οὔτ) ‐‐ ᾤμην ἄν
: ‘I should not have thought so’ were it not for these great authorities. Jowett misses the irony by neglecting the tense (‘I conceive that the true legislator will not trouble himself,’ etc.).
τὸν ἀληθινὸν νομοθέτην and
κἂν ὁστισοῦν εὕροι would strike home, if Isocrates is meant.
ἀνωφελῆ ‐‐ ἐπιτηδευμάτων
. For
ἀνωφελῆ Ξ has
ἀνωφελές, an obvious ‘correction.’ The plural, as Schneider observes, is supported by
τὰ μὲν αὐτῶν (where
αὐτῶν is also neuter).
ὅτι after
τὰ δέ has been called in question by Stallbaum and Hartman. Taken strictly, it must depend on a verbal notion supplied out of
πραγματεύεσθαι (Stallbaum) or
κἂν ὁστισοῦν εὕροι; but in a halfadverbial phrase like
τὰ δέ, we should not pry too closely into the grammatical construction. The effect is exactly like the English ‘because some of them, etc., in other cases, because,’ etc.
τί οὖν κτλ.
With this section of the
Republic we should compare V 461 E, 469 A, VII 540 C, and
Laws 738 B ff. Plato would fain be no iconoclast: his object is to purify, rather than to abolish, the old religion. He tries, in short, to put new wine into old bottles. In particular, when he makes Apollo preside at the foundation of his city (
οἰκίζοντές τε πόλιν οὐδενὶ ἄλλῳ πεισόμεθα), he is acting in accordance with the universal custom of the Greeks, who consulted the oracle at Delphi before planting colonies, and revered him as the universal
ἀρχηγέτης and
οἰκιστής (Preller
Gr. Myth. p. 269). It is equally in harmony with Hellenic, and especially Athenian, usage to refer all matters of public worship to Apollo: see on 427 C. Delphi was the abiding centre of Greek religious and political unity; and it is therefore right that a Greek city (V 470 E), one of whose objects is to promote unity and comity among Greeks (ib. 469 B ff.), should attach itself to Apollo.
τῷ μέντοι Ἀπόλλωνι κτλ.
Cf.
Mem. I 3. 1 (of Socrates)
φανερὸς ἦν καὶ ποιῶν καὶ λέγων, ᾗπερ ἡ Πυθία ἀποκρίνεται τοῖς ἐρωτῶσι, πῶς δεῖ ποιεῖν ἢ περὶ θυσίας ἢ περὶ προγόνων θεραπείας ἢ περὶ ἄλλου τινὸς τῶν τοιούτων. The answer of the priestess was ‘Serve the gods
νόμῳ πόλεως’ (l.c. and IV 3. 16). The spirit in which we worship matters, rather than whom or how we worship. So large and tolerant a sentiment is worthy of the Delphic priesthood and of Plato.
τελευτησάντων τε
. See cr. n. Asyndeton is indefensible here. We must either with all the editors (except J. and C.) read
τε, or add
καί after
θεραπεῖαι.
ἐξηγητῇ ‐‐ πατρίῳ
. πατρῴῳ instead of
πατρίῳ is called for by Ast on slight MS authority.
Ἀπόλλων was ancestor of the Ionians, being father of Ion (
Euthyd. 302 D
), and was worshipped by them as
Ἀπόλλων πατρῷος (Preller
Gr. Myth. p. 272). But (as Schneider observes) “Socrates hic non magis quam alibi in his libris tanquam Atheniensis loquitur, sed tanquam Graecus. Graecis autem omnibus
πάτριος, hoc est, a maioribus traditus harum rerum arbiter et interpres erat Delphicus Apollo.” An allusion to the special connexion of Ionians with Apollo would be out of place, particularly as
πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις follows. In Athens the
ἐξηγηταί formed a college of three members, charged with religious duties. According to Schöll (in
Hermes VI pp. 36 ff.) the members were partly chosen by Apollo in his capacity of
πάτριος ἐξηγητής; apparently the Athenians chose nine, out of whom three were selected—one from each triad —by the representatives of the god: whence their designation
πυθόχρηστοι. It is on this model that Plato perhaps frames his regulations in
Laws 759 D.
πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις
. Delphi is then a religious centre, not for Greeks only, but for all mankind. It was certainly the nearest approach to such a centre that antiquity provided, for it commanded the homage of barbarians as well as Greeks. See Middleton
Journ. of Hell. Studies IX p. 308. Middleton cites Livy XXXVIII 48. 2 “commune humani generis oraculum,” Cicero
pro Font. 30 “oraculum orbis terrae,” and gives examples of the offerings paid by foreigners at Apollo's shrine. Even now, perhaps, Plato would deny that the oracle is dumb, though—true to its own principle of worshipping
νόμῳ πόλεως—it speaks through other voices, and of other gods. See also on V 470 C.
ἐν μέσῳ ‐‐ ἐξηγεῖται
. Cf.
Eur.
Ion 5
, 6
ὀμφαλὸν |
μέσον καθίζων Φοῖβος ὑμνῳδεῖ βροτοῖς. The
ὀμφαλός was “a conical mass of ‘white marble or stone’” (Paus. X 16) in the sanctuary of Apollo at Delphi, “said to mark the centre of the earth.” Two gold eagles stood at its sides, representing the eagles which, according to the legend, met there, having been despatched simultaneously by Zeus from the extreme East and West of the world (Strabo IX 3. 6). The
ὀμφαλός is frequently represented as the seat of Apollo (
ἐπὶ τοῦ ὀμφαλοῦ καθήμενος), “especially upon coins, when he is represented in the character of the giver of oracles”: see for example ImhoofBlumner and P. Gardner in
J. H. S. VIII p. 18, and Plate LXXIV vii. Middleton, on whose article “The Temple of Apollo at Delphi” (cited above) this note is chiefly based, thinks “the word
ὀμφαλός was probably derived from
ὀμφή, a voice, because the divine voice was heard there.” If this is true, the legends associating the shrine with the ‘navel’ or centre of the earth may be due to popular etymology.
