Plato, Republic, ed. John Burnet, 1.339

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[339] τοῦτʼ οὖν ἐστιν, ὦ βέλτιστε, ὃ λέγω ἐν ἁπάσαις 339a ταῖς πόλεσιν ταὐτὸν εἶναι δίκαιον, τὸ τῆς καθεστηκυίας ἀρχῆς συμφέρον· αὕτη δέ που κρατεῖ, ὥστε συμβαίνει τῷ ὀρθῶς λογιζομένῳ πανταχοῦ εἶναι τὸ αὐτὸ δίκαιον, τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος συμφέρον.
νῦν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ἔμαθον ὃ λέγεις· εἰ δὲ ἀληθὲς ἢ μή, πειράσομαι μαθεῖν. τὸ συμφέρον μὲν οὖν, ὦ Θρασύμαχε, καὶ σὺ ἀπεκρίνω δίκαιον εἶναι—καίτοι ἔμοιγε ἀπηγόρευες ὅπως μὴ τοῦτο ἀποκρινοίμην—πρόσεστιν δὲ δὴ αὐτόθι τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος. 339b
σμικρά γε ἴσως, ἔφη, προσθήκη.
οὔπω δῆλον οὐδʼ εἰ μεγάλη· ἀλλʼ ὅτι μὲν τοῦτο σκεπτέον εἰ ἀληθῆ λέγεις, δῆλον. ἐπειδὴ γὰρ συμφέρον γέ τι εἶναι καὶ ἐγὼ ὁμολογῶ τὸ δίκαιον, σὺ δὲ προστιθεῖς καὶ αὐτὸ φῂς εἶναι τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος, ἐγὼ δὲ ἀγνοῶ, σκεπτέον δή.
σκόπει, ἔφη.
ταῦτʼ ἔσται, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ. καί μοι εἰπέ· οὐ καὶ πείθεσθαι μέντοι τοῖς ἄρχουσιν δίκαιον φῂς εἶναι;
ἔγωγε. 339c
πότερον δὲ ἀναμάρτητοί εἰσιν οἱ ἄρχοντες ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἑκάσταις ἢ οἷοί τι καὶ ἁμαρτεῖν;
πάντως που, ἔφη, οἷοί τι καὶ ἁμαρτεῖν.
οὐκοῦν ἐπιχειροῦντες νόμους τιθέναι τοὺς μὲν ὀρθῶς τιθέασιν, τοὺς δέ τινας οὐκ ὀρθῶς;
οἶμαι ἔγωγε.
τὸ δὲ ὀρθῶς ἆρα τὸ τὰ συμφέροντά ἐστι τίθεσθαι ἑαυτοῖς, τὸ δὲ μὴ ὀρθῶς ἀσύμφορα; ἢ πῶς λέγεις;
οὕτως.
ἃ δʼ ἂν θῶνται ποιητέον τοῖς ἀρχομένοις, καὶ τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ δίκαιον;
πῶς γὰρ οὔ; 339d
οὐ μόνον ἄρα δίκαιόν ἐστιν κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος συμφέρον ποιεῖν ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὐναντίον, τὸ μὴ συμφέρον.
τί λέγεις σύ; ἔφη.
ἃ σὺ λέγεις, ἔμοιγε δοκῶ· σκοπῶμεν δὲ βέλτιον. οὐχ ὡμολόγηται τοὺς ἄρχοντας τοῖς ἀρχομένοις προστάττοντας ποιεῖν ἄττα ἐνίοτε διαμαρτάνειν τοῦ ἑαυτοῖς βελτίστου, ἃ δʼ ἂν προστάττωσιν οἱ ἄρχοντες δίκαιον εἶναι τοῖς ἀρχομένοις ποιεῖν; ταῦτʼ οὐχ ὡμολόγηται;
οἶμαι ἔγωγε, ἔφη. 339e
οἴου τοίνυν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, καὶ τὸ ἀσύμφορα ποιεῖν τοῖς ἄρχουσί τε καὶ κρείττοσι δίκαιον εἶναι ὡμολογῆσθαί σοι, ὅταν οἱ μὲν ἄρχοντες ἄκοντες κακὰ αὑτοῖς προστάττωσιν, τοῖς δὲ δίκαιον εἶναι φῇς ταῦτα ποιεῖν ἃ ἐκεῖνοι προσέταξαν —ἆρα τότε, ὦ σοφώτατε Θρασύμαχε, οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον συμβαίνειν αὐτὸ οὑτωσί, δίκαιον εἶναι ποιεῖν τοὐναντίον ἢ ὃ σὺ λέγεις; τὸ γὰρ τοῦ κρείττονος ἀσύμφορον δήπου προστάττεται τοῖς ἥττοσιν ποιεῖν.

Republic. Plato. ed. John Burnet. Oxford. 1905.

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Πολιτεία (Greek) (Platonis Opera Tomus IV: Tetralogia VIII. Burnet, John, editor. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1905.)

