Plato, Republic, Paul Shorey (Translator), 4.428

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[428] 428a Surely. Take the case of any four other things. If we were looking for any one of them in anything and recognized the object of our search first, that would have been enough for us, but if we had recognized the other three first, that in itself would have made known to us the thing we were seeking. For plainly there was nothing left for it to be but the remainder. Right, he said. And so, since these are four, we must conduct the search in the same way. Clearly. And, moreover, 428b the first thing that I think I clearly see therein is the wisdom,¹ and there is something odd about that, it appears. What? said he. Wise in very deed I think the city that we have described is, for it is well counselled, is it not? Yes. And surely this very thing, good counsel,² is a form of wisdom. For it is not by ignorance but by knowledge that men counsel well. Obviously. But there are many and manifold knowledges or sciences in the city. Of course. Is it then owing to the science of her carpenters that 428c a city is to be called wise and well advised? By no means for that, but rather mistress of the arts of building. Then a city is not to be styled wise because of the deliberations³ of the science of wooden utensils for their best production? No, I grant you. Is it, then, because of that of brass implements or any other of that kind? None whatsoever, he said. Nor yet because of the science of the production of crops from the soil, but the name it takes from that is agricultural. I think so. Then, said I, is there any science in the city just founded by us residing in any of its citizens which does not take counsel about some particular thing 428d in the city but about the city as a whole and the betterment of its relations with itself⁴ and other states? Why, there is. What is it, said I, and in whom is it found? It is the science of guardianship or government and it is to be found in those rulers to whom we just now gave the name of guardians in the full sense of the word. And what term then do you apply to the city because of this knowledge? Well advised, he said, and truly wise. Which class, then, said I, 428e do you suppose will be the more numerous in our city, the smiths or these true guardians? The smiths, by far, he said. And would not these rulers be the smallest of all the groups of those who possess special knowledge and receive distinctive appellations⁵? By far.

Republic. Plato. Paul Shorey (Translator). Cambridge, MA. 1935-37.

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Current edition Perseus

Republic (English) (Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vol. 5-6. Shorey, Paul, translator. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1935-37 (printing).)

Editions (1)

Πολιτεία Perseus (Platonis Opera Tomus IV: Tetralogia VIII. Burnet, John, editor. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1905.) — 4.428 focus

[428] 428a
τί μήν;
ὥσπερ τοίνυν ἄλλων τινῶν τεττάρων, εἰ ἕν τι ἐζητοῦμεν αὐτῶν ἐν ὁτῳοῦν, ὁπότε πρῶτον ἐκεῖνο ἔγνωμεν, ἱκανῶς ἂν εἶχεν ἡμῖν, εἰ δὲ τὰ τρία πρότερον ἐγνωρίσαμεν, αὐτῷ ἂν τούτῳ ἐγνώριστο τὸ ζητούμενον· δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι οὐκ ἄλλο ἔτι ἦν ἢ τὸ ὑπολειφθέν.
ὀρθῶς, ἔφη, λέγεις.
οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ τούτων, ἐπειδὴ τέτταρα ὄντα τυγχάνει, ὡσαύτως ζητητέον;
δῆλα δή.
καὶ μὲν δὴ πρῶτόν γέ μοι δοκεῖ ἐν αὐτῷ κατάδηλον εἶναι 428b ἡ σοφία· καί τι ἄτοπον περὶ αὐτὴν φαίνεται.
τί; ἦ δʼ ὅς.
σοφὴ μὲν τῷ ὄντι δοκεῖ μοι ἡ πόλις εἶναι ἣν διήλθομεν· εὔβουλος γάρ, οὐχί;
ναί.
καὶ μὴν τοῦτό γε αὐτό, ἡ εὐβουλία, δῆλον ὅτι ἐπιστήμη τίς ἐστιν· οὐ γάρ που ἀμαθίᾳ γε ἀλλʼ ἐπιστήμῃ εὖ βουλεύονται.
δῆλον.
πολλαὶ δέ γε καὶ παντοδαπαὶ ἐπιστῆμαι ἐν τῇ πόλει εἰσίν.
πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
ἆρʼ οὖν διὰ τὴν τῶν τεκτόνων ἐπιστήμην σοφὴ καὶ εὔβουλος ἡ πόλις προσρητέα; 428c
οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη, διά γε ταύτην, ἀλλὰ τεκτονική.
οὐκ ἄρα διὰ τὴν ὑπὲρ τῶν ξυλίνων σκευῶν ἐπιστήμην, βουλευομένη ὡς ἂν ἔχοι βέλτιστα, σοφὴ κλητέα πόλις.
οὐ μέντοι.
τί δέ; τὴν ὑπὲρ τῶν ἐκ τοῦ χαλκοῦ ἤ τινα ἄλλην τῶν τοιούτων;
οὐδʼ ἡντινοῦν, ἔφη.
οὐδὲ τὴν ὑπὲρ τοῦ καρποῦ τῆς γενέσεως ἐκ τῆς γῆς, ἀλλὰ γεωργική.
δοκεῖ μοι.
τί δʼ; ἦν δʼ ἐγώ· ἔστι τις ἐπιστήμη ἐν τῇ ἄρτι ὑφʼ ἡμῶν οἰκισθείσῃ παρά τισι τῶν πολιτῶν, ᾗ οὐχ ὑπὲρ τῶν 428d ἐν τῇ πόλει τινὸς βουλεύεται, ἀλλʼ ὑπὲρ αὑτῆς ὅλης, ὅντινα τρόπον αὐτή τε πρὸς αὑτὴν καὶ πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας πόλεις ἄριστα ὁμιλοῖ;
ἔστι μέντοι.
τίς, ἔφην ἐγώ, καὶ ἐν τίσιν;
αὕτη, ἦ δʼ ὅς, ἡ φυλακική, καὶ ἐν τούτοις τοῖς ἄρχουσιν οὓς νυνδὴ τελέους φύλακας ὠνομάζομεν.
διὰ ταύτην οὖν τὴν ἐπιστήμην τί τὴν πόλιν προσαγορεύεις;
εὔβουλον, ἔφη, καὶ τῷ ὄντι σοφήν.
πότερον οὖν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ἐν τῇ πόλει οἴει ἡμῖν χαλκέας 428e πλείους ἐνέσεσθαι ἢ τοὺς ἀληθινοὺς φύλακας τούτους;
πολύ, ἔφη, χαλκέας.
οὐκοῦν, ἔφην, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσοι ἐπιστήμας ἔχοντες ὀνομάζονταί τινες εἶναι, πάντων τούτων οὗτοι ἂν εἶεν ὀλίγιστοι;
πολύ γε.

