι τί τὴν πόλιν ἡμῖν τούτων μάλιστα ἀγαθὴν ἀπεργάσεται ἐγγενόμενον, δύσκριτον ἂν εἴη πότερον ἡ ὁμοδοξία τῶν ἀρχόντων τε καὶ ἀρχομένων, ἢ ἡ περὶ δεινῶν τε καὶ μή, ἅττα ἐστί, δόξης ἐννόμου σωτηρία ἐν τοῖς στρατιώταις ἐγγενομένη, ἢ ἡ ἐν 433d τοῖς ἄρχουσι φρόνησίς τε καὶ φυλακὴ ἐνοῦσα, ἢ τοῦτο μάλιστα ἀγαθὴν αὐτὴν ποιεῖ ἐνὸν καὶ ἐν παιδὶ καὶ ἐν γυναικὶ καὶ δούλῳ καὶ ἐλευθέρῳ καὶ δημιουργῷ καὶ ἄρχοντι καὶ ἀρχομένῳ, ὅτι τὸ αὑτοῦ ἕκαστος εἷς ὢν ἔπραττε καὶ οὐκ ἐπολυπραγμόνει.
δύσκριτον, ἔφη· πῶς δʼ οὔ;
ἐνάμιλλον ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικε, πρὸς ἀρετὴν πόλεως τῇ τε σοφίᾳ αὐτῆς καὶ τῇ σωφροσύνῃ καὶ τῇ ἀνδρείᾳ ἡ τοῦ ἕκαστον ἐν αὐτῇ τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττειν δύναμις.
καὶ μάλα, ἔφη.
οὐκοῦν δικαιοσύνην τό γε τούτοις ἐνάμιλλον ἂν εἰς ἀρετὴν 433e πόλεως θείης;
παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.
σκόπει δὴ καὶ τῇδε εἰ οὕτω δόξει· ἆρα τοῖς ἄρχουσιν ἐν τῇ πόλει τὰς δίκας προστάξεις δικάζειν;
τί μήν;
ἦ ἄλλου οὑτινοσοῦν μᾶλλον ἐφιέμενοι δικάσουσιν ἢ τούτου, ὅπως ἂν ἕκαστοι μήτʼ ἔχωσι τἀλλότρια μήτε τῶν αὑτῶν στέρωνται;
οὔκ, ἀλλὰ τούτου.
ὡς δικαίου ὄντος;
ναί.

Republic. Plato. ed. John Burnet. Oxford. 1905.

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Πολιτεία (Greek) (Platonis Opera Tomus IV: Tetralogia VIII. Burnet, John, editor. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1905.)

Translations (1)

Republic Perseus (Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vol. 5-6. Shorey, Paul, translator. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1935-37 (printing).) — 4.433 focus

[433] 433a
Listen then, said I, and learn if there is anything in what I say. For what we laid down in the beginning as a universal requirement when we were founding our city, this I think, or¹ some form of this, is justice. And what we did lay down, and often said, you recall, was that each one man must perform one social service in the state for which his nature is best adapted. Yes, we said that. And again that to do one’s own business and not to be a busybody is justice, 433b is a saying that we have heard from many and have often repeated ourselves.² We have. This, then, I said, my friend, if taken in a certain sense appears to be justice,³ this principle of doing one’s own business. Do you know whence I infer this? No, but tell me, he said. I think that this is the remaining virtue in the state after our consideration of soberness, courage, and intelligence, a quality which made it possible for them all to grow up in the body politic and which when they have sprung up preserves them as long as it is present. And I hardly need to remind you that⁴ 433c we said that justice would be the residue after we had found the other three. That is an unavoidable conclusion, he said. But moreover, said I, if we were required to decide what it is whose indwelling presence will contribute most to making our city good, it would be a difficult decision whether it was the unanimity of rulers and ruled or the conservation in the minds of the soldiers of the convictions produced by law as to what things are or are not to be feared, or the watchful intelligence 433d that resides in the guardians, or whether this is the chief cause of its goodness, the principle embodied in child, woman, slave, free, artisan, ruler, and ruled, that each performed his one task as one man and was not a versatile busybody. Hard to decide indeed, he said. A thing, then, that in its contribution to the excellence of a state vies with and rivals its wisdom, its soberness, its bravery, is this principle of everyone in it doing his own task. It is indeed, he said. And is not justice the name you would have to give⁵ to the principle that rivals these as conducing to 433e the virtue of state? By all means. Consider it in this wise too⁶ if so you will be convinced. Will you not assign the conduct of lawsuits in your state to the rulers? Of course. Will not this be the chief aim of their decisions, that no one shall have what belongs to others⁷ or be deprived of his own? Nothing else but this. On the assumption that this is just? Yes.