Translations (1)

Republic Perseus (Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vol. 5-6. Shorey, Paul, translator. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1935-37 (printing).) — 1.339 focus

[339] This, then, my good sir, is what I understand as the identical principle of justice that obtains in all states 339a —the advantage of the established government. This I presume you will admit holds power and is strong, so that, if one reasons rightly, it works out that the just is the same thing everywhere,¹ the advantage of the stronger. Now, said I, I have learned your meaning, but whether it is true or not I have to try to learn. The advantageous, then, is also your reply, Thrasymachus, to the question, what is the just—though you forbade me to give that answer. 339b But you add thereto that of the stronger. A trifling addition² perhaps you think it, he said. It is not yet clear³ whether it is a big one either; but that we must inquire whether what you say is true, is clear.⁴ For since I too admit that the just is something that is of advantage⁵—but you are for making an addition and affirm it to be the advantage of the stronger, while I don’t profess to know,⁶ we must pursue the inquiry. Inquire away, he said.
I will do so, said I. Tell me, then; you affirm also, do you not, that obedience to rulers is just? 339c I do. May I ask whether the rulers in the various states are infallible⁷ or capable sometimes of error? Surely, he said, they are liable to err. Then in their attempts at legislation they enact some laws rightly and some not rightly, do they not? So I suppose. And by rightly we are to understand for their advantage, and by wrongly to their disadvantage? Do you mean that or not? That. But whatever they enact⁸ must be performed by their subjects and is justice? Of course. 339d Then on your theory it is just not only to do what is the advantage of the stronger but also the opposite, what is not to his advantage. What’s that you’re saying?⁹ he replied. What you yourself are saying,¹⁰ I think. Let us consider it more closely. Have we not agreed that the rulers in giving orders to the ruled sometimes mistake their own advantage, and that whatever the rulers enjoin is just for the subjects to perform? Was not that admitted? I think it was, he replied. 339e Then you will have to think,¹¹ I said, that to do what is disadvantageous to the rulers and the stronger has been admitted by you to be just in the case when the rulers unwittingly enjoin what is bad for themselves, while you affirm that it is just for the others to do what they enjoined. In that way does not this conclusion inevitably follow, my most sapient¹² Thrasymachus, that it is just to do the very opposite¹³ of what you say? For it is in that case surely the disadvantage of the stronger or superior that the inferior 340a are commanded to perform.

Commentary

Commentary on Plato, Republic (Plato. The Republic, Vol 1-2. Adam, James, editor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1902-1903.) focus

Πλάτωνος Πολιτεία . On the name, characters, and date of action of the dialogue, see Introd. §§ 1, 2, 3.

ταὐτὸν εἶναι δίκαιον . Herwerden would expunge ταὐτόν, but ταὐτὸν is not more otiose here than τὸ αὐτὸ below.

ξυμφέρον γέ τι . There is here a hint of the main purpose of the Republic, which is to prove that δίκαιον is ξυμφέρον in the truest sense for the individual and the state.

οὐ ‐‐ μέντοι . “In interrogationibus haec particula” ( μέντοι) “ita cum οὐ negatione coniungitur, ut gravissima sententiae vox intercedat, quo modo aliquis eis quae ex altero quaerit summam veritatis ingerit speciem” (Hoefer de part. Plat. p. 34). μέντοι is simply ‘of course,’ ‘surely’: ‘surely you regard it as just to obey the rulers, do you not?’ The idiom is frequent in Plato. The other examples of it (cited by Stallbaum) in the Republic are infra 346 A, VII 521 D, IX 581 A, 584 A, X 596 E.

πότερον δὲ ἀναμάρτητοι κτλ. The reasoning echoes that of 334 C above.

τιθέναι ‐‐ τίθεσθαι : we should expect τιθέναι in both cases, as the ἄρχοντες according to the theory we are discussing are κρείττονες and supreme as legislators: but the middle of personal interest is naturally used in combination with τὰ ξυμφέροντα ἑαυτοῖς: cf. infra 341 A.

τί λέγεις σύ ; a favourite eristic formula: see Ar. Clouds 1174 τοῦτο τοὐπιχώριον | ἀτεχνῶς ἐπανθεῖ, τὸ τί λέγεις σύ;

τοίνυν : not ‘therefore,’ but ‘also,’ a frequent use in Plato. In the Republic it occurs 29 times, according to Kugler de particulae τοι eiusque comp. ap. Pl. usu p. 34.

ὅταν οἱ μὲν ‐‐ τοῖς δέ (i.e. τοῖς ἀρχομένοις). These two clauses depend, not on ὡμολογῆσθαι, but on ποιεῖν: it is just to do τὰ ἀξύμφορα τοῖς ἄρχουσιν as often as the rulers unwillingly prescribe what is evil for themselves and so long as Thrasymachus says it is just for subjects to do what the rulers have prescribed. Desire for brevity and balance leads Plato to put both clauses under the government of ὅταν, although ‘since’ rather than ‘whenever’ is the more appropriate conjunction for introducing the second: for Thrasymachus does not sometimes but always assert that it is just to obey the rulers. The suggested reading φῄς for φῇς would require us to take τοῖς δέ κτλ. as an independent sentence, and leave μὲν in οἱ μέν without a corresponding δέ.

αὐτό is ‘the matter,’ ‘the case before us’: cf. IV 428 A ( αὐτῷ), VII 518 B ( αὐτῶν), 524 E ( αὐτῷ ), Theaet. 172 E al. The text has been needlessly suspected by Madvig and other critics.

οὑτωσί : not ‘in that case’ (Campbell), but (with Jowett) simply ‘thus,’ as explained in δίκαιον—λέγεις: cf. Ap. 26 E οὑτωσί σοι δοκῶ; οὐδένα νομίζω θεὸν εἶναι;

ναὶ μὰ Δία κτλ. The interlude is intended to mark that the first stage has been reached in the refutation of Thrasymachus.

Plato Republic 1.339

ed. John Burnet

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