Notes on the current edition

Republic

1. σοφία is wisdom par excellence. Aristotle, Met. i., traces the history of the idea from Homer to its identification in Aristotle’s mind with first philosophy for metaphysics. For Plato, the moralist, it is virtue and the fear of the Lord; for his political theory it is the political or royal art which the dramatic dialogues fail to distinguish from the special sciences and arts. Cf. Unity of Plato’s Thought, p. 17, n. 97, Protagoras 319 A, Euthydemus 282 E, 291 C, Gorgias 501 A-B, etc. In the unreformed Greek state its counterfeit counterpart is the art of the politician. In the Republic its reality will be found in the selected guardians who are to receive the higher education, and who alone will apprehend the idea of the good, which is not mentioned here simply because Plato, not Krohn, is writing the Republic.

2. Protagoras, like Isocrates, professed to teach εὐβουλία ( Protagoras 318 E), which Socrates identifies at once with the political art. Plato would accept Protagoras’s discrimination of this for the special arts ( ibid. 318 ff.), but he does not believe that such as Protagoras can teach it. His political art is a very different thing from Protagoras’s εὐβουλία and is apprehended by a very different education from that offered by Protagoras. Cf. Plato’s Laws and the Unity of Plato’s Thought, p. 348, n. 5, Euthydemus 291 B-C, Charmides 170 B, Protagoras 319 A, Gorgias 501 A-B, 503 D, Politicus 289 C, 293 D, 309 C.

3. βουλευομένη: Heindorf’s βουλευομένην is perhaps supported by ᾗ . . . βουλεύεται below, but in view of Plato’s colloquial anacloluthic style is unnecessary.

4. Cf. on 416 C.

5. Cf. Protagoras 311 E

τί ὄνομα ἄλλο γε λεγόμενον περὶ Πρωταγόρου ἀκούομεν; ὥσπερ περὶ Φειδίου ἀγαλματοποιὸν καὶ περὶ Ὁμήρου ποιητήν

Commentary

Commentary on Plato, Republic (Plato. The Republic, Vol 1-2. Adam, James, editor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1902-1903.) focus

ὥσπερ τοίνυν ‐‐ αὐτῶν . For the logically superfluous (though welcome) αὐτῶν cf. II 375 E, infra 439 B, VIII 558 A, and Heindorf on Gorg. 482 D . Theaet. 155 E is a much harsher example, and has often been emended. The apodosis to the ὥσπερ clause is contained in οὐκοῦν— ζητητέον.

οὐκ ἄλλο ἔτι ἦν . On ἔτι (i.e. “after the other three were found” J. and C.) see III 412 B note

αὐτῷ . A corrector in q wrote αὐτῇ, which Schleiermacher preferred. Hartman suggests αὐτοῖς. αὐτῷ is, however, not the city, but simply ‘the matter,’ ‘the subject under discussion’; an idiomatic usage for which cf. I 339 E note For the neuter κατάδηλον cf. 427 D note Hartman's κατάδηλος is unnecessary.