Commentary

Commentary on Plato, Republic (Plato. The Republic, Vol 1-2. Adam, James, editor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1902-1903.) focus

ἤτοι . See 1 344 E note

τι εἶδος , like τρόπον τινά in 432 E and 433 B, hints, I think, that Civic Justice is not, after all, the true and original form of Justice. Hence, in 434 D, Plato is careful to warn us that the subject of Justice is not exhausted till individual Justice has been discussed. See on τοιοῦτο in 443 C.

ἐπιτηδειοτάτη . ἐπιτηδειότατα (Herwerden) is not good: cf. II 374 E and supra 430 A. A few MSS omit πεφυκυῖα, not unnaturally; but the reduplication in φύσις—πεφυκυῖα adds to the emphasis. Plato never tires of emphasizing the ‘natural’ features of his city in Books II—IV.

δικαιοσύνη has been questioned by Richards, on the ground that “the inference announced in τοῦτο τοίνυν κτλ. is already stated in καὶ μὴν ὅτι κτλ., which from its form ( καὶ μήν) is yet evidently only a step in the reasoning.” Richards suggests δίκαιον, and Hartman δικαιοσύνης, neatly but needlessly. τοίνυν in B does not express an inference, but is simply ‘well,’ as in II 369 B, III 413 C, IV 436 B and a host of other passages collected by Kugler ( de part. τοι etc. p. 35). Plato first states a popular view, and then proceeds to shew that it is mainly right on grounds presently to be stated (whence οἷσθ’ ὅθεν τεκμαίρομαι;). No stress should be laid on the fact that δικαιοσύνη is in one case the predicate, and in the other the subject: complete identity is predicated in both cases, as the abstract δικαιοσύνη shews. It might be different if we read δίκαιον, but for this there is no occasion. There is still however a difficulty in δικαιοσύνη: see next note.

εἰρήκαμεν γάρ . This has not been said in the Republic, nor (so far as I know) in any of Plato's earlier dialogues (if we except Alc. I 127 C), so that εἰρήκαμεν refers to ordinary conversation. Such a view has affinities with the legal view of Justice as the virtue which respects the rights of others (cf. 433 E and I 331 A ff.), and is natural enough, especially with the loose connotation which δικαιοσύνη had in popular language. It is however curious that in Charm. 161 B ff. precisely the same account is given of Temperance: ἄρτι γὰρ ἀνεμνήσθην ὂ ἤδη του ἤκουσα λέγοντος, ὅτι σωφροσύνη ἂν εἴη τὸ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν: cf. Tim. 72 A εὖ καὶ πάλαι λέγεται τὸ πράττειν καὶ γνῶναι τά τε αὑτοῦ καὶ ἑαυτὸν σώφρονι μόνῳ προσήκειν. In its popular connotation, σωφροσύνη was not always distinguished from δικαιοσύνη, and even the philosophers (as Strabo VII 3. 4 observes) sometimes used the words in nearly an identical sense. See Nägelsbach Nachhom. Theol. p. 238. Steinhart and others find in the difference between this passage and the Charmides l.c. an indication of the Socratic and Platonic doctrine of the unity of Virtue. No doubt there is a certain sense in which virtue is one (see below on 434 C), but we must insist that the specific virtues are represented by Plato in the Republic as distinct; on any other hypothesis, the perfect City falls to pieces. Perhaps δικαιοσύνη after πολυπραγμονεῖν is an error for σωφροσύνη, and Plato is here deliberately correcting the popular view. If so, καὶ μὴν—γε means ‘and yet,’ i.e. in spite of what we now say that Justice is εἷς ἓν κατὰ φύσιν, ‘we and others have also said that Temperance is τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττειν.’ Adimantus assents. ‘Well,’ continues Socrates, ‘it is apparently (not Temperance, but) Justice which is τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττειν.’ This view gives a much better sense to καί in καὶ τοῦτο, and ἡ δικαιοσύνη receives the proper emphasis.