ὀμφαλός, ‘navel,’ is an Indo-Germanic word (Brugmann
Grundriss II p. 187). Herwerden's excision of the words
ἐν μέσῳ betrays ignorance of what the
ὀμφαλός really was. See also Frazer on Paus. l.c.
αὐτός τε καὶ ‐‐ παρακάλει
. For the idiom cf. (with Schneider)
Phaedr. 253 B
μιμούμενοι αὐτοί τε καὶ τὰ παιδικὰ πείθοντες.
ποῦ ἡ ἀδικία
. If our city is
τελέως ἀγαθή (427 E), it is useless to look for
ἀδικία in it. On this difficulty see II 369 A note
πότερον
. Herwerden's
ποτέραν is quite unnecessary, as Hartman shews; cf. 428 A, 433 D, 434 C, 445 B, V 449 D.
ἐάν τε λανθάνῃ κτλ.
recalls II 367 E.
ὡς οὐχ ὅσιον ‐‐ τρόρῳ
: II 368 B, C.
σοφή ‐‐ δικαία
. This is apparently the earliest passage in Greek literature where the doctrine of four cardinal virtues (if by cardinal virtues we mean those which make up the sum of perfect goodness) is expressly enunciated. The doctrine may of course be Pythagorean, but evidence is wanting, and it is doubtful whether Pindar's
τέσσαρες ἀρεταί
Nem. III 74 are to be interpreted as the cardinal virtues: see Bury ad loc. The nearest approach to the doctrine before Plato is in
Xen.
Mem. III 9. 1
—5 (as Krohn has pointed out
Pl. St. p. 372), with which compare IV 6. 1—12, where Justice, Wisdom, and Courage are named, as well as other virtues, including
εὐσέβεια. Cf. also
Aesch.
Sept. 610
σώφρων δίκαιος ἀγαθὸς εὐσεβὴς ἀνήρ. From other passages in Plato, none of which are so precise and technical as this, it would seem that
ὁσιότης made a good fight for a fifth place:
Prot. 329 C
,
Lach. 199 D
,
Men. 78 D
,
Gorg. 507 B
. In
Phaed. 69 C
and
Laws 631 C
σωφροσύνη, δικαιοσύνη, ἀνδρεία and
φρόνησις (not
σοφία) are named together, without
ὁσιότης, which in the
Euthyphro (12 D ff.) is a subdivision of
δικαιοσύνη. From Adimantus' ready assent (cf. V 476 A note), we may reasonably infer that the doctrine of four cardinal virtues was already a familiar tenet of the Platonic school. Schleiermacher thinks it may have been taken over “aus dem allgemeinen Gebrauch” (
Einleitung p. 26). There is however no evidence to shew that these four virtues
and no others were regarded as the essential elements of a perfect character before Plato. If the theory was originated by Plato himself, it is possible enough that in restricting the number to four, Plato was not uninfluenced by the sacred character of the number four in Pythagoreanism, just as Aristotle has been supposed to have limited his categories to ten on similar grounds. An interesting conjecture is suggested by the remarks of Schleiermacher (l.c. p. 21). Our city is
ex hypothesi perfectly virtuous. Its constituent elements are Rulers, Auxiliaries, Farmers and Artisans. Now the virtues which are exhibited in the lives and mutual relationship of these classes are, as Plato holds, Wisdom, Courage, Temperance, and Justice. Consequently these virtues are the component factors of moral perfection; in other words they are the cardinal virtues. We may admit that there is no
petitio principii in such a method of investigation, which is, in fact, akin to the perfectly legitimate method described in
Men. 86 E
: cf. also V 458 A. If this suggestion is correct, the doctrine of four cardinal virtues will be directly descended from the arrangements of Plato's ideal city. But it is clear from what Plato himself says, both here and in 429 A, 430 D, 432 B, 433 B f., that the doctrine is already an accepted part of his ethical system, and not merely a provisional hypothesis which is intended to be confirmed by what follows. For the relative value and importance of the four cardinal virtues in Plato's way of thinking see
Laws 630 D ff.
οὐκοῦν ‐‐ ηὑρημένον
. Essentially the same method is used by Aristotle to reach his conclusion that virtue is a
ἕξις (
Eth. Nic. II 4). Cf. also (with J. and C.)
Lys. 216 D
, E. Jowett observes that the true function of “this half-logical, halfmathematical method of residues” is in dealing with “abstract quantity” and “the laws of Nature.” It is undeniable that this method is much more likely to lead us astray in ethics than in mathematics or the natural sciences, owing to the nature of the subject; but it is valid if our analysis of the phenomena is exhaustive and exact. A similar method was frequently employed in the Eleatic school: see II 380 D note Plato not unfrequently extends the methods of mathematical reasoning beyond what we should consider their proper sphere: the whole of the preliminary studies, for example, in Book VII are to be pursued according to the methods of pure mathematics. See on VII 528 E ff. and the Appendix to Book VII “On the propaedeutic studies of the
Republic.”