σοφία as here described means φρόνησις—so it is called in 433 B, C— in its application to politics, not metaphysical knowledge of the Idea of Good. It deliberates for the good of the whole city (428 D), but the good is not yet elevated to the rank of an Idea. This point has been rightly emphasized by Krohn ( Pl. St. pp. 40, 362), who points out the essentially Socratic character of this virtue, comparing Xen. Mem. I 2. 64 and IV 1. 2 (a sentiment of which Books II—IV of the Republic are an amplification and exposition in detail). See also Prot. 352 B and Laws III 689 B. Commentators before Krohn (Steinhart for example Einleit. p. 185, and Susemihl Gen. Entw. II p. 153) did not sufficiently grasp the almost exclusively political character of σοφία here, although it is expressly dwelt upon by Plato throughout, and particularly in 429 A. I say ‘almost,’ because here, as elsewhere, Plato, as his manner is, contrives to drop some hints preparing us for a still higher conception of the virtue of the guardians. See on 429 C and 442 C.

ἄτοπον : because it is its smallest section which makes the whole city wise (428 E).

εὔβουλος . εὐβουλία was primarily a political virtue: see on I 348 D.

βουλευομένην . Heindorf's emendation (see cr. n.), which is accepted by Ast, Stallbaum, Baiter and Hartman, appears to me certain for these reasons. First, in τὴν ὑπὲρ τῶν ἐκ τοῦ χαλκοῦ ἤ τινα ἄλλην τῶν τοιούτων below we must understand ἐπιστήμην βουλευομένην, so that βουλευομένην and not βουλευομένη must have been written before. Secondly, if we read βουλευομένη, we must write (with Hermann etc. and a few inferior MSS) ᾗ for ἥ before οὐχ ὑπὲρ τῶν below. Schneider retains βουλευομένη, but understands βουλευομένην before ἐπιστήμην— an indefensible construction, which Laws 807 C (to which he appeals in Addit. p. 31) in no way justifies.

τὴν ὑπὲρ ‐‐ τοιούτων . For the carrying on of the preposition (here διά) cf. (with Schneider) Phaed. 64 D ἐσπουδακέναι περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς καλουμένας τὰς τοιάσδε, οἷον σιτίων κτλ. Ἥκιστά γε κτλ. Τί δέ; τὰς τῶν ἀφροδισίων;

ὅντιν) ἂν ‐‐ ὁμιλοῖ. ἄν cannot, I think, be dispensed with here. It is better to insert it after ὅντινα than (with Baiter) after ἄριστα, for (as Schneider shews by many examples) ἄν likes to attach itself to the relative in sentences of this kind. The political wisdom here described is akin to the βασιλικὴ τέχνη of Euthyd. 291 C ff. and elsewhere, as well as to Aristotle's view of πολιτική as the architectonic art ( Eth. Nic. I 1. 1094^{b} 27 with Stewart's note). It knows what is good and evil, and legislates for the other arts, but the good which it knows is a political and moral conception, not (as yet) the metaphysical Idea of Book VI.

νῦν δή . III 414 B ( φύλακας παντελεῖς).

τί τὴν πόλιν προσαγορεύεις . It should be noted that ‘wise’ (to confine ourselves for the present to the virtue of wisdom) is used (1) of the rulers in the State and the λογιστικόν in man, (2) of the city and the individual as wholes: cf. 441 D ff. Which of these two meanings is intended to be original and primary? This subject is admirably discussed by Hirzel Hermes VIII pp. 379 ff., who shews that the wisdom of the rulers and the λογιστικόν is the fundamental one: cf. Arist. Top. V 8. 138^{b} 1 ff., where τὸ πρῶτον φρόνιμον is said to be ἴδιον λογιστικοῦ. The same, mutatis mutandis, holds good of Courage; and also, though with a difference, of Temperance and Justice. In calling the whole city wise because the rulers are wise, Plato is influenced by its analogy with the individual man, whom we readily and easily call wise, although strictly speaking he is wise only by reason of the λογιστικόν within him. Comparing 443 C ff., we observe that the city is wise because its rulers are wise, and its rulers are wise because their λογιστικόν is wise. In other words the wisdom of the λογιστικόν is the unit out of which the wisdom of the whole city is constructed. See on 443 B ff.

πότερον οὖν . See cr. n. We have still to explain τι ἄτοπον in 428 B, for Adimantus' τί has not yet been answered. For this reason οὖν after πότερον is welcome, if not (as Schneider thinks) indispensable.

πολὺ ‐‐ χαλκέας . Cf. II 379 C note

ὅλη σοφὴ κτλ. The subject is πόλις κατὰ φύσιν οἰκισθεῖσα, ‘a city founded in accordance with Nature.’ On κατὰ φύσιν see II 370 A note

Plato Republic 4.428

Paul Shorey (Translator)

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