δοκεῖ ‐‐ εὕροιμεν . Things which are equal to the same thing are equal to one another. Now (1) the Virtue which enables the others to take root, and (2) Justice, each= τὸ ὑπόλοιπον. Therefore Justice enables the other Virtues to take root. τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττειν. Consequently Justice is τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττειν.> Plato seldom leaves so much to be mentally supplied in his reasoning.

παρέχει . See cr. n. Former editors (except Ast) retain παρέχειν and explain it as depending directly on δοκεῖ. If this is right, καί before ἐγγενομένοις joins τοῦτο εἶναι and παρέχειν; but καὶ ἐγγενομένοις γε, following immediately on ἐγγενέσθαι, naturally suggests that παρέχειν and ἐγγενέσθαι are coordinate and both under the government of ὥστε. That this was felt in antiquity is proved by the variant ἐγγενόμενα for ἐγγενομένοις, preserved in Stobaeus ( Flor. 43. 98) and in Ξ. The author of the reading ἐγγενόμενα must have understood Plato to mean ‘which enabled them all to make their appearance in the city, and having done so, to keep it safe, so long as they are there,’ and this, I think, is the natural meaning of Plato's words, if παρέχειν is retained. But the sentiment is compara tively weak; and consequently Ast and Hartman wish to cancel παρέχειν, making σωτηρίαν depend upon παρέσχεν; but a present tense is necessary. παρέχει seems to me what Plato wrote, ‘aye, and after they have appeared it preserves them, so long as it is present in the city.’ A relative clause often passes into an independent sentence (see on II 357 B); and the idiom is appropriate here because it responds to the emphatic καὶ—γέ. For καὶ—γε cf. 425 B note

δούλῳ ‐‐ ἀρχομένῳ . On δούλῳ see V 469 C note Richards would insert καὶ γεωργῷ after δημιουργῷ, pointing out that the other words go in pairs; but the difference between δημιουργῷ and γεωργῷ is insignificant, since both artisan and farmer belong to the same class in the city.

εἷς ὤν . Most of Stobaeus' MSS ( Flor. l.c.) read εἷς ὢν ἕν. ἕν is unnecessary with καὶ οὐκ ἐπολυπραγμόνει following (Schneider).

σκόπει κτλ. This τεκμήριον turns on the judicial sense of δικαιοσύνη: cf. I 331 E ff. The judicial functions of the rulers follow naturally from 428 D, where it is said that σοφία βουλεύεται—ὅντιν’ ἂν τρόπον αὐτή τε (sc. ἡ πόλις) πρὸς αὑτὴν—ἄριστα ὁμιλοῖ κτλ. It is clear that no class except the rulers can be judges in the State, and judges are necessary: see III 408 D ff.

ἑαυτοῦ κτλ. ἑαυτοῦ is a possessive genitive depending on τοῦ. It should be noted that although ἕξις τοῦ οἰκείου is not the same thing as πρᾶξις τοῦ οἰκείου, the latter involves the former. Plato is looking for a point of contact between his own view of Justice and the popular judicial meaning of the word, and finds it in ἕξις τοῦ οἰκείου. Krohn ( Pl. St. p. 49) appears to me to attach too much weight to ἕξις τοῦ οἰκείου when he calls it a new “Begriffselement,” and complains that it is “weder sachlich erläutert, noch logisch streng abgeleitet.” Cf. 442 E. It should be mentioned that the poet Gray (with less than his usual critical acumen) conjectured τοῦ <ποιεῖν> τὸ οἰκεῖόν τε καὶ <τὸ> ἑαυτοῦ, comparing οἰκειοπραγία in 434 C.

Plato Republic 4.433

ed. John Burnet

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