Plato Republic 4.428

ὥσπερ τοίνυν ‐‐ αὐτῶν . For the logically superfluous (though welcome) αὐτῶν cf. II 375 E, infra 439 B, VIII 558 A, and Heindorf on Gorg. 482 D . Theaet. 155 E is a much harsher example, and has often been emended. The apodosis to the ὥσπερ clause is contained in οὐκοῦν— ζητητέον.

οὐκ ἄλλο ἔτι ἦν . On ἔτι (i.e. “after the other three were found” J. and C.) see III 412 B note

αὐτῷ . A corrector in q wrote αὐτῇ, which Schleiermacher preferred. Hartman suggests αὐτοῖς. αὐτῷ is, however, not the city, but simply ‘the matter,’ ‘the subject under discussion’; an idiomatic usage for which cf. I 339 E note For the neuter κατάδηλον cf. 427 D note Hartman's κατάδηλος is unnecessary.

σοφία as here described means φρόνησις—so it is called in 433 B, C— in its application to politics, not metaphysical knowledge of the Idea of Good. It deliberates for the good of the whole city (428 D), but the good is not yet elevated to the rank of an Idea. This point has been rightly emphasized by Krohn ( Pl. St. pp. 40, 362), who points out the essentially Socratic character of this virtue, comparing Xen. Mem. I 2. 64 and IV 1. 2 (a sentiment of which Books II—IV of the Republic are an amplification and exposition in detail). See also Prot. 352 B and Laws III 689 B. Commentators before Krohn (Steinhart for example Einleit. p. 185, and Susemihl Gen. Entw. II p. 153) did not sufficiently grasp the almost exclusively political character of σοφία here, although it is expressly dwelt upon by Plato throughout, and particularly in 429 A. I say ‘almost,’ because here, as elsewhere, Plato, as his manner is, contrives to drop some hints preparing us for a still higher conception of the virtue of the guardians. See on 429 C and 442 C.

ἄτοπον : because it is its smallest section which makes the whole city wise (428 E).

εὔβουλος . εὐβουλία was primarily a political virtue: see on I 348 D.

βουλευομένην . Heindorf's emendation (see cr. n.), which is accepted by Ast, Stallbaum, Baiter and Hartman, appears to me certain for these reasons. First, in τὴν ὑπὲρ τῶν ἐκ τοῦ χαλκοῦ ἤ τινα ἄλλην τῶν τοιούτων below we must understand ἐπιστήμην βουλευομένην, so that βουλευομένην and not βουλευομένη must have been written before. Secondly, if we read βουλευομένη, we must write (with Hermann etc. and a few inferior MSS) ᾗ for ἥ before οὐχ ὑπὲρ τῶν below. Schneider retains βουλευομένη, but understands βουλευομένην before ἐπιστήμην— an indefensible construction, which Laws 807 C (to which he appeals in Addit. p. 31) in no way justifies.

τὴν ὑπὲρ ‐‐ τοιούτων . For the carrying on of the preposition (here διά) cf. (with Schneider) Phaed. 64 D ἐσπουδακέναι περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς καλουμένας τὰς τοιάσδε, οἷον σιτίων κτλ. Ἥκιστά γε κτλ. Τί δέ; τὰς τῶν ἀφροδισίων;

ὅντιν) ἂν ‐‐ ὁμιλοῖ. ἄν cannot, I think, be dispensed with here. It is better to insert it after ὅντινα than (with Baiter) after ἄριστα, for (as Schneider shews by many examples) ἄν likes to attach itself to the relative in sentences of this kind. The political wisdom here described is akin to the βασιλικὴ τέχνη of Euthyd. 291 C ff. and elsewhere, as well as to Aristotle's view of πολιτική as the architectonic art ( Eth. Nic. I 1. 1094^{b} 27 with Stewart's note). It knows what is good and evil, and legislates for the other arts, but the good which it knows is a political and moral conception, not (as yet) the metaphysical Idea of Book VI.

νῦν δή . III 414 B ( φύλακας παντελεῖς).

τί τὴν πόλιν προσαγορεύεις . It should be noted that ‘wise’ (to confine ourselves for the present to the virtue of wisdom) is used (1) of the rulers in the State and the λογιστικόν in man, (2) of the city and the individual as wholes: cf. 441 D ff. Which of these two meanings is intended to be original and primary? This subject is admirably discussed by Hirzel Hermes VIII pp. 379 ff., who shews that the wisdom of the rulers and the λογιστικόν is the fundamental one: cf. Arist. Top. V 8. 138^{b} 1 ff., where τὸ πρῶτον φρόνιμον is said to be ἴδιον λογιστικοῦ. The same, mutatis mutandis, holds good of Courage; and also, though with a difference, of Temperance and Justice. In calling the whole city wise because the rulers are wise, Plato is influenced by its analogy with the individual man, whom we readily and easily call wise, although strictly speaking he is wise only by reason of the λογιστικόν within him. Comparing 443 C ff., we observe that the city is wise because its rulers are wise, and its rulers are wise because their λογιστικόν is wise. In other words the wisdom of the λογιστικόν is the unit out of which the wisdom of the whole city is constructed. See on 443 B ff.

πότερον οὖν . See cr. n. We have still to explain τι ἄτοπον in 428 B, for Adimantus' τί has not yet been answered. For this reason οὖν after πότερον is welcome, if not (as Schneider thinks) indispensable.

πολὺ ‐‐ χαλκέας . Cf. II 379 C note

ὅλη σοφὴ κτλ. The subject is πόλις κατὰ φύσιν οἰκισθεῖσα, ‘a city founded in accordance with Nature.’ On κατὰ φύσιν see II 370 A note